

A Place for Kant's Schematism in *Glauben und Wissen*

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Abstract: In *Glauben und Wissen*, Hegel criticizes Kant for drawing a deep division between sensibility and understanding. Hegel suggests that Kant's faculty of productive imagination is a step toward uniting intuition and concept in an original unity out of which the two arise, but this requires him to treat the productive imagination in ways Kant would not approve. I argue that Kant's doctrine of the schematism offers an advance on the productive imagination when it comes to solving the intuition/concept dualism Hegel critiques, although there remain serious problems with which Hegel would take issue. Although the schematism might answer some of the criticisms Hegel aims at the intuition/concept dualism, it does not solve the related problem Hegel finds in Kant, namely the dualism of cognition and thing-in-itself.

Introduction

In *Glauben und Wissen*, Hegel criticizes Kant for drawing a deep division between sensibility and understanding. For Kant, the sensible manifold received as intuitions and the concepts produced by the understanding remain distinct, which is a serious problem for Hegel since there is then no necessary connection between the two. Paul Guyer calls this the dualism of intuition and concept, and he notes that Hegel is right to identify it as the primary dualism in Kant.¹ Hegel suggests that Kant's faculty of productive imagination is a step toward uniting intuition and concept in an original unity out of which the two arise, but this requires him to treat the productive imagination in ways Kant would not approve. Throughout *Glauben und Wissen*,

¹ See Paul Guyer, "Absolute idealism and the rejection of Kantian dualism," in *The Cambridge Companion to German Idealism*, ed. Karl Ameriks (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2000): 37-56.

Hegel makes no explicit mention of Kant's doctrine of the schematism. This seems strange, considering that the schematism purports to connect intuition and concept in an intimate, non-arbitrary manner, which seems to be at least part of what Hegel wants. In this paper, I examine the following: (1) Hegel's critique of Kant in *Glauben und Wissen*, (2) Kant's doctrine of the schematism as laid out in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, (3) how far the schematism can go in answering Hegel's critique of Kant's model of cognition, and (4) the weaknesses the schematism would still display in Hegel's view. I conclude that the schematism offers an advance on the productive imagination when it comes to solving the intuition/concept dualism Hegel critiques, although there remain serious problems with which Hegel would take issue. However, although the schematism might answer some of the criticisms Hegel aims at the intuition/concept dualism, it does not solve the related problem Hegel finds in Kant, namely the dualism of cognition and thing-in-itself. For Kant, human cognizers cannot know things-in-themselves, because they are sensible intuiters that can cognize only appearances. This is what Karl Ameriks and others call the "restriction thesis," which is Kant's position that "although our knowledge has an *a priori* structure, it is all only phenomenal," i.e. it deals solely with appearances and not with things-in-themselves.² Accordingly, the schematism establishes a sort of identity between concept and intuition as appearance, but concept and thing-in-itself remain on opposite sides of an unbridgeable gulf.

Hegel criticizes Kant's model of cognition for being self-enclosed: "the whole task and content of this philosophy is, not the cognition of the Absolute, but the cognition of this subjectivity" (68/303).³ Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* sets out to answer the question of how

² Karl Ameriks, "Hegel's Critique of Kant's Theoretical Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 46:1 (1985), 2.

³ All parenthetical references are to G. W. F. Hegel, *Faith and Knowledge*, trans Walter Cerf and Henry Harris (New York: SUNY Press, 1977), followed by corresponding references to Hegel, *G. W. F. Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bänden, 2: Jenaer Schriften* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970).

synthetic judgments are *a priori* possible, but Hegel reprimands Kant for considering only the subjective side of this question. A richer notion of *synthetic a priori judgment*, Hegel contends, would include "the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment are identical in the *a priori* way" (69/304). In other words, these "heterogeneous elements" (the subject as particular being and the predicate as universal thought) must be viewed as not originally heterogeneous, but as "absolutely identical" (*ibid.*). I take it that Hegel here refers to Kant's intuition/concept dualism. This is Kant's view that the sensible manifold of intuition and the pure concepts of the understanding, though both necessary for knowing anything actual, are heterogeneous elements of cognition. As Kant says, "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind," meaning that proper cognition occurs only when intuitions given in sensibility are thought according to concepts of the understanding.⁴

In order to contextualize *Glauben und Wissen*, I should note that Hegel treats the absolute identity of subject and object not as an achievement of cognition but rather the point of departure for idealistic philosophy. In the course of critiquing Fichte, Hegel makes the following claim: "...for experience, because it is experience, is not caught in the shackles of reflection which turns the part into an in-itself, and so makes it impossible to reach the whole. But a totality produced by, or rather found in experience does not exist for cognition, even if it is given as a totality in representational awareness (*Vorstellung*)" (161/393). As we shall see, Hegel lodges similar criticisms against Kant, who also makes the alleged mistake of treating the totality found in experience as something for cognition. On Hegel's view, a radically different approach is needed, taking seriously the alleged identity of subject and object as something that holds prior to its being cognized.

⁴ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1929), A 51, B 75.

Hegel's Engagement with Kant in *Glauben und Wissen*.

Hegel seems to have two primary problems with Kant's model of cognition: (1) it introduces an intuition/concept dualism, and (2) it makes knowing things-in-themselves impossible. Since it treats sensibility and understanding as separate and heterogeneous faculties, Kant's model disallows the union of singular subject and universal predicate Hegel wants—hence, problem (1). Since it permits only *sensible* intuition that is conditioned by forms (space and time) that are peculiar to sensible intuiters, and since the categories of the understanding are not adequate to things-in-themselves, Kant's model precludes any cognition of things-in-themselves—hence, problem (2). In what follows, I suggest that Kant's doctrine of the schematism may solve problem (1), but problem (2) seems endemic to Kant's model of cognition.⁵

As Hegel interprets it, Kant's problem, how synthetic judgments are *a priori* possible, "expresses nothing else but the Idea that subject and predicate of the synthetic judgment are identical in the *a priori* way" (69/304). By subject, Hegel means that which is "particular and in the form of being," whereas by predicate he means "that which is universal and in the form of thought" (ibid.). In Kantian terms, subject is the sensible manifold of intuition, whereas predicate is the pure concept of the understanding. For Hegel, a model of cognition must not only connect subject and predicate (intuition and concept), but must show that they are ultimately, *a priori* identical. Indeed, "Reason" (*Vernunft*) is the identity of these "heterogeneous elements" (*Ungleichartigen*) (ibid.). Hegel will evaluate any model of cognition based on how well it establishes this unity of subject and predicate as a speculative Idea of *Vernunft*. It is unsurprising that he finds Kant's deeply problematic.

