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Andrea Strazzoni

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Neglected sources on Cartesianism: the academic *dictata* of Johannes de Raey

Andrea Strazzoni
Ca’ Foscari University, Venice, Italy

**ABSTRACT**
In this article, I provide a historical and bibliographical exploration of the handwritten, dictated commentaries (*dictata*) of Johannes de Raey (1620/1622–1702) on the texts of René Descartes (1596–1650), shedding light on their structure, development, and on their relations with the academic commentaries of Johannes Clauberg (1622–1665) and Christoph Wittich (1625–1687). The study of these commentaries, which are extant as class notes, is important because they conveyed one of the first systematic teachings of Descartes’s ideas and constituted a vehicle for their further dissemination across northern Europe.

**KEYWORDS**
Academic commentaries; *dictata*; René Descartes; Johannes de Raey; Johannes Clauberg; Christoph Wittich

1. Introduction

The study of the academic dissemination of the ideas of René Descartes (1596–1650) is essential for the comprehension of the “philosophical revolution” he prompted in the seventeenth century. This dissemination took place mostly in the Dutch Republic, where Cartesianism became a philosophy of the university in the 1630s–1640s, thanks to the teaching of Henricus Regius (1598–1679) at Utrecht (from 1638) and of Adriaan Heereboord (1613–1661) at Leiden University (from c. 1644). However, Regius and Heereboord became acquainted with Descartes’s ideas only after having completed their higher education. Moreover, Regius soon clashed with Descartes himself (1645), while Heereboord assumed a remarkably syncretic approach, teaching Descartes’s ideas along with Scholastic ones.1 It was only through a student of both, namely Johannes de Raey (1620/1622–1702), that Descartes’s ideas were systematically taught at Leiden from 1647. From that time, Leiden became the centre of Cartesian dissemination in the Netherlands and throughout northern Europe, thanks to its position as an educational centre which attracted students from all the Reformed countries.2 Studying De Raey’s teaching, therefore, is essential for comprehension of the transmission of Descartes’s ideas, particularly for the peculiarities of their academic contexts of dissemination.3

A substantial part of this teaching was conveyed by De Raey and other Cartesians (such as Johannes Clauberg, 1622–1665, and Christoph Wittich, 1625–1687) by writing and dictating – or allowing copies to be made of – commentaries on Descartes’s texts, which are
extant mostly in handwritten form. Such commentaries, usually titled “dictata”, are today under increasing scrutiny by historians. More attention is being paid to the overall practice of note-taking in the early modern period (by scholars, students, erudites, and travellers), thanks in particular to the studies of Ann Blair and Richard Yeo. Theo Verbeek has published an overview of the Cartesian dictata extant in Dutch libraries and a comparative study of two commentaries by Clauberg on Descartes’s Principia philosophiae (1644), while Domenico Collacciani has more recently brought to light two previously unknown commentaries by De Raey, and Davide Cellamare has provided the first study of the Cartesian commentaries of Wittich. The latter study was made possible by the project The Secretive Diffusion of the New Philosophy in the Southern Low Countries: Evidence on the Teaching of Cartesian Philosophy from Student Notebooks 1650–1750. This project is related in turn to the Magister Dixit project, which has the goal of “digitizing and disclosing all extant handwritten lecture notes of the ancient University of Louvain (1425–1797)” and shedding light on the practice of early modern academic note-taking. Building on their evidence, in what follows I provide (Section 2) an overview of De Raey’s activities and of the methods of teaching philosophy at Leiden, where he dictated the greater part of his extant commentaries; (Section 3) a presentation of the dictata by De Raey; (Section 4) an analysis of their textual organization, as well as of (Section 5) their contents and dating. Finally, (Section 6) I discuss the relations between De Raey’s dictata and those of Clauberg and Wittich.

2. De Raey and the teaching of philosophy at Leiden

De Raey was first a student of Regius at Utrecht in 1641–1643 (acting as respondens in his disputations on Physiologia), and later of Heereboord at Leiden, where he enrolled in 1643 and graduated in arts and medicine in July 1647, becoming in the same year a private lector philosophiae. While still a private teacher, De Raey became so famous in Cartesian circles that, upon the suggestion of Tobias Andreae (1604–1676), Clauberg came to Leiden in 1648 in order to perfect his knowledge of Descartes’s ideas under him. Moreover, De Raey was praised by Descartes himself (as reported by Clauberg) as being an excellent teacher of his philosophy, and he was present, in March 1650, at the opening of the trunk of papers left by the Frenchman at Leiden. A year later he was authorized by the university curators to give public lectures and preside over disputations on the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata; in fact, this was a way to allow him to teach Descartes’s physics by offering a Cartesian interpretation of Aristotelian ideas. This interpretation was substantiated in his Clavis philosophiae naturalis Aristotelico-Cartesiana (1654), which collected the texts of his Disputationes ad Problemata Aristotelis (1651–1652). In 1653 he became an extra-ordinary professor of philosophy (being allowed to teach physics only), while in 1661 he was appointed as an ordinary professor, being allowed also to teach medicine publicly and to preside over medical disputations in the meantime (November 1658–October 1662). According to the series lectionum of Leiden University, De Raey publicly taught Physica from the summer and winter semesters of 1654, and Institutiones medicinae from the winter semester of 1658, he also taught metaphysics and logic, at least in his private lectures. From 1654 at least, he also started to dictate commentaries on Descartes’s works. Eventually, in November 1668, he left Leiden for the Amsterdam Athenaeum Illustre, where he taught logic,
metaphysics, and physics, continued to dictate upon Descartes’s texts, and authored his *Cogitata de interpretatione* (1692).15

When De Raey began his private lectures in 1647, the teaching of philosophy at Leiden had long since abandoned the genre of textual commentaries on Aristotle, and it was taught by textbooks. After the Synod of Dordt (1618–1619), the States of Holland had called for a reform of studies, and Franco Burgersdijk (1590–1635) was asked to provide a textbook making accessible to students the *Systema logicae* (1600) of Bartholomeus Keckermann (1572–1608). This task was accomplished by Burgersdijk writing his *Institutiones logicae* (1626), later abridged in a *Synopsis* (1632); both of which had several editions during the seventeenth century. Notably, in the preface to his *Institutiones logicae*, Burgersdijk distanced himself from his predecessors, who, even if providing compendia of Aristotle’s *Organon*, were still attempting to stick to and interpret his texts. In 1641, Heereboord refused to comply with the order of the university curators to teach philosophy by commenting on Aristotle.16 As for metaphysics, teaching was conducted with the *Primae philosophiae institutiones* (1616) of Gilbertus Jacchaeus (c. 1578–1628), and later with the *Institutiones metaphysicae* (1640) of Burgersdijk. In physics, Jacchaeus’s *Institutiones physicae* (1614) had comparable success, as did Burgersdijk’s *Idea philosophiae naturalis* (1622). This notwithstanding, the genre of commentaries had not completely vanished. First, the profusion of abridgements led to the appearance of annotated editions, such as Heereboord’s *Ερμηνεια logica, seu Explicatio Synopseos Logicae Burgersdicianae* (1650) and his annotated edition (1658) of the *Metaphysica* (1645) of Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644); both provided with an explanatory apparatus per lemmas (as in image 1, from Heereboord, *Ερμηνεια logica, 2*). Second, it was common in the 1630s and 1640s to lecture on pseudo-Aristotle’s *Problemata*: as seen above, De Raey lectured on the *Problemata* in order to teach Descartes’s physics at Leiden from 1651. A decade earlier (1640), Regius had done the same at Utrecht, being allowed to teach (Cartesian) physics without interfering with the official courses in this discipline.17

Even if pseudo-Aristotle’s Problemata was used both by Regius and De Raey only as the starting point for a discussion of Cartesian ideas, such lecturing testifies to the survival of the idea of teaching philosophy by commenting on a text. This, indeed, was to happen upon the appearance of Descartes’s works, which enjoyed several editions in the Netherlands from 1637 onwards.18

3. The academic dictata of De Raey

At present, five handwritten commentaries by De Raey on Descartes’s texts are known.19 Four of these are on Descartes’s Discours de la méthode (1637) and Principia philosophiae, and one is on Descartes’s Meditationes de prima philosophia (1641). No identity of the copyists of De Raey’s dictata can be ascertained, although probably they were all students, as his dictata had clear didactic aims and undoubtedly consisted of class notes, as indicated by some of their titles (to which I will return). Also, De Raey’s dictata do not contain indications of whether they were aimed at public or private lectures; however, given the advanced contents of the dictata and the fact that public lectures were often overcrowded and attracted not only students but also other visitors, we may assume that all De Raey’s dictata served for private lectures, which constituted a substantial component of university teaching and a major source of income for professors.20 Moreover, De Raey’s commentaries on Descartes’s Discours and Principia were prepared, dictated, and copied together, given the fact that every commentary on Descartes’s Discours is extant together with a commentary on Descartes’s Principia in the same manuscript, and vice-versa. Moreover, De Raey used to dictate on Descartes’s Meditationes to the same students.21 De Raey’s Cartesian dictata (the details and specific contents of which I discuss below) are as follows:


(4) Analysis sive argumenta eorum quae continentur in Dissertatione de metodo recte utendi ratione, et veritatem in scientiis investigandi, Auctore Domino Johanne de

(5) De methodo. [...] Principiorum philosophiae pars prima[–quarta]. Amsterdam, University Library, ms. X B 7, exact format not retrieved, pages 9, 171. C. 1669–1702, unknown provenance. Henceforth “AMS 1669–1702”.

Moreover, several other, now lost, dictata and annotations by De Raey on Descartes’s works, not limited to his Discours, Principia, and Meditationes, are listed in the sales catalogues of private libraries, such as those of Simon Emtinck (Lord of Noordwijkerhout, 1674–1752), Emo Lucius Vriemoet (professor at Franeker, 1699–1760), and especially that of the library of the Amsterdam lecturer Johannes Theodorus Schallbruch (1655–1723), which lists an impressive number of Cartesian materials including, besides manuscripts of dictata, no less than 13 copies of different editions of Descartes’s works personally annotated by De Raey, Clauberg, and Wittich, or provided with annotations dictated by them.26 The collection of these items was most probably not just the result of Schallbruch’s activities as a copyist at Leiden, where he enrolled in 1678 and studied under Wittich, before moving to the Dordrecht Academy in the early 1680s, where he studied under Salomon van Til (1643–1713, professor of theology since 1683, who was to publish some of Wittich’s dictata in 1688, as I discuss in Section 6.3);27 indeed, he also acquired from Clauberg’s son (Johannes Christophorus, 1655–1691) materials belonging to his father, which he reports having used for his edition of Clauberg’s Opera omnia (1691).28 Moreover, relevant materials might have come from De Raey himself, given the fact that Schallbruch was his colleague at Amsterdam from 1697, and that De Raey and his wife were witnesses at the baptism of Schallbruch’s son in 1701.29

Such materials show that (1) the dictata catalogued in libraries today constitute only a fraction of the Cartesian commentaries circulating in the second half of the seventeenth century; moreover, (2) that professors certainly developed their commentaries from personal, marginal annotations. Also, (3) commentaries of different professors came to be transcribed in parallel, as in the case of Schallbruch’s copying from autographs of De Raey, Clauberg, and Wittich on an exemplar of Descartes’s Meditationes.30 In doing this, Schallbruch proved to be more a collector and an erudite than a student, and he might have done this after his studies at Leiden. In any case, the presence of parallel or double commentaries can be traced in other dictata discussed in the present article, as I show in the following sections.

4. Textual organization

As far as the textual organization of De Raey’s dictata is concerned, we can identify some important features.

(1) Generally speaking, De Raey’s dictata include three main types of commentary:
(A) A short commentary not concerning or starting with a specific lemma, but considering the overall contents of, or the occasion of writing, a certain text, or a main theme dealt with in it. Such a commentary is usually placed at the beginning of certain sections (as in image 2, CPH 1658, 227).

(B) A short commentary on the contents of several articles or paragraphs, labelled as “analysis textus” or “analysis sive argumenta” (as in the case of LID 1664–1668, beginning with and named after this type of commentary), and placed at the beginning or within the main commentary (which I discuss next). Such analytical sections of the dictata divide and epitomize arguments developed by Descartes across different articles or paragraphs, through references to lemmas and/or to article numbers (as in image 3, LID 1664–1668, 21v).

(C) A more extended commentary of lemmas of Descartes’s text, which constitutes the greater part of all the dictata, and which also covers, in most cases, those parts already subjected to the analysis textus (as in image 3).

These types of commentaries were not new. If we look, for instance, at the commentary on Aristotle’s Physica by Thomas Aquinas, we find, in each of the lectiones into which the commentary is divided, (1) an introduction to the commented text, or a sentence connecting the commentary to the previous lectio; (2) a divisio textus, namely a progressive sub-division of the contents of the book under consideration, often with the use of lemmas from the original text; (3) the explanatio textus, namely the main part of the commentary itself, centred around lemmas; (4) the quaestiones, addressing specific

**Image 2.** A photograph of CPH 1658, 227. Source: Copenhagen, The Royal Danish Library, ms. Don. var. nr. 145 4vo. No copyright.
problems in Aristotle’s texts. 31 While the introductory parts (1) constitute a very minor section of De Raey’s commentaries (it is quite rare to find them), and the textual commentary (3) is akin to those provided by Heereboord (who lists a series of lemmas, each provided with a commentary of the corresponding text, as in image 1), the other parts of the commentaries deserve a separate consideration.

