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Spinoza on Human Purposiveness and Mental Causation

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Abstract

Despite Spinoza's reputation as a thoroughgoing critic of teleology, in recent years a number of scholars have argued convincingly that Spinoza does not wish to eliminate teleological explanations altogether. Recent interpretative debates have focused on a more recalcitrant problem: whether Spinoza has the resources to allow for the causal efficacy of representational content. In this paper I present the problem of mental causation for Spinoza and consider two recent attempts to respond to the problem on Spinoza's behalf. While these interpretations certainly shed some light on Spinoza's account of cognitive economy, I argue that both fail to point the way out of the problem because they fail to differentiate between two forms of representation, one of which is causally efficacious, one of which is not. I close by suggesting that there is some reason to believe that Spinoza's account of mind avoids some of the problems typically associated with mental causation.

Spinoza gilt zwar als kompromissloser Kritiker der Teleologie, aber in den letzten Jahren haben mehrere Philosophiehistoriker überzeugend dafür argumentiert, dass er keineswegs alle teleologischen Erklärungen verabschieden möchte. Neuere Interpretationsdebatten haben sich auf ein hartnäckigeres Problem konzentriert: Verfügt Spinoza über die Ressourcen, um die kausale Wirksamkeit des repräsentationalen Inhalts zuzulassen? In diesem Aufsatz stelle ich das Problem der geistigen Verursachung bei Spinoza dar und betrachte zwei neuere Versuche, im Sinne Spinozas auf dieses Problem einzugehen. Diese Interpretationen werfen sicherlich Licht auf Spinozas Auffassung von kognitiver Sparsamkeit, aber ich argumentiere, dass beide darin scheitern, einen Ausweg aus diesem Problem aufzuzeigen, da es beide versäumen, zwischen zwei Formen von Repräsentationen zu unterscheiden: einer kausal wirksamen und einer, die nicht wirksam ist. Es gibt Grund zur Überzeugung, so lege ich abschließend nahe, dass Spinozas Auffassung des Geistes einige der Probleme vermeidet, die typischerweise mit geistiger Verursachung verbunden sind.

Recent scholarship is divided over whether Spinoza can admit teleology into his mechanistic view of nature. Jonathan Bennett, the most prominent opponent of the teleological reading of Spinoza, contends that Spinoza advances a "nonteleological theory of human motivation" (Bennett 1984, 215). And, as if to convince us of the reasonableness and significance of his reading, he adds "miss that and you miss most of what is interesting in Part 3" (Bennett 1984, 215). In recent years, however, a number of scholars have argued fairly persuasively that Spinoza does *not* wish to eliminate teleological explanations altogether (Curley 1990; Della Rocca 1996; Garrett 1999; Manning 2002; Lin 2006). The focus of the discussion has since shifted to a particular problem raised by Bennett concerning mental causation, namely, whether Spinoza can allow for the causal efficacy

of the representational content of ideas. The central issue here is not *whether* Spinoza believed in human purposiveness, but whether he is *entitled* to such a view given some of views about causation, representation, and the relationship between mental and physical states.

In this paper I will present the problem of mental causation for Spinoza and consider two recent attempts to respond to the problem on Spinoza's behalf. While these interpretations shed some light on Spinoza's account of cognitive economy, I argue that both accounts fail to point the way out of the problem of mental causation. In order to overcome this problem one must differentiate between two kinds of representational states, one of which is causally efficacious, the other of which is not. I close by suggesting that, while his account of human purposiveness is not without its problems, Spinoza has the resources for avoiding some of the more conspicuous problems associated with mental causation.

1. The General Case for Human Purposiveness

Spinoza is widely remembered as a critic of teleological explanations. This reputation is due in large part to his acerbic commentary in appendix to *Ethics* I on why people persist in attributing a purpose to nature – why they "take refuge in the will of God, that is, the sanctuary of ignorance" (*E*I appendix, II/81).[1] Here, he states that "Nature has no end set before it, and all final causes are nothing but human fictions" (II/80). Bennett takes this claim as a wholesale denial of teleology; as he puts it, it "count[s] against any kind of teleology – against 'He raised his hand so as to shade his eyes' as well as against 'Elbows are formed like that so that men can raise their hands'" (Bennett 1984, 215).

However, Edwin Curley has argued that this passage should be interpreted to mean that "all final causes we are apt to ascribe to (God or) Nature are nothing but human fictions" (Curley 1990, 40). Curley's reading is not only philologically plausible, it is in keeping with the thrust of this appendix, which has as its target the end-directness of Nature as a whole, or divine providence, and not human purposiveness. Nowhere is this distinction more apparent than when Spinoza claims near the outset of the appendix that "all the prejudices I here undertake to expose depend on this one: that men commonly suppose that all natural things act, *as men do*, on account of an end" (*E*I appendix, II/78 – my emphasis). Spinoza insists that confusion about natural teleology arises in part because we assume that, because "men act always on account of an end, namely, on account of their advantage" (*E*I appendix, II/78), nature must also act for the sake of such an end. That is, he indicates quite clearly that humans *do* act purposively, even

[1] All references to the *Ethics* are to Spinoza 1985. I adopt the following abbreviations for the *Ethics*: Roman numerals refer to parts; "P" denotes proposition; "C" denotes corollary; "D" denotes definition; "dem." denotes demonstration; "S" denotes scholium (e.g., IIIP59S refers to *Ethics*, part III, proposition 59, scholium). All Latin passages refer to *Spinoza Opera*, ed. Carl Gebhardt, 4 vols. (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925). Citations like "II/80" refer to the volume and page number of the Gebhardt edition.

though nature as such does not. The tendency to attribute a purpose to nature as a whole is one obvious example of a prevalent misconception about teleology – in this case about the scope of teleological explanation – of which Spinoza seeks to disabuse readers.

The other chief example of confusion about final causes lies in the ordinary assumption that such causes play an explanatory role *over and above* efficient causes, as if final causes stood outside of, and guided, the flow of efficient causal events (Curley 1990, 44–46; Carriero 2005). In the passages where Spinoza criticizes final causes, he is not taking issue with human end-directedness *per se* – which, as we've seen, he evidently allows for – but with the supposition that final causes can be offered *in lieu of* efficient causes. Spinoza offers the following psychological explanation for why we tend to treat final causes as distinct from efficient causes: "[men] are conscious of their volitions and their appetite, and do not think, even in their dreams, of the causes by which they are disposed to wanting and willing, because they are ignorant of [those causes]" (II/78). When we act for reasons – that is, when we act purposively – we often fail to regard our intentions as themselves the products of efficient causes. Spinoza, however, encourages us to see final causes as embedded within the nexus of efficient causes. Indeed, he explains in the preface to *Ethics* IV that a final cause is but a species of efficient cause:

> What is called a final cause is nothing but a human appetite in so far as it is considered as a principle, or primary cause, of some thing. For example, when we say that habitation was the final cause of this or that house, surely we understand nothing but that a man, because he imagined the conveniences of domestic life, had an appetite to build a house. So habitation, insofar as it is considered as a final cause, is nothing more than this singular appetite. It is really an efficient cause, which is considered as a first cause, because men are commonly ignorant of the causes of their appetites (II/207).

