

1 Chapter 8

2 **Hegel on law, women**
3 **and contract**4 *Alison Stone*5 **Introduction**

6 Hegel is infamous for his view that in properly constituted societies women are
7 confined to the family and excluded from the public spheres of work and politics.
8 In his very well-known discussion of the matter in his *Elements of the Philosophy*
9 *of Right*, published in 1821, he claims that:

10 The *one* [that is, the male sex] ... divides itself up into personal self-
11 sufficiency with being *for itself* and the knowledge and volition of *free*
12 *universality*, that is, into the self-consciousness of conceptual thought and
13 the volition of the objective and ultimate end. And the *other* [that is,
14 the female sex] ... maintains itself in unity as knowledge and volition of the
15 substantial in the form of concrete *individuality* and *feeling* ... [T]he former
16 is powerful and active, the latter passive and subjective. Man therefore has
17 his actual substantial life in the state, in science, etc., and otherwise in
18 work and struggle ... so that it is only through his division that he fights his
19 way to self-sufficient unity with himself. In the family, he has a peaceful
20 intuition of this unity, and an emotive and subjective ethical life. Woman,
21 however, has her substantial vocation in the family, and her ethical disposi-
22 tion consists in this *piety*. (Hegel, 1991: §166, 206)¹

23 Hegel thinks, then, that women's role is to tend their families within the house-
24 hold. He considers women to be inherently unfit to participate in the worlds of
25 (extra-domestic) work and politics or to engage in sustained intellectual activ-
26 ity. Many feminist scholars have argued that these views do not merely reflect
27 Hegel's acceptance of the prejudices of his time, but follow from his legal and
28 political philosophy more broadly, in a way that makes Hegel's entire political
29 philosophy problematic from a feminist viewpoint. A leading figure among these
30 scholars is Pateman, who argues in her now-classic book *The Sexual Contract*
31 (1988) that Hegel held these views about women because, although critical of
32 social contract theory, he retains (what Pateman sees as) the traditional

1 contractarian belief in an opposition between female body and the status of
2 being a contracting individual.

3 Other feminist scholars, however, have sought to defend Hegel by arguing that
4 his demeaning views on women contradict his broader system, thus reflecting
5 merely contingent biases on his part, from which his work can be extricated so
6 as to yield a system that is both coherent and liberatory for women.² Landes
7 (1981), for instance, argues that Hegel's account of women's familial role
8 conflicts with his attribution to women of civil personality and modern agency.
9 Mills (1996b) argues that his consignment of women to this familial role arbi-
10 trarily limits the possibilities for the development of human spirit (*Geist*).
11 Ravven's (1988) version of this approach is exemplary. She argues that Hegel
12 retains in the modern social world more-or-less exactly the same division
13 between private and public spheres which he found in the ancient Greek world.
14 (He described that division in terms of the split between Antigone acting from
15 the familial principle, who carries out her sisterly duty to bury and commemorate
16 her dead brother Polyneices, and Creon acting from the political principle, who
17 prohibits and punishes this burial of someone whom he deems a traitor.)
18 According to Ravven, the Greeks adhered to this division because they organ-
19 ised social institutions on the basis of nature. Yet in the modern world society
20 supposed to be organised by reason – on Hegel's own account. So it is incoherent
21 that he nonetheless assigns women to the family, that is takes nature as a basis
22 for social divisions. On Hegel's own grounds, Ravven concludes, in modern soci-
23 ety women should be treated as 'fully human and rational' and allowed full access
24 to civil society and the state (Hegel, 1988: 150).

25 Against the background of these feminist debates about Hegel's system, this
26 chapter aims to reinterpret Hegel's views on women, and to show that they do
27 form an integral part of his legal and political philosophy, specifically insofar as
28 it is entwined with his philosophies of nature and mind. Crucially, what connects
29 these different areas of Hegel's thought is his belief that a properly constituted
30 society must be organically structured. An organic social whole, for him, is
31 articulated into three subsystems or social spheres: the sphere of 'immediate
32 unity' – the family; the sphere of 'difference' – civil society, the realm of
33 economic life; and the sphere of 'mediated unity' – the state (see Neuhouser,
34 2000: 133). Hegel also believes that some people must be permanently stationed
35 in each of the earlier spheres, that is in the family and in civil society. He thinks
36 that women must remain within the sphere of the family because women's
37 bodies and psyches embody a lack of differentiation between self and other,
38 whereas men's bodies and psyches embody a principle of difference. Hegel makes
39 these latter claims in his *Philosophy of Nature* and *Philosophy of Mind* (both
40 published successively in 1817, 1827 and 1830).

41 By presenting this reinterpretation of Hegel, I aim to intervene in the feminist
42 debates about Hegel. I will argue that Pateman is right to regard Hegel's patriar-
43 chal stance on women as integral to his system and as connected with his critical
44 response to contract theory, but in my view the connecting factor is Hegel's

1 organicist – and anti-contractarian – idea of the state, which forms part of his
 2 broader emphasis on organic wholes. However, this might seem to imply that
 3 Hegel's organicism should be rejected because it is indissociable from his sexist
 4 view of women. Instead I propose to re-evaluate Hegel's organicism. Despite its
 5 negative consequences for women, it accords productively with recent feminist
 6 efforts to rethink the nature/culture relation and to reconceive nature such that it
 7 is not negatively opposed to culture. Thus my conclusion will differ from that of
 8 most feminists, for whom Hegel's patriarchal views on women either are a fatal
 9 flaw in his system (Pateman) or would be such a flaw if they were integral to that
 10 system but fortunately are not (Mills, Ravven and others). In contrast, I will
 11 conclude that Hegel's views on women form part of a constellation of philosophi-
 12 cal positions that he holds concerning nature, culture and freedom, a constella-
 13 tion that despite its sexism can still be fruitful for contemporary feminism.

14 **Hegel's political philosophy and his conception of law**

15 Before we can understand women's place in Hegel's system, we need to appreci-
 16 ate his basic project in the *Philosophy of Right*. This is to show that a certain set
 17 of social institutions is uniquely legitimate because, together, these institutions
 18 provide the necessary conditions of individual freedom. He believed that this set
 19 of institutions was realised, at least in nucleus, in the most advanced contempo-
 20 rary European societies of his day. The starting point for the *Philosophy of Right*
 21 is, then, the assumption that individuals are free, or have free will. Hegel remarks
 22 that free will is familiar to each of us from our own experience (Hegel, 1991: §4,
 23 37). Although Hegel continually refines his account of free will as the *Philosophy*
 24 *of Right* progresses, at the outset he takes free will to be the ability to choose, from
 25 one's range of individual desires or available courses of action, which to pursue
 26 (Hegel, 1991: 11, 45).