The medieval divisio (2), as John Boyle puts it,

has at least three essential characteristics. First, the interpreter articulates a theme that provides a conceptual unity to the text and the commentary as a whole. Second, the division penetrates at least to the level of verse; it does not simply articulate large blocks of the
text. And third, because the division begins with the whole and then continues through progressive subdivisions, every verse stands in an articulated relation not only with the whole but ultimately with every other part, division, and verse of the text.32

In early modern times, however, such a divisio textus tends to disappear from Scholastic commentaries.33 At the same time, the order of presenting conceptual contents by divisions became central to the logic of Petrus Ramus (1515–1572), upon which De Raey himself dictated and which informed a large number of logical and philosophical textbooks, including Burgersdijk’s, particularly in the northern European areas.34 This method was adopted by De Raey’s first teacher, Regius, and Ramist logic was considered by De Raey as a benchmark for any other traditional logical theory, being praised by him as the best among pre-Cartesian or “vulgar” logical theories, not aimed at philosophy but only at guiding reasoning in practical disciplines.35 Such a judgment, however, did not concern the method of presenting by divisions, but the very logical categories set by Ramus, not matching the Cartesian worldview. In fact, although De Raey’s analysis textus does not proceed by progressive sub-divisions of contents but provides summaries of certain arguments or divisions of large parts of texts, De Raey also adopted a Ramist tool of exposition, namely a tabella analytica (as in image 4, CPH 1658, 179), used in commenting upon Principia I.48. Thus far, if not a direct influence of medieval commentaries, a Ramist way of analysis should nonetheless be ascertained as at work in De Raey’s dictata.

As far as the quaestiones (4) are concerned, these constituted an important part of early modern Scholastic commentaries, as well as of the Louvain dictata. As detailed by Steven Coesemans, such dictata were usually composed of: definitions; expositions of theories (as such dictata did not consist of textual commentaries); and quaestiones, in which certain issues were discussed in detail. Moreover, Coesemans points out a differentiation between dictata – consisting of the above-mentioned structure – and annotata, in which “the presentation is through the form of short questions and answers, rather than lengthy exposition”.36 This type of exposition cannot be found in De Raey’s (or other Cartesians’) commentaries, in which “dictata” and “annotata” are used as interchangeable titles. In any case, short quaestiones and responsiones can be found from time to time in De Raey’s commentaries.37

(2) Moreover, all De Raey’s dictata on Descartes are composed of a base text (henceforth “B-T”), and additions to the B-T; in certain cases, these are clearly distinguishable from the B-T as they are placed in a second column of text, are interlinear, or just fill any available space surrounding the B-T (as in image 5, LID 1664–1668, 5r). The additions usually consist of: integrations, i.e. continuations of the commentary embodied by the B-T; new commented lemmas; another commentary of a lemma already commented on in the B-T (constituting therefore a parallel or double commentary); references to other texts and/or quotations; and meta-commentaries.

(3) Finally, De Raey’s dictata share the same commentaries to certain lemmas with each other, and also share some of their contents with Clauberg’s and Wittich’s dictata (as I discuss in Section 6). Accordingly, we can consider them as revealing the evolution of De Raey’s teaching in different years, as he re-used, changed, expanded, or reduced the contents of his dictata, sharing them with other Cartesians and vice-versa. Each manuscript, in fact, has peculiar features, which I discuss next.
Tabella Analitica Arsic. XLVIII. Prædicationem Cartesiana continens:

MAGNITUDO.
Figura.
Motus.
Sibilis.

Corpus: substantia extensa

Duo summa rerum sunt genera.

Mens: substantia cogitans

Perception
Imaginari
Intelligere
Affirmare
Negare

Voluntas
Propri
Egregere

Adde six substantia corpoream
ad quan spectant

Appetitus
Alevis

Amor
Odium et

Sensus
Tracis, aliamque qualitatum.
5. Contents, dating, and structure of the dictata

5.1. Descartes’s Meditationes, Copenhagen, c. 1657–1658

Dictata CPH 1657–1658, apparently written by one hand (even if a possible change of hand can be noted at page 20, and the style and size of writing often changes across the manuscript), consist of:
(1) a commentary on Descartes’s *Epistola deductoria* [...] *Facultatis Theologiae Parisiensis Decano et Doctoribus* (pages 3–6);

(2) a commentary on the *Præfatio ad lectorem* (pages 7–8);

(3) a commentary on the six *Meditationes*, including their synopses, and on a few lemmas of Descartes’s *Responsiones* and of his *Notae in Programma quoddam* (1648) (pages 9–212).38

The *terminus post quem* (henceforth “TPQ”) of these *dictata* is 1657; De Raey refers to a letter of Descartes to Elisabeth of Bohemia (1618–1680) of 4 August 1645, published for the first time by Claude Clerselier (1614–1684) in the first volume of his edition of Descartes’s correspondence, printed in January 1657.39 A *terminus ante quem* (TAQ) cannot be clearly established; in any case, in *dictata* CPH 1658 there is a reference – in an addition to the B-T – to an annotation to page 5 of the *Meditationes*. The commentaries provided in CPH 1657–1658 and CPH 1658 parallel each other; therefore, in 1658, De Raey had already prepared parts of the text extant in CPH 1657–1658, although of course he could also have used it for lectures after 1658.40

The pages of the manuscript are split in two columns, and very few additions are provided in the second column (as in image 6, CPH 1657–1658, 121), i.e. the greater part of the text seems to be a B-T. The source of the additions could not be ascertained. Moreover, as in some instances the copyist left spaces in between the commentaries to the lemmas (as in image 7, CPH 1657–1658, 159) and some parts of the text are in a smaller size (as in image 8, CPH 1657–1658, 41), probably certain additions to the B-T are present in the first column too. However, the often-varying size of the script does not allow us to assess this with certainty. Notably, these *dictata* present some marginal indications of pages in green ink (as in image 9, CPH 1657–1658, 38), but it is unclear if they were inserted by the same hand as in *dictata* CPH 1658 (extant in the same library), in which one can also find some underlining and marks in green; as the manuscripts come from different private collections, this is probably not the case.

### 5.2. Descartes’s *Discours* and *Principia*, Copenhagen, 1658

*Dictata* CPH 1658, apparently written in all parts by the same hand, consist of:

(1) a commentary on sections 1–5 of Descartes’s *Discours* (pages 3–97);

(2) a commentary on Descartes’s *Principia* (pages 98–571).

This is the only manuscript which is dated; according to the title, the lectures in which the text was dictated took place from May to December 1658 (not exactly matching the summer and winter semesters of that year, so we can suppose he was also dictating upon other texts).41 The preparation of the commentary by De Raey might have taken place from 1656; indeed, he refers to the edition of Descartes’s *Specimina philosophiae* and *Principia* published in 1656 (Amsterdam, Louis and Daniel Elzevir), part of Descartes’s *Opera*.42

The *dictata* are composed of a B-T recognizable by the bigger size of the handwriting, while the additions are in a smaller size, and occupy both the second column of text as well as the column of the B-T (as in image 10, CPH 1658, 23). In the most obvious cases, a
part of the text is in a bigger size, and (up to page 247) the lemmas have been underlined in green, and the commentary in a bigger size of the script has been marked with double green quotation marks on the margins (as in image 10). We can consider such parts as
belonging to the B-T and highlighted in this way by the copyist after he wrote the B-T, while the continuation of these commentaries, in a smaller size and often inserted as new paragraphs, can be considered as additions. Even when the green underlining (used to
highlight certain words in all parts of the *dictata*) and the quotation marks are absent, the bigger size of the text indicates the presence of a B-T and of additions (as in image 11, CPH 1658, 406). Some other lemmas, in turn, have been underlined with dots and/or closed with a squared parenthesis, and commented with a text of smaller size (as in image 12, CPH 1658, 64; image 13, CPH 1658, 130; and image 14, CPH 1658, 147). Given that the text in the second column is also structured in this way (as in image
13) we can consider them as additions too. Moreover, because the lemmas and the commentaries constituting the B-T are often separated by blank spaces (as in image 15, CPH 1658, 91), evidently left for the additions which often fill them, and not all the additions are just double or parallel commentaries, but often serve to clarify or deepen the arguments developed in the B-T, we can suppose that the manuscript is not just a collation, by the copyist, of two courses of De Raey, one dating to May–December 1658 and another prior or posterior to it, but that it hosts different kinds of teaching by De Raey. As argued by Coesemans with regard to the Louvain dictata, the text of the dictata often circulated before the lectures themselves, and presumably this might have happened at Leiden too.43 Accordingly, we can suppose that the B-T is a copy of a previously circulated text, and the additions report the contents of De Raey’s lectures, which he taught using the B-T as a textbook, deepening and expanding its contents by dictating meta-commentaries as well as new commentaries on the same lemma. Finally, it is worth noting that most of the lemmas – both of the B-T and of the additions – are sequentially numbered, often in a way not matching the order of lemmas in Descartes’s texts. Such numbering was certainly added after the writing of the whole manuscript, as it covers both the B-T and the additions, and could have served as points de repère to locate the comments on a copy of Descartes’s works.

5.3. Descartes’s Discours and Principia, Hamburg, c. 1659–1661

Dictata HH 1659–1661 consist of:

1. a commentary on sections 1–5 of Descartes’s Discours (pages 1–48);
2. a commentary on Descartes’s Principia (pages 49–231).

The TPQ can be established as to 1659; in the B-T, De Raey refers to Clauberg’s Logica contracta (1659) and to the Wiskonstige musyka (1659) by Dirk Rembrandtsz van Nierop.
The TAQ cannot be clearly established; in principle, the dictata can date up to 1668, as De Raey is referred to as a professor at Leiden. However, as I show in Section 6.2, some contents of these dictata were re-used by Clauberg in a commentary...
of his on Descartes’s *Principia*, namely in his *Notae breves*, the TPQ of which is 1662. Therefore, I would date these *dictata* to c. 1659–1661.

As with *dictata* CPH 1658, also in this manuscript the sheets are split in two. The manuscript is composed of a B-T written in one column, while a second column is left blank, apparently for additions. These are very few, are for the most part by the same hand as the B-T, and concern mainly parts 3–4 of Descartes’s *Principia*. No
blank spaces are left in the main column of text, and no changes in the size of the writing can be observed. Therefore, we can suppose that the dictata were written on the basis of one text, and that only after copying were a few additions inserted; their source could not be ascertained.

5.4. Dictata on Descartes’s Discours and Principia, Leiden, c. 1664–1668

Dictata LID 1664–1668, written in all parts by the same hand, consist of:

1. a bibliography of some of the works mentioned in the manuscript (f. Vr);
2. a succinct history of philosophy, the text of which is abruptly interrupted (f. VIr);
3. a separate analysis textus of Descartes’s Discours (sections 1–4) (1r) and Principia (1r–2v) (given the fact that the commentary begins with such an analysis textus, the whole manuscript is named after it);
(4) a commentary of Descartes’s *Discours* (sections 1–3) (2v–8r) and of his *Principia* (8v–90v);

(5) a summary, article by article, of parts 1–3 of Descartes’s *Principia*. This text ends abruptly with *Principia* III.70, the commentary of which is left incomplete (91r–102v).
The TPQ of the B-T can be determined as to 1664. In the B-T there is a reference to the 1664 apparition of a comet; this is comet C/1664 W1, observed from November 1664 to February 1665.\(^{45}\) In an addition on the same line, there is a reference to its apparition in 1665. In other additions, references are given to De Raey’s disputations *De forma substantiali et anima hominis* (1665–1667) and *De vero et falso* (1667–1668), and to the
annexation of the Franche-Comté, captured by France from Spain in February 1668 during the War of Devolution, and returned to Spain with the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, signed on 2 May 1668. In turn, the TAQ can be determined as to 1668 itself because De Raey is referred to as a professor at Leiden in the main title.

The manuscript is composed of a B-T written in one column, with a small marginal space often filled with additions; these occasionally fill any other available space on the
page (as in image 6, LID 1664–1668, 5r, and image 16, LID 1664–1668, 7r). The additions are concentrated in the commentary on Descartes’s *Discours* and on parts 1–3 of his *Principia*. Starting with *Principia* III.89, conspicuous portions of the pages are left blank, corresponding to certain articles not commented on by De Raey, and sometimes only the headings of certain articles are provided, without any commentary filling the space obviously left for it (as in image 17, LID 1664–1668, 97r). Also, certain commentaries
are in an evidently smaller size of writing (as in image 18, LID 1664–1668, 64v), so they were certainly written later than the rest of the B-T; i.e. they were additions. Considering that the marginal additions, as seen above, seem to be posterior to the B-T, we can suppose that the copyist started to transcribe a commentary (B-T) without foreseeing any additions, as in the first sections of the manuscript the additions (also concerning articles not commented in the B-T) occupy all the available spaces, often being
interlinear. After having started to insert the additions, he began to leave spaces in the B-T to copy the commentaries of those articles not commented in the B-T itself (as in image 19, LID 1664–1668, 53r). In other words, we can suppose that, in around 1668, the copyist started to transcribe a course of De Raey traceable at earliest to 1664, as a previously circulated text or B-T; shortly afterwards, and before finishing the copy of the B-T, he started to follow the course of 1668, using it to integrate this B-T with additions. He also started to leave blank spaces to host the commentaries on the articles not dealt

Image 18. LID 1664–1668, 64v.
with in the B-T. Given that the marginal additions (on certain articles) often co-exist with blank spaces in the B-T (reserved to other articles, as in image 19), and also that the additions were not copied viva voce but from a manuscript, i.e. the copyist probably knew that some articles were not covered by any lecture before copying the text of the lectures themselves, we can suppose that he nonetheless hoped to be able to fill in the missing commentaries.

