TYING THE DOUBLE METAPHYSICS OF JOHANNES CLAUBERG: 
ONTOSOPHIA AND RATIONAL THEOLOGY*

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The introduction of Descartes' philosophy in the academic curriculum of studies took place, for the first time in history, at the University of Utrecht, quickly spreading to Leiden, Duisburg and Herborn in the early 1650s. Yet, such introduction brought about countless problems in different fields of philosophy as well as in theology and politics¹. The issues of the use of radical doubt, the rejection of substantial forms and the union of body and soul prompted dire accusations of scepticism and atheism to the new philosophy, and called for a defence of its consistence with the Reformed creed and of its legitimacy in replacing the all but uncontested Aristotelian paradigm in philosophy. The German philosopher Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665) was the first academician who attempted to make Descartes' philosophy the basis of all philosophical disciplines of the traditional curriculum of studies, that is, to develop a Cartesian Scholastic². To this aim, Clauberg developed a first philosophy, i.e., a metaphysics based on Descartes' Meditationes and finalized to provide philosophy with a

* I thank Henri Krop for his useful remarks on this paper.
1 See VERBEEK 1992.
2 VIOLA 1975.
foundation, or a demonstration of the reliability of clear and distinct knowledge. Moreover, he set a comprehensive logical theory showing how Descartes' rules of the method may be completed by the Scholastic theory of definition, division and syllogism. Still, Clauberg maintained in the corpus of philosophical disciplines a metaphysics dealing with the meanings of “being”. Accordingly, he developed a twofold metaphysics: on one hand, it concerns the principles of thought, i.e. it is a *philosophia prima* within the order of disciplines. On the other, it deals with the most abstract notions of being, and it is to be acquired after having had a full acquaintance of philosophy. To this discipline, Clauberg devoted the three editions of his *Ontosophia* (1647, 1660, 1664).

In the last years, Massimiliano Savini has provided us with a comprehensive survey of Clauberg's idea of method and *ontosophia*, considered with respect to the historical sources of Clauberg's thought, the parallel debates over Cartesianism in the Netherlands and the internal progress of his positions. As a result, he has shown that the *redoublement* in Clauberg's metaphysics is to be traced back to his original plan of providing a complete course of philosophy before his adherence to Cartesianism – in his 1647 *Elementa philosophiae seu Ontosophia* – where he had both to guarantee the foundational role and the independence from logic of metaphysics as *ontosophia*, and the preliminary function of logic with respect to the whole course of philosophy. If this problem had been solved, in 1647, by some

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3 Strazzoni 2013, 138-141.
4 Clauberg 1647, 1660, 1664(2).
5 Savini 2004; Savini 2006; Savini 2011.
6 Savini 2011, 25-27, 44; see Clauberg 1647, 2.
anticipations of the elements of metaphysics in logic\textsuperscript{7}, after his adoption of Cartesianism Clauberg could provide his philosophy with a foundation in the *philosophia prima*, i.e., Descartes' metaphysics (echoing the traditional *metaphysica specialis*, or the science of immaterial beings)\textsuperscript{8}, independent from logic, and at the same time he could develop a general metaphysics as the last discipline in the order of teaching and thought\textsuperscript{9}. Assuming Savini's reconstruction as a starting point, this article will concern the relations among *ontosophia* and *philosophia prima* in Clauberg's philosophy. After having clarified the plan of Clauberg's philosophy, and shown some sample of his metaphysical arguments, which his first philosophy consists of, I will argue that in Clauberg's philosophy the discipline of *ontosophia*, despite its role as the most abstract science, plays a foundational role with regards to metaphysics as first philosophy. Indeed, *ontosophia* unveils the most important assumptions of first philosophy, which is essentially a rational theology.

1. Metaphysics, logic and physics

The function of metaphysics as first philosophy is outlined by Clauberg against its Aristotelian definition as the science coming after physics: as he writes in his *Differentia inter cartesianam et in scholis vulgo usitatam philosophiam*

\textsuperscript{7} CLAUBERG 1647, 291, 309; see SAVINI 2011, 54-55, 61-63.
\textsuperscript{8} \textit{Infra}, n. 89.
\textsuperscript{9} SAVINI 2011, 299.
(1657, 1680)\textsuperscript{10}, the very name “metaphysica” suggests that this discipline was definitively misplaced in the traditional order of sciences\textsuperscript{11}. This order is reversed by Clauberg by embracing Descartes' plan of disciplines, according to which the tree of philosophy is composed of the roots of metaphysics, the trunk of physics, and the boughs of mechanics, medicine and moral philosophy\textsuperscript{12}. For Descartes, referred to by Clauberg in his \textit{Initiatio philosophi sive dubitatio cartesiana} (1655)\textsuperscript{13}, metaphysics concerns the principles of human knowledge, among which the divine attributes are to be counted\textsuperscript{14} as from them it is possible to deduce natural laws\textsuperscript{15}. As stated in his \textit{Defensio cartesiana} (1652)\textsuperscript{16} metaphysics coincides with natural theology\textsuperscript{17} and proceeds from the acknowledgment of the notions of self and God to that of bodily reality. According to Clauberg's \textit{Differentia}, such concepts lead to the demonstration

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} The first, German edition appeared in 1657 (\textit{Unterschied zwischen der cartesianischer und der sonst in Schulen gebrauchlicher Philosophie}, see CLAUBERG 1657), followed by the Latin translation in 1680 (CLAUBERG 1680).
\item \textsuperscript{11} «Notabilis differentia inter cartesianam et aristoteleam […] siquidem illa a rebus spiritualibus aut intellectualibs et ratione utentibus, haec autem a corporalibus initium sui scrutinii atque doctrinae primum facit, atque ita in scholis prima philosophia dicitur, dignitatis et naturae, non cognitionis nostrae ordine; contra quam fit in philosophia cartesiana: atque etiam haec primum est inventa, illa autem postremo, indeque nominata metaphysica, quasi post-physica», CLAUBERG 1691, \textit{Differentia}, 1226.  
\item \textsuperscript{12} \textit{Ibid.}, 1157. For Descartes' words on the tree of knowledge, see AT IX-2, 14.  
\item \textsuperscript{13} CLAUBERG 1655.  
\item \textsuperscript{14} «In praefat. Editionis Princip. Gallicae, ubi explicaturus ordinem, quem quis tenere debet in se instruendo hac philosophia, \textit{cum iam, inquit, acquisitum habitum quendam inveniendae veritatis in his quaestionibus (nempe mathematicis) debet serio incipere se applicare verae philosophiae, cuius prima pars est metaphysica, quae continet principia cognitionis, inter quae est explicatio praecipuorum Dei attributorum, immaterialitatis animarum nostrarum et omnium notionum clararum et simplicium, quae sunt in nobis. Secunda est physica»}, CLAUBERG 1691, \textit{Initiatio philosophi}, 1154. See AT IX-2, 14.  
\item \textsuperscript{15} «Vide qui Cartesius regulas de motu et corporum existentiam ex Dei natura et existentia derivet», CLAUBERG 1691, \textit{Initiatio philosophi}, 1155. In fact, God is required both to ensure the reliability of our faculties, and to explain the ultimate cause of natural laws.  
\item \textsuperscript{16} CLAUBERG 1652.  
\item \textsuperscript{17} «Theologiam seu metaphysicam», CLAUBERG 1691, \textit{Defensio cartesiana}, 1011.
\end{itemize}
of the reliability of the human faculties, as they include the acknowledgment of the goodness of God\textsuperscript{18} and are, at once, the basis of natural philosophical explanations, like the notions of physical modes and natural laws. Based on a unique introspective act, the Cartesian metaphysics is composed of a few simple rules and principles, whereas Aristotelian philosophy was grounded on several \textit{praecognita} embodied by a logic reflecting a vulgar worldview\textsuperscript{19}. In fact, such logic is described as providing philosophy the ten categories: in some manner, it is a foundational discipline, as it embodies the notions of Scholastic philosophy\textsuperscript{20}. Aristotelian logic and metaphysics are thus paired in their corresponding inadequate concepts, whereas Cartesian metaphysics deals with the proper natures of things, acknowledged through the analysis of the contents of mind\textsuperscript{21}. As to the order of disciplines, both theoretically and pedagogically, Clauberg stands for the priority of metaphysics over logic, since metaphysics as consisting on doubt is the very first step in a new way of thinking. This is clear from his \textit{Initiatio philosophi}, which offers a first outlook on his metaphysical foundation of philosophy. As he has to face the problem of an introduction of the student to a new paradigm, together with the demonstration of its reliability, in this treatise Clauberg maintains that the initiation of scholars to the new philosophy through doubt is to be identified with the theoretical justification of philosophy itself. This introduction and

