We argue that the mathematization of science should be understood as a normative activity of advocating for a particular methodology with its own criteria for evaluating good research. As a case study, we examine the mathematization of taxonomic classification in systematic biology. We show how mathematization is a normative activity by contrasting its distinctive features in numerical taxonomy in the 1960s with an earlier reform advocated by Ernst Mayr starting in the 1940s. Both Mayr and the numerical taxonomists sought to formalize the work of classification, but Mayr introduced a qualitative formalism based on human judgment for determining the taxonomic rank of populations, while the numerical taxonomists introduced a quantitative formalism based on automated procedures for computing classifications. The key contrast between Mayr and the numerical taxonomists is how they conceptualized the temporal structure of the workflow of classification, specifically where they allowed meta-level discourse about difficulties in producing the classification.

1. Introduction

Is mathematizing practice the best way to achieve the aims of science? Answering this is crucial to evaluating how computer technology is changing science. More frequently, though, philosophers and scientists have sought to answer the question, “Why is mathematics so useful for science?” The physicist Eugene Wigner famously attempted to account for the “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” in terms of metaphysical correspondences between nature and reason (Wigner, 1960). Philosophers of science have also examined the “indispensability” of mathematics for science and the implications this may have for the existence of mathematical objects (Colyvan, 2014).

Although superficially similar, the two questions we posed differ profoundly in the assumptions they bring to understanding the place of mathematics in science. The second question views mathematics as a body of knowledge and practice more or less autonomous from science. Penelope Maddy, for example, has argued that we should treat the standards for research in mathematics as distinct from science (Maddy, 1997). Applying math to science then typically depends on mapping an abstract mathematical structure onto a concrete empirical scenario. Baker (2012), for instance, presupposes this sort of mapping relationship in evaluating what it means for mathematics to be indispensable for a scientific explanation. Given this starting point, explaining the usefulness of mathematics becomes a problem of explaining why and how this mapping holds between pre-existing mathematical and scientific objects.

Yet this view of math as autonomous from science is in fact a fairly recent historical development, and represents only a partial account of the overall relationship between math and science. Our present image of mathematics as a pure, abstract, and autonomous activity originated out of particular epistemic problems facing mathematicians a hundred years ago, such as confusions over the nature of physical space in conjunction with geometric reasoning (Corry, 2006; also see Wilson, 2006). Similarly, historian Jeremy Gray has argued that math underwent a modernist transformation in the early twentieth century analogous to modern art or music (Gray, 2008). It would be a mistake to take this image of math as eternal, or to emphasize...
the successes that motivate it without paying attention to the fail- ures that continue to drive math to change and grow.

By contrast, the first question we posed foregrounds how math ematization is an inherently normative, dynamic, and institutional activity that alters the proper conduct of science. The question fo cuses on how the work of mathematization changes the doing of science and does not presuppose facts about the general success or failure of mathematization. Rather, it highlights how mathemat ization transforms the way scientists themselves judge success and failure. Influence can also flow in the other direction, as math ematics changes from its interaction with science—consider, for example, the importance of genetics (and eugenics) and Brownian motion for the development of statistics. (For the case of genetics, see Stigler, 2010).

From this practical perspective, mathematization is a project of institution-building or reform carried out by certain scientists within a community with regard to certain aspects of their work, often in opposition to other scientists within the community. It re quires making the case that things should be done this way, i.e. mathematically, and not as they were done in the past. In this manner, mathematization is an historical process that incorporates cognitive work by scientists to interpret, articulate, and argue for mathematical methods in a concrete organizational context. Studying scientists’ practices of mathematization therefore offers a way to investigate its pros and cons: how do its advocates and opponents make their cases, what resources do they draw upon, and how are their efforts judged over time by other scientists? We believe this represents a rigorous way of investigating the ongoing relationship between math and science, including where they are indistinguishable or overlap.

The normative structure of mathematization is thus organized around ideal and realization. Scientists draw on outside conceptual resources, such as a positivist theory of reason, to specify a norma tive ideal for their practices. In the case we will consider from sys tematic biology, the ideal describes what should hold true of classifications as a result of how they are made. Given this, there remains the task of realizing it in practice. Ensuring this happens is the charge of methodology. We can separate this into at least two parts: (1) stipulating how the ideal should be realized and (2) providing means to validate that it has. The way that method ology represents practice reflects both of these subtasks, in that the actions that are most important to stipulate are also the most important to validate (not that they are always possible or easy to track). Moreover, the development of new tests reflects scientis ts’ growing knowledge about sources of failure in the stipulated method that have to be recognized and corrected. In this way, we can track the process of mathematization by studying how scientists revise their methodology to account for important sources of error that obstruct their ability to realize the ideal. We draw here on re cent work by James Griesemer, who analyzes theories as tracking de vices (Griesemer, 2006, 2007, 2012).

In fact, this normative relationship between methodology and practice is quite general, and we use it as a way of investigating what changes are introduced into the relationship by mathemati zation in particular. We characterize the distinctive features of mathematization here using a comparison between two efforts to reform the practice of biological taxonomy between approximately 1940 and 1965. Our focal contrast is the numerical taxonomy movement that emerged in the 1960s with Ernst Mayr’s contribution to the New Systematics in the 1940s. Both Mayr and the numerical tax onomists sought to formalize the work of classification, but Mayr introduced a qualitative formalism based on human judgment for determining the taxonomic rank of populations, while the numerical taxonomists introduced a quantitative formalism based on automated procedures for computing classifications. Regarding mathematization, we will argue that the defining contrast is how each movement conceptualized the temporal structure of the workflow of classification: more specifically, where and whether they allowed meta-level discourse about problems that occur in the process of producing the classification. We suggest that numerical taxonomy used a widespread strategy for coping with failure, “complete first-order linearization,” that attempts to exile meta level discourse from the classification process, relegate it to be fore and after the work of the process itself.