Image 19. LID 1664–1668, 53r.
5.5. Dictata on Descartes’s Discours and Principia, Amsterdam, c. 1669–1702

Dictata AMS 1669–1702, written in all parts by the same hand, consist of:

1. a commentary of sections 1–3 of Descartes’s Discours (pages 1–9);
2. a commentary of Descartes’s Principia (pages 1–171, separately numbered).

The manuscript does not record the name of any author, but its text substantially matches those of De Raey’s dictata, both in the B-T (see, in the Appendix, the textual agreements in the texts concerning Principia I.4) and in the additions; therefore we can attribute it to him with certainty. A precise TPQ and TAQ could not be established, given that these dictata do not contain references to other texts or facts. As the manuscript is preserved at Amsterdam, we can nonetheless date these dictata to his Amsterdam years (1669–1702).

Like the other dictata, also in this case the manuscript contains a B-T and additions, both marginal and in the main column of text, where they are recognizable by their being written in a smaller size (as in image 20, AMS 1669–1702, Principia, 39). The copyist did not leave space for the commentary on missing articles, although occasionally he inserted additions containing this type of commentary (as in image 21, AMS 1669–1702, Principia, 151). Nonetheless, he left spaces for commentaries of additional lemmas within certain articles already the subject of a commentary (as in image 22, AMS 1669–1702, Principia, 145). We can suppose that, as in the other dictata, the copyist drew his additions from De Raey’s lectures after having copied the B-T. Notably, in these dictata, we do not find the same type of analysis textus present in all the other dictata (the reason for this is unknown), moreover, some parts of the commentary are underlined in red ink.

6. The relations between the dictata

6.1. The relations between De Raey’s dictata

The relations between all these dictata by De Raey are far from being linear. We can nonetheless advance some claim about them.

1. First, the greater part of the commentaries to lemmas given in the B-Ts of the dictata by De Raey reveal conspicuous variants. In other words, the B-Ts of such manuscripts report different courses taught, i.e. dictated, by De Raey, who certainly re-used many of his materials, although he did not simply dictate the same text in every course.

2. Additions to dictata CPH 1658 can be found in the B-T of HH 1659–1661 (see, in the Appendix, the textual agreements in the cases of Principia I.3 and I.4), sometimes even when the B-T of CPH 1658 already contains a similar commentary (see the case of the lemma “ad maturiorem aetatem” in the Appendix). Moreover, the B-T of both the dictata show occasional agreements. Accordingly, De Raey re-used and adapted the contents of CPH 1658 for the course in which he dictated HH 1659–1661. In turn, dictata HH 1659–1661 contain few marginal additions, with negligible agreements with the text of other dictata. As there are no parallel or double commentaries to the same lemma, we can exclude the copyist transcribing, in a continuous text, materials from different courses or types of lectures by De Raey (although the additions may
come from such sources). Also, *dictata* LID 1664–1668 and, to a minor extent, AMS 1669–1702 have a complex structure, comparable to CPH 1658; namely, the manuscript contains many marginal or interlinear additions. Also, these manuscripts reveal agreements with the previous ones (see *Principia* I.3, I.4 and I.71), which De Raey re-used across the years.

6.2. The relations with Clauberg’s dictata

6.2.1. The case of the commentaries on Descartes’s Discours and Principia

Notably, all the *dictata* on Descartes’s *Principia* by De Raey show agreements with the *dictata* on Descartes’s *Discours* and *Principia* by Clauberg. These are the following.

(1) A commentary on the first paragraph of the fourth part of Descartes’s *Discours*, published as chapter 5 of Clauberg’s *Initiatio philosophi sive Dubitatio Cartesiana* (1655) and structured around lemmas, as academic *dictata*. Its preparation can be dated to c. 1654–1655, as it contains a reference to Clauberg’s *Logica vetus et nova* (1654).[^48]
Only three, short agreements with De Raey’s commentaries can be retraced; therefore, no conclusion about the relations of Clauberg’s and De Raey’s commentaries can be drawn.49

(2) Some very short notes on the first eight articles of Descartes’s *Principia*, published as chapter 10 of his *Initiatio*, not structured around lemmas. Such a commentary reveals agreements with Clauberg’s later *dictata* and with Wittich’s (see the cases of *Princípias* I.1 and I.7). Also, in this commentary, Clauberg refers to his *Logica vetus et nova*, so that it can be dated to c. 1654–1655.50

(3) *Dictata philosophica*, annotata in collegio habito super Principiis, a clarissimo Domino Johanne Claubergio, SS. theologiae et philosophiae Doctore et Professore in illustri Academia Duisburgensi. Leiden, University Library, ms. BPL 906, exact format not retrieved, ff. 76, acquired from the private library of Petrus van Musschenbroek.51 The manuscript, written by one hand and provided with very few marginal additions, is dated by the copyist as having been finished (“absolvi”) on 5 October 1661.52 This stands as the TAQ of the manuscript itself. However, there is evidence that the preparation of the commentary might be traceable to 1657. The manuscript contains references to the first edition of Clauberg’s *Logica vetus et nova* (1654), but not to the second (1658); moreover, there is a reference to Clauberg’s disputations *De motu*, which took place in 1657–1658, but the reference is only to the year 1657.53

(4) Clauberg’s *Notae breves in Renati Descartes Principia philosophiae*, intended by Clauberg for his private lectures and published for the first time by Schallbruch in Clauberg’s *Opera omnia*, on the basis of a holograph manuscript given to him by Clauberg’s son.54 This commentary (also covering, unlike all the other commentaries by De Raey and Clauberg, Descartes’s *Epistola dedicatoria*) can be dated to 1662 as TPQ; the text contains a reference to the *Summa theologiae* of Johannes Cocceius (1603–1669), published in that year.55 The TAQ is c. 1664; Clauberg died in January 1665.

As far as the two latter commentaries are concerned, most of the agreements can be found between De Raey’s *dictata* HH 1659–1661 and Clauberg’s *Notae breves*. Identification of the author of those parts shared by De Raey’s and Clauberg’s commentaries is to some extent undecidable, given that Clauberg and De Raey actively cooperated in the defence of Cartesianism in the early 1650s, and could have intervened in each other’s texts.56 These common parts, however, seem nevertheless to be attributed to De Raey as their first author. The TPQ of De Raey’s HH 1659–1661 is antecedent to the TPQ of Clauberg’s *Notae breves* (1662); moreover, as is shown in the Appendix, some agreements with Clauberg’s *Notae breves* can be found not only with De Raey’s HH 1659–1661 but also with the B-T of his earlier CPH 1658 (e.g. *Princípias* I.4). Those commentaries of lemmas given in Clauberg’s *Notae breves* common with De Raey’s *dictata* are often shorter in Clauberg’s *Notae breves* than in De Raey’s *dictata* (*Princípias* I.4). As a matter of fact, both De Raey and Clauberg could equally have abridged or expanded their own or each other’s texts (as the evolution of De Raey’s commentaries shows; see *Princípias* I.71). However, in the case of these two *dictata*, it is likely that Clauberg abridged De Raey’s text, for the reason that, in Clauberg’s *Notae breves*, indications of abbreviation (“et c.”) are sometimes provided (*Princípias* I.37). Moreover,
given that the manuscript of the Notae breves, as reported by Schallbruch, was holograph, it is more likely that he copied some parts of De Raey’s dictata and abridged them, rather than having copied from a more extended manuscript of his own which was also the source of De Raey’s dictata. In Clauberg’s Notae breves, we often find double commentaries to the same lemma, in which one of the commentaries shows agreements with the B-T of De Raey’s dictata HH 1659–1661; Clauberg was probably interested in having De Raey’s commentary in his manuscript.57

Concerning the relations with Clauberg’s Dictata philosophica, as seen above such a commentary was probably prepared by Clauberg in 1657 – i.e. before any other extant dictata by De Raey – even if the first dictata on Descartes by De Raey, now lost, can be traced at least to 1654.58 Moreover, the commentaries revealing agreements between Clauberg’s Dictata philosophica and De Raey’s dictata are shorter in Clauberg’s text, as was the case with his Notae breves. Nonetheless, in the case of Clauberg’s Dictata philosophica, it was probably De Raey who expanded Clauberg’s commentaries. Indeed, as we find double or parallel commentaries in Clauberg’s Notae breves, we may notice that, in some cases, one of the two commentaries is also found in Clauberg’s Dictata philosophica as the only commentary, while the other commentary is also found in De Raey’s dictata. De Raey’s dictata, in turn, include the same text found in Clauberg’s Dictata philosophica (see Principia I.4 and I.71). For instance, in the case of Principia I.4, we find, in Clauberg’s Notae breves, the same text already present in his Dictata philosophica as the only commentary of lemma “errare”, and, given as a second commentary of such a lemma, an abridged version of the commentary given by De Raey in HH 1659–1661. Dictata HH 1659–1661, in turn, also include the text already present in Clauberg’s Dictata philosophica. If Clauberg were the author of the whole text present in De Raey’s dictata, he probably would not have included a double commentary in his Notae breves, as the text used by De Raey already includes Clauberg’s text as given in his Dictata philosophica. In other words, in his Dictata philosophica (c. 1657), Clauberg provided a short commentary of the lemma “errare” (Principia I.4); De Raey later expanded upon it in his CPH 1658 and HH 1659–1661; while preparing his Notae breves, Clauberg kept the commentary he had already provided in his Dictata philosophica as his B-T, and added to it an abridged version of De Raey’s commentary given in HH 1659–1661, skipping, amongst others, the redundant words from it. The same kind of process can be observed also in the case of Principia I.71, in which, however, Clauberg did not abridge, in his Notae breves, De Raey’s commentary provided in HH 1659–1661; given its brevity, this was probably in order to keep it comprehensible. Finally, it is worth noting that, in the preparation of his Notae breves and Dictata philosophica, Clauberg re-used some contents of his earlier notes on Principia I.1–8, printed in his Initiatio (as in Principia I.1 and I.7).

6.2.2. The case of the commentaries on Descartes’s Meditationes
It is worth noting that De Raey’s dictata on Descartes’s Meditationes (CPH 1657–1658) show agreements with:

(1) some Notae by Clauberg on Descartes’s Primae Meditationes (published as chapters 7–9 of his Initiatio) probably dating to 1654–1655, as the text contains references to Clauberg’s Logica vetus et nova (1654);59
(2) to a minor extent, with Clauberg’s *Paraphrasis in Renati Descartes Meditationes de prima philosophia* (1658).

A textual comparison between these texts reveals that Clauberg’s 1655 *Notae* is generally more developed than De Raey’s commentary (see lemmas “animadverti” and “ingens opus”). As Clauberg’s *Notae* certainly precedes De Raey’s CPH 1657–1658, it was probably De Raey who relied on Clauberg’s commentary, abridging it. In any case, the editorial evolution of Clauberg’s *Notae* shows the insertion, across its editions, of materials also present in De Raey’s CPH 1657–1658, such as the lemma “genium”, which is found in the final version of Clauberg’s *Initiatio* published by Schallbruch in Clauberg’s *Opera omnia*, but which is absent in the 1655 edition. This addition probably came from a manuscript by Clauberg found by Schallbruch among his papers, the ultimate source of which, in any case, could have been a previous commentary by De Raey. In turn, the agreements with Clauberg’s *Paraphrasis* are less remarked, but nonetheless reveal a stratification of texts, as both De Raey’s CPH 1657–1658 and Clauberg’s *Paraphrasis* show agreements with Clauberg’s *Notae*, and in turn agreements with each other which cannot be found in the *Notae* itself (see lemma “ingens opus”).

6.3. *The relations with Wittich’s dictata*

Furthermore, De Raey’s and Clauberg’s *dictata* on Descartes’s *Principia* and *Meditationes* show agreements with the *dictata* of Wittich (fellow student of Clauberg since 1642 and later colleague of his at Herborn and Duisburg) on these texts.60 Namely the following.

(1) Wittich’s *In alma Gelriorum (quae est Noviomagi) Universitate [...] Observationes in [...] Renati Descartes [...] Meditationes de prima philosophia*, followed by his *dictata* on *Principiorum philosophiae pars prima, de principiis cognitionis humanae* (from the *Epistola deductoria* up to article 20), in ms. 3415, held at the Wellcome Library.61 These commentaries by Wittich – constituting, in fact, a course in metaphysics – probably date to 1664 at latest (which stands as their TAQ), and were likely transcribed by Michael de Mandeville (1639–1699, father of Bernard 1670–1733, who probably brought the manuscript to England).62 The commentary on the *Meditationes* contains references to works that appeared at latest in 1658 and 1659 (which stands as its TPQ), namely Clauberg’s *Paraphrasis* (1658) and Wittich’s own *Consensus veritatis in Scriptura divina et infallibili revelatae cum veritate philosophica a Renato Des Cartes detecta* (1659).63 The commentary on the *Principia* does not contain references suitable to date it, even if it was probably dictated along with that on the *Meditationes*; i.e. we can attribute the same TPQ to it. Neither of the commentaries contains additions.

