The doctrine of ‘the resurrection of the same body’ in early modern thought

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Abstract: The Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection has long been troubled by the issue of personal identity, but prior to the advent of such concerns there existed a cognate concern about the identity not of the resurrected person, but of the resurrected person’s body. Although this latter issue has exercised scholars of various ages, concern with it was particularly keen in early modern times. In this paper I chart the various ways bodily identity was conceived by early modern thinkers in connection with the resurrection, as well as the key objections their contemporaries developed in response.

Introduction

It is well-known that the Judaeo-Christian belief in the general resurrection, that is, the belief that all human beings will one day be resurrected by God, has long been troubled by the issue of personal identity. Concern over how a person can retain his or her identity in the resurrection, given the apparent break in psychological continuity between death and revivification, has existed since the time of Locke, and continues to exercise contemporary philosophers and theologians. Yet, prior to the advent of such concerns about personal identity, there existed a cognate concern about the identity not of the resurrected person, but of the resurrected person’s body.

To understand why there should have been such a concern, it is important to recognize that, notwithstanding the vision of bodiless souls engendered by Cartesian metaphysics, the Judaeo-Christian tradition has customarily considered humans to be – and only ever be – embodied, corporeal beings, usually some sort of unified composite of body and soul, one upshot of which is that representatives of this tradition have understood ‘resurrection’ to mean a bodily resurrection rather than a revival of a disembodied soul. This was and still is a popular belief, especially among Christians. Many of the early Church Fathers,
such as Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Rufinus, Tertullian, and Methodius, promoted the belief that all would one day experience a bodily resurrection. This doctrine was later endorsed by the Fourth Lateran Council, enshrined in the Apostles’ Creed, and taught by both Luther and Calvin. With such patronage, it is hardly surprising that the belief that humans will undergo a bodily resurrection remained a popular one throughout medieval, renaissance, and early modern times, its popularity only starting to wane to any significant degree in the last two centuries.

Now in and of itself, the belief in a bodily resurrection has not been, historically, an especially problematic one for the Judaeo-Christian tradition, since the religions of this tradition all posit the existence of a God whose power and knowledge are so vast (maximally so, according to some) that the task of effecting a bodily resurrection of humans seems no more difficult – indeed, much less difficult – than some of the other things this God is often credited with, such as creating the universe ex nihilo. So if those belonging to the Judaeo-Christian tradition had simply stated their belief that the resurrection would be a bodily one, arguably the doctrine would not have caused its adherents to have any serious philosophical misgivings about it. But many of the Judaeo-Christian tradition held it to be true, and in some cases as even an article of faith, that humans would not only experience a bodily resurrection, but would actually be resurrected with the same bodies possessed during normal life.

Scriptural passages were often cited in defence of this view, but many also stressed that, unless humans received the same body that they had when alive, their revivification could scarcely be termed a resurrection in the first place. So to many, the very idea of a bodily resurrection presupposed that it would be the same bodies that are brought back. Some also argued that humans would be resurrected with the same bodies because justice required it: in the Judaeo-Christian tradition it was a common belief that body and soul were equal partners in all of a person’s actions, nefarious or otherwise, so in order that rewards and punishments be meted out fairly, the wicked must be punished in the same bodies in which they did their sinning, and the good rewarded in the same bodies in which they performed their good deeds. It was often stated that it would be as unjust to reward or punish a soul for things it had taken no part in as it would to reward or punish a body for deeds it had not performed.

For various reasons, then, the belief that humans are to be resurrected with the same body has been very common among those of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. Unsurprisingly, the chief question raised by this belief was this: What exactly does it mean to be resurrected with ‘the same body’? The prima facie difficulty with providing a satisfactory answer to this question is not hard to fathom, since the diachronic identity of a physical thing has traditionally been thought to be secured by some kind of continuity, whether through space and time or through its constituent parts. But as it is not self-evident that either
kind of continuity can be maintained through a body’s cycle of life–death–
 decomposition–resurrection, it is by no means clear how a person’s resurrected
 body can be said to be the same as the one that a person had during normal life.

Although the question of what it means to be resurrected with the same body
 has exercised scholars of various ages, it would be fair to say that concern with it
 was particularly keen in early modern times, when it was the subject of fierce
 debates which blotted almost as much paper as those surrounding the cognate
 concern of personal identity. As Catharine Trotter correctly noted, thinkers of the
 early modern period interpreted the term ‘same body’ in very different ways in
 the context of the resurrection, a fact which has led one modern scholar to
 remark that ‘the very notion of sameness was soaked in ambiguity’. The aim of
 this paper will be to disambiguate this notion by charting the various ways bodily
 identity was conceived by early modern thinkers, as well as the key objections
 their contemporaries developed in response. Documenting this debate will not
 only contribute much to our understanding of early modern thinking at the
 interface between metaphysics and eschatology, but will also give some useful
 background and context to contemporary efforts to develop a satisfactory notion
 of what it means to be resurrected with the same body.

Before our examination begins, it is worth noting that while some early
 moderns felt able to consider the question of bodily identity independently of
 any other considerations, others saw the issue as overshadowed by two further
 matters. First, there was the wider issue of what it means to say that a body
 remains the same over time during normal life, given the long-recognized fact
 that the parts of a human body are in constant flux. Second, and more import-
 antly, there was the issue raised by anthropophagi, that is, by cannibal activity.
 Although two versions of the so-called ‘cannibal problem’ have been formulated,
 the one that most exercised early modern thinkers is this one, in the words of an
 English divine:

… it will be said, that the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the same body is
 absurd and impossible; because it may happen, that the body of one man, or part of it,
 may be devoured by another man; and so by eating and digesting it may become the
 body, or part of the body of another man; so that at the resurrection, the same body can’t
 belong to both, and that the parts that one hath, the other must be defective in.

