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Persons: Identification and Freedom

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INTRODUCTION

Harry Frankfurt's paper "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person"[1] has quite rightly had an enormous influence on discussions of freedom of the will. His understanding of the will as hierarchical has turned out to be powerful and deep; it has opened up new ways of thinking about old problems in fields as disparate as economics and philosophical theology.[2] And so people sometimes forget that the subject of that paper was really appropriately indicated by the paper's title: "Freedom of the Will and the *Concept of a Person*." Frankfurt's thesis in that paper is that the hierarchical structure of the will not only is an essential feature of the will's freedom but is also the core of the concept of a person. So, for example, he says, "It is my view that one essential difference between persons and other creatures is to be found in the structure of a person's will";[3] "it is having second-order volitions . . . that I regard as essential to being a person."[4] And Frankfurt distinguishes human persons from wantons (in his sense of 'wanton') in this way: "the essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires."[5]

To illustrate his thesis about persons, Frankfurt gives an example of two drug addicts. Each has a powerful desire for the drug to which he is addicted. One addict, however, hates his addiction and struggles against it, though he always fails in the struggle. He is an unwilling addict. Frankfurt says, "[He] has conflicting first-order desires; he wants to take the drug, and he also wants to refrain from taking it."[6] But he has a second-order volition as well: "He is not a neutral with regard to the conflict" between his conflicting first-order desires.[7] "It is the . . . desire [to refrain from taking the drug] that he wants to constitute his will."[8] This addict counts as a person. The other addict doesn't care what his will is. Even if he suffers a conflict among his first-order desires with respect to taking the drug, he doesn't have a preference about which of the conflicting desires wins. And it is just for this reason, on Frankfurt's view, that this addict is a wanton and not a person.

This account of the nature of a person, which identifies a person in terms of a hierarchical set of volitions, is powerful and intriguing, but it also poses serious (and by now familiar) problems.

PROBLEMS WITH FRANKFURT'S ACCOUNT

First, there is the problem of infinite regress. If a person can have second-order volitions, then why not third-order or fourth-order volitions? If a person can will to have a will to do *A*, then presumably a person can also have a will to have a will to have a will to do *A*. What is there that could stop this regress of volitions? More importantly, if we suppose that a human being is a person in virtue of his having second-order desires, why not suppose that a human being's personhood also depends crucially on his having third-order desires or fourth-order desires, and so on?

In addition, there is what has come to be called "the problem of authority." What is there about second-order desires, or any higher-order desires, that makes them authoritative for a person? Why should one set of desires be more authoritative than any other? Why suppose that it is constitutive of the nature of a person to have desires about desires? Gary Watson puts the point this way: "Since second-order volitions are themselves simply desires, to add them to the context of conflict is just to increase the number of contenders; it is not to give a special place to any of those [desires] in contention."[9]

Initially, Frankfurt responded to the problem of authority by claiming that an agent identifies with his second-order desires. When an agent has certain first-order volitions just because he has second-order volitions for those first-order volitions, then the agent has the will he himself wants to have. An agent who "has no preference concerning which of his first-order desires is to be his will" is thereby prevented "from identifying himself in a sufficiently decisive way with *any* of his conflicting first-order desires," and this "destroys him as a person. . . ."[10] But why should we think that a person is to be identified with his second-order desires? Why shouldn't the wanton, for example, be identified with whichever of his conflicting desires he acts on or, for that matter, with the whole set of his conflicting desires?

Here we can also see the connection between the problem of infinite regress and the problem of authority. If an agent is a wanton with regard to his first-order desires unless he has second-order desires with which he identifies, why shouldn't we suppose that he is a wanton with respect to his second-order desires unless he has third-order desires with which he identifies? But then we would also need fourth-order desires to ward off wantonness with regard to third-order desires, and so on.

In one sense, then, the problem of authority and the problem of infinite regress are two sides of the same problem: How are we to understand the notion of a person's identification? It is because a person identifies himself with a desire for a first-order desire that these second-order volitions are supposed to be the agent's own and constitutive of the nature of that person. That is why second-order volitions, with which the agent identifies, are authoritative and also stop any infinite regress. But what is identification in this sense, and why does it make some desires peculiarly an agent's own?

FRANKFURT'S SOLUTIONS

Frankfurt himself has explained his notion of identification in different ways.

A person, he says, can "identify himself *decisively* with one of his first-order desires," so that the commitment of the person to that desire "'resounds' throughout the potentially endless array of higher orders [of desires]."[11] This explains why the second-order desires are authoritative and it cuts off the regress: the person commits himself decisively, and his decisive commitment resounds through levels of desire. But the notion of resounding is metaphorical and vague, and it's hard to see why the agent should be taken to be decisively committed just to those desires for which he has second-order volitions. Why isn't the wanton addict just as decisively committed to those desires by which he is moved when he acts on his desire for the drug?

In a later paper, Frankfurt tries to refine the notion of an agent's identification. He distinguishes between desires with which an agent identifies and those desires which are "*external* to the volitional complex with which the person identifies and by which he wants his behavior to be determined."[12] Here the idea is that something can be internal or external to an agent (or to the agent's "volitional structure") and that what the agent is to be identified with is the internal. So, Frankfurt says, a

> person in making a decision by which he identifies with a desire *constitutes* himself. The pertinent desire is no longer in any way external to him. It is not a desire that he "has" merely as a subject in whose history it happens to occur. . . . Through his action in deciding, he is responsible for the fact that the desire has become his own in a way in which it was not unequivocally his own before.[13]

In another paper, he talks about some psychic forces as exogenous to an agent, and he says of such forces, "the person is not identified with them and they are, in that sense, external to his will."[14]

But this distinction between what is internal and what is external to an agent doesn't get us very far. Why aren't the desires that the unwilling addict repudiates just as internal to him, just as much really a part of his volitional structure, as the higher-order desires with which he is said to identify? It is clear, as Frankfurt himself recognizes, that any of an agent's desires are in some sense internal to that agent. So what is the special sense of 'internal' according to which only an agent's second-order volitions and the first-order desires subsumed under them are internal to him?

In recent papers, Frankfurt has explained the distinction between what is external to an agent and what is internal in this special sense in terms of yet another distinction—between being passive and being active with regard to one's desires. In "The Faintest Passion," Frankfurt says of the desires with which an agent has identified himself, "they are . . . wholly internal to a person's will rather than alien to him; that is, he is not passive with respect to them."[15] Elsewhere he says, "insofar as a person's will is affected by considerations that are external to it, the person is being acted upon. To that extent, he is passive. The person is active, on the other hand, insofar as his will determines itself."[16]

In other work, Frankfurt construes the notion of caring on the basis of the same distinction. A wanton is an agent who doesn't care about his will, and a person is an agent who does, so that a person can also be defined in terms of a particular kind of caring. In some places, Frankfurt explicitly equates identification with caring: "[A person] *identifies* himself with what he cares about."[17] But to care about something, for Frankfurt, is to be active. So, for example, he says, "with respect to those things whose importance to . . . [a person] derives from the fact that he cares about them, the person is necessarily active." If a person does not care about something which in fact really is important to him, then "the person is passive with respect to the fact that the object is important to him."[18] In "The Importance of What We Care About," he says, "Caring . . . presupposes both agency and self-consciousness. It is a matter of being active in a certain way. . . ."[19]

On Frankfurt's view, then, what makes someone a person, as distinct from a wanton, is that she is active rather than passive with respect to her will. What makes her a *free* person is that activity on her part is efficacious in producing a certain set of first-order volitions—namely, those she cares to have, those that are internal to her volitional structure, those to which she decisively commits herself, and those with which she identifies.

ACTIVITY AND LOVE

But is the distinction between being active and being passive really enough to explain the difference between persons and wantons? Is being efficaciously active with respect to one's will really the core of what it is to be free?

Consider, for example, the exercise of human cognitive capacities. Part of what we suppose makes some creature a person is that she senses things and knows things. But to sense is to be passive; someone who senses something is receptive of sensory information. Similarly, to know something is to be affected by something—some truth—of which one is aware.[20] A creature which was only active and in no way passive would seem to be incapable of cognition. So, since being capable of cognition is essential to being a person, it seems as if a crucial element of being a person includes being passive in certain ways.

Or consider human experiences. As Frankfurt points out, there are some experiences which are to be shunned as destructive of personhood. One of his standard examples is prolonged boredom.[21] On the other hand, there are experiences which people prize as enhancing personhood; the capacity which makes these possible would seem to be part of personhood. Sublime aesthetic experiences are examples of experiences of this sort; so are powerful religious experiences. But these seem to have passivity inescapably in them. Edmund Burke says, "The passion caused by the great and sublime in *nature*, when those causes operate most powerfully, is Astonishment; and astonishment is that state of the soul, in which all its motions are suspended. . . ."[22] Talking of her mystical experiences, Teresa of Avila says that in the highest, richest sort of prayer "all the faculties fail and they are so suspended that in no way . . . does one think they are working."[23] After such prayer, she goes on to say, the soul is so moved that it is almost consumed with joy.[24]

These are unusual phenomena, however, and therefore no doubt controversial. So consider just love, which Frankfurt himself points to as particularly characteristic of persons.[25] Frankfurt describes love in this way:

> Loving of any variety implies conduct that is designed to be beneficial to the beloved object. In active love, the lover values this activity for its own sake instead of for the sake of advantages that he himself may ultimately derive from it. His primary goal is not to receive benefits but to provide them. He is motivated by

> an interest in serving the interests and ends of his beloved rather than by an interest in serving his own.[26]

And he goes on to say,

> In active love, the lover cares selflessly about his beloved. It is important to him for its own sake that the object of his love flourish; he is disinterestedly devoted to its interests and ends. Now this is not the only essential constitutive feature of active love. Another of its defining characteristics is that the unconditional importance to the lover of what he loves is not a voluntary matter.[27]

Here Frankfurt's determination to anchor personhood in activity yields an unconvincing characterization of love: a selflessly active devotion to the interests of some person (or cause or object). Such a state of mind and heart, even if it is somehow involuntary (as Frankfurt says it must be), doesn't seem to be sufficient for love, at least love for persons. On this description of love, love is compatible with indifference on the active person's part as to whether he has any personal relationship with the object of his devotion, as long as the person on whom he lavishes his selfless activity flourishes.

