

# Naming and the Analogy of Being: McInerny and the Denial of a Proper Analogy of Being

**ABSTRACT:** This paper addresses the question of whether there is a proper analogy of being according to both meaning and being. I disagree with Ralph McInerny's understanding of how things are named through concepts and argue that McInerny's account does not allow for the thing represented by the name to be known in itself. In his understanding of analogy, only ideas of things may be known. This results in a wholesale inability to name things at all and thereby forces McInerny to relegate naming to a purely logical concern. As a consequence, for McInerny, since naming becomes only a logical concern, being itself cannot be known as analogous according to being and meaning since naming only involves the naming of ideas, not of things.

**R**ALPH MCINERNY WROTE an influential criticism of Cajetan's interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's use of analogy. His original criticism is found in his book entitled *Logic of Analogy*.<sup>1</sup> Several decades later he wrote another book on the same topic, *Aquinas and Analogy*,<sup>2</sup> in which he expanded his critique and further disentangled his thought on analogy from the ubiquitous interpretation of Cajetan. In both works, he maintains the same two-fold thesis. The first is that there are no degrees of analogy, such as the three types of analogy put forth by Cajetan. The second is that there cannot be a proper analogy of being—there can be analogy only according to meaning and not according to being.

The purpose of this essay is to address the latter thesis; specifically, that there is a proper analogy of being according to both meaning and being. However, I am not directly addressing the thought of Thomas Aquinas on analogy, but only the cogency and comprehensiveness of McInerny's understanding of analogy. I shall, hence, criticize it precisely as his theory, while noting that Aquinas himself did not work out a fully explicit treatment of analogy. Thus, I shall address McInerny's interpretation of the analogy of Aquinas as his own theory and criticize it according to its own merit, not as an interpretation of Aquinas.

Utilizing an effective tool of clarification from Oliva Blanchette's book *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics*, we can re-assess McInerny's conception of how things are named through concepts by reflecting on the exercise of judgment.<sup>3</sup> By reflecting on particular acts of judgments and schematizing them, one can begin to see the structure of being itself and how it is made available to us. This is not unlike the way in which Aristotle approaches an understanding of substantial and accidental being in his *Categories* by reflecting on the types of

<sup>1</sup>Ralph McInerny, *The Logic of Analogy* (Dordrecht, Holland: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), hereafter LA.

<sup>2</sup>Ralph McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), hereafter AA.

<sup>3</sup>Oliva Blanchette, *Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics* (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), pp. 43–80, hereafter PB.

predications that correspond to certain kinds of questions asked of beings.<sup>4</sup> Using this method throughout in various stages in my analysis, I bring naming back to the exercise of judgment in which things are named as a concrete synthesis of “this” and “what.” I show how this allows us to name things analogously according to being, allowing things to be named according to meaning and being, which is a proper analogy of being.

## I

In this section I will look at McInerny’s understanding of analogous naming as analogy only according to meaning. In order to do this, I proceed first to discuss his logic of naming and how his conception can be related to a reflection on the direct exercise of judgment. Next, I point out his understanding of the difference between univocal naming and analogous naming. Such an examination helps one to figure out how exactly his conception excludes a proper analogy of being according to meaning and being.

McInerny conceives naming as falling under different types. Univocal naming is that whereby different things share a name and the meaning of that name is the same for each. Equivocal naming is that whereby different things share a name but the meaning of the shared name is different. Analogous naming is similar to both univocal and equivocal naming in that different things share a name but the meaning of the name is only similar in meaning: the meaning is neither equally the same, nor entirely different.

An important element in the different types of naming is the relationship between the name itself as the vocal sign and the thing that is signified by the word. By “thing” McInerny means the intended object of signification. However, a most important third element upon which the differences between the types of naming rest is the way in which a word signifies a thing. The way in which a name signifies a thing is through what McInerny calls a mental grasp of the thing—the intellectual idea of the thing named. In all such instances of naming, words “are signs of what is understood and concepts are similitudes of the things understood” (AA 54). Since concepts of things underlie names merely as signs, McInerny delves into a discussion of exactly how concepts signify the things themselves.

