

Categories and Modes of Being: A Discussion of Robert Pasnau's *Metaphysical Themes*

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In *Metaphysical Themes: 1274-1671*, Robert Pasnau describes Aquinas's and Henry of Ghent's views on the ontological nature of some of Aristotle's categories as "structures." Although not based on a medieval term, Pasnau suggests that the term 'structure' captures their penchant for reductionism and deflationism about the lesser accidental categories (such as action and passion, and perhaps position). "Structure" is a useful notion because it is "ontologically innocent: it is an attempt to account for how the world is organized, but without postulating any further items in the world."¹ In this critical paper reflecting on Pasnau's magisterial and invaluable work, I shall focus on this reductive interpretation of Aquinas's view of categories. Since there is certainly good textual reasons supporting Pasnau's interpretation, I shall present a view that focuses on explicit discussions of categories in Aquinas's corpus. On this basis, I argue that Aquinas should be considered a non-reductionist and realist regarding categories; or at least Aquinas attempted to achieve this status. However, to do so, we must grant Aquinas some idiosyncratic approaches to metaphysics (in comparison to later scholastics)—some views which, nevertheless, I believe are defensible and philosophically fruitful. This analysis will lead me to close with a broader assessment of Pasnau's work that may be helpful in thinking about approaches to the history of metaphysics in the later medieval and early modern periods.

In his chapter on "Real Accidents," Pasnau identifies Aquinas's view on accidents as deflationary. A deflationary account of accidents holds that accidents "do not exist in the same sense that substances exist"²; and that "talk of an accident's existing is best

understood as shorthand for a substance's existing in a certain way.”³ Although there are stronger formulations of deflationism about accidents that has eliminativism as its limit,⁴ Aquinas's view fits this weaker characterization nicely because he says things like, “whiteness is said to exist not because it subsists in itself, but because by it something has existence-as-white.”⁵ Thus, Aquinas is weakly deflationary about accidents since he held that substance is what properly exists—not accidents—and accidents are ways in which the substance exists accidentally. For example, *snow* is white because of whiteness.⁶

Of course, concerning this view, there arises suspicion about the metaphysical separability of accidents, even if only under miraculous conditions (such as transubstantiation). In fact, despite Aquinas's deflationism about accidents, due to the fact that accidents are forms—and in this sense principles of actuality—Aquinas holds that it is metaphysically possible that accidents can be conserved by the power of God even without a subject.⁷ How this is understood to work is beyond the scope of this paper, but as we shall see, this point about forms as principles of actuality is important for establishing a realist interpretation of Aquinas on categories.

Given Aquinas's deflationism, it may not be surprising that Pasnau interprets him as holding a reductionistic account of some of the categories. As mentioned, Pasnau describes Aquinas's view of categories as structures. Whereas Aquinas clearly does not have a reductionist view of substance, quantity, quality and perhaps relation, it is possible that any or all of the remaining categories—Place Where, Time When, Position, Having, Action, Passion—do not each pick out any true kind of entity. Along these lines, Pasnau suggests that Aquinas “endorses the idea that each of the categories marks off a distinct kind of being, but without supposing that there is a one-to-one mapping from categories

to basic entities.”⁸ He is led to this from Aquinas’s view that there are cases where one and the same thing can be classified into more than one category. For example, the same change (*motus*) can fall either under Passion or Action; such as when a single specific event can be expressed either as falling under Action—“Mary built this table”—or under Passion—“This table was built by Mary.” Pasnau suggests that it would be odd for these two sentences to involve different metaphysical commitments since the only difference is between the active and passive voices. Although Aquinas holds that there is a basis in reality between action and passion (“to build” is different from “to be built”), this does not mean there is not some more basic entity that these reduce to: *viz.*, the change itself (which Aquinas sees as being just one actuality for any agent-patient pair). For this reason, Pasnau thinks that the notion of structure is helpful: the lesser categories are ontologically neutral and are fundamental ways in which the world may be arranged without mapping reality at its most fundamental level. In a footnote, Pasnau states that Aquinas holds this structure view for perhaps all categories except Substance, Quantity, and Quality.⁹ When coupled with the deflationary view of accidents, what Pasnau’s view seems to amount to is that although some categories pick out distinct ways in which the substance exists, between some categories—such as Action and Passion—distinct ways in which the substance exists are not picked out in virtue of a real distinction between them.

Having introduced Pasnau’s view, I want to broaden the scope of the discussion beyond Pasnau’s book by examining Aquinas’s ontology of categories. I am doing this in hopes of presenting Aquinas’s view as both deflationary regarding accidents and non-reductionist regarding categories.¹⁰ Not only do I think that Aquinas is a non-reductionist

about categories, but I also think that such an analysis can serve as an opportunity for assessing Pasnau's book. Specifically, I think that the trouble in interpreting Aquinas is found (1) in his lean and yet realist ontology, and (2) his reliance on an analysis of cognitive acts to support ontological distinctions. However, in order to accept Aquinas's view of categories as realist, there are some controversial points that must be granted to Aquinas, not the least of which is the real distinction between existence and essence, the analogy of being, and a kind of isomorphism between thought and reality. As many of us are aware, each of these themes are subject to misinterpretation and sophistical and incoherent application.

The way through which we shall examine categories will be first to reflect on the role that predication plays in Aquinas's view of categories, and then to discuss how categories are a way of mediating being through distinct essences.

The debate over the categories usually orbits around the question about whether they are linguistic, conceptual, or real features of the world. Understanding this debate often becomes confused because of linguistic or conceptual approaches that some thirteenth century scholastics take to identifying the list of categories (and because of the debate over how Aristotle's *Categories* relates to the methodological study of logic and metaphysics). For example, Aquinas and Albert Magnus both advocate establishing the list of categories by reflecting on various modes of predication. This has led both contemporary and medieval thinkers (such as Scotus) to conclude that as a result of such a technique Aquinas has only succeeded at best in providing a rational distinction of the categories and not a real one.¹¹ Although we shall look at the role that predication plays

in identifying the list and nature of the categories for Aquinas, first it is important to identify a previous question about the role that categories play in human cognition.

Far from being known in a derivative manner, Aquinas says in *De potentia* 7.9 that categories are fundamentally ordered to the first things understood by the intellect (*prima intellecta*), which are things existing extra-mentally.

Because relation is rather weak among all the categories, for this reason, certain men supposed that it was from the second things understood (*secundis intellectibus*). For the things first understood are things beyond the soul; with respect to cognizing such things, intellect is drawn at first. However, the second things understood are called intentions consequent upon the mode of understanding; in this second (*hoc secundo*), the intellect understands itself in however much it reflects upon itself, understanding itself to understand, and [understanding] the mode by which it understands. According then to this position, it might follow that relation is not among things beyond the soul, but in the intellect alone, just like the intention of genus and species, and second substances. This, however, cannot be possible. For something is placed in no category unless as a thing (*res*) existing beyond the soul. For a being of reason is divided against being divided by the ten categories (*Meta. 5*).¹²

Here, Aquinas is equating categories with extra-mental things. As first intelligibles, these have cognitive priority to those things that follow upon our understanding. Far from being derivative or dependent on our thought, Aquinas seems to be saying that since categories are related to the first things understood by us, they are grouped-in with that which is cognitively foundational. Importantly, Aquinas also says that “a being of reason is divided against being having been divided by the ten categories.” This is seen in the fact that although a category can be understood as a genus, they are directly predicated of things themselves, whereas the predicate “genus” cannot.

What is presupposed in the above discussion is Aquinas’s theory of abstraction: that which exists extramentally becomes known by us through the process of abstraction in which the extramental content becomes unified in the mind as independent of the

existence conditions of the thing existing extramentally.¹³ The categories themselves are part of the content contained in the mind upon a primary understanding of things—that which is most general in such an understanding—and as such are identified with the extramental things themselves. This distinguishes categories from logical beings since these are secondarily divided against the being that is divided by the ten categories. In this way, there is a priority to the division of the categories in our understanding of the world to the division of our thoughts of them. In conjunction with this prior division, the intellect combines and separates predicates and subjects.¹⁴

However, each category identified with extramental things are not known in a way fully independent of substance.¹⁵ In fact, each accidental category is known concretely in relation to substance, even though each accidental category can be signified independently of it. An accidental essence or form can be distinctly identified from the essence of substance.¹⁶

Given that predicates are identified with the things of which they are predicated, it is not surprising when Aquinas makes the famous claim in his Commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* that categories divide being because “being is said to be in just as many ways as we can make predications.”¹⁷ That is, since our concepts are intrinsically ordered by distinct categories, and predicates can be truly predicated of their subjects, Aquinas believed that through a reflection on the essential relations between certain predicates and subjects one can identify the list of Aristotle's categories; a list which he claims is finite.¹⁸ This allowed Aristotle to generate a logic of categorial predication; such as the rule that two predicates falling under different categories cannot be essentially predicated of each other.¹⁹ One of the things that predication shows us is that there are

predicates that cannot be predicated essentially of some things that other predicates can be essentially predicated of. For example, ‘color’ can be predicated essentially of ‘whiteness’ but it cannot be essentially predicated of ‘human,’ even though ‘rational’ is predicated of ‘human’ in this way.²⁰

Forgoing a discussion of how Aquinas’s derivation of the categories (which I have treated elsewhere²¹), the more pertinent question for our purposes is whether Aquinas held that the results of such a distinction among the categories yields a division of essences. That is, does he conclude that the categories mark a division of things—a real division—rather than merely rational division? Scotus, for example, thought that the result of Aquinas’s derivation based on modes of predication is only a rational division at best, because differences in modes of predication are themselves only rationally distinct and do not imply a distinction of essences.²² This view is echoed by Pasnau when discussing Ockham’s view of categories: “the linguistic-conceptual items that fall into the categories pick out not a distinctive kind of thing, but merely substance and quality in some oblique way.”²³

What is implied in denying that Aquinas held that categories are divided essentially is that it is possible for essence *x* to fall under more than one category. Aquinas rules this out when he says that being signifies “the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten categories,” and that being “is convertible with thing.”²⁴ Since the transcendental *res* signifies the fact that beings have essence,²⁵ what he is saying is that any being as divided by the categories is a thing and has an essence. No two essences falling under distinct categories will have any predicates in common (beyond ‘being,’ etc.). In this way, distinct categories are not themselves essences but express things that

are essentially distinct. One category is accidental to another, and so one thing cannot result from two, except accidentally.²⁶ However, given the fact that being is analogically predicated of things falling under distinct categories, Aquinas also suggests that each thing falling under distinct categories have essences in different but related senses.

Essence translated into the language of predication is definition. Definition demarks the whatness of a thing signified. When we look at how accidental things are understood essentially through predication, we see that a predicate can be concrete or abstract. Whereas the category substance is predicated of concrete things (e.g., “Socrates is a substance), accidental categories are predicated of abstract nouns (e.g., “Wisdom is a quality). Wisdom signifies the category of quality independently of its subject of inherence. Thus, “whatness applies to other categories because it makes sense to ask what something is.”²⁷ In this way, all ten categories are essentially distinct. However, predicates that signify accidental categories have their concrete form predicated of the primary substances in which they inhere (e.g., “Socrates is wise). The concrete sense is important since it is directly applicable to, and abstracted from, fundamental things existing outside of the mind. When considering accidents in a concrete sense, there are differences when discussing the whatness of each accidental item per category. This is because the concrete term ‘wise’ signifies a subject insofar as it signifies wisdom after the mode of an accident.²⁸ An accident, although when signified abstractly does not include the subject in its signification, when signified concretely, depends on, and is individuated by, its subject.²⁹ All accidental essences are referred to substance as a primary kind of being because accidents involve the *ratio* of substance. For example, the *ratio* of quantity (considered in relation to a concrete predicate) includes the notion that it

is the measure of substance and quality includes the notion that it is the disposition of substance.³⁰ In this way, accidents do not have a strict whatness as substance does but the nine categories have whatness and essence in an analogous way.³¹ Despite this condition, each category can be signified abstractly in a way independent of that in which it inheres. This indicates that there is some essential content not reducible to the essential content of its subject of inherence.