\begin{itemize}
  \item[18] \textsc{Clauberg 1691, Differentia, 1233.}
  \item[19] «Illa, (cartesiana) sicuti unum tantum inventorem, et non tam varios auctores […] habet […] quemadmodum et pauciores regulas […] continet […]. Vulgaris philosophia e contrario assumit multa tanquam fundamenta. […] Quod autem cartesiana philosophia initium facit a paucis, altera e contrario multas res praesupponat, e sequentibus patet exemplis. Vulgaris philosophia decem categorias, seu summa rerum genera; cartesiana duo tantum statuit», \textit{ibid.}, 1223.
  \item[20] \textsc{Savini 2011, 55-61.}
  \item[21] \textsc{Clauberg 1691, Differentia, 1229.}
\end{itemize}
justification is provided, first of all, by means of doubt. Doubt serves as an emendative instrument through which it is possible to reach a metaphysical or absolute certainty on the notions of self, God and matter, and to become acquainted with a new way in reasoning. It is the very first step into the new philosophy\(^{22}\), or the initiation to Cartesianism for everyone who has not been acquainted with clear and distinct perceptions, allowing no further dubitation or suspension of judgement\(^{23}\). Such a first, emendative step in philosophy belongs to metaphysics\(^{24}\). However, since logic teaches how to conduct understanding, it is in Clauberg's *Logica* that one can find a relevant part of his metaphysical arguments.

The logic of Clauberg is quadripartite: the first two parts, forming *genetica*, concern the formation of thoughts and their expression in speech\(^{25}\). *Genetica* is about definitions, divisions and syllogisms, being a *hermeneutica* or the interpretation of our own discourse\(^{26}\). The last two parts concern the interpretation or resolution (*analytica*) of the sentences of other men. The third part explains how to understand their meanings, while the fourth

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22 «Dubitatio nostrae, quae alii debito generalior esse videtur non spectet ad eum qui firma iam philosophicae cognitionis fundamenta iecit, quasi ea deberet in dubium revocare ac reicere; verum ad illum duntaxat, qui fundamenta eiusmodi nondum posuit quique non aliter consideretur, quam ut vulgaris homo, nihil adhuc scientifice demonstratum habens, nihil clare distincteque perceptum, cui iudicium superstrui queat indubitatum», CLAUBERG 1691, *Initiatio philosophi*, 1138.

23 Ibid., 1142, 1144.

24 Ibid., 1208-1209.


26 «Logicae geneticae pars posterior [...] inservit menti ad suos conceptus, modo ad priorem partem accommodato, aliis explicandos. Itaque docet, quibus verbis definitiones, divisiones, syllogismi in mente formati sint efferendi. [...] Quae praecpta hermeneutica a grammaticis et rhetoricis diversa esse nemo non videt», ibid.

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(hermeneutica analytica) expounds the rules for an analysis of their truth according to the precepts of genetica\textsuperscript{27}. Actually, it is in the first and in the fourth section that metaphysical arguments can be found, as these parts concern the rules for the formation and analysis of thoughts. Treating «inveniendi veri methodum»\textsuperscript{28}, the first section expounds the conditions for clear and distinct perception. Three main questions are put forward: «quid sit cognoscendum», «quis ipse sit, qui vult cognoscere», «quomodo possit cognoscere, ubi de methodo»\textsuperscript{29}. Stating the basics of Cartesian metaphysics, some words are devoted to the objects of knowledge, matching Descartes' hierarchy of knowledge\textsuperscript{30}. The most important metaphysical point in such considerations, however, is to be found in the treatment of the different degrees of certitude of judgements. Two degrees of certitude and truth are outlined: contingent (or moral) certitude, and necessary certitude, embracing in turn three further degrees: certitudo physica sive de omni; certitudo metaphysica per se and certitudo metaphysica universaliter prima\textsuperscript{31}. Metaphysical or eternal truths are grounded on the clear and distinct perception of the connection of subject and predicate\textsuperscript{32}. A difference, however, is made among

\textsuperscript{27} «Inquirendum est an cogitationes scriptoris, externo sermone nobis explicatae, regulis illis, quas non solum de percipiendi, iudicandi, et recordandi, verum etiam de tradendi modo praescripsit logica genetica, sint conformes», \textit{ibid}, 866. See also page 781.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, 780.

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Ibid.}, 783.

\textsuperscript{30} «Quod omnibus necessario cognoscendum est, ante omnia cognoscamus, v.g. Deum et nos ipsos, in caeteris vero eorum, quae potioris sunt dignitatis et usus, potiorem rationem habeamus, non necessariis atque inutilibus omissis, cum sapientia non paretur ex quarumvis rerum notitia, sed ex earum duntaxat quae maioris sunt momenti», \textit{ibid.}, 784.

\textsuperscript{31} \textit{Ibid.}, 801.

\textsuperscript{32} «Unde vero existit summa illa seu metaphysica de axiomatibus nonnullis in animo nostro certitudo? Resp. Certitudo axiomatis affirmantis proficiscitur e subiecti et
these metaphysical truths, whose highest certitude relies only on the
definition of the subject, as in the sentences «omnis homo est animal
rationale»\textsuperscript{33} or «Deus necessario existit», analysed in the last part of
Clauberg's \textit{Logica}:

examinantur veritas et falsitas, et gradus utriusque in enunciationibus […] ubi
illa […] Deus necessario existit, habet certitudinem […] metaphysicam, estque
per se et universaliter primum, ideoque magis necessaria hac, binarius est par\textsuperscript{34}.