(2) *Annotationes ad Renati Des-Cartes Meditationes*, posthumously published in usum studiorum by Van Til in 1688, as a collation (according to the front page) of three manuscripts, the provenance of which is not specified by the editor, although a possible source could have been Schallbruch, who – as mentioned above – studied under both Wittich at Leiden and Van Til at Dordrecht.64 Wittich’s *Annotationes* is not dated, but it contains the same references to Clauberg’s *Paraphrasis* (1658) and Wittich’s *Consensus veritatis* (1659) given in his *Observationes*, standing as TPQ.65 The only sure TAQ is 1687, when Wittich died.
Given the robust agreements between Wittich’s Observationes and Annotationes (as in lemmas “animadverti” and “ingens opus”), we can consider these texts, if not conveying exactly the same course on Descartes’s Meditationes (as in lemmas “genium” and “exiguum”), at least as evidence that Wittich did not prepare substantially different commentaries on such a text during his career. Moreover, Wittich started preparing these commentaries in around 1659 at the earliest, certainly after Clauberg’s commentary, and probably not before that of De Raey. A textual comparison between all their commentaries shows that Wittich re-used both Clauberg’s and De Raey’s commentaries, sometimes in a longer version, as in the case of the lemma “animadverti”, and sometimes in an abridged form, as in the cases of the lemmas “ingens opus” and “genium”. In some cases, we do find double, partially redundant commentaries on the same lemma by Wittich, as in lemma “exiguum”, the commentary of which was most probably taken by Wittich from De Raey (while Clauberg provided a different commentary in his Paraphrasis). Like De Raey’s commentaries, moreover, both Wittich’s concern Descartes’s Epistola deductoria, Praefatio ad lectorem, and the synopses of the six Meditationes, besides the Meditationes themselves. As far as Wittich’s re-use of Clauberg’s Paraphrasis is concerned, this is not only declared by Wittich himself but can be observed by direct textual appropriations (see lemma “ratio persuadet”, which cannot be found in De Raey’s dictata).

As far as Wittich’s commentary on Descartes’s Principia is concerned, we generally find different commentaries on the same lemmas by him, with respect to those of De Raey and Clauberg (as in Principia I.3 and I.4). Still, some agreements can be observed: the case of Principia I.1, with Clauberg’s Notae breves (in turn based on Clauberg’s notes on Principia I.1–8); the case of Principia I.7, with Clauberg’s notes on Principia I.1–8 (also slightly re-used in his Dictata philosophica, apparently not available to Wittich) and other contents of his Initiatio; the case of Principia I.9, with De Raey’s dictata as well. In any case, Wittich’s commentary was, for the most part, original to him.
7. Conclusion

In conclusion, it is worth remarking, first, that the complexity of De Raey’s dictata does not allow the reconstruction of an archetype and of its variants, i.e. a traditional, philological reconstruction of their texts. Rather than single commentaries, indeed, we should rather speak of a “constellation” of texts, all with parts in common with each other, and with those of other Cartesian authors. Second, it is unclear who inaugurated this genre, i.e. who was the first to provide an academic commentary on Descartes. According to the Bibliotheca Schalbruchiana, De Raey dictated on Descartes’s Principia, Specimina, and Meditationes as early as 1654, and his extant dictata on these texts date to 1657–1658 at the earliest.67 In turn, Clauberg’s Dictata on Descartes’s Principia, dated 1661, might, in fact, be traceable to 1657, after he had already provided partial commentaries on Descartes’s Discours and Meditationes in his 1655 Initiatio. This book can be conceived as the “esoteric” continuation of his “exoteric” Defensio Cartesiana (1652, focusing on method and logic), and covering the more advanced topics of metaphysics. Interestingly, however, in his earlier Defensio, one cannot find this type of commentary; his Defensio is in itself an extended commentary on Descartes’s Discours and method (albeit not based on lemmas), so that Clauberg probably had no need to include a classroom-based commentary. However, given that such a text nevertheless includes “spare” academic materials, such as several disputations he presided over in 1650–1651 (included in Clauberg’s Defensio as chapters 31–37), it might be that, in 1652, he had not yet started his classroom dictata. Thus, both Clauberg’s and De Raey’s earliest dictata – and Cartesian full-blown dictated commentaries as such – seem traceable to 1654 (when Clauberg’s Initiatio was probably completed, as its dedicatory letter is dated 13 February 1655).68 In fact, De Raey became a professor of philosophy at Leiden in June 1653, and taught his first public course on Physica in the summer semester of 1654.69 This certainly allowed a broader circulation and survival of his dictata (at least in private libraries); he might even have started to dictate on Descartes’s texts in that year. In turn, the Duisburg Gymnasium, where Clauberg had taught philosophy since December 1651 or January 1652 (after having taught philosophy and theology at Herborn Academy in 1649–1651), became a university in October 1655.70 This might have prompted him to prepare full-blown commentaries on Descartes’s texts, given the need to provide complete courses in philosophy to a more advanced academic audience.

As far as Wittich’s dictata are concerned, these were certainly prepared after the first commentaries by De Raey and Clauberg. In March 1651, Wittich became professor of mathematics and colleague of Clauberg at Herborn (where he also privately taught theology), then, after having left Herborn together with him, in February 1652, professor of theology at Duisburg (where he arrived only in May), and from May 1655, professor of theology at the Nijmegen Schola Illustris (founded the same year), which, in May 1656, became a university. In his case also, the teaching of a course on Descartes – namely on his metaphysics, which could have nonetheless served as a prodrome to his teaching theology – seems to have been related to his having a post at a university. As no series lectionum from Nijmegen relevant to our investigation could be traced (except those of 1656, according to which Wittich was teaching theology and Hebrew), and given that he was appointed as a professor of theology, we can suppose that he imparted such teaching privately. This holds also for his period at Leiden, where he moved to in 1671 as a professor of theology and where – according to the extant series lectionum (of 1681 only) – he was publicly teaching only such a discipline.71
Appendix

Table of the Latin editions of Descartes’s works (Amsterdam, Elzevir or Blaev) compatible with or actually used in De Raey’s, Clauberg’s and Wittich’s commentaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Specimina philosophiae</th>
<th>Principia philosophiae</th>
<th>Meditationes de prima philosophia</th>
<th>Appendix continens Obiectiones Quintas et Septimas</th>
<th>Epistola ad Voetium</th>
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<tr>
<td>De Raey, CPH 1658</td>
<td>1656 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
<td>1650 and 1654 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
<td>1649 and 1654 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
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<tr>
<td>De Raey, CPH 1657–1658</td>
<td>(no suitable references given)</td>
<td>1650 and 1654 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
<td>1649 and 1654 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
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<tr>
<td>De Raey, HH 1659–1661</td>
<td>1650 (Louis Elzevir) – both the two editions of this year (only compatible editions)</td>
<td>1650 and 1654 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
<td>1649 and 1654 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
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<td>De Raey, LID 1664–1668</td>
<td>1656 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
<td>1650, 1654 (Louis Elzevir) and 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
<td>1649, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), and 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
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<td>De Raey, AMS 1669–1702</td>
<td>1656 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir), 1664, 1667 (Daniel Elzevir), 1685, and 1692 (Blaev); an addition contains a reference to the 1644 edition (Louis Elzevir).</td>
<td>1650, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir), 1670, 1678 (Daniel Elzevir), 1685, and 1698 (Blaev)</td>
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<td>Clauberg, commentaries on Descartes’s Discours, Meditationes and Principia (c. 1654–1655, chapters 5 and 7–10 of his Initiatio)</td>
<td>1644 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
<td>1650 (Louis Elzevir) – both the two editions of this year</td>
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<td>Clauberg, Dictata philosophica (c. 1657)</td>
<td>(no suitable references given)</td>
<td>1650 and 1654 (Louis Elzevir)</td>
<td>(no suitable references given)</td>
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<td>Clauberg, Notae breves (c. 1662–1664)</td>
<td>1644 (Louis Elzevir) for parts 1 and 4 of the commentary and 1650 (Louis Elzevir) – both the two editions of this year – for parts 2–3</td>
<td>1650, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), and 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
<td>1649, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), and 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wittich, Observationes in Meditationes and dictata on Principiorum philosophiae pars prima (c. 1659–1664)</td>
<td>1644 (Louis Elzevir) or 1650 (Louis Elzevir) – both the two editions of this year.</td>
<td>1650, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), and 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
<td>1649, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), and 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir)</td>
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<td>Wittich, Annotationes ad Meditationes (c. 1659–1687)</td>
<td>1644 (Louis Elzevir).</td>
<td>1650, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir), 1670, and 1678 (Daniel Elzevir).</td>
<td>1649, 1654 (Louis Elzevir), 1663 (Louis and Daniel Elzevir), 1670, and 1678 (Daniel Elzevir).</td>
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Case of the lemma “ad maturiorem aetatem”

De Raey, CPH 1658

Maturiorem aetatem. Nam iuvenes multum obnoxii sunt, 1. praecipitantiae, idque quia praecipites spiritus habent, contra senes tardis in omnibus. Hic senes dandis, iuvenes vero exequendis consiliiis idonei sunt, media autem aetas inter haec duo extrema medium ponit. 2. Anticipationi, et praeiudiciis, idque quia non sunt assueti attentioni, deinde quia nimis creduli sunt: tales Galli iuvenes, at maturae aetatis anno quadragesimo, quinquagesimo, omnes excellunt.

Wittich, Observationes (c. 1659–1664)

Quam ad maturiorem. Nam aetas iuvenilis maxime obnoxia est praecipitantiae propter inconsiderantiam et festinationem in iudiciis, cuius physica causa peti potest a mobilitate spirituum, et temperamentum calido. Imo iuvenilis aetas etiam obnoxia est anticipationibus quatenus libentius ex praecursoria opinione quam praesenti perceptione iudicat, iuxta articulum 73 partis primae Principiorum. Haec autem vitia non quidem omnino, sed ex parte tamen emendatur ubi ad maturiorem aetatem accedimus. Nihil autem est quod illa vitia tam potenter eradicare possit, quam matheseos et philosophiae studium.

Clauberg, Notae (c. 1654–1655)

Iam ante aliquot annos. K. Notetur in authore triplex gradus illius ante aliquod annum animadversionis. Nam primo animadvertit illud, cum studiorum curriculum absolvisset in scholis, Dissertationis de methodo p. 3: “tot enim me dubii totque erroribus implicitum esse animadverteri” et c. Et simile tibi possit contingere, si iam ante male in scholis institutus ad hanc philosophiam accedas. K. Deinde

Animadverti. Primo, absoluto studiorum [[cursu]] curriculo, Med. pag. 3. Secundo, sectionis secundae Methodi, ubi causam imperfectionis in scientiis detegit. Tertio, paragrapho penultimo sectionis tertiae, tempore peregrinationis suae. Animadverti non solum decurso, ut mos est, in scholis studiorum curriculo, sed etiam postea longa peregrinatione, in vasto mundi libro volvendo magis occupatus, saepius mecum cogitavi, quam multas tempore infantiae meae de rebus ad humanas scientias pertinentibus (nam de ipsis, quae ad fidem et vitam agendam spectant, in praesentia non ago) falsas

Animadverti non. Tres sunt gradu disius animadversionis, primus fuit absoluto studiorum cursu, de quo in Dissertatione de methodo, pag. 3, articulo sexto. Secundus initio suae peregrinationis in Germania, vide Dissertationem de methodo, sectioni tercia, paragrapho penultimo. Cum rursus se ad peregrinandum accinxit et toto hoc novennio peregrinationis suae. Qui hoc animadvertit est in primo gradu ad scientiam, quemadmodum

Animadverti. Tres sunt gradu disius animadversionis: 1. absoluto studiorum cursu, Methodi pag. 3, articulo 6. 2. Initio sua peregrinationis in Germania, Methodi pag. 9, sectione secunda, ubi causam imperfectionis in scientiis detexit. 3. Sectionis tertiae paragrapheo penultimo, cum rursus se ad peregrinandum accinxit, toto hoc novennio peregrinationis suae: qui hoc animadverterit est in primo gradu ad scientiam, quemadmodum cognitio peccati est primus gradus ad conversionem. Qui