So, for example, a person might sign up to sponsor a child under the aegis of some organization such as CARE, and it might then become very important to the sponsor that her child flourish. In fact, she might find it utterly unthinkable that she drop her sponsorship of that child; her commitment to him might come to have a compelling hold on her, so that the importance to her of her sponsorship is no longer a voluntary matter for her. Furthermore, she might selflessly devote a significant portion of her time to activities dedicated to the interest of the child. And yet the sponsor might be indifferent as to whether she herself has any contact with the child. She might not care at all whether she ever gets to know him personally, as long as his life goes well. In these circumstances, although the sponsor is caring and benevolent towards the child, it hardly seems right to say that she loves him.

And so Frankfurt's description of love, as involuntarily important selfless activity promoting the interests of the beloved, doesn't capture the core of what we generally suppose love to be.

As part of his account of love, Aquinas says that love is the force which drives us to union,[28] and, at least as regards love between persons, this claim about love captures what seems missing in Frankfurt's account. To be united with another person, however, requires passivity as well as activity. Frankfurt is no doubt right in supposing that a lover has first-order volitions for the flourishing of the beloved and second-order volitions for those first-order volitions. But to be active on behalf of his beloved is only part of what his love for her consists in. The desire to be the recipient of her loving activity is the other part. A lover also wants his beloved to desire him; he wants to receive as well as to give.

In Dostoevsky's *The Possessed*, both Shatov and Kirilov are active on behalf of Shatov's wife, Mary. It isn't a voluntary matter for either man that she is important to him, and both of them engage in selfless activity to promote her well-being. But only Shatov wants to be the recipient of Mary's love. He wants to be in her presence, to spend time with her, to open himself up to her, because *her* activity with regard to *him* is also important to him. He wants union with her and not just her flourishing. Kirilov, on the other hand, doesn't care if he ever even sees her as long as she is well. The desire to receive as well as to give, to be passive as well as active, is what distinguishes Shatov's love from Kirilov's benevolent compassion.

Without a complicated interweaving of reciprocal activity and passivity, then, love would be incomplete at best.[29] Selfless activity on someone's behalf, without that person's loving activity in return, without even desire for the relevant kind of passivity, is benevolence, but it isn't love.

So Frankfurt is right in thinking that there must be some explanation of his notion of the identification of a person, but he is wrong to think that the notion can be explicated, ultimately, in terms of a person's activity. Whatever it is for an agent to identify with something, to decisively commit to it, to make it internal to herself, to care about it, can't be parsed simply in terms of activity. How, then, is it to be explained?

A WAY AROUND THE PROBLEM: FISCHER'S *THE METAPHYSICS OF FREE WILL*

In *The Metaphysics of Free Will*, John Martin Fischer sets out to construct a theory of moral responsibility which does not rely on concepts of personhood or a person's identification with some of her volitions.[30] In his view, what he calls 'mesh theories', such as Frankfurt's, are irremediably flawed, and he attempts to construct a theory of responsibility which side-steps Frankfurt's approach.

Frankfurt's work has convinced many philosophers that the ability to do otherwise is not necessary for either freedom of will or moral responsibility.[31] Building on these results, Fischer argues that it is necessary to make a distinction between different kinds of control that an agent may have over her action. An agent who has the ability to do otherwise has regulative control over her action. But an agent who does not have regulative control over her action may nonetheless have what Fischer calls 'guidance control', and guidance control is both necessary and sufficient for moral responsibility, on Fischer's view.

Fischer defines guidance control in this way: "an agent exhibits guidance control of an action insofar as the mechanism that actually issues in the action

is reasons-responsive."[32] Fischer defines two different kinds of reasons-responsiveness—strong and weak. The mechanism that issues in action is weakly reasons-responsive when there is "some possible world in which there is a sufficient reason to do otherwise, the agent's actual mechanism operates, and the agent does otherwise."[33] Weak reasons-responsiveness is all that is needed for guidance control, according to Fischer. Since he also thinks that guidance control is all that is needed for moral responsibility, he concludes that "weak reasons-responsiveness is *all* that is required for the sort of control involved in moral responsibility. That is, . . . weak reasons-responsiveness is *sufficient* for guidance control."[34]

But this claim is mistaken. At least one other condition needs to be fulfilled for moral responsibility, and it is the condition that Frankfurt has been trying to explicate with his analysis of his notion of identification. To see what is missing in Fischer's account, consider Robert Heinlein's *The Puppetmasters*.

In the story, an alien race of intelligent creatures wants to conquer the Earth. Part of the alien plan for invasion includes a covert operation in which individual aliens take over particular human beings without being detected. When an alien "master" takes over a human being, the human being (say, Sam) has within himself not only his own consciousness but the master's as well. The master can control Sam's consciousness; he can make Sam's mind blank, he can suppress or even eradicate some affect of Sam's, or he can introduce thoughts and desires into Sam's consciousness. Most of the time, however, the master leaves Sam's consciousness alone but simply takes it off-line. That is, Sam's consciousness runs pretty much as always, but it has no effect on Sam's behavior; Sam's behavior is produced by the master's consciousness. The master doesn't need to control Sam's behavior in this direct way, though; he sometimes controls Sam's behavior indirectly, by controlling Sam's thoughts and desires and then letting Sam's consciousness produce Sam's behavior.

Since it is crucial to the alien plan that their taking over human beings be undetected in the early stages of the invasion, they are careful to make the behavior of people like Sam correspond to the behavior Sam would normally have engaged in had he not been infected with the alien. So when, under the control of the alien, Sam does *A*, it is also true that if there had been reason sufficient for Sam in his uninfected state to do not-*A*, the alien would have brought it about that Sam in his infected state did not-*A*.

In this case, then, there is a possible world in which there is sufficient reason for Sam to do otherwise, and in that world Sam does otherwise. Furthermore, although Fischer doesn't want to spell out exactly what the identity conditions for mechanisms are, we don't need to consider them for this example. The mechanism operative in the possible world at issue here is straightforwardly the same as the mechanism operative in the actual sequence of events: when the alien takes Sam's consciousness off-line, it is just the "deliberative mechanism" (as Fischer sometimes puts it)[35] or the "faculty of practical reasoning"[36] of the alien.

So although Sam is entirely manipulated by the alien, he meets Fischer's conditions for operating on a weakly reasons-responsive mechanism. It is true of Sam when he does *A* under the control of the master that "the mechanism that actually issues in the action is reasons-responsive."[37] And yet, although Sam's doing *A* is weakly reasons-responsive in this way, Sam is clearly not morally responsible for what he does. In fact, Fischer takes cases of manipulation of this sort to be paradigm cases in which an agent is *not* morally responsible.

What Fischer needs, then, is some way of specifying that the weakly reasons-responsive mechanism on which an agent operates *belongs to that agent*. It isn't enough for moral responsibility that an agent does what he does under the guidance of a weakly reasons-responsive mechanism. The mechanism has to be the agent's own. In fact, it has to be the agent's own in some suitably strong sense. It wouldn't do just to stipulate that the mechanism is implemented in Sam's brain, for example, since it is perfectly possible that the alien operates by the manipulation of Sam's brain.

The problem is made more difficult for Fischer because he sees no incompatibility between causal determinism and moral responsibility.[38] So he can't insist that what makes a reasons-responsive mechanism an agent's own is that nothing else causally determines its states. On the contrary, since he accepts causal determinism, he supposes that any reasons-responsive mechanism is causally determined to be in whatever state it is by something outside the agent who is acting on that mechanism. How, then, can he give a principled and plausible distinction between cases in which an agent is acting on a reasons-responsive mechanism which is his own and cases in which the reasons-responsive mechanism on which the agent acts belongs to someone else? Or, to put the same point a different way, it is hard to see on what basis Fischer takes manipulated behavior, such as Sam's doing *A*, to be a paradigm of behavior for which an agent is not morally responsible. If Sam is morally responsible for what he does when the states of the reasons-responsive mechanism at issue are causally determined to be what they are by something outside Sam, what difference could it make to our assessment of *Sam himself* whether the causal factors determining those states of his mind are animate or inanimate, intelligent or blind?

AN ATTEMPT TO SOLVE THE PROBLEM BY FISCHER AND RAVIZZA

In a forthcoming book, *Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility*,[39] Fischer and Mark Ravizza try to remedy the problem with Fischer's notion of guidance control in *The Metaphysics of Free Will*. On the view of Fischer and Ravizza in the forthcoming book, guidance control is a matter of an agent's acting on his own moderately reasons-responsive mechanism. The change from weak reasons-responsiveness to moderate reasons-responsiveness is not so interesting from my point of view, since Sam in my example can in fact be construed as acting even on a strong reasons-responsive mechanism.[40] What is of interest, however, is the recognition of the importance of stipulating that the mechanism be the agent's own.