⁵ Of course, Kant thinks "problem (2)" is no problem at all, but rather a necessary trait of sensible intuiters.

Frequently, the text of *Glauben und Wissen* does not clearly distinguish between what Hegel maintains, what Kant maintains, and what Hegel thinks Kant *should* maintain. Whatever the case may be, Hegel looks to Kant's "original synthetic unity of apperception,"⁶ in which the "spontaneity" (*Spontaneität*) of the "productive imagination" (*produktive Einbildungskraft*) serves as the very principle of sensibility (69-70/304-305). This spontaneity is to be contrasted with the mere receptivity (*Rezeptivität*) Kant accords sensibility in the Transcendental Aesthetic of the first *Critique*.⁷ As Hegel reads Kant, intuitions are not only received passively, but they are actually generated by the productive imagination. For Kant, "[i]magination is the faculty of representing in intuition an object that is *not itself present*," and since "all intuition is sensible," the imagination must "belong to sensibility."⁸ Hegel has some esteem for the productive imagination, because it allows sensibility to be active and spontaneous in addition to being merely passive and receptive. But it is important to note that, for Kant, sensibility has this spontaneity only insofar as the productive imagination generates a representation of an object not actually present. Whenever an object is represented as actually present, as in sensory perception, sensibility remains entirely passive and receptive vis-à-vis the sensible manifold that is given to it.

Hegel thinks this "synthetic unity must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, but as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites" (70/305). In other words, the synthetic unity of apperception is not a *de facto* unification of variegated functions and moments of cognition, but rather an originary unity out of which these different functions and moments arise. Hegel holds that the customary view that intuition and thought are radically distinct in

⁶ See Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, esp. B 131-140.

⁷ See *ibid.*, A 19-49, B 33-73, esp. A 19-21, B 33-35.

⁸ *Ibid.*, B 151. Kant adds: "In so far as imagination is spontaneity, I sometimes also entitle it the *productive* imagination, to distinguish it from the *reproductive* imagination," the latter of which is subject to the laws of association in empirical psychology.

Kant's system⁹ needs to be modified, because the synthetic unity of apperception is a single principle from which the various faculties and functions of cognition come (ibid.). For example, the productive imagination and the understanding (*Verstand*) have an original source, the latter being only a "higher potency" than the former (ibid.).

Yet Kant's manner of establishing the identity of subject and predicate does not satisfy Hegel, because it is *de facto* and artificial. This is what I identified above as problem (1), the introduction of an intuition/concept dualism. Whereas Hegel views intuition and concept as arising from a common identity that is originary to both, Kant merely connects intuition and concept in the form of an "inference" (72/307). In Kantian cognition, subject and predicate are connected by a tertiary copula, hence remaining quite distinct. This "copula is not something thought" but only "expresses our non-cognizance of the rational" (ibid.). In other words, the copula is an empty place-holder that does not realize the speculative Idea of *Vernunft* according to which subject and predicate (intuition and concept) are absolutely identical. As Hegel interprets it, Kant's synthetic judgment *a priori* does not cognize the absolute identity of particular subject (intuition) and universal predicate (concept), though the copula of any such judgment serves as an unconscious indication of this identity. As I take it, Hegel thinks that one could infer from Kantian synthetic judgment *a priori* that subject and predicate must be identical, but it provides no means by which to achieve insight into this identity.

Kant's notion of productive imagination is also lacking in Hegel's eyes. This faculty should not be treated as "the middle term that gets inserted between an existing absolute subject and an absolute existing world" (73/308). On the contrary, it is the "primary and original" out of which subject and world come about—it is "the sole In-itself (*Ansich*) (ibid.). Hegel is at pain to stress that the productive imagination is not merely a faculty that produces fictitious

⁹ See Guyer, esp. 40-46.

representations, but is actually *Vernunft* itself, at least insofar as it appears in "empirical consciousness" (ibid.). For Hegel, Kant makes two mistakes in this regard. First, he treats productive imagination as a psychological faculty. Second, he did not treat *Vernunft* (in the sense of the absolute identity of subject and predicate) as the sole *a priori*, but rather viewed the *a priori* as a formal matter of universality and necessity (ibid.). For these reasons, Kant's notion of imagination is "raised only to the form of infinitude and fixated as *Verstand*," resulting in only a "relative identity" of subject and predicate (74/309).¹⁰ Put another way, Kant fails to see the full value of the productive imagination and consequently can establish only a "relative" identity of subject and predicate in the form of synthetic judgment *a priori*. As discussed above, this identity consists of an empty copula between subject and predicate, rather than the original, absolute identity of the two that Hegel thinks productive imagination can provide.

Some further clues are provided in Hegel's analogy of a work of art that is unveiled to a spectator who had previously seen only a small portion of that work. Imagine that the spectator then complains "that he was being deprived of his deprivation and that the incomplete had been in-completed" (66/324). This spectator is supposed to be analogous to the philosopher who thinks of the absolute as something to be "*put together* out of the finite and the infinite," who "takes up the finite and subjectivity as absolute truth in the form of a concept" (66/324). Hegel argues that such an approach is doomed. He claims, "In the Idea, however, finite and infinite are one, and hence finitude as such, i.e., as something that was supposed to have truth and reality in and for itself, has vanished" (66/324). These remarks are relevant to Kant's productive imagination, the alleged "middle term" between subject and object that merely connects subject and object by means of a concept, rather than appreciating alleged absolute identity of the finite and the infinite.