Having discussed the categories as essential divisions of things, we can next discuss categories as a division of being. The connection between being and essence is of course Aquinas's view that that by which and through which something exists is its essence. Thus, Aquinas says that "being is divided into ten categories as it is considered absolutely,"³² and that each thing falling distinctly under each of the ten categories is a complete being (*ens perfectum*).³³ Sometimes he refers to entities falling under distinct categories as *ens secundum se* because they exist and have essence not reducible to the essence of substance.³⁴ Since there are ten categories, each with independently signifiable essences that are classed by them, the single act of being that actualizes a substance is diversified *qua* beings in proportion to these essences. For this reason, any two essences falling under distinct categories will each be called distinct beings. As Aquinas says, accidents "have a proper mode of being in their proper essence.... In view of the fact that all accidents are forms of a sort superadded to the substance and caused by the principles of the substance, it must be that their being is superadded to the being of the substance and dependent on that being."³⁵ However, we must consider this in relation to the fact that things are essentially distinct from each other—even within one and the same substance. There is the one being of the individually existing substance but that one being

is directed and actualized according to the accidental essences inhering in it. As a result, there arises the deflationary view that accidents are ways in which the substance exists accidentally.

However, there is more to the story. Aquinas sees the real distinction between essence and existence as having a strong role for a full understanding of the categories. The content expressed by the predicate is derived from abstraction from real things and is in itself independent of existential content. For example, the predicate ‘animal’ is understood independently of how humans exist—such as individual or as contingent, etc. For this reason, Aquinas holds that a quiddity can be within a category only if it is not the same as its existence.³⁶ This is because things are contained in a category only with respect to their common nature or essence. This allows for things like material and immaterial substances—things with different modes of being—to be contained under the category of substance.³⁷ The way in which a material substance exists is fundamentally different from the way in which an immaterial substance—like an angel—exists. This also leaves open the possibility of sorting things not only according to the logic of their common natures—under which the categories fall—but also according to their individual natures or existence: “Two things in the same category can still be diverse in the sense that they have diverse first subjects. He says that the diversity of the categories from the predication of being is considered by the logician because it is conceptual.”³⁸

This last point helps us to understand Aquinas’s view of accidental entities according to the modality of existence and as modes of being. Not only does each accident have its own essential content, but each also has its own way in which it is found to exist or found in nature. Whereas on one hand, a quality is essentially a disposition of

substance, on the other hand it is found in nature as existing in substance. For this reason, accidents do not exist independently of the being of the substance.³⁹ However, Aquinas holds that not only does each categorial thing classify distinct sets of essences but distinct sets of modes of being as well. (Each distinction can be used to classify or identify each of the categories.) For example, although relations have their own essence, they also have the mode of being of “to something.”⁴⁰ Also, quantity exists in such a distinct way from otherwise categorially classified entities insofar as they can themselves be the subject of distinct categorial entities.⁴¹ Cribbing Augustine, Aquinas defines ‘mode’ as “that which a measure determines: wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure.”⁴² In this way, modes of being are both measures of being of the substance as well as a determination of the substance itself. Accordingly, the being of a substance is divided into ten categories according to diverse modes of existence and are the ultimate determination that “this” is “that.”⁴³ This is consistent with Aquinas’s view that accidents make the substance to exist accidentally in some way. Aquinas says that “from an accident and a subject results an accidental existence when the accident comes to the subject.”⁴⁴

We can next address the topic of the composition of categorially distinct entities. That is, by addressing the real distinction between the modes of being and essence of categorial things we can now see how they exist in composition.

The logic of composition of accidents and substances is best expressed by Aquinas in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics*, where he shows us how accidents can be conceived concretely or abstractly:

Now a subject is given directly in the definition of an accident when an accident is signified concretely as an accident fused with a subject, as when I say that

snubness is a concave nose; for nose is given in the definition of snub as a genus in order to signify that accidents subsist only in a subject. But when an accident is signified in the abstract, after the manner of a substance, then the subject is given in its definition indirectly, as a difference, as it is said that snubness is the concavity of a nose.⁴⁵

Amplifying this is the following difficult passage from the *De ente et essentia* where

Aquinas brings in the notion of modes of being in the determination of the composition of accident and substance:

And because accidents are not composed of matter and form, their genus cannot be taken from matter and their difference from form, as in the case of composed substances. Rather, their first genus must be taken from their way of existing itself, according to which the word “being” is diversely predicated of the ten genera according to a priority and posteriority; for example, an accident is called quantity from the fact that it is the measure of substance, and quality according as it is the disposition of substance, and so with the other accidents, according to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*. But their differences are taken from the diversity of the principles by which they are caused. And because proper attributes are caused by the proper principles of the subject, the subject is placed in their definition to function as the difference if they are defined in the abstract, which is the way in which they are properly in a genus; as when it is said that snubness is the turned-up-ness of the nose. But the converse would be the case if their definition were taken according as they are said concretely. For in this way the subject is placed in their definition as a genus because they are then being defined after the manner of composed substance, in which the genus is taken from matter; as when we say that a snub nose is a turned up nose.⁴⁶

Aquinas argues that as categories every accidental category has a genus-difference-species ordering, in a way similar to the example of how “continuous” and “discrete” are differences of quantity, except that the category itself is composed as a genus-difference union. Between these two passages, there seems to be four ways in which this can occur: in (1) pseudo-defining concrete accidents in which (1a) the subject serves as the genus and the categorial ordered accidental essence serves as its difference (e.g., snub contains the genus “nose” as differentiated by “snubness”); (1b) the mode of being of the accident serves as the genus and the accidental essence serves as the difference (e.g., existing

snubness contains the mode of being *inesse*⁴⁷, which serves as the genus as differentiated by “snubness”); (2) pseudo-defining abstract categorially classed accidents in which (2a) the categorially classed accidental essence serves as the genus and the subject serves as the difference (e.g., snubness as differentiated by nose); (2b) the categorially classed accidental essences serves as the genus and the mode of being of the accident serves as the difference (e.g., snubness as differentiated by *inesse*).

Although the abstract signification of an accident is what properly falls under a category, nevertheless, since the accidental essence adds to the notion of the being of the substance, the mode of being of the accident can serve to amplify the intelligibility of the nature of the accident itself. How this is done depends on whether one is considering the accident abstractly (categorially) or concretely (compositionally or existentially). If considered concretely, Aquinas suggests that an accident can be understood in such a way that that which signifies the essence itself should stand as a difference to the subject in which the concretely understood accident exists as its genus. Thus, “snubness” is a concaved nose such that snubness is a concrete property that includes nose as its subject and genus. A similar thing can be done when considering the relationship between how snubness is found to exist (as distinct from its essence) in relation to the substance in which it exists. However, if taken abstractly (and signifying the category itself), the accident will be the genus that has as its difference its subject in which it exists and has its mode of being. For example, concavity of the nose (abstractly conceived) is further specified by snubnosedness in that the latter is that in which the abstract concavity is realized or actualized.⁴⁸ So, on the one hand, the accidental essence is actualized (as specific difference to genus) by the existing subject (the substance) whereas on the other

hand, the being of the substance is further concretely differentiated or determined by receiving a distinct mode of being through the distinct essence of the accident.

Fundamentally, by adding the mode of being, there is allowed a fuller and more specific recognition of the distinctness of each categorial entity as its own thing, and ontologically diversified from every other thing, while including the unity that exists among these distinct ontological elements. The problem of each categorial thing not having a complete essence is resolved by showing how concrete and abstract accidental accidents relate to the being of the substance.

So, how does Aquinas conceive of how the categorial entities combine within a single substance? We have the particular challenge of answering Pasnau's charge of reductionism with respect to some of the categories, especially regarding action and passion. How can Aquinas claim that action and passion are essentially distinct when there is a single event between them? In general, I think that the natural tendency to be reductive about Aquinas's view of the latter accidental categories stems from the close connections that these categorial entities form, especially with respect to the deflationary order that arises in the subjection of one to another. Yet the principle seems to hold for Aquinas that as long as a distinct intelligible principle (hence a distinct essence) is able to be signified in a way distinct from substance (although still understood as ontologically dependent on substance), there arises the articulation of a new mode being within the esse of substance. In what follows, I provide some examples of this, which serve only as a rough sketch.

First, Aquinas maintains that among the accidental categories only relation does not imply a habitude to that subject of which it is predicated.⁴⁹ With the other accidental

categories, there is within the grasp of each categorial being (not including substance and relation) an inherent semantic relation to that wherein it exists. As a consequence of this, each is conditioned by the subject in which they inhere. This gives these eight categorial beings the appearance of indistinctness from the subjects in which they inhere or are otherwise related. For example, he identifies body as “quantity having position.”⁵⁰ Or, one can take the category of habit. In the *Summa theologiae*, Aquinas says that the notion of having can be understood in a variety of different ways: in one sense quality and quantity is “had” by substance. In another sense, a person “has” a friend. However, these distinct ways of having, which are post-predicamental, do not prevent the proper category of habit from being identified. Specifically, Aquinas identifies habit as follows:

And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that “a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had”; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the category of habit: of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that “there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed.”⁵¹

An important aspect in Aquinas’s identification of habit is that the having of one thing by another is mediated or has the intervening subject (*medium*) of action and passion. I think that one can interpret ‘medium’ here as that which is involved as a subject of a categorial essence insofar as it is included in its concrete pseudo-definition (although it can be signified abstractly in a way independently of these subjects). So, it seems that Aquinas’s view of habit is that it is an irreducible essence between two things (e.g., a man and some clothing) that is mediated by action or passion. To put it in terms identified above, habit—although signifiable according to its own principle of intelligibility—is pseudo-

defined either abstractly or concretely in relation to modes of being and subjects of inherence. This is distinct from action, which does not include the notion of having. Habit betokens a relationship existing between a body and what is adjacent to it.⁵²

The theme of unifying and explicating categorial essences along with various intervening subjects appears to be similar to the way he presents the other categories. For example, he says that “position is a disposition, which is the order of that which has parts,” but with the further determination, “with respect to place.”⁵³ This runs parallel to Aquinas’s identification of quality as “disposition of substance” cited above in the passage from the *De ente*.⁵⁴ This is interesting since although there is expressed a similar concept (“disposition of”), yet they are differentiated in that they are dispositions with respect to different subjects or mediums. Namely, the category of position implies the order of parts in place; and place can be considered a subject or medium of position. As a result of this, whatever is moved according to position must be moved according to place.⁵⁵