We begin by introducing the historical and conceptual back ground to biological classification in the early twentieth century. We also introduce Griesemer’s notion of tracking devices and show how it helps us analyze mathematization in a comparative framework. We then discuss Mayr’s efforts to reform classification using a theory of evolution in his 1942 book, Systematics and the Origin of Species. Afterward, we consider Sokal and Sneath’s parallel effort to reform classification in their 1963 book, The Principles of Numerical Taxonomy.

2. Rules of the game

“The methods and techniques of a field of science are often like the rules of a game. It was Linnaeus’s principal service to biology that he established a set of rules by which to play the taxonomic game” (Mayr, 1942, p. 108). This comment from Ernst Mayr sets our scene, in which Mayr and later systematists raised the stakes on the taxonomic game so high that the field shook with debates reaching from the metaphysics of species to the organization of the life sciences (Hull, 1990). Although these arguments often reached unprecedented levels of mathematical and theoretical abstraction for systematics, their character was different from more familiar stories of mathematical modeling in biology (e.g. Abraham, 2004). The point of all this theorizing was not to model or simulate processes of evolution per se, although the nature of evolution was an important factor. Instead, the effort was primarily methodological: to specify how scientists should classify organisms into groups. Hence ours is a story of the difference that introducing mathematics into “the rules of the game” made for systematists’ practice of classification.

Mayr’s choice to talk about the rules of “the taxonomic game” takes on particular significance against the fractured institutional history of systematics and its predecessor, natural history. Emerging from the 19th century, taxonomy was fragmented geographically and across groups of organisms. There were no methodological standards across the whole of taxonomy in the sense of agreed-upon, explicit rules for how to select and analyze specimens in order to produce a classification. Indeed, instituting international rules about nomenclature—how to name a species and designate specimens as material representatives—led to protracted arguments over many years in subfields such as zoology (Johnson, 2012, pp. 216–218). Practical training predominantly focused on what worked in a particular group of organisms rather than on a uniform approach across the kingdoms of life. As Mayr wrote in 1942, “the best textbook in most systematic groups is some particularly good monograph in that group which, by its thorough ness and lucid treatment, sets an example of method” (Mayr, 1942, p. 11).

The project of standardizing classification is fundamentally an institutional one: getting every scientist in the field to reliably classify their organisms in the same way (Gerson, 2008). A number of
systematists, including Mayr and the numerical taxonomists, would go on to attempt to rationalize the process of classification during the middle and late decades of the twentieth century. Their projects required considerable conceptual innovation: reformers like Mayr had to synthesize new arguments to convince other scientists why they should change and how. This section will lay out some of the basic structural elements common to the cases that Mayr and numerical taxonomists made for reform.

Despite their disagreements on many issues, Mayr and the numerical taxonomists shared some points in common. Their different methodologies for classification agreed on elementary requirements for a classification: a classification would describe a set of variable traits found in collected specimens and group them into a hierarchical tree according to rank (species, genus, family, order, etc.). This constituted a static presentation of formal relations between the specimens and implied nothing per se about how the taxonomist arrived at these relations in the classification process. One could thus recognize a classification across systematics independently of how it was produced. In addition, both approaches relied on morphological traits as evidence for classifications. Nonetheless, how a taxonomist made the classification was crucial to evaluating its quality. The central activity of methodology, therefore, was to specify the structure and proper regulation of classification as a work process. While certain tasks are intrinsic to any method of producing a classification (see Table 1), methodology has to go further: it must specify how and why certain performances of classification have more or less epistemic value than others.

Where existing practices of classification were largely embodied and implicit, methodology had to render them explicit in order to succeed. That is, whether scientists had acted in certain ways while producing the classification had to be empirically objective. In some cases, this meant defining new terms to describe successive elements of the workflow so that they could be talked and thought about in new ways. In other cases, this would mean re-conceptualizing existing practices as significant and observable in new ways. This dimension of methodology marks out and alters the activity of classification in order to make it “visible” for inspection.

Tests for the correctness of classification also have to cohere as a unit. A major reason systematists would develop theories of methodology, then, was to articulate general evaluative standards for the quality of classifications and to justify why certain practices were necessary to achieve proper results. Theories of method in effect offered a normative view of what classification should be by specifying what had to be done and why. In the next section we say more about how these theories served as “tracking devices” for regulating scientific practice.

Articulating a method is not the same as mathematization. At its core, articulating a method is a way of talking and thinking explicitly about what often happens implicitly in embodied practice. Bringing actions into “the space of reasons,” to borrow a phrase from Wilfrid Sellars, is already to change how things are done (Sellars, 1997). By contrast, articulating a theory of method means being able to give coherent and interlocking reasons for one’s ideal of good practice. Part of what distinguished Mayr and the numerical taxonomists from their predecessors is how they gave general, theoretically motivated justifications for their methods, which in turn specified universal steps and procedures for anyone producing a classification.

