Personal relations and moral residue

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ABSTRACT

To what extent can one be saddled with responsibility or guilt as a result of actions committed not by oneself but by others with whom one has a familial or national connection or some other communal association? The issue of communal guilt has been extensively discussed, and there has been no shortage of writers willing to apply the notion of communal responsibility and guilt to Germany after the Holocaust. But the whole notion of communal guilt is deeply puzzling. How can evil actions cast a shadow over the future in this way to generate obligations or guilt on the part of those who did not in any way participate in those actions? In this article, I will focus on a question that is a smaller-scale analogue of the question of communal guilt, one which raises similar perplexities but in a more tractable way. I will concentrate on the restoration of relations with perpetrators of great evil in cases in which their whole-hearted repentance is not in doubt. Most of us feel a strong antipathy to the restoration of relations with such a perpetrator. What explains and supports that emotive reaction is the subject of this article, and its conclusions are suggestive of promising approaches to the question of communal guilt.

Key words: Aquinas, communal guilt, forgiveness, Holocaust, repentance
INTRODUCTION

In the terrible days in Hitler's bunker in Berlin, as the Nazi dream of a thousand-year reign was turning into a nightmare of defeat, Magda Goebbels, wife of Hitler's master propagandist Joseph Goebbels, killed all six of her children by Goebbels before committing suicide herself. Before she put her children to death, she told Traudl Junge, Hitler's secretary in the bunker, that 'she preferred for her children to die than for them to live in the disgrace of Germany that would be left.' In a letter to her sister-in-law from her first marriage, Magda explained her resolution to kill the children in this way:

In the world coming [after the war] Joseph will be regarded as one of the greatest criminals Germany has ever produced. His children would have to hear that daily; people would torment them, despise and humiliate them. They would bear the burden of everything that he has done. . . .

Magda's murder of her children is heart-rendingly horrible, and most of us would be inclined to reject her explanation for it as wholeheartedly as the dreadful action itself. And yet, unquestionably, life was hard for the surviving children of the perpetrators of the Holocaust. Martin Borman, Jr., the son of Hitler's factotum Martin Borman, was only 15 years old at the end of the war, not of an age to bear any personal guilt for the actions of his monstrous father; but in his adult years his heritage was a source of great pain to him. He was a member of a group of people who banded together to share their burden as children of Nazis. One member of that group, Thomas Heydrich, whose uncle was Reinhard Heydrich, Himmler's notorious second-in-command, and whose father was also in the German military, spoke for the rest of the group when he said of his own father:

[I]f he had stayed alive, it would have helped me very much: he would have shouldered the guilt I carried for twenty years. I would have been free. . . .

We might suppose that the distress of these adult children of Nazis arose simply from the entirely unjust abhorrence that other people transferred to them from their fathers, and no doubt many did suffer from being marginalized by others. But in fact, the worst of their psychic suffering stemmed much more from another source, namely, their own burden of guilt and their sense of the horror of their patrimony. In response to a question about his childless status, the son of the head of the Gestapo in Braunschweig said, 'Children? No, we have no children. How could we?' The daughter of a general in the Einsatzgruppen responsible for the murder of Jews in Russia learned the truth about her father only in adulthood; and she said:

The wife of Hans Frank's oldest s father ruined his life. He doesn't talk about his father did."

There is surely something perp. Germans who had family members suppose that they suffer from it by a combination of good therapy. And yet a little reflection shows that Most of us also feel it was appropriate if the cost of those reparations was evenly spread at the time of the war. If it perpetrators of the Holocaust were held responsible, it seems that, a fortiori, the part of Germans who were not after it.

The psychic suffering of thechild acceptance of the need for Germ. philosophical questions, most not what extent can one be saddled with actions committed not by oneself or national connection or some communal guilt has been extensively discussed, which has been a problem in early Christian writers proposed Adam and therefore shared in the been no shortage of writers who responsibility and guilt to Gehr approving of a similar sentiment o says of Germans, 'The guilt is held harder to feel the pull of this attit. tive includes such people as Thon the war ended. In what sense is a pt in collective punishment?

The mirror image of the notion responsibility for reparations is to remember a great evil. In wh. in the Holocaust, who are altogether as a communal bond with those w remember it? We might suppose remembering it, as suggested by th
As of then I always wanted to punish, hurt myself; if I had this father, I told myself... I must pay for it.

The wife of Hans Frank's oldest son, Norman, said about her husband, 'His father ruined his life. He doesn't think he has a right to be happy after what his father did.'

There is surely something perplexing about the distress of these and other Germans who had family members implicated in the Holocaust. We might suppose that they suffer from irrational guilt, which should be dealt with by a combination of good therapy and psychoactive drugs of the right sort. And yet a little reflection shows that the matter must be more complicated. Most of us also feel it was appropriate for Germany to pay reparations, even if the cost of those reparations fell on those who were children or not yet born at the time of the war. It was the case that the children of Nazi perpetrators of the Holocaust were not in any way compromised by their heritage, it seems that, a fortiori, there was no obligation of reparation on the part of Germans who were not adults during the war or were born only after it.

The psychic suffering of the children of Nazi criminals and the widespread acceptance of the need for Germany to pay war reparations raises puzzling philosophical questions, most notably, the question of communal guilt. To what extent can one be saddled with responsibility or guilt as a result of actions committed not by oneself but by others with whom one has a familial or national connection or some other communal association? The issue of communal guilt has been extensively discussed. It is a large, complicated issue, which has been a problem in Western philosophy at least since the time early Christian writers proposed that all humanity was somehow united in Adam and therefore shared in the guilt of Adam's original sin. There has been no shortage of writers willing to apply the notion of communal responsibility and guilt to Germany after the Holocaust. For example, approving of a similar sentiment on the part of Karl Jaspers, A. Zvi Bar-On says of Germans, 'The guilt is collective and so is the punishment.' But it is harder to feel the pull of this attitude when one remembers that the collective includes such people as Thomas Heydrich, who was 11 years old when the war ended. In what sense is a person such as Heydrich deserving of a share in collective punishment?

The mirror image of the notion of an inheritance of guilt or a collective responsibility for reparations is what is sometimes spoken of as an obligation to remember a great evil. In what sense can those who did not participate in the Holocaust, who are altogether guiltless of it, who do not have so much as a communal bond with those who were guilty of it, have an obligation to remember it? We might suppose that some prudential good is served by remembering it, as suggested by the dictum that those who do not learn from...
the past are condemned to repeat it. But why should there be a moral obligation on anybody's part to remember it?

Both the notion of communal guilt for the Holocaust and the notion of an obligation to remember it are deeply puzzling. How can evil actions cast a shadow over the future in this way to generate obligations or guilt on the part of those who did not in any way participate in those actions?