27 The first social institution that, Hegel argues, is a necessary condition of
 28 individual freedom in this sense is private property. I cannot be genuinely free
 29 unless I am surrounded by objects that provide tangible evidence of my freedom
 30 and in which 'I regard myself as free' (Hegel, 1991: §18, 224). To make objects
 31 manifest my freedom to me, I must seize, mould and use them in ways that I
 32 freely choose. The moulded and well-used character of these objects then gives
 33 me back a sign of the freedom that I have exercised with respect to those
 34 objects. By moulding and seizing objects in this way, I have been making
 35 these objects into my property – making them into things which are 'mine'
 36 because they manifest my will.

37 Hegel might seem, until this point, to have been dealing with completely
 38 asocial individuals. Actually, though, he maintains that no one can own any
 39 item of property unless others recognise they can do so. Unless others recognise
 40 that a given item is 'mine', others will try to seize and mould that item them-
 41 selves, and in that case the object will come to manifest some other person's will
 42 rather than my own. So, Hegel concludes, property ownership actually depends

1 on contract – in each case, one’s ownership of some item depends on others
2 making and abiding by an agreement to acknowledge that one owns that item
3 (Hegel, 1991: §7, 102). However, others will never be willing to recognise me as
4 the owner of a given set of objects unless those others are themselves prospective
5 property owners who seek my recognition and are willing to recognise my will in
6 order to obtain reciprocal recognition from me. Thus no one can own property
7 unless he recognises others to be property owners as well.

8 Hegel refers to the sphere of property and contract as ‘abstract right’. He calls
9 the relations between individual property owners – relations in which they
10 recognise and respect one another as persons with equal standing – ‘relations of
11 right’ (*Rechtsverhältnisse*). Hegel’s overall argument has been that these relations
12 of right are a necessary condition of property ownership and therefore, in turn,
13 of individual freedom which requires private property. So, Hegel is arguing, basic
14 features of a legitimate society are that it must not infringe individuals’ rights to
15 be self-determining persons and that it must allow individuals to recognise and
16 respect one another as self-determining persons.

17 Nonetheless, Hegel believes that relations of right have their limitations. One
18 property owner will only ever recognise another, and abide by his contractual
19 agreements, when doing so is to his own advantage (securing for him the recog-
20 nition of his own will). So if any opportunities arise for an individual to gain the
21 recognition he seeks without conferring recognition on the other party, then that
22 individual will seize this opportunity – that is, he will make fraudulent contracts
23 or commit various forms of theft. Wrong, or crime, is a constantly recurring
24 problem within relations of right (Hegel, 1991: §82, 115–16). What is needed to
25 overcome this problem is for individuals to learn to recognise others, not merely
26 because recognising others is a means to their own satisfaction, but because they
27 have genuine concern that the needs of others (needs for recognition in this
28 case) should be met. Individuals must learn to be concerned about the needs and
29 interests of others as well as about their own interests. That is, individuals must
30 learn to be moral and so, Hegel argues, a legitimate society will also contain the
31 institution of morality.

32 Yet individuals can only learn to be moral if they are educated to embrace the
33 interests of others, and they can only be so educated if they live, and are brought
34 up, within the right set of social institutions (Hegel, 1991: §153, 196). This set
35 of interlocking institutions Hegel calls ‘ethical life’ (*Sittlichkeit*); it consists of the
36 family, civil society and the state. Within the family, individuals lose any sense
37 of having purely individual interests and come to identify their good with the
38 common good of the entire family. Individuals experience their identification
39 with the family’s common good as the feeling of love for their family members.
40 The family plays a vital role in educating people to be directly concerned that
41 the interests of others – more precisely, the interests of the family as a whole –
42 should be satisfied. However, this is only part of what is required to support
43 relations of right, because situations in which everyone directly identifies with a
44 common good can only arise within small-scale and emotionally intense

1 communities, such as nuclear families. So while a legitimate form of society must
 2 include the family, it must also include other spheres, including that Hegel which
 3 calls ‘civil society’ (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*).

4 Civil society is the field where individuals work and engage in economic
 5 activities and transactions. This does not mean that civil society is identical with
 6 relations of abstract right. Civil society additionally includes: the law and the
 7 legal apparatus of courts, prisons, etc.; the ‘police’ (which makes public arrange-
 8 ments that promote general well-being, e.g. street lighting, price regulation); and
 9 ‘corporations’ (trade associations). The existence of these various institutions
 10 encourages citizens to be ‘public spirited’ – to value these institutions on the
 11 grounds of the benefits that they bring to everyone. The legal system benefits
 12 everyone by enforcing individuals’ rights and forcing owners to respect one
 13 another – which it does not only by punishing criminals, but also because the law
 14 provides a statement of the principles of right and mutual respect, a statement
 15 which commands everyone’s respect just because it expresses what is right. Law
 16 in this sense of a statement of the principles of right is what Hegel calls ‘positive
 17 law’, *das Gesetz* – right which has been formulated in statements, or ‘posited’
 18 (*gesetzt*) (Hegel, 1991: §211, 241).

19 Since Hegel maintains that the law commands respect in virtue of expressing
 20 the principles of right, he appears to think that the law can never be wrong and
 21 cannot legitimately be criticised. Knowles reasonably asks: ‘Is Hegel signalling a
 22 conservative (and ... servile) acceptance of law as we find it, however awful its
 23 demands?’ (Knowles, 2002: 276). I believe not: Hegel is talking about what the
 24 law *ought* to be like if it is to guarantee relations of right and therefore provide
 25 one of the necessary conditions of individual freedom. He is not denying that
 26 actual laws or systems of law may fail to live up to this ideal. Even when actual
 27 laws do fall short, though, Hegel thinks that we can only criticise those faulty
 28 laws by contrasting them to the ideal of a fully legitimate legal system – the ideal
 29 which he is trying to articulate.