One's imagination of conveniences and one's appetite for such comforts are the impulses – or efficient causes – that leads to the construction the house.[2]

In exposing these two confusions that underlie ordinary assumptions about natural teleology, we gain two corresponding insights about Spinoza's view of human purposiveness. First, as we have said, Spinoza evidently accepts the view that human act purposively, since he relies on this point to explain why we are inclined to falsely attribute purposiveness to nature. Second, he wishes to dispel the assumption that final causes stand outside of the efficient causal chain, as if acting for a purpose were the same as being free from antecedent determination by efficient causes.[3] Human beings act for ends; but these ends are to be understood

[2] Bennett admits that this passage "embarrasses [his] interpretation," but he doesn't concede defeat, offering a few ways to explain away this passage, including the rather anemic suggestion that "perhaps Spinoza is saying something he ought not to have said; that happens often enough" (Bennett 1984, 224).

[3] Bennett shrugs off these passages from the appendix to Part I as a muddle, but I think the muddle is Bennett's own. Bennett scolds Spinoza for "link[ing] teleology and radical freedom" (1984, 216), but Spinoza is precisely trying to drive a wedge between these ideas. Spinoza seeks to establish a reputable conception of teleology by integrating it into an efficient causal framework.

as appetites, which are themselves efficient causes. If this is right, Spinoza was not seeking to eliminate teleological explanations *tout court*. Rather, he was seeking emend our understanding of final cause.

But even if Spinoza can show that final causes are appetites, and that they are efficient causes with intentional content[4], this does not yet vindicate Spinoza's belief in human purposiveness. The legitimacy of teleological explanations requires not just that we act from states with intentional properties, it requires that those states are causally efficacious in virtue of their intentional or representational properties. Fred Dretske's well-known opera singer example helps to illustrate the point here (Dretske 1988, 80). A soprano's aria is meaningful (i.e., intentional), and this aria might cause the glass to break, but it isn't in virtue of the meaning of the aria that the glass breaks. If Spinoza's account of teleology is to amount to more than the "half-hearted affair" that Bennett ascribes to him (Bennett 1990, 53), it must be shown that the representational content of mental states can itself be causally efficacious.

2. Bennett's Argument for Epiphenomenalism

Bennett's argument for epiphenomenalism, or the view that mental states are causally otiose, hinges on a few basic premises that he thinks find support in Spinoza's writing. One of the central theses is that "it is not credible that intrinsic states of mind that are isomorphic with states of the brain should also be systematically connected with the representative content of states of mind" (Bennett 1990, 55). This is because the representational content of ideas depends upon the *relational* features of the state such as its causal history. Now, if we accept that the causal activity of bodies can be explained in terms of intrinsic properties, and if the causal powers of ideas parallel the causal powers of bodies (IIP7S), it seems to follow that the representational properties of ideas cannot be among the causal properties. Martin Lin has helpfully reconstructed the argument in the following way:

1. The causal powers of bodies depend [*exclusively*][5] on intrinsic properties such as size, shape, and motion.

[4] There is good reason to suppose that Spinoza believes that *all* appetites have some kind of intentional content. When we look at the passages (in the early part of *Ethics* III) in which Spinoza introduces the notion of appetite, we find an account of appetite that is by all measures intentional. We get our first clear explanation of the notion of appetite [*Appetitus*] in IIIP9S, where we learn that one's appetite is equivalent to one's striving (considered under *both* the attributes of mind and body). And one's striving is evidently intentional, or end-directed, in the simple sense that one is striving *for* something. Specifically, the striving that is the actual essence of all singular things is striving "to persevere in [one's] being" (IIIP6, IIIP7, passim); that is, there is a certain aim that is intrinsic to our striving, namely, self-preservation. And from IIIP12 forward Spinoza deploys the notion of striving in a way that, much to Bennett's chagrin, is unmistakably intentional. Moreover, all specific desires – Desire [*Cupiditas*] being defined as "appetite together with consciousness of the appetite" (IIIP9S) – that arise out of one's general striving, take an object as well – they are intentional.

[5] I have added this qualification to Lin's formulation.

2. There is a parallelism between bodies and their properties and relations on the one hand and ideas and their properties and relations on the other. (IIP7)
3. The causal powers of ideas depend [*exclusively*] on intrinsic properties (1 and 2)
4. The representational properties of ideas depend upon their causal history. (IIP16D and IIPC1)
5. Causal history is an extrinsic property.
6. Therefore, the causal powers of ideas do not depend upon their representational properties. (3, 4, and 5) (Lin 2006, 330).

Since, as I noted above, teleological explanations depend on the efficacy of representational properties, (6) seems to rule out teleological explanations of human behavior. In the next section I will consider two recent attempts to save Spinoza from Bennett's charge of epiphenomenalism. I will suggest that, although these interpretations display a good deal of ingenuity and resourcefulness, they fail to meet the challenge.

3. Two Attempts to Save Mental Causation in Spinoza

3.1 *Manning's Defense*

Richard Manning has pointed out that if representational content is epiphenomenal, Spinoza's metaphysics is in serious trouble, as such a thesis would not only rule out teleological explanation, it would also appear to rule out garden-variety mind-mind ("content-to-content") causation. But surely there are times when the content of one idea seems to explain the production of another idea, as when my perceiving Hamentashen in a bakery reminds me of my grandmother, who seemed always to have these pastries on hand. And it is clear, both from Spinoza's commitment to human purposiveness and from his commitment to psychological associationism that Spinoza believes in the causal efficacy of representational states. If Spinoza is to be rescued from incoherence, one of the premises in the argument above must be challenged. But which one?

Manning offers a rather intriguing interpretation of Spinoza's theory of representation that would call into question premise (5), namely, the claim that causal history is an extrinsic property. Manning's central claim here is that the intrinsic properties of bodies or modes of bodies uniquely pick out the natures of the external bodies that have acted on them,[6] and the intrinsic properties of the ideas that parallel these bodies or modes of bodies uniquely represent the natures of these external bodies. This calls (5) into question, since the claim here is that a thing's causal history is *not* extrinsic to it; or, at least, a thing's causal history supervenes on one's intrinsic properties in such a way that these intrinsic proper-

[6] "Extended effects bear a distinctive, intrinsic indicator of their causes" (Manning 2002, 202).

ties "uniquely determine"[7] their own provenance. Causal history can, as it were, be read off of the intrinsic properties of a body. So, while Manning admits that (4) the representational properties of ideas depend upon their causal history, the fact that causal histories are reflected in the intrinsic properties of states allows Spinoza to regard the representational states of ideas as intrinsic properties. At the very least, this opens the door for the possibility of conceiving of the representational states of ideas as the parallel counterparts to the intrinsic causal properties of bodies.