In this article, I will leave this large-scale question to one side for the sake of focusing instead on a little-league analogy of it which raises similar perplexities. If we can find some solution to the latter problem, it will shed some light on the larger problem of communal responsibility or guilt for past evil on the part of those who did not commit the evil. My chief concern here is only the smaller puzzle, but in the conclusion of this article I will say something briefly about its implications for the larger problem.

A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

To see this smaller puzzle, conduct a thought experiment. Suppose that Joseph Goebbels did not commit suicide after his wife killed their six children and herself; suppose instead that he chose to live and in fact survived till some time after the war. Suppose as well that immediately after the war something—never mind what—occurred which caused Goebbels to see himself as the rest of the world now sees him, as a moral monster, and that in consequence of that awful insight into himself, Goebbels had a genuine conversion of heart and repented all his earlier evil with passion. (I want to call attention to the fact that I am stipulating that the conversion and repentance were genuine and genuinely fervent, so as to ward off questions of a sort irrelevant to the issue of concern to me.) Suppose, too, that Goebbels was duly tried and given a punishment appropriate to his war crimes, though, for the sake of the thought experiment, let it also be the case that that punishment was delayed and not meted out to him for some period of time.

Now consider Goebbels in this period after his repentance and the assignment of punishment (but before the infliction of the punishment, to avoid complicating the thought experiment needlessly). If you had been a contemporary of Goebbels's then, what would your attitude towards him have been? Would you have been willing to admit him to the circle of your friends? Would you have wanted your children to have contact with him? Would you have been willing to have him at your dinner table? For very many people, the answer to these last questions is an adamant 'no'.

The unshakability of this 'no' can coexist with bafflement about what could justify it. Before Goebbels was repentant, what would have rendered it objectionable to include him in family life or among friends is just that the non-repentant Goebbels was a morally evil man. But the same thing cannot be said about the repentant Goebbels. Stipulation in my thought experiment his beliefs and desires are not the condition in his repentant state is the: any ordinary human being. Some might suppose that his past evil sthat this debt makes a morally significant it. But in my thought experiment assigned him; only its implementation see what difference the mere del moral attitude towards him. Any the perpetrator which has been cl present in him in his repentant cc.

So what is there about his past which casts a shadow over our j. What is it which leaves the repentant morally tainted by his past evil? problem of communal guilt or res larger problem in a simpler and m what it is about the past evil of an shadows our attitude towards tha perhaps some light will be shed o on the part of a family or a nation were not participants in that historic obligations because of it.

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be said about the repentant Goebbels. If he is genuinely repentant (and by stipulation in my thought experiment he is), then his actions, his volitions, his beliefs and desires are not those a morally evil man has. His moral condition in his repentant state is therefore, apparently, no different from that of any ordinary human being. Some people who favor retributive punishment might suppose that his past evil saddles him: with a debt of punishment, and that this debt makes a morally significant difference to our attitudes towards him. But in my thought experiment, the appropriate punishment has been assigned him, only its implementation is delayed. Since this is so, it is hard to see what difference the mere delay of the punishment could make to our moral attitude towards him. Any morally beneficial effect on the character of the perpetrator which has been claimed to spring from punishment is already present in him in his repentant condition.

So what is there about his past evil actions, volitions, beliefs and desires which casts a shadow over our present and future attitudes towards him? What is it which leaves the repentant, reformed Goebbels apparently still morally tainted by his past evil? Clearly, this puzzle is analogous to the problem of communal guilt or responsibility, but it presents elements of that larger problem in a simpler and more manageable form. If we can understand what it is about the past evil of an individual person that appropriately overshadows our attitude towards that person when he is wholly repentant, then perhaps some light will be shed on the way in which the past history of evil on the part of a family or a nation affects the responsibilities of others who were not participants in that history but nonetheless seem to inherit guilt or obligations because of it.

In my view, significant light is thrown on the puzzle in this thought experiment by a part of Aquinas's ethics not much discussed in recent times, namely, his notion of a stain on the soul. In the next section, I will begin by explaining the context of that notion within Aquinas's general theory of action. Then I will explicate in some detail Aquinas's claim that serious moral wrongdoing leaves what he calls 'a stain' on the soul. Finally, I will attempt to show what help his notion of a psychic stain gives with the problems raised by my thought experiment involving Goebbels. I will argue that Aquinas's account helps us to understand not only why the adamant 'no' towards Goebbels in my thought experiment is warranted but also why that 'no' is compatible with our ordinary understanding of the positive moral status of a repentant person.

THE BACKGROUND: AQUINAS'S THEORY OF ACTION

Aquinas's argument for the presence of a stain on the soul depends on ruling out other moral defects that a morally wrong action (even a repentent morally
wrong action) can leave in an agent. To appreciate his argument, then, it is important to understand something of his general theory of morally right and wrong actions.

For Aquinas, any action, even a mental action, is the product of a coordinated activity on the part of an agent's intellect and will. Aquinas takes the will to be not a neutral faculty, as we generally suppose when we think of the faculty or module responsible for volitions; rather, it is a certain bent or inclination. The will, Aquinas says, is a hunger, an appetite, for goodness. By 'goodness' in this connection Aquinas means goodness in general, not this or that specific good thing; that is, the will is an inclination for what is good, where the phrase 'what is good' is used attributively and not referentially. Furthermore, the good here is the good broadly considered, as distinct from the moral good only.

By itself the will makes no determinations of goodness; apprehending or judging things as good is the business of the intellect. The intellect presents to the will as good certain things or actions under certain descriptions in particular circumstances, and the will wills them because it is an appetite for the good and they are presented to it as good. For this reason, the intellect is said to move the will not as an efficient cause but as a final cause, because its presenting something as good moves the will as an end moves an appetite. On Aquinas's account, the will wills only what the intellect presents at that time as good under some description. Acts of will are for something apprehended or cognized as good at a particular time in particular circumstances, as distinct from something which is good considered unconditionally or abstractly. But all things (other than God and happiness) are such that they can in principle be considered good under some descriptions and not good under others, so that there is nothing about the intellect's apprehension of them which must constrain the will of any agent always to want them.

On the other hand, the will in its turn also moves the intellect. In fact, for Aquinas, the will exercises some degree of efficient causality over the intellect. In some circumstances, it can command the intellect directly to adopt or to reject a particular belief. It can also move the intellect by directing it to attend to some things and to neglect others, or even to stop thinking about something altogether. Since the will wills something only in case the intellect presents it as some sort of good, the fact that the will can command the intellect to stop thinking about something means that the will can, indirectly, turn itself off, at least with regard to a particular action or issue. (This is only a limited ability on the part of the will, however, since the apprehensions of the intellect can occur without any preceding act of will and so in some cases may force the issue back on the agent's attention.)