Mathematization, however, goes a step further. Methodological theory can still be qualitative in nature: it can specify formalized rules and templates for classification without incorporating something like an externalized, deductive system. For instance, we will see how Mayr used visual patterns of geographic speciation as a guide for distinguishing species from subspecies. These geographical patterns are a qualitative formalism because their consequences can only be drawn by a human interpreter. By contrast, Robert Sokal and Peter Sneath—co-founders of numerical taxonomy—pursued quantitative formalization. In their view, classification was a sequence of symbolic manipulations using mathematical rules that could be verified as correct over a domain of mathematical variables. In mathematizing classification, they articulated a set of externalized, syntactic manipulations—in practice, computer programs—that operated within a semantic domain of abstract numbers, i.e. the input matrix of specimen traits.

Sokal and Sneath’s articulation of a quantitative formalism for the game of classification transformed both the visibility of the practice and its accessibility to normative tracking. In this context, mathematization meant specifying the process of classification as a calculation that could be precisely repeated by anyone, regardless of their expertise in biological taxonomy of a particular group of organisms. Carrying out this ideal enabled numerical taxonomy to take immediate advantage of computing technology, which helped make the tedious calculations involved feasible (Vernon, 1988). As a result, each step of the classification process was represented explicitly in the structure (code) of the algorithm, and differences in input and procedure could be traced comprehensively by their consequences for downstream calculations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1</th>
<th>Common tasks in taxonomy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collecting</td>
<td>How many specimens are needed and from where?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifying</td>
<td>Does a specimen fall under any existing categories?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describing</td>
<td>Two possible objects of description: the particular specimen that one collected, and the group of which it is an instance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naming</td>
<td>If a specimen doesn’t match existing categories, should it stand for a new subspecies or species (and possibly genus)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revising</td>
<td>How should a classification change to reflect novel variation observed in new specimens?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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1 The morphology of an organism generally refers to its outward appearance and anatomy (external, internal, or both), such as the colors of a bird’s plumage, the kind of mouth parts on an insect, or the segments in a fossilized trilobite. It could also include subtle features, such as those revealed by chemical stains. These are aspects of an organism’s phenotype, as opposed to its genotype, which would later come into prominence as nucleotide sequencing assumed a much greater role in taxonomy and phylogenetic systematics.
To begin, we can characterize mathematization as making mathematics indispensable. Superficially, this is common sense—how could something be mathematized if it didn’t require math? However, if the meaning of these concepts is open-ended and contextual, then the slogan itself says nothing yet. Rather, it serves as an interpretive guide to those features of an historical sequence we need to identify and specify in order to understand it as mathematization. We must figure out, for example, what it could mean for the scientists involved for “mathematics” to be “indispensable.” This turns on its head the normal manner in which philosophers of science have sought to analyze the indispensability of math, which presupposes the existence of universal meanings.

However, this characterization does not tell us on its own how to go about localizing the meaning of its concepts to a concrete historical situation. As a guide, we can add the idea that what is indispensable is what is tracked and normalized. This might seem counterintuitive if we think that the indispensable is what happens without any effort or care on our part. That is hardly an accurate description of scientific work, though. The tasks of research are better understood as fragile, demanding achievements. Indispensable things are thus exactly those that have to be put into place by someone in order for the work to succeed. For this very reason, scientists spend an immense amount of time and effort tracking whether these things are present and performed in the right way.

If we understand indispensability in this practical way, it also becomes clear why mathematization is an intrinsically normative activity. The project of mathematization is to change what is indispensable, and hence to alter what must be done to carry out research. Moreover, mathematization is intrinsically caught up in revising what needs to be tracked and evaluated in the research process. This suggests that we can unpack the meaning of mathematics in a case by looking at changes in how the scientists involved track and evaluate their work practices.

This approach extends recent work by James Griesemer on how scientific theories function as tracking devices (Griesemer, 2006, 2007, 2012). His work thus far has emphasized how scientists track biological processes, while we focus on how they track their own practices. Griesemer starts with the observation that “scientists frequently follow a process in order to understand both its causal character and where it may lead” (Griesemer, 2007, p. 375). He then argues that we can analyze scientists’ theories about the process in terms of how they serve as tools for tracking what happens in the process. A necessary, general feature of causal processes in this regard is that they can be “marked.” For instance, “radioactive tracers, fluorescent stains, genetic markers, and embryonic transplants all facilitate tracking processes and determining how physiological, molecular, and genetic outcomes result from known inputs” (Griesemer, 2007, p. 375).

Marking a process can happen through experimental intervention but also through natural events. Griesemer argues that scientists rely on mental marking through the application of attention to a pre-existing feature of the process: “noticing a morphological feature (a structure, a pigment pattern, a cell in a particular location) of an embryonic region is an important type of mental marking in embryology. Noted morphological features can be tracked to where they end up several or many cell divisions or developmental stages later” (Griesemer, 2007, p. 379).

Most importantly, many causal processes of interest can be tracked and represented in multiple, distinct, but overlapping ways. Griesemer develops an extended case study about how Gregor Mendel necessarily incorporated the tracking of developmental processes in his research (Griesemer, 2007). The discipline of genetics sought to isolate inheritance and development as distinct processes, yet for Mendel the two in practice were closely intertwined. The distinction between inheritance and development should therefore not be taken for granted historiographically (or within biology itself). Griesemer argues that the different histories of genetics and developmental biology in the twentieth century can be understood in terms of how “foregrounding and backgrounding of different aspects of the same biological process lead to different research styles” (Griesemer, 2007, p. 380).