Case of the lemma “animadverti”

|--------------------------------|------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| lamm ante aliquot annos. K. Notetur in authore triplex gradus illius ante aliquod annum animadversionis. Nam primo animadvertit illud, cum studiorum curriculum absolvisset in scholis, Dissertationis de methodo p. 3: “tot enim me dubii totque erroribus implicitum esse animadverteri” et c. Et simile tibi possit contingere, si iam ante male in scholis institutus ad hanc philosophiam accedas. K. Deinde | Animadverti. Primo, absoluto studiorum [[cursu]] curriculo, Med. pag. 3. Secundo, sectionis secundae Methodi, ubi causam imperfectionis in scientiis detegit. Tertio, paragrapho penultimo sectionis tertiae, tempore peregrinationis suae. Animadverti non solum decurso, ut mos est, in scholis studiorum curriculo, sed etiam postea longa peregrinatione, in vasto mundi libro volvendo magis occupatus, saepius mecum cogitavi, quam multas tempore infantiae meae de rebus ad humanas scientias pertinentibus (nam de ipsis, quae ad fidem et vitam agendam spectant, in praesentia non ago) falsas | Animadverti. Tres sunt gradu disius animadversionis, primus fuit absoluto studiorum cursu, de quo in Dissertatione de methodo, pag. 3, articulo sexto. Secundus initio suae peregrinationis in Germania, vide Dissertationem de methodo, sectioni tercia, paragrapho penultimo. Cum rursus se ad peregrinandum accinxit et toto hoc novennio peregrinationis suae. Qui hoc animadvertit est in primo gradu ad scientiam, quemadmodum | Animadverti. Tres sunt gradu disius animadversionis: 1. absoluto studiorum cursu, Methodi pag. 3, articulo 6. 2. Initio sua peregrinationis in Germania, Methodi pag. 9, sectione secunda, ubi causam imperfectionis in scientiis detexit. 3. Sectionis tertiae paragrapheo penultimo, cum rursus se ad peregrinandum accinxit, toto hoc novennio peregrinationis suae: qui hoc animadverterit est in primo gradu ad scientiam, quemadmodum cognitio peccati est primus gradus ad conversionem. Qui | (Continued)
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<td>animadvertit in peregrinatione, occasione illius, quod opera quibus diversi artifices, inter se non consentientes, manum adhibuere, raro tam perfecta sint, quam illa quae ab uno absoluta sunt, Dissertationis de methodo p. 11: “eodemque etiam modo cogitavi, quoniam infantes omnes ante fuimus quam viri” et c. L. Tertio illud animadvertit specialius dubitationis novennio “circa res singulas observando quidnam possit in dubium revocari, et quidnam nobis occasionem male iudicandi praebet”, Dissertationis de methodo pag. 26.81</td>
<td>opiniones pro veris admiserim.84</td>
<td>agnitio peccati est primus gradus ad conversionem. Qui hoc vero non animadvertunt, nunquam ad solidam rerum cognitionem pervenire possunt, cum meliora non desiderentur, quemadmodum ante Evangelium promulgatum gentes suas tenebras non animadvertunt.86</td>
<td>vero hoc nunquam animadvertunt, nunquam ad solidam rerum cognitionem provenire [sic] possunt, cum meliora non desiderent, quemadmodum ante Evangelium promulgatum gentes suas tenebras non animadvertunt.87</td>
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Case of the lemma “ingens opus”

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<td>Sed ingens opus. A. Ingens hoc opus vocat primo respectu generalis opinionum eversionsionis, quia valde arduum et difficile est sic excutere ex animo nostro ea quae ante ab eo assumta et approbata fuerunt, partim quia dubitandi rationes habere oportet antequam dubitare velimus (unde praecipuas earum philosophus in hac Meditatione exposuit), partim quod et si statuerimus nihil affirmare vel negare, decreti tamen illius facile obliviscar, nisi profunde memoriae fuerit infuxum, ideoque ut attente hac de re cogitaretur postulavit, vide epistolae ad Instantias Gassendi pag. 143. […] D.</td>
<td>Primo quidem generalis illa eversio male fundatarum opinionum, quae longo usu et familiaritatis … devinctam sibi … credulitatem nostram. Secundo, instauratio illa, omni ex parte bene fundatae et instauratae scientiae et deinde bene ordinatae a primis fundamentis. Parte ultima sectionis secundae Methodi et parte ultima sectionis tertiae et parte secunda sectionis secundae.</td>
<td>Sed attendenti ex una parte, quam tenaces natura simus eorum, quae rudibus annis intellecta nobis existimamus, ob longam iis credendi consuetudinem. Ex altera, quam difficile sit immota naturalis certitudinis principia, et quae a nullo humano ingenio labefactari queant fundamenta reperire, geminatum illud quod proposueram, destructionis scilicet et constructionis, opus valde arduum atque ingens esse iam tum videbatur.</td>
<td>Ingens opus. Hoc est arduum et laboriosum, quatenus proprie Marte erat ab authore consequendum: nunc autem glacie ab ipso fracta nobis est facillus. Illud autem opus est, tum generalis eversio omnium male fundatarum opinionum, quae longo familiaritatis usu constrictam tenebant nostram credulitatem, tum instauratio philosophiae a primis fundamentis.</td>
<td>Ingens opus. Quatenus proprio Marte ab authore erat exsequendum, erat valde arduum, et laboriosum, sed nunc glacie fracta nobis est facillus: illud autem opus est, tum generalis eversio omnium male fundatarum opinionum, quae longo familiaritatis usu constrictam tenebant nostram credulitatem, tum etiam instauratio philosophiae a primis fundamentis.</td>
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### Case of the lemma “ratio persuadet”

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<tr>
<th>Clauberg, Notae (c. 1654–1655)</th>
<th>Clauberg, Paraphrasis (1658)</th>
<th>Wittich, Observationes (c. 1659–1664)</th>
<th>Wittich, Annotationes (c. 1659–1687)</th>
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<td><strong>Sed quia iam ratio persuadet.</strong> [<em>…</em>] B. Sed iam plenius dicamus, quae ratio persuadeat, [<em>…</em>] prima desumitur a natura philosophiae, cuius est animum humanum perficere, quantum naturae viribus est possibile in hac vita, ac proinde merito tendit ad omnem possibilium certitudinem, quae ab omnibus etiam possibilibus dubitandi rationibus libera existat.</td>
<td><strong>Etenim quia haec dubiorum reiectio eo tendit, ut prorsus indubitata principia inveniam, et quia scientia, ad quam adspiro, dubii omnis expers esse debet, cum veritas cuiusque rei talis sit, ut magis et minus non recipiat, nec nisi unum verum et rectum in re qualibet esse queat, manifestum est in hoc negotio, non minus accurate ab iis quae non plane certa sunt atque indubitata, quam ab aperte falsis, assensionem esse cohibendam.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ratio persuadet. Quia haec dubiorum reiectio eo tendit, ut prorsus indubitata principia inveniam, et scientiam ab omni dubio immunem. Vide Synopsin Primae Meditationis in fine.</strong></td>
<td><strong>Ratio persuadet. Quia haec dubiorum reiectio eo tendit, ut prorsus indubitata principia inveniam, et scientiam ab omni dubio immunem. Vide Synopsin Primae Meditationis fine.</strong></td>
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96
**Case of the lemma “genium”**

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<td><em>Sed genium aliquem malignum.</em> Potuisset author, hac suppositione omisso, simpliciter fingere seu supponere falsa esse ea quibus in ineunte aetate crediditatem suam addixerat, eaque suppositio nil potuisset, frequenti conscientia et experientia nostrorum errorum. Sed quia nimirum nihil omitendum erat quod a pertinacissimo obici vel fingi posset, author prudenter admodum, hoc etiam largitur adversario supponitque non modo nos falli in opinionibus nostris a nobismet ipsis, verum etiam aliquem esse extra nos qui nobis imponat. Et ut omnem cavillandi occasionem effugere a Deo quem fontem veritatis vocat transfert istam fraudem in rem cogitationem et satis potentem aliam, quales censentur esse genii sive mentes separatae. Et quanquam vix quisquam inter Christianos certitudini suae scientiae sibi ... a malis geniis, certum est Gentiles multo maiores viri illis attribuere multasque eorum experiri imposturas. Philosophia autem generalis esse debet et nulli religioni mancipata. Accedit denique peculiaris ratio huius suppositionis, quod primo multum iuvet ad distinctam cognitionem mentis si fingamus et nostri corporis et aliarum rerum corporearum ideas nobis aliunde obturari, quia tam manifestum est mentem quae habet tales ideas nullam talem rem corpoream esse. Adde quod vale ... et certa</td>
<td><em>Supponam igitur. Sufficere potuisset supponi, nos falli in omnibus a nobis ipsis, sed ut nihil omitteter, quod a pertinacissimo adversario adduci potuisset, supponit etiam esse aliquem extra nos, qui nos data opera fallat. Non optimum Deum.</em> Accurate transfert deceptionem a Deo ad genium, ad omnem calumniam effugiendam. <em>Fontem veritatis.</em> Qui propterea non potest fallere si sit fons veritatis, quod quidem hic nondum notum est certitudine infallibili sed demum notum fiet Meditazione Quarta: verum quia vel genus vel Deus hic supponi potuit nos fallere, maluit prius tanquam minus reprehensio noxioxiun. <em>Malignum.</em> Quanquam vix quisquam inter Christianos certitudini suae scientiae metuat a malis geniis, id tamen fit inter Gentiles, qui multas eorum experiri imposturas. Et debet valde evidens esse et certa scientiae, quae posita tam hyperbolica suppositione consistere potest, uti postea videbimus.*98</td>
<td><em>Supponam et c. Sufficere potuisset supponi nos falli a nobis ipsis in omnibus: sed ut nihil omitteter, quod a pertinacissimo adversario adduci potuisset, supponit etiam esse aliquem extra nos, qui nos data opera fallat. Optimum Deum.</em> Accurate a Deo ad genium transfert fallaciad omne calumniam effugiendam. <em>Veritatis.</em> Propert quam non possit fallere, quod de Deo nunc quidem non potuit certo cognoscere ante Meditazione Tertia, sed illud ex veteri opinione de Deo loquitur, et quia non est necessario Deo id attribuere, quod potest ad genium malignum referri. <em>Malignum.</em> Quanquam vix quisquam inter Christianos a malis geniis, id tantum fit inter Gentiles, qui multas eorum experiri imposturas. Philosophia quals [sic] esse debet, et nulli religioni mancipata. Accedit, quod valde debet esse evidens et certa scientia, quae seposita tam hyperbolica suppositione consistere possit. Facit etiam multum ad distinctam cognitionem mentis, si fingamus, et nostri corporis et aliarum rerum corporearum ideas aliunde nobis obtendere, inde enim manifestum est mentem, qui [sic] habet eas ideas, nullam tamen rem corpoream esse. Epistolae ad Voetium pag. 32.*99</td>
<td><em>Genium.</em> Q. Licet vix quisquam inter Christianos certitudini suae scientiae metuat a malis geniis, certum tamen est, Gentiles multo maiores illis vim attribuere, multasque eorum experiri imposturas. Philosophia autem generalis esse debet.*100</td>
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<td>debeat esse conclusio, …</td>
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<td>tam hyperbolica hypotesi sistere potest: prout videmus sequenti</td>
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<td>Meditatione de existentia mentis.97</td>
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**Case of the lemma “exiguum”**

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<td>Exiguum quid et c. Cum Hippocrate, Democrito, Epicuro et plerisque alis antiquis philosophicis [sic] et ipso etiam Aristotele, quando non logicae sed physicae considerabat animae substantiam, ut colligere licet ex libro 2 cap. 3 de Generatione animalium collato cum textibus alis inde enim evidens est apud Aristotelem substantiam animae esse subtile et calidum atque incorruptibile quoddam corpus, quod elemento stellarum analogum dicebat, propter perennem motum et intellectum. Vide ea quae dictavimus ad pag. 69.101</td>
<td>Vel si quid advertebam, exiguum quid imaginabam instar venti, vel aëris, vel aetheris, quod primarisis sive crassioribus mei partibus esset infusum (quo sensu Virgilius in similsi re dixit: “totamque infusa per artus mens agitat molem”) per attributa, ut postea liquebit, aliena et heterogenea.102</td>
<td>Vel exiguum. Vulgares philosophi animam considerantes logice definiunt: actum sive entelechian corporis organici potentia vitam habentis, qua definitione non magis explicatur animae essentia, quam si quis diceret formam horologi esse, quod sit actus ferrei organici: hanc definitionem examinat author: quoniam tantum vult considerare id, quod sponte per cognitionem naturalem de se putaverit. Vel exiguum quid. Sic antiqui plerique philosophi de anima sensorunt, et vix ulli alii etiam nunc cita revelationem divinam aliter animam concipiunt: haec sententia fuit Democriti, Hippocratis, Epicuri, ipsius Aristotelis, quando physice consideravit animae substantiam, ut colligere licet ex libro secundo de Generatione animalium comparato cum textibus aliis: et vix alii cita revelationem divinam vel talem methodum animam aliter concipiunt. Exiguum. Quando Peripatetici considerant logice, definiunt actum seu ἐντελέχειαν corporis organici potentia vitam habentis, qua definitione non magis explicatur animae essentia, quam si quis diceret formam horologi esse, quod sit actus ferrei organici potentia certum motum habentis. Alias Aristoteles quando animae substantiam consideravit physice, cum alii antiquis philosophis consideravit eam, tanquam subtile, calidum, atque incorruptibile quoddam corpus, ut colligere licet ex libro 2 de Generatione animalium comparato cum textibus aliis: et vix alii cita revelationem divinam vel talem methodum animam aliter concipiunt.</td>
<td>Exiguum. Quando Peripatetici considerant logice, definiunt actum seu ἐντελέχειαν corporis organici potentia vitam habentis, qua definitione non magis explicatur animae essentia, quam si quis diceret formam horologi esse, quod sit actus ferrei organici potentia certum motum habentis. Alias Aristoteles quando animae substantiam consideravit physice, cum alii antiquis philosophis consideravit eam, tanquam subtile, calidum, atque incorruptibile quoddam corpus, ut colligere licet ex libro 2 de Generatione animalium comparato cum textibus aliis: et vix alii cita revelationem divinam vel talem methodum animam aliter concipiunt.</td>
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|                        | intellecutum, quamvis quando animam consideravit logice, eam aliter definiverit tali definitione in … nihil nisi vera, non intellecta prout supra vidimus. Similis sententia est Porphyrii citante eum Pena de Usu optices, “ait Porphyrius in eo libro quem scripsit de Anthro Homerico, animos et genios corpus habere, sed valde teneue, aerium et humidum, et cum aeris natura calore fundatur, et tenuior fiat, frigore vero cogatur et densescat hinc fieri colligit, ut animi interdii aciem fugiant oculorum propter lucis calorem, noctu vero densetur et aspectabilis fiat propter nocturnum frigus”
|                        | comparato cum textibus alis. |

**Case of Principia I.1**

|---------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Considera etiam differentiam inter Primam Meditationem et hos articulos: v.g. ibi numero singulari de se, hic in plurali de nobis loquitur, quia Principia philosophiae publici iuris faciens voluit contendere ut, si vera essent, a quam plurimis recipentur, vide Epistolae ad Dinetum pag. 150 fine.