30 Hegel argues that the legal system can only command the assent from indi-
 31 viduals which it deserves if (a) every citizen is familiar with the content of the
 32 law and (b) the legal system is sufficiently transparent that it can be seen to be
 33 fulfilling its function of enforcing individuals’ rights, and doing so fairly and
 34 effectively (Hegel, 1991: §132R, 159–60. For (a) to be possible, the law must be
 35 written down in an orderly, accessible and readily intelligible form. For (b) to be
 36 possible, criminal proceedings should be public, due process must be observed
 37 and jury trial should exist.

38 Civil society, then, as Hegel sees it, includes institutions such as a transparent
 39 legal system and public authorities, institutions which manifestly promote the
 40 interests of all individuals, and which each individual learns to respect and value
 41 on that account. In this way civil society educates people to feel and show
 42 concern for the interests of others – yet still in an unsatisfactory way, Hegel
 43 thinks. The structure of civil society presupposes that each individual pursues his
 44 own interests, which he takes to be interests that he has purely as an individual;

1 in addition, civil society educates people to be concerned about the interests that
2 others also take themselves to have just as individuals. But civil society does not
3 educate individuals to be concerned about interests that they, and others, take
4 themselves to have *not* just as individuals but in virtue of belonging to a collec-
5 tive (Hegel, 1991: §258R, 276). We might say in Rousseau's terms that civil
6 society accommodates only the will of all but not yet a truly general will.

7 Hegel concludes that the final sphere of ethical life, the state, is necessary
8 because it educates citizens to identify their interests with those of the state as a
9 whole. The state is the set of institutions in which political representatives
10 deliberate about and carry out what is in the whole community's good. By
11 participating in the state – via their deputies – each citizen comes to feel that his
12 sense of self is bound up with his membership in this collective (he acquires a
13 sense of national identity and pride) and so he becomes motivated to embrace
14 the good of the collective as a whole. However, in embracing this common good,
15 citizens do not abandon any sense of having purely individual interests. Citizens
16 continue to spend most of their time pursuing the purely individual interests that
17 they, as *Bürger* (participants in civil society) take themselves, and other *Bürger*,
18 to have. Yet the institutions of civil society – for example, the legal system – are
19 ultimately orchestrated and regulated by the state. Through political participa-
20 tion, citizens become aware of this, and realise that even in pursuing their indi-
21 vidual interests they are still doing what is in the common good: they are
22 pursuing economic activities to which the state, the arbiter of the common good,
23 has given its support.

24 Overall, Hegel has argued that this whole family/civil society/state
25 conglomerate is legitimate because it provides the conditions of individual
26 freedom. More specifically, relations of right – property and contract relations –
27 are necessary conditions of individual freedom of choice. And the institutions
28 of ethical life are the necessary conditions without which relations of right
29 will unravel into endless cycles of crime. As Cornell et al. note (1991: x–xi),
30 then, Hegel's account of law has the merit that it recognises the necessity of
31 certain basic, inalienable, rights to individual self-determination and dignity,
32 rights which may not be infringed and which the state must respect and
33 protect. But – and for Cornell et al. this is also a merit of Hegel's account –
34 he denies that these individual rights provide a sufficient basis for social coex-
35 istence. For him, relations of right depend on institutional frameworks of
36 family, civil society and state.

37 Hegel's entire argument in the *Philosophy of Right* may be regarded as a critical
38 response to social contract theory. Hegel himself denounces social contract
39 theory, which, he claims, 'proceeds atomistically and moves upward from the
40 basis of individuality' (1991: §165A, 197). To speak very generally, social
41 contract theorists hold that all individuals are free and argue that institutions are
42 only acceptable if individuals have freely agreed to establish or participate in
43 them, or would, rationally, so agree. Hegel takes his analysis of relations
44 of abstract right to have shown that no lasting social relationships can be

1 established on the basis of contractual agreements, because contractual agree-
 2 ments presuppose self-interested individuals, whose self-interest will motivate
 3 them to renege on or dispense with their agreements whenever it suits them.
 4 Even property relations cannot be maintained unless society contains some insti-
 5 tutions that do not rest on voluntary agreements, but within which individuals
 6 live and are educated prior to any possibility of contracting into them.

7 Despite these criticisms of social contract theory, Hegel does not reject every
 8 aspect of it. He agrees with contract theorists that social institutions are legiti-
 9 mate only if they enable and promote individual freedom, where this freedom is
 10 still understood in terms of individual choice between different options or differ-
 11 ent antecedently given personal desires. Indeed we might almost see Hegel as
 12 arguing in a Hobbesian vein that individuals can never securely hold onto their
 13 own private property unless they live under a form of political organisation that
 14 induces others to respect that property. Unlike Hobbes, though, Hegel envisages
 15 the required form of political organisation to be one that educates individuals to
 16 willingly adhere to the common good, and which transforms individuals' entire
 17 motivational structure so that they cease to be the purely self-interested agents
 18 that they were from the standpoint of abstract right. And, unlike contract theo-
 19 rists more generally, Hegel believes that the state can only do this in cooperation
 20 with civil society and the family, and that all these social institutions can only
 21 perform their educational role if they lie beyond the reach of voluntary agree-
 22 ment, as a background context of social and ethical life in which individuals are
 23 bathed throughout their existence. This context, then, cannot be one into which
 24 one enters by contracting; rather, it forms the necessary precondition of any reli-
 25 able contract.

26 **The place of women in Hegel's system**

27 Where do Hegel's views on women fit into his legal and political philosophy? He
 28 discusses women's social role within his account of the family. Upon marrying,
 29 he says, women change their names, leave their families to enter those of their
 30 husbands, and cede responsibility for property ownership and management to
 31 their husbands (Hegel, 1996: §82, 150–1). As Pateman points out:

32 Hegel's marriage conforms to the ... law of coverture, [which] Sir William
 33 Blackstone explained as follows: 'By marriage, the husband and wife are as
 34 one person in law: that is, the very being, or legal existence of the woman is
 35 suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated
 36 into that of the husband. (Pateman, 1996: 214)

37 Pateman offers a leading account of how Hegel's views on women follow from his
 38 general philosophy, specifically from his critical response to social contract
 39 theory. Since this response is, as we have seen, at the centre of his entire
 40 project in the *Philosophy of Right*, Pateman's suggestion that Hegel's response to

1 contract theory is the source of his views on women is plausible, so it is worth
2 examining and assessing her interpretation of Hegel.