McInerny identifies concepts properly as ideas of things. He is mainly concerned with the idea that names signify the things themselves through the mind. He states that the way through which a name signifies a thing is through a meaning that is proper to the knower of the thing. Humans know things through the process of corporeal sensation in which a thing is designated as it is sensed by the one perceiving. Human cognition proceeds through the level of sensation to the level of intelligible knowledge of the thing perceived. Although sensation designates a particular thing, it is known through a mode proper to the knower. The mode through which an object is known involves the abstract concepts of genus and species. Genus and species are universal in nature insofar as they may refer to a number of individual things and are ordered

<sup>4</sup>See Aristotle, *Categories*, trans. J. L. Ackrill in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1995), pp. 3–24.

one to another. That is, human beings know individual things according to definitional concepts derived through an intellectual process.

Hence, McInerny describes genus and species as modes through which a thing that exists outside of the mind is understood. However, genus and species, if taken in themselves, do not represent the thing itself, but rather are ways through which a thing is represented in the mind. In fact, species and genus are accidental to a thing in itself insofar as the thing as it exists outside of the mind does not exist as genus or species; genus and species are to be found only in the mind. An example of such an abstract species is “humanity.” “Humanity” pertains only to a universal form and hence does not represent a particular thing directly. McInerny terms that through which the intellect knows a thing as the *modus significandi*, since a thing is made “significant” to the intellect through an intellectual mode of signifying.

Since genus and species do not represent a thing itself, but rather are modes suitable to the intelligence through which a thing is understood, the idea of things must necessarily include a conception that does represent the thing directly. The conception must represent the thing as it is found, as a particular thing, but at the same time it must understand it through the intellectually necessary conceptual mode—the *modus significandi*. In order to do this, McInerny introduces the *res significata* as the substantial or concrete form. The *res significata* involves an abstract or generic intellectual form in composition with a material conception that accounts for its particularity.

McInerny notes that although our understanding of things is different from a thing’s existence outside of the mind, such an understanding is not false. Such a way of understanding is a modification in “our understanding, not [a modification of the] thing understood” (AA 60). Such an understanding does not confuse a particular thing with a universal, for it is still acknowledged as a particular thing. But a particular thing is principally signified in the knower only through the *modus significandi*.

Hence, since the *modus significandi* is the intelligible manner through which a thing is understood, the name properly signifies the *modus significandi*. Therefore, when “man” is named (the *res significata*), “rational animal” (the *modus significandi*) is properly signified according to meaning.

McInerny next asserts that when a name signifies a thing, the *res significata* signified by the *modus significandi* is linked as a *ratio* of intention to the thing that exists outside of the mind. He asserts that in the conception of the thing itself, there is a specific intention to the extra-mental thing. He notes that “there is really something outside the mind that answers to the conception . . . as the signified to the sign” (AA 81). Also, “the concept is a sign of a real nature, and the name signifying it is called a *nomen rei* (e.g., ‘man’). The concept does not exist in reality outside the mind since it is precisely an accident of the intellect, but *something* (italics mine) in reality answers directly to it as the signified to the sign” (AA 82). McInerny proposes this in hopes of avoiding the modern epistemological subject-object problem, in hopes of saving the name as signifying the thing itself, not merely the idea of the thing.

Having established how McInerny conceives of how things are known through concepts through *modus significandi* and *res significata*, I will next show how these concepts may be understood through a reflection on the direct exercise of judgment.

First, since the *modus significandi* is a logical determination, it relates in the exercise of judgment as the “what” or quiddity that serves as the predicate of a judgment. The only difference is that McNerny describes the *modus significandi* as an abstract species whereas a predicate in a direct exercise of judgment is properly itself predicated of a subject and composes with a subject as the terms of a judgment and hence is concrete. However, the abstract *modus significandi* is accounted for as abstract in the indirect exercise of judgment where judgments about abstract concepts are made.

McInerny conceives the *res significata* as the composition of the *modus significandi* with a conception of matter. This concept is known through the terms of a judgment in the direct exercise of judgment. The terms are the determination predicated of the subject. The subject is understood in the direct exercise of judgment as a “this” that designates a particular thing. Hence, McNerny’s conception of matter is taken to serve as a “this” in the direct exercise of judgment.

