

How we conceptualize climate change: Revealing the force-dynamic structure underlying stock-flow reasoning

Kurt Stocker¹ and Joachim Funke²

¹University of Zürich, Switzerland; ²Heidelberg University, Germany

How people understand the fundamental dynamics of stock and flow (SF) is an important basic theoretical question with many practical applications. Such dynamics can be found, for example, in monitoring one's own private bank account (income versus expenditures), the state of a birthday party (guests coming versus leaving), or in the context of climate change (CO₂ emissions versus absorption). Understanding these dynamics helps in managing everyday life and in controlling behavior in an appropriate way (e.g., stopping expenditures when the balance of a bank account approaches zero). In this paper, we present a universal frame for understanding stock-flow reasoning in terms of the theory of force dynamics. This deep-level analysis is then applied to two different presentation formats of SF tasks in the context of climate change. We can explain why in a coordinate-graphic presentation misunderstandings occur (so called "SF failure"), whereas in a verbal presentation a better understanding is found. We end up with recommendations for presentation formats that we predict will help people to better understand SF dynamics. Better public SF understanding might in turn also enhance corresponding public action – such as enhancing pro-environmental actions in relation to climate change.

Keywords: force dynamics, stock-flow reasoning, climate change, causation, presentation format, dynamic problems

The dynamics of stock and flow represent a fundamental, abstract principle of nature: incoming objects are accumulated in a stock that keeps these objects for a certain period of time before they leave the stock by an outflow process. This abstract process description can be applied to species in a certain region (e.g., a given stock of birds has births as inflows and deaths as outflows), to the customers in a warehouse (e.g., a certain number of customers are at a given point in time in the store, new customers enter as inflows and satisfied customers leave as outflows), or to the daily food intake of persons (the current body weight representing the stock).

One stock-flow dynamics is of special interest for the survival of most species on planet earth: the greenhouse gases, especially the carbon dioxide (CO₂) emissions that contribute to global warming. Concerning CO₂ emissions into the atmosphere, a certain amount of emissions is added as inflow to the given stock in the atmosphere, the outflow dissolves mostly in the oceans or by means of photosynthesis. For more than 50 years, the balance between in-

and outflow seems to be disturbed by extreme increases of greenhouse gas emissions due to human activities (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2013).

Understanding such stock-flow (SF) processes is of great importance when one wants to control a given system (not only to beware a bathtub from overflow). Therefore, it is alarming to hear about the "SF failure" that has been reported repeatedly (Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009; Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 2007): "Results from the experiments reported here demonstrate an important and pervasive problem in human reasoning: our inability to understand stocks and flows, that is, the process by which the flows into and out of a stock accumulate over time" (Cronin et al., 2009, p. 128).

Within the context of the climate change debate, the SF failure has important implications for the presentation of results (like those from the IPCC-reports) and for the possible implementation of educative measurements (Clayton et al., 2016). A deeper understanding of the SF failure seems therefore necessary particularly because recent work from Fischer, Degen, and Funke (2015) suggests that the SF failure might be an effect of the type of representation, i.e., how the information about stock and flow is presented to the participants. Our paper offers an explanation of the representation effects found by Fischer and colleagues in terms of a more fundamental analysis of SF reasoning processes. This analysis fleshes out the underlying causal structure that is inherent to SF reasoning.

Specifically, we (in section A) show for the first time how an SF problem (using atmospheric CO₂ accumulation as an example) can be described in terms of force dynamics, a prominent theory of causal cognition (e.g., Stocker, 2014; Talmy, 2000). Moreover, we examine (in sections B–D) how well scientific presentation formats comprising coordinate systems and graphs, verbal formats, and pictorial-schematic formats of presenting an SF problem (exemplified by atmospheric CO₂ accumulation) represent the force-dynamic structure underlying basic SF reasoning. Our central argument is: the better the formats represent the underlying force-dynamic structure of the SF problem, the better people can understand it. Finally (in section E) the implications of these differences of how well the underlying force-dynamic structure of SF CO₂ accumulation is represented in these different formats are discussed.

Corresponding author: Kurt Stocker, University of Zurich, Department of Psychology, Neuropsychology, Binzmühlestrasse 14, PO Box 25, CH-8050 Zürich, Switzerland, e-mail: kurt.stocker@gess.ethz.ch

A. The force-dynamic structure of conceptualizing stock-flow CO₂ accumulation

A most basic SF system consists of one inflow, one outflow, and one stock (Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 2007; Fischer et al., 2015). In this section the basic force-dynamic structure underlying SF reasoning is exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level. People often prefer to make use of the underlying causal structure to understand SF reasoning (Brehmer, 1976; Fischer et al., 2015; Garcia-Retamero, Wallin, & Dieckmann, 2007; Gonzalez, 2004). As a starting point to reveal the basic causal – force-dynamic – structure of atmospheric CO₂ level SF relations, consider the following two sentences adapted from Fischer and colleagues (2015, p. 13). These sentences highlight the basic causal relations involved in increase and decrease of atmospheric CO₂ level:

(1) *Examples of informal causal verbalizations of SF reasoning (exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level)*

- a. CO₂ emissions are caused by the burning of fossil fuels and increase atmospheric CO₂ concentration.
- b. CO₂ absorptions are caused by forests and oceans and decrease atmospheric CO₂ concentration.