Because God is defined as \textit{ens summe perfectum}\textsuperscript{35}, this definition implies a
necessary existence. Therefore, «Deus necessario existit» is to be considered
even more necessary than «binarium esse parem», because the truth of the
former sentence depends on the definition of the subject, whereas that of the
latter relies on the notion of the predicate\textsuperscript{36}. Clauberg finds in logic the proper
place for an analysis of the degree of certitude of the bases of Cartesian
metaphysics, which is treated by paying attention to the kinds of subject-
predicate connection. This analysis is applied to the \textit{a priori} proof, but also to
Descartes' \textit{a posteriori} argument. In the last section of \textit{Logica}, indeed, the
principle of causality is examined from an analytical point of view\textsuperscript{37},

\textsuperscript{33} ibid., 803.
\textsuperscript{34} ibid., 891.
\textsuperscript{35} ibid., 892.
\textsuperscript{36} ibid., 893.
\textsuperscript{37} «Examini analytico subiecimus veritatis certitudinisque gradus ac differentias, iam
etiam, Logicae nostrae ordinem secuti, gradus universalitatis in axiomatibus, et quae
quibus superiora, quibus inferiorea sint, expendamus: hoc enim multum prodesse ad
iudicium formandum ipsa nos docuit. Sumamus vulgarissimum illud: quod quid non
habet, id alteri dare non potest», \textit{ibid.}, 894.
involving, in fact, metaphysical considerations; it is considered in the light of the concepts of efficient and exemplary cause, which in the case of God's idea must be identified as it contains perfection in its objective being\textsuperscript{38}. This argument will be properly developed in \textit{Exercitationes de cognitione Dei et nostri}. However, before turning to such treatises, I will spend some words to Clauberg's physics. More than in his other works, in fact, it is in his \textit{Physica} that he develops his overview on the system of sciences, devoting some consideration to the role of rational theology.

In physics, Clauberg is concerned with the study of the mind insofar as it can allow a better explanation of the experiences of man\textsuperscript{39}. The treatises included in his \textit{Physica} (\textit{Physica contracta, Disputationes physicae, Theoria corporum viventium} and \textit{Corporis et animae in homine coniunctio})\textsuperscript{40} start with the definition of the basic concepts of physics and end in the analysis of human nature. Clauberg's main focus is on human nature as a premise for the other disciplines. His consideration of the human mind concerns its union with the body, fully analysed in his \textit{Corporis et animae in homine coniunctio}, aimed to further the progress of physics, medicine, theology, law, ethics, didactic and logic\textsuperscript{41}. Many metaphysical considerations carried on in physics, like those on

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{38} \textit{Ibid.}, 896-897.
\bibitem{39} «Inscriptio libri huius tria tibi promittit. Primum est explicatio virium et naturae rerum corporearum. […] Alterum est explicatio proprietatum mentis, non absolute spectata, nam eo intuitu ad scientiam physicam reduci non solet, sed relate ad corpus, quod proprium naturalis philosophiae subjectum censetur. […] Mens humana quomodo corpori imperet agendo, quomodo item a corpore patiendo sentiat, imaginetur […] similesque functiones exerceat, […] tractatur. Tertium est explicatio coniunctionis illius hypostaticae, qua mens et corpus ad unum hominem constituendum admirabili modo conveniunt», \textsc{Clauberg 1691, Physica, Lectori salutem}, I (unnumbered).
\bibitem{40} \textsc{Clauberg 1664(1)}.
\bibitem{41} \textsc{Clauberg 1691, Physica, 209}.
\end{thebibliography}
actions and passions of the mind, however, have to be considered as the conclusions rather than the premises of natural philosophy. His *Physica* ends with an explanation of body-mind interaction designed to implement our grasp of phenomena rather than to establish such a grasp\(^42\). In any case, the metaphysical points entailed by Clauberg's *Physica* deserve some attention, especially in their intersections with the themes of his *Exercitationes* and *Ontosophia*. Indeed, in his *Physica* Clauberg clarifies his plan of philosophy, and sets some metaphysical argument.

In his *Disputationes physicae*, refining Descartes' metaphor of the tree of knowledge\(^43\), Clauberg outlines the relations among the sciences: he regards law and medicine as badly grounded insofar as they are detached from philosophy. In such a case, they will be only a study of the Prince's decrees and an empirical practice\(^44\). On the contrary, the proper architecture of the sciences includes metaphysics or first philosophy as the discipline grounding physics, on which moral theory and medicine are based. From moral philosophy, furthermore, law and politics flow\(^45\). Clauberg underlines the practical value of philosophy, as politics is put at the top of the architecture,

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\(^42\) See the *Corporis et animae in homine coniunctio*, *illud reale et elegantissimum physicis thema nobis hic tractandum est, quomodo universi conditor […], nihil impediente tanta naturae corporeae et incorporeae diversitate, unum ex utraque hominem composuerit*, *ibid.*, 213.

\(^43\) *Philosophia, et praesertim physica, licet iurisprudentiae ac medicinae radix ac fundamentum recte iudicetur*, *ibid.*, 53.

\(^44\) *Quamvis enim illae disciplinae sine philosophia tractari soleant a multis, quatenus iurisprudentiae leges a principis voluntate pendentes, medicina observationes et experientiam sequitur; nemo tamen praeclarum et solidum quid in iis praestare novit, nisi philosophiae praeceptis imbutus ante fuerit*, *ibid.*

\(^45\) *Nam facile est ostendere, veram iurisprudentiam in morali doctrina, doctrinam moralem una cum medicina in physica, physicam denique in metaphysica vel prima philosophia radicari ac fundari*, *ibid.*
while medicine and law are firmly based on physics and metaphysics⁴⁶, or the worthiest sciences⁴⁷. Politics, in fact, gains the status of scientia only if it is based on a philosophical theory of man, as in the case of medicine: this theory is fully developed in the Coniunctio. According to his Logica vetus et nova, indeed, even the knowledge of God is ultimately practical, as it grounds disciplines such as medicine or law⁴⁸. The main metaphysical topic in Clauberg’s Physica concerns the role of God, defined in traditional terms. He considers God the creator and conserver of matter and motion⁴⁹, and assigns to res and leges an effective, secondary causality, because laws are the causes that nature follows⁵⁰. Such laws are purportedly deduced from divine perfection⁵¹, whose definition is borrowed from the Ethica Nicomachea⁵². This