This brings us specifically to the categories of action and passion. Regarding these, Aquinas says that

although motion is one, yet there are two categories which are based on motion depending on the different external things according to which the predicamental denominations are made. For an agent is one thing from which as from something external the predicament of passion is taken; and the patient is some other thing from which something is denominated an agent.⁵⁶

This is an important passage for addressing Pasnau’s worry about action and passion. The motion (or event in Pasnau’s language) is indeed one, but it serves only as the subject or medium (*viz.*, the basis) which requires further formal specification or differentiation. This further differentiation comes from both the cause of the action and the receiver of

the action. So, the essence of action arises from the agent itself and the motion, whereas the essence of passion arises from the passive subject and the motion. It seems that the agent, the passive subject and the motion are all merely subjects that serve as the genus of the categorial essences of action and passion themselves. That is, the categories of action and passion are based on the notions of acting cause and of effect,⁵⁷ coupled with the single event of change itself. Regarding action and passion specifically, as with all the categories, action and passion have their own subjects, which include quality, quantity, where and when.⁵⁸

Does this analysis that I have given prove that Aquinas is not a reductionist about categories even though he is a deflationist about accidental beings? I think that the answer to this question can come only with a broader discussion about ontological methodology and expectations. Of course, Aquinas sees his view as ontologically robust, but in doing so he asks us to approach his conclusions in a certain way. In fact, this brings me to what constitutes a broad assessment of Pasnau's book. Although I have gone fairly quickly through some complicated issues in Aquinas's metaphysics, right or wrong, an important lesson can be drawn from it in relation to the way that Pasnau approaches metaphysics in general in his book. Specifically, Pasnau seems resistant to entertaining the idea that conceptual or linguistic structures can be a valid way of articulating and establishing ontological concepts. This can be best illustrated by highlighting two passages from Pasnau's book:

If the substance-accident ontology does not fall out of the definition of what a substance is, then how does it arise? No doubt, part of its appeal comes from an uncritical reliance on the surface structure of language. Since language attaches predicates to subjects, it is easy to suppose that the world's structure corresponds. This sort of simple-minded thought should have carried little weight with scholastic authors, however. They had at their disposal a variety of semantic

theories that explained predication without any commitment to a substance-accident ontology, such as Ockham's version of supposition theory, which he formulated in the interests of his own austere ontological program (pp. 106, 107).

Compare that quote with the following one in which he is discussing a doctrine that is characteristic of nominalists:

[The] characterization of the disagreement [between nominalists and realists] focuses on whether the surface structure of language corresponds to the structure of reality, in such a way that distinct terms match up with distinct things in reality. This, however, has little to do with the problem of universals; it refers mainly to a dispute over the categories (see Ch. 12): does every predicate across Aristotle's categorial scheme—e.g., warm, six-feet tall, next to, sitting—have corresponding to it a real accidental form? (p. 86).

I think in these two quotations we see, despite its heroic merits, a limitation in Pasnau's approach. In not taking seriously metaphysical approaches through language, Pasnau bends his analysis to the side of the nominalist, even if this label is radically deficient. I think that his analysis as a consequence is forced to pass over a serious treatment of those historically sympathetic to a (Thomistic?) realism, which envisions, for example, that the best way of conceiving and mediating matter is through the propositional subject, form through predicates, existence through the predication of the copula, and inherence through a content expressed in the act of judgment. I think that this is unfortunate since an appealing aspect of Aquinas's metaphysics is its leanness; a tightness that both gives rise to natural ways of understanding his metaphysical principles and to reductive moves on the part of his interpreters.

¹ Robert Pasnau, *Metaphysical Themes: 1276-1671* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 231.

² Pasnau, p. 181.

³ Pasnau, p. 183.

⁴ Stronger deflationism is encapsulated by Pasnau later when he says the following: "it might seem that either one should endorse accidental forms as metaphysical parts that exist in their own right, as substances do, or else treat them as merely an aspect (a mode?) of the substance. In the latter case, however, it would seem odd to say, as Aquinas seems to, that a substance has multiple existences,

substantial and accidental. On a strictly deflationary view, it would seem better to say that only the substance exists,” p. 194.

⁵ Pasnau, p. 184. Here Pasnau is quoting Aquinas, *Quodlibet* IX.2.2.

⁶ Pasnau, p. 192. This is a partial quote from Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, 3.77.1 ad 4.

⁷ Pasnau, p. 187.

⁸ Pasnau, p. 230.

⁹ Pasnau, p. 231n. Pasnau cites the following passage from Aquinas to support his view: “[T]he other classes of things are a result of relation rather than a cause of it. For the category *when* consists in a relation to time; and the category *where* in a relation to place. And *posture* implies an arrangement of parts; and *having* (*attire*), the relation of the thing having to the things had” Aquinas, *In duodecim libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio*, ed. M. R. Cathala and R. M. Spiazzi (Rome: Marietti, 1971). Translated by John P. Rowan, 1961.

¹⁰ By ‘reductionist’ I mean the view that although a difference can be made among things, this difference does not mark a real distinction in such a way to pick out two distinct things.

¹¹ For example, this is Scotus’s conclusion in his *Question Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics*. Agreeing perhaps with Pasnau’s interpretation of Aquinas on the categories, Scotus also seems to hold the notion that establishing only a rational distinction rather than a real one was not done by accident by Aquinas. That is, it is not as if Aquinas thought he was mistaken in providing a real distinction among the categories but only managed to conduct his examination within a rationally distinct scope, but that Aquinas was intending to divide the categories rationally by dividing them via modes of predication.

¹² *De potentia*, q. 7 a. 9 co.: *Respondeo. Dicendum quod relatio ad Deum est aliqua res in creatura. Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est, quod sicut dicit Commentator in XI Metaph., quia relatio est debilioris esse inter omnia praedicamenta, ideo putaverunt quidam eam esse ex secundis intellectibus. Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit. Secundum ergo hanc positionem sequeretur quod relatio non sit in rebus extra animam, sed in solo intellectu, sicut intentio generis et speciei, et secundarum substantiarum. Hoc autem esse non potest. In nullo enim praedicamento ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra ens divisum per decem praedicamenta ut patet V Metaph. Si autem relatio non esset in rebus extra animam non poneretur ad aliquid unum genus praedicamenti. Et praeterea perfectio et bonum quae sunt in rebus extra animam, non solum attenditur secundum aliquid absolute inhaerens rebus, sed etiam secundum ordinem unius rei ad aliam, sicut etiam in ordine partium exercitus, bonum exercitus consistit: huic enim ordini comparat philosophus ordinem universi. Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur. Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam seu passivam. Ex his enim solum duobus attenditur aliquid in uno, respectu extrinseci. Mensuratur enim aliquid non solum a quantitate intrinseca, sed etiam ab extrinseca. Per virtutem etiam activam unumquodque agit in alterum et per passivam patitur ab altero; per substantiam autem et qualitatem ordinatur aliquid ad seipsum tantum, non ad alterum, nisi per accidens; scilicet secundum quod qualitas, vel forma substantialis aut materia, habet rationem virtutis activae vel passivae, et secundum quod in eis consideratur aliqua ratio quantitatis, prout unum in substantia facit idem, et unum in qualitate simile, et numerus, sive multitudo, dissimile et diversum in eisdem, et dissimile secundum quod aliquid magis vel minus altero consideratur: sic enim albius aliquid altero dicitur. Et propter hoc philosophus in V Metaph. species assignans relationis, quasdam ponit ex quantitate causatas, quasdam vero ex actione et passione. Sic ergo oportet quod res habentes ordinem ad aliquid, realiter referantur ad ipsum, et quod in eis aliqua res sit relatio. Omnes autem creaturae ordinantur ad Deum et sicut ad principium et sicut ad finem, nam ordo qui est partium universi ad invicem, est per ordinem qui est totius universi ad Deum; sicut ordo qui est inter partes exercitus, est propter ordinem exercitus ad ducem, ut patet XII Metaph. Unde oportet quod creaturae realiter referantur ad Deum, et quod ipsa relatio sit res quaedam in creatura. “...Because relation is rather weak among all the categories, for this reason, certain men supposed that it was from the second things understood (*secunda intellecta*). For the things first understood are things beyond the soul; with respect to cognizing such things, intellect is drawn at first. However, the second things understood are called intentions consequent upon the mode of understanding; in this second (*hoc secundo*), the intellect understands itself in however much it reflects upon itself, understanding itself to understand, and*

[understanding] the mode by which it understands. According then to this position, it might follow that relation is not among things beyond the soul, but in the intellect alone, just like the intention of genus and species, and second substances. This, however, cannot be possible. For something is placed in no category unless as a thing (res) existing beyond the soul. For a being of reason is divided against being divided by the ten categories (*Meta.* 5).” Special thanks to Sarah Wear for essential translation suggestions for the above passage. Another translation continues: “Now if relation had no objective reality, it would not be placed among the predicaments. Moreover the perfection and goodness that are in things outside the mind are ascribed not only to something absolute and inherent to things but also to the order between one thing and another: thus the good of an army consists in the mutual ordering of its parts, to which good the Philosopher (*Metaph.* x) compares the good of the universe. Consequently there must be order in things themselves, and this order is a kind of relation. Wherefore there must be relations in things themselves, whereby one is ordered to another. Now one thing is ordered to another either as to quantity or as to active or passive power: for on these two counts alone can we find in a thing something whereby we compare it with another. For a thing is measured not only by its intrinsic quantity but also in reference to an extrinsic quantity. And again by its active power one thing acts on another, and by its passive power is acted on by another: while by its substance and quality a thing is ordered to itself alone and not to another, except accidentally: namely inasmuch as a quality, substantial form or matter is a kind of active or passive power, and forasmuch as one may ascribe to them a certain kind of quantity: thus one thing produces the same in substance; and one thing produces its like in quality; and number or multitude causes dissimilarity and diversity in the same things; and dissimilarity in that one thing is considered as being more or less so and so than another, thus one thing is said to be whiter than another. Hence the Philosopher (*Metaph.* v) in giving the species of relations, says that some are based on quantity and some on action and passion. Accordingly things that are ordered to something must be really related to it, and this relation must be some real thing in them. Now all creatures are ordered to God both as to their beginning and as to their end: since the order of the parts of the universe to one another results from the order of the whole universe to God: even as the mutual order of the parts of an army is on account of the order of the whole army to its commander (*Metaph.* xii). Therefore creatures are really related to God, and this relation is something real in the creature.”

¹³ Cite article: Aquinas’s Abstractionism.....

¹⁴ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 6 l. 4 n. 21: *Et alia ratio est, quia utrumque, scilicet ens verum et ens per accidens, sunt circa aliquod genus entis, non circa ens simpliciter per se quod est in rebus; et non ostendunt aliquam aliam naturam entis existentem extra per se entia. Patet enim quod ens per accidens est ex concursu accidentaliter entium extra animam, quorum unumquodque est per se. Sicut grammaticum musicum licet sit per accidens, tamen et grammaticum et musicum est per se ens, quia utrumque per se acceptum, habet causam determinatam. Et similiter intellectus compositionem et divisionem facit circa res, quae sub praedicamentis continentur.* “1243. Another reason for excluding them is that, while “both of these,” namely, being in the sense of the true and accidental being, (+) belong to some class of being, (~) they do not belong to being in the proper sense, which is found in reality. Nor do they designate another kind of being distinct from beings in the proper sense. For it is evident that accidental being is a result of the coincidental connection of beings which exist outside the mind, each of which is a being of itself. For even though the grammatical musical has being only accidentally, nevertheless both grammatical and musical are beings in the proper sense, because each of these taken by itself has a definite cause. Similarly the intellect combines and separates those things which are contained in the categories.”