Naturally, the stock will increase if the inflow is greater than the outflow, decrease if the outflow is greater than the inflow, and remain constant if there is an equal amount of in- and outflow. If one puts these increase/decrease SF reasoning mechanisms into a slightly formalized verbal format, one notices that causality is involved at two different hierarchical levels:

(2) *The basic causal structure of SF reasoning in slightly formalized verbal format (exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level)*

- a. The burning of fossil fuels **causes_{level-1}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to increase.
- b. Absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans **cause_{level-1}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to decrease.
- c. Larger increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [increase which is **caused_{level-1}** by the burning of fossil fuels] than decrease of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [decrease which is **caused_{level-1}** by absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans] **causes_{level-2}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to increase.
- d. Larger decrease of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [decrease which is **caused_{level-1}** by absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans] than increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [increase which is **caused_{level-1}** the burning of fossil fuels] **causes_{level-2}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to decrease.
- e. Equal increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [increase which is **caused_{level-1}** by the burning of fossil fuels] and decrease of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [decrease which is **caused_{level-1}** by absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans] **causes_{level-2}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to remain constant.

Taking (2c) as an example, we can notice the embedded causal hierarchy that is underlying basic SF reasoning: in order to capture basic SF reasoning in a full-fledged way, one must not only understand the causes of the increase and decrease (here termed level-1-causality), but one must also understand that the relationship between increase and decrease (e.g., increase is higher than decrease) of course also has causal consequences (here termed level-2-causality; e.g., increase is higher than decrease causes stock to rise). Abstracting away from (2), we can also outline the generic causal structure of SF reasoning:

(3) *The generic causal structure of SF reasoning in slightly formalized verbalized format*

- a. A **causes_{level-1}** stock to increase.
- b. B **causes_{level-1}** stock to decrease.
- c. Larger amounts of inflow [inflow which is **caused_{level-1}** by A] than outflow [outflow which is **caused_{level-1}** by B] **cause_{level-2}** stock to increase.
- d. Larger amounts of outflow [outflow which is **caused_{level-1}** by B] than inflow [inflow which is **caused_{level-1}** by A] **causes_{level-2}** stock to decrease.
- e. Equal amounts inflow [inflow which is **caused_{level-1}** by A] and outflow [outflow which is **caused_{level-1}** by B] **causes_{level-2}** the stock to remain constant.

What are the basic mental elements (basic building blocks) that make up SF reasoning? The conceptualization of cause and effect has long been treated (and often still is) as if cause and effect are themselves conceptual primitives – two conceptual “atoms” that do not consist of still further smaller elements (e.g. Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001; Pearl, 2000; Spirtes, Glymour, & Scheines, 2000). However, with the advent of the theory of force dynamics – a by now prominent theory of causal cognition that has initially been proposed by Talmy (e.g., Stocker, 2014; Talmy, 2000) – it has been possible to demonstrate that cause and effect can be described as consisting of still smaller conceptual elements (see below). In analogy, cause and effect are more like conceptual “molecules” that consist of conceptual “atoms”, rather than being atoms themselves.

That causation represents force-dynamic thinking patterns has also been supported by experimental findings (Barbey & Wolff, 2007; Wolff, 2003, 2007; Wolff & Song, 2003). Stocker (2014) has offered a substantial revision of the original force-dynamic account as developed by Talmy (1985, 1988, 2000). This revision makes it possible that force dynamics can be applied to all causation, no matter how concrete or abstract the entities that are involved in the causation are (with the framework developed by Talmy it was not clear, how force dynamics could be applied for certain abstract entities). This modern version of force dynamics is called *elementary force dynamics* (Stocker, 2014) because it places a strong emphasis on identifying the elements (conceptual primitives) that make up a cause and the elements that make up an effect. First we introduce the basics of elementary force dynamics with a classic example from Talmy. Then we will demonstrate how elementary force dynamics can also be used to describe basic “elementary” SF reasoning, using atmospheric CO₂ accumulation as an example.

A.1. Force dynamics: General elements of the theory

Both classic force dynamics (Talmy, 2000) and elementary force dynamics (Stocker, 2014) involve the assumption that mental representation of causation involves the conceptualization of two opposed entities that are engaged in a force interaction. All general elements of the force-dynamic theory explained in this section stem from theoretical cognitive-linguistic work (Stocker, 2014; Talmy, 2000). For a linguistic exemplification, consider the following sentence adapted from Talmy (2000, p. 416):

(4) The ball started rolling because of the wind.

In a force-dynamic terms, the *ball* functions as the *agonist* (*Ago*).¹ In elementary force dynamics (Stocker, 2014), *Ago* is a cognitive entity which can take on any given state or action. In (4) *Ago* is the *ball*, which initially takes on the state-value *stationariness* (if there were no wind, the ball would not be moving). The opposed conceptualized force entity is referred to as the *antagonist* (*Ant*) in force-dynamic theory. In (4) the *wind* takes on the *Ant* function. In elementary force dynamics, *Ant* is always conceptualized as attempting to impose a state or action onto *Ago* that is *different* from the outset action or state of *Ago*. Thus, when *Ago* is initially associated with stationariness, *Ant* will by definition try to impose a value or state other than stationariness. Hence in (4) the wind carries a different force value than the ball: *Ant* carries the force value *motion*, trying to impose this onto the inert ball. The resultant (effect) of a force-dynamic interaction always relates to *Ago*. The resultant depends on which of the force entities – *Ago* or *Ant* – is conceptualized as being stronger. In causation types that can be phrased with *because* (*of*), as in (4), *Ant* is always conceptualized as being stronger.² Consequently, in (4) the force of *Ant* (the wind’s motion force) is stronger than force of *Ago* (the ball’s inert force). Thus, the ball is conceptualized as having been moved by the wind. Stocker (2014) has introduced a specific formal system to describe force-dynamic interactions (which is an abstraction of Talmy’s original force-dynamic diagramming system). For a force-dynamic interaction underlying the linguistic use of words like “because” or “caused” (formally termed CAUSE or *successful causation*), the notational system looks as follows:

(5) C: Ago-x, Ant-x_{diff}(++) →
 E: Ago-x_{diff}

C stands for cause and *E* for effect. In elementary force dynamics, *Ago* can initially be associated with any given state or action value (value “x”). In contrast, *Ant*’s value must by definition be a state or action value that differs from x (“x_{diff}” where *diff* stands for different). *Ant* attempts to impose its different value onto *Ago*. As *Ant*’s force is stronger than *Ago*’s force in *because* (“++” stands for stronger³), the effect *E* is that *Ago* has to take on the different force value of *Ant* (→ E: Ago-x_{diff}). The content of (4) is force-dynamically distributed as follows (following notational convention, the content of (4) is added to the force-dynamic formula of (5) in underlined subscript):

(6) C: Ago_{ball-x_{stationariness}}, Ant_{wind-x_{diff}motion}(++) →
 E: Ago_{ball-x_{diff}motion}

(6) reads: the cause *C* involves conceptualizing the ball in the function of *Ago* with the initial state value (x) of being stationary. *Ago* is weaker than *Ant* (the wind). *Ant* is conceptualized as imposing the different value (x_{diff}) of

motion onto *Ago* (the ball). As *Ant*’s imposing motion is conceptualized as being the stronger (++) force than *Ago*’s inert force, the cognized effect *E* is indeed that the wind (*Ant*) causes the ball (*Ago*) to move.

A.2. Force dynamics applied to stock-flow reasoning

As a novel contribution to the study of stock-flow reasoning, it is now shown that the force-dynamic elements in (5) readily offer themselves to capture the basic causal mechanisms that are at work in stock-flow reasoning. (7) lays out all the force-dynamic elements that are involved in SF reasoning – exemplified in relation to how people conceptualize climate change (the details of (7) will become clear as the analysis proceeds).

- (7) *The force-dynamic elements of SF reasoning (exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level)*
- a. Agonist (*Ago*): stock (atmospheric CO₂ level)
 - b. Antagonist₁ (*Ant*₁): stock increaser (burning of fossil fuels)
 - c. Antagonist₂ (*Ant*₂): stock “decreaser” (absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans)
 - d. x-state: at a certain level
 - e. x_{diff}-action₁: increase level
 - f. x_{diff}-action₂: decrease level
 - g. x_{diff}-action₃: remain level
 - h. stronger than (++)
 - i. larger than (>)
 - j. equal to (=)

Looking at (7), we may note that it is proposed that the stock can always be conceptualized as *Ago* (7a; atmospheric CO₂ level), and the forces that increase or decrease the stock always as *Ant* (7b–c; the burning of fossil fuels as an atmospheric-CO₂-level increaser, and absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans as an atmospheric-CO₂-level “decreaser”). The initial conceptualized state of *Ago* (atmospheric CO₂ level) before the intervention of *Ant* is always to be at a certain level (7d). Force interaction that results in increase, decrease or no increase/decrease of the stock (of atmospheric CO₂ level) always involves *Ant* trying to intervene with *Ago*’s state (7e–g), and depending on whether *Ago* or *Ant* is conceptualized as stronger (7h), the end result relates to either a change of stock amount – more increase than decrease or more decrease than increase (7i) – or no change of stock amount (7j). It is now shown how the elements of (7) can capture level-1 causality and

¹Talmy (2000) borrowed the terms agonist and antagonist from physiology, where these terms stand for members of specific opposed muscle pairs. In force dynamics, these terms are used in a different sense than in physiology (see Stocker, 2014).

²*Ant* is always stronger than *Ago* when the causal relationship can be phrased with words such as “caused”, “because”, “therefore”, and the like. There are other forms where *Ago* is stronger than *Ant*, e.g. in „The ball did not roll *despite* the wind” (see Stocker, 2014).

³Talmy (2000) uses the symbol “+” to represent the force-dynamic meaning *stronger than*. However, since this symbol is already used in mathematics as a symbol to represent the meaning *plus* and since a few basic mathematical symbols (>, =) will later on in this article be used in a force-dynamic context, we use “++” to represent the force-dynamic meaning *stronger than* so as to avoid potential confusion with the mathematical meaning *plus*.

level-2 causality in their conceptual entirety. (8a) and (8b) represent force-dynamic reformulations of the slightly formalized verbal formats of (2a) and (2b), respectively (they represent level-1 causality).

(8) *Level-1 causality of SF reasoning in force-dynamic format exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level*

a. **C:**

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{at-a-certain-level}}}$,
 $A_{\text{nt}}^{\text{burning of fossil fuels-X}_{\text{diffincrease level}} (++)} \rightarrow$

E:

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{diffincrease level}}}$
Verbalized: The burning of fossil fuels

causes_{level1} atmospheric CO₂ concentration to increase.

Abbreviation:

EMISSION-CAUSES-CO₂-INCREASE

b. **C:**

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{at-a-certain-level}}}$,
 $A_{\text{nt}}^{\text{forests and oceans-X}_{\text{diffdecrease level}} (++)} \rightarrow$

E:

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{diffdecrease level}}}$
Verbalized: Absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans

causes_{level1} atmospheric CO₂ concentration to decrease.