It is worthwhile noting that, in spite of light-hearted treatments of the cannibal
 problem in contemporary literature, it was taken very seriously by early modern
 thinkers, not least because the problem is in fact more acute than might first
 appear. For as was often pointed out, there is a sense in which all of us are (or
 at least potentially might be) cannibals, on account of the ‘subtle Cookery of
 Nature’, to use Humphrey Hody’s felicitous phrase. That is, the matter belong-
 ing to the bodies of deceased humans may enter into the bodies of others via
 a more indirect route than straightforward cannibalism, since the remains of
 human bodies sometimes nourish plants and animals, which in turn may be
eaten by other humans. Considered in this way, the problem of the ownership of bodily matter highlighted by the cannibal problem potentially applies to everyone, not just those who intentionally ingest human flesh. Nevertheless, in what follows I shall continue to refer to the objection as the cannibal problem.

With these considerations in mind, we turn now to the early modern accounts of what it means to be resurrected with the same body, of which I count no fewer than eight.

Raising the body as it was when it died

The first of these accounts is this:

RB1 (=Resurrection Body 1) A person’s resurrected body will consist of all and only those bits of matter of which that person’s body was composed at the point of death.

This account was very popular with the Church Fathers, and was still being endorsed in early modern times by English divines like William Lupton, John Pearson, and William Wilson. Proponents of this account, including all three aforementioned divines, often cited certain passages of scripture in support of it, for instance Matthew 27.52–53 and John 5.28, which refer to the dead rising from their graves, and Revelation 20.13, which refers to the sea giving up its dead. The interpretation of these passages favoured by Lupton, Pearson, and Wilson was that it is the body as it was when it died which is to be brought back, such that the resurrected body of each individual is mathematically or numerically identical with that individual’s body as it was when the individual died.

No doubt satisfied by what were perceived to be its solid scriptural credentials, proponents of RB1 generally did not attempt to make a philosophical case for their chosen view, though it is easy to see how they could have done. After all, RB1 entails that there will be material continuity (that is, continuity of constituent materials) between resurrection and pre-resurrection bodies, and such continuity is often considered sufficient to ground claims of identity. For instance, a watch which is disassembled and its parts scattered about a workshop may, it is often said, be the very same watch once again if its parts are gathered together again and arranged as they were prior to its disassembly. As Lupton, Pearson, and Wilson envisage the same thing occurring with human bodies at the resurrection, it seems they have a prima facie defensible conception of how resurrection and pre-resurrection bodies can be deemed the same.

Despite the aforementioned advantages, RB1 did not find favour with many early modern thinkers and was subjected to a variety of objections. For instance, Samuel Bold wrote:

Those who assert [the necessity of our being resurrected with all those particles and only those particles which our bodies contained when they died] have provided such a
Necessary Article for all Christians to believe, as no Man can in an ordinary way know is True. Yea, which (if it is an Article of Christian Faith) will render it impossible for any Man after the Resurrection, to know that he is the same Man or Person he was formerly: for seeing he is absolutely ignorant of, and cannot know the Numerical Particles his Body did consist of, when laid in the Grave; and cannot by this Article be the same Man or Person, unless his Body do consist just of the same Numerical Particles that Body did consist of, which was laid in the Grave, he will never be able to know, or be strictly certain, that he is the very same Man or Person which formerly lived in the World.

To the best of my knowledge, no adherent of RB1 ever formulated a response to this epistemological objection. But then it is doubtful that they would need to, since the objection is applicable to many other definitions of ‘same body’, as will become clear over the course of the paper.

A much greater worry for adherents of RB1 came in the form of the cannibal problem. Samuel Drew suggested that RB1 is ill-equipped to tackle the cannibal problem because for all to be resurrected with the same body as defined by RB1, it would have to be the case that no-one dies while containing any matter from the body of another person, a scenario apparently ruled out by the exploits of cannibals. So how did adherents of RB1 respond to the cannibal problem? The short answer is: they didn’t. For instance, William Lupton did not mention the cannibal problem at all in his sermon on the resurrection. Nor did John Pearson in his lengthy discussion of the same subject. And William Wilson states very firmly in his large treatise on the resurrection that he will ‘not examine those curious Questions, with which vain Men endeavour to perplex this Doctrine’.

It would be rash to speculate on the motives behind Lupton’s, Pearson’s, and Wilson’s decision not to address the cannibal problem, but had they attempted to do so it is likely they would have quickly realized how little room for manoeuvre was afforded them by their endorsement of RB1. Indeed, in order to show that it is possible for all to be resurrected with the same body as defined by RB1, Lupton, Pearson, and Wilson would need to show that no two human bodies will contain the same bit of matter at their respective times of death.

Interestingly, the early modern period was awash with theories that could serve to do just this. For instance, John Edwards, Anthony Fleury, and Bernard Nieuwentijt suggested that there was no proof that human flesh is actually assimilable by other humans. François Feller went one step further and argued that human flesh is not assimilable by its very nature, while Hugo Grotius and Robert D’Oyly claimed that it is not assimilable because of God’s intervention, i.e. whenever one person is eaten by another, God intervenes to ensure that no part of the former’s body ever becomes part of the latter’s. Another alternative was put forward by Humphrey Hody, who claimed that while human flesh is assimilable, in the event that parts of one person’s body found their way into the body of another, God would intervene to ensure that the latter did not die until the parts of the eaten person had passed out of the system of the cannibal. The adoption of one or other of these theories may have enabled adherents of RB1 to neutralize...
the cannibal problem, though arguably the extra baggage would not have made RB1 more plausible to most early modern thinkers, especially given the relatively widespread belief that human flesh is assimilable by other humans.