Fischer and Ravizza give a detailed discussion of what it is for a mechanism to be an agent's own. Essentially, they maintain that an agent is acting on a mechanism that is his own when the agent's history includes the agent's taking responsibility for that mechanism by taking responsibility for the actions which stem from it; "the process by which an agent takes responsibility for the springs of his action makes them *his own*."[41] Taking responsibility with regard to a mechanism, on their view, has three components. The agent "must see himself as the source of his behavior"[42] in acting on that mechanism; he "must accept that he is a fair target of the reactive attitudes" of others;[43] and these beliefs about himself must "be grounded in his *evidence* for these beliefs."[44] An individual who has met these conditions with regard to the mechanism on which he acts is, on their view, acting on a mechanism which is his own.

Fischer and Ravizza are at pains to consider whether there could be an agent who lacked such attitudes but was still morally responsible for his acts, and they argue that there could not be such an agent. What the Heinlein story suggests, however, is an equally troublesome possibility, namely, that there could be an agent who is acting on a moderately reasons-responsive mechanism and has the relevant attitudes about that mechanism but who is nonetheless not responsible for his acts.[45]

In Heinlein's story, Sam's practical reason is manipulated by the alien but in such a way as to be reasons-responsive, as I explained above. Suppose that we now rewrite the story a little, with Fischer and Ravizza's new account of moral responsibility in mind. Let it be the case that, after the alien has infected Sam and before he starts to manipulate Sam's reason, the alien has what is, in effect, a conversation with Sam. The alien may have no purpose for this conversation other than to amuse himself. But suppose that, for amusement or some other purpose, the alien wants to convince Sam that when Sam acts under the control of the alien, Sam is as much an agent and as suitable a candidate for the reactive attitudes of others as he ever was in his uninfected state.

The alien might, for example, put forward arguments for compatibilism which Sam finds extremely plausible. In consequence, Sam might come to believe that all the states of his reason are causally determined by factors outside himself and that, nonetheless, when he acts on his reason, determined in this way, he is incontrovertibly an agent and that it is perfectly appropriate for others to maintain the reactive attitudes towards him. Next, the alien might argue to this effect: It can make no difference to our assessment of a person *S* whether the external factors determining the states of *S*'s reason are sentient or not; our assessment of *S* himself should remain the same regardless of whether the causes determining *S*'s reason include something intelligent among them. Suppose that Sam finds this argument, too, very plausible.[46]

By this means, Sam in the revised story is brought to believe that, in acting on his reason as it is controlled by the alien, he *is* an agent and a suitable target for the reactive attitudes of others, just as he was in his uninfected state. These beliefs of Sam's will be false, but, of course, it is possible for human beings to reason themselves into very peculiar false beliefs. The history of philosophy is studded with examples, though, no doubt, we would not all agree on what those examples are.

Furthermore, these beliefs of Sam's will be founded on the evidence available to Sam, namely, what Sam knows and believes and the arguments of the alien which Sam accepts.

One might think that Sam would realize how false these beliefs of his are once the alien started to take control of him, so that Sam would cease to take responsibility for the manipulated mechanism on which his behavior is based when he experiences the process of being controlled. But, given the way in which Sam came to these beliefs, in the grip of his alien-inspired philosophical theory Sam might, even so, continue to hold his false beliefs, just as people under the sway of some ideology cling tenaciously to beliefs which seem to others around them to be perfectly incredible. Furthermore, since at least at the outset the alien takes care to ensure that Sam acts in character, people around Sam will react to him in his infected state just as they did before. And so they will only confirm Sam in his mistaken beliefs that in acting under the control of the alien, he is an agent and a fair target of reactive attitudes.

In this way, then, Sam takes responsibility, in the Fischer and Ravizza sense, for the mechanism on which he acts when he is controlled by the alien. Since this mechanism is also reasons-responsive in the way described above, Sam meets the Fischer and Ravizza conditions for moral responsibility when he is controlled by the alien.

Consequently, although Fischer and Ravizza try to remedy the problems in the account of moral responsibility in Fischer's *The Metaphysics of Free Will*, I don't think that their attempted remedy is successful. The problem with the old account remains also in the new one, namely, that an agent who is manipulated by someone else can still count as morally responsible on their analysis of moral responsibility.

So Frankfurt's problem needs to be solved, even if it can't be solved in the way Fischer or Fischer and Ravizza suppose.

A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM

One way to solve Frankfurt's problem is to split it into two different problems of identification, with two correspondingly different accounts of identification. The easiest way to present these two kinds of identification is to give an example of an account of freedom which relies on them and to illustrate them in the context of that account. In what follows, I will present Aquinas's account of the nature of human freedom and use it to illustrate these disparate kinds of identification. In this section, I will first summarize the account very roughly,[47] and then I will discuss a controversy between Peter van Inwagen, on the one hand, and Fischer and Ravizza, on the other, which highlights the sort of agency at the heart of Aquinas's account of freedom. In the subsequent section, I will explain the two different kinds of identification which Aquinas's account relies on, and then I will show how these two different approaches to identification help with Frankfurt's problem.

(1) AQUINAS'S ACCOUNT OF FREEDOM

Unlike Fischer, who takes freedom and moral responsibility to be a function of intellect (or a "reasons-responsive mechanism"), and Frankfurt, who takes freedom to be a feature of the will, Aquinas takes freedom with regard to any act, including acts of willing, to be a systems-level feature, emerging from the dynamic interaction of intellect and will. Aquinas takes intellect and will to be related in this way. Will can exercise efficient causality on the intellect; one's will can have an effect, indirectly or even directly, on what one believes. On the other hand, the will is an inclination for what is good, and determinations of what is good are made by the intellect, not by the will. So the intellect exercises *final* causality on the will.[48] It determines what is good—in some broad sense of 'good' which ranges over all senses of value, including prudential, moral, and metaphysical. Furthermore, it determines the good not just in an abstract sense but also in the particular: on occasion, it presents to the will what is good at this time, in these circumstances, under some particular description. Finally, nothing in Aquinas's account requires him to suppose that the intellect's calculations need to be fully conscious; they might instead be tacit or covert.[49] They might also be irrational, misguided, self-deceptive, or mistaken; nothing in the fact that they are calculations of intellect requires that they be rational or right.

Because will can causally affect intellect, and intellect's conclusions in turn result in the will's wanting something or other, the will exercises an indirect sort of control over itself. If intellect determines that doing *A* (at this time, in these circumstances, under this description) is good (in some sense of 'good', which need not be moral), then the will wants to do *A*.[50] But the will can also direct intellect to stop thinking about doing *A*, or to pay attention to something other than doing *A*, or to consider *A* under a description which makes it seem not good. And in this way the will can exercise some control over its own acts. Of course, the will causally affects the intellect in this way only in case the intellect has presented doing so as good. Although it isn't the case that every act of intellect must be preceded by an act of will, every act of will must be preceded by an act of intellect.

The intellect influences the will, but it doesn't exercise efficient causality on it. On Aquinas's account, the will is an intrinsic principle of action. Part of what this claim means for Aquinas is that it is impossible for *anything* to exercise efficient causality on the will. If something operated on the will with efficient causality, what was so affected would no longer count as the will because it would no longer be an *intrinsic principle*. So any act of will arises in consequence of an act of intellect on the agent's part, but the intellect doesn't efficiently cause that act of will.

On the other hand, intellect can be acted on with efficient causality not only by the will but even by something extrinsic to the agent. So, for example, Aquinas considers the question whether Satan can exercise efficient causality on a human being's intellect, and his answer is affirmative.[51] But he also supposes that any cognitive state extrinsically produced in this way will be subject to review by the intellect of the human being, which will accept or reject whatever thought Satan may introduce. The resulting cognitive state will thus be a state of the human agent's own intellect. If Satan were to take over most or all of a human being's cognitive function, however, any intellect operative in that person would be Satan's, on Aquinas's view, and not the human being's. If the human being were to act in the grip of such external possession, he wouldn't then be acting on his own intellect. (It is for just that reason that Aquinas supposes that demon-possessed people aren't free.)

Aquinas takes the same attitude towards the causal determination of all cognitive function by inanimate forces extrinsic to an agent.[52] What matters to him is the extrinsic causal determination of all intellective function, not whether the extrinsic cause is itself intelligent or not.[53] For an intellect to

count as an agent's intellect, it can't be the case that its states are largely or entirely causally determined by something outside the agent.

For Aquinas, an act of will is free only if it has as its ultimate cause[54] the agent's own intellect and will. Like Fischer's account of moral responsibility,[55] Aquinas's account of freedom ties it directly to a reasons-responsive mechanism. Desires and volitions are based on an agent's views (however tacit or irrational) of what is good (in some sense of 'good').[56] On the other hand, the agent's views of what is good will be brought about, in part, by what the agent herself desires and wills. Though there are acts of intellect that are not preceded by acts of will, the will has a kind of control over the intellect that the intellect does not have over the will, because the will *can* exercise efficient causality on the intellect. In Aquinas's account, therefore, the will holds the sort of primacy Frankfurt thinks it should have.

