

Without exotic objects, it might seem that thoughts about Zeus and thoughts about Oliver Twist are difficult to distinguish, since they are the same in referential content. Manuel García-Carpintero grapples with that problem, using two ideas, the idea of distinct pretences and the idea of multiple contents, referential and descriptive.

Although, space has not allowed for more than a mention of some of these excellent essays, I encourage those interested in singular reference and thought to use them as resources in developing their views.

Each paper has its own bibliography; an additional cumulative bibliography would be a useful resource in a book like this.

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Memory: A Philosophical Study

By SVEN BERNECKER

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Sven Bernecker's contribution to the ongoing revival in the philosophy of memory offers a consistent vision and analysis of propositional remembering, and covers a range of topics in analytic metaphysics and epistemology. Bernecker defends a methodological externalism, by which memory 'must be analyzed from a third-person point of view' (34): so even though conceptual analysis remains the primary method, the 'linguistic intuitions' that guide it 'are not a priori but empirical working hypotheses' (31). Given the central role of such intuitions in Bernecker's treatment of many briefly described thought experiments throughout the book, it is strange that he does not defend their use more explicitly in this early section on method, instead leaving it to a later footnote (147, n. 11) to say that 'trying to defend the use of intuitions in the philosophy of memory would . . . take us too far afield'. Bernecker's subtitle signals a restricted target audience: this is a book for those analytic philosophers who will enjoy long exegeses on Twin Earth, slow switching or quasi-memory. Psychological results on memory are cited, but only piecemeal, and interactive dialogue with scientific theory is not Bernecker's aim.

Bernecker convincingly rejects a series of connected positions that he calls the epistemic theory, preservationism about memory justification, non-causal retention theories and the identity theory of memory. Against the epistemic theory, he argues that in certain circumstances I can remember a proposition even when I did not believe or

know it at the time of encoding, or even when I do not believe or know it at the time of retrieval. Against preservationism, he argues that in certain restricted circumstances memory can generate new justification. Memory cannot be analysed as retaining knowledge, nor as simply retaining an ability or disposition, but must involve a causal connection between my past and my present representation that *p*. Finally, the content of my representation now, at retrieval, need not be type identical with the content of my representation at encoding, but only similar in certain respects.

In some quarters, the views under attack here may not look much like live options, given the success of Martin and Deutscher's (1966) causal theory, on the one hand, and the long-standing consensus in cognitive psychology that remembering is active reconstruction, on the other. Bernecker does not, for instance, make good on his claim that the archive-style identity or copy theory of memory is 'the standard view in philosophy, whereupon our memory is nothing but a passive device for registering, storing, and retrieving information' (217): the only sources he cites here are from distant history (saying on successive pages first that Plato was 'an early advocate of the identity theory' and then that he does 'not mean to suggest that Plato . . . endorsed the identity theory'). Bernecker does not discuss central recent philosophical work on memory in which such archival views of storage are firmly rejected (e.g. Campbell 2006, Hoerl 2007). Perhaps such views are still present elsewhere in philosophy, in work that is not explicitly about memory, or in ways of thinking about memory in the broader culture, but Bernecker does not seek to offer evidence for such claims. He does, however, list a surprising number of analytic epistemologists who have continued to defend the epistemic theory and (to a lesser extent) non-causal accounts of retention (66, 105–13): perhaps Martin and Deutscher's critiques, which Bernecker follows closely and with relatively minor modifications, have had insufficient influence.

Bernecker's positive alternatives to these positions are moderate. He allows for the content of a present representation to diverge from that of the past representation only when and to the extent that the content of the former is *entailed* by the content of the latter: there is no room for the incorporation of new content, or any active transformation of content. While Bernecker is right to worry that psychologists who over-emphasize evidence for the constructive nature of memory sometimes lose sight of the point that remembering often does successfully track past events (219), his revision to the identity theory of memory arguably takes insufficient account of that evidence. Perhaps thus restricting the 'permissible range of aberration' only to entailments, such as the shift from encoding that *Caesar was assassinated by Brutus* to remembering that *Caesar died of unnatural causes* (222), does not sufficiently expand our sense of the ways in which memory processes, at every stage from encoding to retrieval, might generate additional content and yet remain reliable (Michaelian 2011).