¹⁵ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 9 l. 1 n. 1: *Postquam determinavit philosophus de ente secundum quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, hic intendit determinare de ente secundum quod dividitur per potentiam et actum. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima continuat se ad praecedentia, et manifestat suam intentionem in hoc libro. In secunda prosequitur quod intendit, ibi, quod quidem igitur. Dicit ergo primo, quod in praemissis dictum est de ente primo, ad quod omnia alia praedicamenta entis referuntur, scilicet de substantia. Et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat, quia omnia alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. Dicitur enim quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; similiter in aliis. Et hoc patet ex hoc, quod omnia accidentia habent rationem substantiae, quia in definitione cuiuslibet accidentis oportet ponere proprium subiectum, sicut in definitione simi ponitur nasus. Et hoc declaratum est in praemissis, scilicet in principio septimi.* “1768. Having established the truth about being as divided into the ten categories, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about being as

divided into potency and actuality. This is divided into two parts. In the first he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, and explains what he intends to do in this book. In the second (1773) he carries out his announced plan. He accordingly points out, first, that he has already discussed above the primary kind of being to which all the other categories of being are referred, namely, substance. And he explains that all the other categories are referred to substance as the primary kind of being, because all other beings—quantity, quality, and the like—involve the concept of substance. For being is said of quantity because it is the measure of substance; and of quality because it is a certain disposition of substance; and the same thing applies in the case of the other categories. This is evident from the fact that all accidents involve the concept of substance, since in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for example, in the definition of *snub* it is necessary to include nose. This was made clear at the beginning of Book VII (1347).”

¹⁶ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 7 l. 1 n. 15: *Quod etiam sit prior ordine cognitionis, patet. Illud enim est primum secundum cognitionem, quod est magis notum et magis manifestat rem. Res autem unaquaeque magis noscitur, quando scitur eius substantia, quam quando scitur eius quantitas aut qualitas. Tunc enim putamus nos maxime scire singula, quando noscitur quid est homo aut ignis, magis quam quando cognoscimus quale est aut quantum, aut ubi, aut secundum aliquod aliud praedicamentum. Quare etiam de ipsis, quae sunt in praedicamentis accidentium, tunc scimus singula, quando de unoquoque scimus quid est. Sicut quando scimus quid est ipsum quale, scimus qualitatem, et quando scimus quid est ipsum quantum, scimus quantitatem. Sicut enim alia praedicamenta non habent esse nisi per hoc quod insunt substantiae, ita non habent cognosci nisi in quantum participant aliquid de modo cognitionis substantiae, quae est cognoscere quid est.* “1259. (1) It is evident too that substance is first in the order of knowing, for that is first in the order of knowing which is better known and explains a thing better. Now each thing is better known when its substance is known rather than when its quality or quantity is known; for we think we know each thing best when we know what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know of what sort it is or how much it is or where it is or when we know it according to any of the other categories. For this reason too we think that we know each of the things contained in the categories of accidents when we know what each is; for example, when we know what being this sort of thing is, we know quality; and when we know what being how much is, we know quantity. For just as the other categories have being only insofar as they inhere in a substance, in a similar way they can be known only insofar as they share to some extent in the mode according to which substance is known, and this is to know the whatness of a thing.”

¹⁷ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 6: *Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia quoties ens dicitur, idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, toties esse significatur, idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis.* “890. Being must then be narrowed down to diverse genera on the basis of a (+) different mode of predication, which flows from a different mode of being; for “being is signified,” i.e., something is signified to be, “in just as many ways” (or in as many senses) as we can make predications. And for this reason the classes into which being is first divided are called *praedicaments*, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating. Therefore, since some predicates signify what (i.e., substance); some, of what kind; some, how much; and so on; there must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication. For example, when it is said that a man is an animal, is signifies substance; and when it is said that a man is white, is signifies quality; and so on.”

¹⁸ *Expositio Posteriorum*, lib. 1 l. 34 n. 9: *Circa primum, primo resumit quod de unoquoque possunt aliqua praedicari, quidquid significant: sive sit quale, sive quantum, vel quodcunque aliud genus accidentis, vel etiam quae intrans substantiam rei, quae sunt essentialia praedicata. Secundo, resumit quod haec, scilicet substantialia praedicata, sunt finita. Tertio, resumit quod genera praedicamentorum sunt finita; scilicet quale et quantum et cetera. Si enim aliquis dicat quod quantitas praedicetur de substantia, et qualitas de quantitate, et sic in infinitum; hoc excludit per hoc, quod genera praedicamentorum sunt finita. Quarto, resumit quod, sicut supra expositum est, unum de uno praedicatur in simplici praedicatione. Et hoc ideo inducit, quia posset aliquis dicere quod primo praedicabitur unum de uno, puta de homine animal; et ista praedicatio multiplicabitur quousque poterit inveniri aliquod unum, quod de homine praedicetur. Quibus finitis, praedicabuntur duo de uno: puta, dicitur quod homo est animal album; et sic multo plura*

praedicata invenirentur secundum diversas combinationes praedicatorum. Rursus, praedicabuntur tria de uno: puta, dicitur quod homo est animal album magnum; et sic semper addendo ad numerum, magis multiplicabuntur praedicata, et erit procedere in infinitum in praedicatis, sicut etiam in additione numerorum. Sed hoc excludit per praedicationem unius de uno. Quinto, resumit ut non dicamus aliqua simpliciter praedicari de ipsis, quae non aliquid sunt, idest de accidentibus, quorum nullum est aliquid subsistens. De accidente enim neque subiectum neque accidens proprie praedicatur, ut supra dictum est. Omnia enim huiusmodi, quae non sunt aliquid substantiale, sunt accidentia, et de his nihil praedicatur simpliciter loquendo: sed haec quidem praedicantur per se, scilicet de subiectis, vel substantialia praedicata vel accidentalia. Illa vero secundum alium modum, idest per accidens, scilicet cum praedicantur de accidentibus, aut subiecta, aut accidentia. Haec enim omnia, scilicet accidentia, habent de sui ratione quod dicantur de subiecto: illud autem quod est accidens, non est subiectum aliquod; unde nihil proprie loquendo potest de eo praedicari, quia nihil talium, scilicet accidentium, ponimus esse tale, quod dicatur id, quod dicitur, idest quod suscipiat praedicationem eius, quod de eo praedicatur, non quasi aliquid alterum existens, sicut accidit in substantiis. Homo enim dicitur animal vel album, non quia aliquid aliud sit animal vel album, sed quia ipsummet quod est homo, est animal vel album: sed album ideo dicitur homo vel musicum, quia aliquid alterum, scilicet subiectum albi, est homo vel musicum. Sed ipsum accidens inest aliis; et alia, quae praedicantur de accidente, praedicantur de altero, idest de subiecto accidentis; et propter hoc praedicantur de accidente, ut dictum est. Hoc autem introduxit, quia si accidens praedicatur de subiecto, et e converso, et omnia quae accidunt subiecto, praedicentur de se invicem, sequetur quod praedicatio procedat in infinitum, quia uni infinita accidunt. "Thirdly, he reaffirms that the genera of predicaments are finite, namely, quality, quantity and so on. For if someone were to say that quantity is predicated of substance, and quality of quantity, and so on to infinity, he excludes this on the ground that the genera of predicaments are finite."

¹⁹ *Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 26 n. 7: Deinde cum dicit: quod autem contingit etc., manifestat quod supposuerat, scilicet quod, altero extremorum existente in aliquo toto, alterum non sit in eodem, dicens quod manifestum est ex coordinationibus, scilicet praedicatorum diversorum, quae non commutantur ad invicem. Scilicet quia id quod est in uno praedicamento, non est in altero, manifestum est quod contingat b non esse in toto, in quo est a, aut e converso, quia videlicet contingit unum terminorum accipi in uno praedicamento, in quo non est alius. Sit enim una coordinatio praedicamenti acd, puta praedicamentum substantiae; et alia coordinatio sit bef, puta praedicamentum quantitatis. Si ergo nihil eorum, quae sunt in coordinatione acd, de nullo praedicatur eorum, quae sunt in coordinatione bef; a autem sit in p, quasi in quodam generalissimo, quod sit principium totius primae coordinationis; manifestum est quod b non erit in p, quia sic coordinationes, idest praedicamenta, commutarentur. Similiter autem est si b sit in quodam toto, ut puta in e; manifestum est quod a non erit in e. "Then (79b5) he explains something he had presupposed, namely, "on condition that one of the extremes exist in some whole and that the other be not in the same," saying that it is "clear from the 'orderings' of the various predicaments, which are" not mutually interchangeable. In other words, because that which is in one predicament is not in another, it is plain that B happens not to be in the whole in which A is, or vice versa, because one of the terms happens to be taken from one predicament in which the other is not found. Thus, let one ordering of the predicaments be ACD, say the predicament of substance, and another ordering be BEF, say the predicament of quantity. Then if none of those in the ordering ACD be predicated of none in the ordering BEF, while A is in P as in that most general item which is the principle of the whole first ering, it is plain that B is not in P, because then the orderings, i.e., the predicaments, would be interchanged. Similarly, if B is in some whole, say in E, it is plain that A is not in E."*

²⁰ *Expositio Posteriorum, lib. 1 l. 33 n. 6: Deinde cum dicit: quare autem in quod etc. ostendit differentiam praedicatorum per se ad invicem. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo, distinguit praedicata ad invicem secundum diversa genera; secundo, ostendit differentiam praedicatorum; ibi: amplius substantiam quidem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nos praedicari dicimus solum illud, quod praedicatur non secundum aliud subiectum, hoc autem diversificatur secundum decem praedicamenta; sequitur quod omne quod sic praedicatur, praedicetur aut in quod quid est, idest per modum substantialis praedicati, aut per modum qualis, vel quanti, vel alicuius alterius praedicatorum, de quibus actum est in praedicamentis. Et addit cum unum de uno praedicetur: quia si praedicatum non sit unum sed multa, non poterit praedicatum simpliciter dici quid vel quale; sed forte dicitur simul quale quid, puta si dicam, homo est animal album. Fuit autem necessaria haec additio; quia si multa praedicentur de uno, ita quod multa accipiantur in ratione unius praedicati, poterunt in infinitum praedicationes multiplicari, secundum*

infinitos modos combinandi praedicata ad invicem. Unde cum quaeritur status in his quae praedicantur, necesse est accipere unum de uno praedicari.

²¹ Paul Symington, *On Determining What There Is* (New Brunswick: Ontos, 2010).

²² John Duns Scotus,

²³ Pasnau, p. 226.