On Aquinas's account, alternative possibilities are not essential to freedom, any more than they are on Frankfurt's views. If the good of doing some action *A* is overwhelmingly apparent to the agent, if it impinges in some direct sort of way on the intellect, then no amount of recalculation under different descriptions will get the intellect to present a different result, and any directive on the will's part to get intellect to stop thinking about the issue will also be ineffective. In that case, there are no alternative possibilities for the agent other than doing *A*. Nonetheless, Aquinas supposes that an agent who does *A* in such circumstances does it freely as long as his doing so has as its ultimate source only his own, normally functioning intellect and will.[57]

As this description of Aquinas's account makes clear, where there is an alternative possibility available to an agent, it will be open to her only because she can be in a different intellective state from the one she is in fact in. For Aquinas, the alternative possibilities for the will are dependent on alternative possibilities for the intellect. On this view, it is not possible for the determination of the intellect to be that doing *A* is what is good now and for the will (with that determination of the intellect still in place) to will not to do *A*. But it may nonetheless subsequently be possible for the will to will not to do *A* because it may be possible for the agent's intellect to recalculate and to rescind the determination that doing *A* is good now.

It should be clear that Aquinas's account of human freedom is an incompatibilist account; human freedom is not compatible with causal determinism. If something acts with efficient causality on an agent's will, then the agent's act doesn't stem solely from his own intellect and will,[58] and, for that reason, the act does not count as free. Nonetheless, Aquinas's account of freedom will strike many libertarians as highly unsatisfactory.

There is a fundamental difference of intuition here. For some libertarians,[59] an act of will is free only in case the agent could have performed a different act of will in exactly the same set of circumstances with exactly the same set of beliefs and desires.[60] It will be handy to have a name for libertarians of this sort. I propose to call them 'Scotistic libertarians' in honor of Duns Scotus, an influential proponent of this view.[61] For Scotistic libertarians, the alternative possibilities available to the will need to be available simultaneously, in the same state of mind. To be free, the will needs to be not only undetermined by causal influences outside the agent, it also needs to be unconstrained even by the agent's intellect. On Aquinas's view, however, it isn't possible for the will to be unconstrained by the intellect, and what is necessary for freedom is that an agent's will not be causally determined by anything outside the agent. For Aquinas, there is an alternative possibility open to the will only in virtue of the fact that it is possible for the intellect to be in a different state.

(II) DIFFERENT CONCEPTIONS OF FREE AGENCY: A DISPUTE BETWEEN VAN INWAGEN AND FISCHER AND RAVIZZA

Because Fischer and Ravizza don't recognize this fundamental difference in intuitions about the nature of freedom, their recent criticism of van Inwagen's position on free will will be thought to miss its mark by Scotistic libertarians.

Van Inwagen maintains that the will is rarely free, since it rarely has alternative possibilities open to it. In fact, on van Inwagen's view, the will is free only in case there is some conflict or ambivalence in the agent. Only in case an agent is torn between equally attractive alternatives, or between morality and desire, or between incommensurate values does the agent have the ability to will otherwise than he does, and so only in those circumstances is the agent free.[62]

In response, Fischer and Ravizza claim that an agent is free even in circumstances which involve no conflict or ambivalence of this sort, because the agent can reflect in such a way as to *generate* reasons and desires which he did not have before. So, for example, they say,

> Just about anybody can summon up the worry that he is not free to do otherwise. That is, one can worry that, despite the pervasive intuitive feeling that frequently we have genuine freedom to do various things, we do not in fact have such freedom. . . . This worry can then generate *some* reason (perhaps, a desire) to do otherwise simply to prove that one can do so. Thus . . . even an agent who actually does not have any desire to do other than *A* can have the power to generate such a desire (during the relevant temporal interval). . . . The leading idea here is that there is no reason to suppose that agents *generally* lack the power to generate (in some way or another) reasons to do otherwise. . . .[63]

And they explain why their sort of example is efficacious against van Inwagen this way:

> Van Inwagen's claim is that if in some possible world, w_1, Nightingale has a strong, unopposed inclination to answer the phone as soon as it rings, then Nightingale is going to answer the phone as soon as it rings and he is not able in w_1 to do otherwise. . . . [But] as long as Nightingale is genuinely *able* (during the relevant temporal interval) in w_1 to generate a desire not to answer the phone, then he is *able* in w_1 not to answer the phone. Insofar as w_2 [a world in which Nightingale has conflicting inclinations as regards answering the telephone and does not answer the phone] is *genuinely accessible* to Nightingale, then w_2 is relevant to what Nightingale *can* do in w_1.[64]

The first thing to see here is that Fischer and Ravizza's case against van Inwagen can't rest just on the claim that there is a possible world, w_2, in which Nightingale acts otherwise than he does in this world, w_1, and that w_2 is accessible *to* w_1.[65] This claim isn't enough to yield conclusions about whether Nightingale is free (in van Inwagen's sense) in w_1. One lesson of Frankfurt-style counterexamples to the principle of alternative possibilities is that what happens in an alternative sequence may not be relevant to assessments of freedom in the actual sequence. We can see the point here by producing an analogue to a Frankfurt-style counterexample with regard to the case at issue.

Suppose that there is an evil neurosurgeon Black who has implanted a device in Nightingale's brain which allows him to control Nightingale's decisions. Then it is possible for Black to leave Nightingale's beliefs and desires[66] just as they are but to produce in Nightingale the decision not to answer the phone.[67] Let the world in which Black does so be w_3. Since Black has the capability in w_1 to affect Nightingale's decisions in this way, w_3 is accessible to w_1, and in w_3, with the same set of beliefs and desires as he has in w_1, Nightingale decides otherwise than he does in w_1. But surely this sort of example isn't sufficient to refute van Inwagen's position. Nothing in the facts that in w_3 Nightingale decides otherwise (even with the same cognitive and conative states which he has in w_1) and that w_3 is accessible to w_1 shows that Nightingale himself has the ability to will against a strong, unopposed inclination. There is an alternative possibility available to Nightingale as regards his decision to answer the phone, but the alternative possibility stems from an ability vested in the neurosurgeon, not in Nightingale.

The Heinlein story of Sam and his master I sketched above also gives us an analogue to a Frankfurt-style counterexample. In that story, it is true that there is another world in which Sam does otherwise than he does in this world and that that world is accessible to this world, and yet it isn't the case that Sam is free in this world.

In the view of many philosophers, standard Frankfurt-style counterexamples show that alternative possibilities aren't necessary for freedom. In my view, these analogues to Frankfurt-style counterexamples show that alternative possibilities aren't sufficient for freedom either.[68] In the standard Frankfurt-style counterexamples, the absence of alternative possibilities doesn't preclude an agent's acting on his own unimpeded intellect and will in the actual sequence of events. In the analogue counterexamples, the presence of an alternative possibility doesn't stem from any ability that the agent's own intellect and will have in the actual sequence. What the standard and analogue counterexamples together show, I think, is that in order to determine whether or not an agent is free, it is important, as Aquinas thinks, to determine whether the intellect and will on which he acts are his own and not, as Scotistic libertarians suppose, whether alternative possibilities are present or absent for him.

Consequently, Fischer and Ravizza's claim to have a counterexample to van Inwagen's position has to depend crucially on the fact that, in their example, w_2 is genuinely accessible *to Nightingale* in w_1. In their example, Nightingale himself can change his own intellective states, and consequently his options for decisions change. Fischer and Ravizza are thus thinking of freedom in Aquinas's sort of way, where the will's alternative possibilities come to it in consequence of changes in the agent's cognitive states. That is no doubt also one of the reasons why Fischer and Ravizza emphasize that the alternative possibility becomes available to Nightingale "during the relevant temporal interval." The generation of a new intellective state, which is necessary for the alternative possibility for Nightingale, requires some temporal interval, however small.

But for Scotistic libertarians, the alternative possibilities for the will that are generated by sequential intellective states are no more relevant than the possibilities that are generated by the evil neurosurgeon's ability to intervene. The alternative possibilities relevant to assessments of free will, on Scotistic libertarianism, don't depend on changes in intellective states. Rather, they are the possibilities open to the will in the circumstances, that is, with everything except acts of will held constant. That is why, from the point of view of Scotistic libertarianism, Fischer and Ravizza have just missed the point of the argument when they try to refute van Inwagen's conclusion by claiming that Nightingale's cognitive states could be different and that Nightingale could decide differently if his cognitive states were different.

For my purposes here, what is helpful about the dispute is the way in which it highlights Aquinas's position. One can hold an incompatibilist theory of free will, as Aquinas does, without accepting the principle of alternative possibilities; one can maintain that the will is free in a way that is incompatible with causal determinism without espousing Scotistic libertarianism. What exactly to call Aquinas's position is not clear. It seems to me that it is a species of libertarianism, but one which grounds libertarian freedom in an agent's acting on his own intellect and will and not in the alternative possibilities open to the agent.[69]

TWO KINDS OF IDENTIFICATION

Aquinas's account of freedom shows us that identification (of the sort relevant to Frankfurt's account of a person) can be taken in two different ways and that in consequence two different explanations of identification should be given.

(I) THE IDENTIFICATION OF AN AGENT'S INTELLECT AND WILL AS HIS OWN

Connecting an agent's freedom to his acting on his own intellect and will, as Aquinas does, obviously raises a question. How do we identify an agent; how do we know when the intellect and will on which an agent acts are his own? There is a two-part explanation of *this* sort of identification that can be derived from Aquinas's account of the nature of intellect and will and his understanding of personal identity.