**Stillingfleet’s ‘true and real parts’**

It is notable that while belief in ‘the resurrection of the same body’ was almost unanimous in early modern times, most of those who expressed an opinion on the matter flatly denied RB1, and it is no less notable that those who did deny RB1 generally did so with one eye on the cannibal problem, the force of which seems to have convinced numerous thinkers that humans are not necessarily resurrected with numerically the same bits of matter their bodies had at the point of death. The following interpretation of ‘the resurrection of the same body’ is a case in point; found in the work of Edward Stillingfleet, that erstwhile disputant of Locke, it was developed with the threat of the cannibal problem very much in mind. Stillingfleet claims that:

> If a Man lives to thirty or forty years, his Body hath undergone many new Repairs in that time, and all the old Materials were as true and real parts of the Body, as the new ones, and yet it is the same Body, in the sense of all Mankind.  

The moral Stillingfleet draws from this is that as long as a person’s resurrection body is composed of bits of matter that were at one time or another parts of that person’s body during normal life (i.e. were ‘true and real parts’ of that person’s body), then that person can be said to be resurrected with the same body. He offers two examples to bolster his case; one involves a victim of cannibalism, the other ‘a corpulent Man’ who dies anything but corpulent, having fallen victim to consumption. In the case of the cannibal victim, Stillingfleet supposes that the parts eaten by the cannibal will not be returned to the victim, but that this will not result in any deficiency in the victim’s resurrection body because the missing parts will be made up with bits of matter which were part of the victim’s body before the cannibal struck. In the case of the consumption victim, Stillingfleet suggests that it is not unreasonable to suppose that he will be resurrected with all the parts his body had just before the consumption really took hold. In both cases, Stillingfleet thinks that the resurrection bodies will be considered the same as the ones the two individuals had during normal life. Stillingfleet’s view thus amounts to this:

**RB2** A person’s resurrected body will consist of bits of matter which were parts of that person’s body at some point during normal life.

Although it is not explicit, in formulating RB2, Stillingfleet seems to ground the identity of resurrection and pre-resurrection bodies on the fact that there is material continuity between the two, in that the former only consists of bits of matter which were once part of the latter.
Yet such a manoeuvre did not convince Samuel Drew, who argued that RB2 contains at least one barely concealed absurdity, which is that ‘there may be as many distinct identities, as there are parts which are capable of constituting them’. Drew’s point, which is scarcely clear from this brief summary, draws its force from the fact that, during normal life, a person’s body is composed of different bits of matter at different times. This means that there will be a relatively large quantity of matter which, on RB2, will qualify as ‘true and real parts’ of that person’s body. Drew then supposes that God fashions a person’s resurrection body by indiscriminately selecting from the bits of matter which once formed part of that person’s body; according to RB2, the resultant resurrection body will be the same as the one that person had during normal life. Drew then points out that the bits of matter ‘inhering in the body … when it dropped into the grave, will have the same right’, i.e. will also have the right, according to RB2, to be deemed ‘the same body’ as that person had during normal life. The upshot, writes Drew, is that ‘This second number may also constitute another identity of the same body, and we shall then have two identities of the same body, which is an absurdity that surpasses, if possible, a palpable contradiction.’

34 According to Drew, however, the situation is even worse than that; instead of licensing two ‘identities of the same body’, RB2 licenses a countless number, since there are countless possible arrangements of ‘true and real parts’ of a person’s body, each of which will give rise to ‘the same body’. Drew thus offers what he takes to be a reductio of RB2, namely that it allows different bits of matter in different arrangements to be termed the same.

The body raised as it was in any period of life

A variation of RB2 is to be found in other thinkers, such as Samuel Chandler, who writes:

… it is no more necessary to the constituting the same body, that it should be the body we have today … than that it should be the body we had twenty years ago, or the body we may have the same number of years hereafter … The restoration of that body that we had in any period of life, may be sufficient to give it the denomination of the same body.35

Chandler here supposes that a person’s resurrected body will feature the very same bits of matter that together composed her body at some particular point during life. So, on Chandler’s view, a person may be resurrected with the very same bits of matter her body had at the age of twenty, or at thirty, or at any other age. We can summarize Chandler’s view as follows:

RB3 A person’s resurrected body will consist of all and only those bits of matter which together composed that person’s body at some point during that person’s life.
In advancing RB3, Chandler presumably intends to secure the identity of a person’s resurrection body and pre-resurrection body on the fact that there will be material continuity between them (or rather, continuity between the resurrection body, and the pre-resurrection body as it was at one particular time). Moreover, RB3 is framed in such a way as to defend the possibility of a universal resurrection against the cannibal problem. For RB3 allows victims of cannibalism to be resurrected with the matter their bodies had prior to being eaten, and/or cannibals to be resurrected with the matter their bodies had prior to becoming cannibals. So no-one need go short at the resurrection; cannibals and victims alike may be resurrected with the same body (as defined by RB3), together with everyone else.