²⁴ *ST I^a q. 48 a. 2 ad 2: Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in V Metaphys., ens dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod significat entitatem rei, prout dividitur per decem praedicamenta, et sic convertitur cum re. Et hoc modo, nulla privatio est ens, unde nec malum. Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis, quae in compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum est, et hoc est ens quo respondetur ad quaestionem an est. Et sic caecitatem dicimus esse in oculo, vel quamcumque aliam privationem. Et hoc modo etiam malum dicitur ens. Propter huius autem distinctionis ignorantiam, aliqui, considerantes quod aliquae res dicuntur malae, vel quod malum dicitur esse in rebus, crediderunt quod malum esset res quaedam. “As the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text 14), being is twofold. In one way it is considered as signifying the entity of a thing, as divisible by the ten "predicaments"; and in that sense it is convertible with thing, and thus no privation is a being, and neither therefore is evil a being. In another sense being conveys the truth of a proposition which unites together subject and attribute by a copula, notified by this word "is"; and in this sense being is what answers to the question, "Does it exist?" and thus we speak of blindness as being in the eye; or of any other privation. In this way even evil can be called a being. Through ignorance of this distinction some, considering that things may be evil, or that evil is said to be in things, believed that evil was a positive thing in itself.”*

²⁵ *De veritate*, 1.1.

²⁶ *De potentia*, q. 2 a. 2 arg. 2: *Sed dicitur, quod significat simul essentiam et notionem. Sed contra, in divinis, secundum Boetium, sunt haec duo praedicamenta; substantia, ad quam pertinet essentia; et ad aliquid, ad quod pertinent notionalia. Non potest autem aliquid esse in duobus praedicamentis, quia homo albus non est aliquid unum nisi per accidens, ut habetur V Metaph. Ergo potentia generandi non potest in sua ratione utrumque complecti, scilicet substantiam et notionem.* “Should it be said that it denotes both the essence and a notion,—on the contrary, according to Boethius (*De Trin.*) there are two predicaments in God, substance to which the essence belongs, and relation to which the notional acts belong. But a thing cannot be in two predicaments, since a white man is not one thing save accidentally (*Metaph. v, 7*). Therefore the generative power cannot include both, substance namely and notional act.” Also, *De potentia*, q. 2 a. 2 ad 2: *Ad secundum dicendum, quod in rebus creatis unum praedicamentum accidit alteri, propter quod non potest ex duobus fieri unum, nisi unum per accidens; sed in divinis relatio est realiter ipsa essentia: et ideo non est simile.* “Among creatures one predicament is accidental to another, wherefore one thing cannot result from two, except what is one accidentally; whereas in God relation is in reality the very essence; and thus there is no comparison.”

²⁷ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 7 l. 4 n. 2: *Quod enim aliquo modo, idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in singulis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. Interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum, in quibus est quod quid est.* “1332. For the fact that it belongs to the others “in another sense,” i.e., in a qualified sense, is clear from the fact that in each of the other categories some reply may be made to the question “What is it?” For we ask of what sort a thing is, or what its quality is, as “What is whiteness?” And we answer, “Color.” Hence it is evident that quality is one of the many things in which whiteness is found.”

²⁸ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 10: *Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, in quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.* “894. And there is no truth in Avicenna’s statement that predicates which belong to the class of accidents primarily signify substance and secondarily accidents, as the terms white and musical. For the term white, as it is used in the categories, signifies quality alone. Now the term white implies a subject inasmuch as it signifies whiteness after the

manner of an accident, so that it must by implication include the subject in its notion, because the being of an accident consists in being in something. For even though *whiteness* signifies an accident, it still does not signify this after the manner of an accident but after that of a substance. Hence it implies a subject in no way. For if it were to signify a subject primarily, then the Philosopher would not put accidental predicates under essential being but under accidental being. For the whole statement “the man is white” is a being in an accidental sense, as has been stated (886).”

²⁹ *Met.* 7.4 1352: “Hence “in one sense,” i.e., primarily and without qualification, only substance will have a definition, and only substance will have an essence. “And in another sense,” i.e., secondarily and with some qualification, the other categories will also have a definition. For substance, which has a quiddity in the absolute sense, does not depend on something else so far as its quiddity is concerned. An accident depends on its subject, however, although a subject does not belong to the essence of its accident (in much the same way as a creature depends on the creator, yet the creator does not belong to the essence of the creature), so that an extrinsic essence must be placed in its definition. In fact, accidents have being only by reason of the fact that they inhere in a subject, and therefore their quiddity depends on their subject. Hence a subject must be given in the definition of an accident at one time directly and at another, indirectly.”

³⁰ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 9 l. 1 n. 1: *Postquam determinavit philosophus de ente secundum quod dividitur per decem praedicamenta, hic intendit determinare de ente secundum quod dividitur per potentiam et actum. Et dividitur in duas partes. In prima continuat se ad praecedentia, et manifestat suam intentionem in hoc libro. In secunda prosequitur quod intendit, ibi, quod quidem igitur. Dicit ergo primo, quod in praemissis dictum est de ente primo, ad quod omnia alia praedicamenta entis referuntur, scilicet de substantia. Et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat, quia omnia alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. Dicitur enim quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; similiter in aliis. Et hoc patet ex hoc, quod omnia accidentia habent rationem substantiae, quia in definitione cuiuslibet accidentis oportet ponere proprium subiectum, sicut in definitione simi ponitur nasus. Et hoc declaratum est in praemissis, scilicet in principio septimi.* “1768. Having established the truth about being as divided into the ten categories, the Philosopher’s aim here is to establish the truth about being as divided into potency and actuality. This is divided into two parts. In the first he links up this discussion with the foregoing one, and explains what he intends to do in this book. In the second (1773) he carries out his announced plan. He accordingly points out, first, that he has already discussed above the primary kind of being to which all the other categories of being are referred, namely, substance. And he explains that all the other categories are referred to substance as the primary kind of being, because all other beings—quantity, quality, and the like—involve the concept of substance. For being is said of quantity because it is the measure of substance; and of quality because it is a certain disposition of substance; and the same thing applies in the case of the other categories. This is evident from the fact that all accidents involve the concept of substance, since in the definition of any accident it is necessary to include its proper subject; for example, in the definition of *snum* it is necessary to include nose. This was made clear at the beginning of Book VII (1347).”

³¹ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 7 l. 4 n. 1: *Hic ponit secundam solutionem propositae quaestionis: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo ponit solutionem. Secundo probat eam, ibi, illud autem palam, et cetera. Tertio removet quasdam dubitationes, quae possent ex praedictis oriri, ibi, habet autem dubitationem. Circa primum duo facit. Primo ostendit quomodo definitio et quod quid est invenitur in substantia et accidentibus. Secundo quomodo de utrisque praedicetur, ibi, oportet quidem igitur intendere. Dicit ergo primo, quod dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non sit accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est. Ipsum enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia huiusmodi talia. Sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae, aliis autem alio modo, idest secundum quid.* “1331. Here he gives the second solution to the question which was raised; and in regard to this he does three things. First (582:C 1331), he gives the solution. Second (584:C 1339), he proves it (“Now it is evident”). Third (585:C 1342), he dispels certain difficulties which could arise from the previous discussion (“Now if one denies”). He accordingly says, first (582), that it is necessary to say, as was stated in the foregoing solution (581:C 1325) that there is no

definition and whatness of accidents but only of substances; or according to another solution it is necessary to say that the terms definition and whatness are used in many senses. For in one sense whatness signifies substance and this particular thing, and in another sense it signifies each of the other categories, such as quantity, quality and the like. Moreover, just as being is said to belong to all the other categories, although not in the same way, but primarily to substance and secondarily to the others, similar fashion whatness belongs in an unqualified sense to substance, “but in another sense to the other categories,” i.e., in a qualified sense.”

³² *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 1: *Hic philosophus distinguit quot modis dicitur ens. Et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens in ens per se et per accidens. Secundo distinguit modos entis per accidens, ibi, secundum accidens quidem et cetera. Tertio modos entis per se, ibi, secundum se vero. Dicit ergo, quod ens dicitur quoddam secundum se, et quoddam secundum accidens. Sciendum tamen est quod illa divisio entis non est eadem cum illa divisione qua dividitur ens in substantiam et accidens. Quod ex hoc patet, quia ipse postmodum, ens secundum se dividit in decem praedicamenta, quorum novem sunt de genere accidentis. Ens igitur dividitur in substantiam et accidens, secundum absolutam entis considerationem, sicut ipsa albedo in se considerata dicitur accidens, et homo substantia. Sed ens secundum accidens prout hic sumitur, oportet accipi per comparationem accidentis ad substantiam. Quae quidem comparatio significatur hoc verbo, est, cum dicitur, homo est albus. Unde hoc totum, homo est albus, est ens per accidens. Unde patet quod divisio entis secundum se et secundum accidens, attenditur secundum quod aliquid praedicatur de aliquo per se vel per accidens. Divisio vero entis in substantiam et accidens attenditur secundum hoc quod aliquid in natura sua est vel substantia vel accidens.* “He says, then, that while things are said to be both essentially and accidentally, it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he later divides essential being into the ten predicaments, nine of which belong to the class of accident (889). Hence being is divided into substance and accident insofar as it is considered in an absolute sense; for example, whiteness considered in itself is called an accident, and man a substance. But accidental being, in the sense in which it is taken here must be understood by comparing an accident with a substance; and this comparison is signified by the term *is* when, for example, it is said that the man is white. Hence this whole “the man is white” is an accidental being. It is clear, then, that the division of being into essential being and accidental being is based on the fact that one thing is predicated of another either essentially or accidentally. But the division of being into substance and accident is based on the fact that a thing is in its own nature either a substance or an accident.”

³³ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 5 l. 9 n. 5: *Deinde cum dicit secundum se distinguit modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente, ibi, amplius autem et esse significat. Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum, ibi, amplius esse significat et ens. Dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secundum se, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis. Sciendum est enim quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde in tertio huius probavit philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest.* “Here he distinguishes between the types of essential being; and in regard to this he does three things. First, he divides the kind of being which lies outside the mind, which is complete being, by the ten predicaments. Second (895), he gives another type of being, inasmuch as being exists only in the mind (“Again, being, signifies”). Third (897), he divides being by potentiality and actuality— and being divided in this way is more common than complete being, for potential being is being only imperfectly and in a qualified sense (“Again, to be”).”

³⁴ Aquinas, Commentary on Metaphysics, 5.9.