¹⁰ Translation altered.

In addition to these problems, Hegel also censures Kant's model of cognition for barring access to things-in-themselves. This is what I discussed above as problem (2). As Hegel puts it, "No other organ remains for the things in themselves but sensation (*Empfindung*); for sensation alone is not *a priori*, or in other words, it is not grounded in man's cognitive faculty for which only appearances exist" (74/310). Since Kant thinks that theoretical cognition pertains only to appearances (Ameriks' "restriction thesis"), the thing-in-itself remains thoroughly unknowable, transcending all possible experience. Worse still in Hegel's eyes, sensation is "no more something truly *a priori* than any other subjectivity" (ibid.). The appearances of sensation are *a posteriori* and can only be known experientially, whereas the workings of human cognition itself are *a priori* and can be known with certainty. Since Kant provides no means of cognizing things-in-themselves, and since the appearances of things-in-themselves somehow occasioned are not adequate to those things-in-themselves, each subjectivity is left with nothing other than a collection of (perhaps arbitrary) appearances. The difference between Kant's model of cognition and one Hegel could endorse is that between sensible intuition and intellectual intuition. While the latter would give direct insight to things-in-themselves and thereby permit their cognition, the former only gives appearances and thereby precludes the cognition of things-in-themselves.

As Hegel writes, the identity of subject and predicate in Kant is only that of a "formal or more properly, psychological idealism," because the subject (sensible intuition) is only an appearance, not a thing-in-itself (75/311). Since the thing-in-itself is completely incommensurate with sensible appearance, and since human cognizers have no other means of accessing the thing-in-itself, the only identity of subject and predicate it can achieve is the subjective one that links appearance and concept. This is a merely formal, psychological affair that fails to realize the absolute identity of thing-in-itself (subject) and concept (predicate) that

Hegel wants. This is problematic in its own right, but according to Hegel, it also causes difficulties for the proper cognition of appearance: this formal idealism "can no more cognize the *appearance* of the Absolute in *its* truth than it can cognize the absolute identity, the one being completely inseparable from the other" (76/312). Hegel treats the Absolute and the appearance of the Absolute as closely intertwined, such that one cannot be known without the other. Since Kant's model disqualifies cognition of the Absolute itself, its cognition of the appearance of the Absolute must be deficient as well. I examine more closely below why this is so for Hegel.

It is now clear that problems (1) and (2) are both *dualistic* difficulties in Hegel's eyes. Problem (1) establishes a dualism between intuition (subject, appearance, sensible manifold) and concept (predicate, thought) within cognition itself. Problem (2) establishes a dualism between cognizer and thing-in-itself. Kant offers no solution to problem (2)—in fact, it is not a problem for him at all, since he believes that synthetic judgments *a priori* are possible without the abolition of this dualism. Kant does, however, offer a solution to problem (1) in the guises of the productive imagination and the synthetic unity of apperception. I have discussed above why Hegel does not find these proffered solutions fully satisfactory. Yet it is strange that Hegel does not also consider Kant's doctrine of the schematism anywhere in *Glauben und Wissen*. After all, Kant invokes schemata as the links between intuitions and concepts, so they would seem to hold much interest for Hegel's attempt to solve problem (1). Considering how explicit Kant is about this, the schematism would seem to be a much more obvious choice than the productive imagination or the synthetic unity of apperception if one were trying to solve the intuition/concept dualism. In the following, I briefly consider Kant's explication of the schematism in the first *Critique*. After this, I explore what strengths and weaknesses the schematism would have vis-à-vis problems (1) and (2).

Kant's Doctrine of the Schematism.

The Analytic of Principles in Kant's first *Critique* opens with the following claim: "In all subsumptions of an object under a concept the representation of the object must be *homogeneous* with the concept... the concept must contain something which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it."¹¹ Here Kant directly addresses Hegel's problem (1), the intuition/concept dualism. In order for intuitions to be thought according to concepts, there must be some commonality between them. Yet intuitions and concepts seem heterogeneous, so how is their homogeneity to be established? Kant answers that there must be some third thing between the two, which he calls the "transcendental schema." This schema cannot be empirical, yet it must be both "intellectual" and "sensible," i.e. it must have something in common with both concepts (*Verstand*, the categories) and intuitions.¹² Kant identifies the "transcendental determination" of time as just such a schema. Like the categories of *Verstand*, time is universal and obeys an *a priori* rule. But time is also present in any empirical representation whatsoever—unlike space, time conditions every appearance, whether of inner or outer sense.¹³ Hence, time is homogenous with both the concepts of *Verstand* and the intuitions of sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*), making it a suitable candidate to mediate and connect intuitions with concepts.

The schema is generated by the imagination, but the schema is not itself an image. This is because images (*Bilder*) always refer to particular intuitions, and the schema is not a particular intuition but rather a "representation of a universal procedure of imagination in providing an

¹¹ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 137, B 176. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Band 3 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997).

¹² *Ibid.*, A 138, B 177.

¹³ *Ibid.*, A 138-9, B 177-8.

image for a concept..."¹⁴ For example, the schema of a triangle in general is not the image of a particular triangle, because any such image must be obtuse, acute, or right-angled, and the schema must encompass all possible triangles. The schema according to which any triangle whatsoever may be imagined is rather the rule in virtue of which such images are produced—it is "a rule of synthesis of the imagination, in respect to pure figures in space."¹⁵ Whereas the schema itself is the representation of this rule, the "schematism" is the procedure of *Verstand* by which schemata are deployed.