If the intellect does present something to the will as good, then, because the will is an appetite for the good, the will wills it—unless the will directs the intellect to reconsider, to direct its attention to something else, or to stop considering the matter at hand. The intellect's presenting such an act on the part of the intellect is part of the will directing the attention on Aquinas's account of intellect feedback system composed of the passions, a complication I am looking to albeit Aquinas's account of the not committed to seeing moral mistakes in deliberation, since the by the will. In cases of incontinent sentencing something as good which the intellect, influenced by desires to represent the thing in question and not good (under a double-minded) and in the last analysis person represents as the best alter not that which the agent takes to the abstract.

If we remember this part of Aquinas's identification of the will as a hun make a mistake and identify the 'toggling' switch with three positions: of the will is more complicated example, the will can will some particular action and other specific commands to body parts; hence what intellect presents to it as a thing of the intellect. Finally, by ex, dispositional habits or dispositions, so that it is something. There can be habits that these can also be influential in wh

On Aquinas's theory of action, not only from a moral flaw in the intellect, which apprehends a good or which takes a lesser good, a greater good. Aquinas recognizes habits or dispositions which ren similar wrong acts in the future. I he recognizes virtues and vices of example, wisdom is an intellect;

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an act on the part of the intellect may itself be a result of previous acts on the
part of the will directing the attention of the intellect. It is apparent, then, that
on Aquinas's account of intellect and will, the will is part of a dynamic
feedback system composed of the will and the intellect (but also including the
passions, a complication I am leaving to one side here). For this reason,
although Aquinas's account of the will assigns a large role to intellect, he is
not committed to seeing morally wrong actions simply as instances of
mistakes in deliberation, since the intellect's deliberations are also influenced
by the will. In cases of incontinence, where the intellect seems to be repre-
senting something as good which the will is not willing, Aquinas would say
that the intellect, influenced by the will, is in fact being moved by opposed
desires to represent the thing in question as both good (under one descrip-
tion) and not good (under a different description), so that the intellect is
double-minded. In the last analysis, what the intellect of the incontinent
person represents as the best alternative in these circumstances at this time is
not that which the agent takes to be good considered unconditionally or in
the abstract.

If we remember this part of Aquinas's account and also take seriously his
identification of the will as a hunger or an appetite, we will be less likely to
make a mistake and identify the will on his account as nothing more than a
toggle switch with three positions: accept, reject, and off. Aquinas's account
of the will is more complicated than such an identification implies. For
example, the will can will something with more or less strength. It can give
specific commands to body parts. Under the pull of the passions, it can influence
what intellect presents to it as good by selectively directing the attention
of the intellect. Finally, because it is an appetite, the will can have
dispositions or habits, so that it can be more or less readily inclined to want
something. There can be habits or dispositions of the intellect as well, and
these can also be influential in what an agent chooses to do.

On Aquinas's theory of action, then, any act of moral wrongdoing stems
not only from a moral flaw in the will but also from a corresponding flaw
in the intellect, which apprehends as an apparent good what is not a real
good or which takes a lesser good as better than something which is in fact
a greater good. Aquinas recognizes that repeated wrong acts can build up
habits or dispositions which render a person more liable to the same or
similar wrong acts in the future. These are vices, in his terminology; in fact,
he recognizes virtues and vices of the intellect as well as of the will. So, for
example, wisdom is an intellectual virtue which makes its possessor apt in
moral discernment on matters of great weight. Enough moral wrongdoing,
however, can build up in the intellect the opposite of wisdom, namely, the
habit or disposition of folly, which is a kind of moral stupidity in serious
cases. More familiar cases of morally wrong habits, such as the habit of avarice, are vices in the will.

Any morally wrong act, then, can be considered to leave the agent morally flawed in three respects. The wrong act itself springs from an erring intellect and from a wrongly configured will; it either contributes to the formation of an intellectual or moral vice or springs from one of them.

The repentance of a wrong act undoes at least some of these flaws. On Aquinas's theory of action, when an agent S does a morally wrong act A, his intellect (perhaps itself under the influence of a flawed will) erroneously apprehends doing A at that time in those circumstances as the good to be pursued, and S accordingly forms a morally wrong volition to do A. If nothing external to the will impedes that volition, S then does A. When S repents, his intellect accepts that doing A was in fact morally wrong, and his will rejects the doing of A, rather than being configured by the desire for it. In consequence of his repentance, then, the flawed configuration of S's intellect and will are removed and replaced by morally good configurations instead.

This can happen in such a way as to leave relatively untouched the building dispositions or habits in the intellect and will, as often happens when a person repents some particular act of moral wrongdoing without a deeper change of heart. But if the repentance is deep enough and fervent enough, then it may also alter for the better the habits of the intellect and will which were building or already in place inclining the agent to morally wrong acts. It is hard to find clear cases of repentance of this sort among well-known Nazis. The most famous (but also controversial) real-life case is Albert Speer, whose apparently genuine repentance distinguished him from other high-ranking Nazis, such as the flagrantly unrepentant Goering, in the period immediately after the war. It is easier to find cases in which the change of heart and mind, the repentance, as it were, which erases previous dispositions, is dubiously moral if it is moral at all. Himmler's case is not untypical. Himmler was fervently Catholic in his youth; at 19, he wrote in his diary, 'Come what may, I shall always love God, pray to Him, and adhere to the Catholic Church and defend it.' And yet five years later, in 1924, Otto Strasser (brother of the infamous Gregor Strasser) wrote about Himmler, 'Comes from a strong Catholic family, but does not want to know anything about the Church.' By the time Himmler's father died a decade or so later, although Himmler did attend the Catholic funeral, in public comments he relegated the Catholic liturgy of the funeral to 'all the festivals, all the celebrations in human life, in our life, whose Christian forms and style we cannot accept inwardly, which we can no longer be a party to, and for which, in so and so many cases, we have not yet found a new form.'

Given his theory of action, then, the saint (at least repentance of a sufficient for wiping out the flaws introduced into an agent by his understanding of the nature of a person should have the same in question. But this is not in fact repentant agent, there remains w Aquinas himself poses an objection...

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AQUINAS’S NOTION OF A STAIN ON THE SOUL

Given his theory of action, then, one would suppose that, for Aquinas, repen-
tance (at least repentance of a sufficiently wholehearted sort) would be suf-
cient for wiping out the flaws of intellect and will, occurring and habitual,
introduced into an agent by his own moral wrongdoing. On Aquinas’s
understanding of the nature of moral wrongdoing, it seems as if a repentant
person should have the same moral status as he did before the wrongdoing
in question. But this is not in fact Aquinas’s view. Even for a whole-heartedly
repentant agent, there remains what Aquinas calls ‘a stain on the soul’.