First, on Aquinas's account of personal identity, an individual human person is a composite of body and soul, and his soul is that form or configuration of his body which enables him to cognize and to will (as well as to engage in many other distinctively human and generically animal activities).[70] So Sam is constituted by *this* configuration of *this* body, and the configuration of his body includes Sam's intellect and will.[71] Nothing turns on Aquinas's particular approach to personal identity here. What is important is just that having this particular intellect and will is part of what it is to be this person, whether we take intellect and will as components of soul or as systems of brain modules.

Secondly, on Aquinas's position, what else is necessary for an intellect and will to count as an agent's own is that their states are not causally determined (with *efficient* causation), in the ways described above. In the case of the will, Aquinas supposes that if anything, intrinsic or extrinsic to the agent, acts on the will with efficient causality, it ceases to be a will at all. In the case of the intellect, even something extrinsic to the agent can act on it with efficient causality[72] without the intellect's ceasing to be the agent's own, providing that the external cause doesn't affect intellective function largely or entirely.[73] So the identification of an intellect or a will as a person's own, on Aquinas's account, requires a rejection of causal determinism as regards the states of intellect and will.[74]

(II) THE IDENTIFICATION OF AN AGENT WITH HER HIGHER-ORDER VOLITIONS

With this explanation of what makes an intellect and will an agent's own, we can now explain the second kind of identification—i.e., a person's identification with some of her volitions—in terms of the connection between her own will and intellect.

Consider, first, Francesca, whose will is free in Frankfurt's sense. Francesca has a first-order volition for some act *A*—say, standing in a faculty meeting to indicate a vote for censure of a colleague accused of sexual harassment of his female students. Francesca supposes that her colleague is guilty, that censure is appropriate in the circumstances, that she has an obligation to vote for censure, and so on. Francesca may nonetheless have some opposed desires; she may, for example, be afraid of reprisals from powerful faculty supporters of her colleague, and so she may also have some desire not to stand. But the desire which is effective in her, which constitutes her volition, is the desire to stand and vote for censure. And since this is a free act of hers, she also has a second-order volition that this first-order desire be her will.

On Aquinas's view of the connection between intellect and will, the first-order volition to stand reflects the determination of Francesca's intellect that in these circumstances and at this time the good thing to do, in some sense of 'good', is standing.[75] Her second-order volition also stems from a determination of intellect. In a reflective review of the states of her will, her intellect determines that the first-order volition to stand is good. In making this determination the intellect is not considering just what it would be good to do on this occasion and in these circumstances. If it were, the intellect's considerations with regard to a second-order volition would be no different from its operations with regard to a first-order volition. Rather, in reflecting about first-order volitions, Francesca's intellect is reflecting on what sorts of volitions it is good for Francesca to have, and this is not the same as asking whether it would be good for Francesca to stand now.

We can more readily see the difference between these two kinds of determination on the part of the intellect by considering the internal conflict of a morally incontinent person. So suppose Francesca has a morally incontinent colleague, Irene. Incontinence is a complicated and puzzling phenomenon, and I don't suppose that the following sketch of Irene either fully describes or completely explains incontinence. But a full-fledged account of incontinence isn't necessary for my purposes. I want only to illustrate and clarify the different operations of intellect in connection with different levels of volition.

Irene agrees entirely with Francesca's views of this case, and, like Francesca, she fully intends to stand to vote for censure as well. But she is much more afraid of reprisal than Francesca is, and, under the pressure of her considerable anxiety, at the last minute she fails to stand. Afterwards, she hates herself and can't face Francesca. Irene has opposed first-order desires (to stand and not to stand), just as Francesca does, but in Irene's case, under the momentary sway of her powerful anxiety, the desire that becomes effective, that becomes her will, is the desire not to stand to vote for censure. On Aquinas's way of thinking about the will's connection to intellect, at the last moment, in some swift calculation, which was perhaps not even fully conscious, Irene

considered that it would be good for her, in some prudential sense of 'good', not to stand now, in these circumstances, even though at the same time her intellect judged the failure to stand not to be morally good.

Nonetheless, Irene thinks about the case just as Francesca does. That is, she thinks that the accused faculty member is guilty of sexual harassment, that he should therefore be censured, that she has a moral duty to vote for censure, and so on. One reason Irene hates herself afterwards is that in calm moments, when she takes everything into consideration, her intellect is not disposed to believe that prudential goods trump moral goods in such cases. In calculating whether or not to stand in those circumstances and at that time, prudential considerations were uppermost in her mind because of her fear and her unwillingness to act against it. But when she reflects on the state of her will, Irene's intellect takes account of more general considerations and reaches the same sort of conclusions as Francesca's intellect. And so Irene's intellect retrospectively repudiates as not good the will on which she acted when she didn't stand to vote for censure. She has a second-order desire for a will that wills to stand, and it is at odds with the first-order volition not to stand.

Irene is to be identified with her second-order volition, as she is not to be identified with her first-order volition, because her second-order volition derives from the all-things-considered judgment of her intellect in a way that her first-order volition does not.[76] Her first-order volition stems from a hasty intellective determination about what would be good to do now, in these very circumstances. Her second-order volition stems from a considered intellective determination about what would be good to do in general in circumstances like these. This all-things-considered determination is dispositionally if not occurrently in her mind even when she wills not to stand, so that she is internally divided in intellect (and therefore also in will) when she fails to stand. That is why it is true of Irene that her intellect sees the case as Francesca's does. Furthermore, Irene can unify herself (in intellect and therefore also in will) in thinking that standing to vote for censure is good. She could conquer her fear of reprisal and the cowardly, self-serving thoughts which that fear prompts in her mind. But she couldn't intellectively unify herself around the contrary thought. That is because she sees things too clearly, too evidently, the same way Francesca does. That's why she can't face Francesca and hates herself after she fails to stand.

A person identifies herself with her second-order volitions, then, because they reflect the whole view of her mind, in a way that first-order desires do not, and because (in a different sense of 'identification') she is to be identified not only with her will but also with her mind.[77]

Two different kinds of identification are thus at issue in the concept of a person, not just one, and two different accounts of identification are needed to explain it. One account explains when an intellect and will are an agent's own, and the other explains why it is that a person is to be identified with certain states of her will.

The first kind of identification helps solve the problem in Fischer's account. Fischer, like Aquinas, ties freedom and moral responsibility to an intellect, or a "reasons-responsive mechanism." Fischer's account, however, doesn't specify that the reasons-responsive mechanism must be the agent's own, and it is not so easy to see how, on his account, we can determine when the mechanism an agent acts on is his own. The attempt by Fischer and Ravizza to remedy this flaw in Fischer's original account is unsuccessful; it is still possible on their new account for a manipulated agent to count as morally responsible. Because Aquinas rejects causal determinism, he has a principled distinction between free and manipulated acts; he can give an explanation for why Sam's intellect isn't his own when it is totally controlled by the master.

The two kinds of identification also help solve the problem of authority in Frankfurt's account. An agent's second-order volitions are authoritative for her because they reflect the all-things-considered judgment of her own mind, and her mind is constitutive of her. For the same reason, she is intellectively integrated in acting in accordance with her second-order volitions and fragmented in acting against them.

It is, of course, possible that an agent might be internally divided at the second-order level of the will and that her intellect might be correspondingly ambivalent. In that case, her second-order volitions wouldn't be authoritative for her; third-order volitions would be required. And here the unpleasant possibility of an infinite regress seems to reappear.

If, however, we connect acts of will to acts of intellect, as Aquinas does, then third-order volitions will be rare. They will arise, for example, in an agent who is ambivalent between whole worldviews. Consider an agent who was raised in the milieu of the religious right but who is in the process of rejecting his upbringing and adopting Marxist attitudes towards religion and politics. As he considers how to vote in the upcoming presidential election, sometimes he feels the pull of his roots. He looks back at the views of his family, and his mind is once again drawn in that direction. He thinks that he should accept again the worldview that he had when he was raised. Then he thinks that it would be good for him to have a will which wills to vote for a presidential candidate on the extreme right of the political spectrum, and he wants to have such a second-order volition. At other times, however, he

rejoices in what he takes to be his progress away from the misguided and constricting worldview of his childhood, and he thinks that he should be intellectively liberated from it entirely. At such times, he thinks it would be good for him to have a will which wills not to vote for right-wing candidates, and he wants to have a second-order volition of that sort. In a case of this sort, it is his third-order volitions, rather than his second-order ones, which are authoritative for him.

But it is hard to know what a fourth-order volition would be. Such a volition would reflect the intellect's determination that, for example, it would be good for the agent to have the will for the second-order volitions appropriate to right-wingers. But what would such a view be except an approval of his childhood culture and an acceptance of the religious views he originally held? In that case, the putative fourth-order volition would in fact just be a third-order volition for a will reflecting those right-wing beliefs. An act of will on an agent's part stems from considerations on the part of the agent's intellect, but the intellect's reflections on what it would be good to will are connected to what the intellect takes to be good in the circumstances or in general. An agent wobbling between completely different worldviews might generate reflections on his own standards of what counts as good in general, and so he might produce third-order volitions in himself. But reflections on his reflections on his standards of goodness seem to collapse into reflections on his standards of goodness. So while it is possible to construct a case in which it is plausible to assign third-order volitions to an agent, higher-order volitions will collapse into third-order, or even second-order, volitions.

The connection between will and intellect, then, solves the problem of infinite regress as well as the problem of authority.