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⁴⁶ «Quod si forte alia de causa, veluti regiminis civilis intuitu, caput philosophiae iurisprudentia censeatur, id non magis in ipsam iurisprudentiam, quam in politicam, quae pars est philosophiae, quadrare certum est: cum plures legum civilium, quatenus a politica distinguuntur prudentia, imperiti summa cum laude respublicas olim gubernarint atque etiamnum gubernent. Porro philosophiam cum radicem et fundamentum iurisprudentiae et medicinae affirmo, veram et sanam intelligo», ibid.
⁴⁷ Ibid., 54.
⁴⁸ «At nunquid caeli notitia ad Creatorem agnoscendum ac celebrandum adducimur, et nunquid sequitur, omnem cognitionem quodammodo practicam esse oportere, nullam otiosam aut sterilem», ibid.
⁴⁹ «Materiae substantia servante Deo semper manens», ibid., 57.
⁵⁰ Ibid., 97-98, 103.
⁵¹ «Permanet, quantum in se est, constantia Dei illud non deferente [...]. Enimvero cum sine causa haud quicquam fieri possit, citra actionem causae status demutari nequeat. [...] Unde natura lex nata est prima, a divinae conservationis simplicitate et constantia pendens. Eadem haec Dei perfectio alteri quoque naturae legi finis et origo est», ibid., 6. Clauberg does not address the problem of the creation of eternal truths by God.
⁵² «Perfectionem artificis ex eo elucere, quod tale opus fabricarit, cui nihil addi, nihil demi possit. His enim verbis describere solemus id quod perfectum appellamus. Et nunquid opera, quae scire affabreque facta sunt, hoc nomine commendantur, quid nihil illis detrahi aut addi possit; ut bene Aristoteles 2 Eth. cap 5», ibid., 100. See ARISTOTLE, Ethica Nicomachea V, 2, 1106a 26-1106b 35.
perfection or constancy is in balance with divine freedom\[^{53}\] which is another of the attributes of God. In any case, it is in the *Exercitationes* that the pivotal topic of the role of God in the foundation of philosophy finds its systematisation. Not as regards the deduction of natural laws, which have their justification only in the *Physica*, but as regards the truth of our concepts.

2. Metaphysics as rational theology

Clauberg's *Exercitationes centum de cognitione Dei et nostri*\[^{54}\] focus on two main topics: the theory of ideas and the demonstration of the existence of God\[^{55}\]. The proofs expounded in Descartes' *Meditationes*, indeed, indeed, are examined by Clauberg in the light of the properties of thought.

The rational theology developed in his *Exercitationes* is not only meant to provide physics with a foundation. Since Clauberg conceives of all disciplines as relying on philosophical knowledge, even disciplines like law find their foundation in *philosophia prima*, in accordance with an attempt to

\[^{53}\] «Deum equidem liberrime omnia agere in omnibus nullo modo imus inficias; sed affirmamus insuper, perpetuo eum agere caeteris perfectionibus suis congruerenter, adeoque sapienter et constanter; nec uni libertatis attributo sic esse insistendum, ut reliqua eius virtutes, quae non minus in eo spectandae nobis exhibentur, minus a nobis praedicari videantur», CLAUBERG 1691, *Physica*, 101.

\[^{54}\] CLAUBERG 1656.

\[^{55}\] «Quibus de rebus tractat metaphysica sive prima philosophia, illa inprimis quae a Renato Cartesio publico data? Resp. Tractat de principiis cognitionis humanae, sive de primis initiis et fundamentis omnis nostrae scientiae, quam ex naturae lumine possumus haurire. Ita mens cuisque hominis philosophaturi primo incipit a cognitione suae existentiae, qua nihil ei notius esse potest. E sui notitia provehitur deinde in cognitionem Dei creatoris et conserveratoris, hunc necessario existere, omnisque datorem luminis esse demonstrat», CLAUBERG 1691, *De cognitione Dei et nostri*, 592.
integrate Cartesianism in the academic curriculum\textsuperscript{56}. God, as the first cause, is to be taken into consideration in all disciplines, not only in the deduction of physical laws\textsuperscript{57}. Natural theology is thus present from the first to the last step of philosophy\textsuperscript{58}, which ends in physics, ethics and politics\textsuperscript{59}. His \textit{Exercitationes} contain the presentation and clarification of Descartes' proofs, enriched with corollary considerations borrowed mainly from Scholastic and Renaissance authors. Actually, Clauberg does not add any new points to such proofs: with his considerations, however, he discloses some points implied in Descartes' proofs.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{56}«Utilis [...] est naturalis Dei cognitio propter alias omnes humanas disciplinas, quarum firma et evidens notitia expetitur. Non enim possunt satis refutari sceptici neque conclusionis ullius vera certitudo haberi, nisi ante probetur Deum summe veracem et causam omnis veri et boni necessario existere, a quo proinde accipiamus omnem intellectum, quo si recte utamur, hoc est si non nisi de clare distincteque perceptis judicemus, fallere aut falli nequeamus. Et constat inter cunctos logicos et philosophos, non posse obtineri ullius rei creatae veram scientiam, nisi perspectis causis; causas autem non posse perfecte cognosci, nisi ad primam et supremam causam, quae Deus est, recurratur», \textit{ibid.}, 594.
\item \textsuperscript{57}«Addo peculiari de causa tractationi de Deo locum esse dandum in primis philosophiae principiis, quoniam perfecta rerum scientia, quam philosophando ac quirere laboramus, ex causarum praecipue notitia resultat. At prima rerum omnium causa, et sine qua reliquarum causalitates nec sunt, nec accurate cognosci possunt ulla, est Deus», \textit{ibid.}, 596.
\item \textsuperscript{58}«Nam initio philosophiae non ulterius agitur de Deo, quam quatenus eius cognitio ad iacenda omnis scientiae humanae fundamenta desideratur. Sed in fine absoluta de Deo tractatio instituitur,omniaque eius attributa, quae ex naturae lumine cognosci queunt, expenduntur, quod initio necessarium non erat, quoniam non omnia Dei attributa se habent ut principia rerum creatarum, et quae huiusmodi relationem possunt recipere, non tamen absolute ideo aut planius, quam originis illa relatio postulat, opus est explicare. Nec possunt sane attributa Dei absolute et plene satis explanari, antequam rerum ab eo creatorum tractatio praecesserit», \textit{ibid.}, 596.
\item \textsuperscript{59}«Dico per universam philosophiam diffusam esse theologiam naturalem, quia dum in operibus Dei rite contemplandis occupamur, fieri nequit, quin ipsius opificis potentiam, bonitatem, sapientiam passim admirando, in eius notitiam magis magisque assurgamus. Quaecunque enim sunt in rerum natura creata et ordinata, ad ipsum tanquam suum principium et originem sunt referenda. Quod respiciens S. Augustinus in Epist. ad Volusianum, ipsam quoque physicam, ethicam, politicam aliasque disciplinas theologiae terminis contineri asseruit», \textit{ibid.}, 596. See Augustine, \textit{Epistola ad Volusianum}, § 5.17.
\end{itemize}
arguments. His first focus is on the imitative nature of ideas, which can be thus conceived as images, in accordance with the views of Bartholomäus Keckermann and Rudolph Goclenius. Presenting the first proof, in addition to the twofold nature of ideas – formal and objective – Clauberg highlights the relation between human and divine ideas, envisaged as ectypes and archetypes. God, therefore, is at the same time the efficient and the exemplar cause of our innate ideas. As these are conceived as images or imitations, they cannot be more perfect than what they are images of, as stated by Aristotle and Keckermann:

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\textit{imago est, inquit Aristoteles lib. 6. Top. cap. 2, quae per imitationem efficitur, sive cuius generatio est per imitationem. Imitatio autem, veram eius naturam si intueamur, per se nihil aliud est, quam conformatio imperfectioris ad perfectius, ut bene inter alios definit Keckerm. Syst. Phys. Lib. 4 cap. 8.}
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Assuming the existence of an imitation or an \textit{esse obiectivum seu vicarium} (a term borrowed from Goclenius), an archetype is thus required. Besides

60 «Observo 1. conceptum seu ideam omnem habere duplicem dependentiam, unam a concipiente sive cogitante intellectu [...] altera, a re concepta aut simili, cuius scilicet repraesentatio sive imago est, sive unde per imitationem expressa est. [...] Observo 2. intellectum esse causam conceptus efficientem, [...] rem vero conceptam [...] esse causam conceptus exemplarem (quae quidem etiam ad efficientem reducit) atque eo modo ad conceptum referri, quo archetypon ad ectypon», CLAUBERG 1691, De cognitione Dei et nostri, 606. See p. 618: «ex ideis aliae sunt ectypae, quales est idea Dei et aliarum rerum ab homine non factibilium, aliae archetypae, quae rerum faciendarum formulae et exemplaria sunt et a philosophis ad causam efficientem referuntur».
61 Ibid., 606. See ARISTOTLE, Topica, 140a 14-15; KECKERMANN 1623, 564.
62 GOCLENIUS 1613, 1047.
63 «Idea secundum esse vicarium spectata non potest esse perfectior sua causa, hoc est, suo exemplari, imperfectior esse potest. Imo nulla imago plus realitatis et perfectionis repraesentare, quam reperitur in ea re, unde talis imago desunta sive expressa est. [...] Probatum [...] tum ex natura imaginis atque imitationis, tum ex illo axiomate, quod
Aristotle, Keckermann and Descartes, the position of Clauberg relies on Eustache de Saint-Paul and Goclenius' works, which set the ground of Descartes' discussion of ideas. Clauberg's strategy is to refer the basics of Descartes' arguments to the Scholastic sources. However, it is not clear to what extent Clauberg supports the view that ideas are truly mental images or visual contents: «imago quaedam», «tanquam imago» or «per modum imaginis» suggest that Clauberg is only using a comparison with images more than identifying ideas with them, following a philosophical terminology adopted by Descartes himself. In fact, the status of ideas remains ultimately unexplained, even if Clauberg maintains Descartes' classification of ideas into fictitious, innate and adventitious.

Clauberg's alternative in characterizing ideas is to describe them as definitions. The propositional nature of ideas is supported by Clauberg in reporting Descartes' argument for the existence of the idea of God. It can be

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effectus non possit esse nobilior causa. Et sane, quam necessarium est, ut omnis idea habeat causam exemplarem, tam necessarium est, ut omne praeclarum quod habet idea, procedat ac derivetur ab exemplari illa causa. [...] Ut ex nihilo nihil fit a natura: ita nec potest mens nostra ullum realem conceptum formare, nisi rem aliquam imitata: et cuius totum esse in imitatione consistit, id non potest plus continere, quam est in imitabili sive exemplari. [...] Si ergo [...] summae perfectiones non sunt in mente [...] sequitur eas esse extra mentem nostram [...] hoc est, in Deo», CLAUBERG 1691, De cognitione Dei et nostri, 609.

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64 Ibid., 608, 609-610, quoting Descartes' Meditatio prima and tercia: see AT VII 19-20, 40, 51-52.
65 EUSTACHE DE SAINT-PAUL 1620, 54-55; GOCLENIUS 1613, 208-209.
66 ARIEW 2011, 101-121.
67 CLAUBERG 1691, De cognitione Dei et nostri, 617
68 See Exercitatio VIII: «cogitationis et picturae comparatio, ad melius intelligendum pro Dei existentia allatum argumentum utilis», ibid., 609.
69 See Descartes' Meditatio tercia, AT VII, 37. On the use of the term in coeval philosophical tradition, see SAVINI 2004, 170-181.

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acknowledged, indeed, by understanding the very definition of “God”\textsuperscript{70}. Actually, such a characterization does not add anything to our comprehension of the nature of ideas, stating only the linguistic meanings of words and sentences. This is confirmed by the identification of ideas with \textit{themata}, or with whatever can be conceived by mind, following Descartes and the traditional logic. In \textit{Logica vetus et nova} Clauberg states that the difference between perception and judgement matches the difference between simple and complex \textit{themata}\textsuperscript{71}. Complex \textit{themata}, actually, are propositions\textsuperscript{72}. Therefore, insofar as every simple \textit{thema} can be rendered into a complex one, every idea is expressed by a definition. Such intersections of logic and metaphysics, again, do not put light on how ideas represent things. This is also the case with the epistemological considerations developed in physics. Clauberg’s \textit{Theoria corporum viventium} contains an overview of mental faculties. He defines the functions of the soul as thoughts (\textit{cogitationes}), divided into actions and passions. Passions are perceptions or \textit{conversiones mentis ab obiecto}, that is, modifications of the soul determined by a form or figure. Actions are wills, or \textit{lationes animi ad obiectum}: «adeo ut voluntas latio quaedam animi esse videatur, tendens ad obiectum in idea propositum; perpectio autem quaedam eius figuratio vel in varias formas conversio, veniens ab obiecto»\textsuperscript{73}. “\textit{Obiectum}, “\textit{idea}, “\textit{figuratio}” and “\textit{forma}” are the terms

\footnotesize

\textsuperscript{70}«Addo, quod definitio rei nihil aliud sit, quam clara et distincta rei idea, ita ut, si omnia vocabula in definitione Dei adhibita sint intelligibilia, necessum sit, quid Deus sit, intelligi, Deus, aiunt, est maximum id, quod cogitari potest. Inde sic infero: ergo Deus cogitari potest, hoc est, Dei idea, sensu cartesiano, haberi potest», Clauberg 1691, \textit{De cognitione Dei et nostri}, 604.

\textsuperscript{71}CLAUBERG 1691, \textit{Logica vetus et nova}, 799-800.

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid., 829.

\textsuperscript{73}CLAUBERG 1691, \textit{Physica}, 190.
used by Clauberg to express what is involved in mental activities. Also in the
theory of knowledge, thus, Descartes' theory is rendered into Scholastic
terms. Eventually, these metaphysical insertions into logic and physics show
that the justification of science is provided by an appeal to the veracity of
God rather than by a consideration of the actual ways in which ideas match
tings. Ultimately, the nature of ideas is considered insofar as it serves the
demonstration of the existence of God.