Manning's attempt to show that, for Spinoza, intrinsic states reflect their causal history turns in large part on his interpretation of Spinoza's causal account of representation. According to Spinoza, the idea of any mode of body represents *both* one's own body (directly) and the external body (indirectly) with which one's body has interacted to produce this mode (IIP16 and IIP16C1). Manning rightly notes that the case for indirect representation of the external cause (henceforth: causal theory of representation) is grounded in Spinoza's claim that ideas of modes of bodies *involve* the nature of external (causally impacting) bodies. The question of what it means for x to *involve* [*involvere*] y is quite perplexing; nor does it help that Spinoza's demonstration here points us back to the notoriously ambiguous 1A4, which reads: "the knowledge of an effect depends on, and involves, the knowledge of its cause" (II/46). Manning's suggestion is that we understand "x involves y" to mean something like "x is determined to be as it is (in part) by the nature of y, and in a way that reflects y's distinctive nature" (Manning 2002, 197).

Ultimately, though, Manning concludes that Spinoza's account is implausible, since "no matter how robust a conception of the connection between causes and effects – no matter how distinctively causes marks their effects – the intrinsic structure of an internal effect is still insufficient to individuate its cause, and hence its representational content" (Manning 2002, 203). The idea that there could be intrinsic, determinate markers of a thing's causal history may help Spinoza avoid the charge of epiphenomenalism, but it commits him to a deeply implausible theory of representation.

3.2 *Lin's Defense*

Martin Lin offers a response to Bennett that resembles Manning's in certain respects. Like Manning, Lin argues that passive affects, or modes of the body (IIID3), are inextricably tied to, and expressive of, their sources. And, like Manning, Lin appeals to Spinoza's causal theory of representation (IIP16 and IIP16C1) in support of this view of the mapping relationship between affects and their causes. But despite these resemblances, Lin's account differs from Manning's in several important ways. I will focus on these differences.

First, whereas Manning rejects thesis (5), Lin accepts (5), but rejects (3) and (1). That is, Manning claims that Spinoza accepts that the causal power of ideas depend only on the intrinsic properties of those ideas, but contends that causal

[7] While Manning relies heavily on this locution, he notes that the sense in which intrinsic physical states determine their cause is "logical, not … causal or epistemic" (Manning 2002, 201).

histories supervene on the intrinsic properties of those ideas. Lin, by contrast, maintains that representational content depends on extrinsic features, such as causal histories, but argues that Spinoza is committed to the following three claims:

(i) "The causal powers of passive affects are at least partially individuated by extrinsic properties of those affects." (Lin 2006, 337)

(ii) "Many of the ideas that motivate and guide action are passive affects on Spinoza's account." (Lin 2006, 337)

(iii) "The factors that serve to individuate the causal powers of ideas are the very same factors that individuate the contents of ideas." (Lin 2006, 337)

These three theses help to establish that extrinsic properties can both determine the content of ideas and causally contribute to subsequent modes of behavior. The key claims here are (i) and (iii). Thesis (i) depends on an antecedent point about the individuation of passive affects. Spinoza makes it clear in several places that he takes affects to be widely individuated. Building on the causal theory of representation and the claim that modes of body reflect the natures of their causes, Spinoza maintains that "the nature of each passion must necessarily be so explained that the nature of the object by which we are affected is expressed. For example, the joy arising from A involves the nature of object A, that arising from object B involves the nature of object B, and so these two affects of joy are by nature different, *because they arise from causes of a different nature*" (IIIP56dem – my emphasis). Affect types are individuated by extrinsic cause types.

Lin is also able to show that these extrinsic causes do not merely individuate passive affects, they also individuate the causal powers of these affects. This follows fairly directly from the preceding point, since among the passive affects that are individuated widely by external causes are various species of desire (IIIP56dem). Desires or appetites (IIIP9) are partially causally responsible for actions.[8] But the causal power of the particular affects that beget action derives not just from one's own power, but from the "power of an external cause paired [*comparata*] with our own" (IVP5D – Lin's translation). From this it follows that the causal power of affects are, in part, individuated by their extrinsic causes, which is just what (i) states. Indeed, at least some of the time, the very same extrinsic factors, namely the natures of the external causes that act on our bodies to produce the affects, individuate both the contents of the affects and their causal powers of the affects, which is essentially the claim of (iii).

[8] It should be noted that I am using "action" here in the ordinary, non-technical sense, as opposed to Spinoza's technical notion of action as adequately causing some effect (IIIP3).

4. Two Types of Representational Content

From here Lin is able to show that the contents and the causal powers of one's affects do not merely have a common source, affects are causally efficacious *because* of what they express or represent.[9] For instance, suppose that I see someone holding an ice cream cone. This perception induces in me a desire for ice cream, which ultimately results in my buying an ice cream cone. Here, I form a desire *for* ice cream that is individuated by its cause (viz., the ice cream that I perceived), and it is in virtue of representing this cause that I, in turn, move to purchase ice cream.

If successful, the account offered by Lin would not just block Bennett's objection and allow for the possibility of representational efficacy, it would supply a positive account of how representational content can contribute to the production of an effect. Lin's account, thus, goes further than Manning's as an attempted vindication of teleological explanations in Spinoza.

The problem with this account, as Lin sees it, is that an affect is supposed not only to represent its cause, it is also supposed to represent the *essence* of its cause – it is the *essence* of the cause that individuates the content and causal powers of the affect. This follows from Spinoza's commitment to what Lin calls the Causation Through Essence (CTE) thesis, which maintains that all effects follow from the essences of the causal bodies. And Lin, understandably, finds this thesis so implausible as to undermine the force of Spinoza's defense of human teleology (Lin 2006, 345).

4.1 *Distinguishing* De Dicto *from* De Re *Content*

While there is much to admire about Manning's and Lin's attempts to save Spinoza from the problem of mental causation, I believe that they share with Bennett the mistaken assumption that Spinoza has a univocal conception of (indirect) representational content. All three take Spinoza's account of representational content to be grounded in the causal account first offered in IIP16 and IIP16C1.[10] And the causal account of representation invites the problem of mental causation, since it takes content to be dependent on the causes of passive affects, and these causes are extrinsic to the body.