Finally, grounding personhood in an agent's intellect and will in this way helps explain why personhood and passivity are not antithetical. An agent's intellect might take passivity in certain circumstances as a great good, and the agent's will would then desire that passivity in those circumstances. The agent's consequent passivity, even if it is a passivity in which "all the motions of the soul are suspended," doesn't contravene the agent's own intellect and will but rather has its source in them.[78]

IDENTIFICATION, FREEDOM, AND OPTIMISM

Taking identification in two different ways also helps with one other perplexing or disconcerting feature of Frankfurt's account of free will. On Frankfurt's account, the conditions for free will are strenuous. In order to count as having free will, an agent has to be internally integrated; there has to be a harmonious mesh between her second-order and first-order volitions.

So an agent who, for example, acts against his own second-order desires doesn't act with free will even if he is morally responsible for that act. On Frankfurt's account, then, there can be acts for which an agent is morally responsible but which are not done with free will.[79] On the other hand, however, there is also a long tradition in philosophy which takes at least some actions of an internally divided person to be done with free will and which makes a very strong connection between free will and moral responsibility.

The heart of freedom, put intuitively and primitively, is being able to do what *you* want to do. As Frankfurt sees it, an agent who is divided against herself won't be doing what *she* wants to do no matter what she does; whatever an internally divided agent does, some part of her divided self won't want to do *that*. That's why in order for her to count as acting with free will, she has to have second-order volitions with which she identifies when she acts.

But if we think of an agent's identification in the two different ways sketched above, then we get two correspondingly different ways in which an agent can do what *she* wants to do. When an agent acts on her own intellect and will, that is, on the intellect and will which are part of her and causally undetermined in the way described, then she is doing what she herself wants to do even if she is internally divided in intellect and will. On this view, an agent is not only morally responsible for acts done against her second-order desires, for example, but she also acts with free will in such circumstances. On the other hand, when an agent identifies with the volitions on which she acts in the second sense of identification, she is doing what she wants, but in a stricter or stronger way. There is a sense, then, in which in such a case she is also free in a more strenuous or thoroughgoing way.

On Aquinas's view, an agent who is free in this stronger way—Frankfurt's way—must be not only wholehearted but also morally good.

Although Frankfurt seems willing enough to accept objective standards of value, including moral value, he doesn't think that these standards constrain the ways in which agents can be identified with their own volitions. That is, it is possible, on his view, for an agent to be entirely identified with his second-order volitions when those volitions are for a will which wills something that is objectively morally wrong. It is consequently also possible that such an agent have freedom of will, that is, that his second-order volitions be efficacious in producing the corresponding first-order volitions. Such an agent would be wholehearted in evil.[80]

Consider, for example, some wicked agent Walter, who has first-order volitions for the torture of women and who also identifies with those volitions. He has second-order volitions for those first-order volitions and no countervailing second-order volitions for a different sort of will. Walter is wholehearted and internally integrated in his evil, and his will is free in acting on these integrated but evil volitions.

For Aquinas, a case such as Walter's is impossible. Aquinas, too, thinks that there is an objective moral standard, and he holds that it can be known by the exercise of reason. Furthermore, he thinks that the objective moral standard, at least in its rudiments, is so accessible to ordinary reason that no human intellect is ever totally in ignorance of it. A human being who takes to be good something which is a serious objective evil will therefore always be double-minded.[81]

So, on Aquinas's view, the case of evil Walter needs to be redescribed in this way. With some part of his mind, Walter will take to be good what is in fact an objective evil, viz., the torture of women. But with some other part of his mind, however far from full conscious awareness it may be and however vague and uncertain it may be, Walter will nonetheless understand that the torture of women is wrong. Because Aquinas supposes that the intellect's reflections generate the volitions of the will, he therefore also thinks that double-mindedness of this sort in an evil agent will generate corresponding opposing desires and volitions. Consequently, Walter will have opposed first-order desires and also opposed second-order volitions. So for Aquinas, unlike Frankfurt, it is not possible for a person to be integrated or wholehearted in evil. Furthermore, Aquinas takes inner peace to be the result of wholeheartedness and internal integration. And so he expresses his view about the conflict in the intellect and will of an evil person by affirming a biblical claim: "there is no peace to the wicked."[82]

I don't know how to produce an argument that would adjudicate the issue between Frankfurt's account and Aquinas's here. But I think it is worth noting that on Aquinas's account, but not on Frankfurt's, there are limits to how evil a human being can become. He can never become so evil that some part of his mind and will are not still on the side of the good. That is why, on Aquinas's view, moral wrongdoing fragments a person and the wicked are internally restless. Of the two accounts, Frankfurt's and Aquinas's, Aquinas's is the more optimistic about the nature of human persons.[83]

NOTES

1. Harry Frankfurt, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," in his *The Importance of What We Care About* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 11–25.
2. See, for example, Eleonore Stump, "Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will," in *Perspectives on Moral Responsibility*, ed. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), 211–34.
3. Frankfurt, op. cit., 12.
4. Ibid., 16.
5. Ibid. It isn't clear that there are any normally functioning adult human beings who are wantons in Frankfurt's sense. To be denied personhood in virtue of being a wanton, a human being needs to be utterly without any care about what sort of character he has, and it's hard to imagine even a depraved or specially thoughtless human being who had no such care at all, however mistaken or irrational it might be. Such care can be found even among human beings whose cognitive capacities aren't functioning normally, such as the cognitively impaired elderly or the mentally ill. It is true that, on this sense of 'person', those whose cognitive capacities are very far from those of a normal adult human being (infants, those in a permanent vegetative state, and so on) don't count as persons. But in the case of such human beings, we all recognize that they need to be accorded some special status; we think it is morally acceptable in their case, for example, that others make medical decisions for them. We might mark our concern that such human beings nonetheless be treated as ends in themselves by insisting that they count as persons, or we might simply point to their humanity as the basis for the respect and care they ought to have, thereby reserving 'person', as Frankfurt does, for normally functioning adult human beings.
6. Ibid., 17.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Gary Watson, "Free Agency," *Journal of Philosophy* 72 (1975): 218; cited in Frankfurt, op. cit., 166.
10. Frankfurt, op. cit., 21.
11. Ibid.
12. Frankfurt, "Identification and Wholeheartedness," in *The Importance of What We Care About*, 165.
13. Ibid., 170.
14. Frankfurt, "The Faintest Passion," *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* 66 (1992): 9.
15. Ibid., 8.
16. Frankfurt, "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love," in *Vernunftbegriffe in der Moderne. Veröffentlichungen der internationalen Hegel-Vereinigung*, ed. Hans Friedrick Fulda and Rolf-Peter Horstmann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994), 437.
17. Frankfurt, "On the Necessity of Ideals," in *The Moral Self*, ed. Gil Noam and Thomas Wren (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 20.
18. Frankfurt, "On the Usefulness of Final Ends," *Iyyun: The Jewish Philosophical Quarterly* 41 (1992): 10.
19. Frankfurt, "The Importance of What We Care About," in *The Importance of What We Care About*, 83.
20. This point was made in conversation by Richard Moran. In conversation, Frankfurt has maintained that the human ideal of activity, and activity as control, can be seen in Aristotle's notion of God, as thinking thinking about thinking, not acted upon by anything outside itself. But not all religions see the divine as isolated within itself in this way. Judaism, for example, takes God to be not only related to everything in the world as its creator but also specially related to a particular people whom he loves and to whom he reacts. Christianity puts loving interpersonal relations into the deity itself with the doctrine of the Trinity. But, as I argue below, any person who enters into loving relations with another must be passive as well as active, since being in a loving relationship includes being the recipient of another person's activity and responding to it. (In my view, nothing in this claim is incompatible with the medieval theological doctrine that God is impassible or that God is *actus purus*, but it isn't possible to explain and defend this view in passing in a note.)
21. See, for example, Frankfurt, "On the Usefulness of Final Ends," 15.
22. Edmund Burke, *A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*, ed. Adam Phillips (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). For an interesting contemporary philosophical discussion of the nature of human reactions to what is great

in nature, art, and religion, see Howard Wettstein, "Awe and the Religious Life: A Naturalistic Approach," in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 21, ed. Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). Wettstein brings out clearly the passive element in such reactions.