In the same manner, the second demonstration of the existence of God
is borrowed from Descartes and is clarified through references to Scholastic
philosophy. The proof is based on the experienced continuity of our
existence, due to Divine conservative action74. According to Clauberg, since it
is not possible to infer our persistence in being from our past existence, a
conservative cause is to be postulated75. The demonstration relies on the
principle of the successive nature of time and is supported by quotations
from Samuel Desmaret's *Systema theologicum* (1645)76, used to prove that time
is experienced in the same way by men and angels. The reference confirms
Clauberg's theological interests: he also demonstrates that we cannot be
conserved by angels77.

Finally, the third proof is explained by Clauberg in the light of his logic,
spating that Descartes did not develop his *a priori* argument according to the

74 As *duratio* is existence, conservation and creation are the same thing: see CLAUBERG
1691, De cognitione Dei et nostri, 645-646.
75 Ibid., 636.
76 Ibid., 637. See DESMARETS 1645, V, § 34; DESMARETS 1649, 97-98.
77 "Quod difficilius sit aliena curare et conservare, quam propria et sua, unde sequitur, si
anima mea non possit suas proprias cogitationes [...] nec suum corpus [...] conservare,
tum nulla probabili ratione posse angelo tribui potentiam conservandi animam meam", CLAUBERG 1691, De cognitione Dei et nostri, 639.
canons of the *Topica* but from the intuition of the idea of God:

ille canon logicus: quod convenit definitioni [...] etiam convenit definito (v.g. Deo) [...]. Quaeris, si canon ille definitionis [...] cur eum non retinuit, cur alio potius loquendi modo, quam vulgato et communi usus fuit? Responsorum pete ex Logicae nostrae part. 2 quaest. 134. Voluit potius a notione prima naturae atque ideae, quam a notione secundae definitionis argumentum ducere; [...] cartesiana maior clarius exponit quam definitionis canon [...]. Hae et similes rationes fuerunt Cartesio, cur non uteretur topico isto canone²⁸.

The introduction of a logic guided by the criterion of clarity and distinctness supersedes the use of dialectic canons in philosophy. Indeed, in his *Logica vetus et nova* only the syllogistic theory of Aristotle's *Analytica* is accepted, whereas the dialectics of the *Topica* is not considered as being admitted by Descartes²⁹. This acceptance is ultimately allowed by the propositional nature of ideas, which enables the inclusion of a proceeding based on the intuition of clear and distinct ideas into a demonstrative, syllogistic system. The use of the notion of *thema complexum*, in fact, is what allows such insertions of ideas into syllogisms. Since *themata* or ideas have a propositional nature, they can be combined in demonstrations. Descartes' third proof, indeed, is presented in a syllogistic form by Clauberg³⁰.

The demonstrations of the existence of God open two ways to ensure our knowledge. First of all, Clauberg supports an “ontological” criterion of

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²⁹ It is to be noted, however, that Clauberg himself refers to Aristotle's *Topica* in order to show the premises of Descartes' first proof: *supra*, n. 61.
³⁰ «Sic proponi potest: quod continetur in idea seu conceptu, id ipsum de ea verum est. Atqui existentia necessaria continetur in idea seu conceptu Dei, seu, necessitas existendi in Dei idea continetur. Ergo verum est Deum necessario existit. Maior probatur inductione [...]», CLAUBERG 1691, *De cognitione Dei et nostri*, 647.
truth, according to which an idea is more true insofar as it represents something more real than other beings, such as God is. If truth is a matter of correspondence between model and imitation, or between thing and idea, it is still maintained by Clauberg that truth is first of all in the model and by consequence in its ectype. *Veritas rei*, thus, is the condition of correspondence truth\(^81\). Since it contains more perfection, the idea of God is the most true: moreover, the ideas of eternal essences are intrinsically more true than all the others. A traditional point that has its counterpart in Clauberg's theory of transcendentals, which is maintained by him in a Cartesian context\(^82\). The ultimate argument in the foundation of philosophy, however, is that of *veracitas Dei*, confirming the validity of Descartes' criterion of truth (or evidence in perception) and to be defined as *veritas ethica*:

> quoniam philosophaturus ante omnia certam habere debet hanc regulam: quicquid clare et distincte percipio, verum est. Haec autem e veracitate Dei eruitur et a priori demonstratur in metaphysica, licet etiam propriae mentis attendentis conscientiam testem suae certitudinis habeat. [...] Quid intelligitur per Dei veracitatem? Resp. illa quae in scholis veritas ethica dicitur, et a logica nec non metaphysica et physica veritate distinguishitur. Consistit autem in dictis, factis, promissis, signis aliis\(^83\).

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81 In fact, *veritas rei* is the very correspondence of something with its own idea or definition: «quam ad rem observa, quod alii veritatem rei censent consistere in conformitate eiusdem cum sua idea, alii in convenientia cum sua definitione, ubi res eadem diversis tantum modis effertur», *ibid.*, 648.

82 «Per se esse manifestissimum, quod idea Dei mihi exhibeat omnem realitatem, est enim idea Dei, hoc est, entis perfectissimi sive realissimi [...] exhibitio sive repreaesentatio. […] Et hinc sequitur, ideam Dei esse maxime vera, id est, maioris perfectionis, realitatis, veritatis, bonitatis repraesentatrixem, quam ulla alia in mente nostra idea, cum nulla alia omnimodam nobis perfectionem repraesentet. [...] Habent etiam realitatem aliae aliis maiorem: veritas enim, realitas, entitas, perfectio hoc loco idem revera sunt», *ibid.*, 616.

This statement of God's truthfulness is to be related to the other proof of divine veracity: as *sumnum ens*, God is the most true being\textsuperscript{84} and cannot deceive us. The ontological *veritas* of God leads to His *veracitas*. That is, the divine attribute of perfection – or His very reality, goodness and unity – is the ultimate guarantee of the truth of our judgements. God is regarded as the most perfect being and as the first cause of things, of truth (as He is truth itself) and therefore as ethically trustworthy: these points are the very ground of every science.

A further point is to be highlighted on Clauberg's *Exercitationes*. Even if primarily intended to ground physics, they are about topics belonging also to the other parts of philosophy. They focus on a broader scope of subjects: some considerations concern the demonstration of the immortality of the soul\textsuperscript{85}, the ethical problems related to Descartes' theory of passions (focusing mainly on wonder)\textsuperscript{86} as well as the topic of body-mind relation studied in *Coniunctio*.\textsuperscript{87} His *Exercitationes* are functional, ultimately, to the development of a Cartesian Scholastic, or a comprehensive system designed to replace the whole philosophical *curriculum* as the foundation of superior studies. Moreover, his *Exercitationes* reveal some intersections with the last part of philosophy. According to him, rational theology has to be developed as the

\textsuperscript{84}This is suggested by Clauberg in proving the ethical truthfulness of God through a quotation from Descartes' *Secundae responsiones*: «probatur [...] a summi entis et nonentis oppositione. Resp. 2. p. 76. *Qui est summum ens, non potest non esse etiam summum bonum et verum, atque idcirco repugnat, ut quid ab eo sit quod positive tendat in falsum*, ibid., 652. See AT VII, 144.
\textsuperscript{85}CLAUBERG 1691, *De cognitione Dei et nostri*, 675-684.
\textsuperscript{86}Ibid., 722-735.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., 752-755.
concluding part of the system:

nam initio philosophiae non ulterius agitur de Deo, quam quatenus eius cognitio ad iacienda omnis scientiae humanae fundamenta desideratur. Sed in fine absoluta de Deo tractatio instituitur, omniaque eius attributa, quae ex naturae lumine cognosci queunt, expenduntur, quod initio necessarium non erat, quoniam non omnia Dei attributa se habent ut principia rerum creatarum, et quae huiusmodi relationem possunt recipere, non tamen absolute ideo aut plenius, quam originis illa relatio postulat, opus est explicare\textsuperscript{88}.

