

THE PERSONA AND THE SHADOW IN ANALYTIC PSYCHOLOGY AND EXISTENTIALIST PHILOSOPHY

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Abstract The Jungian conflict between the persona (“the mask of the soul”) and the shadow (a sort of “counter-persona”) is, from a philosophical perspective, akin to the dialectic between appearance and essence or, in a more existential fashion, similar to the difference between falseness and authenticity. Starting from a suggestion made by V. Dem. Zamfirescu, we will compare C. G. Jung’s persona with J. P. Sartre’s bad faith and Martin Heidegger’s *das Man*. If the persona were a mask mediating between the Ego and the external world, the shadow would be an interface between the Self and the Ego. Remembering that Nietzsche (not only S. Freud and A. Schopenhauer) deeply influenced Jung in the constitution of the shadow, we will evaluate it in comparison with one of the key terms of Nietzschean nihilism, the last human being.

Keywords Jungian archetypes, persona, shadow, existentialism, identification with the shadow, the “they”, nihilism

The existential reconstruction of persona and shadow

The liaison between analytic psychology and existential philosophy is rarely researched, despite their similarities. They share almost the same *Zeitgeist* (reaching their peak between 1930 and 1960), they are both interested in the individual (*der Einzelne* in Max Striner’s vocabulary) – rebelling against the (post)structuralist dissolution of the subject – and they both presuppose that this individual has a sense of depth which is usually hidden, repressed or suppressed. The first purpose of our paper is to provide an investigation of the term of “persona” in Jungian psychology, following its descriptions in C. G. Jung’s *Collected Works*, but also in studies belonging to important Jungian psychologists (Jolande Jacobi, June Singer, Barbara Hannah, Anthony Stevens, Murray Stein and so on). This investigation will lead us to a definition of the

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persona that can be reconstructed in Heideggerian terms: because the imprints of the outer world and the sphere of alterity are essential in the constitution of the persona, we can well define it as being composed of “Being-in-the-world” (*In-der-Welt-Sein*) + “Being-with” (*Mit-Sein*). Therefore, we will investigate the “persona” in order to observe what is radically *existential* in its architecture. Moreover, we will see that both Jung (in *Two Essays in Analytical Psychology* from *The Collected Works* 7) and Sartre (in *Being and Nothingness*) discuss how society pressures us to identify with the professional persona. The final step of our first purpose will be to discuss the identification between “persona” and *das Man*, following V. D. Zamfirescu’s insight, also noting the similarity between *Einebnung* and *Ausgleichung*, two German versions of “levelling”. It is a newer way of looking at the notion of “persona”, which was simply understood as “mask”: now we have restructured it phenomenologically as “Being-in-the-world” + “Being-with” and we have used it to designate the existential notion of inauthenticity, comparing it with *das Man* and bad faith. Moving on to the second part of the article, we will also give a new definition of the shadow. If the persona were described as an interface between the Ego and the world (the preeminence of the “world” being essential, as we will see), the shadow can be symmetrically remodelled as an interface between the Ego and the deeper Self. We will compare the shadow with the Freudian concept of “id” and with the Schopenhauerian will. But, more importantly, we will ask ourselves (and this is our secondary purpose): what is radically *existential* in the constitution of the shadow? (a question we have also discussed for “persona”). Friedrich Nietzsche, the second historical forerunner of existentialism (after S. Kierkegaard), is helpful here with his philosophy of the shadow. We remind ourselves that Carl Jung developed his notion of shadow based on the late 19th-century Nietzschean writing *The Wanderer and His Shadow*. Whereas from the point of view of analytic psychology the shadow was equivalent to the “inferior personality”, from an existential perspective the dynamics between the shadow and the light (in a Nietzschean fashion) would emphasize the “bright side of the shadow”, a paradoxical feature of the dark repressed “id”. Following Post-Jungian philosopher Lucy Huskinson’s analogy between the *Übermensch* and the Self, we will compare the shadow with the last human being (*der letzte Mensch*). Therefore, in the first part of our article, we provide a phenomenological reconstruction of the “persona” through the imprints of the external world and the “other” and a comparison with *das Man* and bad faith, and in the second part of this paper we will revisit the shadow as it was philosophically seen by Schopenhauer, Freud and most of all, by Nietzsche. The concepts of “persona” and “shadow” are somehow isolated if we see them mainly through the self-absorbed lenses of mere psychology: generally, if we read them through the history of philosophy and more specifically through nineteenth- and twentieth-century existentialism, we can see them in a new light as valid philosophical notions that discuss the (post)modern conflict between essence and appearance.