Given its apparent success in resolving the cannibal problem, it is perhaps surprising that RB3 was not advanced more often. Its apparent lack of popularity cannot be traced to any critical onslaught it received either, as no such onslaught occurred. To a large extent this may have been due to the relative obscurity of the works in which it appeared. For instance, we can only assume that in framing his objection to RB2, Samuel Bold was unaware of RB3, because his objection surely applies to the latter as well as the former. For it seems clear enough that God could, if He so desired, resurrect the body of a person as it was at the age of ten, or at the age of twenty, or at the age of thirty and so on, each of which would have an equal right to be deemed ‘the same body’, according to RB3, despite each differing in terms of material content and arrangement. And as this is precisely the corollary Bold found so absurd with RB2, it is safe to suppose that he would have had no greater sympathy toward RB3, had he known of it.

The introduction of new matter

Another suggestion touted in the early modern period of how to understand the ‘resurrection of the same body’ can be found in the writings of Winch Holdsworth, who outlines his view as follows:

... the same humane Bodies which were Born, Liv’d and Dy’d, Distinct from all others, shall at the last Day, by an Almighty Power, be Restor’d to the same Principle of Individuation; God, according to his good Pleasure, Restoring from the several Lodgments of Nature, a sufficient Quantity of the Materials of the Old, to which such New Matter, as He sees fit, may be Added, or Not. 36

But why would God, when fashioning a person’s resurrection body, bring together some materials which were formerly part of that person’s body, and add to them some other materials that never were? An answer can be found in the work of another proponent of Holdsworth’s view, John Edwards:

The Flesh of Man, devoured by another and become (as we now suppose) his Flesh, can be restored by God to him whose Flesh it was at first: God can repair the Man-Eater’s
Both Edwards and Holdsworth appear to hold that God will seek to resurrect each body with the same numerical bits of matter it had when it died, but the fact that this will not be possible in some cases – specifically those in which there is a problem of ownership thanks to the exploits of anthropophagi – seems to have been in no small way responsible for them formulating their conception of ‘the same body’ which allows for the introduction of new matter where necessary. The suggestion put forward by both Edwards and Holdsworth can be summarized as follows:

RB4 A person’s resurrected body will consist of all and only those bits of matter of which that person’s body was composed at the point of death, or, if this is not possible, then it will consist of as many such bits of matter as are available, together with some new bits of matter which were previously not part of that person’s body at all.

But why should it be thought that cannibals are resurrected with the same bodies, given that their resurrection bodies consist of some of the matter possessed by their bodies at the time of death along with some matter which had never before been part of them? Holdsworth explains that, in normal life, human bodies are subject to a constant ebb and flow of materials – some bits of matter are added, while other bits are lost – without it ever ceasing to be the case that each body is the same. In Holdsworth’s view, it follows from this that the introduction of new matter does not deleteriously affect the diachronic identity of a human body, and so God can introduce new matter to a person’s resurrection body without thereby destroying its identity. Many early modern thinkers were generally sympathetic to the first part of this argument, namely that the introduction of new matter does not deleteriously affect the diachronic identity of a human body during normal life, but concerns were raised over the second part.

Robert D’Oyly, for instance, argued that the introduction of ‘foreign matter’ into a person’s resurrection body would undercut the core idea that what is brought back in the resurrection is something that was once alive: ‘nothing can be said to be Dead but what once had Life, and is now deprived of it; which cannot, without the most palpable Falshood, be said, either of the Soul, or a Body consisting of foreign Matter’. To seal his critique, D’Oyly claimed that RB4 also undermines the broader notion that resurrection involves a bringing back of something that existed before: ‘the proper Notion of a Resurrection as here understood imports only the recovery, or raising again of a Body corrupted, into its former State’. Implicit here is the requirement that, to qualify as a resurrection at all, it must be the same body that is returned; D’Oyly also assumes that any resurrection body incorporating ‘foreign matter’ does not qualify as ‘the same’. So if, as licensed by RB4, a cannibal’s resurrection body includes some ‘foreign
matter’, then, according to D’Oyly, it cannot be ‘the same body’ and hence cannot be said to have been resurrected at all.

**Seeds and cores**

The inclusion of foreign matter in a resurrection body was also endorsed by, or at least permitted by, our fifth response to the question of how humans retain the same bodies in the resurrection. Very popular in the early modern period, this response borrows heavily, as many of its proponents acknowledged, from 1 Corinthians 15. There, St Paul notes that, in the case of wheat, what is sown is not wheat itself but rather a seed, with God giving a body to every seed. The vague analogy that many saw here between human bodies and wheat was subsequently enriched by a doctrine drawn from seventeenth-century alchemy, namely that the seed of a plant lives on even when the rest of the plant dies, and is in fact indestructible (proved, it was often thought, by the fact that a plant burned to ashes later grows again).

The combination of St Paul and alchemical thinking gave rise to the view that every human body has an ‘essential’ seed or core which remains with it throughout the whole of its life and stays intact after death. Moreover, the durable core was thought to be the source of a body’s identity, such that irrespective of whichever ‘accidental’ bits of matter it happened to be joined at any given time, the resulting body was always the same one (as any and all changes that a body underwent were merely to its accidental features, not to the essential core). According to this theory, then, all God needs to do to bring everyone back with the same body is locate the essential core of each body and build it back up with whatever bits of matter he likes. This view can be summed up as follows:

RB5 A person’s resurrected body will consist of some kind of essential core, which remains numerically the same core that person’s body had during life, together with other bits of matter of which the latter may or may not have been composed during life.