23. Teresa of Avila, *The Collected Works*, vol. 1, trans. Kieran Kavanaugh and Otilio Rodriguez (Washington, D.C.: Institute of Carmelite Studies Publications, 1976), ch. 18, 121.
24. Ibid., ch. 19, 122.
25. See, for example, Frankfurt, "Some Thoughts about Caring" (manuscript), 21–22. See also his "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love": "The authority for the lover of the claims that are made upon him by his love is the authority of his own essential nature as a person. It is . . . the authority over him of the essential nature of his own individual will" (443). (I am grateful to Harry Frankfurt for allowing the former paper to be seen in manuscript.)
26. Frankfurt, "Autonomy, Necessity, and Love," 438.
27. Ibid., 440.
28. See, for example, *Summa theologiae*, I–II, q. 28 a. 1.
29. If we take the desire for being the recipient of someone else's desires as itself an active desire, then unrequited love—unsatisfied or unfulfilled love, love which never achieves its goal—might be construed as just an active state. But full-fledged love, which reaches its goal of being united with another person, could not; to be in a loving relationship includes certain sorts of passivity.
30. John Martin Fischer, *The Metaphysics of Free Will: An Essay on Control* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994).
31. See, for example, Frankfurt, "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," in *The Importance of What We Care About*, 1–10. Some philosophers use 'freedom of will' or 'free will' just to mean being able to do otherwise. But in the face of the arguments surrounding the principle of alternative possibilities, this usage seems contentious, if not clearly overly restrictive.
32. Fischer, op. cit., 163.
33. Ibid., 166.
34. Ibid., 168. In a note to the next sentence in this paragraph, Fischer indicates some concern with his position because his definition of *weak* reasons-responsiveness leaves him open to certain counterexamples, and elsewhere in the book he indicates that he is aware of problems with his account and is considering revisions of his position. Those revisions are presented in the new account of moral responsibility given by him and Mark Ravizza in their forthcoming book, which I discuss below.
35. Fischer, op. cit., 162.
36. Ibid., 163.
37. In fact, as I have described the situation, the mechanism is even *strongly* reasons-responsive (from which it follows that it is weakly reasons-responsive as well).
38. See Fischer, op. cit., 147–54. In their forthcoming book, *Responsibility and Control*, which I discuss below, Fischer and Ravizza go to some lengths to undermine incompatibilism. They try to show that one of the best and strongest arguments for incompatibilism, made by Peter van Inwagen, fails. That argument depends on a principle labeled 'Transfer NR'. The principle says that if (1) p is the case and no one is or ever was morally responsible for that fact and (2) if p is the case, then q is the case, and no one is or ever was responsible for the fact expressed in this conditional, then (3) q is the case, and no one is or ever was responsible for that fact. Fischer and Ravizza give convincing counterexamples to Transfer NR, all of which are cases of preemptive overdetermination or simultaneous causation. In such cases, there is a path to q in addition to the path for which no one is or ever was responsible, and in that additional path there is someone who is responsible. They maintain that cases of freely willed action can be assimilated to those cases in which the principle fails, even on the assumption of causal determinism.

Consequently, Fischer and Ravizza argue, the argument for incompatibilism fails. But although Fischer and Ravizza seem to me right in claiming that Transfer NR isn't in general true, it isn't nearly so clear that cases of freely willed action can be assimilated to the kinds of cases in which the principle fails. Here's why.

Suppose that Cartesian dualism is false and that any mental state, such as the state of making a decision, is correlated with some neural state, where by 'correlation' we mean whatever the correct relation between mental and neural states turns out to be. Let 'D' stand for some mental state, such as recognizing a face or making a decision, and let 'N' stand for the neural state correlated with that mental state. (For example, D might be the mental state of Richard's recognizing the face of his daughter. Then N would be the neural state in Richard's brain in which a certain sequence of neural firings—from the retina, through the optic nerve to the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus, into various layers of the visual cortex, to the relevant memory areas of the cortex, and so on—is completed.) Then if causal determinism is true (and Cartesian dualism is false), the following premises are true:

> (1) The laws of nature and the conditions at the time of the big bang causally determine that Richard is in neural state N at t_1, and no human being is or ever was morally responsible for this fact.
>
> (2) If the laws of nature and the conditions at the time of the big bang causally determine that Richard is in neural state N at t_1, then Richard makes decision D at t_1, and no human being is or ever was morally responsible for the fact expressed in this conditional.
>
> (3) Therefore, Richard makes decision D at t_1, and no human being is or ever was morally responsible for this fact.

In order to show that this argument fails using the Fischer and Ravizza strategy, we'd have to show that there was another path to the same result of Richard's making decision D. But, of course, if causal determinism is true (and Cartesian dualism is false), there is no other path to that result; all paths are paths for which some analogue of (1) and (2) will be true. For this case to be assimilated to cases of preemptive overdetermination or simultaneous causation, there would have to be some way to make a decision which wasn't causally determined; that is, causal determinism would have to be false.

So although Fischer and Ravizza are right that Transfer NR isn't true in general, it's hard to see why we should think that the cases in which it fails can be extended to include cases of decisions which are causally determined.

39. John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, *Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming). I am grateful to Fischer and Ravizza for making this book available to me in manuscript.
40. The conditions for moderate reasons-responsiveness differ from the conditions for weak reasons-responsiveness basically in two ways. First, the mechanism on which some person acts has to be "regularly reasons-responsive"; it has to involve "a coherent pattern of reasons-recognition." Secondly, the mechanism must operate because it recognizes reasons, including moral reasons, and reacts to them; the action produced by the mechanism must be done because of the reason for the action. When Sam is controlled by the alien, he meets both these conditions. The mechanism is regularly reasons-responsive, since the alien's intellect is regularly reasons-responsive, and Sam's intellect as controlled by the alien is therefore also regularly reasons-responsive. In fact, the mechanism is even responsive to reasons (moral and otherwise) that matter to Sam rather than to the alien, since, at the outset of the invasion, the aliens want the invasion to be a secret and consequently make the behavior of the persons they infect as close as possible to the behavior those persons would have engaged in had they not been infected. Consequently, when Sam under the control of the alien does A, it is because there is a reason for Sam to do A, and the mechanism controlling Sam is responsive to that reason for reasons of its own.

It is also the case that the mechanism of Sam's intellect as controlled by the alien's intellect recognizes and reacts to reasons; when Sam does something under the control of the alien, it is because of the reason for the action which is recognized by the mechanism controlling him.

41. Fischer and Ravizza, op. cit., 309, manuscript; their emphasis.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid., 313.
45. This is a possibility which Fischer and Ravizza touch on just in a note.
46. The reader who doesn't think much of these arguments is invited to imagine his own or to imagine that Sam is philosophically inept and readily flummoxed.
47. In what follows, I will present interpretations of Aquinas which I have argued for at length in two papers, "Aquinas's Account of Freedom: Intellect and Will," *The Monist* (forthcoming) and "Aquinas on Intellectual Virtue: Wisdom and Folly," in *Aquinas's Moral Theory*, ed. Scott MacDonald and Eleonore Stump (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
48. It is not easy to explain what final causality is when it isn't a matter of the relations of *a person* to something else, but for present purposes perhaps this will suffice. To say that intellect exercises final (but not efficient) causality with respect to the will is to say (among other things) that the intellect constrains the will or that the will is in the state it is in because of the intellect or that the will's state stems from the state of the intellect—without the intellect's having an efficient causal impact on the will. Such relations of constraint without efficient causation are in fact not uncommon. Consider two computer modules, *A* and *B*, programmed in the following way. As long as no signal of any sort is coming from *A*, *B* is active; *B* isn't active if a signal comes from *A*. In this case, *B* is constrained to be in the state it is in, when it is on, because of the state of *A*, but *A* doesn't act on *B* with efficient causality. A more complicated example of the same kind is the case of certain retinal ganglion cells which are so constructed that they fire as long as no light is shined in their visual field. For these neurons, what happens in the visual field constrains what happens in the ganglion cells but without making a causal impact on those cells.
49. Consciousness is clearly a degreed, rather than an all-or-nothing, property; there is a continuum of consciousness with full, occurrent consciousness as an intrinsic limit at one end and total unconsciousness as an extrinsic limit at the other end. I am assuming that the tacit states of intellect at issue here fall somewhere on this continuum. They are at least accessible enough to consciousness that they could be brought into occurrent thought by therapists, for example; so they could, in principle, be brought into occurrent thought by the agent himself. What is not accessible to consciousness even in this attenuated sense, what is utterly outside an agent's consciousness, could not count as a candidate for the states of intellect related to acts of will, since Aquinas clearly understands such acts of intellect as conscious in some sense. For a discussion of intellective cognition in Aquinas, see my "Aquinas's Account of the Mechanisms of Intellective Cognition," *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (forthcoming).
50. In the succeeding discussion, I will not continue to insert the parenthetical qualifiers which are in this sentence, but they should be taken as understood. There is also a complication in Aquinas's account which I am omitting here. For Aquinas, intellect actually makes two separate determinations with regard to any action, namely, what it would be good to do at this time, etc., and what it would be best to do, in case the first intellective determination turns up more than one alternative. What precedes action, then, is some determination about what is best (in some sense of 'best') under some description, at this time, in these circumstances. It might also be the case that there is no best alternative but only two or more equally good alternatives. If there really is no way for an agent's intellect to rank the alternatives, then the agent's intellect can determine that randomly picking one of the alternatives is the best thing to do at this time, in these circumstances, etc.

51. One shouldn't get confused and conflate intellect and sense here. Aquinas certainly supposes that the senses are regularly acted upon with efficient causality by things extrinsic to the one sensing. The question here has to do just with intellect.
52. See, for example, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, 24.2, where he says, "If the judgment of the cognitive [faculty] is not in a person's power but is determined extrinsically (*aliunde*), then the appetite will not be in his power either, and consequently neither will [his] motion or activity." For a very interesting argument against causal determinism and for top-down causation, see John Dupré, *The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993). The way in which Aquinas understands intellect's processing of sensory data clearly involves top-down causation.
53. Here someone might raise an objection. Aquinas thinks that all intellective knowledge begins in sensory cognition, and he does take sensory cognition to be causally produced by things extrinsic to the cognizer. So someone might suppose, contrary to what I am claiming here, that for Aquinas intellective states also are all causally determined by things outside the cognizer, in virtue of their dependence on sensory cognition. But this objection would be mistaken. Aquinas thinks that the senses don't act on the intellect with efficient causation and that in fact the order of causation is just the opposite: the intellect acts with efficient causation on sensory data. That is, the intellect isn't just passively affected by sensory data; it actively processes sensory data in a way not caused by the data itself but rather by the structure and natural functioning of the processing modules. So the intellect on Aquinas's view, like the brain on our view, is responsive to things in extra-mental reality but not causally determined by them to be in one particular state or another.