Unfortunately for readers of Kant, the schematism "is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover..."¹⁶ Yet Kant claims that "the *image (Bild)* is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination (*productiven Einbildungskraft*)," whereas the schema "is a product and, as it were, a monogram, of pure *a priori* imagination (*reinen Einbildungskraft*), through which, and in accordance with which, images themselves first become possible."¹⁷ This is a very important passage, one that Hegel seems to overlook. Kant here distinguishes between two types of imagination. He identifies productive imagination (*productive Einbildungskraft*) as an "empirical faculty" that manufactures images in the normal sense. He contrasts this productive imagination with the pure *a priori* imagination that produces the schema, that which makes empirical images possible in the first place.

Time is the essential element of all the schemata. In fact, the schemata differ only in the *manner* in which they are *a priori* determinations of time. The schema of the categories of quantity or magnitude (unity, plurality, totality) is the "time-series" of possible objects of

¹⁴ Ibid., A 140, B 179-80.

¹⁵ Ibid., A 141, B 180.

¹⁶ Ibid., A 141, B 180-1.

¹⁷ Ibid., A 141-2, B 181. Translation altered. Kemp Smith reads *reproduktiven* for *productiven*, but I follow the *Gesammelte Schriften* in opting for the latter.

cognition, which is the "generation (synthesis) of time itself in the successive apprehension of an object."¹⁸ This is not very clear, but Kant seems to mean that objects are cognized according to unity, plurality or totality only insofar as successive intuitions are thought as adhering to the same object(s) through time. Put another way, the schema of magnitude or quantity is "number, a representation which comprises the successive addition of homogeneous units."¹⁹ For example, an object is cognized as a unity if a sensible manifold is thought according to the category of unity, but this can only be done in virtue of the schema of number, which is the determination of the object as single through successive moments in time.

The schema of the categories of quality (reality, negation, limitation) is the "time-content" of possible objects of cognition, which is the "synthesis of sensation or perception with the representation of time; it is the filling of time."²⁰ This seems to mean that an object is cognized as real, negated or limited only if that object is thought as residing within time. For example, the schema of reality is the "quantity of something in so far as it fills time."²¹ An object is cognized as real only if a sensible manifold is thought according to the category of reality, and this can be done only in virtue of the schema that determines that object as occupying some time.

The schema of the categories of relation (inherence and subsistence, causality and dependence, community) is the "time-order" of possible objects of cognition, which is the "connecting of perceptions with one another at all times according to a rule of time determination."²² This seems to mean that an object is cognized as inherent, caused or reciprocated only if that object is thought as obeying a specific succession within time. For

¹⁸ Ibid., A 145, B 184.

¹⁹ Ibid., A 142, B 182. Kant does not offer specific examples of schemata for the three categories of the type quantity (unity, plurality, totality), though he does so for the schemata of the three categories of relation, as well as the three of modality.

²⁰ Ibid., A 145, B 184.

²¹ Ibid., A 143, B 183.

²² Ibid., A 145, B 184.

example, the schema of the category of causality is "the real upon which, whenever posited, something else always follows."²³ As a pure concept of the understanding (category), causality cannot be applied to a sensible manifold (intuitions) unless causality's corresponding schema serves to mediate and link the two. This schema is a transcendental determination of time, because it consists of a necessary succession, i.e. the following of one thing upon another.

The schema of the categories of modality (possibility—impossibility, existence—non-existence, necessity—contingency) is the "scope of time" (*Zeitbegriff*), which is "time itself as the correlate of the determination whether and how an object belongs to time."²⁴ This seems to mean that an object is cognized as possible, existent or necessary according to that object's relation to time itself—whether it must be the case at all times (necessary), whether it may be the case at some times (possible), etc. For example, the schema of the category of necessity is the "existence of an object at all times."²⁵ Necessity itself is a pure concept that is heterogeneous to the sensible manifold of intuition, while the "existence of an object at all times" is the schema that permits the deployment of the concept and hence the cognition of necessary objects.

The concepts of *Verstand* have "significance" (*Bedeutung*) only under the conditions provided by the schemata, because these concepts could not otherwise be connected to objects of possible experience.²⁶ Hence, concepts have to do solely with the empirical, since all objects of possible experience are conditioned by space and time in sensibility. The schemata subject "appearances" (*Erscheinungen*) to "universal rules of synthesis," thereby helping to constitute a unified, "original (*ursprünglichen*) apperception."²⁷ But since the schemata permit cognition of

²³ Ibid., A 144, B 183.

²⁴ Ibid., A 145, B 184.

²⁵ Ibid., A 145, B 184.

²⁶ Ibid., A 146, B 184.

²⁷ Ibid., A 146, B 185.

empirical appearances alone, they not only "realise the categories, they at the same time restrict them, that is, limit them to conditions which lie outside the understanding, and are due to sensibility."²⁸ The schematism therefore limits cognition to appearances alone, precluding cognition of things-in-themselves.

Kant considers what happens if one dispenses with schemata and seeks to employ the categories by themselves. Would this not grant cognition of things-in-themselves, since the interference occasioned by the schemata would be absent? Kant answers that the categories divorced from schemata (and hence *Sinnlichkeit* as well) would indeed have meaning, but only of a purely logical sort, because they would lack any object of possible experience that they could cognize. Concepts without objects are empty and signify nothing, and human cognizers can acquire objects only through sensible intuitions, which require schemata in order to be thought. Hence, *Sinnlichkeit* "realises the understanding (*Verstand*) in the very process of restricting it."²⁹ The schematism precludes any theoretical knowledge of things-in-themselves.

Since the workings of the schematism are "concealed in the depths of the human soul," however, one cannot know exactly how these transcendental determinations of time operate. But as for what Kant thinks one can know about the schematism, I take the following to be crucial. (1) Each schema consists of a transcendental determination of time, because nothing besides time is homogeneous with both concepts and intuitions. (2) Each schema is produced by the *a priori* imagination and not the productive imagination, because it is not an empirical image but rather an *a priori* rule for connecting intuitions and concepts. (3) The pure concepts of *Verstand* can cognize empirical appearances but not things-in-themselves, because they have objects only through the schematism that connects them to empirical appearances.