We will unpack this variation in style via one of the defining tasks of methodology: to manage failures that occur during research. We argue that the shift between Mayr and numerical taxonomy is fundamentally a re-organization of where and how their methodological theories localize and cope with errors. Mayr believed that taxonomy was irrevocably both objective and subjective: the human element of expert judgment could never be removed. His theory of method imposed objective constraints on the process without specifying a complete, linear procedure. In this way, Mayr’s methodological strategy functioning via “checkpoints” at certain key stages in classification. By contrast, Sokal and Sneath believed that the quality of classification depended on taxonomists following an externalized, repeatable procedure that rendered each step visible in an unbroken chain. By transforming the process into a complete, first-order and strictly linear process, they displaced failure management from within the process proper, moving it instead to the start and finish.

4. Mayr’s biological species concept as a normative resource

This section begins our examination of Mayr’s methodological contributions, starting with evolutionary theory as the source of Mayr’s normative reasons for revising practice. We often think of “is” and “ought” as independent, yet the two are entangled for the purposes of classification: knowledge about what species are informs how we ought to study them. In two subsequent sections, we describe how Mayr used his theory of evolution to identify a particular stage in the process of classification as methodologically crucial, and how he drew on empirical and theoretical knowledge of evolution to develop tools for managing the difficulties of this stage. Our later discussion of numerical taxonomy will follow a parallel structure.

As an émigré to the United States in 1931 from Germany, Mayr found himself standing between two movements within biology. Taxonomists in Europe had been developing an approach to classification that distinguished between species and subspecies based on gaps in the geographic variation among populations. This approach was much rarer in the Anglo-Saxon world (for an exception that proves the rule see Johnson, 2012). On the other hand, biologists in America and England were leaders in the development of genetics and its importance to evolutionary theory (Mayr & Provine, 1980). They were largely ignorant of developments in Continental systematics and saw little use for it in studying evolution. Mayr’s 1942 book, Systematics and the Origin of Species, simultaneously addressed Anglo-Saxon geneticists and taxonomists in order to demonstrate the mutual relevance of genetics and a geographic approach to evolution. His book used the genetic theory of species as reproductively isolated populations to articulate and revise the methods and aims of systematics. It also established the relevance of geographic variation for studying speciation.

The pivotal issue in Systematics and the Origin of Species is the nature of species and speciation. Mayr’s definition of species has become famous as the “biological species concept,” although the version he offered in 1942 was in fact a mild revision of a longer tradition involving reproductive continuity and inclusiveness (Wilkins, 2009). What matters for us here is not the uniqueness of Mayr’s version, but how he used the concept to articulate a methodology for classification.

In a section titled “Species Criteria and Species Definitions,” Mayr draws a contrast between three major approaches to defining
species: the practical, morphological, and biological species concepts. For the practical species concept, Mayr quotes Darwin from the Origin of Species: “In determining whether a form should be ranked as a species or a variety, the opinion of naturalists having sound judgment and wide experience seems the only guide to follow” (quote taken from Mayr, 1942, p. 115). As Mayr saw it, this definition would be endorsed by “a good proportion” of systematists at the time. He respected the practicality of the definition for “taxonomic routine work,” perhaps meaning the placement of specimens in genera with well-established diagnostic characters. His objections, however, were that the practical definition “cuts the Gordian knot and is therefore quite unsuitable in a more theoretical discussion of the origin of species. Furthermore, it suggests that the species is an entirely subjective unit, which is not true, as we shall shortly see” (Mayr, 1942, p. 115).

The morphological species concept holds that “a species is a group of individuals or populations with the same or similar morphological characters” (Mayr, 1942, p. 115). In practice, a taxonomist might decide that a specimen fits within no pre-established groupings and should be established as a reference standard for a new species. See (Farber, 1976) for a broader discussion of the roles that specimens played for taxonomy in this regard. Under the morphological concept, new specimens would be added to that species insofar as their bodily features were similar to the key characters used in describing the original specimen. At a more technical level, Mayr asserted that a “great many systematists” would say that “a species is what can be separated on the basis of clear-cut, qualitative key-characters, [while] a subspecies is characterized by quantitative differences and can be identified only by the actual comparison of material of the two studied forms” (Mayr, 1942, p. 116).

The key difficulty with the morphological concept is that “fertility and crossability vary to some extent independently of morphological characters” (Mayr, 1942, p. 116). This is a practical problem in several ways. Variation within a geographically connected population sometimes exceeds variation across isolated populations. See Fig. 1 for an example of the geographic variation Mayr had in mind. The morphological concept has no resources for helping the systematist manage widespread geographic variation within populations. Another issue is that organisms that are nearly identical morphologically and live in the same area may nonetheless fail to interbreed—Mayr called these “sibling species.” It would be misleading to place these two populations within the same species when their evolutionary fates are separate.

The biological species concept, then, tried to rectify these difficulties by defining species as “groups of actually or potentially interbreeding natural populations, which are reproducitively isolated from other such groups” (Mayr, 1942, p. 120). However, it is often difficult or impossible to determine whether two populations can “actually or potentially” interbreed. Direct observation only demonstrates actual interbreeding. Even laboratory experiments simply demonstrate the possibility of interbreeding in an artificial setting, while what matters is whether species would interbreed in the wild, given the opportunity.

In order to assist the practical application of the biological species concept, Mayr re-appropriated morphological similarity as an indicator of propensity for interbreeding. “If we examine the ‘good’ species of a certain locality we find that the reproductive gap is associated with a certain degree of morphological difference. If we find a new group of individuals at a different locality, we use the scale of differences between the species of the familiar area to help us in determining whether the new form is a different species or not” (Mayr, 1942, p. 121). In addition, the judgment of the taxonomist would still play a role in some cases: when two populations are similar but geographically isolated, “it is necessary . . . to leave it to the judgment of the individual systematist, whether or not he considers two particular forms as ‘potentially capable’ of interbreeding” (Mayr, 1942, p. 120).

