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ON THE STATUS OF NATURAL DIVINATION IN STOICISM¹

ABSTRACT: Cicero's De divinatione portrays the Stoics as unanimous in advocating both natural and technical divination. I argue that, contrary to this, the earlier leaders of the school like Chrysippus had reasons to consider natural divination to be significantly epistemically inferior to its technical counterpart. The much more favorable treatment of natural divination in De divinatione is likely the result of changes introduced later, probably by Posidonius.

KEY WORDS: Stoicism, divination, knowledge, Cicero, Chrysippus, Posidonius.

Barring few notable exceptions—Xenophanes of Colophon, the Epicureans, the Academics under Arcesilaus and Carneades, and the Pyrrhonists—ancient philosophers generally thought that divination is a legitimate method of predicting future events based on divinely supplied signs. Starting with Plato (*Phaed.* 244a8-d5), it was not uncommon to distinguish between two kinds of divination. According to him, the former involves predicting future events while the diviner is in altered mental states such as dreaming, melancholy, mania, frenzy, etc. The latter is employed by the „clear-headed“ (ἔμφορονες), who derive predictions from prolonged and repeated observation of signs such as bird movements, animal entrails, astronomical and meteorological phenomena, etc., and their connections with subsequent events. Among the philosophers who took divination seriously it appears that the former type was usually the preferred method. Plato himself, for instance, held that divination based on divinely inspired mania (μανία) is more perfect and more admirable than the one based on empirical observations because its predictive power results from the immediate divine

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influence on the diviner's soul that is made possible by its being in an altered state (*Phaedr.* 244d2). For similar reasons, the Peripatetics like Dicaearchus and Cratippus even completely rejected observation-based divinatory methods and accepted only those based on dreams and frenzy (Aet. 5.1 = Ps.-Plut. *Plac.* 904E; Cic. *Div.* 1.5).

Extant sources on the Stoic theory of divination—which except for Cicero's *De divinatione* are sadly very sparse—report that, after Zeno and his immediate successor Cleanthes laid the basic theoretical foundations, a number of prominent members of the school wrote books on divination, including Sphaerus, Chrysippus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus, Posidonius of Apamea, and Athenodorus.² Evidence suggest that divination as a method of predicting future events was firmly rooted in Stoic metaphysics, according to which the cosmos is ordered, rational, divine, and benevolent. One of the key metaphysical doctrines in this context was that all events are fully predetermined by antecedent causes (Plut. *Fat.* 574D; Alex. *Aphr. Fat.* 202,2). The Stoics called this all-encompassing cosmic chain of causes „fate“ (εἰμαρμένη) and, in accordance with their view that everything in the cosmos is imbued by divine reason (λόγος), they held that fate itself is divine, rational, and providential.³ They argued that divination (μαντική) exists based on the existence of fate and providence (πρόνοια), that is, because all events, including those that will occur in the future, are fully causally determined by the divine cosmic order.⁴ In fact, according to Cicero, who preserves the most detailed version of this argument, the Stoics held that divination exists because gods, who possess the knowledge of the providentially ordered fate and who love and care for us and our well-being, provide us with the signs of future events as well as with the ability to understand these signs (*Div.* 1.82-3; 2.101-2).

Similarly to Plato, the character Quintus, who in Cicero's dialogue *De divinatione* is defending divination by relying partially on the Stoic position received from Posidonius and partially on the Peripatetic Cratippus,⁵ also divides divination into two kinds, which he calls „natural“ (*naturalis*) and „artificial“ (*artificiosa*), respectively:

[T1:] Namely, there are two kinds of divining, the one dependent on art, and the other on nature. What people or what state is there that is not affected by the prediction of those who examine animal entrails or interpret warning signs and lightning or of augurs or as-

2 Cic. *Div.* 1.6; DL 7.149, 7.178.

3 DL 7.142-3; 7.149; Hippolytus *Haer.* 1.21.1; Aet. 1.27.5 = Stob. 1.5.17-20 W; Alex. *Aphr. Mixt.* 227,5-10; DL 7.138; Cic. *ND* 2.57-8; *Div.* 1.125-8.