²⁸ Ibid., A 146, B 185-6.

²⁹ Ibid., A 147, B 187.

Reconsidering Hegel's Critique of Kant.

In the following, I consider how Hegel's criticism of Kant in *Glauben und Wissen* would fare if he had considered the schematism. This approach has an obvious weakness. In that work, Hegel's arguments are deployed against Kant's reproductive imagination and synthetic unity of apperception, and Hegel may well have deployed entirely different arguments against Kant's schematism. If one were to show, for example, that the schematism does not fall prey to Hegel's arguments, this hardly establishes that he would have endorsed Kant's doctrine. I concede that this is so, but I maintain that my approach is nonetheless worth pursuing. As discussed above, Hegel detects two major problems in Kant's model of cognition: (1) the intuition/concept dualism, (2) the cognition/thing-in-itself dualism. Hegel considers both the reproductive imagination and the synthetic unity of apperception as possible solutions to problem (1), and he finds them inadequate to the task. In criticizing how both these fail, Hegel suggests a number of traits that a satisfactory solution must exhibit—indeed, he goes an appreciable distance in outlining his own notion of *Vernunft*, which adequately unites subject and predicate. Knowing many of the traits that the solution to problem (1) must possess, and knowing many of the problems it must avoid, one can reconstruct with a considerable degree of plausibility how Hegel would have evaluated the schematism. I focus primarily on Hegel's problem (1), the intuition/concept dualism, because Kant's account of the schematism explicitly claims to link intuitions and concepts, whereas Kant admits that cognition of things-in-themselves is not possible.

As discussed above, Hegel thinks the absolute identity of subject and predicate "must be conceived, not as produced out of opposites, but as a truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites" (70/305). Hegel alleges that Kant's model of cognition fails to provide this identity, because it treats the connection between intuition and concept as an empty "copula" from which the identity of intuition (subject) and concept (predicate) can only be inferred (72/307). In Kant's version of synthetic judgment *a priori*, the subject (an object of intuition) is asserted to be some predicate (a pure concept of the understanding): S is P. Hegel claims that this "is" fails to be properly cognized as the absolute identity of S and P, because it is only a place-holder that links S and P in a *de facto* manner. In the judgment itself, the identity of subject and predicate remains "unconscious" (ibid.). Does Kant's account of the schematism resist Hegel's criticisms?

However one answers this question, the schema that connects intuition and concept is much more complex than the "copula" that Hegel mentions. The schema is purportedly a "mediating representation" that is homogeneous with both concepts and intuitions.³⁰ Further, the schema is a transcendental determination of time, which makes the mediation of the otherwise heterogeneous concept and intuition possible. Far from being an "empty" placeholder, the copula that connects intuition and concept is actually a representation that is homogeneous with intuition and concept in virtue of its being a transcendental determination of time. This observation by itself is not sufficient to refute Hegel's charge that the identity of intuition and concept is not itself cognized in Kant's synthetic judgment *a priori* and that this identity is only inferred after the fact. Nor does this show that the schematism secures the "original identity" of subject and predicate Hegel wants rather than a *de facto* identification of them. But this does show that Kant's account of the connection of intuition and concept is more sophisticated than Hegel allows. To satisfy Hegel, the schematism must bring about not only the cognition of the identity of intuition and concept in

³⁰ Ibid., A 138, B 177.

judgments themselves, but the schematism must also establish that intuition and concept are originally identical and spring from a common source.

For Hegel, this common source is *Vernunft* itself, which he identifies with the productive imagination. Conversely, Kant treats the productive imagination as a tertiary term between intuition and concept (73/308). In Hegel's eyes, Kant's productive imagination is merely psychological, because it fabricates nothing more than fictitious images and fails to provide an original identification of intuition and concept. Hence, productive imagination establishes only a *de facto*, "relative identity" of subject and predicate (74/309). In defense of Kant, his notion of the productive imagination is quite different from Hegel's. In fact, he explicitly contrasts the productive imagination to the schematism, which latter is supposed to unite intuition and concept. Whereas the productive imagination is an "empirical faculty" that produces only images, the schematism is a "monogram" of "pure *a priori* imagination" that makes the production of images possible in the first place.³¹ Kant would seem to think that the productive imagination is incapable of doing the work Hegel allots to it, since it deals only with sensible images and hence cannot be some original source from which intuitions and concepts both arise.

Hegel seems to cede this in the only place he directly refers to Kant's schematism, in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*.³²

For Kant says that in the mind, in self-consciousness, there are pure conceptions of the understanding (*reine Verstandesbegriffe*) and pure sensuous perceptions (*reine Anschauungen*); now it is the schematism (*Schematismus*) of the pure

³¹ Ibid., A 141-2, 181.