Jung's persona and the notion of existential authenticity

The persona¹ is “the mask of the actor”.² A sort of contrast between object and subject, general and particular, archetypal mask and distinctive voice, makes up the ontological constitution of the persona: Jung defined it many times as “individual” + “world” or “individual” + “other”. “The persona ... is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be”³ or “the individual’s system of adaptation to, or the manner he assumes in dealing with, the world”⁴.

Moreover, “the persona is that which in reality one is not, but which oneself as well as others think one is.”⁵ The persona is the projection of appearance (“that which ... one is not”), fakeness accepted (and required) by the other, and unconsciously credited even by the individual (“that ... which oneself ... thinks one is”). One can fall in love with one’s persona, while both the ego and the shadow suffer because of the great deal of energy leaked by the mask. “The persona is ... a functional complex that comes into existence for reasons of “adaptation or personal convenience ... The persona is exclusively concerned with the relation to objects.”⁶

The persona mediates between the inner and the outer world, between the impressions generated by the unconscious and the stimuli of the external world.⁷ The imprints of the world (Heidegger would have used the term “Being-in-the-world” to reveal the original connection between individual and world) and of the other (“Being-with” in Heideggerian terminology), in other words the external factor of the persona is more important than the internal one. This is why one does not need his or her persona when one is alone⁸ or that one loses his or her persona if one is completely isolated.⁹

The persona is called a social archetype precisely to explain the prevalence of the world in its constitution. At least at a conscious level, we are most of the time honest with ourselves, without feeling guilty that we often tell lies to other people. “There is always some element of pretence about the persona, for it is a kind of shop window in which we like to display our best wares.”¹⁰ Moreover, it is a “barricade”,¹¹ “designed on the one hand to make a

¹ We have used *The Collected Works of C. G. Jung, Complete Digital Edition*, 19 volumes, ed. Gerhard Adler and R. F. C. Hull (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press: 2014, henceforth CW).

² CW 9/I §43.

³ CW 7 §246.

⁴ CW 9/I §221.

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ CW 6, § 801.

⁷ June Singer, *Boundaries of the Soul. The Practice of Jung's Psychology* (New York: Anchor Books, 1994), 159–164.

⁸ Jolande Jacobi, *Die Seelenmaske. Einblicke in die Psychologie des Alltags* (Olten und Freiburg im Breisgau: Walter-Verlag, 1971), 41.

⁹ Barbara Hannah, *The Inner Journey. Lectures and Essays On Jungian Psychology* (Toronto: Inner City Books, 2000), 75.

¹⁰ Anthony Stevens, *Jung. A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 63.

¹¹ CW 7 §269.

definite impression upon others, and, on the other, to conceal the true nature of the individual.¹² We could speak of the double teleology of the persona: a) the positive one: our mask wants to move the others, to receive admiration or envy; b) the negative one: masks often hide an inane Ego or a violent shadow.

The identification with the persona is – according to Jung – one of the greatest mistakes one can make on the road towards individuation. “Identification with one’s office or one’s title is very attractive indeed, which is precisely why so many men are nothing more than the decorum accorded to them by society. In vain would one look for a personality behind the husk. Underneath all the padding one would find a very pitiable little creature.”¹³

“The mask of the soul” can grow into our flesh¹⁴ and in this circumstance it is almost impossible to discern between persona and Ego: “Only, the danger is that they become identical with their personas – the professor with his text-book, the tenor with his voice. Then the damage is done ... The garment of Deianeira has grown fast to his skin.”¹⁵

Jung warns that from the perspective of the Self it is a mistake to identify with the persona.¹⁶ However, the categories of the world and the other pressure us to identify with our professional persona, which is always paid in cash:¹⁷