4 DL 7.149; Diogenianus *apud* Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 4.3.2.

5 It is extremely difficult to discern precisely which views in Quintus' exposition come from Cratippus, which from Posidonius, and which from the earlier Stoics, and this is notoriously a major problem of *De divinatione* as a source; the literature on this issue is vast, but a good recent survey is provided by Wardle (2006: 31-36).

trologers or lots (for these entirely depend on art), or by dreams or prophecies (for these are the two classified as natural)? I definitely think that it is necessary to investigate the outcomes of these practices rather than their causes. For there is certain power and natural force that announces the future both through signs observed over a long time, as well as through some kind of divine instinct and inspiration. (*Div.* 1.11-12)

This and other passages in the dialogue suggest that the Stoics held that artificial divination relies on theorems and conjectures, which are primarily based on long-term repeated empirical observation of signs (bird movements, animal entrails, astronomical and meteorological phenomena, etc.), and their correlation with subsequent events. On the other hand, natural diviners predict the future not through reasoning and conjecture, but by relying on the signs received while their mind is either dreaming or in prophetic frenzy as in the case of oracles, which are mental states that make the soul susceptible to divine inspiration.⁶

The evidence seems to imply that artificial and natural divination can be distinguished from each other in three important ways. The first difference is related to the mental states involved—artificial divination occurs while the diviners are awake, sane, and sense-perceptive, natural requires them to be temporarily deranged or sleeping. The second is that artificial divination, as its very name indicates, is an art (*ars*), a body of systematic knowledge and practice, while its natural counterpart is „devoid of art“ (*carere arte*, Cic. *Div.* 1.34, 70). A Greek source confirms this by reporting that for the former kind of divination the Stoics used the label „technical“ (τεχνικόν), and for the latter „nontechnical“ (ἄτεχνον) and „unteachable“ (ἀδίδακτον).⁷ This suggests that, unlike artificial divination, the predictions of natural divination involve no reasoning or conjecture. The clue as to why and how this is so is perhaps provided by the final difference. Namely, it seems that, unlike in the case of artificial diviners, who always grasp future events indirectly through interpreting divine signs, in natural divination the future event either directly appears or is explicitly communicated to the diviner by someone in a dream or vision.⁸ For instance, Cicero says that natural diviners „cer-

6 Cf. Cic. *Div.* 1.34, 70-72, 109-110, 127-128 (= T2 below); 2.26-27.

7 Ps.-Plut. *Vit. Hom.* 2.212 (lines 2592-7). The time of the composition of the text is uncertain; Keaney and Lamberton, who also provide the latest English translation, argue for the late second or early third century C.E. (Keaney & Lamberton 1996: 7-10). If this is correct, then it is chronologically possible that the author was familiar with and perhaps even influenced by Cicero's account of the Stoic theory of divination, as it has been suggested by Wynne (2019: 203, n 30). However, the text does seem to contain bits of information that has no clear parallel in Cicero (e.g. natural divination being ἀδίδακτον, or classification of divinatory signs as ὄρρα), which indicates that it may be coming from a source independent from Cicero.

8 For scholars who also take direct representation of future events to be a key feature of natural divination, see e.g. Allen (2001: 168) and Wynne (2019: 204-207); cf. Wardle (2006: 126).

tainly see those things they proclaim while prophesizing“ (*cernunt illa profecto quae vaticinantes pronuntiant*, *Div.* 1.114). The same is suggested by a section in *De divinatione* that is apparently inspired by Posidonius:

[T2:] For those things which will be do not suddenly come into being, but, like the uncoiling of a rope, the passage of time creates nothing new and only unfolds what was previously there. Both those who have the gift of natural divination as well as those for whom the course of events is known through observation discern this. Though the latter do not see the causes themselves, they still see the signs and marks of these causes; by applying to them memory, diligence, and the records of predecessors, the kind of divination that is called artificial is created, related to entrails, lightnings, portents, and heavenly signs. It is, therefore, not surprising that those things that exist nowhere are foreseen by diviners; all things exist, but are distant in time. As the seeds contain the power of those things that are produced from these seeds, so in causes are stored future things, whose coming the soul sees either when excited or set free in sleep, or reason foresees by conjecture. (*Cic. Div.* 1.127-128)

According to this, Posidonius held that natural diviners „see“ (*cernunt*) future events directly, while artificial diviners do not see the events themselves, but only see the signs (*signa*) and marks (*notae*) of them (cf. also *Div.* 2.47).⁹ This suggests that Posidonius believed that, while our souls are temporarily deranged or dreaming, they have some kind of special ability that gives them direct cognitive access to future events.