Aquinas himself poses an objection to this position of his of this sort:

... if sin causes a stain, this stain is either something positive, or a pure
privation. If it is something positive, it can only be a disposition or habit: for nothing else seems to be caused by an act. But it is not a dis-
position or habit, for a stain can remain even after the removal of a dis-
position or habit, as is evident in the case of a man who has committed
a mortal sin of prodigality, and then by mortally sinning acquires a habit
of the opposite vice. Therefore the stain does not denote anything
positive in the soul. Similarly, it is not a pure privation either. Because
all sins agree as far as turning away and privation of grace go, and so it
would follow that there is only one stain for all sins. Therefore the stain
is not the effect of sin.24

Here Aquinas’s putative objector is canvassing the possibilities for the effects
left on the psyche of a person S who does a morally wrong act A. If S’s doing
A leaves a stain on S’s psyche, then, the objector says, that stain has to consist
either in the presence of some new flaw in S’s psyche or in the absence of
something good that was previously in S’s psyche. But, the objector argues,
it can be neither of these, and therefore there is no such thing as a stain on
the soul left by moral wrongdoing.

The putative objector argues for the first part of his conclusion in this way.
Any flaw that consisted in a positive attribute caused by an act of moral
wrongdoing would have to be (or contribute to the establishing of) a dis-
position or habit of such wrongdoing. To rule out this alternative, the objector
raises the example of a person who leaves entirely behind the habit of a former
vice by some single act of moral wrongdoing of a sort opposed to that vice.
(Imagine a sad version of the parable of the prodigal son, where the soul-
seared prodigal, now at home, steals a huge sum of money from a neighbor
and resolves to hoard it, come what may, so as never to be poor again.) In
such a case, on the argument in the objection, the old prodigal habits and dis-
positions in the will are removed. And so, the objection implies, if there still
remains in the soul some stain from the former period when the agent sinned
by being prodigal, that stain cannot be a habit or disposition of the will. Since,
on the objection, those are the only candidates for a positive attribute, then if there is a stain on the soul, it cannot be a positive attribute.

The argument for the second part of the objector’s conclusion is more condensed. The stain left by an act of moral wrongdoing cannot consist in a privation or absence either, according to the putative objector, and that is because the only candidate for something which could be taken away from the psyche by a single morally wrong act would be grace itself. But every serious moral wrong deprives a psyche of God’s grace, and so there would be only one kind of stain on the soul from every kind of moral evil – and this, the putative objector thinks, is a *reductio ad absurdum* of the claim that the stain could be a privation or an absence. It seems obvious (at least the objector takes it as obvious, and Aquinas agrees, as his rejoinder to the objection shows) that different kinds of wrongdoing stain the soul in different ways; avarice leaves a different sort of stain from that left by murder. Consequently, the stain cannot consist in a privation.

And so, since the argument in the objection has already concluded that the stain cannot be something positive in the psyche, in the view of the putative objector, the only candidates for something that could count as a stain are ruled out. Consequently, it is not true, the objector claims, that every seriously wrong moral act leaves a stain on the soul.

In reply to the objector’s argument, Aquinas says:

The stain is neither something positive in the soul, nor does it signify a privation only; rather, it signifies a certain privation of the soul’s brightness in relation to its cause, which is sin. And so diverse sins occasion diverse stains. It is like a shadow, which is the privation of light because of the obstacle of some body, and which varies according to the diversity of the bodies which constitute the obstacle [to the light].

The heart of this reply of Aquinas’s consists in the claim that the objector’s argument rests on a false dilemma. There is a third possibility: in addition to the possibilities that the psychic stain is a disposition or an absence of some intrinsic characteristic, there is the third possibility that the stain is an absence of some relational characteristic which the soul would have had without the morally wrong act and which would have contributed to the soul’s looseness.

Aquinas’s terminology here has a certain ambiguity to it. Sometimes he describes the stain as if it were a characteristic stemming from a relation of the agent’s, as in the example in the quotation just given, where the stain seems to be a characteristic, namely, darkness, which is in a soul separated from the light of God. But in other places Aquinas seems to take the stain just as the very relation itself, as the separation of the soul from God, for example. For my purposes here, it is not important to sort out this ambiguity, and so for simplicity’s sake I will take the stain on the soul to be the relation of being separated, from God or from some other person.

There are places where Aquinas which is lost in sinning) divine grace. So, for example, he

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WRONGDOING

Aquinas’s idea that we have to think about the effect of moral w
There are places where Aquinas speaks of the soul's comeliness (the comeliness which is lost in sinning) as a matter of the soul's being illumined by divine grace. So, for example, he says:

The stain of sin remains in the soul even when the act of sin is past. The reason for this is that the stain . . . implies a defect in the brightness [of the soul] on account of [its] withdrawal from the light of reason or of the divine law. And therefore so long as a human being remains out of this sort of light, the stain of sin remains in him.26

Elsewhere, Aquinas contrasts the soul's intrinsic characteristics with the relational nature of the stain and the lost comeliness of the stained soul:

. . . a stain implies a loss of brightness as a result of some contact, as is clear in the case of corporeal things, from which the term 'stain' has been transferred to the soul by a figure of speech. Now, just as in the body there are two sorts of brightness, one resulting from the inward disposition of the members and from color, the other resulting from a supervening external luminosity, so too, in the soul, there are two sorts of brightness, one which is a habit and, as it were, intrinsic, the other as it were an external flash of light.27

That this so-called flash of light is a matter of standing in a certain relation to God is made explicit in other passages. So, for example, Aquinas says:

Two things can be considered with regard to sin: the guilty act, and the consequent stain . . . [Now] if we speak of the removal of sin as far as the stain is concerned, it is evident that the stain of sin cannot be removed from the soul unless the soul is joined to God, since it was through being separated from God that it suffered the loss of its brightness, which is the stain . . . 28

Because the stain is a relational characteristic, it can remain even when the sin that caused the stain ceases. Aquinas puts the point this way:

The act of sin produces distance from God, and the defect of brightness is consequent on this distance. Now, in the same way, local motion causes local distance; and so, just as when motion ceases, local distance is not removed, so when the act of sin ceases, the stain is not [thereby] removed.29

WRONGDOING AND RELATIONSHIP

Aquinas's idea that we have to consider disrupted relationships when we think about the effect of moral wrongdoing on the perpetrator of the wrong
is helpful; and it seems right even if we bracket his theology and consider only human relationships. So, for example, consider the relations between Martin Heidegger and Hermann Staudinger, a Nobel-prize-winning chemist at the University of Freiburg during the time when Heidegger was rector. Documentary evidence recently came to light showing that Heidegger secretly betrayed Staudinger to the Gestapo and campaigned for his dismissal from the university because of the pacifist sentiments which Staudinger had expressed at an earlier period in his life. Staudinger was interrogated by the Nazis on more than one occasion and, in the end, narrowly escaped the punishment Heidegger had covertly tried to bring about.