³⁵ *Contra Gentiles*, lib. 4 cap. 14 n. 12: *Quamvis autem in Deo ponatur esse relatio, non tamen sequitur quod in Deo sit aliquid habens esse dependens. In nobis enim relationes habent esse dependens, quia earum esse est aliud ab esse substantiae: unde habent proprium modum essendi secundum propriam rationem, sicut et in aliis accidentibus contingit. Quia enim omnia accidentia sunt formae quaedam substantiae superadditae, et a principiis substantiae causatae; oportet quod eorum esse sit superadditum supra esse substantiae, et ab ipso dependens; et tanto uniuscuiusque eorum esse est prius vel posterius, quanto forma accidentalis, secundum propriam rationem, fuerit propinquior substantiae vel magis*

perfecta. Propter quod et relatio realiter substantiae adveniens et postremum et imperfectissimum esse habet: postremum quidem, quia non solum praeexigit esse substantiae, sed etiam esse aliorum accidentium, ex quibus causatur relatio, sicut unum in quantitate causat aequalitatem, et unum in qualitate similitudinem; imperfectissimum autem, quia propria relationis ratio consistit in eo quod est ad alterum, unde esse eius proprium, quod substantiae superaddit, non solum dependet ab esse substantiae, sed etiam ab esse alicuius exterioris. Haec autem in divinis locum non habent: quia non est in Deo aliquod aliud esse quam substantiae; quicquid enim in Deo est, substantia est. Sicut igitur esse sapientiae in Deo non est esse dependens a substantia, quia esse sapientiae est esse substantiae; ita nec esse relationis est esse dependens neque a substantia, neque ab alio exteriori, quia etiam esse relationis est esse substantiae. Non igitur per hoc quod relatio in Deo ponitur, sequitur quod sit in eo aliquod esse dependens; sed solum quod in Deo sit respectus aliquis, in quo ratio relationis consistit; sicut ex hoc quod sapientia in Deo ponitur, non sequitur quod sit in eo aliquid accidentale, sed solum perfectio quaedam in qua ratio sapientiae consistit. Per quod etiam patet quod ex imperfectione quae in relationibus creatis esse videtur, non sequitur quod personae divinae sint imperfectae, quae relationibus distinguuntur: sed sequitur quod divinarum personarum minima sit distinctio. “Although, of course, one holds that there is a relation in God, it does not, for all that, follow that there is in God something which has a dependent being, for in us the relations have a dependent being because their being is other than the being of the substance. Hence, they have a proper mode of being in their proper essence, just as happens in the case of the other accidents. In view of the fact that all accidents are forms of a sort superadded to the substance and caused by the principles of the substance, it must be that their being is superadded to the being of the substance and dependent on that being. And by as much as the being of each and every one of them is prior or posterior, by that much the accidental form in its proper essence will be more like a substance or more perfect. For this reason even a relation really accruing to a substance has a being which is last in order and quite imperfect: last in order, that is, because not only is the being of the substance prerequisite, but also the being of other accidents, out of which the relation is caused (thus to be one in quantity causes equality, and one in quality similarity); quite imperfect in turn, because the proper essence of the relation consists in its being toward-another-hence, its proper being, which it adds to the substance, depends not only on the being of the substance, but on the being of some exterior thing as well. This situation, of course, has no place in divinity, since there is in God no other being than that of substance, for whatever is in God is substance. Just as the being of wisdom in God, therefore, is not being by depending on substance (since the being of wisdom is the being of substance), so the being of relation is not being by depending either on substance or on another exterior thing (since the being of relation is also the being of substance). From the fact, then, that one puts a relation in God it does not follow that there is in Him some dependent being, but only that there is in Him some aspect in which aspect the essence of relation consists. just so from the fact that one puts wisdom in God it does not follow that there is something accidental in Him, but only that there is a certain perfection in which the essence of wisdom consists.”

³⁶ “And because quiddity in these substances is not the same as existence, they are orderable within a predicament. And this is why they have a genus, a species, and a difference, although their proper differences are hidden from us. For even in the case of sensible things, the essential differences themselves are not known; whence they are signified through accidental differences which rise out of the essential ones, as a cause is signified through its effect; this is what is done when biped, for example, is given as the difference of man. But the proper accidents of immaterial substances are unknown to us; whence their differences cannot be signified by us either through themselves or through accidental differences.”

³⁷ *ST I^a q. 88 a. 2 ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod substantiae immateriales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materialibus, quia non est in eis eadem ratio potentiae et materiae, conveniunt tamen cum eis in genere logico, quia etiam substantiae immateriales sunt in praedicamento substantiae, cum earum quidditas non sit earum esse. Sed Deus non convenit cum rebus materialibus neque secundum genus naturale, neque secundum genus logicum, quia Deus nullo modo est in genere, ut supra dictum est. Unde per similitudines rerum materialium aliquid affirmative potest cognosci de Angelis secundum rationem communem, licet non secundum rationem speciei; de Deo autem nullo modo.* “Created immaterial substances are not in the same natural genus as material substances, for they do not agree in power or in matter; but they belong to the same logical genus, because even immaterial substances are in the predicament of substance, as their essence is distinct from their existence. But God has no connection with material things, as regards either natural genus or logical genus; because God is in no genus, as stated above (Question [3], Article [5]). Hence through the likeness derived from material

things we can know something positive concerning the angels, according to some common notion, though not according to the specific nature; whereas we cannot acquire any such knowledge at all about God.”

³⁸ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 5 l. 22 n. 9: *Patet autem ex dictis quod aliqua continentur sub uno praedicamento, et sunt unum genere hoc modo secundo, quae tamen sunt diversa genere primo modo. Sicut corpora caelestia et elementaria, et colores, et sapes. Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis.* “1127. Now it is clear, from what has been said, that some things are contained under one category and are in one genus in this second sense, although they are diverse in genus in the first sense. Examples of this are the celestial bodies and elemental bodies, and colors and flavors. The first way in which things are diverse in genus is considered rather by the natural scientist and also by the philosopher, because it is more real. But the second way in which things are diverse in genus is considered by the logician, because it is conceptual.”

³⁹ *In De generatione*, lib. 1 l. 6 n. 6: *Secundo ibi: si quidem primum etc., ostendit quod secundum utrumque sensum sequitur inconueniens. Si enim simpliciter dicatur primum ens quod est substantia, ergo et simpliciter non ens dicitur non substantia. Si ergo generatio simplex hoc requirit, quod sit simpliciter entis ex simpliciter non ente, sequetur quod erit substantia ex non substantia. Sed quando ponitur non esse substantiam neque hoc (quod est demonstrativum individualis substantiae), manifestum est quod nullum aliorum praedicamentorum remanebit, idest neque quale neque quantum neque ubi: quia sequeretur quod passiones, idest accidentia, separarentur a substantiis, quod est impossibile. Si autem dicatur quod illud ex quo aliquid generatur simpliciter, sit non ens universaliter, prout ens simpliciter dicitur ens commune, sequetur quod per hoc quod dicitur non ens, intelligatur universaliter negatio omnium entium. Unde sequetur quod illud quod generatur simpliciter, generetur penitus ex nihilo: quod est contra rationem naturalis generationis, et contra sententias omnium philosophorum naturalium, qui scilicet de generatione naturali locuti sunt.* “47. Secondly [47], he shows that according to both senses something inadmissible follows. For if "absolute being" is taken to mean the first being, which is substance, then "absolute non-being" will be non-substance. If, therefore, absolute generation requires that there be absolute being from absolute nonbeing, it will follow that there will be substance from non-substance. But when it is assumed that neither substance exists nor a "this" (which implies an individual substance), then it is plain that none of the other predicaments will remain, i.e., neither quality, nor quantity, nor "where" — because otherwise it would follow that "passions," i.e., accidents, would exist separated from substances, which is impossible.”

⁴⁰ *De veritate*, q. 21 a. 1 arg. 3: *Sed dicebat, quod addit respectum ad finem.- Sed contra: secundum hoc enim bonum nihil aliud esset quam ens relatum. Sed ens relatum concernit determinatum genus entis, quod est ad aliquid. Ergo bonum est in aliquo uno praedicamento determinato: quod est contra philosophum in I Ethic., ubi ponit bonum in omnibus generibus.* “The answer was given that it adds a relation to an end.—On the contrary, in this case good would be nothing but related being. But related being pertains to a definite category of being, which is called itrelation” or “to something.” Good would therefore be in a definite category. But this is contrary to what the Philosopher says, placing good in all the categories.”

⁴¹ *Super De Trinitate*, pars 2 q. 4 a. 2 arg. 6: *Praeterea, posterius numquam est causa prioris. Sed inter omnia accidentia primum locum tenet quantitas, ut dicit Boethius in commento praedicamentorum. Inter quantitates autem naturaliter numerus prior est, cum sit simplicior et magis abstractus. Ergo impossibile est quod aliquod aliud accidens sit principium pluralitatis secundum numerum.* “6. What is posterior is never the cause of what is prior. But among all accidents, quantity holds first place, as Boethius says in *Lib. praedicam.* Among quantities, however, number is prior since it is more simple and more abstract. Therefore an accident cannot be the principle of plurality according to number.”

⁴² *ST I^a-IIae* q. 49 a. 2 co.: *Respondeo dicendum quod philosophus, in praedicamentis, ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, dispositionem et habitum. Quarum quidem specierum differentias sic assignat Simplicius, in commento praedicamentorum, dicens quod qualitatum quaedam sunt naturales, quae secundum naturam insunt, et semper, quaedam autem sunt adventitiae, quae ab extrinseco efficiuntur, et possunt amitti. Et haec quidem, quae sunt adventitiae, sunt habitus et dispositiones, secundum facile et difficile amissibile differentes. Naturalium autem qualitatum quaedam sunt secundum id quod aliquid est in potentia, et sic est secunda species qualitatis. Quaedam vero secundum quod aliquid est in actu, et hoc vel in profundum, vel secundum superficiem. Si in profundum quidem, sic est tertia species qualitatis, secundum vero superficiem, est quarta species qualitatis, sicut figura et forma, quae est figura animati. Sed*

ista distinctio specierum qualitatis inconueniens uidetur. Sunt enim multae figurae et qualitates passibiles non naturales, sed aduentitiae, et multae dispositiones non aduentitiae, sed naturales, sicut sanitas et pulchritudo et huiusmodi. Et praeterea hoc non conuenit ordini specierum, semper enim quod naturalius est, prius est. Et ideo aliter accipienda est distinctio dispositionum et habituum ab aliis qualitatibus. Proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit, unde importat quendam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram. Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per philosophum in V Metaphys. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem et passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem. Si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum sui rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni et mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens. Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia specie qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, vel quod sit cito transiens aut diuturnum. Non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali, quia motus et passionem non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem. Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio, dicit enim philosophus, in VII Physic., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis, quod sunt dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam. Et quia ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid, ut dicitur in II Physic. ideo in prima specie consideratur et bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus. Unde in V Metaphys. philosophus definit habitum, quod est dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male. Et in II Ethic. dicit quod habitus sunt secundum quos ad passionem nos habemus bene vel male. Quando enim est modus conueniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni, quando autem non conuenit, tunc habet rationem mali. Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis. "Therefore we must explain otherwise the distinction of dispositions and habits from other qualities. For quality, properly speaking, implies a certain mode of substance. Now mode, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3), "is that which a measure determines": wherefore it implies a certain determination according to a certain measure. Therefore, just as that in accordance with which the material potentiality [potentia materiae] is determined to its substantial being, is called quality, which is a difference affecting the substance, so that, in accordance with the potentiality of the subject is determined to its accidental being, is called an accidental quality, which is also a kind of difference, as is clear from the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 19). Now the mode of determination of the subject to accidental being may be taken in regard to the very nature of the subject, or in regard to action, and passion resulting from its natural principles, which are matter and form; or again in regard to quantity. If we take the mode or determination of the subject in regard to quantity, we shall then have the fourth species of quality. And because quantity, considered in itself, is devoid of movement, and does not imply the notion of good or evil, so it does not concern the fourth species of quality whether a thing be well or ill disposed, nor quickly or slowly transitory. But the mode of determination of the subject, in regard to action or passion, is considered in the second and third species of quality. And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitory or lasting. But in them, we do not consider anything pertaining to the notion of good or evil: because movements and passions have not the aspect of an end, whereas good and evil are said in respect of an end. On the other hand, the mode or determination of the subject, in regard to the nature of the thing, belongs to the first species of quality, which is habit and disposition: for the Philosopher says (Phys. vii, text. 17), when speaking of habits of the soul and of the body, that they are "dispositions of the perfect to the best; and by perfect I mean that which is disposed in accordance with its nature." And since the form itself and the nature of a thing is the end and the cause why a thing is made (Phys. ii, text. 25), therefore in the first species we consider both evil and good, and also changeableness, whether easy or difficult; inasmuch as a certain nature is the end of generation and movement. And so the Philosopher (Metaph. v, text. 25) defines habit, a "disposition whereby someone is disposed, well or ill"; and in Ethic. ii, 4, he says that by "habits we are directed well or ill in reference to the passions." For when the mode is suitable to the thing's nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is

unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil. And since nature is the first object of consideration in anything, for this reason habit is reckoned as the first species of quality.”