³² The *Register* of Hegel, *Werke*, lists "Schematismus" as appearing only once in all twenty volumes, namely in the section of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* quoted below. See Helmut Reinicke, *G. W. F. Hegel: Werke in zwanzig Bänden: Register* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1979), 561.

understanding, the transcendental faculty of the imagination (*transzendente* Einbildungskraft), which determines the pure sensuous perception in conformity with the category and thus constitutes the transition to experience. The connection of these two is again one of the most attractive side of the Kantian philosophy, whereby pure sensuousness and pure understanding, which were formerly expressed as absolute opposites, are now united. There is thus here present a perceptive understanding (*intuitiver Verstand*) or an understanding perception (*verständiges Anschauen*); but Kant does not see this, he does not bring these thoughts together: he does not grasp the fact that he has here brought both sides of knowledge into one, and has thereby expressed their implicitude. Knowledge itself is in fact the unity and truth of both moments; but with Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something particular, and they are only united in an external, superficial way, just as a piece of wood and a leg may be bound together by a cord.³³

Hegel here considers whether the transcendental imagination (*transzendente Einbildungskraft*) can solve the intuition/concept dualism, whereas in *Glauben und Wissen* he looks to the productive imagination (*productiven Einbildungskraft*). The route of the *Lectures* seems more fair, since Kant does not claim that the productive imagination is capable of doing what Hegel criticizes it for not doing, namely uniting intuition and concept in an original, absolute union. For Kant, the productive imagination generates only empirical images, while the pure *a priori*

³³ Hegel, *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1896), 441. Hegel, *G. W. F. Hegel: Werke, 20: Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie III* (Frankfurt-am-Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971), 347.

imagination generates schemata.³⁴ By instead considering the "transcendental imagination" and the schematism he equates with it, Hegel's critique of Kant is more to the point. In the *Lectures*, Hegel admits that the schematism addresses the intuition/concept dualism by producing "perceptive understanding or an understanding perception." Stephen Priest notes that this identity of intuition and concept, achieved by the schematism, is what Hegel seeks in *Glauben und Wissen*: "The result of this synthesis is what was regarded as valuable in *Faith and Knowledge*..."³⁵ Yet Hegel is still critical of Kant, because the schematism achieves only a "superficial" union of intuition and concept. Moreover, intuition and concept is each something "particular," so their identity is not the absolute, originary identity of subject and predicate that Hegel wants. I consider these issues more fully below.

Nonetheless, Hegel implicitly recognizes here that the schematism offers an advance over the productive imagination when it comes to the intuition/concept dualism. The schematism seems to serve this role more effectively, because it is a "monogram" or blueprint of *a priori* imagination itself. Being *a priori*, this blueprint is anterior to both intuition and concept. In a sense, both intuition and concept are originally identical in the schema, because it is the transcendental rule according to which objects of possible experience can be cognized. However, Hegel is unlikely to be satisfied with this, because this original identity of intuition and concept is merely a monogram or blueprint. Although Kant does not use this term, the identity in question may be called merely "virtual," because the schematism achieves a kind of simulated identity between intuition and concept rather than an absolute identity. In order for cognition to occur, a sensible manifold must be given in sensibility and thought according to the concepts of *Verstand*. This cognition is possible because of the schematism that unites concept and intuition,

³⁴ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 141-2, B 181.

³⁵ Stephen Priest, "Introduction," in *Hegel's Critique of Kant*, ed. Stephen Priest (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 33.

but the schema itself is only the transcendental rule according to which this cognition proceeds. Yet although the schematism does not achieve the *absolute* identity of intuition and concept Hegel desires, it does achieve a *virtual* identity of intuition and concept that the productive imagination cannot. Of course, this notion of a monogram falls short of what Hegel believes is needed: "The productive imagination must rather be recognized as what is primary and original, as that out of which subjective Ego and objective world first sunder themselves into the necessarily bipartite appearance and product..." (73/329).

For these reasons, the schematism does not fully solve Hegel's problem (1), but it does defuse some of the sub-problems associated with it, thus offering an advance on the productive imagination. Hegel diagnoses problem (1) based on the following observations about Kant's model of cognition, many of which are inter-related. First, the "is" that connects intuition and concept is an empty copula, so the identity of the two remains uncognized. Second, the identity of intuition and concept can only be inferred from synthetic judgments *a priori*, not cognized within the judgment itself. Third, the identity of intuition and concept that is achieved is only relative and not originary. Fourth, the productive imagination that identifies intuition and concept is only a psychological process, not an *a priori* one. Taking each of these charges in turn, I argue that Kant's schematism can *partially* answer them.

First, the copula that connects intuition and concept is not empty, because it relies upon the schema, which is a transcendental determination of time. As noted above, each category has a corresponding schema that connects intuition and concept according to an *a priori* rule. The schema of the category of necessity, for example, is the "existence of an object at all times."³⁶ One does not cognize a sensible manifold and the category of necessity by themselves, but one cognizes their identity as a schematized concept as an object existing at all times. Accordingly,

³⁶ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason.*, A 145, B 184.

the copula connecting intuition and concept is not empty nor uncognized in the schematism, because it contains the schematized unity of the two. That said, the schematism remains an obscure process, and there is presumably much to it that remains uncognized, perhaps uncognizable. Kant cedes this when he calls it "an art concealed in the depths of the human soul, whose real modes of activity nature is hardly likely ever to allow us to discover..."³⁷ So the schematism only partially answers Hegel's first charge. The copula of synthetic judgment *a priori* is not empty, nor completely uncognized, but it is not *fully* cognized.

Hegel's second charge is answered for some of the same reasons. The identity of intuition and concept is cognized in a synthetic judgment *a priori* itself, because one cognizes it in the schematized concept that is a necessary component of any such judgment. Taking the previous example again, one cognizes the identity of a sensible manifold (intuition, subject) and necessity (concept, predicate) in the appropriate schema, the "existence of an object at all times." Hence, one need not infer the identity of intuition and concept after the judgment has occurred. As with the first charge, this cognition may not be fully satisfactory to Hegel. I consider this problem in responding to Hegel's third and fourth charges below. Taken by itself, however, Kant's schematism seems to dispose of this second charge, because the identity of intuition and concept is cognized in the schematism.