    It might be worth pointing out here that contemporary neurobiologists take a similar view of the brain's functioning even as regards sensory cognition. Even so simple an act of sensory cognition as registering a color turns out to require a great deal of active processing by more than one brain center, so that incoming sensory data by itself constrains but does not causally determine neural states involved in sensory cognition. (For an excellent account of color vision that makes this point abundantly clear, see Semir Zeki, *A Vision of the Brain* [London: Blackwell Scientific Publications, 1993].)
54. The causation in question here is efficient causation. For Aquinas, there are, of course, other sorts of causes as well; there is, for example, an ultimate final cause of the will, which is the ultimate end of the agent. In the description of Aquinas's account here, 'cause' will mean efficient cause unless otherwise specified. Furthermore, by 'ultimate cause' here I mean ultimate *created* cause. Aquinas's account of divine creation and divine grace complicate his picture of freedom. I discuss Aquinas's account of divine action on the will at length in "Aquinas on Grace and Freedom" (forthcoming).
55. The new account by Fischer and Ravizza is even closer to Aquinas's theory than Fischer's account in *The Metaphysics of Free Will* is. What produces the remaining problems for Fischer and Ravizza, in my view, is also one of the last major differences between their account and Aquinas's, namely, that they, unlike Aquinas, suppose moral responsibility to be compatible with causal determinism.
56. For an argument that desires and volitions need to be related to an agent's cognitive states in this way, see Richard Moran, "Frankfurt on Identification: Activity and Passivity in Mental Life" (forthcoming).
57. In the special circumstances of the creation of the will and the bestowal of grace, God is the exception to this claim.
58. In fact, it doesn't seem to depend on the agent's will at all, since, for Aquinas, the will is an intrinsic principle and as such can't be acted on by something else with efficient causality.
59. Duns Scotus, Samuel Clarke, and Richard Swinburne are representative of such libertarians. I have sometimes thought that Peter van Inwagen was also a good example, but the controversy between van Inwagen and Fischer and Ravizza has left me less clear about van Inwagen's position. For the controversy, see Peter van Inwagen, "When Is the Will Free?" in *Philosophical Perspectives IV: Action Theory and Philosophy of Mind*, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1990), 399–422; John

Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, "When the Will Is Free," in *Philosophical Perspectives VI: Ethics*, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1992), 423–51; van Inwagen's response to their paper, "When the Will Is Not Free," *Philosophical Studies* 75 (1994): 95–113; and their response to van Inwagen's response, "Free Will and the Modal Principle," *Philosophical Studies* 83 (1996): 213–30. In "When the Will Is Not Free," van Inwagen apparently accepts the view that an agent has the ability to do otherwise if there is some motive which the agent does not have but which is a "nearby" potential motive for the agent. In that case, of course, the alternative possibilities for the will are not simultaneous but depend on some psychological state that can be generated "in the relevant interval," even if that psychological state is a motive rather than simply an intellective state. Van Inwagen's concession to Fischer and Ravizza suggests that he isn't in fact a good example of the sort of libertarian I have in mind here.

60. If volitions just are desires of a certain sort, then the phrase 'beliefs and desires' here needs to be qualified to make an exception for those desires which are the volitions in question.
61. See, for example, *John Duns Scotus: Contingency and Freedom. Lectura I 39*, trans. A. Vos Jaczn, H. Veldhuis, A. H. Looman-Graaskamp, E. Dekker, and N. W. den Bok (Dordrecht: Kluwer Publishing Co., 1994), 116–17. Scotus says there that freedom of the will entails a certain power, "not one according to which the will has acts successively, but it has them at the same moment. For at the same moment the will has an act of willing, at the same and for the same moment it can have an opposite act of willing. . . . Willing at a, it can not-will at a." See also Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995), esp. chs. 3 and 4.
62. Van Inwagen's view appears to be something of an intermediate between Aquinas's position and Scotistic libertarianism. Aquinas supposes that the will is constrained by a single-minded directive on the part of the intellect but that it is nonetheless free in such circumstances. On Scotistic libertarianism, the will is not free if it is constrained by the intellect, but the will can will against a single-minded directive of the intellect, so that it is free (because unconstrained) even in such cases. It seems as if, for van Inwagen, the will is not free if it is constrained by the intellect, as on Scotistic libertarianism, but it also seems as if the will cannot will against a single-minded directive of the intellect, as Aquinas held. At any rate, thinking of van Inwagen's position in this way helps make sense of his view that the will is free only in case there is some serious ambivalence in the agent.
63. Fischer, op. cit., 52.
64. Ibid., 53.
65. It is not clear that Fischer and Ravizza would agree with this point. In "Free Will and the Modal Principle," Fischer and Ravizza make this claim: "In assessing the alternatives open to an agent we do not consider merely those accessible possible worlds that are *most similar* to the actual world. Rather, for an agent to have the power to act indefensibly it suffices that there merely be *some* accessible possible world in which he does so act"(225). This line of Fischer and Ravizza's can be read as affirming what I am denying here.
66. Unless, of course, volitions or decisions are or include desires or are necessarily based on particular desires, in which case there would have to be some change in desires in any change in volitions or decisions. This caveat should be taken to govern subsequent expressions of this sort as well.
67. Fischer himself gives a case very similar to this one in which the evil neurosurgeon introduces no change in his victim's mental capacities beyond producing a decision to vote in a certain way (see Fischer, op. cit., 131–32).
68. These analogue Frankfurt-style counterexamples, in my view, therefore also call into question what Fischer calls "the flicker of freedom strategy" designed to support the principle of alternative possibilities (see Fischer, op. cit., 134–40). I explain and develop this point in my "Frankfurt-style Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternative Possibilities" (forthcoming).

69. I have argued for this position in "Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," in *Faith, Freedom, and Rationality*, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Jeff Jordan (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996).
70. For some discussion of the notion of form in Aquinas and the sort of configuration with which it can be identified, see my "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism, and Materialism without Reductionism," *Faith and Philosophy* 12 (1995): 505–31.
71. I have argued for this interpretation of Aquinas's account of the soul in "Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism, and Materialism without Reductionism."
72. And, of course, Aquinas supposes that something intrinsic, namely, the will, regularly does act on the intellect with efficient causation.
73. If Aquinas were to deny that anything extrinsic acted with efficient causality on the intellect, then he would be rejecting the claim I argued for above, viz., that passivity is an essential part of cognitive functioning.
74. There is nothing peculiar to medieval philosophy or to dualist accounts of the mind in the rejection of causal determinism. For an interesting recent argument against causal determinism on the part of someone opposed to dualism in philosophy of mind, see Dupré, op. cit.
75. For some brief remarks about the way in which volitions reflect or stem from the intellect or the way in which the intellect constrains the will, without the intellect's exercising efficient causality on the will, see note 48.
76. Making this claim precise would require giving and defending a theory of incontinence, which is outside the scope of this paper. The salient point here, I think, is just that after the vote what is true of Irene is not that she now believes Francesca's view of the case is wrong but rather that she is ashamed of herself and afraid to face Francesca. So something of this sort must be true of her. At the time of the vote, under the pull of the passions she culpably ignored thoughts that would have led her intellect to reject the belief that failing to stand was then the (prudently) good thing to do, or she was double-minded in believing that this occasion was an exception to the general rule that prudence shouldn't trump morality, or something else of the sort which explains both the motivation that results in her failure to stand and her shame immediately afterwards.
77. In conversation, Harry Frankfurt has objected to this view on the grounds that it can't explain in what sense the thoughts around which Irene is being said here to identify herself are her own. But this objection seems to me not to appreciate the two senses of identification. Irene is to be identified with her mind, insofar as at least part of what it is to be Irene is to have *this* mind, where *this* counts as her mind only in case it is functioning normally, which includes not being causally determined by factors outside her. A thought produced by this normally functioning mind is then *her* thought in virtue of having been produced by *her* mind. Once her thoughts are identified in this way, the second sense of identification can be brought in to explain why Irene's second-order volitions are particularly authoritative for her.
78. Of course, if what were at issue in passivity were not the suspension of the motions of the soul but the permanent cessation of those motions, then passivity would be antithetical to personhood. But in ordinary cases of passivity, an agent's inactivity is only temporary; it results from her faculties' being at rest, not from their being destroyed.
79. See, for example, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person": "It is not true that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if his will was free when he did it. He may be morally responsible for having done it even though his will was not free at all" (23–24).
80. I'm not sure whether or not Frankfurt would think an agent could be wholehearted with regard to subjective evil. But for my purposes here, the interesting point has to do with what is objectively morally wrong, not with whether an agent would acknowledge it as wrong.
81. He might also be confused, irrational, self-deceived, or have other impairments of this sort.

82. See, for example, *Summa theologiae*, I–II, q. 45 a. 4 and a. 6. The biblical claim can be found in Isaiah 48:22.

83. I am grateful to the participants of an author's colloquium with Harry Frankfurt at the Zentrum fuer interdiziplinaerische Forschung at the University of Bielefeld, and especially to Harry Frankfurt himself, for lively discussion which led me to write this paper. I am also indebted to William Alston, John Martin Fischer, Harry Frankfurt, Carl Ginet, Robert Gordon, John Heil, Christopher Hill, Norman Kretzmann, and William Rowe for very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.