*Quoniam infantes nati sumus. Vide infra paragraphum LXXI huius partis, et Responsionum Sextarum pag. 165. Hic loquitur auctor in numero plurali, secus ac in Meditationibus, quia hoc scriptum cum ederet, iam paratus erat contendere, ut si vera essent, quae in eo traderet, a quamplurimis recipentur et c. Vide Epistolae ad Dinetum pag. 150 fine.*

*Tulimus. Hic loquitur author in plurali, atque ita supponit quaedam per methodum syntheticam, quae nondum erant probata. In Meditationibus loquitur in singulari de se solo, de quo per intimam conscientiam, accuratam potuit habere cognitionem.*
### Case of Principia 1.3

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<td><em>Ad contemplationem veritatis.</em> Illam nimirum qua philosophiae propria est, nam extra hunc respectum dubitatio adeo generalis et seria locum non habet. Wide regulam secundam ethices, pag. 23. Aliae disciplinae etiam quidem contemplantur veritatem, at non tam ipsius veritatis quam alterius usus, et saepe etiam actionis gratia. Ex. gr. theologiam propter humanam salutem, medicinam propter sanitatem, logica propter disputacionem, iurisprudentiam iustitiae administrandae gratia inter homines, atque ideo tam rigido ibi opus non est examine. 109</td>
<td><em>Ad contemplationem veritatis.</em></td>
<td><em>Ad solam contemplationem veritatis.</em> Scilicet philosophicam, in qua ipsa veritas sibi pretium est, etsi alius usus inde non sequeretur. Aliae disciplinae etiam quidem contemplantur veritatem, at non ita veritatis sed alterius usus et saepe actionis gratia. E. gr. theologiam propter humanam salutem, iurisprudentiam iustitiae administrandae gratia inter homines, atque ideo tam rigido ibi opus non est examine. 110</td>
<td><em>Ad solam contemplationem veritatis.</em> Hinc in Prima Meditatione dicit nullum hinc metuendum periculum nec errorem. Periculum esse non potest, quia haec dubitatio non versatur circa moralia vel res agendas, in quibus solis est periculum; non etiam error est metuendi, quia error per ipsam dubitationem vitatur: qui enim dubitat, non iudicat, et qui non iudicat, non erat: error enim est in judicio. Sic ergo per hanc limitationem exspectiuntur res morales; item res fidei et religionis, quae omnia ad usum vitae spectant. 111</td>
<td><em>Ad contemplationem veritatis.</em> Et quidem ad philosophiam, adeo ut haec dubitatio in alis disciplinis locum non habeat, quippe quae ad usum vitae spectant, atque alium finem habent. At qui rerum agendarum necessitas non semper tam accurati examini moram patitur, fatendum est, humanam vitam circa res particulares saepe erroribus esse obnoxiam. Sed illi ut nec praedicta non ita saepius nocent tibi, nec tam accurato examine ibi opus est, sed sufficit grossarium esse. Methodi pag. 16. 112</td>
<td><em>Ad contemplationem veritatis.</em> Et quidem philosophicam quae valde accurata et rigida est et in qua veritas ultimus finis est. 113</td>
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108 In qua ipsa veritas sibi pretium est, etsi alius usus inde non sequeretur.

109 Sicut philosophicam, in qua ipsa veritas sibi pretium est, etsi alius usus inde non sequeretur. Aliae disciplinae etiam quidem contemplantur veritatem, at non ita veritatis sed alterius usus et saepe actionis gratia.

110 E.g. theologiam propter humanam salutem, iurisprudentiam iustitiae administrandae gratia inter homines, atque ideo tam rigido ibi opus non est examine.

111 Hinc in Prima Meditatione dicit nullum hinc metuendum periculum nec errorem. Periculum esse non potest, quia haec dubitatio non versatur circa moralia vel res agendas, in quibus solis est periculum; non etiam error est metuendi, quia error per ipsam dubitationem vitatur: qui enim dubitat, non iudicat, et qui non iudicat, non erat: error enim est in judicio. Sic ergo per hanc limitationem exspectiuntur res morales; item res fidei et religionis, quae omnia ad usum vitae spectant.

112 Sed illi ut nec praedicta non ita saepius nocent tibi, nec tam accurato examine ibi opus est, sed sufficit grossarium esse. Methodi pag. 16.

113 Et quidem philosophicam quae valde accurata et rigida est et in qua veritas ultimus finis est.
longius dissita fuerint. Tertio, sensus animadvertit operationes et vires agendi, circa quas etiam saepissime errat, tum quatenus vim agendi adscribat subiectis quibus ea non competit, ut ventriculo vim coquendi, et c., tum quatenus vires agendi corporeas haud aliter concipit atque facultates animae, ut author ostendit exemplo gravitatis, Sextarum Responsionum pag. 10. Quarto, sensus multis modis errat in iudicio de corporum substantia atque existentia, ut ostenditur articulo 71 huius partis. Si quis nobis obiciat sensum tam semper non errare in tribus posterioribus casibus, responditur: hinc non sequi sensuum iudicia non debere in dubium vocari, nisi quis nobis viam ostendere possit, qua intellectus sibi permissus et sensus nondum repurgatus verum a falso tam clare discernere possit ut nulla ratio dubitandi superexit. Adde quod saepe diximus ad conclusionem philosophicam satis non esse quod verum sit, sed debet esse bene fundata, hoc est iustis rationibus stabilita. Paragrapho 9. 

distantia, sensus saepe errat, ubi objectum minus remotum, … parvum est. Ut autem distinctius intelligam, quomodo sensus erret, tres ex eo gradus distingueri sunt. Responsiones Sextae, pag. 163, paragrapgo 9: receptio nempe, perceptsio, et iudicium, et in hoc ultimo tantum error est. … denique, sensum non errare in aliquibus, et verum esse iudicium eius, hinc non sequitur sine examine, et absque ratione sensum sequendum esse in philosophia, quia iudicium sensus non bene fundatum est, ut videbimus articulo 71. 

percipit ut magnitudinem Solis aut Lunae praecise tale et tantum credit esse secundum se quale et quantum sensibus apparat. Si autem aliquid horum forte verum esse contingat ut casu fit, et sic non quidem falsa sed male fundata est sensuum cognitione. Possemus addere sensuum iudicia de substantia quae dicitur per accidens incurrere in sensum, item de potentibus et viribus agendi quae tantum per effectus in sensum incurrunt. 

revera non existere putamus. Quanto ad iudicia de rerum naturis et proprietatibus ea triplicia occurrit: primum genus versatur circa propria sensuum objecta; vulgo patibiles qualitates vocant, et hic communiter dicunt philosophi, sensus errare nunquam, nos ex adverso eos semper errare dicimus, quatenus credimus ex iudicio sensuum qualitates illas tales existere in objectis, quales sensui exhibentur. Secundo huc spectant iudicia de magnitudine, figura, motu, quiete, situ ac distantia, quae vulgo dicuntur objecta communia, quae quidem etiam in rebus propinquis ac satαι magnis prope ad veritatem accedunt, at vero in rebus dissitis et valde parvis modo vera modo falsa sunt. Tertio addi possunt iudicia de facultatibus et viribus agendi, quae etiam infinitis modis falsa sunt.
Case of Principia I.7

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<th>Clauberg, notes on Principia I.1–8 (c. 1654–1655)</th>
<th>Clauberg, Dictata philosophica (c. 1657)</th>
<th>Wittich, dictata on Principiorum philosophiae pars prima (c. 1659–1664)</th>
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<td>Ille articulum 7, “facile quidem supponimus nullum esse Deum”, duriusculum aliquid videtur. At sciendum primo, authorem in hoc ordine philosophandi non potuisse alter loqui, quia nec dum cognoverat Deum, necdum eius existentiam demonstraverat. […] Denique, authorem non supponere, quod nullus sit Deus, sed tantum dicere, facile quidem supponimus, h. e. supponere sive fingere possimus, sed non ideo fingere possimus nos non esse et c. […] Objectionem aliam contra articulum 7 refutatam vide capitulo sequentis articulo 26. […] Contra qua cavillator aliquis ita insurget: “itane certior tui quam Dei existentia? Et homuncionem, qui cum Deo comparatus revera nihil est, […] esse necesse est, Deum esse non necesse est? Non effugies, puto, Deum impietatis ultorem et maiestatis suae vindicem”. Ubi bonus vir confundit certitudinem quae rei tribuitur estque necessitas quaedam in existendo, cum ea quae tribuitur intellectui. Nempe quia Dei existentia necessaria est, hominis vero contingens, ideo existimat, mentem humanam etiam prius et facilius de Deo certam esse qua in de semetipsa. Hae rationes si dubium in se opponatur certo in se, idem valebit quod contingens sive contingenter existens.121</td>
<td>Facile quidem supponimus. Hoc est facile quidem possumus fingere. Dicit hic tantum author quod est possibile. Duriuscula haec verba videntur antagonistas, ideoque prolixius et clarius illa hic explicare operae pretium esse censemus […]122</td>
<td>Reicientes. Author hic utitur duriori voce, quia nimium illis sensuum praeiudiciis adhaeremus. […] Facile quidem. Hoc est comparative accipendum, id est facilius supponimus nullum esse Deum et c. quam nos non existere. […] Sed obiicies: absurdum esse, certiorem esse nostri quam Dei existentia, quia inde sequatur homuncionem existere, non vero necesse sit Deum existere, id quod valde absurdum est. Respondeo hoc nullo modo inde sequitur, potest enim quod est contingens quo ad existentiam nobis tamen magis certum esse, respectu nostrae cognitionis, quam id quod respectu suae existentiae est necessarium […]123</td>
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### Case of Principia I.9

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<td><em>Nobis consciis in nobis fluent</em>. Vel sunt ita ut mens eorum subjectum et causa efficiens sit. Quae ergo ad solum corpus spectant, nullo modo involvunt cogitationem, ut coctio cibi, secretio urinae. Secundo, quae ad solam mentem spectant, et illi per se componunt quatenus est res cogitans tantum, ut velle, nolle, affirmare, negare; sunt cogitationes merae, quorum omni ex parte mens sibi conscia est, eo momento quo eas habet. Tertio, quaedam in nobis ad totum compositum spectant, ut sensus et appetitus, quae cogitationes sunt quatenus eorum immediate nobis consci sumus. Antecedere potest aliquid in corpore ut primus gradus sensus, et sequi ut motus arbitrarius, quae cogitationes non sunt.</td>
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<td>Quatenus eorum in nobis conscientia est. Trium [... [ generum in nobis sunt actiones et proprietates. Quaedam ad solum corpus, aliae ad mentem tantum et aliae denique ad totum compositum spectant. Quae ad mentem spectant in iis necessario involvitur conscientia, talia sunt intelligere, velle, ratiocinari. Quae ad solum corpus spectant in iis ex adverso nulla involvitur conscientia, et talia sunt gravitas, levitas, color, figura, motus, et c. Denique ad compositum spectant sensus, appetitus et affectus. Atque in his aliquid est cuius immediatam conscientiam habemus et aliquid etiam cuius haud ita immediate sumus consci ex. gr. ... primus sensuum, item ita vellicatio stomachi, quae causa famis est, ut et ea corporis perturbation, quae causa affectuum est.</td>
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<td>In nobis conscientia est. Actiones et proprietates in nobis spectant: 1. solam mentem, 2. solum corpus, 3. compositum. Prima necessario involvunt conscientiam sui, secunda non, tertia partim involvunt, partim non, ut sensus ratione trium graduum.</td>
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<td>Consici sumus.127 Primo, in totum purae intellecctionis et volitionis, quos vocant actus elicits. Secundo, consici sumus ex parte et aliquatenus sive cum restrictione actuum sensationis, item actuum imperatorum, qualis est actus movendi nostra membra. Tertio, consici sumus eorum in quibus nulla cogitatio continetur, sed valide mediate et remote, cuiusmodi sunt actus omnes, qui pertinent ad nutritionem corporis nostri: istiusmodi enim actus ratiocinative demum cognoscimus, non immediate per conscientiam.</td>
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<td>Cogitationis nomine. [... ] 1. Quae ad corpus pertinent eorum nullam habemus conscientiam, exempli grati, figura, motus, calor, nutritio, aliaeque innumer. 2. Quaedam ex adverso omnia propria mentis sunt, ut intelligere, affirmare, negare, velle, nolle. [... ] Adeoque horum actionum per omnia sumus consci, eo momento quo eas exercemus. 3. Quaedam sunt medi generis et ab unione mentis cum corpore pendent, ut affectus et sensus omnes, tum interni, tum externi. [... ] Qui actus idcirco cogitationes sunt quatenus eorum in nobis immediata conscientia est, exempli gratia doloris quatenus tristis sensatio est in mente cuius interventu advertit corpori suo male esse in parte aliqua.</td>
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### Case of Principia I.37