3 Pateman begins by showing that Hegel formed his account of women and
4 the family against the backdrop of the puzzle of the marriage 'contract' as it
5 had existed in Christian societies up until Hegel's time. Marriage had been
6 defined as a contract since at least the fourteenth century, yet had never rested
7 on any 'agreement between two equal partners who negotiate until they arrive
8 at terms that are to their mutual advantage' (Pateman, 1988: 154–5). Rather,
9 the marriage contract was unwritten and included the wife's commitment to
10 obey and serve her husband. The terms of this peculiar-looking 'contract'
11 could not, and still largely cannot, be adjusted to suit the spouses' interests and
12 circumstances; for example, spouses cannot agree on how long their marriage
13 is to last.

14 According to Pateman, Hegel makes sense of the anomaly of the marriage
15 contract by seeing marriage as unique among other kinds of contract, in that it
16 is a 'contract to transcend the standpoint of contract' (Pateman, 1988: 174). By
17 the 'standpoint of contract' Hegel means the outlook of individual property
18 owners, a self-interested outlook which as we have seen easily slides into criminal
19 grasping at others' property. This internal tension within the standpoint of
20 contract means that contractual relations cannot function reliably unless they
21 are supplemented by other, non-contractual, social relationships. So the stand-
22 point of contract must be 'transcended': integrated within social relationships in
23 which individuals become genuinely concerned for the interests of others. An
24 agreement to marry is an agreement by which property owners relinquish their
25 sense of having purely individual interests and embrace the good which they and
26 their spouse share as a couple. In this way those who get married are contracting
27 to give up the standpoint of contract. Hegel's general picture of the family is thus
28 of a piece with his anti-contractarian project.

29 Moreover, Hegel believes that living in a family atmosphere of love and trust
30 instils in individuals – both spouses and their children – a disposition to abide by
31 promises and contracts. Thus family life is the necessary precondition at the
32 affective level for reliable and lasting contractual relationships. Yet family life
33 cannot itself be contractually based, otherwise it would not involve the atmos-
34 phere of whole-hearted devotion to common interests from which the members'
35 feelings of love and trust issue.

36 According to Hegel, though, the only family members who ever progress
37 outside their families are men. How, then, Pateman asks, are women able – as
38 Hegel says they are – to make contracts to get married? Pateman's answer is that,
39 according to Hegel, contractual relationships and free personhood are essential
40 aspects of (although not sufficient for) modern civil life (Pateman, 1988: 188).
41 As such, women must be permitted to participate in these aspects of modern civil
42 life to at least some extent. But this participation cannot extend as far as
43 full-blown engagement in the public world of property and contract. Rather,
44 according to Hegel, women should have just enough civil personality that they

112 Feminist encounters with legal philosophy

1 can agree to get married and thereupon renounce any further claim to be free
2 persons capable of entering into contracts.

3 But why does Hegel hold the initial view that women are not fit to participate
4 in the public sphere? After all, one might accept Hegel's idea that family rela-
5 tionships are non-contractual and rest on feelings of love and trust and a sense
6 of common interest, but argue that these relationships equip *all* family members –
7 both men and women – to participate in economic relations outside the family.
8 According to Pateman, the reason why Hegel thinks women must remain within
9 the family is because his political philosophy inherits a particular conception of
10 contract from classical contract theory. This conception of contract includes a
11 particular conception of the kind of individual who is able to make contracts. On
12 this conception, the contracting individual is defined in opposition to the
13 female-bodied individual. Pateman explains:

14 The body of the 'individual' is very different from women's bodies. His body
15 is tightly enclosed within boundaries, but women's bodies are permeable,
16 their contours change shape and they are subject to cyclical processes. All
17 these differences are summed up in the natural bodily process of birth.
18 (Pateman, 1988: 96)

19 According to classical contract theory, the contracting individual is someone
20 who can own property, and this capacity derives from the individual's ownership
21 of his own body. For example, Locke holds that one has property rights over
22 anything with which one 'mixes one's labour' (Locke, 1988: 287–8); thus prop-
23 erty rights derive from a prior right over one's own labour and so, in turn, over
24 the body with which one can labour. However, a hidden assumption in
25 social contract theory is that women cannot own their bodies (or, at least,
26 cannot own them in the unproblematic way that men do) because the boundaries
27 of women's bodies are fuzzy. In particular, no clear boundaries separate pregnant
28 women's bodies from those of the foetuses they carry. The classical idea of the
29 contracting individual thus carries with it an assumption that this individual is
30 male and that having a female body, in contrast, makes it difficult if not impos-
31 sible for someone to own herself, to own property and to make contracts. Women
32 are in this way naturally lacking in self-control and open to being dominated by
33 others.

34 When Hegel takes over the idea of the contracting individual, he takes over
35 these assumptions as well, Pateman argues (1988: 180–1). Because of these
36 assumptions, Hegel cannot see how women – with their female bodies – can take
37 part in relations of right, and he concludes that they must have no opportunity
38 to make contracts other than the initial contract by which they get married.
39 Moreover, Hegel argues that because in each family only the man progresses into
40 the public world, it must always be the man who takes on the job of thinking
41 and acting on behalf of his family's common interests. Every household must be
42 male-headed.

1 Hegel himself at this point wonders whether the allegedly ‘universal’,
2 common, interests which the individual marriage partners come to embrace (on
3 his account) are actually the *masculine* interests of the husband (Hegel, 1996:
4 §83R, 151). Yet Hegel reiterates that marriage does establish a genuine sense of
5 common interests in its members, and is not merely an institution within which
6 one individualistic person dominates another. He believes, though, that it is
7 always the husband who must take on the role of identifying what the family’s
8 common interests consist in and deciding how best to meet them. He must do
9 this because he alone can advance beyond the family into civil society. As Hegel
10 puts it, the husband becomes ‘primarily responsible for external acquisition and
11 for caring for the family’s needs’ (Hegel, 1996: §171, 209).

12 So, the family as Hegel portrays it embodies two forms of inequality between
13 women and men (not that he himself understands these to be forms of inequal-
14 ity). Firstly, men progress beyond the family and women cannot. This becomes
15 the source of a second inequality, because it means that the husband acquires the
16 exclusive right to serve as the representative of his family. And with this right,
17 he gains additional rights: to exercise control over the family’s property, to
18 bestow his name on any children, and to cause the severance of his wife’s ties
19 with her family of origin. Hegel explains, ‘both of the persons who marry want
20 to constitute one person; [therefore] the wife loses her name and no longer
21 belongs to her family’ (Hegel, 1996: §78R, 145).