Society expects ... every individual to play the part assigned to him as perfectly as possible, so that a man who is a parson must not only carry out his official functions objectively, but must at all times and in all circumstances play the role of parson in a flawless manner. Society demands this as a kind of surety; each must stand at his post, here a cobbler, there a poet. No man is expected to be both. Nor is it advisable to be both, for that would be “odd.” Such a man would be “different” from other people, not quite reliable ... Society is persuaded that only the cobbler who is not a poet can supply workmanlike shoes.¹⁸

At an intersubjective level, one finds the fear of other, the repulsion towards the other's Ego. Beyond the mask hell resides, a sort of volcano which can burst at once, a lawless chaos resembling the Freudian id. The dictatorship of the persona rebrands the Self through its functionality: the individual with a deficient persona will be considered a not-man, a “stranger” who has “no shield against the projections of others”).¹⁹ In Sartre's *Being and Nothingness* one finds a similar argument with Jung's critique of the professional persona:

¹² CW 7 §305.

¹³ CW 7 §230.

¹⁴ Hannah, *The Inner Journey*, 77.

¹⁵ CW 9/I §221.

¹⁶ CW 7 §247.

¹⁷ CW 9/I §221.

¹⁸ CW 7 §305.

¹⁹ Hannah, *The Inner Journey*, 76.

There is the dance of the grocer, of the tailor, of the auctioneer, by which they endeavour to persuade their clientele that they are nothing but a grocer, an auctioneer, a tailor. A grocer who dreams is offensive to the buyer, because such a grocer is not wholly a grocer. Society demands that he limit himself to his function as a grocer, just as the soldier at attention makes himself into a soldier-thing with a direct regard which does not see at all, which is no longer meant to see ... There are indeed many precautions to imprison a man in what he is, as if we lived in perpetual fear that he might escape from it, that he might break away and suddenly elude his condition.²⁰

We are asked to surrender our personality and to submissively identify with our function: therefore, falseness is a universal currency. We feel offended if the grocer takes off his mask and confesses to us; the cobbler who writes poems is regarded with contempt, and so on. Beneath the persona there is a world our society prefers to censor.

According to the Romanian philosopher and psychologist Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu, the Jungian persona can be compared with the Heideggerian the “they” [*das Man*], “creatively” translated by the iconic Romanian philosopher Constantin Noica as “the anonymous Being”. The persona shares with the “they” three of its characteristics: averageness [*Durchschnittlichkeit*], levelling down [*Einebnung*], disburdenment of being [*Seinsentlastung*].²¹ Here is how Heidegger describes the averageness of the Dasein, suffocated under the dictatorship of the “anonymous Being”: “Thus the “they” maintains itself factually in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which it regards as valid and that which it does not, and of that to which it grants success and that to which it denies it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore.”²²

Just like the persona, *das Man* is a compromise between individual and world (“compromise” must be read here as a euphemism for the conjunction between a subservient subject and an authoritarian society). Heidegger’s *Einebnung* (levelling down) reminds us of the Nietzschean notion of *Ausgleichung*, also translated as “leveling”:²³ “Every kind of priority gets noiselessly suppressed. Overnight, everything that is primordial gets glossed over as something that has long been well known. Everything gained by a struggle becomes just something to be manipulated. Every secret loses its force. This care of averageness reveals in turn an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the “levelling down” [*Einebnung*] of all possibilities of

²⁰ Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being And Nothingness*, transl. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1993), 59.

²¹ Vasile Dem. Zamfirescu, *Filosofia inconștientului* (Philosophy of the Unconscious) (Bucharest: Editura Trei, 2009), 445.

²² Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978), 165.

²³ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, ed. Rolf-Peter Horstman and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 134.

Being.”²⁴

The main task of the averageness, an inherent feature of the “they”, seems to be the obliteration of the exceptional, the annihilation of anything which might transgress the platitude of the norm. One should note here that the Nietzschean term for “leveling” is connected with “mediocrization”²⁵ [*Vermittelmässigung*] and “diminution”²⁶ [*Verkleinerung*]. The persona is the minuscule version of the Dasein: through it we all take part in the diminishment of the world. The third Heideggerian feature makes mention of disburdenment:

The “they” can, as it were, manage to have 'them' constantly invoking it.¹ It can be answerable for everything most easily, because it is not someone who needs to vouch for anything. It 'was' always the “they” who did it, and yet it can be said that it has been 'no one'. In Dasein's everydayness the agency through which most things come about is one of which we must say that “it was no one”. Thus the particular Dasein in its everydayness is disburdened by the “they” ... Everyone is the other, and no one is himself ... The “they”... is the “nobody” [*das Man ... ist das Niemand*].²⁷

The disburdenment required by the “they” is not unlike depersonalization: from a Jungian perspective, this surrender to the personality (as abandonment of the Self) is equivalent to the identification with the professional persona, required by society. We truly are *das Man*, claims Heidegger (our persona takes over the attributions of the Ego-Self axis, in Edward Edinger's terms) and, as anonymous and functional robots, “we are the nobodies”.