Having elucidated his theory of how words signify things through concepts, McNerny returns to the question regarding types of naming: equivocal naming, univocal naming, and analogous naming.

Equivocal naming involves a common word (*vox*) that signifies different *res significata* that each have unrelated logical meanings. “Things named equivocally are said to only have a name in common; as soon as we look beyond a shared name, we see diversity” (AA 87). In equivocal naming, McNerny makes it clear that a name in common is not a name taken according to meaning, but rather refers to a common word that is written and spoken identically but has different meanings. When equivocal naming is brought to the level of meaning, one sees that equivocal naming is not naming in common at all but rather that different univocal names are involved. The name “pen” as it signifies a place to put swine or as an ink-filled writing utensil can be considered an example of equivocal naming. Equivocal naming has a name in common but different *modi significandi* and different *res significata*. That is, when “pen” is used to signify a place to put swine and is used to signify an ink-filled writing utensil, the noun “pen” signifies two different objects as well as two different abstract definitions of those objects. Therefore, according to meaning, naming two such objects “pen” involves, in essence, two different names.

Univocal naming involves a common name that signifies different things but the logical meaning is the same as applied to each thing. An example of univocal naming is when one names two things “animal,” signifying sentient being, referring to an individual horse and an individual dog. In the instance of univocal naming, the name is the same, and the meaning is the same, but the things to which the name applies are different.

However, according to McNerny, with univocal naming the *res significata* and the *modus significandi* are the same although they relate to different things. This may cause some confusion, so it is important to explain further why McNerny asserts this. The main thing to keep in mind is that the *res significata* does not stand for the thing itself directly although it does represent it directly. That is, the *res significata* includes a particular thing implicitly or potentially. The *res significata* should be thought of as a substance, the highest univocal category. As substance, it includes

potentially all further designations that fall under it, but does not explicitly include them. Hence, in univocal naming when McInerny says that the *res significata* and the *modus significandi* are the same when applied to each thing univocally named, he is not stating that *res significata* explicitly stands for the individual thing, but only represents it as a concrete substance. I elaborate on McInerny's understanding of substance in section four below.

Analogous naming comes into play, so to speak, between univocal naming and equivocal naming. Analogous naming involves the same name signifying different things according to different meanings. However, analogous naming is not synonymous with equivocal naming. The difference is that with analogous naming various meanings through which different things are signified are similar or related in meaning. An analogous name has the character of having different meanings, but at the same time, there is a discernable intelligible relationship between the different meanings.

McInerny demonstrates his understanding of analogy by couching it in his conception of *modus significandi* and *res significata*. However, when used in describing the logic of analogy, McInerny alters the meaning of *modus significandi*. Whereas in univocal naming the *modus significandi* is purely an abstract notion through which the *res significata* is understood, with analogous naming, a *res significata* with its univocal *modus significandi* becomes the *modus significandi* through which the *res significata* of an analogous name is understood. When explaining the logic of analogy, McInerny describes that through which analogy is understood (*modus significandi*) not as an abstract species as with univocal naming, but as a proper concrete subject "which [is] conjoined with [a] *res significata*" (AA 128).

McInerny applies the concepts of *modus significandi* and *res significata* in the analysis of a particular example of analogy, namely, the well-traveled analogous name "health" as applied analogously to different things. "Health," in his analysis, is the *res significata*, the concrete conception which is signified by the name "health." An important difference in his designation of "health" as the *res significata* is that health itself is not a concrete substance: taken abstractly, "health" is that by which something has health. However, when "health" is understood concretely, a subject of "health" must be included. Therefore, health taken as the *res significata* should be understood as, "that which has health" (AA 89), making the understanding of health concrete. In naming different kinds of things "healthy," McInerny points out that the *res significata* will always be the same despite the various analogous meanings of health. The *res significata* will always be "that which has health." Of course, "that which has health" is a proper reference to a living sentient organism since the latter is the proper subject of health. Therefore, the *res significata* does not just include health abstractly, but also references the animal to which health is properly applied.