⁴³ *In Physic.*, lib. 3 l. 5 n. 15: *Ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta. Tripliciter autem fit omnino praedicatio. Unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, ut cum dico Socrates est homo, vel homo est animal; et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum substantiae. Alius autem modus est quo praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret ei. Quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum quantitatis (nam quantitas proprie consequitur materiam: unde et Plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum qualitatis (unde et qualitates fundantur super quantitatem, sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in superficiebus); aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum relationis (cum enim dico homo est pater, non praedicatur de homine aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsecum). Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis: sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantiis praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod homo sit albus. Denominari autem ab aliquo extrinseco invenitur quidem quodammodo communiter in omnibus, et aliquo modo specialiter in iis quae ad homines pertinent tantum. Communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; denominari enim aliquid causatum et mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori. Cum autem quatuor sint genera causarum, duo ex his sunt partes essentiae, scilicet materia et forma: unde praedicatio quae posset fieri secundum haec duo, pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae, utpote si dicamus quod homo est rationalis, et homo est corporeus. Causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid ab agente: intantum enim finis habet rationem causae, in quantum movet agentem. Remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori. Sic igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum passionis, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum actionis, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est. Mensura autem quaedam est extrinseca et quaedam intrinseca. Intrinseca quidem sicut propria longitudo uniuscuiusque et latitudo et profunditas: ab his ergo denominatur aliquid sicut ab intrinseco inhaerente; unde pertinet ad praedicamentum quantitatis. Exteriores autem mensurae sunt tempus et locus: secundum igitur quod aliquid denominatur a tempore, est praedicamentum quando; secundum autem quod denominatur a loco, est praedicamentum ubi et situs, quod addit supra ubi ordinem partium in loco. Hoc autem non erat necessarium addi ex parte temporis, cum ordo partium in tempore in ratione temporis importetur: est enim tempus numerus motus secundum prius et posterius. Sic igitur aliquid dicitur esse quando vel ubi per denominationem a tempore vel a loco. Est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus. In aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vel aliquid huiusmodi ad incedendum sine laesione. Et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. Unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae: ut puta si diceretur quod homo est manuatus vel pedatus. Sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati complexionis eius, tum propter multiformitatem operum quae conveniunt homini in quantum habet rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accommodari non poterant a natura: sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. Unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco, quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque mensurae: unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur habitus. Sed attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum.* “322. To settle this matter it must be remembered that being is divided into the ten predicaments not univocally, as a genus into its species, but according to the diverse manner of existing. Now the modes of existing are parallel to the modes of predicating. For in predicating something of something, we say that this is that; that is why the ten genera of being are called “predicaments.” Now every predication takes place in one of three ways. One way is to predicate of a subject that which pertains to its essence, as when I say “Socrates is man” or “Man is animal.” According to this the predicament of

“substance” is taken. Another way is to predicate of a subject something that is not of its essence but yet inheres in the subject, This inherent thing may be traceable to the matter in the subject, in which case one has the predicament of “quantity” (for quantity is properly a result of matter; for which reason Plato traced the “large” to matter); or it is traceable to the form and in this case, there is the predicament of “quality” (for which reason qualities are founded on quality, as color in a surface, and figure in lines or in a plane); or the predication may be due to a relation existing between subject and something else and thus we have the predicament of “relation”, (for when I say, “The man is a father,” it is not something absolute that is predicated of the man but a relation in him to something without). The third mode of predicating is when something outside the subject is predicated after the manner of denomination; this allows even extrinsic accidents to be predicated of substance; but yet we do not say that man is whiteness but that man is white. To be denominated by something extrinsic can occur, generally speaking, to all things in one way or another, and in a special way in those matters that refer only to man. Speaking generally, a thing can be denominated by something extrinsic either according to the notion of cause or according to that of measure. For something is denominated “caused” or “measured” on account of its relationship to something extrinsic. Now there are four genera of causes, two of which are parts of the essence, namely, matter and form; hence any predication based on these two pertains to the predicament of “substance,” as when I say that man is rational and man is corporeal. In regard to the other two causes, the final cause does not cause separately from the agent; for the end is a cause only insofar as it influences the agent. Therefore, the only cause according to which a thing can be denominated something as based on something extrinsic is the agent cause. Consequently, when something is denominated from the agent cause, it is the predicament of “passion,” for to undergo (*pati*) is nothing but the undergoing of something from an agent; on the other hand, if the agent cause is denominated something on account of its effect, one has the predicament of “action,” for action is an act from the agent into something else, as stated above (no, 316). In regard to measures, it will be either intrinsic or extrinsic. An intrinsic measure would be a thing’s own length and width and depth: in these cases a subject is being denominated something by reason of what inheres intrinsically; hence this Pertains to the predicament quantity. The extrinsic measures are time and place. It is the predicament “when”, whenever something is denominated by time; when it is denominated by place, it is the predicament “where” or the predicament “situs”, which adds to “where” the order of the parts in place. Such an order of parts is not considered in regard to the measure which is time, for the order of parts in time is already implied in the notion of time; for time is the number of motion according to the order of the “before” and the “after” [its parts]. Thus it is through denomination from time or place that something is said to be “when” or “where”. There is a special predicament for men. For in other animals nature provided the requirements for preserving life, such as horns for defense, a tough and wooly hide as a covering, claws or the like for proceeding without harm. Hence, when by reason of this equipment animals are said to be “armed” or “covered” or “shod,” they are somehow so called not by reason of something; extrinsic but of something intrinsic, which is part of them. Hence, such are referred to the predicament of “substance,” as the same would be if man were said to be “endowed with hands” or “feet.” But the other things could not be endowed upon man by nature, both because they would be out of keeping with the subtlety of his complexion and because reason makes man capable of an enormous number of works for the performance of which nature could not have endowed him with specific instruments. In the place of all these instruments man has reason, which he can use to make for himself the things that are intrinsic to other animals. So when a man is said to be armed or clothed or shod, he is denominated thus by reason of something extrinsic to him that is neither a cause nor a measure; hence it is located in a special predicament called “habitus.” But we should not fail to note that this predicament is in certain matters used also for other animals not inasmuch as they are considered in their nature but insofar as they are put at the service of man: thus we that a horse is caparisoned or saddled or armed.”

⁴⁴ *De ente et essentia, 5. Et hoc ideo est, quia non habent per se esse, absolutum a subiecto, sed sicut ex forma et materia relinquitur esse substantiale, quando componuntur, ita ex accidente et subiecto relinquitur esse accidentale, quando accidens subiecto advenit.*

⁴⁵ *De ente et essentia 5. Et quia accidentia non componuntur ex materia et forma, ideo non potest in eis sumi genus a materia et differentia a forma sicut in substantiis compositis, sed oportet ut genus primum sumatur ex ipso modo essendi, secundum quod ens diversimode secundum prius et posterius de decem generibus praedicatur; sicut dicitur quantitas ex eo quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas secundum quod est dispositio substantiae, et sic de aliis secundum philosophum IX metaphysicae. Differentiae vero in eis sumuntur ex diversitate principiorum, ex quibus causantur. Et quia propriae*

passiones ex propriis principiis subiecti causantur, ideo subiectum ponitur in diffinitione eorum loco differentiae, si in abstracto diffiniuntur secundum quod sunt proprie in genere, sicut dicitur quod simitas est nasi curvitas. Sed e converso esset, si eorum diffinitio sumeretur secundum quod concretive dicuntur. Sic enim subiectum in eorum diffinitione poneretur sicut genus, quia tunc diffinirentur per modum substantiarum compositarum, in quibus ratio generis sumitur a materia, sicut dicimus quod simum est nasus curvus. Similiter etiam est, si unum accidens alterius accidentis principium sit, sicut principium relationis est actio et passio et quantitas; et ideo secundum haec dividit philosophus relationem in V metaphysicae. Sed quia propria principia accidentium non semper sunt manifesta, ideo quandoque sumimus differentias accidentium ex eorum effectibus, sicut congregativum et disgregativum dicuntur differentiae coloris, quae causantur ex abundantia vel paucitate lucis, ex quo diversae species colorum causantur.

⁴⁶ *De ente, 5.*

⁴⁷ Aquinas derives the distinct modes of being of each of the ten categories in his *Commentary on the Metaphysics* 5.9. I am giving the more generic notion of a mode of being as “to be in”

⁴⁸ *Commenary on Metaphysics*: “1353. Now a subject is given directly in the definition of an accident when an accident is signified concretely as an accident fused with a subject, as when I say that snubness is a concave nose; for nose is given in the definition of snub as a genus in order to signify that accidents subsist only in a subject. But when an accident is signified in the abstract, after the manner of a substance, then the subject is given in its definition indirectly, as a difference, as it is said that snubness is the concavity of a nose. 1354. Hence it is clear that when I say snub nose, it is not necessary to understand concave nose in place of nose; because nose is not included in the definition of snub as though it were part of its essence, but as something added to its essence. Hence snub and concave are essentially the same. But snub adds over and above concave a relation to a determinate subject; and thus in this determinate subject, nose, snub differs in no way from concave, nor is it necessary that any word should be put in place of snub except the word concave. Thus it will not be necessary to use concave nose in place of snub, but only concave.”

⁴⁹ *ST I^a q. 28 a. 2 ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod verba illa Augustini non pertinent ad hoc, quod paternitas, vel alia relatio quae est in Deo, secundum esse suum non sit idem quod divina essentia; sed quod non praedicatur secundum modum substantiae, ut existens in eo de quo dicitur, sed ut ad alterum se habens. Et propter hoc dicuntur duo tantum esse praedicamenta in divinis. Quia alia praedicamenta important habitudinem ad id de quo dicuntur, tam secundum suum esse, quam secundum proprii generis rationem, nihil autem quod est in Deo, potest habere habitudinem ad id in quo est, vel de quo dicitur, nisi habitudinem identitatis, propter summam Dei simplicitatem.* “These words of Augustine do not imply that paternity or any other relation which is in God is not in its very being the same as the divine essence; but that it is not predicated under the mode of substance, as existing in Him to Whom it is applied; but as a relation. So there are said to be two predicaments only in God, since other predicaments import habitudo to that of which they are spoken, both in their generic and in their specific nature; but nothing that exists in God can have any relation to that wherein it exists or of whom it is spoken, except the relation of identity; and this by reason of God's supreme simplicity.”

⁵⁰ *ST III^a q. 76 a. 3 arg. 3: Praeterea, corpus Christi semper veram retinet corporis naturam, nec unquam mutatur in spiritum. Sed de ratione corporis est ut sit quantitas positionem habens, ut patet in praedicamentis. Sed ad rationem huius quantitatis pertinet quod diversae partes in diversis partibus loci existant. Non ergo potest esse, ut videtur, quod totus Christus sit sub qualibet parte specierum.* “Further, Christ's body always retains the true nature of a body, nor is it ever changed into a spirit. Now it is the nature of a body for it to be “quantity having position” (Predic. iv). But it belongs to the nature of this quantity that the various parts exist in various parts of place. Therefore, apparently it is impossible for the entire Christ to be under every part of the species.”