But what, we might ask, is this ‘essential’ core? To this question we find a bewildering variety of answers. Robert Boyle famously identified the bones as being the obvious candidate, partly on account of a passage from Ezekiel (37.7–8) which tells of the bones of the dead being raised up and furnished with new sinews (which Boyle took to mean skin, nerves, tendons, and ligaments), and partly because his own experiments had shown that human bones were ‘of a stable and lasting texture’, and ‘not apt to be destroyed by the operation either of earth or fire’. Despite Boyle’s status, his view was not without its critics. Even John Tillotson, an Anglican archbishop and therefore presumably not in the same league as Boyle on scientific matters, was aware that the bones are not stable features of the human body ‘because they grow, and whatever grows is nourish’d
This fact was clearly unknown to Humphrey Hody who identified, like Boyle, the bones as ‘integrant and necessary Parts’, but to them added ‘the Skin, the Nerves, the Tendons, the Ligaments, and the Substance of the several Vessels’. According to Hody, as long as these remained, then a body was truly whole, and could be built up again with new material while still retaining its identity.

But these were not the only suggestions as to what constitutes the essential core of the body. Both Bernard Nieuwentijt and Charles Drelincourt suggested that it is the bones and nerves, while Henry Felton opted for the ‘Solid parts, the Substratum, that supports the Accidents’, (though what exactly that is he did not say). Samuel Johnson, whose forays into philosophy apparently extended beyond kicking stones in an attempt to refute Berkeley, claimed that in every human body there is ‘a certain Stamen, a Root, a Principle, or Seed of Life’, and the survival of this guaranteed the identity of the body. Johnson, however, neglected to mention which part of the human body qualified as this vital ‘stamen’. And in this he was not alone. Samuel Drew refused to be drawn on ‘the dimensions, the texture, the configuration, and the place of residence’ of what he termed the body’s ‘immovable matter’. The naturalist Joseph Priestley spoke of an essential ‘stamina’ or ‘germ’, a view he cheerfully admitted he had lifted from the philosopher Isaac Watts, who had in fact been a bit more forthcoming in arguing that the core of the body is its ‘essential and constituent Tubes, Fibres or staminal Particles’ which were to be found especially in the bowels and bones.

Although proponents of RB5 disagreed on which part(s) of the body qualified as its essential core, most were of the view that it was indigestible, i.e. not assimilable into other human bodies (which thus neutralized the threat posed by the cannibal problem) and/or indestructible, though supporting evidence for this claim was typically not provided. Yet the lack of evidence for the oft-claimed indigestibility/indestructibility of the body’s essential core was not the biggest concern among critics of RB5, which instead focused on the broad suggestion that the identity of a person’s resurrected body is secured by the recovery of its essential core to which other bits of matter can then be added. ‘For this is not to assert’, wrote William Wilson, ‘a Resurrection of the same Body, but only of some small part of it’.

Locke made a similar point: if the identity of human bodies is secured by the identity of some kind of ‘seminal part’ contained within them, then this seminal part alone must be judged the same thing as the seminal part joined to one other particle of matter, or a thousand, or a million. Thus on this view, Locke notes, ‘a Body may be enlarged by the addition of a Hundred or a Thousand times as much bulk as its own matter, and yet continue the same Body, which I confess, I cannot understand’. Even Humphrey Hody, a proponent of RB5, saw this fault in versions of the essential-core doctrine other than his own; after outlining Boyle’s claim that the bones alone were essential for bodily resurrection, Hody...
wrote: ‘This is not to defend the Doctrine of the Resurrection, but to give it up to it’s Adversaries, and to advance another Doctrine instead of it. For it is not true that a Body so made up, may be call’d the same with that which died.’

**The flower of substance and ‘little ethereal machine’**

The idea of an indestructible essential core also appeared under a different guise in the early modern period, in the youthful writings of Leibniz. He too argued that the body contains a seminal part or core, which he dubbed its ‘flower of substance’:

> I am of the opinion that every body … has a flower of its substance … . This flower is so subtle that it even remains in the ashes of incinerated things and can, so to speak, draw itself together into an invisible centre … . Now I also believe that this flower of substance of a human being neither increases nor decreases, although its clothing and covering are in constant flux.

To get a better understanding of Leibniz’s doctrine it is helpful to note at the outset that he conceives the majority of matter in a human body as a sort of common or rude ‘stuff’ through which runs the animal spirits. The animal spirits were considered by many in early modern times to be the soul’s instrument or agent in the body, and although intermediary between incorporeal soul and corporeal body they are themselves very much corporeal, consisting of a subtle form of matter, akin to a thin fluid, which originate in the brain and circulate through the nerves of the body. This is Leibniz’s view also, though he makes the further claim that within the spirits lies ‘a subtler part’. This ‘subtler part’ is the flower of substance. If the spirits are a subtle form of matter, like a thin fluid, then the even more subtle flower of substance is perhaps best conceived as a kind of smoke or vapour running throughout them.

Now according to Leibniz, the flower of substance serves as the seat of a person’s soul. In fact it is ‘substantially united’ to a person’s soul, which itself exists in a mathematical point possessing location but no extension. During life, this point is to be found in ‘the very centre of the brain’, although a person’s flower of substance is not restricted to this point but instead ‘diffuses itself’ throughout the remaining matter of that person’s body. Yet despite being corporeal and spread throughout the body, the flower of substance is all of a piece, that is, it exists as a single unified thing incapable of being divided but capable of contracting itself back into its originating point, which, according to Leibniz, is what it does when a person dies. When this happens the flower of substance will persist unharmed, its indestructibility being secured by the fact that it is located in an indivisible point, which makes it impervious to fire (‘For who will be able to burn a point?’), the activities of cannibals (it ‘cannot be diminished by teeth, or dissolved by the acid of the stomach, nor likewise can it be converted into nourishment’), and anything else that can be thrown at it. So every other part of
the body may decay, be eaten, or be destroyed in some other way, but the flower of substance will persist until the time of the resurrection, when it will suddenly be in a position to diffuse itself through a greater quantity of matter once again.