The biological species concept therefore set a new standard—reproductive isolation—within which previous standards became re-interpreted and constrained. Simple morphological similarity was no longer adequate evidence for grouping specimens together as species, since sometimes highly similar species still do not interbreed. In the same way, dissimilarity alone was no longer sufficient for placing specimens in different species. One also had to demonstrate the absence of geographic continuity linking the populations and judge whether the dissimilarity between isolated populations would prevent interbreeding. Difficult cases where good evidence was lacking or the relationship between populations themselves was in flux would require expert judgment (Mayr, 1942, p. 114).

5. Articulating structure in the process of classification

In the introductory part of Systematics, Mayr briefly summarized the “procedure of the systematist” (Mayr, 1942, p. 11). As he wrote, “before our knowledge of a species reaches the point where it can be included in a monograph, it has to be subjected to a definite process of study, of which I will now give a short outline” (Mayr, 1942, p. 12). One begins with collecting specimens, and proceeds to identify them using previously published diagnostic criteria. “Very frequently, however, particularly in less well-known groups of animals, some of the investigated specimens do not agree with any described species. Here is where the difficulties of the conscientious systematist begin. Before he can proceed to describe his specimens as a new species, he must eliminate a number of other possibilities” (Mayr, 1942, p. 13). Mayr goes on to describe several issues that must be resolved: “There is considerable individual variation in most animals. Perhaps his specimens are just extreme variants? Or there may be an undescribed sex or age class, or an unknown ecotype” (Mayr, 1942, p. 13). If the specimens cannot be resolved back into known species, the systematist must then proceed to give a description, define which specimens will stand as “types” for future reference, and follow the rules of nomenclature to name the new species.

The “difficulties of the conscientious systematist” pick out exactly the point at which Mayr sought to articulate new structure in the process of classification using his biological species concept. When one finds that some specimens cannot be fit into an existing taxonomy, certain questions must be answered in order to correctly judge their status as new species, subspecies, developmental stages, different sexes, or extreme individual variants. Answering these questions would require examining many other specimens labeled with their geographic origin, local ecology, and so on.

Mayr’s intervention on the stage of identifying new species therefore had repercussions throughout the whole process. For instance, one would need to collect many specimens from populations across a geographic range and carefully record where they came from. Historically, systematists and natural historians had often named new species based on a single specimen with no geographic data (Johnson, 2012), but this was hardly adequate from Mayr’s perspective, even if sometimes unavoidable. However, this repercussion involved a shift in the content of the steps—what must be done to move forward—instead of the order of steps.4

4. In fact, he also mentions two other minor definitions based on genetic identity and sterility of offspring, which we omit for the sake of brevity.

5. For a broader discussion of how systematists presented the process of classification, see Sterner (2013).

6. Classifying species using geographic variation also depended on a major shift in practice to using multiple type specimens to describe a species rather than a single type.
Instituting methodological checkpoints

Mayr’s intervention in the practice of classification was intended to reform systematics and alter the direction of the community as a whole. He sought to articulate both how cutting edge biology should be done in systematics and how researchers in the field should judge each other’s work. One major methodological innovation he developed was akin to a checklist of questions one should answer in deciding the taxonomic rank of some group, i.e. species, subspecies, or population. The checklist is effectively a tool for collecting existing knowledge about sources of error and facilitating correct reasoning. However, it supplemented rather than replaced the expert systematists’ judgment about how to deal with difficult cases. Next, we describe how Mayr arrived at such methodological tools and what their limits were.

What could be articulated about the process of classification given Mayr’s theory of species? In his view, the process of evolution exhibited an almost topological level of continuity: in even attempting to define the nature of species, “we are confronted by the paradoxical incongruity of trying to establish a fixed stage in the evolutionary stream. If there is evolution in the true sense of the word, as against catastrophism or creation, we should find all kinds of species—incipient species, mature species, and incipient genera, as well as all intermediate conditions. To define the middle stage of this series perfectly... is just as impossible as to define the middle stage in the life of man, mature man, so well that every single human male can be identified as boy, mature man, or old man” (Mayr, 1942, p. 114). What can be said within this uniform stream of evolution? For Mayr, one could still draw distinctions between populations based on observed discontinuities in a given slice of time.

Fig. 2 gives Mayr’s best shot at breaking the evolutionary process into stages. The figure also serves as a practical guide for differentiating species and subspecies. Stage 2 of the figure illustrates what it looks like for a species to be appropriately separable into subspecies. Stages 3–5 illustrate the complex reasoning process that is involved with determining when subspecies have become species. Once a group of populations that constitute a species has been isolated geographically (Stage 3), it is able evolve independently. If a systematist observes two populations that are similar but distinct and have overlapping ranges but no interbreeding, then that is a good reason to declare them distinct but closely related species (Stage 4). However, if the populations are taxonomically distinct but interbreed when their ranges overlap, they have probably been isolated in the past but did not evolve to become different species (Stage 5). Hence Fig. 2 offers standardized criteria for recognizing species and subspecies, and it walks the reader through what the evidence says about populations’ history and Mayr’s inferred evolutionary causes.

When the conscientious systematist faced specimens that he could not readily identify, he was then supposed to consult his knowledge of their geographic distribution and variation. This marked a distinctive stage in the overall process of classification that nonetheless potentially concealed a great deal of further work as the systematist sought to classify his data under the different stages. Mayr left it up to the systematist, for instance, how to judge what degree and kinds of morphological variation would count as a barrier to reproduction. He also left it entirely implicit how to account for limitations in the sampling of specimens in judging whether two populations were geographically isolated.