Posidonius was not the only Stoic who wrote about natural divination. Cicero reports that Chrysippus, in addition to the general work *On Divination*, also wrote two shorter pieces *On Dreams* and *On Oracles*, which were apparently collections of numerous examples of concrete predictions of natural divination.¹⁰ Furthermore, Antipater too collected divinatory dreams, as well as the prophecies that Socrates famously received from his δαιμόνιον.¹¹ All this seems to be consistent with the picture

9 While the text talks about causes (*causae*) and not about events (*eventa*), in this context we can take the former to refer to the latter because the Stoic theory of fate implies that every event that happens is caused by a previous event and itself is a cause to a future event.

10 *Cic. Div.* 1.6, 1.37, 1.39, 2.115, 2.134, 2.144. The title of Chrysippus' two-book work Περὶ μαντικῆς is attested in Diogenes Laertius (7.149) and Περὶ χρησμῶν in Photius (s.v. Νεοτρός, *Lex.* nu 296), while the title of his work on divinatory dreams is attested only in Cicero, *Div.* 2.134.

11 *Div.* 1.39, 1.122-3, 2.144. According to Plato, from the early age Socrates started hearing a voice in his head occasionally warning him not to do certain things (*Apol.* 31d1-4). It is not entirely clear, however, why these instructions should count as instances of natural divination as Cicero portrays it. Perhaps each time Socrates heard the voice he would very briefly fall into some sort of altered mental state (cf. *Plut. De gen. Soc.* 580E), or perhaps it is because these divine instructions were explicit and required no technical interpretation.

painted by Cicero, who in *De divinatione* portrays the Stoics in no uncertain terms as unanimous in advocating both artificial and natural divination equally.

There is, however, a serious complication with this picture, or so at least I shall argue. In order to see how the complication arises, let us begin by examining closely one of the Stoic definitions of divination embedded in the following report by Stobaeus:

[T3:] For they deem divination to be theoretical knowledge of signs related to human life that extend from gods and spirits.¹²

Despite its brevity, the definition provides two very valuable insights. First, divination is a discipline that constitutes—or at least can and ideally should constitute—knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). The Stoics had a peculiar and rather strict view on knowledge. They thought that its foundation is a special sort of representational mental state, which they called the „apprehensive appearance“ (καταληπτική φαντασία). They defined the latter as an appearance that is ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος καὶ κατ’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὑπάρχον ἐναπομεμαγμένη καὶ ἐναπεσφραγισμένη, ὅποια οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο ἀπὸ μὴ ὑπάρχοντος (SE *M* 7.248, cited in T4 below; cf. also *M* 7.402, 410, 426; *PH* 2.4; *DL* 7.50). As I have argued in detail elsewhere, this means that the apprehensive appearance is „from what is present, and molded and sealed in accordance with that present [thing] itself, such that it would not come about from what is not present“, or in other words, that it is caused by something that is spatiotemporally present for the person having the appearance, and depicts that present thing truthfully and reliably (Stojanović 2019). The Stoics further held that if we give our „assent“ (συγκατάθεσις) to an apprehensive appearance of something, we achieve „apprehension“ (κατάληψις), an accurate and secure grasp of that thing (SE *M* 7.153). If our assent is exceptionally firm and stable, then the instance of apprehension counts as knowledge. This special firmness and stability of assent results not so much from the power of each individual instance of apprehension, as from many apprehensions that have coalesced into a coherent system (Stob. 2.73,22-24 W). On the other hand, weakly assenting to apprehensive appearances as well as assenting to nonapprehensive appearances is classified as „opinion“ (δόξα, SE *M* 7.151). According to the Stoics, having apprehensions is relatively common, but knowledge is rare and is achieved only when one becomes a Sage, the paradigm of epistemic and moral perfection. Consequently, they held that only a Sage is a good diviner, since only he possesses divinatory knowledge (Stob. 2.67,13-16 W; Cic. *Div.* 2.129).