I want to argue that the way out of the problem of mental causation is to see that Spinoza has a two-fold account of representational content. In addition to the causal account, which gives us the *de re* content of an idea, Spinoza adopts another

[9] Once Lin goes further to show that to "express the nature" of the individuating external cause is to *represent* that cause (as he puts it, "expression constitutes perception" [2006, 342]), he is able to show that representational content is causally efficacious: to *represent* x is, in part, to produce effects (or behave) on account of the *representation* of x.

[10] Almost all of the scholarship from the last forty years has focused on the causal account of representation. See, for instance, Daisie Radner 1971. Margaret Wilson follows Radner in claiming that, according to Spinoza, "a 'mind' 'represents' something just in case its body is causally affected by that thing" (Wilson 1999, 131). In what follows I shall urge that we not accord hegemonic significance to the causal account.

account of representation content, which provides us with the *de dicto* content.[11] And while the *de re* content depends on extrinsic or relational properties, the *de dicto* content does not. *De dicto* content, then, does not encounter the same problems concerning causal efficacy. So one can accept that content is externally fixed in one sense, while at the same time admitting that content in another sense is an intrinsic property that can do causal work.

4.2 *Prima Facie Evidence for Dual Theory of Representation*

To see that there must be more to Spinoza's conception of representational content than what one finds in the causal account, let's return for a moment to Manning's account. Manning's interpretation turns on the claim that affect-types are always reflective of, and tied to, the natures of their causes, such that "the recurrence of a mode type depends causally on the original interaction" (Manning 2002, 200). This is based, of course, on the causal theory of representation: affect x represents (indirectly) y iff x is *caused by* y.

If this exhausted Spinoza's account of representational content, his account would be far more defective than Manning suggests. For instance, if images always represent their causes, or (indirect) objects, and if this were Spinoza's only account of representation, one could never misrepresent the (indirect) object of our affects. And any theory of representation that precludes misrepresentation is deeply impoverished (see Dretske 1986). Fortunately, though, we should not ascribe such a view to Spinoza. Misrepresentation is not only possible on his account, it is prevalent. This gives us *prima facie* grounds to believe that Spinoza's account of representation is, at the very least, more complicated than the causal theory suggests.

Moreover, both Manning and Lin maintain that because the representational contents of ideas are tied to their causes, in order to be in a particular representational state, an affect must have been produced by a particular type of external body: tokens of a particular representational state type must be caused by the same external body type. For Lin, this is suggested by the fact that passive affects and their causal powers are "individuated widely because they *express the natures of their external causes*" (Lin 2006, 341). If an affect were produced by a body of a different nature, it would in fact *be* a different affect with different causal powers. Manning is even more explicit about this, claiming that "for Spinoza, the only way for a state of that type to arise in the body is by interaction with that specific external body" (Manning 2002, 200).

But despite Manning's insistence that "Spinoza does not discuss the case in which a token state of the same type as that resulting from an interaction with

[11] Here I am following Dretske (1988, 73ff.) in distinguishing between the the *de re* and *de dicto* content of beliefs. Dretske construes the distinction thusly: "A great many representational contents are of [the] *de re* variety. There is a representation *of* the tank as being half full, *of* an animal as being lame or sick, *of* a doorbutton as being depressed, *of* a cat as being up a tree ... These are called *de re* contents because the things (*re*) about which a comment is made is determined by nonrepresentational means, by means other than *how* the item is represented" (1988, 73). By contrast, some representational states have "*de dicto* content, a content whose reference is determined by *how* it is represented" (ibid.).

a given body occurs without the causal influence of that body" (Manning 2002, 200), it seems that that is precisely what Spinoza is allowing for in IIP17Cdem.

> While external bodies so determine the fluid parts of the human body that they often thrust against the softer parts, they change (by Post. 5) their surfaces with the result (see A2″ after L3) that they are reflected from it in another way than they used to be before, and still later, when the fluid parts, by their spontaneous motion, encounter those new surfaces, they are reflected in the same way as when they were driven against those surfaces by the external bodies. Consequently, while, thus reflected, they continue to move, they will affect the human body with the same mode, concerning which the mind (by P12) will think again, that is (by P17), the mind will again regard the external body as present; this will happen as often as the fluid parts of the human body encounter the same surfaces by their spontaneous motion. So although the external bodies by which the human body has once been affected do not exist, the mind will still regard them as present, as often as this action of the body is repeated (IIP17C dem.).

This passage reveals how non-veridical imaginings are possible.[12] The account that he gives is not unlike Descartes' explanation of what appear to be mistakes of nature (e.g., dropsy and phantom limb pain) in the *Sixth Meditation* (AT VII/85–89): a bodily state that is typically, or has been historically, produced by a particular type of external stimulus can be induced by some other (e.g., "spontaneous"[13]) motion to go into the same state. This passage tells decisively against Manning's claim that "the only way for a state of that type to arise in the body is by interaction with that specific external body" (Manning 2002, 200). The images, or affections, of the human body are constituted by the motion and rest of the various (hard, soft, and fluid) parts of the body, and these same motions – that is, the same image (IIP17Cdem.) – can be triggered by different causes.[14]

[12] Spinoza himself concludes that the preceding account shows "how it can happen (as it often does) that we regard as present things which do not exist" (IIP17S). Since images are defined as "affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present to us" (IIP17S), and imagining is nothing more than regarding bodies through such images, it is clear that Spinoza takes himself to have shown in IIP17C dem., how non-veridical imaginings are possible. I belabor this point because it was challenged by an anonymous reviewer, who suggested that IIP17C dem. was in fact about memory, rather than non-veridical imaginings. While I disagree with the suggestion that this passage offers an account of memory – memory is in fact introduced in the scholium to the subsequent proposition – I would argue that on Spinoza's account memory is a special case of the more general phenomenon of non-veridical imaginings discussed here. While this characterization might sound odd, we must bear in mind that non-veridical imaginings are not the same as errors, which occur only when the mind "is considered to lack an idea which excludes the existence of those things which it imagines to be present to it" (IIP17S). Memory generally includes both the non-veridical imagining and the idea that the thing that one is imagining (i.e., regarding as present) is not in fact now occuring.

[13] "Spontaneous motion" here means an internally produced motion, not an *uncaused* motion, which is philosophically incoherent, according to Spinoza.

[14] Don Garrett illustrates this point in the following way: "Consider, for example, the change in internal state that occurs when an apple is dropped and becomes slightly bruised. The state is, according to Spinoza, due partly to the nature of the apple, as an individual self-preserving mechanism: partly to the nature of its parts; and partly to the external causes that operated on it. But there are *many* combinations of internal and external causes that could produce this same state or affection; merely from the bruise, one could discern very little about its causes, either internal or external" (2008, 21).