Mayr later codified the comparisons involved with using Fig. 2 as a table in a textbook he co-authored with E. Gorton Linsley and Robert L. Usinger (Mayr, Linsley, & Usinger, 1953). The table is called the discrimination grid (see Fig. 3), and it differentiates classificatory outcomes based on distinctions between three common sources of data: morphological similarity, reproductive isolation,
and geographic distribution. It offers a practical aid for the systematist once he had gathered together the available evidence and compared the samples using the three distinctions. However, the authors note that evidence on reproductive isolation is often missing, and they provide extensive further discussion of how to use indirect evidence to distinguish between columns in the grid.

In this manner, Mayr found a way to introduce a qualitative formalism into the practice of classification based on his biological species concept. Fig. 2 provides a formal template against which any particular geographic distribution can be compared. The schema (supposedly) applied universally to any instance of classification, but it did so at a particular moment of the process: when the conscientious systematist discovers that “some of the investigated specimens do not agree with any described species.” Beyond the visual representation given in Fig. 2, the cognitive work of assigning ranks to these specimens was also arranged as a standardized table of questions (along with associated checklists of subquestions). Nonetheless, Mayr’s formalism had relatively little to say about how and in what order one should answer these questions for a concrete set of samples and their respective traits. His intervention into classificatory practice therefore established a novel checkpoint with rationalized standards based on a particular theory of evolution.

7. Mathematics as an instrumental standard for classification

Twenty-one years separate Systematics and the Origin of Species (1942) from Principles of Numerical Taxonomy (1963). In the meantime, systematists in the Anglo-Saxon world published a variety of new methodological textbooks, including (Mayr et al., 1953; Simpson, 1961). A flagship journal for theoretical papers, Systematic Zoology, started in 1952. By the early sixties, 15% of universities owned a computer, and federal funding agencies were itching to get biologists using them (Hagen, 2001; November, 2012). According to Hagen, the period saw “a significant generational shift in thinking about statistics” (Hagen, 2003, p. 354), brought about in part by the central role of population genetics in the Modern Synthesis and the rise of computer technology.

The book suggests moving through the process by considering in order whether two samples are from the same population, the same species, or the same subspecies (Mayr et al., 1953, p. 79). However, the discussion of the discrimination grid that follows indicates that this sequence is imperfect. For example, the authors’ discussion of the grid indicates that one must sometimes decide whether two samples are from the same interbreeding population or are sibling species.
While method was an ongoing subject of discussion in systematics, it took Sokal and Sneath to fan the spark of methodology into a raging debate. Although they did not target Mayr as a primary opponent in their book, they did argue against all systematists who used evolutionary theory as a guide for selecting characters and naming species. Instead, Sokal and Sneath grounded their methodology in a logical positivist theory of human reason. They also updated and revised classical morphological traditions in taxonomy by introducing statistics, computer technology, and information theory. In this section, we describe the positivist background to numerical taxonomy and show how Sokal and Sneath appropriated it as a tool for criticizing any reliance on evolutionary theory in classification.

The numerical taxonomy movement grew out of remarkably similar criticisms of existing practices that originated independently in the U.S. and England in the late 1950s, driven in each case by the desire of an outsider for greater methodological clarity (Vernon, 1988, 2001). Eventually, Robert Sokal in Kansas connected with Peter Sneath in London, and they collaborated to produce Principles of Numerical Taxonomy.

Sneath in particular was inspired by the botanist John Scott Lennox Gilmour, who wrote an influential paper linking taxonomy and logical positivism (Gilmour, 1940). Gilmour’s ideas are readily apparent in Principles as theoretical backing for Sokal and Sneath’s methodology. However, Principles contributed a practical interpretation to Gilmour’s work by aligning his view of human reason with the use of statistics and computational procedures. Before getting to the practical implementation, though, we need to describe the theoretical role played by logical positivism in Gilmour’s view of classification.

Gilmour’s article, which ironically appeared in Julian Huxley’s volume on the New Systematics (1940), begins by describing an ongoing debate among systematists. Gilmour identifies himself with a group, in contrast to Mayr and others, that “feels doubtful whether a ‘logical’ classification (based on correlation or coherence of characters) is always and necessarily a phylogenetic one” (Gilmour, 1940, p. 461). Rather than engage in a further analysis of evolutionary theory, Gilmour advances the view “that no satisfactory solution to these problems is possible without first examining the fundamental principles which underlie the process of classification, and, further, that these principles cannot be adequately formulated without basing them on some epistemological theory of how scientists obtain their knowledge of the external world” (Gilmour, 1940, p. 462). In other words, Gilmour was advancing an alternative normative basis for the debate over classification: systematists needed a better understanding of the general acquisition of scientific knowledge instead of evolution, which was only one natural process among many.

Gilmour went on to endorse a picture of human thought where the conscious mind receives units of sense data that it actively packs together to form concepts. “For example, the object which we call a chair consists partly of a number of experienced sense-data such as colours, shapes, and other qualities, and partly of the concept chair which reason has constructed to ‘clip’ these data together” (Gilmour, 1940, p. 464; emphasis original). Since the classification of a set of specimens under a common name is equivalent to subsuming them under a concept, Gilmour reasoned that this theory of human knowledge has direct bearing on how to do taxonomy:

“In any consideration of scientific method it is essential to distinguish between these ‘clips’ and the sense-data which they hold together. The latter are given, once and for all, and cannot be altered, whereas the former can be created and abolished at will so as the better to give a coherent picture of the every-increasing range of sense-data experienced. For example, the phenomena of specific differentiation in Linnaeus’s day were clipped together by the concept of special creation, which was later replaced by the concept of gradual evolutionary differentiation” (Gilmour, 1940, p. 464).