12 εἶναι δὲ τὴν μαντικὴν φασιν ἐπιστήμην θεωρητικὴν σημείων τῶν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων πρὸς ἀνθρώπινον βίον συντείνοντων, Stob. 2.67,16-19 W; cf. also Stob. 114,16-18 W and SE *M* 9.132. This definition of divination was either coined or at least endorsed by Chrysippus because an independent source, Diogenianus (in Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 4.3.3), confirms that Chrysippus held that divination constitutes ἐπιστήμη.

Second, according to T3 above, the subject of divinatory knowledge are „signs“ (σημεῖα) sent by the gods and spirits. The Stoics' theory of signs is crucial for understanding the ability of divination to predict the future. They shared the view, relatively common at the time, that there are two general ways of discovering the truth, either by grasping things that are „obvious“ (πρόδηλα) directly through perception and (non-inferential) thought, or by grasping things that are „hidden“ (ἄδηλα) indirectly through inference from signs (SE *PH* 2.97-9; *M* 8.144). For example, the fact that it is day now we grasp immediately through sense perception, but that fire is burning in the distance we grasp indirectly through observing that smoke is rising, since the latter is the sign of the former. Many details of the Stoic theory of signs are unclear, mostly because our knowledge of it almost exclusively depends on Sextus Empiricus whose discussion is tainted by his own skeptical agenda.¹³ Nevertheless, it is possible to say with relative certainty that for the Stoics one of the defining characteristics of a sign is its ability to „uncover“ (ἐκκαλύπτειν) or „reveal“ (ἐνδεικνυσθαι) the hidden thing it signifies.¹⁴ It is precisely in virtue of this revelatory ability that signs, which are by definition directly accessible to us, can transfer apprehension (κατάληψις), as it were, to the thing signified, which not directly cognitively accessible to us.¹⁵

The definition in T3 above thus entails that divination is a predictive method that relies on divine signs, which are obvious and grasped through apprehensive appearances, to achieve apprehension and eventually knowledge of future events, which although initially hidden are revealed by these signs.¹⁶ This characterization, however, gives rise to two problems related to natural divination that do not apply to its artificial counterpart. First, our sources unanimously report that the Stoics consistently claimed that appearances received while the subject is in an altered mental state are not capable

13 Cf. Allen (2001: 147-148).

14 It is not clear what this power to „uncover“ or „reveal“ precisely involved for the Stoics. Sextus sometimes suggests that it is a psychological process that simply recalls from our memory a representation of something that is not presently being perceived (cf. ἀνανέωσις or „renewal“ in *M* 8.143, 152-153, 287). However, one problem with this approach is that it is difficult to see how a sign can help us recall something we have never previously perceived, as in the case of things that are „hidden by nature“ (φύσει ἄδηλα, cf. SE *PH* 2.97-99; *M* 8.145-150). Furthermore, it seems the Stoics explicitly rejected mere recollection from memory as sufficient for uncovering (SE *PH* 2.141-142; *M* 8.307-309). This suggests a power that is much more epistemically robust, which perhaps amounted to the ability to produce and transfer apprehension; see below, n. 15.

15 Cf. *M* 8.253 where Sextus says that signs allow us to „create apprehension“ (κατάληψιν ποιοῦμεθα) of hidden things through observing clear things.