What about the *modus significandi*? Will it always be the same also even when naming different kinds of things "healthy" as with univocal names? Is the *modus significandi* the same when "health" is said of complexion, or when we say that a diet is "healthy"? No, when different things are named "healthy," different *modi significandi* are used in understanding the different meanings for the name "healthy."

However, the *modus significandi*, which includes the univocal meaning of the thing named analogously, also always references the subject of the *res significata*, namely, “animal” as the subject of health. The reference in the *modus significandi* involves some type of relationship to the subject in the *res significata*.

To illustrate this is the following expanded an analogous proposition with full disclosure of the *modus significandi* and the *res significata*: “Diet is a preservative of health in the subject.” The *modus significandi* is “Diet is a preservative of,” and the *res significata* is “health,” meaning, “health in a subject.” We see that in order to understand diet as “healthy,” there is the presupposed conception that “health” is properly said of “animal.” Such a univocal conception is presupposed and implicitly referenced in all analogous naming. This conception is called the *ratio propria*, expressed in relation to the above example as, “animal is the subject of health.” In this explicit enunciation of the *ratio propria*, the *modus significandi* is “animal” wherein “health” is univocally predicated of “animal.” Hence, “health” is found properly only in “animal.” With all analogous naming, there is a *per prius et posterius* ordering among the secondary analogates to the primary analogate.

Let us bring McInerny’s use of *res significata* and *modus significandi* in analogous naming back to the direct exercise of judgment. An analogous judgment is more complex than a univocal judgment insofar as when a secondary analogate is named analogously, there is a presupposition of the univocal meaning of the secondary analogate itself. That is, in the analogous judgment, “diet is healthy,” the secondary analogate “diet” first needs to be understood in its univocal sense apart from it being named analogously as “healthy.” We need to know that “diet” itself means “the sustenance consumed by an animal.” Next, the univocal meaning of “health” needs to be understood which is “the proper and efficient physical functioning of an animal.” We see in the direct exercise of judgment that “diet” is the subject, its definition is the predicate, and “health” is the subject of a different judgment with its definition as its predicate. When we examine the definitions, however, we see that both relate to “animal.” When we name “diet” as “healthy,” we understand through the relation that each has to “animal.” We next discern the type of relationships that each has to “animal.” “Animal” is the subject of “health” and “diet” is preservative of “health.” Hence, when we name “diet” as “healthy” we mean the following: “Diet is preservative of health in an animal.”

The way that McInerny conceives how things are named through concepts has a bearing on how he understands the analogy of being. McInerny reaches the conclusion in his analysis of naming that the analogy of being is not to be understood as meaning a “relation to one of the many existent things” (AA 153); rather, the analogy of being is possible only if being is taken as an essence, or concept, only. That is, there can be an analogy of “being,” but there cannot be an “analogy of being.” In what follows, I present the precise argument through a distilled and pointed treatment of Section 2.1, in which he reaches this conclusion.

When McInerny says that being can be taken as a name only, he has an exact understanding of how things are named. First, as stated, McInerny recognizes that things are named through concepts. He then asserts that all concepts are understood through a mode of universality, wherein particular things are understood through

a universal mode. This yields the notion that all concepts are universal in nature. Since this is so, he relegates these concepts as proper only to the subject of logic, since logic is the study of universal concepts. Hence, naming itself, insofar as it is carried out through universal concepts, is only the concern of logic. This has a bearing on the idea of analogy according to being and not according to meaning. Due to McInerny's relegation of naming to logic, naming of things analogously according to their actual existence—or being—while at the same time named univocally according to meaning, is not possible. There can only be analogy according to meaning.

McInerny's analogy of being is understood primarily through the generic category of substance. For McInerny, substance potentially includes designations of being, not only lesser genus and species, but even individuals as such. For McInerny, being is primarily understood as analogous, however, regarding only the relationship that accidental categories have to substance. Substance is the *ratio propria* referred to when naming characteristics found in the accidental categories as being. Being is proper to substance, although accidents are analogously called being. According to this understanding of being, it is not merely a genus, for it includes accidental categories and substance so it must be understood analogously.