Abbreviation:

ABSORPTION-CAUSES-CO₂-DECREASE

(8a) suggests that the atmospheric CO₂ concentration is force-dynamically conceptualized as *Ago*. Naturally, before any CO₂ concentration increasing or decreasing force interferes, the CO₂ concentration is conceptualized as being *at a certain level* – thus “at a certain level” functions as the x-value of *Ago*. In (8a), the role of *Ant* is taken on by the *burning of fossil fuels*. Recall that in elementary force dynamics, *Ant* is by definition conceptualized as having a value different from the one of *Ago* which it tries to impose onto *Ago*. Here, *Ant* carries within it the force value (x_{diff}) of *increasing* *Ago*’s (CO₂ concentration’s) initial state of remaining at a certain level. The burning-of-fossil-fuel’s (*Ant*’s) force of increasing the CO₂ concentration is conceptualized as being stronger (++) than the CO₂ concentration’s basic state of remaining at a certain level. All this – cognizing the CO₂ concentration’s (*Ago*’s) initial state (the state before any forces act upon *Ago*) as *being at a certain level* and cognizing a stronger *Ant* force that imposes an increasing-level force onto *Ago* – represents the force-dynamic cause *C*. Thus, given that *Ant* is conceptualized as being stronger than *Ago*, the cognized effect *E* is indeed that the burning of fossil fuels (*Ant*) causes the CO₂ concentration (*Ago*) to rise. As will be seen, the whole force-dynamic conceptualization of (8a) will become part of still larger force-dynamic conceptualizations in SF reasoning. In relation to this, it will be convenient, if we can abbreviate (8a). Thus an abbreviation is already introduced: EMISSION-CAUSES-CO₂-INCREASE (please recall that this abbreviation stands for the entire force-dynamic structure (8a)).

Force-dynamically (8b) reads very similarly to (8a) as it is only some content values that change. The *Ago* at the outset is the same in (8b) as in (8a): the cause (*C*) again involves cognizing the CO₂ concentration’s (*Ago*’s) initial state (the state before any forces act upon *Ago*) as *being at a certain level*. But this time *Ago*’s initial state is conceptualized as being intervened by a different *Ant*: this time the *forest and ocean absorption mechanisms* function as *Ant* and as such *Ant* is carrying within it the force to

decrease *Ago*’s initial state of remaining at a certain level. As *Ant* is again stronger (++) than *Ago*, the conceptualized effect (*E*) is this time that CO₂ concentration *decreases*. Formally (8b) is abbreviated to: ABSORPTION-CAUSES-CO₂-DECREASE (please recall that this abbreviation stands for the entire force-dynamic structure (8b)).

As already shown in (2), the basic causal structure of SF reasoning involves a two-level causal hierarchy. So far, we have examined level-1 causality from a force-dynamic viewpoint. Level-2 causality now involves force-dynamically to conceptualize atmospheric CO₂ increase with the following formulation for (2c), where CO₂ increase is larger than decrease:

(9) *Level-2 causality (increase > decrease) of SF reasoning in force-dynamic format exemplified with increasing atmospheric CO₂ level (with abbreviations)*

C:

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{at-a-certain-level}}}$,
 $A_{\text{nt}}: [\text{EMISSION-CAUSES-CO}_2\text{-INCREASE} > \text{ABSORPTION-CAUSES-CO}_2\text{-DECREASE}]$
 $X_{\text{diffincrease level}} (++) \rightarrow$

E:

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{diffincrease level}}}$
Verbalized: Larger increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [increase which is **caused_{level1}** by the burning of fossil fuels] than decrease of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [decrease which is **caused_{level1}** by absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans] **causes_{level2}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to increase.

Thus, *Ago* in (9) is still (as in all other examples) the atmospheric CO₂ concentration. The role of *Ant* is now force-dynamically complex: *Ant* now stands for “increase is higher than decrease” (where increase and decrease themselves also have a cause, as captured by the formal abbreviations; the larger-than relation is represented with the standard mathematical symbol for this, >). This semantically complex *Ant* (increase > decrease) naturally carries within it the force of *increasing* *Ago*’s (CO₂ concentration’s) initial state of remaining at a certain level. Thus, given that *Ant* is conceptualized as being stronger than *Ago*, the cognized effect *E* is that *increase > decrease* causes the CO₂ concentration (*Ago*) to rise. The two remaining SF level-2-causality possibilities (CO₂ decrease or CO₂ remaining constant) can be formally captured in very similar ways to (9):

(10) *Level-2 causality (decrease > increase; increase = decrease) of SF reasoning in force-dynamic format exemplified with decreasing and constant atmospheric CO₂ level*

a. **C:**

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{at-a-certain-level}}}$,
 $A_{\text{nt}}: [\text{ABSORPTION-CAUSES-CO}_2\text{-DECREASE} > \text{EMISSION-CAUSES-CO}_2\text{-INCREASE}]$
 $X_{\text{diffdecrease level}} (++) \rightarrow$

E:

$A_{\text{go}}^{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{diffdecrease level}}}$
Verbalized: Larger decrease of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [decrease which is **caused_{level1}** by absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans] than increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [increase which is **caused_{level1}**

by the burning of fossil fuels] **causes_{level2}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to decrease.

b. **C:**

$Ago_{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{at-a-certain-level}}}$
 Ant: [EMISSION-CAUSES-CO₂-INCREASE
 = ABSORPTION-CAUSES-CO₂-DECREASE]
 $x_{\text{diffremain level}} (++) \rightarrow$

E:

$Ago_{\text{atmospheric CO}_2\text{-concentration-X}_{\text{diffremain level}}}$
Verbalized: Equal increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [increase which is **caused_{level1}** by the burning of fossil fuels] and decrease of atmospheric CO₂ concentration [decrease which is **caused_{level1}** by absorption mechanisms of forests and oceans] **causes_{level2}** atmospheric CO₂ concentration to remain constant.

Thus, in (10a) the complex Ant represents the relationship *decrease > increase* which imposes the force onto Ago (atmospheric CO₂ level) of decreasing CO₂ level, and in (10b) Ant represents the relationship *increase = decrease* which imposes the force onto Ago (atmospheric CO₂ level) of keeping the CO₂ level at a constant level.