Suppose, what does not seem to have been the case, both that Staudinger knew about Heidegger’s proceedings against him and that later Heidegger was entirely repentant for his actions. If (contrary to fact) Heidegger had been genuinely repentant, then, like the repentant Goebbels of my thought experiment, Heidegger’s intellect and will, and the dispositions of his intellect and will, would (in his repentant state and with regard to Staudinger) have been those of a morally good person. Nonetheless, there would have been a problem for Staudinger as regards Heidegger. After Heidegger’s initiation of the Nazi investigation of Staudinger, Heidegger stood in a different relation to Staudinger from that which he had had before. Afterwards, Heidegger was a person who had betrayed Staudinger’s trust. Even if Heidegger were sorry for it, even if his repentance was so deep and evident that Staudinger had no concern about Heidegger’s future trustworthiness, Heidegger’s history then included his betrayal of Staudinger, as it did not before. Heidegger then had a relational property which he lacked before, namely, the relational property of having betrayed his colleague. And this relational property will clearly make a huge difference to Staudinger.

It would be helpful here to be able to say in some more detail what it is to disrupt a relationship or to introduce distance into it. It will, however, be at least as hard to analyze the metaphors in these locations as it is to say what constitutes the establishing of a personal relationship, or what closeness in personal relationships is. Our untutored efforts in that regard are not likely to be successful. Intimacy, we might say, is requisite. Intimacy, however, is simply a metaphor which is familiar enough to be unnoticed; the Latin word from which ‘intimacy’ comes means ‘innermost’ — but then being intimate is a matter of not being at a distance, and the explanation is not advanced. It is not surprising therefore that there are whole books given to trying to explain what goes into the establishing and maintaining of personal relationships. Plainly, then, it will not be possible in passing here to spell out with any precision what goes into the disruption of a relationship or what conditions make a relationship distant. Consequently, for present purposes, I will rely on the ordinary intuitive sense we all have of what a distant or a disrupted relationship is.

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It is clear that this relational property is relevant to a moral evaluation of Heidegger, even if we stipulate that Heidegger’s repentance was deep enough so that no one, including even Staudinger, felt any inclination to inflict him further through any sort of penalty or punishment. Nonetheless, even if Heidegger had been forgiven in this way, it does seem right to think, as Aquinas does, that something which was good in his relationship to his colleague Staudinger, some innocence in their relationship, lost some of its brightness and was shadowed or stained by Heidegger’s acts of betrayal. (I do not mean to say that there is no remedy for such a problem or that a relationship undermined in this way cannot in fact be restored, as I will explain below in the section on removing the stain. I mean here only to confirm Aquinas’s claim that the wrongdoing, considered in itself alone, diminishes or darkens, as Aquinas puts it, something relational that was good.)

A case can be made that, contrary to Aquinas’s position, this change of relational property is accompanied by changes in intrinsic characteristics which are also relevant to a moral evaluation of the agent and which are left untouched by repentance alone, however fervent that repentance is. It is noteworthy that, in the moral evaluation of the repentant Goebbels in my thought experiment, intellect and will were the only faculties canvassed. But there are other mental capacities relevant to the evaluation of an agent. Memory, for example, also is important in such cases. Surely, it makes a difference to an agent’s psychic economy that he remembers what it was like to do the morally wrong acts he did. It will make a difference to Staudinger that Heidegger remembers what it was like to conspire against him, and it seems right that it should.

This claim rests on intuitions which strike me as very widely shared. But those inclined to resist them may want to consider more extreme cases in which there seems to be something staining just about the memory itself, apart from the other effects of the memory on the rememberer. The memory of having engaged in the physical torture of another human being is an example. Otto Moll was at the head of the work detail managing the exterminations at Auschwitz; he participated in the gassing and cremation of very many people, and he himself shot people too weak to be herded into the gas chambers. At his interrogation at Nuremberg, he evinced a strong desire to dissociate himself from the horrors he had engaged in. But even if it had been the case that Moll was genuinely repentant (and there is no evidence that he was), there would have been something morally compromising about the memory of his acts. That may be one reason why the repentant themselves find such memories an affliction. Moll himself felt that his mind had cracked under the strain of the memories.

There is also a sense in which engaging in a serious moral wrong leaves a psyche with a certain sort of moral slackness, as it were, a sort of moral
flabbiness which it would not otherwise have had. There are cognitive facul-
ties other than intellect and memory, of a sort not imagined in Aquinas’s
philosophical psychology; and wrongdoing can leave them, too, morally
worse. So, for example, consider the ability to simulate the mind of another
human being, which is part of the cognitive capacities of all normal human
adults. Most people cannot simulate the mind of a person such as Moll; and we
give expression to that incapacity by saying things like ‘I can’t imagine
how a person can do a thing like that!’ But perhaps someone who has engaged
in violent crime or horrible wrongdoing is for that very reason more able to
simulate the mind of the person who engages in other serious moral evils.

That a person is morally the worse for being able successfully to form this
sort of simulation seems to me clear, although the moral flaw here is not a
matter of the agent’s having flawed desires or flawed beliefs about what is
good, any more than the flaw in the memory of the torturer is. At any rate,
that extensive participation in monumental evil can leave a psyche slack in a
morally deplorable way, however exactly we are to analyze such slackness, is
shown most clearly by the extreme case of Rudolf Hess. The psychiatrists
who examined him at Nuremberg testified both to his self-serving cunning
and to his ‘great instability’; and Major Sheppard said of Hess, ‘I believe by
the nature of his make-up, which reflects cruelty, bestiality, deceit, conceit,
arrogance, and a yellow streak, that he has lost his soul and has willingly per-
mitted himself to become plastic in the hands of a more powerful and comp-
pelling personality.’

And so Aquinas has conceded more to the argument in the objection
quoted above than he needed to do, because he was restricting his consider-
ation of possible changes effected in the psyche of a wrongdoer to only a
subset of mental capacities, by focusing on privations or dispositions just in
the will and the intellect. Nonetheless, it is his notion of the stain as a matter
of disturbed relationships that I want to highlight here.

MORAL WRONGDOING AND ALIENATION

The relationship Aquinas focuses on is the wrongdoer’s relationship to God,
which is disrupted because by his wrong action the agent distances himself
from God. But there are also other relationships, those just between human
beings, to consider; as far as that goes, there is also the matter of a wrong-
doer’s relationship to himself. A person can be alienated or estranged from
himself, as well as from others.