Epistemology therefore presents a methodological imperative for the taxonomist: keep the category of “sense-data,” i.e. taxonomic characters of specimens, separate from the category of concepts, which may change over time. Sokal and Sneath interpreted this imperative to mean keeping evolutionary theory out of any role in guiding what data is relevant to classification and weighting its importance. They believed that evolutionary theory was too theoretical in the pejorative, speculative sense, and that involving systematists’ pet theories in the building of classifications would breed instability, bias, and logical regress. Far from being a universal standard for classification, Mayr’s application of the biological species concept would count as radically limiting the value of any classification built under its guidance.

A general-purpose classification, by contrast, would be one that maximizes the number of inductive generalizations that can be made about the specimens’ properties. These generalizations of course represent a shorthand that “clips” together the properties for ease of use. Gilmour calls this inductively optimal classification “natural,” whereas other classifications are by comparison “artificial.” He writes, “What is the essential difference between [natural and artificial]? Apart from any possible phylogenetic significance… surely the fundamental difference is that natural groups class together individuals which have a large number of attributes in common, whereas in artificial groups the individuals concerned possess a much smaller number of common attributes” (Gilmour, 1940, p. 466).

While Gilmour’s argument is presented in purely qualitative terms, Sokal and Sneath developed a computational procedure that realized it quantitatively. They used statistical measures to evaluate the correlations between character data and applied clustering algorithms to group the specimens according to their degree of similarity. The crucial challenge, then, became applying Gilmour’s notion of optimality to fully specify classification as a mathematical calculation. In contrast to Mayr, each step should flow automat-
Articulating structure in the process of classification

Following Gilmour’s view of reasoning, we would expect to find three major stages in classification: observation of sense-data, organization of this data into an inductively optimal conceptual structure, and application of this structure to particular aims. Fig. 4 shows a flow chart for classification at the start of Principles of Numerical Taxonomy. The diagram at the same time enriches Gilmour’s picture and maintains its basic structure: stages 1–3 represent the collection of sense-data, stages 4–5 represent the process of finding an optimal grouping, and stages 6–7 represent the application of this grouping to create an efficient diagnostic key for identifying new specimens. Note, though, how the collection of sense-data actually involves a number of cognitively complex steps, contra logical positivism: the taxonomist must gather specimens, determine what can be measured, produce the measurements, and then translate these into a character matrix. This and related issues would prove an ongoing difficulty for numerical taxonomy and other, later mathematical methods in systematics, which we will return to shortly.

Fig. 4 also nicely illustrates the core mathematical content of Sokal and Sneath’s workflow: steps 3–5 correspond respectively to Chapters 5–7 of Principles, which contain the vast majority of mathematics in the book. Compared to Mayr’s picture of the work process, these steps offer a radically different articulation of the crucial stages in classification. Geographic variation is completely lost in the character matrix of step 3, which simply lists the numer-
ical values of each trait for each specimen regardless of how variation among specimens is distributed among collecting sites. Numerical taxonomy was in fact intentionally agnostic about what these specimens represented in terms of populations, subspecies, or species: each specimen was called an “operational taxonomic unit” or OTU, which had no assigned rank in the Linnaean hierarchy. The next step involved making comparisons between each pair of specimens based on some measure of the statistical “distance” between their trait values. This produces an affinity (or distance) matrix between OTUs, which is then fed into a clustering algorithm that groups the OTUs into a hierarchical tree. Whereas Mayr differentiated groups by the topology of their geographic distribution, numerical taxonomists differentiated groups by the statistical clustering of their traits.

9. Instituting step-by-step procedures

The general procedure that Sokal and Sneath articulated for classification is not the same as a lab protocol or cooking recipe, where considerable embodied skill and interpretation fill in the gaps between instructions. The core steps of classification in numerical taxonomy were automated on a computer such that each step could literally be executed and tracked in totality as an externalized, discrete event. As a result, numerical taxonomy displaced the work of managing failure to outside the process of classification itself. The particular techniques that Sokal and Sneath created to manage failures became the loci for decades of debate about how and whether evolutionary theory should influence classification. In other words, systematists increasingly recognized the value of mathematization without necessarily agreeing with Sokal and Sneath’s views of their discipline’s aims.

Within numerical taxonomy, classification consisted of a sequence of calculations on the data embodied in the character matrix. The systematist was tasked with the challenge of translating the morphological features of the specimen into numerical values. Typically, each measurement of a trait would turn into a discrete variable (e.g. 0 or 1) or a continuous variable (any value from 0 to 1). For each specimen, the taxonomist would measure or score a set number of traits. The data for each specimen forms a column in step 3 of Fig. 4. Since there are multiple specimens, the lists of measurements for each specimen are then combined together as a matrix. This matrix is the basic mathematical object on which all further computations depended, and the set of all possible matrices (according to certain restrictions) forms the semantic domain over which the classification algorithms would work.

One of the most common algorithms is called single-linkage clustering. It follows a pre-defined set of operations on the data matrix to produce a branching tree diagram listing the similarity relationships between specimens within a hierarchy. The algorithm is straightforward: first put each specimen with its associated traits into its own cluster. Next, determine the distance between each pair of clusters by finding the minimum distance between any specimen from one cluster and any specimen from the other. Join the pair of clusters with the smallest distance. Continue doing this until only one cluster is left. The branches in the output tree then correspond to the clusters joined at each iteration.