The third charge, that Kant establishes only a relative identity and not an original identity of intuition and concept, is more difficult to answer. Hegel's absolute, original identity of subject and predicate is *Vernunft* itself, out of which intuition and concept arise. This identity is logically anterior to both intuition and concept. The relative identity in Kant's model is only a *de facto* identification of two items that are originally separate. Kant's schematism seems to offer little in answer to Hegel's charge. As discussed above, schemata do seem to be *virtual* identities

³⁷ Ibid., A 141, B 180-1.

of intuitions and concepts, but not actual identities. In other words, any schema, such as the "existence of an object at all times," is originally present in the *a priori* imagination, but only in a formal manner. Intuition and concept are actually separate in origin, and they become identical only when an actual sensible manifold is thought according to a schematized concept. Here the separation of intuition and concept is logically anterior to their identity, which is the opposite of what Hegel wants. Hence, the schematism offers no resistance to Hegel's third charge, because it is incapable of providing an original *actual* identity of intuition and concept.

Hegel's fourth charge is that the productive imagination secures the identity of intuition and concept in only a psychological and empirical way, not an *a priori* one. As noted, Kant does not think the productive imagination solves problem (1), since it deals only with empirical images. Hence, he might agree with Hegel insofar as the productive imagination does not establish the identity of intuition and concept. But does the schematism sidestep Hegel's charge? It seems so, because the schematism is a process of the *a priori* imagination, not the empirical or psychological imagination. Since the schemata are present in the *a priori* imagination as virtual identities of intuition and concept, the schematism seems to avoid Hegel's fourth charge. The schematism is *a priori*, not psychological. While Hegel's third charge remains in force, and problem (1) is not fully solved, it is clear that the schematism offers an advance on the productive imagination when it comes to appreciating the identity of intuition and concept. While this actual identity remains only "relative" and not original in Hegel's sense, the schematism does not merely provide an empty, inferred or psychological identity of intuition and concept, but rather a sophisticated, direct and *a priori* one.

Problem (2), that Kant's model precludes cognition of things-in-themselves, is not completely unrelated to problem (1). Hegel notes that the identity of subject (intuition) and

predicate (concept) in Kant leads to a merely "formal or more properly, psychological idealism," because the subject is only an appearance, not a thing-in-itself (75/311). Kant's model of cognition lacks an "organ" that might intuit things-in-themselves, because it has only sensation (*Empfindung*), through which appearances are received only experientially and hence *a posteriori* (74/310). In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant admits that human beings cannot cognize things-in-themselves, because we know nothing but "our mode of perceiving them."³⁸ He adds that the sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) of humans is "derivative" and not "original," because it relies on sensations being given to it.³⁹ Unlike intellectual intuition, which would provide an "original" and direct insight into things-in-themselves, sensible intuition offers nothing for cognition besides appearances. Worse still for Hegel, Kant's model cannot even deal with these appearances properly, because each is "completely inseparable from the other" (76/312). For Hegel, the Absolute and the appearance of the Absolute are closely related—knowing the Absolute is a necessary condition for properly knowing the appearances of the Absolute. If this is true, then Kant's model of cognition cannot provide knowledge of appearances, since he holds cognition of the thing-in-itself and hence the Absolute to be impossible.

Hence, Hegel seems to make two major charges related to problem (2). First, Kant's model of cognition precludes knowledge of the Absolute. Second, Kant's model of cognition makes proper knowledge of appearances impossible. I take these charges in turn, examining whether the schematism can deflect some of their force. The schematism seems incapable of answering these charges and thus remains helpless to solve problem (2). As we have seen, Kant treats schemata as representations that unite intuitions and concepts, but these intuitions are only sensible appearances. Since Kant's model permits no access to things-in-themselves, the

³⁸ Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 42, B 59.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, B 72.

schematism cannot deflect Hegel's first charge. In order to do so, Kant's model would have to permit intuition of things-in-themselves, the cognition of which is a necessary condition for knowledge of the Absolute. Moreover, the schematism cannot answer Hegel's second charge, that proper cognition of appearances requires proper cognition of the Absolute. *If* Hegel is right about this, then one must cede that Kant's model for cognizing appearances is unsatisfactory, because it cannot cognize the Absolute. Of course, Kant would not think Hegel is correct on this point. The entire purpose of the first *Critique* is to demonstrate the possibility of synthetic judgment *a priori*, which is accomplished by sensible intuitions (appearances) being thought according to schematized concepts. For Kant, proper cognition of appearances consists in this alone. Nonetheless, Kant would have to admit that *if* Hegel were right about cognition of the Absolute being necessary for cognition of appearances, then Kant's own model would be incapable of properly cognizing appearances, since it cannot cognize the Absolute. On Hegel's own terms, however, there is nothing provided by the schematism that can solve problem (2)—things-in-themselves remain uncognizable in Kant's model.

What the Schematism Cannot Accomplish For Hegel.

Although it is strange that Hegel does not consider Kant's schematism more closely, it is nonetheless clear that the schematism is unable to accomplish much of what Hegel desires. There are a number of reasons why this is so. First, Hegel requires an absolute identity of subject and predicate, whereas Kant's schematism presupposes the heterogeneity of subject and predicate. Second, Hegel wants this identity of subject and predicate to be universal, while the schematism offers a connection between merely particular subjects and predicates. Third and

finally, Hegel treats cognition of this identity as active, while Kant's model of cognition grants a significant role to passivity. I consider each of these in turn.

First, and perhaps most importantly, Hegel wants an "absolute identity" of subject and predicate in which subject and predicate are known to be actually identical. In Kant's model of cognition, conversely, a particular sensible manifold (subject) is connected to a concept (predicate) via some schema: S is P. For Kant, subject and predicate are separate, and they are merely connected in thought. One might therefore say that Kantian cognition deals in the "is" of predication, since P is predicated of S. Hegel, on the other hand, seems to want more than this out of cognition. Not only are subject and predicate connected in thought, but they are somehow one and the same. Therefore, one might say that Hegelian cognition deals in the "is" of identity. Not only can P be predicated of S, but S and P are actually the same. Proper cognition recognizes this truth. Clearly, the schematism cannot help Hegel achieve this, because it only provides a tertiary connection between heterogeneous items, and it never permits subject and predicate to be actually identical.