Aquinas’s own views entail that there will be such internal alienation in
certain cases. According to Aquinas, in doing a morally wrong action a
wrongdoer becomes divided within himself. That is because, on Aquinas’s
optimistic views of human nature, human beings are built in such a way that

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AND ALIENATION

The wrongdoer's relationship to God, action the agent distances himself onships, those just between human there is also the matter of a wrong-
can be isolated or estranged from will be such internal alienation in doing a morally wrong action a self. That is because, on Aquinas's beings are built in such a way that neither a human intellect nor a human will can fail entirely to be connected to the good. For Aquinas, a human being cannot be wholly integrated in evil, but only in good. Someone who fails to will the good in one way or another therefore also fails to be integrated within himself to one degree or another. To some extent, such a person will be divided in will and also double-minded. In order to will the wrong action, he will have to suppress something in his intellect, which thus becomes divided against itself; and some part of his will will reject what some other part of his will desires. To this extent, the wrongdoer will be alienated from himself.

It is worth noting in this connection how often high-ranking Nazis were thought by others to be alienated from themselves in this way. Even Himmler saw his closest subordinate Heydrich in this way. Heydrich, Himmler said, is 'an unhappy man, completely divided against himself'.

A person internally divided in this way cannot be close to others either. He cannot reveal his mind to another person if he has hidden a good part of his mind from himself. And if he is internally divided in what he cares about, then whichever part of his divided will another person allies herself to, she will be separated from some other part. To that extent, they will not be united; he will want something she does not (or vice versa), no matter what the state of her will is. For this reason, in serious moral wrongdoing, to one degree or another, a person isolates himself from others. The social isolation and loneliness of the high-ranking Nazis is a feature regularly remarked on by their biographers. One of Ribbentrop's biographers remarks that by the mid-1930s Ribbentrop was characterized by 'an insensitive remoteness' that left him 'extremely difficult to like'. Even with regard to perhaps the most gregarious and social of the Nazi elite, Goering, one of his biographers says, 'Few got close to him. Indeed for all his excessive sociability he remained an outsider, keeping people at a distance. . . . [H]is sociability was a mask.'

It may be that an agent's alienation from herself ceases when she repents the evil she did, because the repentance undoes the internal division in her intellect and will; with regard to the former morally wrong act, the intellect of the repentant person has ceased to be double-minded, and her will is whole-hearted as well. But her internal integration does not instantly, by itself alone, restore her relationships with others, who were put at some distance from her by her wrongdoing. Albert Speer was able to survive Spandau as well as he did and to write Inside the Third Reich while he was in prison because his friend Rudolf Wolters spent his time and his resources unstintingly to support Speer and Speer's family. When Inside the Third Reich appeared, Wolters was stunned to find that there was no mention of him or acknowledgment of his help anywhere in Speer's highly successful book. It seems clear, in hindsight, that Speer, in his new role as repentant Nazi, found it prudent to distance himself from Wolters, whose postwar devotion to Hitler was embarrassing to Speer, but Wolters was devastated.
by what he took to be Speer's betrayal of his self-sacrificial friendship. 44 Even if Speer had eventually managed to repent that betrayal, his repentance alone would not have been sufficient for restoring the disturbed relationship between them. 45 A relationship has a life of its own; the healing of the relationship between Wolters and Speer was not the same thing as the internal healing of Speer's divided self.

And so Aquinas's position does seem right. Being separated to one degree or another from people to whom one would otherwise have been connected in close or caring ways takes away from the wrongdoer something that would have been lovely in him. Since it is through his own doing that the loneliness is diminished, there is something appropriate in the metaphor that represents the diminution as a stain.46

Someone might suppose here that the relationship between friends, such as Speer and Wolters, should be healed as soon as the betrayer is repentant; but this supposition rests on the mistaken assumption that a relationship is not affected by the past states of the persons in it, that only their present condition is relevant to it. As my remarks above about memory show, however, at least through memory the past lives on into the future. Wolters knew that Speer had not cared about him or honored his devotion, and both he and Speer remember that Wolters did not matter to Speer in anything like the way in which Speer mattered to him. In that way, a past state influences their relationship at a later time.

Furthermore, even if Wolters had never learned of Speer's betrayal, Speer's hiding his own memory of it would impact his relationship with Wolters detrimentally in another way. And the point would remain the same even if, after having repented his betrayal of Wolters, Speer himself suffered amnesia about it. There was a point in time after which Speer was a person who had betrayed the trust of his friend; before that time, he was not. And that difference in Speer's history alters his relationship to his friend, in morally relevant ways, which repentance alone does not undo. Or, if this example is unpersuasive in our current forgiving culture, then substitute an act of moral wrongdoing towards which we take a sterner attitude. Johann Paul Kremer, the camp doctor at Auschwitz, recorded in his diary that he would roam the camp dormitories in search of Jews from whom he might take fresh specimens of liver and pancreas by having them killed on his dissection table.47 Imagine, per improbabile, that at a later time in his life a thoroughly repentant Kremer developed amnesia and did not know who he was or what he had done; and imagine also that, by an accident of fate, Kremer wound up at the same dinner table with a survivor of that period in the Auschwitz camp, who failed to recognize his dinner companion as the camp doctor Kremer. People who knew the history of both men and heard of that dinner would wince, wouldn't they? There is something jarring in the thought that those two men, the beast and one of those afflicted by him, should be sharing a meal without awareness of their past co-jarring is a moral judgment on Kremer.

To this extent, then, even apart from Aquinas seems to me right in supposing a stain on the soul which is not erasable.

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Although Aquinas thinks that even a stain on the soul, he also thinks various places he discusses the way example, he says:

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To this extent, then, even apart from the much clearer case involving God, Aquinas seems to me right in supposing that serious moral wrongdoing leaves a stain on the soul which is not eradicated just by repentance.

When it comes to someone such as Goebbels, the wrongdoing is political, on an international scale, but the scale complicates the case without fundamentally altering it. By his complicity in the Holocaust, Goebbels removes himself a distance of light-years from ordinary human beings. He is a person who participated in the murder of millions of people, and any present relationship he might have to other people would have to be affected by that past evil. Even deep, fervent repentance on his part would not alter that past fact about him, and so by itself it also would not alter the disturbed and distant relationship between him and other people either.

RESTORATION

Although Aquinas thinks that every act of serious moral wrongdoing leaves a stain on the soul, he also thinks that this stain is not permanent, and in various places he discusses the way in which it can be removed. So, for example, he says:

... although the act of sin, by which a human being is distanced himself from the light of reason and the divine law, ceases, the person himself does not immediately return to the [state] in which he was [before he sinned]. Rather, there is necessary some motion of the will contrary to the previous motion of [the will in sinning].

This motion of the will includes the acceptance of what Aquinas calls ‘satisfaction’. Satisfaction is one of the three integral parts of penance (the other two being contrition and confession). Aquinas sees penance in general as a kind of medicine for sin; and, on his view, it aims primarily at the restoration of friendship between the wrongdoer and the one wronged (at least God, if not also human beings).