22 Pateman explains these views of Hegel’s by arguing that they stem from his
23 male-centred conception of contract, which leads him to think that women are
24 unfit to take part in the contractual relations which regulate social intercourse
25 outside the family. But a serious problem with Pateman’s account of Hegel is that
26 he does not simply take over, but actually rejects, the traditional contractarian
27 idea that the contracting individual is a self-sufficient owner of property. Hegel
28 argues that individuals can only own property if they are recognised to do so by
29 others, so that owners are never self-sufficient. Their capacities for ownership
30 actually depend on their relations with others, and ideally society will be struc-
31 tured so that it enables and encourages individual owners to recognise others for
32 their own sake. Here Hegel is redefining what it is to be a contracting individual.
33 On his redefinition, the contracting individual is never self-contained but is
34 embedded in a network of relations of recognition which constitute him (or,
35 potentially, her) as a property owner. But if being a contracting individual does
36 not involve self-sufficiency but, on the contrary, involves complex relations of
37 dependence on others, then being a contracting individual is not necessarily
38 incompatible with the (*ex hypothesi*) female condition of lacking clear boundaries
39 that differentiate one’s body from those of others. So, far from conceiving the
40 activity of contracting to be incompatible with having a female body, Hegel
41 rethinks contracting in a way that makes it, in principle, *compatible* with having
42 a porous female body.

43 Because Hegel rethinks contract so that it is at least potentially compatible
44 with having a female body, it cannot – as Pateman argues – be his conception of

1 contract which leads him to place women in the private sphere. So we still lack
 2 an adequate explanation of why Hegel believes that women belong in the family.
 3 Still, Pateman's explanation does point in the right direction. Hegel does indeed
 4 think that the female body embodies a lack of differentiation between self and
 5 other. And he does indeed think that this feature of the female body means that
 6 women should not participate in the public realm. But for Hegel this is not
 7 because women's bodies make them incapable of contracting. Rather, for Hegel,
 8 it is because women's bodies suit them to be the full-time 'organs' of just one
 9 subsystem within an organically structured society – the subsystem of 'immediate
 10 unity', the family.

11 **'Immediate unity' in the family and the female body**

12 We have seen that Hegel criticises contract theory on the grounds that voluntary
 13 relations can only be coherently maintained within social institutions to which
 14 individuals belong non-voluntarily. Ultimately, Hegel is arguing here that indi-
 15 viduals can only have freedom of choice if they are also free in what he regards
 16 as a deeper sense: if they also have what Neuhaus calls 'social freedom', the
 17 freedom to act in accordance with social roles and positions (for example, the
 18 role of a family member) which are essential to their identities (Neuhaus,
 19 2000: 33).

20 This deserves a little elaboration. As Hardimon explains, Hegel's idea is that
 21 the modern social world needs to be so organised that it enables individuals to
 22 'actualize themselves as individuals ... and as social members' (Hardimon, 1994:
 23 102). If society only enabled individuals to be free *as* individuals – in terms of
 24 exercising the ability to choose between options and desires – then what Hegel
 25 regards as a fundamental need of individuals would remain unfulfilled, namely
 26 their need to feel at home in the social world – and not merely to feel at home
 27 in a deluded way but to feel *and be* at home. Individuals need to feel, not alien-
 28 ated from society, but that it is their home. For this they need to be able to
 29 participate in social institutions, to act according to the roles available within
 30 those institutions, and to affirm these roles rather than finding them a constraint
 31 or burden. Thus this kind of social freedom is a fundamental part of freedom, of
 32 being able to act in a self-determining way as opposed to acting from externally
 33 imposed constraints.³ So, again, the individual freedom that contract theory
 34 prizes is possible only in a kind of society organised in fundamentally non-
 35 contractual and non-voluntarist ways.

36 For Hegel, individuals can attain this deeper kind of 'social' freedom only if
 37 the social order is structured in the right way, into the interlocking set of institu-
 38 tions that he has outlined. A social order that is structured in this way – into
 39 distinct but mutually supporting spheres – is organised *organically*, for Hegel.
 40 Here Hegel relies on a particular understanding of what it is to be an organism.
 41 On this understanding, an organism is an entity which has its own purposes
 42 (above all to reproduce itself) and which articulates itself into specialised

1 subsystems (the digestive system, the reproductive organs) which support one
 2 another so as to fulfil the organism's purposes (Hegel, 1971: §381A, 9–10). Hegel
 3 also thinks that every organism is self-determining – that is free – in the sense
 4 that it develops and articulates itself in accordance with its *own*, inbuilt, purpose
 5 or plan. So, an organically structured social order can be described as free, for
 6 Hegel, because it freely organises itself into the determinate set of social institu-
 7 tions that are required for its own purposes qua social order. Ultimately, for
 8 Hegel, individuals cannot have freedom of choice unless they first have social
 9 freedom, and they can only achieve social freedom within a social order that is
 10 *itself* free in the sense of being organically articulated.

11 When Hegel describes the elements of a legitimate social order within the
 12 *Philosophy of Right*, then, he takes it that this social order is a living system:

13 As living spirit, the state exists only as an organised whole, differentiated
 14 into particular functions which proceed from the single concept ... of the
 15 rational will and continually produce it as their result. (Hegel, 1971:
 16 §539, 265)

17 Hegel is using the word 'state' here, as he sometimes does, to mean a structured
 18 social order as a whole. The overall purpose of the social order is to reconcile
 19 people's sense of having individual interests – and, correspondingly, their sense
 20 of being different from one another as individuals – with concern for others and
 21 commitment to the collective good, corresponding to a sense of 'unity' with
 22 others. As a purposive entity, the social order must be subdivided into specialised
 23 spheres, each with a function and character that flow out of the purpose of the
 24 social order as a whole. Specifically, then, the social order must be subdivided
 25 into one sphere that fosters a strong sense of unity between people (the family),
 26 one sphere that fosters a strong sense of difference between people (civil society)
 27 and another sphere that reconciles the two (the state).