Now, one could insist, clinging to the notion of wide individuation, that even if the motions of my body are the same when produced by x and y, the affects are actually distinct in the two cases – the former is *of* x, and the latter is *of* y. In a certain sense – in the *de re* sense (deployed, for instance, in IIIP56) – that is correct. But to insist on this conception of representation as *the* conception of representation is to invite the causal efficacy problem, since in this scenario the source of these two identical motion/rest states seems to have no impact on their causal powers. Whether or not Peter is present, if Paul's body is affected as it is in Peter's presence, then – barring the intervention of some other idea that excludes Peter's presence – Paul will behave as though Peter were there. In short, even if the content of an affect is in *some respect* determined by its source, we shouldn't regard this as exhausting Spinoza's account of representational content, lest we wish to concede that representational content is causally otiose.

There is one final reason why we should be wary of according too much significance to the causal theory of representation, which is that it rests on a relation that is not representational in any ordinary sense. Our affects represent extrinsic causes because these modes of body "involve the nature" of the external body (IIP16). But what does it mean for A to involve [*involvere*] the nature of B? Generally, Spinoza seems to take this relation to mean something like logical or conceptual entailment: "... to say that A must involve the Concept of B is the same as to say that A cannot be conceived without B" (IIP49dem). For A to involve B is for A to contain information that implicates B[15]. An idea of a triangle *involves* that idea of a figure with interior angles that add up to 180°. The latter information in contained in, and entailed by, the former idea. Strange as it may sound, Spinoza seems to think that when one's idea A logically entails, or involves, idea B, it is appropriate to claim that one has an idea *of* B in one's mind. One sees this, for instance, when Spinoza moves from the claim that each idea of body "involves an eternal infinite essence of God" (IIP45) to the claim that "the human mind has an adequate knowledge of God's eternal and infinite essence" (IIP47).

There are several things to highlight here. First, when one has an idea of B because an affect *involves* B (or B's nature) there is no suggestion that one actually *grasps* B. Our minds represent many things of which we are totally unaware, and which have no apparent impact on our behavior.[16] So, despite the fact that we have in our minds adequate ideas of God, few people accurately apprehend this idea. To put it somewhat paradoxically: we often misrepresent something that we represent perfectly accurately. The paradox dissolves, however, when we separate out two senses of representation. The first sense of representation, the one captured by the causal account, tells us what is conceptually available to the mind, whereas the second sense tells us what the mind apprehends. This lends further support to the view that there is more to Spinoza's account of representation than what one

[15] Don Garrett suggests that we understand "involve" to mean something like "implicate" (forthcoming).

[16] If one needs further evidence of this point, one need only consider that Spinoza claims that "nothing can happen in [the] body which is not perceived by the mind" (IIP12), which surely does not imply that one is consciously aware of everything that is happening in the body.

could glean from the causal account. Moreover, if we are looking to identify which forms of representation are causally efficacious, it seems that we must appeal to what the mind actually apprehends, not what is merely conceptually available. So, if we want to overcome the problem of mental causation, we are likely going to have to extract from Spinoza's philosophy another model of representation, which is precisely what I will do in the next section.

5. Towards an Account of Mental Causation in Spinoza

In this section I will maintain that Spinoza has an account of representational content according to which the representational features of ideas are not directly dependent on the causal history of those ideas. That is, I wish to reject premise (4) of the argument above.[17] Don Garrett suggested, but did not develop, something along these lines in "Teleological Explanation in Spinoza and Early Modern Rationalism," claiming that Spinoza might want to distinguish between wide and narrow content, with narrow content doing the causal work (Garrett 1999, 325). To believe in narrow content is to believe that two beings in intrinsically identical states will have the same idea-types – that is, there will be something that their ideas are *about* that will be shared, even if they stand in different relations to other objects.[18] If we are confining ourselves to narrow content here, we must reject out of hand the scenario that Bennett thinks that Spinoza allows for, in which "animals x and y are now intrinsically exactly like one another and unlike z, whereas x and z are exactly alike in their mental contents and in that respect unlike y" (Bennett 1990, 54) – if x and y are intrinsically alike, then they must also be exactly alike in their contents.

In order to show why (4) may be rejected, so that we may in turn defend the causal efficacy of representational content, we must establish that such content co-varies with the intrinsic, causal features of bodies. A key text in support of this relationship of co-variation is IIP17Cdem., which, we will recall (see above), discusses the case where the "fluid parts" of the body are reflected in the same

[17] Once we disambiguate these two senses of representational content, we can reinterpret the argument in a way that avoids the problem of causal efficacy.

1. The causal powers of bodies depend [*exclusively*] on intrinsic properties such as size, shape, and motion.
2. There is a parallelism between bodies and their properties and relations on the one hand and ideas and their properties and relations on the other. (IIP7)
3. The causal powers of ideas depend [*exclusively*] on intrinsic properties (1 and 2)
4. The *de re* representational properties of ideas depend upon their causal history. (IIP16D and C1)
5. Causal history is an extrinsic property.
6. Therefore, the causal powers of ideas do not depend upon their *de re* representational properties. (3, 4, and 5).

The revised argument in no way precludes the causal powers of *de dicto* content.

[18] This assumes that it is conceivable that two beings could have different relations to other bodies and still be in the same intrinsic state – Manning would claim that Spinoza denies this possibility.

way by distinct stimuli. Spinoza makes it clear here that sameness of physical motion implies sameness of content: whenever one is in a particular physical state, and so (by IIP7) whenever one is in intrinsically the same mental state, one will have the same representational content.

One finds additional support for such this reading elsewhere. Consider, for instance, Spinoza's discussion of image-formation in IIP40S. In IIP40S, Spinoza claims that *how* we imagine things – that is, the narrow (*de dicto*) content of these affects – is directly tied to the states of our body. The discussion here concerns universal images, or images of kinds (e.g., "Man, Horse, Dog, and the like"), and Spinoza's claim is that "these notions are not formed by all [NS: men] in the same way, but vary from one to another, in accordance with what the body has more often been affected by ... *each will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his body*" (II/121). In other words, even if two people have ideas about the same referent, the (*de dicto*) way in which they imagine that referent will be tied to the particular states of their bodies. This point evidently applies also to particular images, such as one's image of the sun. Spinoza claims that irrespective of whether or not one has true knowledge of the distance of the sun, one still cannot help but imagine it as near (IIP35S). We might wonder why it is that this particular imagistic content is so intractable as not to be displaced by new information. The answer is that this content is fixed by "an affection of our body" (IIP35S) over which we have no control. Of course, we can avoid error by countervailing this image with more powerful information, but we cannot cease to imagine the sun in this way so long as our bodies are similarly affected. How it is that we imagine the sun depends[19] entirely on the state of the body. This gives us our first thesis (T1):

T1: The narrow representational content of images maps onto intrinsic states of body.