In sum, in this section it has been shown how the force-dynamic elements of (7) can fully flesh out the complex causal mechanisms that underlie SF reasoning. In the following sections, different presentation formats for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation will be investigated to see how well they represent (3), 2-level causality, and (7), the basic causal elements of SF reasoning. We will argue that the better the presentation format for stock-flow reasoning represents the underlying force-dynamic structure, the better people can understand stock-flow reasoning (in the following sections exemplified with CO₂ accumulation).

B. Pictorial-schematic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation

As Fischer and colleagues write:

The structure of SF systems is often explained by a bathtub analogy: The water level (stock) in a bathtub increases if the inflow of water through the faucet exceeds the outflow through the drain; the water level drops if the outflow exceeds the inflow (2015, p. 2).

This bathtub analogy readily lends itself to a pictorial-schematic presentation format for SF CO₂ accumulation. Thus, in order to investigate how well a pictorial bathtub analogy of SF reasoning can represent the underlying force-dynamic structure, we have devised such a pictorial-schematic presentation (see Figure 1). This is how we intuitively would present the bathtub analogy in a pictorial-schematic presentation format; future studies would have to determine if there is an optimal way of how to represent the bathtub analogy for climate change in a pictorial-schematic format.

All pictorial-schematic elements of stock-flow CO₂ accumulation in Figure 1 have their ready analogues to potential water increase or decrease in a bathtub: instead of an increasing, decreasing, or constant water level in a bathtub container, we have an increasing, decreasing, or constant CO₂ level in an “atmosphere container”; instead of water entering and leaving a bathtub, we now have CO₂ “entering and leaving” the atmosphere; instead of larger/smaller amounts of inflow and outflow of water,

we have larger/smaller amounts of inflow and outflow of CO₂ (larger/smaller amounts of in- and outflow are depicted by smaller and larger arrows, respectively).

As a basic guide to analyze the causal force-dynamic content of Figure 1 we first use (3). This will allow us to check whether the pictorial-schematic representation of SF reasoning in Figure 1 explicitly represents *two-level* causality. Then (7) – the force-dynamic elements of SF reasoning – will be used as a force-dynamic check to examine whether a pictorial bathtub analogy of SF reasoning (Figure 1) can represent all force-dynamic elements that are involved in basic SF reasoning.

As examined in (3), *SF level-1 causality* involves the two basic causal relationships. First in level-1 causality (3a), A (i.e., Ant₁) increases the stock (Ago). Figure 1(a–c) depicts this with an arrow pointing into the stock (labeled “CO₂ IN (EMISSION: burning of fossil fuels)”), suggesting CO₂ increase in the atmosphere. Second in level-1 causality (3b), B (i.e., Ant₂) decreases the stock (Ago). Figure 1(a–c) depicts this with an arrow pointing out of the atmosphere (labeled “CO₂ OUT (ABSORPTION: forests, oceans)”), suggesting CO₂ “leaving” the atmosphere.

As also examined in (3), *SF level-2 causality* involves three basic causal relationships: (3c) *increase > decrease* causes stock increase; (3d) *decrease > increase* causes stock decrease; and (3e) *increase = decrease* causes stock to remain constant. In Figure 1, the > and = relationships are captured by the different sizes of both solid-line arrows. Thus, for instance, if (depicting (3a)) the inward-pointing arrow is larger than the outward-pointing arrow, then it can be deduced that this results in CO₂ increase (symbolized with the upward-pointing dotted arrow).

Force-dynamically we may furthermore note that Figure 1 depicts all ten force-dynamic elements that are involved in basic SF reasoning (cf. with (7)):

- (11) *The force-dynamic elements of SF reasoning in the pictorial bathtub-analogy format (exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level)*
 - a. Ago: *stock* (here CO₂ level) is pictorial-schematically represented by a dotted line symbolizing the CO₂ level which is complemented by the verbal label CO₂ level
 - b. Ant₁: *stock increaser* (emission) is pictorial-schematically represented by an inward-pointing arrow which is complemented with the verbal labels CO₂ IN and EMISSION: burning of fossil fuels
 - c. Ant₂: *stock “decreaser”* (absorption) is pictorial-schematically represented by an outward-pointing arrow which is complemented by the verbal labels CO₂ OUT and ABSORPTION: forests, oceans
 - d. x-state: being at a certain given level; pictorial-schematically represented by the horizontal orientation of the dotted CO₂ level line and by adding the verbal label level next to the verbal label CO₂
 - e. x_{diff-action1}: *increase level* is pictorial-schematically represented by the dotted upward arrow which is complemented with the verbal label increase
 - f. x_{diff-action2}: *decrease level* is pictorial-schematically represented by the dotted downward arrow which is complemented with the written label decrease




Figure 1. Pictorial-schematic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation (based on the bathtub analogy). (a) More CO₂ gets in the atmosphere (symbolized by the larger inward-pointing arrow) than out (smaller outward-pointing arrow), resulting in CO₂ increase (upward-pointing arrow). (b) More CO₂ leaves the atmosphere (larger outward-pointing arrow) than comes in (smaller inward-pointing arrow), resulting in CO₂ decrease (downward-pointing arrow). (c) The same amount of CO₂ enters and leaves the atmosphere (symbolized by equal-sized inward- and outward-pointing arrows), resulting in a CO₂ concentration that remains constant (symbolized by a horizontal non-pointed strip).