Key to this theory is Leibniz’s belief that the soul contains a kind of blueprint of the body within it: ‘the … unity of the body comes from the mind … the idea or essence or the body – namely of this body … survives in the mind’. Consequently, whenever the soul’s instrument, the flower of substance, is diffused through a quantity of matter, irrespective of how large or small this quantity may be, it diffuses its identity to it as well. Hence the body a person has at birth is, on this theory, the same as the one that person has at adulthood, old age, death, and at the resurrection, the identity being secured on the continuity of the only essential material part, the flower of substance. Leibniz’s idea can be summarized as follows:

RB6 A person’s resurrected body will consist of a ‘flower of substance’, which is a subtle form of matter into which the person’s soul is permanently implanted, and which remains numerically the same ‘flower of substance’ that person’s body had during life, together with a quantity of other matter through which the aforementioned flower of substance is diffused.

Christia Mercer claims that Leibniz’s doctrine of a flower of substance is ‘enormously clever’ for its ability to explain how a human body is able to remain the same while undergoing considerable changes. It is difficult to disagree with this assessment, and its apparent cleverness no doubt explains why different versions of the doctrine were put forward by other thinkers. Samuel Clarke, for instance, independently advanced a remarkably similar theory, albeit much more tentatively and with much less detail. More notably, from a historical standpoint, in the latter half of the eighteenth century, Charles Bonnet, inspired by Leibniz, claimed that the germ of the body and seat of the soul is an indestructible ‘little ethereal machine’ located in the human brain, and that ‘the resurrection will be nothing but the prodigiously accelerated development of this germ, presently sealed within the corpus callosum’. And in the Jewish midrashic tradition we find the doctrine of the luz bone, which holds that the resurrection is to be effected from a small almond-shaped bone residing at the base of the spine (or nape of the neck, according to some), which is the seat of the soul. According to the seventeenth-century rabbi, Menasseh Ben Israel, ‘in the spine there is a particular small bone which is never destroyed; from that small bone alone, after the destruction and annihilation of the other parts of the body, man is restored and brought back’.

The parallels between the luz bone and Leibniz’s flower of substance are many: both are considered to be the seat of the soul, and both are considered to be
indestructible (Menasseh relates the story, found in numerous Jewish commentators, of the failure of Emperor Hadrian’s attempts to destroy a luz bone by grinding it, burning it, immersing it in water, and finally striking it with a hammer on an anvil).\textsuperscript{71} Common to all such theories, however, is the problem of maintaining the indestructibility of whatever part of the body is identified as being the seat of the soul in the face of empirical evidence to the contrary. Léonard Euler, for instance, noted that the head did not seem to offer much protection to the ‘little ethereal machine’ Bonnet located in the brain, as a blow to the head can lead to memory loss and other psychological problems.\textsuperscript{72} If such damage could occur at a time when the germinal organ was supposedly protected by the rest of the brain and the skull, there seemed to be slim grounds for thinking that it would be resistant to damage or destruction when such protection was lacking, as it would be after death. Arguably the same concern looms over other versions of the doctrine behind RB6, such as the luz bone and Leibniz’s flower of substance.

\textbf{Scholasticism}

Leibniz’s doctrine was of course heavily indebted to the Scholastic tradition of which he was arguably a part. A more typical proponent of the Scholastic view was Kenelm Digby, who endorsed the Scholastic conception of substances as a combination of substantial form and matter. Of the latter he had this to say: ‘Matter considered singly by it selfe, hath no distinction: All matter is in it selfe the same; we must fansie it, as we doe the indigested Chaos, It is an uniformely wild Ocean.’\textsuperscript{73} So according to Digby, in itself it makes no sense to speak of a bit of matter retaining its identity over time, because matter is by its very nature undifferentiated. In the idiom of the Schools it is just pure potentiality, and only exists insofar as it is organized by a form. As Digby explains, a physical body can only be said to retain its identity if the substantial form which organizes it remains the same: ‘that which giveth the numerical individuation to a Body, is the substantiall forme. As long as that remaineth the same, though the matter be in a continuall fluxe and motion, yet the thing is still the same.’\textsuperscript{74}

Human bodies are no exception. For the Scholastics, the substantial form of a human body is the soul, which remains numerically the same soul throughout a person’s life and even afterwards, because the soul continues to exist after death, albeit in a disembodied state. When God brings about the resurrection, the soul is once more joined to a quantity of undifferentiated matter which at that point becomes the resurrected body of the person in question. And since that person’s soul has remained the same, and since only substances or (in the case of humans) their substantial forms can be said to retain identity, the matter organized by that person’s soul in her resurrection body is therefore by definition the same matter
organized by her soul during her normal life. Thus, her resurrection and pre-
resurrection bodies will be the same. Digby nicely illustrates this as follows:

... if God should joyne the Soule of a lately dead man (even whiles his dead corps
should lie entire in his winding sheete here) unto a Body made of earth taken from
some mountaine in America; it were most true and certaine that the body he should
then live by, were the same Identicall body he lived with before his Death and late
Resurrection. It is evident that sameness, thisnesse, and thatnesse, belongeth not to
matter by it selfe, (For a generall indifference runneth through it all) but onely as it
is distinguished and individuated by the Forme. Which, in our case, whensoever the
same Soule doth, it must be understood always to be the same matter and body.75

Thus, Digby’s view amounts to this:

**RB7**  A person’s resurrected body will consist of a quantity of
undifferentiated matter organized by that person’s soul
(substantial form).