Likewise, although Bernecker follows Martin and Deutscher closely again in refusing to require that the causal chain between past and present representations should be located entirely within the body (129–131), he resists the further idea that the representing vehicles that carry memory content might be distributed or hybrid, including natural or social as well as neural resources. Rehearsing standard criticisms of the extended mind hypothesis, Bernecker thinks that it either requires the kind of strict parity between inner and outer which could be refuted by pointing out that 'unlike a notebook, biological memory need not be charged, may get wet, and is immune to computer viruses and worms' (179), or else leads to 'a gratuitous

proliferation of cognitive systems' (180). Interrupting a long discussion of the quite different topic of content externalism, neither this section on vehicle externalism nor an equally cryptic and non-committal discussion of social or transactive memory is well integrated into the book as a whole.

The most radical part of Bernecker's project is at its outset, in his defence of a purely grammatical taxonomy of memory, against the standard classifications in philosophy and psychology alike which distinguish experiential (personal or episodic) memory from factual (propositional or semantic) memory, and both from practical or procedural memory. While there are indeed inconsistencies and issues to be resolved in these standard taxonomies, Bernecker's reading of the literature is selective and unsympathetic. His intuitions here about the results delivered by various taxonomic proposals are often contestable: though these intuitions are meant to be 'empirical working hypotheses', they are not measured (for example) against robust research traditions on the cross-cultural cognitive semantics of memory (Amberber 2007). Arguing that the distinction between propositional and experiential memory 'is not sharp', Bernecker suggests that 'my remembering that last summer I spent a few days in Rome' cannot be neatly assigned to either category (16). He overemphasizes the mainstream reliance on phenomenological criteria for experiential memory, then takes the existence of individual differences in mental imagery as reason to dismiss such phenomenological criteria, and in general thinks rather strangely that his methodological externalism mandates treating the phenomenology of remembering as irrelevant. I just don't follow the compressed reasoning behind Bernecker's refusal to align the standard philosophical and psychological distinctions (19), but in any case where current ways of marking important distinctions are untidy, one might typically seek to render them more precise rather than deny the distinctions altogether.

On Bernecker's alternative, the only 'kinds' of memory are given by 'the grammatical objects of the verb 'to remember'', which he identifies as objects, properties, events and propositions. Grammar is here not a symptom of or a rough guide to underlying psychology, but a governing principle in itself. So the phenomena which mainstream accounts of experiential or episodic memory, for example, seek to identify are not marked out as distinctive in Bernecker's taxonomy, and even in discussing personal identity his book concentrates entirely on propositional memory: all putative cases of experiential remembering, which are usually expressed with a gerundive can, for Bernecker, be 'translated into 'remembering that' constructions', and then analysed alongside cases of memory for other propositions (21). Marya Schechtman (2011) complains that this failure to include a marker for the distinction between cases in which I remember an event because I experienced it, and cases in which I merely remember that it happened because I read or heard about it elsewhere, is a significant problem for the new taxonomy. Bernecker's reply that he didn't 'lay claim to [his] taxonomy being the only viable one' (2011: 112) won't do: it is incumbent on the proponent of a radical alternative to a mainstream system of classification like this, which does much work across many fields in philosophy and psychology, to offer a more systematic account of the putative key phenomena of the prior system in the terms of the new system. Certainly, we need to be more attentive to the rich interanimations of episodic, semantic and procedural memory in many real activities of remembering, and to the multiplicity of sources, operating at distinct timescales, which often drive retrieval. But this will arguably require supplementing and

integrating conceptual analysis with more significant engagement with the cognitive and social sciences of memory.

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Relying on Others: An Essay in Epistemology

By SANFORD C. GOLDBERG

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According to Goldberg, knowledge is not an individual achievement, one an individual can accomplish on his own, but one that relies on others. On Goldberg's view, many of the anti-individualist arguments used in semantics to show that meaning is not in the head can be extended to current work in epistemology to show that knowing and being justified aren't either. Both the epistemic and semantic properties of an individual's beliefs, Goldberg argues, can change even if he or she remains molecule for molecule the same and, as a result, do not supervene on what is going on within his skin but depend, as well, on what is occurring outside of him and often on the efforts of others.

Goldberg is a reliabilist. For him, whether we are justified in our beliefs depends on whether the processes by which we acquire them are reliable. However, Goldberg is also an anti-individualist; for him, whether the processes are reliable depends not only on what goes on inside our own head but inside the head of others as well. Social elements, according to Goldberg, affect not only the semantic contents of our beliefs but also their epistemic quality. In a previous book, Goldberg examined the nature of