If the external reality (the world) can be found above the persona, underneath it there is – not only the Ego, but also – the Self. The persona mediates between the Ego and the world and the shadow is the veil between the Ego and the Self. We have seen that the persona has a striking external imprint; on the contrary, the shadow wants to stay hidden from the world, to live in the underground, becoming denser and more threatening. The Ego is the middle term between the persona and shadow, the world and underworld, the social and demonic archetype. “Persona and shadow are usually more or less exact opposites of one another, and yet they are as close as twins.”²⁸

The constitution of the shadow for Jung and Nietzsche

On countless occasions, all through the *Collected Works*,²⁹ Jung defines the shadow as *the inferior personality*. The shadow can be understood as a personal inferiority in contrast with the superiority of the Ego ideal. We display the persona and hide the shadow. Jung uses the

²⁴ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 165.

²⁵ Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 134.

²⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals. A Polemical Tract*, trans. Ian Johnston (Arlington: Richer Resources, 2009), 31.

²⁷ Heidegger, *Being and Time*, 165–6.

²⁸ Murray Stein, *Jung's Map of the Soul. An Introduction* (Chicago: Open Court, 1998), 109.

²⁹ CW 7 §78, CW 9/I §513, CW 9/II §15, CW 10 §714 (28), CW 16 §134, etc.

Freudian notions of repression [*Verdrängung*] and resistance [*Widerstand*] to show the escapist mechanism of the shadow: “Seen from the one-sided point of view of the conscious attitude, the shadow is an inferior component of the personality and is consequently repressed through intensive resistance.”³⁰ The Ego does not want to accept the content of the shadow: “The shadow personifies everything that the subject refuses to acknowledge about himself”³¹. I cannot see myself in the shadow: the shadow is my hidden and denied brother, it is “the thing he [the individual] has no wish to be”³². Moreover, the shadow consists “not just of little weaknesses and foibles, but of a positively demonic dynamism”³³. The shadow, understood as a “heart of darkness within the ego”,³⁴ is the inner devil we have committed in the basement of our being, afraid of his aggressiveness and force. We are afraid of our own interiority, this is why we flee from ourselves into the persona, the “they” or bad faith. But the persona is a sort of fake mirroring, while “the shadow ... is a sort of counter-persona”.³⁵ The shadow, “the dark, un-lived, and repressed side of the ego complex”,³⁶ the “part of the personality which has been repressed for the sake of the ego ideal”,³⁷ is the first acquisition on the path of the individuation. “There is no development unless the shadow is accepted”.³⁸

If the persona were the interface between the Ego and the world, the shadow would be – in Jungian terms – the interface between the Ego and the Self. We find externality beyond the persona and internality beyond the shadow. Who are we really? We would probably be afraid to really grasp who we are. “It is a rare and shattering experience for him to gaze into the face of absolute evil”,³⁹ to say *Tat Twam Asi* [“thou art that” in Sanskrit] to our inner demon.

Jung warns us⁴⁰ that the shadow corresponds to the Freudian personal unconscious: “The personal unconscious contains lost memories, painful ideas that are repressed (i.e., forgotten on purpose), subliminal perceptions, by which are meant sense-perceptions that were not strong enough to reach consciousness, and finally, contents that are not yet ripe for consciousness. It corresponds to the figure of the shadow so frequently met with in dreams.”⁴¹

One could say, using a more technical term from Freud's second theory describing the psyche, that the shadow corresponds to the *id*. “It is the dark, inaccessible part of our personality ... We approach the id with analogies: we call it a chaos, a cauldron full of seething

³⁰ CW 7 §78.

³¹ CW 9/I §513.

³² CW 16, §470

³³ CW 7 §35.