Contemporary commentators are split on whether RB7 resolves the difficulty of
how individuals are raised with the same body. While Caroline Walker Bynum
calls it ‘an elegant solution’,76 Udo Thiel claims that ‘[a]lthough authors like
Digby subscribe to the doctrine of the sameness of the resurrection-body, their
position is really a thinly veiled version of the view that the identity of the body is
not required for the restoration of the same self at the resurrection.’77 I think such
a gloss fails to capture the subtlety of Digby’s position, and in doing so it reveals
just how alien Digby’s views are to the modern mind, especially on the issue of
matter being undifferentiated in itself.

Despite the apparent success of the Scholastic account in being able to explain
what it means to be resurrected with the same body, it is interesting to note that
it has not been historically popular, even among those who devised it! Many
Scholastics were instead in favour of view expressed by RB1,78 despite the prob-
lems involved with that. Their reluctance to endorse RB7, which their meta-
physics would seem to demand, may in part be due to their adherence to the
principle that *a privatione ad habitum non dari regressum* [there is no return
from privation to possession], the upshot of which is that, *pace* Digby, re-
introducing the same substantial form into a quantity of undifferentiated matter
does not automatically bring about numerically the same thing; for that to occur,
the thing has to go through the same process of generation and corruption it did
the first time around. Leibniz notes that their loyalty to the aforementioned
principle made it difficult for the Scholastics to grasp how the same flesh can be
returned in the resurrection (which is supposed to be an instantaneous rather
than lengthy process),79 while more unsympathetic opponents, like the Cathars,
argued that it ruled out the possibility of resurrection altogether.80

Such concerns with the principle that *a privatione ad habitum non dari
regressum* were not, however, responsible for RB7’s lack of popularity in the early
modern period. For many early modern thinkers the problem lay not with that principle, but with the acceptability of RB7’s metaphysical underpinnings. The philosophical credibility of hylomorphism, that is, the doctrine that things are composed of matter and form, was severely eroded with the advent of the mechanistic worldview ushered in by Galileo and Descartes. Crucial to the mechanical philosophy was the rejection of substantial forms, and a reconceptualization of matter as extension (that is, something which occupies space) rather than pure potentiality. Considered to have great explanatory success, the mechanical philosophy became so firmly embedded that, for many, it was difficult to see what grounds there could be for repopulating the world with substantial forms, even if doing so would allow for elegant solutions to otherwise thorny philosophical problems.

**Descartes**

And it is to a proponent of the mechanical philosophy – Descartes – that we now turn for our final attempt to explain how humans can be said to retain the same body. Perhaps surprisingly, Descartes’ view is in essence very similar to that advanced by Scholastics such as Digby, though arguably it ought not to have been. On the question of the identity of material things, Descartes offers an unambiguous answer:

> When we speak in general of a body, we mean a determinate part of matter, a part of the quantity of which the universe is composed. In this sense, if the smallest amount of that quantity were removed we would *eo ipso* judge that the body was smaller and no longer complete; and if any particle of the matter were changed we would at once think that the body was no longer quite the same, no longer *numerically the same*.\(^{81}\)

So for a material thing to retain its identity, it must continue to be composed of the very same matter in the very same arrangement. But according to Descartes, such a criterion is not applicable in the case of a human body:

> But when we speak of the body of a man, we do not mean a determinate part of matter with a determinate size; we mean simply the whole of the matter joined to the soul of that man. And so, even though that matter changes, and its quantity increases or decreases, we still believe that it is the same body, *numerically the same body*, provided that it remains joined in substantial union with the same soul.\(^{82}\)

Although the above remarks are made in the context of the Eucharist rather than the resurrection, they undoubtedly commit Descartes to the following position on the latter:

**RB8**  A person’s resurrected body will consist of the same soul united to a quantity of matter.

This is a fair extrapolation from Descartes’ view that sameness of soul guarantees sameness of body, for such a principle leaves no scope for Descartes to
adopt any position on the identity of the resurrection body bar RB8. Its similarity to the Scholastic view, encapsulated in RB7, is clear enough, though given Descartes’ understanding of matter as extension rather than potentiality, and the fact that he has a clear criterion of identity for material things in general, his claim that sameness of a human body hinges on the sameness of its soul has more of an ad hoc feel to it. Nevertheless, RB8 is obviously immune to the cannibal problem, as for Descartes it will make no difference what (or even how much) matter is united to a soul to form a person’s resurrection body; so long as the soul is the same, the body will be so too. As such, there are no grounds for disputes over ownership of bodily matter.

The ability to sidestep the cannibal problem did not, however, immunize RB8 against critical attack. Menasseh Ben Israel, for instance, objected: ‘But this opinion is completely absurd, because on this view there would be no resurrection, but only a transmigration of souls into new and different bodies.’ Implicit here is the assumption that the identity of human bodies is determined independently of whether they are united to this or that soul or any soul at all. This assumption was shared by many in the early modern period, and ironically it was the undermining of Scholasticism by the mechanical philosophy, of which Descartes was a key figure, that helped to make this so. Nevertheless, by making this assumption, which Descartes did not share, Menasseh reveals himself to be operating from an entirely different philosophical perspective, and one more in accord with modern intuitions than arguably Descartes was.