16 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias *Mantissa* 179,16-18: „they [viz. the Stoics] grant both that divination exists and that it gives them cognition of the things which seem to be hidden from others“ (διδόντες τε εἶναι μαντικὴν καὶ τῶν ἀδήλων δοκούντων εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις γνωστικὴν αὐτὴν τιθέμενοι); see also SE *M* 8.131.

of being apprehensive, even when they happen to be true. Consider, for instance, the following section from one of the most detailed and comprehensive extant accounts of the Stoics' theory of the apprehensive appearance by Sextus Empiricus:

[T4:] Among true [appearances] some are apprehensive and some are not; the not apprehensive ones are those that strike people in [a state of] affection. For countless phrenitics and melancholics draw an appearance that is true, yet not apprehensive but occurring in this way externally and by chance, hence they are often not confident about it and do not assent to it. The apprehensive [appearance] is one that is from what is present, and molded and sealed in accordance with that present thing itself, such that it would not come about from what is not present. [...] The first of these [requirements for an appearance to be apprehensive] is its coming about from what is present; for many appearances strike us from what is not present, as in the case of those who became mad, and these would not be apprehensive. (*M* 7.247-249)

According to Sextus, the Stoics held that while appearances entertained by people suffering from an „affection“ (πάθος) can sometimes be true, they can never be apprehensive. The affection in this context obviously refers to some sort of mental derangement, such as phrenitis (φρένιτις), melancholy (μελαγχολία), or mania (μανία), conditions that were commonly discussed in ancient medicine. The text suggests that the main epistemological concern regarding the appearances in question is that they are true merely by chance, probably since unlike the apprehensive appearance they are not caused by that which they represent, although they do represent that thing accurately. Namely, phrenitis, melancholia, and mania were conditions often characterized by vivid hallucinations, appearances that the Stoics called „empty“ (διάκενος) because they are not caused by things that are actually present.¹⁷ Such appearances fail to meet the first among the three necessary requirements for apprehensiveness and cannot be apprehensive, which in turn entails that they cannot provide foundation for knowledge as defined by the Stoics. Since, as we saw above, natural diviners rely precisely on „empty“ appearances in predicting future events, it follows that this form of divination can never constitute knowledge, which obviously contradicts the requirement established in T3 above that divination should at least in principle be able to achieve the status of knowledge.¹⁸ In fact, this precisely may have been what prompted the Stoics to distinguish

17 Galen *Diff. symp.* VII.60-1; *Loc. aff.* VII.225-8. For the Stoic use of διάκενος or κενή in reference to φαντασία, see *SE M* 8.67 and P.Berol. inv. 16545 (reconstructed in Backhouse 2000), as well as Cicero's Latin translation *visum inane* in *Acad.* 2.47-54 and 88-90. Some Stoics including Chrysippus also used the expressions „empty drawing“ (διάκενος ἔλκυσμός) and „imagination“ (φανταστικόν) to refer to the same representational mental state (cf. *SE M* 7.241-5 and especially Aetius 4.12 quoted as T5 and discussed below).

18 Interestingly, in the second book of *De divinatione* in which Cicero is laying down the case against divination, he uses this point in 2.126 to call Quintus out on doctrinary inconsistency.

technical from nontechnical divination. Namely, they defined „technique“ (τέχνη) very similarly to the way they defined knowledge, as „a system of apprehensions organized towards a goal that is useful in life“ (Olympiod. *In Plat. Gorg.* 12.1). Because of this, since natural divination relies on appearances that cannot be apprehensive, this predictive method is incapable of constituting a technique.¹⁹

The second problem is that some prominent Stoics may have harbored serious doubts regarding the ability of natural divination to „reveal“ future events in the technical sense of the word. This is suggested by the following summary of Chrysippus' views preserved by Aetius:

[T5:] [1] Chrysippus says that the following four [things] differ from each other. Appearance is an affection arising in the soul, revealing itself and that which has made it. For example, when through sight we observe the white [of an object], the affection is what is engendered in the soul through vision; and this affection enables us to say that there is something underlying white which activates us. And similarly for touch and smell. [2] Appearance gets its name from „light“; for just as light reveals itself as well as the other things encompassed in it, so too appearance reveals itself and that which has made it. [3] Apparent object is what makes the appearance; the white or the cold, or anything capable of activating the soul, is the apparent object. [4] Imagination is an empty drawing, an affection in the soul that comes from no apparent object, as in the case of people who fight with shadows and punch at thin air. For an appearance has some underlying apparent object, while imagination has none. [5] Phantasm is that which we draw in the imagination's empty drawing. It occurs in people who are melancholic and mad. At any rate, when Orestes in the tragedy says „Mother, I beg you, do not set upon me those bloody-looking, dragon-shaped girls! They, they are attacking me!“ he says this as a madman, and sees no one, but merely thinks that he does. [6] That is why Electra says to him „Stay, poor wretch, peacefully in your bed; for you see none of those things you think you clearly know.“ And similarly Theoclymenus in Homer. (Aetius 4.12.1-6)