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<tr>
<th>De Raey, HH 1659–1661</th>
<th>Clauberg, Notae breves (c. 1662–1664)</th>
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<td><em>Quia necessario illos sic exhibent.</em> Necessitas opposita libertati vulgo ponitur in intrinseco et ad unum determinato principio agendi, quod vocat naturam. Ex. gr.: quod ignis urat, lapis descendat, coelum semper in gyrum agatur et c. Qua in opinione involvitur permicosisissimus error [...]. Ut ergo nec scindendi in cultro nec laedendi in sagitta vir ab intrinseca cultri vel sagittae necessitate pendet, sic putandum est de omnibus rebus corporeis quorum idcirco necessitas in agendo eodem modo explicanda est.(^{131})</td>
<td><em>Quia necessario illos sic exhibent.</em> Necessitas opposita libertati vulgo ponitur in intrinseco et ad unum determinato principio agendi, quod vocat naturam. Ex. gr.: quod ignis urat, lapis descendat, et c. Qua in opinione involvitur permicosisissimus error [...]. Sicut ergo nec scindendi in cultro nec laedendi in sagitta vir ab intrinseca cultri vel sagittae necessitate pendet, ita de reliquis omnibus rebus corporeis et c.(^{132})</td>
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### Case of Principia I.71

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<td><em>Temere.</em> A causis internis et externis.(^{133})</td>
<td><em>Temere.</em> Prout ab internis vel externis causis fortuito impellebatur, adeoque illud temere opponitur imperio rationis et consilio voluntatis, quae in infantibus vix locum habent.(^{134})</td>
<td><em>Temere.</em> Hoc est absque consilio, partim ex fortuito spirituum motu et cursu, partim ex fortuito causarum externarum vel internarum impulsu in mobiles infantium partes.(^{135})</td>
<td><em>Temere.</em> Id est, absque consilio, partim ex fortuito spirituum motu et cursu, partim ex fortuito causarum externarum vel internarum impulsu in mobiles infantium partes. <em>Temere.</em> A causis internis et externis.(^{136})</td>
<td><em>Temere.</em> Hoc est, cita voluntatis imperium, spontaneo spirituum influxus. Tales autem motus spontanei et necessarii vi spirituum et sanguinis aliqui toto vitae tempore fiunt, pulsus cordis, arteriarum, respiratio, et c.(^{137})</td>
<td><em>Temere.</em> Prout neme ne internis vel externis causis corporeis incitatur ad motum aut etiam ipsi animales spiritus suopte impetu ruunt in nervos: ut faciunt continuo in respiratione et alii motibus naturalibus. Hic autem intelligentur motus animales qui dicuntur temere et fortuito fieri, quatenus non subsunt imperio animae in prima aetate.(^{138})</td>
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Notes

1. Bos, Correspondence; Verbeek, “Heereboord, Adriaan”.
2. Notably, the University of Leiden had been a centre of dissemination of ideas alternative to Aristotelianism at least since 1613, when Willebrord Snel (1580–1626) assumed the chair of mathematics and adopted a Ramist-inspired methodology in teaching, being later followed in this by Jacob Golius (1596–1667). On the Leiden tradition in teaching, see Lunsingh Scheurleer and Posthumus Meyjes, Leiden University; Ruestow, Physics at Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century Leiden; Wiesenfeldt, Leerer Raum.
3. Historians are increasingly exploring different uses of Descartes in and outside academia, as well as with regard to the “higher” academic disciplines of medicine and theology: see, for instance, Schmaltz, Early Modern Cartesianisms.
4. I discuss the dictata terminology in Section 4.
9. Clauberg enrolled at Leiden University in November 1648 and studied under De Raey until August 1649: Clauberg, Logica vetus et nova (1658 edition): Tobiae Andreae [Epistola], 1 and 3 (unnumbered); Clauberg, Physica: Johanni de Raei [Epistola], 1–2 (unnumbered); Clauberg, Opera: Vita per Christianum Heninium descripta, 4 (unnumbered); Du Rieu, Album, 391; Verbeek, “Clauberg: A Bio-Bibliographical Sketch”, 183–185.
10. Clauberg, Logica vetus et nova (1658 edition): Tobiae Andreae [Epistola], 3 (unnumbered). This might have happened during a direct meeting of De Raey and Clauberg with Descartes at The Hague, most probably in 1649. Such a meeting is testified to in Schweling, Exercitationes cathedrae, 184. See, moreover, Baillet, Vie, volume 1, xxvii–xxxii.
13. De Raey taught Clauberg’s Logica vetus et nova (1654) in his private lectures at Leiden (De Raey to Wittich, 12 August 1680, in De Raey, Cogitata, 658), and also dictated a commentary on Petrus Ramus’s Dialecticae libri (1556; see infra, n. 26). In October 1651, he had 15 students in logic (collegium logicum) and 10 in Cartesian philosophy (collegium Cartesianum): De Raey to Clauberg, 3 October 1651, in Lentulus, Cartesius triumphatus, 6. In one of his dictata, dating to c. 1659–1661 (as I show below), De Raey refers to a commentary on
Franco Burgersdijk’s *Institutiones logicae* (1626): “\Vide mss. logica in epistola Burgersdicii pag. 8,” Cod. phil. 323 W. 28, 15 (in the transcriptions, the use of brackets \[ \] indicates a deletion, dots … (without single square brackets) indicate illegible text (regardless of the number of letters), slashes \(/\) indicate an addition with respect to the base text of the manuscripts, and the use of italics indicates the lemmas from Descartes’s works; abbreviated words and punctuation have been integrated). All his extant *dictata* on Descartes’s works cover topics in metaphysics. The sensitive character of the discipline – which led in 1647–1648 to formal prohibitions on teaching Descartes’s ideas – explains why the public lectures of De Raey were, at least nominally, on physics only. Also, in his *Clavis*, De Raey does not deal with Descartes’s metaphysics. See Verbeek, *Descartes and the Dutch*, chapter 4.

14. See *infra*, n. 58.
19. Two other *dictata* by De Raey are on the *Epitome Institutionum medicarum* (1631) of Daniel Sennert (1572–1637), and are extant at London: British Library, ms. Sloane 1733, and Wellcome Library, ms. 3415 (the manuscript is digitized at: [https://wellcomecollection.org/works/qa46375z](https://wellcomecollection.org/works/qa46375z), accessed 1 December 2021). The manuscripts, the study of which exceeds the scope of the present paper, report the same text (see *infra*, n. 62). Moreover, De Raey also used to lecture on Descartes’s *Les passions de l’âme* (1649): in particular, Otto Dietrich Vögeding (1635–1700), who enrolled at Leiden on 22 October 1668, witnessed De Raey’s (last) lectures on Descartes’s *Principia* and *Passions*, as reported in Tering, *Descartes ja tema ideede*, 29, who, however, does not declare his source.
21. See *infra*, n. 40.
23. Collacciani, “Manuscripts”.
24. Meinel, *Nachlass*, 117. The manuscript is digitized at: [http://resolver.sub.uni-hamburg.de/goobi/HANSw3903](http://resolver.sub.uni-hamburg.de/goobi/HANSw3903), accessed 1 December 2021. Blair draws attention to Jungius’s collection of lecture notes, to which De Raey’s *dictata* were added after his death: Blair, “The Rise of Note-Taking”.
25. BPL 907, IIr; Luchtmans, *Bibliotheca Musschenbroekiana*, 183. The manuscript is digitized at: [http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:1614649](http://hdl.handle.net/1887.1/item:1614649), accessed 1 December 2021.
26. The catalogue of the private library of Emtinck lists, amongst De Raey’s *dictata* on Descartes’s *Discours et Principia*, his *dictata* on Ramus’s *Dialecticae libri*, as well as an annotated copy of Descartes’s *Passions*: Schouten, *Bibliotheca Emtinckiana*, volume 2, 298 (items 150–152), 309 (item 298), 343 (items 156–158), 390 (item 91). See also Brouwer, *Bibliotheca Vriemoeotiana*, 114 (item 1372, *dictata* on Descartes’s *Principia*); Wetsten, *Bibliotheca Schalbruchiana*, 115–124 (see esp. items 541, 545, and 579–617). Some of these items date to De Raey’s years at Amsterdam, where he continued to dictate on Descartes.
29. *DTB Dopen, 1 Jan 1700 - 31 Dec 1708*, Amsterdam, Stadsarchief, archiefnummer 5001, inventarisnummer 47, 40v, nr. 8.
31. For a full-discussion, see Bourke, “Introduction”, xxii–xxiii.
33. In the case of the Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. in quatuor libros de Coelo Aristotelis Stagiritae (1593), for instance, one finds an introduction to the text of a chapter (comparable to (A)), the explanatio textus, consisting of a series of commented lemmas (C), and the quaestiones. Similarly, the divisio textus cannot be found in the commentaries of Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589), who provides, in his In libros Aristotelis Physicorum Commentarii (1601), introductions to the books of the text and textual explanations through references to specific words. Also, Heereboord retains only the explanatio textus commentary.
34. See supra, n. 26; Hotson, Commonplace Learning.
35. Strazzoni, “How did Regius become Regius?”; De Raey, Cogitata: Specimen logicae interpretationis, 537; De Raey to Wittich, 12 August 1680, in De Raey, Cogitata, 658.
37. E.g.: “Quaeritur: utrum omne bonum sit obligatorium? Negatur de bono iucundo, sed de utili et honesto affirmatur. Magis ad bonum quam ad verum obligatus homo est,” Don. var. nr. 145, 38.
38. On the Notae in Programma, see, for instance, the commentary on the lemma “nos invitans”, Thott 578b, 119–120; AT VIII–II, 360.
40. “Circa res singulars. Post novennalem peregrinationem in meditationibus suis non amplius singulars veteris scientiae opiniones, sed earum omnium fundamenta ad examen revocavit, et sic eas simul et semel delevit e mente sua. Quemadmodum eo tempore quo novi aedificii a primis fundamentis instauratio inchoanda est, omnes parietes ipsaque fundamenta erti vimus, sed uti ante illam instaurationem, dum vetus aedificium adhuc inhabitandum est ad tempus, partes illius aliquas ruinae et periculum minantes destruimus, sic etiam author se gessit tempore novennalis peregrinationibus circa scientiam suam. Vide annotationem ad pag. 5 Meditationum,” Don. var. nr. 145, 47–48. Cf. Thott 578b, 17–18: “Generalibus huic. Tempore novennalis peregrinationis, circa res singulars observabat, quidnam in dubium revocari posset: atque ita per dubitationem vel negationem seriem opiniones vere incertas aut falsas paulatim avellebat; ea fere ratione qua partes aliquas aedificium obtinentem parietis et fundamenti obici potest, nos ignorare et sic eas simul et semel delevit e mente sua. Quemadmodum eo tempore quo novi aedificii a primis fundamentis instauratio inchoanda est, omnes parietes ipsaque fundamenta erti vimus, sed uti ante illam instaurationem, dum vetus aedificium adhuc inhabitandum est ad tempus, partes illius aliquas ruinae et periculum minantes destruimus, sic etiam author se gessit tempore novennalis peregrinationibus circa scientiam suam. Vide annotationem ad pag. 5 Meditationum,” Don. var. nr. 145, 47–48. Cf. Thott 578b, 17–18: “Generalibus huic. Tempore novennalis peregrinationis, circa res singulars observabat, quidnam in dubium revocari possit: atque ita per dubitationem vel negationem seriem opiniones vere incertas aut falsas paulatim avellebat; ea fere ratione qua partes aliquas aedificii (quod suo tempore opportune a fundamentis instaurandum est) prae caeteris fatiscentes et ruinam minantes demolimus. Ubi vero architectus paratus est, et materia aliqua novi aedificii comparata, simul et semel vetus aedificium destruendum est: ita ut nec firmissima quidem fundamenta, nec parietes iis superstructum retineantur. Nam etiam in fundamento aut parietibus veteris aedificii nullum videamus vitium: evidens tamen est secundum leges architecturae destrui debere. Si quidem novo aedificii omni ex parte bene fundatum et ordinatum futurum sit, deinde ut intra firmitatem parietis et fundamenti obici potest, nos ignorare authorem eius, vel si ille bonus et probus architectus […] fuerit, an non impostor aliquid, fuerit inter famulos qui … facere potuit si etiam circa eas opiniones de quorum veritate sumus persuasissimi, similia … medio pag. 7. Et hinc non sequuntur dationes [sic] seriae sed fictae et effectatae … quas author hyperbolicae vocat”. See AT VI, 556; AT VII, 18. In the Appendix, I provide a table in which the editions of Descartes’s works compatible with or used in De Raey’s, Clauberg’s, and Wittich’s commentaries are listed.
41. At Leiden, the summer semester started on 1 March, and the winter semester on 1 October: Molhuysen, Bronnen, volume 1, 157*, 191–2*.
42. Van Otegem, A Bibliography, chapter 14. The ascertainment of the editions of Descartes’s works used by De Raey in his other dictata does not help to date them.
43. Coesemans, Faculties of the Mind, 29.
45. Notably, De Raey made observations on a comet that appeared in 1664, in a now lost manuscript: Nijenhuis, “Witsen”, 250.
46. BPL 907, 19r, 56r.
47. E.g. “\[Aequales. Reseptu magnitudinis,\]” Cod. phil. 323 W. 28, 196; cf. Don. var. nr. 145, 472: “Aequales. Quoad magnitudinem; similis, quoad figuram et soliditatem”.
52. BPL 906, 76r.
53. BPL 906, 3r, 8r, 33v. Also, Clauberg refers to the first edition of his *Ontosophia* (1647), but not to the second one (1660), and refers to page 494 of the first volume of Clerselier’s edition of Descartes’s correspondence, without specifying the volume number. In turn, in his, certainly later, *Notae breves*, Clauberg repeatedly specified the volume number across the commentary: in fact, in 1657, only the first volume had appeared, while the second one followed in 1659. See BPL 906, 6v, 23r.
57. As seen above, in *CPH* 1658, De Raey himself dictated this type of parallel commentaries. Accordingly, if we suppose that the presence of a double commentary, in Clauberg’s *Notae breves*, indicates that he prepared a manuscript including his own and De Raey’s commentary on certain lemmas, we cannot exclude that De Raey did the same in his own *dictata*. However, the additions in the double commentaries in De Raey’s *CPH* 1658 appear not to show agreements with Clauberg’s commentaries, even if his overall *dictata* *CPH* 1658 were also based on Clauberg’s *Dictata philosophica*. There is only an agreement between De Raey’s *dictata* and a double commentary given in Clauberg’s *Dictata philosophica* (which contains few double commentaries: see BPL 906, 2v, 7r, 34r, 51v, 67r): “Delapsam esse. Sci licet in ulla, in quo non est, locum”, BPL 906, 67v; cf. Don. var. nr. 145, 445: “Delapsam. Esse ad eum locum in quo iam versatur”. See AT VIII–1, 204.
58. “Principia philosophiae, Dissertatio de methodo, Dioptrice, et Meteora, item Meditaciones […]” 3 vol. Fuit olim Caroli Heidani, Abrahami Heidani filii, cum annotationibus mss. exceptis ex ore Johannis de Raai, anno 1654”, Wetsten, *Bibliotheca Schalbruchiana*, 120 (item 590). Given that the indication of the year in such a catalogue is usually placed after the title of the item for sale and before the indication of annotations or other features of it, I presume that 1654 is the year of the annotations. Karel Heidanus (1636–1697) enrolled at Leiden as an 11-year-old honorary student in 1647 and, already as doctor of law, in 1666: Du Rieu, *Album*, 382, 528.
60. After two years spent at the Solingen Gymnasium, Clauberg studied at the Bremen Gymnasium (1639–1644) and then at Groningen (1644–1646). After a stay in France and England, he came back in the Netherlands at the beginning of 1648, where he was guest of Andreae at Groningen before moving to Leiden in order to study under De Raey until the summer holidays of 1649. Afterwards, he moved to Herborn (where he stayed until December 1651) and Duisburg (where he died in January 1665). Wittich, like Clauberg, studied at Bremen in 1642–1644, at Groningen in 1644–1646, and at Leiden in 1646–1648, at the time of De