³⁴ Murray Stein, *Jung's Map of the Soul. An Introduction*, 107.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 110.

³⁶ Marie-Louise von Franz, *Shadow and Evil in Fairy Tales. Revised Edition* (Boston: Shambhala, 1995), 3.

³⁷ Edward C. Whitmont, *The Symbolic Quest. Basic Concepts of Analytical Psychology* (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), 160.

³⁸ CW 9/I §600.

³⁹ CW 9/II, §19.

⁴⁰ CW 9/I §474.

⁴¹ CW 7 §103.

excitations.”⁴² Freud's definition echoes Schopenhauer's interpretation of the will: “[I]n itself the will is as wild and impetuous an impulse as is the force appearing in the plunging waterfall; in fact it is, as we know, ultimately identical therewith”⁴³. Therefore, the shadow would be “a cauldron full of seething excitations” or a “plunging waterfall”, fitting metaphors for the huge unconscious source of energy.

The source of Jung's exploration of the shadow is not Freudian though, it is more likely Nietzschean. Nietzsche's short dialogues from *The Wanderer and His Shadow* present the original depiction of the shadow, its ambiguity, reclusiveness and mysterious density:

The Shadow: It seemed to us as if we were too close to you to be permitted to speak about ourselves.

The Wanderer: Delicately put! very delicately! Ah, you shadows are 'better humans' than we, I perceive.

The Shadow: And yet you call us “intrusive” – us, who understand at least one thing well: how to be silent and how to wait – no Englander understands it better. It is true that you find us very, very often trailing along behind humans, yet not in subjection to them. When a human avoids the light, we avoid him: thus far, at least, does our freedom extend.

The Wanderer: Ah, but the light avoids humans much more often, and then you also forsake them.

The Shadow: It has often caused me pain to abandon you: much about human beings has remained dark to me, deeply curious as I am, because I cannot always be around them.⁴⁴

Considering the original Nietzschean notion of the shadow from this text, we can see that it is not always easy to discern between shadow, Ego and persona, that all these three concepts are dynamic and share their semantic territory with each other. A simple mathematical rule would claim that there is an almost perfect contradistinction between persona and shadow: the more “ideal” and pleasant the persona, the denser the hidden shadow. “Everything profound loves masks”,⁴⁵ remarked Nietzsche, claiming that a profound shadow needs a spectacular persona or that the depth of the shadow and the falseness of the persona go hand in hand. Coming back to the Nietzschean dialogue between the wanderer and the shadow, we also note this specific and constitutive need of the shadow for light (“when a human avoids the light, we avoid him”). What is the meaning of “light” in this context? The persona is fake light for the authentic (but heavy and darkened) shadow. Light can mean one of two things:

⁴² Sigmund Freud, *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, trans. W. J. H. Sprott (New York: Norton, 1933), 105–6.

⁴³ Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, vol. 2, trans. E. F. J. Payne (New York: Dover, 1958), 213.

⁴⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human and Unpublished Fragments*, trans. Gary Handwerk (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2013), 293.

⁴⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, 38.

a) The Self is the true judge of the shadow, its lighthouse in the realm of darkness, its soteriological symbol in the hell of the unconscious. We are travellers on the Ego-Self axis (Edinger) and the integration of the shadow may be our first step. One could almost say that the fake light of the persona hides the plutonic side of the shadow. Conversely, the dense darkness of the shadow is just a cover-up for the magnificent brilliance of the Self.

b) If the shadow were in strict inferiority, its repression and unawareness would be understandable. But the shadow also has a *bright side* (what Nietzsche called “light”, and this is its secondary meaning), also containing a great deal of unused energy, which could help us improve ourselves. It “does not consist only of morally reprehensible tendencies, but also displays a number of good qualities, such as normal instincts, appropriate reactions, realistic insights, creative impulses”.⁴⁶ The discovery and integration of the shadow is a process necessary for the individual self-creation. The shadow “even contains childish or primitive qualities which would in a way vitalize and embellish human existence”.⁴⁷ Taking into account the immense potential of the creative libido residing in the dark and dense shadow, Jung claimed that “the shadow was 90 percent pure gold”.⁴⁸ We, therefore, see that the shadow is a fake inferiority, containing authentic potentialities of achieving individuation. Reversing an alchemical aphorism quoted by Jung,⁴⁹ one should say: “Son, extract from the shadow its ray!”