In order to appreciate the implications of this thesis, we must say a bit more about Spinoza's theory of belief and error. Spinoza thinks that ideas are intrinsically dynamic.[20] The contrast here is with Descartes. Descartes famously claims in the *Fourth Meditation* that erroneous beliefs arise because judgment is the product of two faculties with disparate scopes: the intellect and the will. Specifically, error occurs when the will assents to that which the intellect does not properly apprehend. Spinoza rejects Descartes' account in a couple of revealing ways. First, he denies that there are "absolute faculties" of mind, such as "the will" or "the intellect" (IIP48S). Moreover, he claims that volitions are internal to the ideas themselves, in the form of affirmations or negations: "the idea of the triangle must involve this same affirmation, namely that its three angles equal two right

[19] Strictly speaking, of course, this is not a relationship of causal dependency, since "the body cannot determine the mind to thinking" (IIP2). Rather, I take dependency here to mean a sort of (conditional) logical dependency: if one is in physical state P, one must be in mental state M.

[20] For a full treatment of this claim, see Della Rocca 2003.

angles. So conversely, this idea of the triangle also can neither be nor be conceived without this affirmation" (IIP48S).[21]

The same principle obviously applies to images, which are a subset of ideas. This is evident from the way in which Spinoza defines images, which, as we have seen, are "the affections of the human body whose ideas *present external bodies as present to us*" (IIP17S – my emphasis). Images include both propositional content and a propositional attitude, namely, the regarding of the content as present. So, to imagine the sun is to affirm its existence (IIP35S). And this affirmative idea – which is at least belief-like,[22] if not an all-out belief – remains even when one knows better. The reason that this belief-like state is not itself a false judgment is that the mind may contain a countervailing image or idea that is more forceful than the image of the sun as near (IVP5–IVP17). So, one's belief – or dominant belief – may be correct even when the image is non-veridical.

From this it seems to follow that, while the causal activity of images may be obscured by the more powerful causal activity of other ideas, nevertheless the volitional power of these ideas is intrinsic to the images themselves, which, as we've said, co-vary with the intrinsic states of the body. This leads us to our next thesis:

T2: At least some of the causal powers of images map onto intrinsic states of body.

Perhaps it should not be surprising that the narrow representational contents of images and (some of) the causal powers of images *both* map onto the intrinsic states of body, since there is also reason to believe:

T3: The causal powers of images are inherent in their narrow representational content.

The claim here is that image-types have characteristic outputs, such that tokens of this type will produce predictable effects when joined to a conative system. Don Garrett has suggested something like this in a pair of recent papers.[23] He claims that Spinoza "is maintaining that a given internal state of a thing *represents* its external cause insofar as its production by that cause is able to play a role in determining the self-preserving behavior of a self-preserving individual."[24] As he

[21] The converse is never actually demonstrated, and it seems to contradict the asymmetrical portrayal of the idea/volition relationship that Spinoza offers at IIA3.

[22] I would not hesistate to regard such mental states as beliefs, since they are states that produce characteristic forms of output (e.g., inferences, overt behaviors, etc.) in the absence of countervailing beliefs. However, if one wishes to reserve the notion of "belief" for particularly salient, action-guiding mental states I have no objection to this, since, for the sake of this paper, nothing substantive hangs on this distinction. To avoid controversy, we may refer to imaginings as belief-like.

[23] Garrett 2008 and Garrett (forthcoming). This account helps to flesh out what Spinoza's conception of "narrow content" might look like. Part of what I am doing, then, is showing how Garrett's paper on teleology and his papers on representation might hang together.

[24] Garrett 2008, 22. Cf. "the idea of an internal affection of a body represents the external cause of the affection to the extent that the production of the affection by that cause is able to play a role in determining the self-preserving behavior of that thing" (Garrett [forthcoming]).

puts it elsewhere, an idea's "*primary* representational content is determined by the *manner* in which it directs or influences self-preservatory activity."[25] So, for instance, given that I am afraid of bears, the image that I have of a body in front of me is an image *of a bear* only if, other things being equal, this image elicits bear-avoidance behaviors. If it leads me to approach the animal gleefully, despite my paralyzing fear of bears, I must not be representing the bear *as* a bear. To simplify the story a bit, what an idea is (primarily) *about* can be identified in terms of what the idea *does* to direct a thing's striving.

The claim that, according to Spinoza, the contents of ideas are best understood as causal states requires a bit more explanation. Consider Spinoza's account of affects, which are a species of ideas (General Definition of the Affects, II/203). Spinoza makes it clear in his discussion of the affects in *Ethics* III that, because of our essential striving to persevere in our being, affects not only register changes in our power of action, they also, in the absence of intervening forces, lead to the production of behavior. Take for instance an affect like love. Love is a fairly *basic* affect for Spinoza. It is defined as "joy with the accompanying idea of an external cause" (IIIP13S). If one loves something, one will, other things being equal, seek to preserve or acquire that thing (IIIP12ff.).[26] Similar claims could be made concerning the other affects, which are nothing other than differentiated forms of joy, sadness, and striving, which are themselves *intrinsically* motivating, and so – barring impediments – intrinsically causal.

Now, as noted above, affects themselves are parasitic on mental content (IIA3). And because affective attitudes like love are always joined to some representational content (object), in order to have a love of Xs, one must have an idea of Xs. To love dogs is to have an idea, namely, a universal image of dogs. We may represent the affect in the following schematic way:

	Affective Attitude		*Image Content*
Affection:	Love	of	Dogs

Our affective attitudes piggyback on images and their content in such a way that when an image is invoked, the affective attitude too will be invoked. From this we get a further explanation of why affects are inherently causal: affects are complex mental states comprised of both conative/affective and cognitive properties that jointly produce actions. This is Spinoza's version of the Belief-Desire model of action. However, the affect-image "love of dogs" on its own will not produce behavior without an occurrent belief (e.g., present image). Based on what I've said about Spinoza's account of the imagination, we can see that when our bodies are in such a state that we have an image of a dog, we have – in effect – an occurrent belief. Here is how we might schematize this, in light of the fact that to imagine X is to regard X as present:

[25] Garrett forthcoming. I take it that Garrett understands "determined" here to be either logical (cf. Manning, *supra* note 17) or epistemological, rather than causal.

[26] We strive to imagine (and preserve) sources of joy [*Laetitia*] and to exclude from the imagination (destroy) sources of sadness (IIIP13).

	Epistemic Attitude	*Operator*	*Image Content*
Occurrent Belief:	I believe	that	there is a dog present before me.