Satisfaction is a matter of the sinner’s doing voluntarily what would be punishment, simply considered, if it were imposed on him against his will. Aquinas says:

... a human being is joined to God through his will. And so the stain of sin cannot be removed from a human being unless his will accepts the order of divine justice, as, for example, if of his own accord he takes upon himself a punishment in recompense for his past fault, or even if he bears patiently a punishment given him by God. For, either way,
punishment has the nature of satisfaction. Now punishment that is a matter of satisfaction loses something of the nature of punishment: for it is the nature of punishment to be against the will. And although, strictly speaking, satisfactory punishment is against the will, nevertheless then, in this case, it is voluntary. . . .52

Aquinas’s idea, then, is that the stain left by moral wrongdoing, which leaves relationships disrupted, is removed, and the wrongdoer is restored to a position where friendship is available to him, by satisfaction; and satisfaction is a matter of the wrongdoer’s voluntarily doing something which is penal at least to this extent, that in other circumstances it would have been against his will to do. How onerous the satisfaction is must surely be a function of the nature of the original wrongdoing. If in anger a husband deliberately smashed his wife’s cherished teapot, the satisfaction necessary would no doubt be considerably less than whatever is required for repairing relations after an affair.

It is important to note here that on Aquinas’s view the point of satisfaction is to restore relationships, not to effect punishment for the wrongdoing. (Punishment may also be required for other reasons—for example, because it is a legal sanction for a crime—but that punishment is not the same as the satisfaction of penance.) Furthermore, satisfaction is not a matter of the offended party’s setting conditions for forgiveness. In discussing the remission of sins, which is on his view the goal of penance, Aquinas maintains that sins are remitted when the soul of the offender is at peace with the one offended.53 This emphasis is what we would expect from the previous explanation of the nature of the stain on the soul. The stain develops when the wrongdoer puts some distance between himself and others by the wrongdoing, and so it will also be the wrongdoer who needs to retrace that distance. There is psychological sense in this view, too. The wrongdoer will be at peace with others when he has a sense of having done what he can to make amends.

And so, on Aquinas’s view, contrition and confession, which comprise what we ordinarily mean by ‘repentance’, are not enough to remove the stain of sin, however efficacious they may be in restoring the wrongdoer to a morally good internal state. That is because the stain of sin has to do with the relationships disrupted by the wrongdoer’s acts. Removing the stain of sin requires the wrongdoer’s making satisfaction, the third part of penance on Aquinas’s view; and this is the wrongdoer’s voluntarily doing something of a sort he would otherwise eschew as against his will, for the sake of restoring the relationships disrupted by his wrongdoing.

It is clear that making satisfaction is not the correlate of or even a necessary condition for forgiveness. When the prodigal son in the parable returns home, his father falls on his neck and kisses him before the son has a chance to say a word. The forgiveness of the father is there for him unconditionally.
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And so the stain of moral wrongdoing, as distinct from any of the other
effects moral wrongdoing has, is removed when the wrongdoer finds a way
to make satisfaction and thereby undo his being at a distance from those
affected by his wrongdoing.

Aquinas clearly presumes that there is no wrongdoing and no stain such
that in this life the wrongdoer cannot make satisfaction for it and by that
means restore the relationships his wrongdoing disrupted, at least insofar as
the cause of the disruption lies in something in the wrongdoer. (There could
also be other causes of disruption, such as the unwillingness of the injured
party to forgive the wrongdoer, and the wrongdoer's making satisfaction will
by itself not be sufficient to remove these.) But not everyone will accept this
presumption of Aquinas's. Some people will reject the idea that there is
anything a person such as Goebbels could do which would restore relation-
ships between him and those horrified by his actions. For such people, there
are limits on the kinds of stain on the soul that making satisfaction can
remove. I do not wish to take sides here, because the question is too compi-
cated to be dealt with as a side issue in this article. But we can perhaps begin
to think about it by considering what we would expect of a good God. If we
would find it hard to call a deity good who was implacable towards some
repentant people, then perhaps a willingness to forgive repent evil of any
kind is part of our idea of what it is for a person to be good. And if a moral
monster such as Goebbels could be forgiven, if he were in the right circum-
stances for forgiveness to apply to him, then it is not so easy to see what
would prohibit his doing something by way of satisfaction in order to find his way back to life in the human community.\textsuperscript{54}

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this article, I called attention to the strong sense most people share, that they would be adamantly against admitting Goebbels into their families or including him among their friends, even if he had lived after the war to experience a thorough-going repentance, and I asked what might explain and justify this reaction. Aquinas's concept of a stain on the soul, which is a matter of the alienation that moral wrongdoing produces in the wrongdoer, helps to do so.

Aquinas's idea that the stain is removed by satisfaction is also helpful. I have no idea what would count as satisfaction for Goebbels, given the magnitude and the depth of the moral evil of his actions. Nonetheless, Aquinas's idea seems to me intuitively right even in his case. The powerful moral rejection most people would feel towards Goebbels even in a repentant state would not remain the same in the face of unceasing attempts by a repentant Goebbels to repair anything at all of the devastation he had wrought. That this is so helps explain the fact that Albert Speer, whose role in the Nazi regime was at least as important as that of Goebbels, was to some considerable extent rehabilitated in the view of many people.\textsuperscript{55} Speer not only appeared thoroughly repentant after the war's end, but he also accepted his punishment from the Nuremberg court willingly; and in one way after another he used his public position as a forum for educating his audience about the evils of the Nazis, thereby doing something to make amends for his earlier contribution to their success and so doing something to make satisfaction, in Aquinas's sense.\textsuperscript{56}

Aquinas's account of stain and satisfaction is also suggestive for the larger problems with which this article began. Perhaps there is something transitive about disturbed relationships. If my brother and his wife have a bitter, hostile divorce, my relations with her will inevitably be altered, no matter how much I love her, because of my familial relationship to my brother, whose relationship to her is broken. In a similar way, because the relation between parent and offspring is far-reaching in its influence, even if it is not close and loving, perhaps the relationships of children are somehow disturbed by the disturbed relationships their parents have had. Maybe, mutatis mutandis, there is even some transitivity to the complicatedly disturbed relationships among peoples or nations that a huge political evil such as the Holocaust produces. If so, then Aquinas's account would also give some help with the larger-scale problems I deliberately set to one side at the outset of this article. In that case, Aquinas's account also sheds light on the notion of a duty to remember great evils involving whole communities.

I am grateful to Paul Roth and Mark of this paper.