The constitution of the shadow for Nietzsche and Jung has yet a deeper level. Considering Lucy Huskinson's suggestion that *Übermensch* and Self are more or less the same thing,⁵⁰ what is the Nietzschean equivalent of the Jungian shadow? Remembering that the shadow itself makes a spectacular appearance in *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* (“With you I strived to enter everything forbidden, worst, remotest... ‘Nothing is true, all is permitted’: thus I persuaded myself. I plunged into the coldest waters, with head and heart.”⁵¹), the most intriguing personification of the shadow may be the last human. Nietzsche's masterpiece is built on the contrast between *Übermensch* and the last human, between the “being of overcoming” who is capable to transgress and goes beyond human nature and the being who refuses to realize the inherent potentialities of human kind, sliding towards devolution.

Beware! The time approaches when human beings will no longer give birth to a dancing star. Beware! The time of the most contemptible human is coming, the one who can no longer have contempt for himself.

Behold! I show you *the last human being*.

⁴⁶ CW 9/II §422f.

⁴⁷ CW 11 §134, p. 95.

⁴⁸ C. G. Jung, quoted in John A. Sanford, *The Strange Trial of Mr. Hyde. A New Look at the Nature of Human Evil* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987), 126–7.

⁴⁹ CW 14 §117.

⁵⁰ Lucy Huskinson, *Nietzsche and Jung. The Whole Self in the Union of Opposites* (New York: Brunner-Routledge, 2004) 89–90.

⁵¹ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, trans. Adrian del Caro (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 221.

‘What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?’ – thus asks the last human being, blinking.

Then the earth has become small, and on it hops the last human being, who makes everything small. His kind is ineradicable, like the flea beetle; the last human being lives longest.

‘We invented happiness’ – say the last human beings, blinking.⁵²

Having contempt for oneself, according to Nietzsche, is somehow necessary in order to evolve, to break the static structure of the subject, to “become who we (truly) are”. The last human is the doppelgänger of the *Übermensch*, his shadow, the being that anticipates and hopes for a happy apocalypse, choosing the slumber of media over self-awareness. For him, “love” (going beyond the principle of the individual, a sort of self-overcoming through the other), “creation” (an achievement of a superior and generous being, one that despises pettiness) and “longing” (a Heraclitic projection as opposed to the satisfied repression of the ignorant), “the star” (the very symbol of transcendence, mobility and purpose) literally mean nothing. The defiant, dangerous, dumb and blinking inventors of a most contemptible happiness, the last human beings represent a particularly scary and touching shadowy figure, one that if we are true to ourselves, will soon be acknowledged.

We should end our research with a few remarks on the identification with the shadow (Jung's controversial diagnosis of Nietzsche) that is “a phenomenon which occurs with great regularity at such moments of collision with the unconscious”, transforming the subject “into a hero or into a godlike being, a superhuman entity”.⁵³ This identification presupposes the demise of the consciousness, the death of the inner “sun”, which adverts to the nihilist feeling of Byron's masterpiece, *Darkness*:

The bright sun was extinguish'd, and the stars
 Did wander darkling in the eternal space,
 Rayless, and pathless, and the icy earth
 Swung blind and blackening in the moonless air;
 Morn came and went—and came, and brought no day ...
 A fearful hope was all the world contain'd;
 Forests were set on fire—but hour by hour
 They fell and faded—and the crackling trunks
 Extinguish'd with a crash—and all was black.⁵⁴

The sombreness of the consciousness, the dissolution of the Ego, the disjunction in the structure of identity (I ≠ I), the strangeness and alienation are all symptoms of the identification

⁵² Ibid., 9–10.

⁵³ CW 7 §40f.

⁵⁴ G. G. Byron, *Selected Poems*, ed. Paul Wright (Ware, Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions, 2006), 775.

with the shadow. One can redefine this identification as death of the Ego, who is annihilated by the dark contents of the unconsciousness. We can almost say that if the integration of the shadow may be understood as a sort of consciousness of the unconscious (building a *Lichtung* in the heart of darkness), the identification with the shadow would be – in an inverse manner – an unconsciousness of the conscious (a *Verdunkelung* that contaminates all light).