61. See supra, n. 19; Cellamare, “A Theologian”, 589.

62. The cover of the manuscript reports “A. o 1656” and “M[.] D[e] Mandeville, med. studios., die ultimo mensis Aprilis 1664”. “1656” might refer to De Raey’s dictata on Sennert (see supra, n. 19), the only dated text of the manuscript, which appears to report, on the first page, “Inceptum collegium die 29 Septemb. 1656”, ms. 3415 (page 134, unnumbered, of the whole manuscript), but it could even report “1661” (see image 23 (ms. 3415, 134 (unnumbered))). In fact, De Raey publicly taught medicine in 1658–1662 only (see supra, n. 11), but he could have privately imparted such teaching before then (see supra, n. 8; see also Borch, Itinerarium, volume 2, 30, reporting De Raey’s private lectures in medicine around 1661). The manuscript contains different lecture notes, from Leiden, Franeker, and Nijmegen. Namely: (1) anonymous, Philosophia moralis; (2) Observationes ex lectionibus osteologiae D. van Horne (two incomplete paragraphs added on the last page of item (1), certainly taught at Leiden; (3) Philippus Matthaeus, In alma Frisiorum (quae est Franequera) Universitate Observationes in […] D. Alberti Kyperi Institutiones medicas, Franeker; (4) anonymous, Tractatus quidam de actionibus naturae (separate pages bound within item 3); (5) Johannes de Raey, Dictata ad Epitomen Institutionum medicarum Danielis Sennerti […] Inceptum collegium 29 Septemb. 1656 (covering up to book 5, part 2, section 4, chapter 2), Leiden; (6) Johannes Antonides van der Linden, Doctrina de febribus, Leiden; (7) an anonymous, untitled commentary on the Pathologia of Jean Fernel (1497–1558), books 5–7, part of his Medicina (1554); (8) Wittich, Observationes in Renati Descartes Meditationes de prima philosophia; (9) Wittich, dictata on Principiorum philosophiae pars prima, Nijmegen. We can tentatively reconstruct the hands of these items as follows: (1) is by one hand (hand A); (2) (which is just a short addition) is by hands B and C; (3) is by hand A, with marginal additions by the same hand A and by another hand D; (4) is by hand A; (5) is by hand A up to page 35, continuing from there with hand E, and its marginal additions are by hands C and D; (6) and (7) are by hand E, with marginal additions by, apparently, the same hand E or by hand D; (8) and (9) are by hand C. However, the catalogue description attributes the whole manuscript to the hand of Michael de Mandeville. Anthony McKee argues that some of the texts have to be attributed to Walter de Mandeville (1637–1662), brother of Michael. The cover, in fact, also records his name, and that of a certain “Antonette” and a “Joachimus”, whose identities could not be ascertained (and no De Mandevilles with such first names could be found). The presence of their names, in any case, makes sense of the different hands of the manuscript itself. Walter enrolled at Franeker as a student of medicine on 28 August 1655, and then at Leiden as a student of medicine on 30 September 1656 (one day after the beginning of De Raey’s course on Sennert, if we read “1656” in the manuscript), and graduated in medicine at Franeker on 10 March 1659, before becoming, in February 1661, professor of medicine at Nijmegen. In turn, Michael enrolled at Leiden as a student of law in October 1665, before obtaining a degree in medicine at Nijmegen in 1666. Even if no evidence of his studies at Nijmegen before 1665 can be traced, he might have followed Wittich’s lectures there in 1664 at latest. I suppose that the first lecture notes, namely those by hand A, were written by Walter, who wrote them up to 1656; hence, the manuscript was continued by someone unknown (hand E), while Michael (hand C) completed the manuscript up to April 1664, copying only Wittich’s lectures. Additions were made also by two other unknown figures (hand B, as item 2 seems to be an addition written by two hands (B and C), and hand E). A comparison of the hands of the manuscript with an extant document by Michael de Mandeville could not shed light on the issue. See McKee, An Anatomy of Power, 22–23; Du Rieu, Album, 452, 686; Brinkhoff, “De doctorsbul”; Centraal Bureau van Genealogie, “The Mandeville Genealogy”; Bots, “Témoignages sur
l’ancienne université de Nimègue”, 23; Bots, “L’enseignement de la médecine”, 249–250; Eberhardt, Wittich, 204; Cellamare, “A Theologian”; Jansen, “De familiebijbel”.

63. Wittich, Observationes, 13, 14 (unnumbered).
64. Wittich, Annotationes, front page.
66. See also Cellamare, “A Theologian”.
67. See supra, n. 58, and Section 3.
68. Notably, in 1655, Johannes Placentinus (1630–1683) presided over, at Frankfurt (Oder), a series of disputations consisting of theses which are nothing but the titles of the articles of Descartes’s Principia, or abridgements of their contents, published in the same year as his Renatus Des-Cartes Triumphans, id est, Principia philosophiae Cartesianae, in Alma Vindrina, ventilata atque defensa. However, this work cannot be considered as a dictatum. See Omodeo, “Central European Polemics”. Similarly, De Raey commented upon passages from Descartes’s Discours, Principia, Meditationes, and from the epitaph of Pierre Hector Chanut (1601–1662) for Descartes in his Disputatio philosophica specimen exhibens modestiae et prudentiae in philosophando, held at Amsterdam on 14 June 1687 (in De Raey, Cogitata, 632–654). Each commentary is given in the form of a thesis after a long quotation from these texts. See also supra, n. 49.
69. Molhuysen, Bronnen, volume 3, 76, 27*.
70. Verbeek, “Clauberg: A Bio-Bibliographical Sketch”, 184–187; Hantsche, “Johann Moritz”. Unfortunately, no series lectionum from Duisburg relevant to our investigation could be traced: for a discussion, see Rasche, “Seit wann und warum gibt es Vorlesungsverzeichnisse an den deutschen Universitäten?”. See also Trevisani, Descartes in Germania, 85–86, supposing that Clauberg’s teaching, after the opening of the University, was focused on the commentary on Descartes. Some series lectionum of the Herborn Academy, dating from the year 1650, do not mention classes on Descartes: Konferenzen und Visitationen der Hohen Schule: Schulkonferenz, Wiesbaden, Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Bestand 95, Nr. 901, 4r–6v. See Menk, Die Hohe Schule Herborn; Menk, “Omnis novitas periculosas”.
72. X B 7: De methodo, 9.
73. Clauberg, Initiatio, 358.
74. The only references to Descartes’s Principia not consisting of a part-article designation are to page 2 of the dedicatory letter to Elisabeth of Bohemia (which does not allow to identify a particular edition) and to the Latin version of Descartes’s 1647 opening letter to the French translator of his Principia (which is missing only from the 1644 edition): Clauberg, Opera: Notae breves, 529 and 581.
75. Only a reference could be retraced, compatible with such editions: see lemma “animadverti”.
76. Besides two references compatible with the 1644 and the 1650 editions (see lemma “animadverti”), a third reference to Descartes’s Discours is to the lemma “postquam huc veni”, which is said to be found on page 19: Wittich, Annotationes, 140. However, the lemma cannot be found on this page: it is in fact on page 29 of the 1644 edition, on page 27 of the 1650 editions, and on page 20 of those that appeared afterwards (1656, 1664, 1672, and 1677). Therefore, Wittich was most probably using the 1644 edition.
77. Van Til declares, in his preface, that Wittich used an Elzevir edition: Wittich, Annotationes: Benevolo lectori, 2 (unnumbered). In his edition, Van Til reported the full text of Descartes’s Meditationes besides Wittich’s commentary.
78. The use of an Elzevir edition is declared in the commentary: Wittich, Annotationes, 4 (unnumbered).
79. Don. var. Nr. 145, 30; AT VI, 552. Unless indicated, in the Appendix my references to AT concern only the lemmas.
80. Cod. phil. 323 W. 28, 11–12.
81. Clauberg, *Initiatio*, 219–220; AT VII, 17. Clauberg also provided a double commentary on the lemma “animadverti” in his *Notae* (214–219), though the first had an introductory function, i.e. certainly it was not derived from other *dictata*.

82. Read: “Methodi pag. 3”.

83. Thott 578b, 14; AT VII, 17.


85. Read: “pag. 3, articulo sexto”.


89. Thott 578b, 15–16.


97. Thott 578b, 31–32; AT VII, 22.

98. Wittich, *Observationes*, 17 (unnumbered); AT VII, 22.


101. Thott 578b, 48–49; AT VII, 26. De Raey seems to refer to a commentary of his on the text of page 69 of the 1650 or 1654 edition of Descartes’s *Meditationes*, on the *Secundae Obiectiones*, concerning the nature of the soul (AT VII, 130–132); however, no commentary of his on such a text could be retrieved.


107. Wittich, *dictata on Principiorum philosophiae pars prima*, 3 (unnumbered); AT VIII-1, 5.

108. Don. var. nr. 145, 108; AT VIII-1, 5. The rule is given at page 23 of the 1656 edition of Descartes’s *Principia* (I.76), and roughly matches Descartes’s second rule of morals given in his *Discours*.


111. Wittich, *dictata on Principiorum philosophiae pars prima*, 3 (unnumbered). In the commentary Wittich refers to the text given in AT VII, 22.

112. BPL 907, 9v. The reference is to page 16 of Descartes’s *Specimina* of one of the editions which appeared from 1656 onwards, where the second rule of morals is given: see *supra*, n. 108.


114. BPL 906, 2r; AT VIII-1, 6. Cf. Clauberg, *Initiatio*, 277, referring to paragraph 9 of Descartes’s *Sextae Responsiones*.


119. BPL 907, 9v–10r.


122. BPL 906, 2v.

123. Wittich, *dictata on Principiorum philosophiae pars prima*, 5 (unnumbered); AT VIII-1, 6.

124. Don. var. nr. 145, 122; AT VIII-1, 7.

125. Cod. phil. 323 W, 28, 55; AT VIII-1, 7.


127. Read: “consciis in nobis fiunt”.


129. BPL 907, 11r.

130. X B 7: *Principia*, 5–6; AT VIII-1, 7.

131. Cod. phil. 323 W, 28, 68–69; AT VIII-1, 18–19.

132. Clauberg, *Opera: Notae breves*, 501–502. “Naturam” is emphasised in both texts, i.e. it is underlined in De Raey’s and is in italics in Clauberg’s.

133. BPL 906, 20v; AT VIII-1, 35.

134. Don. var. nr. 145, 218.

135. Cod. phil. 323 W, 28, 90.


137. BPL 907, 22r.


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**Notes on contributor**

*Andrea Strazzoni* (PhD, Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2015) has held postdoctoral positions at the Gotha Research Centre and at the University of Basel, and is currently a Marie Skłodowska-Curie fellow at the University of Venice. He works on the ways in which Cartesian ideas were spread and intertwined with different scientific and philosophical paradigms.

**ORCID**

*Andrea Strazzoni* [http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5552-2592](http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5552-2592)

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