⁵¹ *ST I^a-IIae q. 49 a. 1 co.: Respondeo dicendum quod hoc nomen habitus ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur, uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud. Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde philosophus inter post praedicamenta habere ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt opposita, et prius et posterius, et alia huiusmodi. Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens et id quod habetur, sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel*

quantitatem nihil est medium. Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio, sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum. Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum, unde philosophus dicit, in V Metaphys., quod habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum habitus, de quo dicit philosophus, in V Metaphys., quod inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius. Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est, de quo philosophus, in V Metaphys., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, ut sanitas habitus quidam est. Et sic loquimur nunc de habitu. Unde dicendum est quod habitus est qualitas. “I answer that, This word "habitus" [habit] is derived from "habere" [to have]. Now habit is taken from this word in two ways; in one way, inasmuch as man, or any other thing, is said to "have" something; in another way, inasmuch as a particular thing has a relation [se habet] either in regard to itself, or in regard to something else. Concerning the first, we must observe that "to have," as said in regard to anything that is "had," is common to the various predicaments. And so the Philosopher puts "to have" among the "post-predicaments," so called because they result from the various predicaments; as, for instance, opposition, priority, posterity, and such like. Now among things which are had, there seems to be this distinction, that there are some in which there is no medium between the "haver" and that which is had: as, for instance, there is no medium between the subject and quality or quantity. Then there are some in which there is a medium, but only a relation: as, for instance, a man is said to have a companion or a friend. And, further, there are some in which there is a medium, not indeed an action or passion, but something after the manner of action or passion: thus, for instance, something adorns or covers, and something else is adorned or covered: wherefore the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "a habit is said to be, as it were, an action or a passion of the haver and that which is had"; as is the case in those things which we have about ourselves. And therefore these constitute a special genus of things, which are comprised under the predicament of "habit": of which the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "there is a habit between clothing and the man who is clothed." But if "to have" be taken according as a thing has a relation in regard to itself or to something else; in that case habit is a quality; since this mode of having is in respect of some quality: and of this the Philosopher says (Metaph. v, text. 25) that "habit is a disposition whereby that which is disposed is disposed well or ill, and this, either in regard to itself or in regard to another: thus health is a habit." And in this sense we speak of habit now. Wherefore we must say that habit is a quality.”

⁵² *In Physic., lib. 5 l. 3 n. 3: Deinde cum dicit: secundum substantiam autem etc., manifestat conditionalem praemissam. Et primo ostendit quod in aliis generibus a tribus praedictis, non potest esse motus; secundo ostendit quomodo in istis tribus generibus motus sit, ibi: quoniam autem neque substantiae et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo ostendit quod in genere substantiae non est motus; secundo quod nec in genere ad aliquid, ibi: neque est in ad aliquid etc.; tertio quod nec in genere actionis et passionis, ibi: neque agentis neque patientis et cetera. Praetermittit autem tria praedicamenta, scilicet quando et situs et habere. Quando enim significat in tempore esse; tempus autem mensura motus est: unde per quam rationem non est motus in actione et passione, quae pertinent ad motum, eadem ratione nec in quando. Situs autem ordinem quandam partium demonstrat; ordo vero relatio est: et similiter habere dicitur secundum quandam habitudinem corporis ad id quod ei adiacet: unde in his non potest esse motus, sicut nec in relatione. Quod ergo motus non sit in genere substantiae, sic probat. Omnis motus est inter contraria, sicut supra dictum est: sed substantiae nihil est contrarium: ergo secundum substantiam non est motus.* “He passes over the three predicaments of *when*, *situs* and *habitus*.

For *when* expresses existence in time, which is the measure of motion, Hence for the same reason that there is no motion in action and passion which pertain to motion, there is no motion in *when*. *Situs* denotes order of parts, and order is a relation; in like manner, *habitus* bespeaks a relationship existing between a body and what is adjacent to it. Hence there can be no motion in *situs* and *habitus* any more than in relation. That motion (487) is not found in the genus of *substance* he proves by saying that every motion is between contraries, as we have said; but nothing is contrary to substance. Therefore, there is no motion in respect of substance.”

⁵³ ST I^a-IIae q. 49 a. 1 ad 3: *Ad tertium dicendum quod dispositio quidem semper importat ordinem alicuius habentis partes, sed hoc contingit tripliciter, ut statim ibidem philosophus subdit, scilicet*

aut secundum locum, aut secundum potentiam, aut secundum speciem. In quo, ut Simplicius dicit in commento praedicamentorum, comprehendit omnes dispositiones. Corporales quidem, in eo quod dicit secundum locum, et hoc pertinet ad praedicamentum situs, qui est ordo partium in loco. Quod autem dicit secundum potentiam, includit illas dispositiones quae sunt in praeparatione et idoneitate nondum perfecte, sicut scientia et virtus inchoata. Quod autem dicit secundum speciem, includit perfectas dispositiones, quae dicuntur habitus, sicut scientia et virtus complete. "Disposition does always, indeed, imply an order of that which has parts: but this happens in three ways, as the Philosopher goes on at once to say (Metaph. v, text. 25): namely, "either as to place, or as to power, or as to species." "In saying this," as Simplicius observes in his Commentary on the Predicaments, "he includes all dispositions: bodily dispositions, when he says 'as to place,'" and this belongs to the predicament "Position," which is the order of parts in a place: "when he says 'as to power,' he includes all those dispositions which are in course of formation and not yet arrived at perfect usefulness," such as inchoate science and virtue: "and when he says, 'as to species,' he includes perfect dispositions, which are called habits," such as perfected science and virtue."

⁵⁴ *De ente*, 5.

⁵⁵ *In Physic.*, lib. 4 l. 7 n. 4: *Unde Alexander dixit quod ultima sphaera nullo modo est in loco: non enim omne corpus de necessitate est in loco, cum locus non cadat in definitione corporis. Et propter hoc dixit quod ultima sphaera non movetur in loco, neque secundum totum, neque secundum partes. Sed quia oportet omnem motum in aliquo genere motus poni, Avicenna eum secutus, dixit quod motus ultimae sphaerae non est motus in loco, sed motus in situ, contra Aristotelem, qui dicit in quinto huius, quod motus est tantum in tribus generibus, scilicet in quantitate, qualitate et ubi. Sed hoc non potest stare: impossibile est enim quod motus sit per se loquendo in aliquo genere cuius specierum ratio in indivisibili consistit. Propter hoc enim in substantia non est motus, quia ratio cuiuslibet speciei substantiae consistit in indivisibili, eo quod species substantiae non dicuntur secundum magis et minus: et propter hoc, cum motus habeat successionem, non producitur in esse forma substantialis per motum, sed per generationem, quae est terminus motus. Secus autem est de albedine et similibus, quae participantur secundum magis et minus. Quaelibet autem species situs habet rationem in indivisibili consistentem; ita quod si aliquid additur vel minuitur, non est eadem species situs. Unde impossibile est quod in genere situs sit motus. Et praeterea, remanet eadem difficultas. Nam situs, secundum quod ponitur praedicamentum, importat ordinem partium in loco: licet secundum quod ponitur differentia quantitatis, non importet nisi ordinem partium in toto. Omne igitur quod movetur secundum situm, oportet quod moveatur secundum locum.* "475. Wherefore Alexander said that the outermost orb is not in place at all: for it is not necessary for every body to be in place, since place is not in the definition of body. For this reason he held that the outermost sphere is not in motion in place, neither as a whole, nor as to its parts. But since every motion must fit into one of the genera of motion, Avicenna, following him, said that the motion of the outermost sphere is not motion in place but motion in *situs* [position in place]. This is against Aristotle, who says in Book V (L. 4) that motion is present only in three genera, namely, quality, quantity, and "where." Avicenna's position is untenable because it is impossible that motion strictly speaking be in a genus the notion of whose species consists in an indivisible. For the reason why there is not motion in the genus "substance" is that the nature of every species of substance consists in an indivisible, due to the fact that the species of substances do not admit of more or less; on this account, since motion is successive, a substantial form is not made existent by motion but by generation, which is the terminus of motion. The case is different with whiteness and like things, which can be participated according to more or less. But every species of *situs* has a nature that consists in an indivisible, so that if anything be added or taken away the original species does not remain. Hence it is impossible for motion to exist in the genus of *situs*. Besides, the same difficulty remains. For *situs* taken as a predicament implies the order of parts in place; although if it be taken as a difference in the genus of quantity it implies merely an order of parts in a whole. Therefore, whatever is moved according to *situs*, must be moved according to place."

⁵⁶ *In Physic.*, lib. 3 l. 5 n. 16: *Sic igitur patet quod licet motus sit unus, tamen praedicamenta quae sumuntur secundum motum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales denominationes. Nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori, sumitur per modum denominationis praedicamentum passionis: et alia res est patiens a qua denominatur agens. Et sic patet solutio primae dubitationis.* "This makes it clear that although motion is one, yet there are two predicaments which are based on motion depending on the different external things according to which the predicamental denominations are made. For an agent is one thing from which as from something external the predicament

of “passion” is taken; and the patient is some other thing from which something is denominated an agent. This solves the first difficulty (mentioned in 321).”

⁵⁷ *In Physic.*, lib. 3 l. 5 n. 17: *Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia in actum, non est nisi ab aliqua causa agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut dictum est.* “Therefore, in regard to what there is of motion in external reality, motion is placed reductively in that genus which terminates the motion, as the imperfect is reduced to the perfect, as stated above (no. 281). But in regard to what reason apprehends about motion, namely, that it is midway between two-terms, here the notion of cause and effect are brought in; because for something to be reduced from potency to act an agent cause is required. From this aspect, motion pertains to the predicaments of “action” and “passion”; for these two predicaments are based on the notions of acting cause and of effect, as was said above (no. 322).”

⁵⁸ *Sententia Metaphysicae*, lib. 7 l. 3 n. 10: *Deinde cum dicit quoniam vero. Inquiri quorum sit quod quid erat esse. Et primo movet quaestionem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi, at vero secundum se dictorum. Dicit ergo primo, quod sunt quaedam composita in aliis praedicamentis, et non solum in substantia. Quod quidem dicit propter hoc, quod substantiarum sensibilium, quae sunt compositae, quidditatem inquiri. Sicut enim in substantiis sensibilibus compositis est materia, quae subiicitur formae substantiali, ita etiam alia praedicamenta habent suum subiectum. Est enim aliquod subiectum unicuique eorum, sicut qualitati et quantitati et quando et ubi et motui, sub quo comprehenditur agere et pati. Unde sicut quoddam compositum est ignis ex materia et forma substantiali, ita est quaedam compositio ex substantiis et accidentibus.* 1315. Now since there are (580). He inquires to what things essence belongs. First, he raises the question; and second (581:C 1318) he answers it (“But neither”). He accordingly says, first (580), that there are certain composites in the case of the other categories and not merely in that of substance. He says this because he is investigating the quiddity of sensible substances, which are composite. For just as composite sensible substances have matter, which is the subject of substantial forms, so also do the other categories have their own subject. For there is some subject of each of them, namely, of quality, quantity, when, where, and also of motion, in which are included both action and being acted upon. Hence just as fire is a composite of matter and substantial form, in a similar way there is a kind of composition of substance and accidents.