Namely, if in his dispute with the Academics over the possibility of knowledge Chrysippus himself argued that appearances of those who are dreaming are untrustworthy and unreliable compared to those who are awake (cf. Cic. *Acad.* 2.87-88), how can the Stoics be in favor of divination from dreams? As I shall suggest below, I believe that this objection can be effectively raised only against the later Stoics like Posidonius (whose position on divination primarily is advocated by Quintus), since Chrysippus and the earlier Stoics accepted the epistemological inferiority of divination from dreams.

19 Here I disagree with Wynne (2019: 200-208), who argues that since Chrysippus believed that divination in general can constitute knowledge, natural divination too is capable of being knowledge, so the distinction between technical and nontechnical divination and classification of natural divination as nontechnical must be later developments. However, if Chrysippus thought that „empty“ appearances of natural diviners cannot be apprehensive, as I think T4 and T5 strongly suggest, then one should expect him to hold precisely that natural divination can neither be a τέχνη nor ἐπιστήμη.

According to this, for Chrysippus one of the key features of an appearance (φαντασία)—which in this context seems to refer specifically to one that is perceptual—is that it is a mental state produced by the „apparent object“ (φανταστόν), that is, something external that has caused the appearance by activating our soul through its sense organs. In contrast, imagination (φανταστικόν) is characterized as „empty drawing“ (διάκενος ἔλκυσμός), a mental state that arises without being caused by an external object.²⁰ This is why imagination is said to represent a „phantasm“ (φάντασμα), an image produced by the soul itself, and not a φανταστόν, an external object that appears. Unlike the content of a perceptual appearance, the content of an imagination, therefore, is not causally connected to that which it represents, at least not immediately.²¹ Furthermore, presumably due its immediate causal connection with the object it represents, perceptual appearance has an important ability—it „reveals“ (ἐνδείκνυται) this object. We have already mentioned the concept of „revealing“ or „uncovering“ above, in the context of the Stoics’ view that while we have to rely on signs to reveal indirectly the things that are „hidden“ (ἄδηλα), while we have direct cognitive access to things that are „obvious“ (πρόδηλα). It seems that this type of direct access is made possible precisely by the ability of perceptual appearances to reveal the object that has caused it and its content that is discussed by Chrysippus in Aetius’ summary above. The text, however, is resoundingly silent regarding the ability of imagination to „reveal“ that which has caused its content, which is understandable given that imagination is not caused by the object it represents. This suggests that Chrysippus thought that imaginations lack the kind of ability to directly reveal things that perceptual appearances possess.

Now, Aetius’ summary continues by pointing out that imaginations or „empty drawings“ are typically entertained by people who are melancholic and mad, which are precisely the mental conditions in which natural diviners characteristically make their predictions. Indeed, the allusion at the very end of the summary to Theoclymenus, whose case is meant to serve as an example of Chrysippean imagination, is itself an instance of natural divination. Theoclymenus is a prophet who plays the role of a supporting character in Homer’s *Odyssey*, and the reference here is most likely to *Od.* 20.350-7 where, during the banquet attended by Penelope’s rude and disrespectful suitors, Theoclymenus has a vision of them all bloodied and dead; several hours later the suitors are indeed all slaughtered by Odysseus and his entourage. If this example

20 For a more detailed discussion of this passage, as well as for specific reasons for translating διάκενος ἔλκυσμός in this passage as „empty drawing“ rather than as „empty attraction“ like other scholars, see Stojanović (forthcoming).