Clauberg will not develop such a complete rational theology. In fact, he developed only a Cartesian ontology, or a branch of philosophy that replaces the old discipline μετά τα φυσικά. Such a discipline finds its systematization in his ontosophia, or the attempt to develop a theory of being in a Cartesian context. Ontosophia is the crown of the system, or a metaphysics that can only be developed after the other disciplines have been established. It can gain the original place of metaphysics and, insofar as it is not designed to ground science, it can deal with mere concepts besides the actual features of substances. It is a replacement, thus, of the traditional metaphysica, and can be legitimately developed after physics. However, first philosophy, logic and ontosophia are ultimately interconnected.

3. The role of ontosophia in the philosophy of Clauberg

Clauberg’s metaphysics is to be evaluated in the light of the end of his

\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 596. See Savini 2011, 184-185.
system. That is, the study of *ens quaternus ens*, or a metaphysics that goes beyond Descartes' foundation of philosophy: besides being a *philosophia prima*, it is also a *philosophia universalis, ontosophia*, or the discipline concerning all the attributes of being, no matter if they are only our modes of thinking. In traditional terms, the *metaphysica generalis*89. In Clauberg's philosophy, it comes after first philosophy: however, like logic, it has some intersections with foundational theory. An examination of it can highlight the whole structure of Clauberg's system.

*Ontosophia* had three main editions90. Whereas the 1647 version precedes Clauberg's adoption of Cartesianism, the other editions contain Cartesian notions and omit some parts of the first edition (*Prolegomena, Didactica* and *Diacritica*), retaining only *Primae philosophiae elementa*91. Cartesian insertions can be noticed, for instance, in the definition of being as extended or immaterial substance, or in the note on the distinction between first philosophy, based on *cogito*, and *ontosophia*, based on the non-contradiction principle92. Even if Clauberg rejects Aristotle's ten categories as the principles of being, he still finds in the Scholastic tradition those concepts allowing the development of a science of being. He proposes, in all the editions of *Ontosophia*, a threefold distinction of the meaning of “*ens*”: *intelligibilis, realis* and *res*. His 1664 *Ontosophia* is mainly devoted to the properties of *ens* in the third meaning. However, as *philosophia prima* begins

89 On the early history of ontology, see FERRATER MORA 1963, and SAVINI 2011, 25-33. On the distinction of general and special metaphysics in the late Scholastic tradition, see COURTINE 1985.
90 CLAUBERG 1647; CLAUBERG 1660; CLAUBERG 1664(2).
92 CLAUBERG 1691, *Metaphysica de ente*, 283, 286 (references are to the third edition).
with the consideration of the mind, *ontosophia* begins with that of intelligible being. *Ens*, in this meaning, cannot be opposed to anything: indeed, if intelligible being is opposed to a non-intelligible entity, this, in turn, will become intelligible. The second meaning is *aliquid*, or whatever can have a formal being. *Aliquid*, thus, can be opposed to *non ens* as whatever has no formal being. *Non ens* can be, therefore, a sort of *ens* according to the first meaning: even if in this case it is only an *ens rationis*. The third meaning of *ens* is a sub-class of the second one: it is substance as opposed to modes.

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94 «Non posse quicquam opponi enti sive intelligibili, de quo in praesentia agimus, ne per mentis quidem fictionem. Nam si quid proprie ei opponi posset, id utique foret non ens sive non intelligible. At eo ipso quo non ens sive non intelligibile opponimus, hoc intelligimus, quia per intellectum ista fit oppositio. Ergo quod non intelligibile tunc dicitur in oratione, fit intelligibile in ratione, unde rationis ens nominatur», *CLAUBERG* 1691, *Metaphysica de ente*, 283-284.

95 «Aliquid igitur est, quod non tantum mente cogitatur vel cogitari potest, sed alio praeterea modo est aut certe esse potest: sive in mente, ut omnes cogitationes nostrae, sive in mundo», *ibid.*, 285.

96 «Nihilum, quod alicui generatim opponitur […] non ens appellatum, est quicquid nullum esse reale habet, hinc dicitur aliquid negativum et sua natura, hoc est, cum nulla accedit ficio, tantum negative, id est, per remotionem et absentiam entis animo concipitur, et negativo solum nomine dignum est»*, *ibid.*, 286.

97 «Haec dicta sunt de nihilo sive non ente, quod enti in secunda significacione accepto contradictorie vel privative opponitur. Hoc vero non obstat, quo minus ipsum quoque nihilum in prima et generalissima significacione ens dici queat. Nempe omnis privatio et negatio, dum rationis nostrae obiectum est, utcunque proprium, hoc est, negativum tantum, de ea conceptum ratio formet, ens rationis dici potest», *ibid.*, 288-289. *Entia rationis*, in fact, must be distinguished: as the fiction of a golden mountain does not imply contradiction, whereas that of square circle does (see *ibid.*, 289).

98 «Ens in significacione tertia acceptum proprissimé quoque res dicitur […]. Vulgo quidem substantia, id est, rei quae ita existit, ut aliquo ad existendum subjecto non indigeat, opponitur accidens, quod in alio existit, tanquam in subjecto; sive, cuius esse est inesse. At non omnia, quae in substantia considerantur, accidentia […] dici debent; cum plurima sint entis attributa essentialia et inseparabilia, a quibus distinguuntur accidentalia […]. Et haec proprie modi appellantur, nempe modi rerum ipsarum, a
However, “ens” in third signification does not only mean mind and extension: it can also mean modes modified by other modes: that is, *modi mediati* and *immediati*. Therefore, more than substances in a strict sense, *res* are substances or modes (*sensu cartesiano*) conceived as subjects of other modes. Rather than to Cartesian real substances, Clauberg seems to refer to the notions of *subiectum* and *adiunctum* as described by Franco Burgersdijk, which Clauberg himself counts among the relative attributes of being in his *Logica contracta* and in *Ontosophia*. This categorization can be explained by recalling the proper place of Clauberg’s *Ontosophia* in the system: its concepts are not designed to be employed in other disciplines but are the result of a speculation on being in its most abstract meanings. Such meanings, therefore, are not regarded as matching the actual features of extended and spiritual substances.