- g. $x_{diff-action3}$: *remain level* is pictorial-schematically represented by the dotted horizontal non-pointed strip complemented with the written label *constant*
- h. stronger than ($++$): is pictorial-schematically represented by placing the larger flow arrow to the stronger force entity and the smaller flow arrow to the weaker force entity (the force-relationship itself has no additional verbal label; it is thus only symbolized by symbolically suggesting that *stronger* = *larger* and *weaker* = *smaller*).
- i. larger than ($>$): is (similar to h) pictorial-schematically represented by placing the larger flow arrow to the larger flow quantity and the smaller flow arrow to the smaller flow quantity
- j. equal to ($=$): is pictorial-schematically represented by placing equally-sized flow arrows to the inflow and outflow quantities

Summing up the analysis of Figure 1, one can notice that the pictorial-schematic presentation format for stock-flow reasoning together with its complementing verbal labels depicts the causal structure of SF reasoning about CO₂ level in the atmosphere in its entirety: it depicts both levels of the causality hierarchy (level-1 and level-2 causality, cf. (3)) as well as all force-dynamic elements that make up basic SF reasoning (cf. (7)).

C. Verbal presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation

Consider the following verbal format (from Fischer et al., 2015) that is used to assess the understanding of lay people's SF understanding in the context of climate change:

- 12) *Verbal presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation*
CO₂ emissions are caused by the burning of fossil fuels and lead to an increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration. CO₂ absorptions are caused by forests and

oceans and decrease atmospheric CO₂ concentration. CO₂ emissions are currently twice as high as CO₂ absorptions. Imagine that emissions were reduced by 30%: How would the atmospheric CO₂ concentration react?

- a. Atmospheric CO₂ concentration would increase.
- b. Atmospheric CO₂ concentration would decrease
- c. Atmospheric CO₂ concentration would remain constant.

This format yielded high understanding of SF problems: the majority of the participants correctly inferred that as long as there is more CO₂ increase than decrease (which is what the scenario above suggests), CO₂ level rises. Let it now be examined how extensively (12) covers the underlying causal (force-dynamic) structure of basic SF reasoning. As with the pictorial-schematic format of the bathtub analogy which was examined in the previous section, first (3) serves again as a guide to analyze if both levels of the causality hierarchy (level-1 and level-2 causality) are represented; and then (7) is again used to see how extensively force-dynamic elements are represented.

The SF level-1 causal relation (3a) is clearly covered in (12) with the sentence "CO₂ emissions are caused by the burning of fossil fuels and lead to an increase of atmospheric CO₂ concentration". SF level-1 causal relation (3b) is also covered: "CO₂ absorptions are caused by forests and oceans and decrease atmospheric CO₂ concentration".

In (12), the *level-2-causality* relationship (3c) *increase > decrease* is covered by the two sentences "CO₂ emissions are currently twice as high as CO₂ absorptions. Imagine that emissions were reduced by 30%" as well, of course, as by the corresponding correct answer "Atmospheric CO₂ concentration would increase". The causal thinking that is behind the other two theoretically possible basic relationships – (3d: *decrease > increase*) and (3e: *increase = decrease*) – are covered by the (wrong) answers "Atmospheric CO₂ concentration would decrease" and "Atmospheric CO₂ concentration would remain constant", respectively.

In (12), how extensively are the force-dynamic elements that are involved in basic SF reasoning (cf. with (7)) rep-




Figure 2. Coordinate-graphic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation. The graph plots time on the x-axis and hypothesized amounts of atmospheric CO₂ in giga-tons on the y-axis. The predicted emission and absorption curves are plotted.

resented? This is shown in (13). If force-dynamic elements are missing, then this will be symbolized with “—” and “n.a.” stands for *not applicable*.

- (13) *The force-dynamic elements of SF reasoning in verbal format (exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level)*
- a. Ago: “CO₂ concentration”
 - b. Ant₁: “burning of fossil fuels”
 - c. Ant₂: “forests and oceans”
 - d. x-state: — (x_{at a certain level} has to be inferred)
 - e. x_{diff-action}₁: “CO₂ concentration would increase”
 - f. x_{diff-action}₂: “CO₂ concentration would decrease”
 - g. x_{diff-action}₃: “concentration would remain constant”
 - h. stronger than (++) : n.a.
 - i. larger-than (>) : n.a.
 - j. equal-to (=) : n.a.

Hence, we may note that (12) explicitly represents almost all force-dynamic elements that are involved in basic SF reasoning. What is not explicitly expressed in (12) is that Ago’s (the CO₂ concentration’s) state is conceptualized as being initially at a certain level (before any intervention takes place). However, given the high SF understanding that (12) has produced (Fischer et al., 2015), one may perhaps assume that the omission of this piece of information can easily be inferred. That relational information such as *increase > decrease* (13h–j) is not represented in (12), lies in the nature of the task. After all, the very nature of this task is for the participants to infer relevant relational information, such as *increase > decrease*, from the other given information.

In sum, in this section it has been shown that causal force-dynamic structure of SF reasoning about atmospheric CO₂ level is almost captured in its entirety by the verbal presentation format of Fischer and colleagues (2015) and that the one force-dynamic value missing – the x-state *at a certain level* – can probably be easily inferred.

D. Coordinate-graphic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation

Figure 2 (as used in Fischer et al., 2015) shows one of the most common forms of how to represent stock-flow CO₂ accumulation in studies on understanding SF phenomena: a coordinate-graphic presentation format based on standard scientific presentation norms (plotting a relation of two variables on an x- and y-axis). It is now examined how well the coordinate-graphic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation represents the underlying causal structure of SF reasoning.

We may note that the graphic presentation of Figure 2 does neither depict level-1 causality (3a) nor level-1 causality (3b). Hence, neither the actual causal interplay between emission and CO₂ increase (how more emission leads to more CO₂) nor between absorption and CO₂ decrease (how more absorption leads to less CO₂) is depicted in the coordinate-graphic presentation.