When my body is stimulated such that my "dog" image is triggered (T1), I have a belief – or belief-like attitude (see reasoning behind T2) – that there is a dog in front of me. And when this image is triggered and joined with the universal image of dogs, my affective attitude towards this type of object is triggered. In the absence of interfering forces, the result will be *some* form of dog-caring, dog-pleasing or dog-preserving behavior towards the thing in front of me.

The upshot here is that the representational content of an idea will, in conjunction with the affective attitude that one takes towards the object, orient one's striving in specific ways, and will thus causally contribute to one's action.[27] The suggestion, then, is that the best way to think about narrow (*de dicto*) representational content for Spinoza is as that state which orients one's striving in particular ways – that is, as a functional, or causal, state. Ideas are best understood functionally, as states that produce such-and-such characteristics outputs when joined with particular affective attitudes. From this it follows that T3 – that contents are intrinsically efficacious – is not only true, it is a near tautology. And based on this understanding of T3, T4 falls out:

T4: The representational content of at least some ideas is causally efficacious.

This is precisely what we set out to show.

This account has the virtue of overcoming the problems faced by the causal (*de re*) account of representation. For instance, it indicates how misrepresentation might occur. This occurs, on Garrett's account, "when an idea is confused between several possible causes *and* the idea causes the mind to act in a way that would tend to be self-preserving if one of the other possible causes had been the actual cause" (Garrett 2008, 22n22). In such cases, the narrow (*de dicto*) content of an image causes one to respond in ways that are inappropriate given the actual external stimulus (i.e., *de re* content). It also avoids the causal efficacy problem without forcing Spinoza to abandon his thoroughgoing naturalism. However, the account that I have offered is schematic, at best, and in need of much further refinement. And it appears to be susceptible to some serious objections. I will close by briefly examining a couple of these objections.

[27] Consider Spinoza's example of Paul's idea of Peter (IIP17S). Relying on IIP17C, Spinoza shows that if the right conditions are produced in Paul's body, he will regard Peter as present, even if Peter's body does not cause Paul's body to go in this state, because Peter is, let's say, dead. If Paul is lying in bed in both cases and wants to engage Peter in some conversation, Paul will likely summon Peter by the bedside in either case.

6. Responding to Objections

One objection concerns the logical structure of functional explanations. If we understand an "idea of X" as that which, when combined with a desire for X, produces – *ceteris paribus* – X-directed behavior, then there is a conceptual link between the content and the outcome. But it is commonplace today to adopt the Humean thesis that causes are logically independent from their effects.[28] We may offer rough-and-ready explanations where the *explanans* is logically related to the *explanandum.* For instance, we may explain why a glass broke by citing its fragility (taking "fragility" to be a propensity to break under such-and-such conditions), or we may explain why Bill died by citing the poison that he ingested (taking "poison" to be a substance with a propensity to kill under such-and-such conditions). But, so the argument goes, these concepts will never figure into a rigorous, scientific explanation.[29] Be that as it may, Spinoza would flatly reject the Humean constraint on causation. Throughout *Ethics* I he insists that for B to be caused by A is for B to be conceived through A: causation actually *requires* conceptual dependence, or so it would appear. So the fact that the narrow (*de dicto*) contents of ideas are individuated in ways that logically connect them to behaviors thus in no way undermines the causal efficacy of such content.[30]

But even if Spinoza is able to avoid the logical independence problem by appealing to his rather idiosyncratic conception of causation, problems remain concerning how mental content, understood in terms of causal roles, can do any genuine explanatory work, especially given Spinoza's ostensible commitment to the basic tenets of mechanism. On the face of it, one might think that there is no real problem here: functional properties, like the representational content of mental states, supervene on intrinsic physical states like size, shape, and motion, so mechanistic and functionalist explanations can peaceably coexist.[31] But, while functional properties may be admitted into a mechanistic worldview, it is not clear that such properties can do any causal work. Jaegwon Kim, for instance, has forcibly argued that "functional properties, as second-order properties, do not bring new causal powers into the world: they do not have causal powers that go beyond the causal powers of their first-order realizers" (Kim 2000, 115–116). All

[28] For a discussion and critique of the way that this thesis has been wielded against reason-based explanations, see Donald Davidson 1980.

[29] See Bennett 1990, 56. For a response to Bennett, see Della Rocca 1996, 255–6.

[30] Another related concern about adopting a causal role account of content to explain how representational content is fixed is that such an account will wind up being viciously circular. Garrett presents and rebuffs this challenge in the following passage: "This interpretation of Spinoza bears some resemblance to a proposal by Ruth Barcan Marcus to the effect that *belief-that-p* should be understood in terms of *acting-as-if-p-were-true.* So stated, the analysis looks dangerously circular – and so it would be if *acting-as-if-p-were-true* had to be spelled out in terms of *acting-as-if-p-were-believed-to-be-true.* In order to avoid circularity, it is necessary to have some way to determine how a thing will, *ceteris paribus*, act if *p* is the case. But Spinoza's *conatus* doctrine provides just such a specification: given *p*, each thing will do, of the things genuinely within its power, and unless overcome by external causes, whichever is most conducive to its own preservation" (Garrett forthcoming).

[31] Carriero presents something along these lines in passing, in order to suggest that the problem of mental causation need not be taken so seriously (2005, 106).

of the causal work is being done at the base, subvenient level. Kim's argument pushes the causal efficacy challenge further than Bennett's in that it appears to apply even to causation through narrow representational content. The fulcrum of Kim's argument lies in the so-called "principle of explanatory exclusion," according to which "no event can be given more than one *complete* and *independent* explanation" (Kim 1997, 258; see also Kim 1993). According to Kim, if mechanistic explanations are entirely sufficient without appealing to mental contents, mental contents cannot do any independent work in explaining a given phenomenon.

Spinoza could reply by noting that his causal/explanatory barrier between thought and extension (IIIP2) requires that we distinguish between a physical event and its parallel mental event, in which case we are speaking of two distinct *explicanda*. And Kim himself admits that his argument does not vitiate a dual *explicanda* approach.

Still, one might not let Spinoza off so easily. After all, even if the "order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things" (IIP7), it might be thought that mental parallels are mere epiphenomenal shadows of the real causal work that is taking place at the physical, mechanistic level. And the functional construal of mental states helps to foster the impression that mental states are, as Kim puts it, "second-order," or derivative properties.