In his *Exercitationes*, moreover, Clauberg admits that even if it is possible to find some attributes common to God and creatures, this does...
not justify the scientific status of ontosophia. In other words, even if ontosophia is the crown of his system, it is not grounded on first philosophy, since it does not deal with clear and distinct concepts:

hactenus dicta eo faciunt, ut rerum omnium similitudo et convenientia quaedam agnoscatur: at si quis putet me existimare, illis ipsis satis esse probatum tradendum esse ontosophiam seu universalem [...] scientiam, is a mente mea aberrat. [...] Nam si conceptus illi quos habere potest mens nostra, a Deo et creatura quodammodo abstracti et utriusque conceptui communes, non sint satis clari et distincti, sed confusi nimir, et quae mentem veritatis studiosam non satis afficiant, multo minus impleant, dubitari sane cum ratione poterit, an pertineant ad scientiam, utpote quae objectum requirit quod clare distincteque percipiatur 103.

Clauberg, however, sets aside the deeper consequences of Descartes' metaphysics for the theory of being. His Ontosophia has a heterogeneous composition, according to which a Cartesian distinction of being in extended and spiritual substance104 is followed by a survey of its attributes given in traditional terms. As ens is first of all a concept or a second notion, ontosophia is first of all a study of concepts or modi considerandi, i.e., beings of reason. However, because it has not a foundational role with respect to those sciences dealing with objects different from thoughts themselves, according to Clauberg it is still possible to pursue it as a branch of philosophy, or the “science” dealing only with abstract concepts. An emphasis on attributes of

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103 Ibid., 703.
104 «Primaria igitur entis realis divisio est illa sine dubio, quae maxime opposita et contraria attributa (intellige positiva) in rebus divisis menti nostrae consideranda exhibet. Nulla autem realia attributa magis opponi sibi queant, quam ex una parte longum, latum et profundum esse [...] ; ex altera parte intelligere, velle, nolle et c.», CLAUBERG 1691, Metaphysica de ente, 291.
being reduced to mere concepts, *modi considerandi* or beings of reason can be found in different places of the treatise. Discussing real, modal and rational distinctions and the notions of identity and difference, Clauberg admits that
tota haec disputatio de eodem ac diverso potius ad modum cogitandi et loquendi pertinet, quam ad res ipsas in se spectatas. Quod nihil hic novi videri debet, cum similis aliorum generalium entis attributorum sit ratio\(^{105}\).

Moreover, in the dedicatory letter he states that he is speaking only about our ways of considering things, without clarifying, however, to what extent our abstraction of their attributes is legitimate\(^{106}\). Despite these remarks, there is a foundational reason for treating transcendentals as real attributes, in Clauberg’s perspective. That is, grounding truth on God as the utmost being, whose archetypes are more real, true and good than any other created thing.

The definition of God as ethically veracious, provided on the ground of divine perfection and goodness\(^ {107}\), is laid down in the light of the doctrine of transcendentals. The ontological proof of the existence of God has its counterpart in the consideration of being as perfect, true and good. Our thoughts, moreover, are true insofar as they imitate divine archetypes. The correspondence truth is based on the ontological truth, since our ideas of things are more true to the extent that they imitate the models present in the


\(^{106}\) «Generalissimos istos conceptus et terminos, uti vocant, ad certum prorsus numerum atque ordinem reduci non posse experiendo didici. Adeo transcendentia illa non solum connexa, verum etiam innexa sibi sunt. Quin imo nihil aliud sunt, quam diversi de re eadem cogitandi modi, qui, animo iam hac iam illuc se convertente, mille formis variari solent et possunt. Id quod hac editione tertia vel inprimis demonstrare studui», *ibid.*, *Lectori salutem*, 279 (unnumbered).

\(^{107}\) *Supra*, n. 83-84.
Clauberg’s *Ontosophia* reveals, in sum, a problem intrinsic to Cartesianism: that of the adherence to classical metaphysics within a philosophy based on the *cogito*. A tension, therefore, is to be noticed in his metaphysics: between *philosophia prima* and *ontosophia*. Indeed, his metaphysics implies an overestimation of the ontological value of the attributes of being, accordingly of a foundation of truth on a theory deploying the notions of transcendentals. At the same time, it is stated that they are mere ways of considering substances. In any case, insofar as *unum*, *verum* and *bonum* are deemed as actual attributes of things, *ontosophia* seems to have a foundational value, with respect to the other parts of philosophy, more consistent than that admitted by Clauberg himself.

In conclusion, some words are to be devoted to the relations between logic, first philosophy and *ontosophia*, or the study of being. In the first edition of his *Ontosophia* Clauberg states that logic has a priority in a didactic order, as it teaches how to use the intellect, whereas metaphysics (still identified with *ontosophia*) comes first in the natural order of the sciences, since it deals with the first genres of things. In the following editions of Clauberg’s *Ontosophia*, and along with the development of his more mature views, the plan of the disciplines changes. As a Cartesian *philosophia prima* is introduced, logic and *ontosophia* come after it. Logic is based on the evidence

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108 *Supra*, nn. 81-82.
109 This topic is well considered in Savini 2011, 44-69 (*Le rôle de la logique dans l’instauration de la métaphysique, La configuration du rapport entre logique et ontosophia dans la fondation de la métaphysique*) and 184-193 (*Philosophie première et ontologie*).
110 Clauberg 1647, 33-34; see Savini 2011, 64-65;
criterion prescribed by the method. It maintains, however, its instrumental role\textsuperscript{111}: it teaches how to organize and interpret speech in the light of an adequate formation of concepts. Such a logic is implied by Descartes' metaphysics because it makes explicit the rules of reasoning underlying that part of philosophy\textsuperscript{112}. Moreover, it shares with first philosophy its starting point, namely, doubt. If first philosophy discovers the first notions and truths, logic teaches its proper method. It is, somehow, a corollary discipline of first philosophy. The natural order of disciplines outlined by Clauberg prescribes starting with first philosophy and to end, with the help of logic, in \textit{ontosophia}, after all the other disciplines have been established: physics (the trunk of philosophy, also embodying foundational arguments), moral philosophy, medicine, politics, law, mechanics. However, their development is actually interconnected, since metaphysical considerations are implied both by logic and ontology.

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\textsuperscript{111} CLAUBERG 1691, \textit{De cognitione Dei et nostri}, 592.
\textsuperscript{112} This is stated in Clauberg's \textit{Exercitationes de cognitione Dei et nostri}: «nuspiam apertius Cartesius est logicus, quam in libello de Passionibus animae; sed maxime etiam logicus est, ubi artem celat, ut in Meditationibus metaphysicis. Confer. Log. II. 14. […] Ad recte \textit{definiendum} opus esse praemittere divisiones, sancit Logica I. 103. Id quod videmus factum esse ab auctore», \textit{ibid.}, 723. See SAVINI 2004, 378-379.
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