Similarly, one also does not find level-2 causality relationships directly represented in the graph of Figure 2. Only part of the relationship (3c) “*increase > decrease* causes stock increase” can be logically inferred; for instance for 2050, by noticing that emission is still higher on the y-axis than absorption (this, of course, allows to infer “*increase > decrease*”). However, the causal consequence of this (“causes stock to increase”) can no longer be inferred from the visual information given by the graph of Figure 2. Hence, while parts of level-2 causality can be logically inferred by inspecting the visual information in the graph, the actual causal consequences cannot be directly derived by solely inspecting the visual information in the graph.

Finally, we turn to the question: how extensively are the force-dynamic elements that are involved in basic SF reasoning (cf. with (7)) represented in Figure 2?

- (14) *The force-dynamic elements of SF reasoning in the coordinate-graphic format (exemplified with atmospheric CO₂ level)*
- a. Ago: “CO₂ in giga tons”
 - b. Ant₁: the plotted line labeled “Emission”
 - c. Ant₂: the plotted line labeled “Absorption”
 - d. x-state: — (x_{at a certain level} has to be inferred)
 - e. x_{diff-action}₁: — (in accompanying text only)




Figure 3. Pictorial-schematic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation where increase/decrease/constancy has to be inferred. Could be combined with a verbal format.

- f. $x_{diff-action_2}$: — (in accompanying text only)
- g. $x_{diff-action_3}$: — (in accompanying text only)
- h. stronger than (++): n.a.
- i. larger-than (>):(++): n.a.
- j. equal-to (=): n.a.

The force-dynamic analysis of the graph in (14) is summarized quickly: the force-dynamic interaction between the Ago and the Ant is not represented because the action-values of the Antagonists (the powers that lead to increase, decrease, or constancy) are not represented in the graph. Therefore, none of the actual causal interplay between atmospheric CO₂ level and emission/absorption that leads to CO₂ increase is graphically displayed.

While the coordinate-graphic presentation format (14) displays the underlying causal relationships only marginally, it of course does display information that the pictorial-schematic presentation format (Figure 2) and the verbal presentation format (12) does not display: predictions of how levels of emission and absorption develop over time. Such information is of course vital and indispensable, also for the public. Thus, what might be at hand in order to optimize public understanding of climate change (cf. Introduction) is a synthesis of the coordinate-graphic, the verbal, and the pictorial-schematic format (see Discussion).

E. Discussion

In this article two main endeavors were undertaken. First, we developed a force-dynamic account of stock-flow reasoning and showed that our new theoretical approach to stock-flow reasoning can explain all basic cognitive aspects that are involved in stock-flow reasoning. Second, we carried out an analysis in terms of this new force-dynamic account for stock-flow reasoning in relation to three different modes of presentation of CO₂ accumulation: (a) the pictorial-schematic format of the bathtub analogy (as shown in Figure 1), (b) the verbal format (as shown in (12) and (13)), and (c) the coordinate-graphic format (as shown in (14) and in Figure 2). Force-dynamic theory explains why (b) produces better understanding than (c) because the neces-

sary force-dynamic elements for a correct understanding are only present in (b). Thus, our force-dynamic account has the theoretical power to explain the empirical finding of Fischer and colleagues (2015) that a verbal format of stock-flow reasoning produces a better understanding than what studies using coordinate-graphic format (Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009; Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 2007) have found.

Additionally, – as a new empirical question – we can also turn to the question how the bath-tube-analogy-based pictorial-schematic presentation format could be used to enhance understanding of SF reasoning (including understanding the SF reasoning about climate change). So far (in section B) we have only shown (see Figure 2) pictorial-schematic presentation formats that “give away” whether there will be stock increase, decrease, or constancy (because the purpose was to identify the underlying causal and force-dynamic structure and not to present ways how SF reasoning abilities might be tested). However, any investigation into basic SF reasoning skills must of course not give away what has been termed level-2 causality in this paper (increase > decrease causes stock increase; decrease > increase causes stock decrease; and increase = decrease causes stock to remain constant) – because it is just the correctness of these inferences that usually are tested when investigating how well people perform in SF reasoning (Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009; Fischer et al., 2015; Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 2007).

Figure 3 gives one example of a pictorial-schematic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation that does not give away level-2 causality.

The pictorial-schematic format in Figure 3 could for instance be combined with the verbal format of Fischer and colleagues (2015), with (12), to assess basic understanding of SF reasoning skills. Answering the questions in (12), participants in corresponding studies could use a graph among the lines of Figure 3 to think their answers through. As participants would be reading the addition (“twice as high”) and subtraction (“reduced by 30%”) information, they might for instance inspect the graph and might mentally project




Figure 4. Pictorial-schematic complementation of the coordinate-graphic presentation format for stock-flow CO₂ accumulation. Furthermore, this combined format could also be presented together with an additional coordinate graph that shows the real, actual increase over the years.

corresponding higher and lower levels of CO₂ levels into the picture. Such a visual aid could possibly lead to still higher understanding of SF reasoning about climate change. Schematic visual information – like the one in Figure 3 that highlights more spatial relations than actual visual content – might indeed assist reasoning skills. People for instance do better in logical reasoning when little or no imagery is required, but when the problem can be cognized with a clear spatial layout (Knauff, 2013).

Finally: what could be done to counteract so called “SF failure” – the widespread wrong interpretations of SF problems that involve emission/absorption coordinate graphs (Cronin, Gonzalez, & Sterman, 2009; Sterman & Sweeney, 2002, 2007)? This is a very important question, as such coordinate graphs feature prominently in official reports about global warming (e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2013). A simple attempt to counteract SF failure would be to add a pictorial-schematic presentation format of Figure 1 to the coordinate-graphic presentation format of Figure 3. A text that could be added to Fig. 1 is for instance: “2050. Still CO₂ increase. As long as there is more CO₂ emission than absorption, there is CO₂ increase”. This is represented in Figure 4.