But this cannot be Spinoza's view. To claim that physical states are more basic than mental states would be to violate a central tenet of Spinoza's metaphysics, namely, his belief in the ontological parity of the attributes and modes of these attributes. Instead of thinking of physical properties as more basic than mental, representational properties, Spinoza exhorts us to see them as equiprimordial. Intentional causation and physical causation, and their distinct causal relata, mirror one another because they are two ways of describing one and the same thing. This is precisely what Spinoza suggests at IIIP2S: "All these things, indeed, show clearly that both the decision of the mind and the appetite and the determination of the body by nature exist together – or rather are one and the same thing, which we call a decision when it is considered under, and explained through, the attribute of thought, and which we call a determination when it is considered under the attribute of extension and deduced from the laws of motion and rest" (II/144).

But, one might insist, if mental states are understood functionally, it would seem that they must be second-order properties that are themselves constituted or realized by a set of first-order properties that give mental states there functional properties and do all of the real causal work. And the derivative nature of functional states can be seen from the fact that they can be multiply realized, or composed of different first-order properties. The first concern – namely that mental states, as functional states, must be ontologically derivative and causally otiose – raises an important challenge that will ultimately help us to clarify a point about Spinoza's account of mental states. It is true that if mental states were *nothing but* functional states, we might need to conclude that they depend on first-order realizers. However, Spinoza would maintain that mental states, and their contents, are ontologically basic, intrinsic states, despite the fact they are

individuated in functional terms. We pick out these states in terms of what they do, but this does not mean that they are *nothing more* than what they do.

As for the supposition that mental states must be derivative since they can be instantiated by different physical states, there is evidence that Spinoza would have denied multiple realizability. For instance, he maintains that "each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one from the essence of the other" (IIIP57). While we often use general language to describe mental content, the particular hues of the content will vary with the physical structure (ratio of motion and rest) of the thing. So, to use Spinoza's examples, we may think that an affect like "lust" can be realized by different structures in different animals, Spinoza insists that if we are being precise, we'll want to distinguish between, say, "equine lust" and "human lust" (IIIP57S).[32] So, too, we often talk as though two people can think about the same thing (shared content) despite the different activity taking place in their brains; but in reality, the content of their ideas will be different. We may say, crudely that two people are thinking *about* humanity, but the particular narrow content of their ideas will be distinct (IIP40S).[33] The appearance of multiple realizability arises only because our language is too coarse to capture the subtle inflections of mental content (see e.g., IIIP56S).[34] In fact, mental content and physical states state in a relationship of one-one co-variation.

Whether, ultimately, Spinoza's account of mental causation is compelling depends in part on the plausibility of other features of his thought – e.g., his account of causation and his account of the mind-body relationship. Much work, then, remains to be done for a full vindication. What I have tried to show here is simply that concerns that Spinoza is committed to epiphenomenalism can be dispelled; but this can only be accomplished once we clearly distinguish between two conceptions of representation at work in the *Ethics*.[35]

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[32] The individuation here will be very fine-grained, since structures are so specific.

[33] Such a concept is bound to "vary from one to another, in accordance with what the body has more often been affected by, and what the mine imagines or recollects more easily ... each will form universal images of things according to the disposition of his body" (IIP40S).

[34] In the *Ethics* Spinoza is not particularly interested in the nuances of content of affects, as making such minute distinctions is not a critical part of living well: "though there is a great difference between this or that affect of love, hate or desire for example, between the love of one's children and the love of one's wife, it is still not necessary for us to know these differences, nor to investigate the nature and origin of the affect further" (IIIP56S).

[35] This article grew out of a paper that I delivered to the *Boston University Teleology and Causation Workshop* several years ago. I wish to thank the organizers of this group, Charles Wolfe and Gal Kober, for providing a forum for developing my ideas on the topic of Spinoza and teleology. I am also indebted to Charles for providing many helpful comments on a more recent version of the paper. And, finally, I would like to thank the editors of this volume, Dominik Perler and Stephan Schmid, along with an anonymous reviewer for encouraging me to clarify a few important points.

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Hume on Force and Vivacity

A Teleological-Historical Interpretation

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Abstract

Hume seems to have discarded with final causes and teleology. However, his invocation of a pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas suggests otherwise. This paper takes Hume's general strategy of shifting to the external perspective into account, and argues that the seemingly internal property of force and vivacity are, in fact, functional-teleological properties. Force and vivacity bears many explanatory burdens: It explains the difference between imagination and memory, between conception and belief, and it establishes causal necessity. What kind of property is this supposed to be? We can answer this question by taking into account Hume's explanation of the way in which this very property is communicated in the cases of ideas of memory and belief, and of the function it performs in these cases. It will be argued that force and vivacity is not an intrinsic, phenomenal property of ideas. It is a relational and historical property. A major objective of the paper is the application of this interpretation from the case of ideas to the case of impression. What kind of history could transfer force and vivacity to impressions? Answer: natural history. By a careful examination of passages concerning innate capacities, passions, and animal instincts, we can make sense of the tenet that impressions have force and vivacity because of our natural history. It will be suggested that Hume's philosophy of mind is fit to integrate Darwinian Design as an explanatory corner-stone.

Hume, so scheint, ist ein scharfer Kritiker von Finalursachen und Teleologie. Seine häufig als ironisch missverstandene Berufung auf eine Art „prästabilierter Harmonie" zwischen Naturverläufen und Ideenabfolgen verweist jedoch auf eine andere Lesart. Der folgende Essay behauptet, indem er Humes explanatorische Strategie betont, etwa im Falle seiner berühmten Lösung der skeptischen Zweifele zur Kausalität zu einer externen Perspektive zu wechseln, dass es sich bei der scheinbar geistinternen Eigenschaft „Kraft und Lebendigkeit" tatsächlich um eine teleologisch-historische Eigenschaft handelt. Kraft und Lebendigkeit leisten in Humes Philosophie des Geistes eine große Erklärungsarbeit: Sie erklären den Unterscheid zwischen Vorstellung und Erinnerung, zwischen Vorstellung und Überzeugung, und sie stellen die wesentliche Zutat der kausalen Notwendigkeit dar. Doch um welche Art Eigenschaft handelt es sich? Diese Frage kann mit Blick auf Humes Ausführung darüber beantwortet werden, wie diese Eigenschaft auf Ideen der Erinnerung und auf Überzeugungsideen übertragen wird, und v.a. mit Blick auf die Funktion, die diese Eigenschaft übernimmt. Es soll gezeigt werden, dass es sich bei Kraft und Lebendigkeit um keine intrinsische, phänomenale Eigenschaft von Ideen handelt, sondern um eine relationale, historische Eigenschaft. Ein wichtiges Ziel des Essays besteht darin, diese Deutung von Ideen auf Eindrücke zu übertragen. Inwiefern kann es sich bei der Kraft und Lebendigkeit von Eindrücken um eine relationale und historische Eigenschaft handeln? Die Antwort findet sich in der Naturgeschichte,