Together, these algorithms and the data matrix constituted a quantitative formalism for the process of classification. Each step in the process was specified by the algorithm and data input in advance, and could be tracked explicitly as the code was executed on a computer. Numerical taxonomy stands out in the history of systematics as the first attempt to mathematize classification as a whole and on a universal basis, rather than for particular local cases or isolated steps (Hagen, 2001, 2003). Its two crucial innovations in this regard were to formulate character measurements as abstract objects isolated from theories about evolution, and to interpret this data as a statistical sample that could be analyzed using clustering algorithms.

While the character matrix and clustering algorithm appear to jointly determine the classification, the methodological challenge for numerical taxonomy quickly became coping with the need for multiple competing techniques for building matrices, measuring distances, and clustering. In the case of clustering algorithms, single-linkage is only one of many possibilities, each of which differs over exactly how it joins groups together. For instance, should one instead join groups based on the maximum distance between any of their members, or between their centers of mass? Another vexing issue was whether to count the absence of a character in a particular specimen as providing positive information. This appeared counterintuitive in cases where one specimen had a unique trait, such as a spiny back, that no other specimen shared. Should all the other specimens be judged more similar because one specimen stands out?

Attempting to answer these questions led Sokal and Sneath to adopt a strategy of contextualizing the overall process of classification. Gilmour’s notion of clipping together sense data in an optimal way offered little guidance for these practical difficulties, but they pursued the idea that one could manage the plurality of methodological choices by identifying kinds of situations where one option was demonstrably better than the others (Sneath & Sokal, 1973, p. 146). One example is James Rohlf’s (1972) concluding discussion about different methods for multidimensional data analysis (MDSCALE, PCORDA, and PCA). “The following general recommendations are suggested as a result of the present study: the MDSCALE solution is to be preferred unless there is a large number of OTU’s. If there are [missing data] and/or fewer OTU’s than characters then PCORDA should be considered next. Only if there are no [missing data] and/or many more OTU’s than characters should PCA be employed” (Rohlf, 1972, p. 279).

Rather than allowing reflective re-interpretation or analysis of during classification itself, Sokal and Sneath coped with new difficulties by multiplying the choices one made before or after the process. Once one embarks on the classification process (for instance by telling the computer to execute the code), no further human judgment is needed—the determination of the process by the character matrix and clustering algorithm is complete. This reflects what we call a “complete first-order linearization” strategy for mathematization, such that meta-level judgment or discussion about the mathematized process is only legitimate outside the process itself. While this view of how classification should work may seem extreme, or even implausibly naive, Sokal in particular was genuinely motivated by the idea that human expertise was entirely replaceable by mathematical procedures (Sokal & Rohlf, 1970; Vernon, 1988).

10. Conclusion

Instead of attempting to explain a static field of mathematical successes collected according to present-day standards, we have argued for viewing mathematization as a normative activity that transforms what counts as scientific success. This approach enabled us to establish the distinctive features of mathematization as a program for institutional change in the case of numerical taxonomy within systematic biology. One important remaining issue, though, is to clarify what roles logical positivism and operationalization played in mathematizing classification.

Looking forward from the 1960s, new methods for classification, such as numerical cladistics, grew out of numerical taxonomy that did not always share its allegiance to logical positivism (Hagen, 2001). In this regard, we can see that Sokal and Sneath used positivism to formulate a particular way in which classification...
should be statistical. As a sequence of mathematical procedures, however, their method could be used and modified independently of positivism. Given the basic sequence of steps identified in Fig. 4, one could substitute different calculations that abandoned certain key tenets of numerical taxonomy, such as equal weighting of character traits. The effects of mathematization on classification therefore extended beyond the influence of positivism, although the rise of “pattern cladism” in the 1980s shows that they remained intimately related (Hull, 1990).

By contrast, we argue that operationalization cannot be isolated in this way from the mathematization of classification. In general, operationalizing a task by listing a sequence of actions, for example in a recipe or protocol, does not require mathematization. In the particular historical context of numerical taxonomy, however, mathematical reasoning had come to depend constitutively on operationalization. In the first half of the twentieth century, multiple normative projects within mathematics, such as Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica or Hilbert’s program, sought to define mathematical reasoning axiomatically as a sequence of steps justified by the application of universal rules (Gray, 2008). Under this ideal, one could not successfully mathematize a reason- ing process without also operationalizing it by stating the sequence of manipulations to be applied at each step. This shift in the standards of mathematics also proved decisive for the invention and design of computers, which automated mathematical reasoning as a formal process of symbolic manipulations.

While Sokal and Sneath did not engage with axiomatics directly, some of their students did (e.g. Jardine & Sibson, 1971). Sokal and Sneath also recognized the value of mathematical methods for the objectivity and repeatability of classification and the necessity of using computers for numerical taxonomy to be practical (Sokal & Sneath, 1963, pp. 48–49; Vernon 1988). Similarly, a basic tenet of logical positivism was that valid human reasoning could be fully articulated in terms of first-order logic. While one could perhaps have sought to mathematize classification based on an alternative ideal of math, Sokal and Sneath chose to embrace this historical change in math rather than reject it. As a result, operationalizing classification was part and parcel of mathematizing it for numerical taxonomy. This reality is likely here to stay because the growing size of genomic data sets has entrenched the necessity of computers for taxonomy (Suárez-Díaz & Anaya-Muñoz, 2008).

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