1 Sereny (2001: 362).
3 Sereny (2001: 305).
4 ibid.: 290.
5 ibid.: 291.
7 See, for example, May and Hoff.
8 This is a view that some take to be example, Romans 5.
10 Margalit (2002).
11 Although I will not always add to be understood. My description convey to a contemporary audier mortal sin. For Aquinas, only in theologiae Ia1ae.39.1.
12 For a detailed discussion of Aq., chapter "The Mechanisms of Cognizant" we currently think of it, is part below the level of intellect are set
13 ST Ia1ae 10.1 and 1a.82.1.
14 The distinction between referents easier to illustrate than to define. If we have been the son of Chinese or President of the United States' attr: the position of President could be on the other hand, we were using the current President could have h
15 See ST Ia 1a.3.6 where Aquinas disti
16 ST Ia 82.4.
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involving whole communities. To the extent to which the failure to remember a great evil undermines the possibility of communal reparations for that evil, there is an obligation to remember it.

Whether in fact Aquinas’s account of a stain on the soul could be shown to be applicable to these more complicated cases is, however, a topic for another article. For this article, it is enough to have shown the way in which Aquinas’s account gives some insight into the smaller and more tractable problem posed by the repentant Goebbels of my thought experiment.

NOTES

I am grateful to Paul Roth and Mark Peacock for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1 Sereny (2001: 362).
3 Sereny (2001: 305).
4 ibid.: 290.
5 ibid.: 291.
7 See, for example, May and Hoffman (1991).
8 This is a view that some take to be expressed as early as the letters of Paul; see, for example, Romans 5.
10 Margalit (2002).
11 Although I will not always add the qualifier ‘serious’ in what follows, it should be understood. My description ‘serious moral wrongdoing’ is an attempt to convey to a contemporary audience what Aquinas has in mind with the notion of mortal sin. For Aquinas, only mortal sin leaves a stain on the soul. See Summa theologica 1a.89.1.
12 For a detailed discussion of Aquinas’s account of the human intellect, see the chapter ‘The Mechanisms of Cognition’ in my Aquinas (Stump, 2003). Perception, as we currently think of it, is part of intellectual functioning for Aquinas; faculties below the level of intellect are sensory rather than cognitive.
13 ST 1a.12.1 and 1a.82.1.
14 The distinction between referential and attributive uses of linguistic expressions is easier to illustrate than to define. If we say ‘The President of the United States might have been the son of Chinese immigrants’, we might be using the phrase ‘the President of the United States’ attributively, rather than referentially, to indicate that the position of President could have been filled by a person of Chinese ancestry. If, on the other hand, we were using the phrase referentially, we would be saying that the current President could have had different parents from the ones he had.
15 See ST 1a.5.6 where Aquinas distinguishes the good into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant.
16 ST 1a.82.4.
Although faith is divinely infused, according to Aquinas, he also seems to suppose that faith results from such an action of the will on the intellect. See, for example, Aquinas's *Questiones disputatae de veritate* where Aquinas talks of the will's commanding intellect to produce faith; *QDV* 14.3, reply, ad 2, and ad 10. For further discussion of this issue, see the chapter on faith in Stump (2003).

See *St Ilae* 17.1 and *Ilae* 17.6. For further discussion of Aquinas's account of the will's control over the intellect, see the chapter on wisdom in Stump (2003).

 Cf., for example, *St Ilae* 17.2 and *Ilae* 17.5 ad 1.

Padfield (1990: 3).

Ibid.: 80.

Ibid.: 172.

*St Ilae* 86.1 obj. 3.

*St Ilae* 86.1 ad 3.

*St Ilae* 86.2.

*St Ilae* 89.1.

*St Ilae* 87.6.

*St Ilae* 86.2 ad 3.


It is a salient feature of my example that Staudinger knows of Heidegger's betrayal, and someone might suppose that there would be no disturbance of the relationship if the matter had remained hidden from Staudinger. But this supposition is clearly mistaken. To keep the matter hidden, Heidegger would have had to engage in deception where Staudinger is concerned; he would have had to resemble about important parts of his past and about significant parts of his inner life. Clearly, this walling-off and deception would effect serious separation between the two of them.

See, for example, LaFollette (1996).

For a case in which a blow to the head releases previously repressed memories whose recall is traumatic for the rememberer, see Sacks (1985: 161–5).

See Overy (2001: 392–3).

For a helpful introduction to the literature on simulation theory, see Davies and Stone (1995).

Overy (2003: 419).

Ibid.: 461.

For Aquinas, intellect does include a faculty of memory, too; but the memory case in my example of what it felt like to do a serious moral wrong is an instance of what Aquinas takes to be sensory memory, and sensory memory is not included within the intellect on his views. See the chapter 'The Mechanisms of Cognition' in Stump (2003).

For an excellent recent discussion of this possibility, see Moran (2001).  

Hoelne (2000[1969]: 162). It should be added that Himmler explained what he saw in Heydrich with the erroneous theory that Heydrich had Jewish blood somewhere in his family tree.


Ibid.: 141.

This claim will remain true even if about Speer's failure to acknowledge given in note 31.

In the case of the others who are considered in the nature of a loss is

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*St Ilae* 86.2.

*St Ilae* 90.2.

*St Ilae* 84.5.

*St Ilae* 85.3 and *Ilae* 86.2.

*St Ilae* 87.6.

*St Ilae* 113.2.

I am grateful to Paul Roth for asssistance to address this question.

Speer's manifold involvement in complicity in Germany's use of sla

For a detailed discussion of Speer's of whether or not Speer really was

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**BIBL**


personal relations and moral residue

45 This claim will remain true even if it were the case that Wolters had never learned about Speer's failure to acknowledge him and his help. Support for this claim is given in note 31.
46 In the case of the others who are separated from him, the separation might be considered in the nature of a loss but not a stain.
48 ST I/Iae.86.2.
49 ST I/Ia.90.2.
50 ST I/Ia.84.5.
51 ST I/Ia.85.3 and I/Ia.86.2.
52 ST I/Iae.87.6.
53 ST I/Iae.113.2.
54 I am grateful to Paul Roth for astute questions that called my attention to the need to address this question.
55 Speer's manifold involvement in every part of Germany's war effort and his complicity in Germany's use of slave labor is well documented in Sereny (1995).
56 For a detailed discussion of Speer's role after the war and an excellent evaluation of whether or not Speer really was repentant, see Sereny (1995).

bibliography

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History writing and the restor CAROLYN AB

This article investigates how historians identify with victims in a European Jewry. It takes historia Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Willing Executives argues that most historical narrative writing about atrocities generates and victims. The essay then analyses successfully or not, to overcome

Key words: dignity, empathy, perpetrator

The notion that historians of the Holocaust restore to victims their dignity – i.e. posthumous victory – seems to be a means of Anglo-American historical writing. This idea is arguably manifest in so in contrast to postmodern literary matter. Jane Caplan writes that

... it is one thing to embrace post modern power, to decenter kinds of meaning contend, when the issue. But should the rules of c