21 In some cases, of course, the content of imagination can be causally connected to the object it represents, e.g. when we are imagining a horse that is currently absent but that we had perceived earlier (cf. DL 7.61). But even then the external object is the distant cause, while the immediate or proximate cause is the soul itself.

indeed originates with Chrysippus, and there is no reason to doubt that it does, then it suggests that he may have had considerable reservations regarding the epistemological legitimacy of divinatory imaginations in respect to their ability to reveal future events directly as natural divination requires. Perhaps this explains why Chrysippus and Antipater's books on divinatory dreams included not only a record of large number of cases, but also interpretations in accordance with Antiphon's influential theory of dream interpretation (Cic. *Div.* 1.39; cf. also 2.144).²² This is significant because Cicero reports that interpretation of dreams (*somniorum interpretatio*), together with the interpretation of oracles and prophecies, was classified not under natural, but under artificial divination (*Div.* 1.116), probably because like other methods of technical divination it relied on prolonged observation and recording of signs received through dreams and mentally deranged states, and their relationship with the subsequent events (*Div.* 2.124, 146).

The two problems outlined above in my view seriously bring into question Cicero's depiction of the Stoics as being unanimous in considering natural divination to be equally legitimate as its artificial counterpart. But if Cicero's portrayal is inaccurate, what was actually the status of natural divination in Stoicism? Regrettably, extant evidence is painfully inadequate to justify any definite and firm conclusions. Nevertheless, it may still be sufficient to support a developmental account, which would roughly go as follows. The earlier leaders of the school like Chrysippus (and perhaps also his immediate followers such as Antipater), as we have seen above, had good reasons to think that, due to the serious epistemic deficiencies of the mental states characteristically involved in their application, the methods of natural divination are substantially inferior to those of artificial divination and incapable of constituting a body of systematic predictive knowledge. Because of this, the division of divination into technical or artificial and nontechnical or natural was adopted by the school around the time of Chrysippus precisely to clarify that only the former should count as properly scientific, while the latter shouldn't. The fact that Chrysippus and Antipater collected prophecies and predictive dreams suggests that they probably held that divinatory imaginations can be a valuable and legitimate source of signs that are sent to us by gods and spirits, but that without being subjected to reasoning and conjecture that rely on empirical observation—and thus incorporated into a body of systematic technical knowledge—predictions made based on them are scientifically inadequate. Despite this, instead of completely banishing natural divination from the school, they tolerated it and treated it as a part of their general divinatory theory because of its ubiquity and practical usefulness. According to this account, the much more favorable view of

22 Antiphon's work on dream interpretation did not survive. Some extremely limited insight into its content is provided by a handful of extant fragments from other authors, which have been collected, translated and discussed in detail by Pendrick (2002).

natural divination that Cicero attributes to the Stoics was probably the result of the changes introduced later, perhaps by Posidonius. Although it is often difficult to separate precisely the ideas of Posidonius from those originating in other sources of *De divinatione*, it is clear that he had elaborate theoretical views on natural divination. Perhaps the most significant among these was his explanation of our ability to foresee the future while dreaming or temporarily deranged that was based on some kind of special power our soul has when it separated from the senses (Cic. *Div.* 1.63-64; 1.129-130). This explanation, which fits the Platonic and Peripatetic traditions much better than the orthodox Stoic psychology, could have been what led Posidonius to award to natural divination a status that was substantially more elevated than what the earlier members of his school were prepared to allow.

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O statusu prirodnog proricanja u stoicizmu

(Apstrakt)

Ciceronovo delo *De divinatione* predstavlja stoike kao jednoglasne u zastupanju i prirodnog i tehničkog proricanja. Nasuprot tome, ja dokazujem da su raniji predvodnici škole poput Hrisipa imali razloga da smatraju prirodno proricanje značajno epistemički podređenim u odnosu na tehničko. Mnogo povoljniji odnos prema prirodnom proricanju u *De divinatione* je po svoj prilici posledica promena koje su uvedene kasnije, verovatno od strane Posejdonija.

KLJUČNE REČI: stoicizam, proricanje, znanje, Ciceron, Hrisip, Posejdonije.