28 Hegel's organic conception of society seems to imply that everyone ought to
 29 be permitted to participate in all three spheres, because each sphere enriches its
 30 participants' lives by giving them access to an essential aspect of membership in
 31 a modern society. Apparently, then, women ought to be able to participate fully
 32 in family, civil society and the state, while men ought, as well as having access
 33 to civil society and the state, also to participate in the life of the family as fully
 34 as women, undertaking an equal share of domestic responsibilities. But, of course,
 35 Hegel does not agree; he thinks that women may participate only in the familial
 36 sphere. This is because, as Wood points out, for Hegel 'differentiated institutions
 37 require a social differentiation among individuals. Each principle [that is each
 38 sphere] must have its proper representative and guardian' (Wood, 1990: 244).
 39 Given specialised institutions, certain individuals must be permanently based in
 40 and responsible for each of them. This conclusion follows from Hegel's idea that
 41 a properly constituted society must be structured in the same way as an organism.
 42 Each of the functionally specialised subsystems within an organism is realised by

1 a specific range of organs (for instance, the stomach, bowels, etc., realise the
 2 digestive system; the gonads, genitals, etc., realise the reproductive system).
 3 Similarly, Hegel assumes that each social subsystem must be maintained by a
 4 dedicated set of people who serve as its 'organs' or functionaries. In fact, in his
 5 *Philosophy of Nature* Hegel is emphatic that animals are a higher form of organic
 6 life than plants because in animal bodies there is full functional specialisation,
 7 whereas in plants each part or component system contains within itself the
 8 entire network of functions – this is why it is possible to generate entire new
 9 plants through cutting and grafting (See Hegel, 1970: §343A, 304). Functional
 10 specialisation is integral to a proper organic whole, for Hegel.

11 This belief underlies not only Hegel's position on women but also his view
 12 that 'in our modern states, the citizens have only a limited share in the universal
 13 business of the state' (Hegel, 1991: §255A, 273). He endorses a legislature
 14 composed of two houses, the landed aristocracy and a house of deputies from the
 15 corporations that organise civil society, who are elected through processes inter-
 16 nal to the corporations. Thus neither peasants nor the vast majority of burghers
 17 may participate directly in the political sphere.

18 However, even if we accept that there must be some people who are perma-
 19 nently based in and responsible for their families, it does not automatically follow
 20 that those people must always be women. This role might be played by men in
 21 some families and women in others. But Hegel introduces the further idea that
 22 women, as a sex, must play a familial role because their bodily and psychical
 23 nature uniquely suits them for this role, or, as he himself puts it, 'The *natural*
 24 determinacy of the two sexes acquires an *intellectual* and *ethical* significance'
 25 within the context of an organically articulated social order (Hegel, 1991: §165,
 26 206). Women's nature is to embody an 'immediate unity' of self and other, both
 27 physically and psychically, while men's nature is to embody 'difference' between
 28 self and other. Hegel expands on this in his *Philosophy of Nature*.

29 Hegel discusses sex difference within his account of 'sexual relationships'
 30 (*Geschlechtsverhältnisse*), by which he means the reproductive activities of
 31 animals, including human beings. These 'sexual' relationships arise when one
 32 animal encounters another of the same species and senses that the two animals
 33 are both 'identical' (in the sense that they belong to the same species) and 'differ-
 34 ent' (as individuals). The animal senses a tension between the identity and the
 35 difference:

36 [it] *feels* this deficiency [or tension]. Consequently, the genus [that is, the spe-
 37 cies] is present in the individual as a strain opposed to the inadequacy of the
 38 single actuality; it is present as an urge to attain its self-feeling in the other
 39 of its genus. (Hegel, 1970: §368, vol. 3, 172–3)

40 The animal acquires an urge to make the identity of the two animals tangible in
 41 some way. The solution is to copulate with the other and thereby produce
 42 offspring, which, as the product of both parents, tangibly manifest the parents'

1 species-identity. Hegel says: 'In the natural state the identity of the sexes is ... a
2 third, that is *produced*, in which both sexes intuit their identity as a natural actu-
3 ality' (1996: §75, 139). Ultimately, though, reproduction is futile, because the
4 offspring are still individual animals that differ from their parents as yet more
5 separate individuals. Despite its futility, it is reproduction in which animals are
6 driven to engage.

7 According to Hegel, in any reproductive process the two participant animals
8 must play different roles. Reproduction is a process with a purpose: the purpose
9 of producing a third entity that manifests the identity of the two animals that
10 have contributed to it. Just as every purposive organism must articulate itself into
11 specialised subsystems, likewise the two individuals who are carrying out the
12 purposive activity of reproduction must assume specialised roles within that
13 process. The entity to be produced must be a 'third', different from the parents,
14 and so one parent must be responsible for producing the child as a distinctive
15 individual entity. Yet the offspring is also to be nothing more than an embodi-
16 ment of the identity between the parents. In this respect, the offspring must itself
17 be identical with the parent(s). The second parent is responsible for producing
18 the offspring as something that is identical with its parent(s).

19 Each parent animal develops a specific reproductive anatomy that enables it
20 to play one or the other of these roles. 'The *formation* [anatomical shape] of the
21 *different sexes* must be different, their determination in opposition to one another
22 which is posited by the concept must exist' (Hegel, 1991: §165, 174). Notably,
23 then, Hegel does not think that different animals play different roles in reproduc-
24 tion because they have different anatomies. He thinks that there are different
25 roles in reproduction, of which each animal must assume one, and that the
26 anatomy of each animal develops accordingly.

27 Those animals whose role is to produce the offspring as something that is
28 different from them develop male reproductive anatomy. The distinctive feature
29 of the male genitals, Hegel thinks, is that they are primarily located on the
30 outside of the body. Generally, Hegel believes that 'external' organs and limbs
31 enable animals to engage and interact with items in the external world; accord-
32 ing to him, the outward development of anatomical shape reflects the subject's
33 'relation to an other outside it' (Hegel, 1991: §355A, vol. 3, 131). Male repro-
34 ductive anatomy is no different: it enables male animals to contribute to the
35 offspring in a way that treats it as something different from the male parent – by
36 expelling it outside that parent's body, in the form of semen.

37 On the other hand, those animals whose role is to produce the offspring as
38 something that is identical with them develop female anatomy. The female geni-
39 tals are located on the inside of the body. Here Hegel appears to be influenced by
40 what Laqueur (1990) calls the 'one-sex' model of anatomy, which prevailed until
41 the late eighteenth century. According to this model, female genitals are the
42 same as male but have failed to develop fully, owing to a deficiency of heat; they
43 have remained inside the body as a result. The internal reproductive anatomy of
44 females allows them to contribute to their offspring in a way that treats the

1 offspring as something identical to them, as a part of their own bodies. Their
 2 anatomy allows females to retain their offspring in their wombs, within their own
 3 bodies, as an element within their own bodily processes. Hegel sums up his
 4 picture of sex difference as follows: ‘... in one or other of these genitals, one or
 5 the other part is essential; in the female this is necessarily the undifferentiated
 6 element, while in the male it is the sundered element of opposition’ (Hegel,
 7 1970: §368, vol. 3, 174).