One might object that Hegel here *confuses* the "is" of identity with the "is" of predication. According to this objection, it is a conceptual confusion to hold that the subject and predicate of a proposition ought to be *identical*, because the business of a proposition is to *connect* a predicate to a subject, i.e. to say something true about a subject. It would be silly, so the objection goes, to demand that what is predicated of a subject be the same as that subject. Hence, while it is true that Kant's model of synthetic judgment *a priori* does not permit the cognition of the absolute identity of subject and predicate, this is a strength of Kant's model, since synthetic judgment *a priori* has no business attempting to cognize such absolute identity.

However, Hegel does not seem confused here in the sense of being unaware that logicians typically distinguish between the "is" of identity and the "is" of predication. Indeed, he exhibits this awareness when he critiques Kant for privileging the "is" of predication while ignoring the role of the "is" of identity in synthetic judgment *a priori*. Hence, Kant's model provides only an empty "copula" (72/307) that fails to cognize the "truly necessary, absolute, original identity of opposites" it ought to cognize (70/305). This disagreement of Kant and Hegel hinges on each having a different conception of what cognition is supposed to do. For Kant, cognition must connect subject and predicate with the "is" of predication. For Hegel, cognition must unite subject and predicate with the "is" of identity. Whether Hegel is right about this, and whether this view is even coherent, are entirely different matters. Hegel may indeed be confused in the sense of demanding of cognition something unintelligible or deeply inappropriate. In that case, his critique of Kant is entirely misguided, since it rejects Kant's model of cognition for failing to do something that is either nonsensical or unsuitable. For now, I note only that Hegel seems aware of the distinction between the "is" of predication and the "is" of identity, and he is committed to the view that cognition must exhibit the latter. Subject and predicate are in truth absolutely identical, so any model of cognition that assumes a real disparity between subject and predicate cannot be otherwise than inadequate.

Second, Hegel seems to want an identity not just of finite and particular subjects and predicates, but rather one of *universal* predicate and *universal* subject. On this view, subject and predicate are not identical merely in some individual cases—they are ultimately identical, being two sides of the same universality, $S = P$. Fully satisfactory cognition is the recognition of this universal truth, which seems to hold always and everywhere for Hegel. Again, Kant's schematism fails to deliver such a universal identity, because it works solely with finite,

particular subjects (intuitions) and predicates (concepts). As Hegel notes in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, "with Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something *particular*, and they are only united in an external, superficial way..."⁴⁰ In the *Encyclopaedia Logic*, an addition to §24 reads, "...all finite things, however, are affected with untruth; they have a concept, but their existence is not adequate to it."⁴¹ Kant's schematism offers a virtual identity of only "finite things." For Hegel, this means that the schematism can at best only establish an identity of things whose existence is not adequate to their concepts. In other words, the schematism fails to establish a *universal* identity of subject and predicate, succeeding only in establishing a particular identity of finite intuitions and concepts. The universal identity of subject and predicate Hegel wants is achieved as a speculative idea of *Vernunft*. Since Kant's model assumes a quite different goal, namely the connection of a particular subject and a particular predicate, the schematism cannot satisfy Hegel's demand for universality.

Third, Hegel treats cognition as thoroughly *active*, which means that the knower actively cognizes the absolute, universal identity of subject and predicate. This identity is not passively impressed on the knower. For Kant, however, particular intuitions are always received passively, which makes the schematism partially dependent on something non-active. On Kant's model, one can cognize only what is given in sensibility. Although one might argue that the schematism itself is active, because it is produced by the *a priori* imagination, it nonetheless must work with passively received intuitions. Hence, the schematism seems unable to satisfy Hegel's requirement that cognition be thoroughly active, because it presupposes a passive element.

⁴⁰ Hegel, *History of Philosophy*, vol. 3, 441. Italics mine.

⁴¹ Hegel, *The Encyclopaedia Logic*, trans. T. F. Geraets, H. S. Harris, and W. A. Suchting (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991), 60, §24.

In *Glauben und Wissen*, Hegel displays some esteem for the productive imagination. In that work, the productive imagination is supposed to generate the identity of subject and predicate. As discussed above, however, Kant's version of the productive imagination does not generate anything that has reality outside the imagination, so it is inadequate for Hegel's purposes. In short, Kant's productive imagination is active, but it does not constitute anything outside itself. The schematism, because it merely connects a concept to some intuition that happens to be present through sensibility, has a somewhat different drawback. In short, the schematism is active to an extent, but it is constrained to work solely with passive data. An addition in the *Enyclopædia* reads, "Perception as such is always something singular that passes away, but cognition does not stop at this stage. On the contrary, in the perceived singular it seeks what is universal and abides..."⁴² Kant may accept that intuition is "always something singular that passes away," but he does not authorize theoretical cognition to seek "what is universal and abides." Accordingly, in Hegel's eyes, Kant's model of cognition is prey to passivity, and the schematism does not change this.

If successful, this paper has shown that the schematism offers an interesting vantage point from which to consider Hegel's critique of Kant's model of cognition. Although the schematism cannot ultimately satisfy Hegel, it goes some distance toward answering Hegel's problem (1), the intuition/concept dualism. This is because the identity of intuition (subject) and concept (predicate) it provides is (a) not empty, (b) not merely inferred from synthetic judgments *a priori*, (c) not psychological or empirical. On the contrary, the schema is a sophisticated, *a priori* process that cognizes the identity of intuition and concept within synthetic judgment *a priori* itself. However, the schematism cannot fully satisfy Hegel, because it cannot establish the universal, active, absolute identity of subject and predicate in cognition. Further, the schematism

⁴² Ibid., 78, §38.

seems powerless to solve problem (2), because the preclusion of knowledge of things-in-themselves is endemic to Kant's model. Nonetheless, reading *Glauben und Wissen* with Kant's schematism in mind helps illuminate both Hegel's critique of Kant and the model of cognition of which Hegel ultimately approves.

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