**Conclusion**

Since the early modern period, the belief that humans will experience a bodily resurrection has steadily declined in favour of the view that the resurrection will be spiritual, and as a result less ink has been spilled in attempts to explain how humans can be resurrected with the same body. Yet many are still committed to the idea of a bodily resurrection, as well as to the position that humans will be resurrected with the same bodies (it being affirmed, for instance, in §§988–1001 of the 1992 Catechism of the Roman Catholic Church), and, as noted earlier, efforts are still being made to determine how this should be understood. While some of these efforts have no precursors in early modern thought, others revisit some of the accounts of ‘same body’ discussed in this paper. Consequently, while the foregoing discussion provides an historical context to the efforts of contemporary scholars seeking to fashion a defensible account of what it means to be resurrected with the same body, I see no reason why it cannot serve another function, namely as a useful resource of raw materials for present-day thinkers engaged in that endeavour. Indeed, it would be fitting if it was not just problems that one age of philosophy bequeaths to another, but the means to resolve them as well.
Notes

1. This is true despite the common Christian belief that humans will rise with a spiritual body.
9. The belief in a bodily resurrection for all, coupled with the tradition identifying the Valley of Jehoshaphat as the location of the last judgement (and thus where all the resurrected will one day be gathered), did, however, give rise to the concern over whether all the resurrected could simultaneously fit into that one valley, though historically this concern was not considered to be as serious as the one currently under discussion. For more information, see my ‘Leibniz and the Jehoshaphat problem’, The Heythrop Journal, 51 (2010), forthcoming.
13. Catharine Trotter A Letter to Dr. Holdsworth, occasioned by his sermon preached before the University of Oxford: on Easter-Monday, concerning the resurrection of the same body (London, 1726), 42.
15. Two useful historical accounts of early modern thinking on various difficulties connected with the resurrection are Dacome ‘Resurrecting by numbers’, 74–110, and Fernando Vidal ‘Brains, bodies, selves, and science: anthropologies of identity and the resurrection of the body’, Critical Inquiry, 28 (2002), 930–974. However, while both devote space to various early modern attempts to explain what it means to say that humans will be resurrected with the same body, neither treats the issue systematically, and the authors do not mention many of the thinkers discussed in this paper.
17. Samuel Chandler *Sermons*, I, 2nd edn (London, 1759), 459. The other version of the cannibal problem invites us to suppose a cannibal who has eaten nothing but human flesh throughout her entire life. In such a case, the cannibal’s body would always be entirely composed of flesh that was formerly part of the bodies of other humans. Now, as it was believed that on the day of the resurrection every last scrap of eaten flesh would have to be returned to its original owner, the problem is that, since the cannibal’s body has only ever contained eaten flesh, it would seem that she cannot be resurrected at all. Yet the resurrection is supposed to be universal. This version of the cannibal problem was discussed by Aquinas, among others. See Aquinas *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Charles J. O’Neil (tr.) (New York NY: Image Books, 1957), IV.80.5.


20. See Badham *Christian Beliefs*, 47.


25. See, for example, Bernard Nieuwentijt *The Religious Philosopher: or, the right use of Contemplating the Works of the Creator*, III, John Chamberlayne (tr.) (London, 1719), 1031.


31. Hugo Grotius *De veritate religionis Christianae* (London, 1755), 97; Robert D’Oyly *Four Dissertations* (London, 1728), 462.

32. Hody *The Resurrection of the (Same) Body Asserted*, 185–186, 189.


37. Edwards *Theologia Reformata*, 9. Edwards is in fact inconsistent on this matter, as he also says (8) that ‘We understand by the same Body, the Body which he [i.e. a man] had when his Soul took its Farewel of the World’, which would make him an adherent of RB1.


39. D’Oyly *Four Dissertations*, 434.


41. See, for example, Thomas Browne *Religio Medici*, 8th edn (London, 1682), 109.


44. Tillotson *Sermons on Several Subjects*, 4468.

45. Hody *The Resurrection of the (Same) Body Asserted*, 188.


51. Watts *Philosophical Essays*, 189.
52. See, for example, Hody *The Resurrection of the (Same) Body Asserted*, 187–188; Johnson *The Resurrection of the Same Body, 22*; Watts *Philosophical Essays*, 190.
66. Samuel Clarke *A Discourse concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of Natural Religion, and the Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation* (Glasgow: Richard Griffin and Co., 1823), 327. It should be noted that Clarke did not actually endorse RB6 or his version of the theory behind it; he simply presents it as one possible way of resolving the cannibal problem.
69. Leibniz may well have been influenced by this theory. He certainly mentions it in many texts, e.g. Leibniz *Sämtliche Schriften*, 2, I, 185.
70. Menasseh *De resurrectione mortuorum*, 202.
71. For more information on the luz bone, including details of some Renaissance and early modern discussions of it, see Edward Reichman and Fred Rosner ‘The bone called Luz’. *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*, 31 (1996), 52–65. This paper does not, however, mention Menasseh.
73. Kenelm Digby *Observations vpon Religio Medici* (London, 1643), 84.
78. See Bynum ‘Material continuity’, 68ff.
83. Menasseh *De resurrectione mortuorum*, 200.
84. See Badham *Christian Beliefs*, ch. 5; Patrides ‘Renaissance and modern thought’, 177–178.

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