As shown in Figure 4, bringing together different presentation formats (*coordinate*, *pictorial-schematic*, which could furthermore be accompanied by *verbal*) could form a powerful synthesis that could possibly help a) researchers to more adequately assess basic stock-flow reasoning skills, and b) the public to better understand reasoning about climate change. Together with coordinate graphs showing the real increase over the years, this synthesis would allow representing future predictions of emission and absorption developments (SF coordinate format), while at the same time making the underlying force-dynamic (causal) structure transparent (SF verbal and pictorial-schematic format). Given the “relentless rise of carbon dioxide”

(as NASA puts it⁴), and given the dangers that come with it for our planet, we should not too easily accept the “SF failure” of people as a scientific fact. Quite the opposite: we have offered a theoretical (force-dynamic) interpretation of an empirical finding (of Fischer and colleagues, 2015) that makes a strong case that – as long as the presentation formats for SF reasoning represents force-dynamic causal thinking patterns – people actually show large *SF competence*. SF competence might be a much more promising basis than SF failure to promote pro-environmental behavior among the human species in order to protect our planet.

Declaration of conflicting interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be constructed as a potential conflict of interest.

Author contributions: The authors contributed equally to this work.

Handling editor: Andreas Fischer

Copyright: This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.

Citation: Stocker, K., & Funke, J. (2018). How we conceptualize climate change: Revealing the force-dynamic structure underlying stock-flow reasoning. *Journal of Dynamic Decision Making*, 5, 1. doi:10.11588/jddm.2019.1.51357

Received: 24 Aug 2018

Accepted: 03 May 2019

Published: 07 May 2019

⁴ https://climate.nasa.gov/climate_resources/24/

References

- Barbey, A. K., & Wolff, P. (2007). Learning causal structure from reasoning. In *Proceedings of the 29th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society* (pp. 713–718). Nashville, TN: Erlbaum.
- Brehmer, B. (1976). Learning complex rules in probabilistic inference tasks. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, *17*(1), 309–312. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9450.1976.tb00245.x
- Clayton, S., Devine-Wright, P., Swim, J., Bonnes, M., Steg, L., Whitmarsh, L., & Carrico, A. (2016). Expanding the role for psychology in addressing environmental challenges. *American Psychologist*, *71*(3), 199–215. doi:10.1037/a0039482
- Cronin, M. A., Gonzalez, C., & Serman, J. D. (2009). Why don't well-educated adults understand accumulation? A challenge to researchers, educators, and citizens. *Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes*, *108*(1), 116–130. doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2008.03.003
- Fischer, H., Degen, C., & Funke, J. (2015). Improving stock-flow reasoning with verbal formats. *Simulation & Gaming*, *46*(3-4), 255–269. doi:10.1177/1046878114565058
- Garcia-Retamero, R., Wallin, A., & Dieckmann, A. (2007). Does causal knowledge help us be faster and more frugal in our decisions? *Memory & Cognition*, *35*(6), 1399–1409. doi:10.3758/bf03193610
- Goldvarg, E., & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2001). Naive causality: A mental model theory of causal meaning and reasoning. *Cognitive Science*, *25*(4), 565–610. doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2504_3
- Gonzalez, C. (2004). Learning to make decisions in dynamic environments: Effects of time constraints and cognitive abilities. *Human Factors*, *46*(3), 449–460. doi:10.1518/hfes.46.3.449.50395
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] (2013). Summary for policymakers. In T. F. Stocker, D. Qin, G.-K. Plattner, M. Tignor, S. K. Allen, J. Boschung,...P.M. Midgley (Eds.), *Climate change 2013: The physical science basis*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from <http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg1/#.UuqH1BDGOOc>
- Knauff, M. (2013). *Space to reason: A spatial theory of human thought*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Pearl, J. (2000). *Causality: Models, reasoning, and inference*. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
- Spirtes, P., Glymour, C., & Scheines, R. (2000). *Causation, prediction, and search*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2nd edition.
- Serman, J. D., & Sweeney, L. B. (2002). Cloudy skies: Assessing public understanding of global warming. *System Dynamics Review*, *18*(2), 207–240. doi:10.1002/sdr.242
- Serman, J. D., & Sweeney, L. B. (2007). Understanding public complacency about climate change: Adults' mental models of climate change violate conservation of matter. *Climatic Change*, *80*(3-4), 213–238. doi:10.1007/s10584-006-9107-5
- Stocker, K. (2014). The elements of cause and effect. *International Journal of Cognitive Linguistics*, *5*(2), 121–145.
- Talmy, L. (1985). Force dynamics in language and thought. In *Papers from the twenty-first regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society*, 293–337. Chicago Linguistic Society.
- Talmy, L. (1988). Force dynamics in language and cognition. *Cognitive Science*, *12*(1), 49–100. doi:10.1016/0364-0213(88)90008-0
- Talmy, L. (2000). *Toward a cognitive semantics. Vol. 1: Concept structuring systems*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Wolff, P. (2003). Direct causation in the linguistic coding and individuation of causal events. *Cognition*, *88*(1), 1–48. doi:10.1016/s0010-0277(03)00004-0
- Wolff, P. (2007). Representing causation. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General*, *136*(1), 82–111. doi:10.1037/0096-3445.136.1.82
- Wolff, P., & Song, G. (2003). Models of causation and the semantics of causal verbs. *Cognitive Psychology*, *47*(3), 276–332. doi:10.1016/s0010-0285(03)00036-7