8 We can now see what is involved in Hegel’s idea that female bodies embody a
 9 principle of self/other unity. The special role of female reproductive anatomy is
 10 to contribute to producing offspring in a way that treats those offspring as identi-
 11 cal with their parent(s), and hence this anatomy develops on the inside of the
 12 female body so that females can contribute to, and feed and nurture, offspring as
 13 elements within their own bodies. Female anatomy is organised so that it treats
 14 the mother and her offspring as an undifferentiated unity – so that it does not
 15 establish any boundary separating the mother’s body from that of her offspring.

16 Hegel also claims, regarding human beings specifically, that this kind of
 17 physiology translates into a specific kind of female psyche, which draws no
 18 distinction between the mother’s self and the self of the foetus or child.
 19 He discusses this in an early section of his *Philosophy of Mind*, on the ‘feeling
 20 soul’ (Hegel, 1971: §403–§406, 92–122). The condition of having a ‘feeling soul’
 21 (*fühlende Seele*) is one through which each individual human being must pass at
 22 an extremely early stage in his or her life. Someone with a feeling soul is
 23 swamped by their sensations and experiences, not having yet developed the
 24 cognitive and conceptual skills to organise and comprehend these experiences.
 25 Other people and, above all, the child’s mother are a particular source of these
 26 overwhelming feelings. Hegel seems to suggest that this condition of being
 27 swamped by feelings that emanate from the mother begins while the child is still
 28 a foetus in the womb. At this time ‘opposition is completely absent’ and the
 29 foetus is utterly ‘dominated’ by its mother, who is the source of all its sensations
 30 (Clarke, 1996: 158). A trace of this domination continues after birth, with the
 31 psyche of each young child being fundamentally imprinted by experiences that
 32 occur in the context of its relationship with its mother. The mother, Hegel says,
 33 ‘is the genius of the child’ (1971: §405, 95), that is she is the presiding spirit who
 34 fundamentally stamps the child’s personality (Clarke, 1996: 159, 161). Hegel’s
 35 point is that in early life there is a lack of psychical opposition between mother
 36 and child, which results from and prolongs the lack of physical distinction that
 37 obtained when the child was still in the womb. Ultimately, each child transcends
 38 this undifferentiated relationship and achieves a level of separateness from its
 39 mother. But, according to Hegel, each one of us always retains a particular indi-
 40 vidual character that results from the experiences that have shaped us during
 41 these formative relationships with our mothers.

42 Hegel has described the psychical mother/child relationship from the chil-
 43 dren’s side, but his point applies to mothers as well. At least while absorbed in
 44 caring for their children, mothers do not (as Hegel sees it) distinguish psychically

1 between themselves and their children. This prolongs the lack of distinction that
 2 mothers felt during pregnancy. Women's condition of physical and psychical
 3 fusion with their children makes them ideally suited for the role of full-time
 4 family maintenance. As family members, people have no sense of having purely
 5 individual interests and they take their interests to be identical with those of the
 6 family as a whole. Since women have no clear sense of their bodily boundaries
 7 or of the boundaries of their selves, they are uniquely suited to the identity of
 8 family member with its lack of any sense that there might be boundaries between
 9 different members' interests. This is why, for Hegel, it must be women who dedi-
 10 cate themselves to the care of their families: women's porous boundaries make
 11 them the ideal category of people to be functionaries of the family as one
 12 subsystem within an organic social whole.

13 **Nature, culture and freedom**

14 I have argued that Hegel does have systematic philosophical reasons for his
 15 stance on women, reasons that derive from his legal and political philosophy as
 16 it entwines with his philosophies of nature and mind. Hegel's belief that women
 17 have a natural disposition to identify closely with and to care for others might be
 18 turned against him to suggest that women have a unique and important role to
 19 play within the public sphere as well as within the family. Thus many late
 20 nineteenth-century feminists adapted the initially patriarchal idea that women
 21 have special maternal, nurturing, virtues to argue that women should be granted
 22 political rights – above all the vote – because women had the moral qualities to
 23 reform, pacify and purify the public sphere (Bryson, 1992: 88–9).

24 Even so, few contemporary readers will be convinced by Hegel's reasons for
 25 believing in women's special moral nature. His account of reproductive anatomy
 26 relies on a pre-Darwinian view of species, so that he explains anatomy teleologi-
 27 cally in terms of the purposes of organisms. This pre-Darwinian holistic concep-
 28 tion of organisms is integrally linked to Hegel's conception of the state. However,
 29 even though this constellation of organicist views appears to be outdated and
 30 constitutively linked to the patriarchal belief in women's domestic place,
 31 I suggest that this constellation still has value for contemporary feminists.
 32 In particular, it is relevant to recent feminist efforts to rethink the nature/culture
 33 relation and to challenge the traditional valorisation of culture over nature.

34 Grosz, one of those involved in these efforts, motivates her version of this
 35 feminist return to nature by referring to critiques of the sex/gender distinction
 36 made by earlier feminist theorists, including her own earlier self (as in Grosz,
 37 1994). These theorists argued (against the sex/gender distinction) that our
 38 bodies, not only our minds, are culturally shaped, and that we become sexed by
 39 taking on cultural norms corporeally. As Grosz observes, this argumentative
 40 strategy revalues the body relative to the mind by lifting bodies into the realm of
 41 culture and meaning and out of the sphere of 'mere biology' and mere nature
 42 (Grosz, 2004: 2–4; 2005: 44–5, 171–2). This strategy presupposes a hierarchical

1 opposition of culture and mind – and now, too, bodies – over the biological and
 2 the natural; moreover, Grosz suggests, it prevents feminist theorists from
 3 adequately accommodating the biological dimension of human life and culture.

4 Further, she argues, it is a mistake to assume that what is biological is fixed and
 5 unchanging: the essential nature of biological life is to evolve and organise
 6 itself non-deterministically. Because nature is dynamic, it ‘incites’ culture to
 7 change; different cultures are different expressions of nature in its variability.
 8 Another key part of the biological dimension of human life, as Grosz sees it, is
 9 sexual duality. Merging Darwin with the later Irigaray, Grosz maintains that
 10 sexual difference occurs naturally in most living species, including humankind,
 11 because it is ‘the strategy [which] life has developed to ensure its maximum vari-
 12 ation and proliferation’ (Grosz, 2004: 10).

13 Grosz’s recent approach has pronounced parallels, unexplored by Grosz herself,
 14 with Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel, cultures are manifestations of spirit, but spirit
 15 is not simply opposed to nature: ‘The transition from nature to mind is not a
 16 transition to an out-and-out other, but is only a coming-to-itself of mind out of
 17 its self-externality in nature.’ And ‘nature itself overcomes its externality ... This
 18 transition from necessity to freedom is not a simple transition but a progression
 19 through many stages ... of nature’ (Hegel, 1971: §381A, 13–14). Spirit is a
 20 higher-level development of nature, not radically distinct from nature but its
 21 most refined elaboration. This is because nature is not merely inert matter:
 22 nature is through-and-through organic, and even the most narrowly ‘mechanical’
 23 or inanimate parts of nature already contain the seeds of organic life and must be
 24 understood not mechanistically but rather as approximations to the organic. For
 25 nature to be organic means that it is self-organising, in a way that prefigures and
 26 will be ultimately manifested in the creative, self-reflexive and self-moving char-
 27 acter of spirit. Thus Hegel, too, challenges the nature/culture dichotomy and
 28 does so, like Grosz, by seeing culture and spirit as manifestations of a nature that
 29 is already dynamic and self-organising.

30 It is because Hegel refuses to separate culture from nature that he thinks both
 31 that the state should be structured as an organism and that the several spheres
 32 within society should be organised so that they collectively manifest and realise
 33 the ‘natures’ of their individual members. Society is to refine and rearticulate
 34 nature in higher form, not to repress nature or set nature aside. Consequently,
 35 the difference between male and female natures too needs to find social realisa-
 36 tion. Just as Grosz sees sexual difference as essential to nature qua self-changing,
 37 Hegel sees sexual difference as essential to nature qua self-organising (as we saw
 38 in his *Philosophy of Nature*). As we have also seen, though, Hegel understands the
 39 sexual difference in a way that leads him to confine women to the family, so that
 40 this confinement is integrally connected with his organic view of nature.

41 However, this does not mean that Hegel’s positions on women, the family and
 42 the state should be rejected or dismissed by feminists. Their value for feminism
 43 is not simply negative, but is ambiguous, because Hegel’s demeaning picture of
 44 women is motivated by philosophical assumptions about nature, culture and

1 their relation which can be recontextualised within contemporary feminism in
 2 productive ways, so as to help us rethink the significance of natural and biologi-
 3 cal forces in human cultural and social life. Contrary to those such as Ravven
 4 who locate Hegel's value for feminism in (what they – wrongly in my view – take
 5 to be) his elevation of spirit over nature, I suggest that this value lies in his deter-
 6 mination to integrate spirit with, and within, nature.

7 Notes

- 8 1. In all references to Hegel's works, paragraph number precedes page number.
 9 Translations are sometimes corrected without special notice.
 10 2. For an excellent critical account of this family of defences, see Hom (2009: ch. 1).
 11 3. For further explanation see Hardimon (1994: ch. 3).

12 Bibliography

- 13 Bryson, V. (1992) *Feminist Political Theory: An Introduction*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
 14 Clarke, E. O. (1996) 'Fetal attraction: Hegel's an-aesthetics of gender', in P. J. Mills (ed.),
 15 *Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
 16 University Press.
 17 Cornell, D., Rosenfeld, M. and Carlson, D.G. (1991) 'Introduction', in D. Cornell, M.
 18 Rosenfeld and D. G. Carlson (eds), *Hegel and Legal Theory*. London: Routledge.
 19 Grosz, E. (1994) *Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana
 20 University Press.
 21 Grosz, E. (2004) *The Nick of Time: Politics, Evolution, and the Untimely*. Durham, NC: Duke
 22 University Press.
 23 Grosz, E. (2005) *Time Travels: Feminism, Nature, Power*. Durham, NC: Duke University
 24 Press.
 25 Hardimon, M. (1994) *Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation*. Cambridge:
 26 Cambridge University Press.
 27 Hegel, G. W. F. (1970) *Philosophy of Nature*, 3 vols, trans. M. J. Petry. London: Allen &
 28 Unwin.
 29 Hegel, G. W. F. (1971) *Philosophy of Mind*, trans. W. Wallace. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
 30 Hegel, G. W. F. (1991) *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*, trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge:
 31 Cambridge University Press.
 32 Hegel, G. W. F. (1996) *Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of*
 33 *Right, Heidelberg 1817–1819, with Additions from the Lectures of 1818–1819*, trans. J. M.
 34 Stewart and P. C. Hodgson. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
 35 Hom, S. (2009) 'Antigone's Lament: Care, Death and Subjectivity in Hegel and Irigaray'.
 36 Unpublished PhD thesis, Stony Brook University.
 37 Knowles, D. (2002) *Hegel and the Philosophy of Right*. London: Routledge.
 38 Landes, J. B. (1981) 'Hegel's conception of the family', *Polity*, 14 (1): 5–28.
 39 Laqueur, T. (1990) *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud*. Cambridge, MA:
 40 Harvard University Press.
 41 Locke, J. (1988) *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett. Cambridge: Cambridge
 42 University Press.

122 Feminist encounters with legal philosophy

- 1 Mills, P. J. (1996a) *Feminist Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel*. University Park, PA:
2 Pennsylvania State University Press.
- 3 Mills, P. J. (1996b) 'Hegel's Antigone', in P. J. Mills (ed.), *Feminist Interpretations of*
4 *G. W. F. Hegel*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- 5 Neuhouser, F. (2000) *Foundations of Hegel's Social Theory: Actualizing Freedom*. Cambridge,
6 MA: Harvard University Press.
- 7 Pateman, C. (1988) *The Sexual Contract*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- 8 Pateman, C. (1996) 'Marriage and the standpoint of contract', in P. J. Mills (ed.), *Feminist*
9 *Interpretations of G. W. F. Hegel*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University
10 Press.
- 11 Ravven, H. (1988) 'Has Hegel anything to say to feminists?', *The Owl of Minerva*, 19 (2):
12 149–68.
- 13 Wood, A. (1990) *Hegel's Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor & Francis
Not for distribution