## II

*An Alternative Understanding of Logic and Naming.* I agree with McInerny that being is taken as a name, but disagree with his reduction of naming to logic. Such a reduction is not warranted.

A major flaw in his reasoning is depicted in a certain equivocation between two claims. This flaw is found in his understanding of naming. On the one hand, McInerny flatly rejects the problematic notion that, for example, "'Man' signifies my thought of man or even the thought of man, as if 'man' meant man as thought about . . . [Rather, a name] signifies what Thomas in the *De ente [et essentia]* calls the *natura absolute considerata*." On the other hand, with full knowledge that he relegates naming wholly to the subject of logic, he quotes Aristotle: "the logician considers the mode of predicating and not the existence of the thing" (AA 82). This is problematic because if naming is of things existing in themselves, and naming is wholly a logical concern, and logic does not concern itself with the existence of the thing, is naming only a concern of logic?

In order to address this problem, I suggest a change in method. It seems that McInerny retreats from the thing itself into logical concerns and then tries to account for naming fully through logic. It will be beneficial to begin with a broader and inclusive understanding of how things are known. Our knowledge of things cannot be fully reduced to the intentions of logic, so neither does our understanding of things need to be limited to the subject matter of logic, namely, our concepts. To be fair to McInerny, he does acknowledge that things are not fully reducible to essential concepts; for, his conception potentially includes the things themselves, acknowledging the actual beyond the potential. However, it is important to go further and say that in human experience, we go beyond knowing things merely as analogous according to meaning.

Therefore, let us begin with a reflection on the human action in which things are understood: in the direct exercise of judgment. The direct exercise of judgment is the structure through which a thing is identified and known as actually existing. The structure includes a subject, a predicate, and an act of the judgment itself in which the understanding comes to some composition or division of intelligence with reality as truth or falsity. Therefore, when we talk about knowing things through concepts, our way of knowing things themselves—as beings in particular—must include the three elements included in the structure of judgment. If one of these elements is missing in our reflection on how things are known, our reflection or concept is inadequate to account for how things are known in themselves.

At the level of the direct exercise of judgment, in which we make judgments about real things, in order for things to be known as they exist, our judgment must necessarily include subject and predicate taken together concretely as an essence. The predicate is a determination said of a subject. A predicate is what is positively said of a subject. On the other hand, predicates—at the level of the direct exercise of judgment—refer this understanding to the particular thing known, the latter signified by the subject. We know the subject as “this” or “that.” So far, McInerny would agree with this assessment. In accord with this, McInerny states that things themselves are signified through a mode of concretion of the subject and predicate, which he calls the *res significata*.

However, does McInerny really have a sufficient understanding of concrete essence as subject (“this”) and predicate (“what”)? To be sure, McInerny includes determinations in his understanding of how things are signified through concepts. McInerny accounts for determinations in what he calls the *modus significandi*, which are abstract in nature. In addition, however, he also has a reference to determinations in the *res significata*. The difference is that the *res significata* is a composition of the abstract determination with the concept of matter (the subject) taken concretely as a substance. He states that

because there is a difference between form and the subject of form in the material things to which our mind is proportioned, we have one mode or way of signifying the composite of form and matter [*res significata*] and another way of signifying the form as such [*modus significandi*] . . . these [are] the concrete and abstract modes of signification. Names that signify forms do not signify them as subsisting; it is the composite that has the form that subsists. (AA 77)

With this in mind, I assume that McInerny includes both the “what” and the “this” in the *res significata*. However, upon closer analysis, it is seen that he does not really understand “this” properly as it is in the structure of judgment. Therefore, as mentioned above, if a conception of how things are named through concepts excludes either “this” or “what” in the exercise of judgment, or misrepresents either element, it cannot account for knowledge of things as they exist in reality.

It is our assertion that McInerny misapprehends how the “this” operates in the exercise of judgment in its role of concretion with the “what.” McInerny treats “this” merely as another determination in addition to the predicate. McInerny tries to bring

the “this” into his conception of things by adding to the “what” a further determination of matter. He treats matter just as another genus: “the generic notion comprises a form, the determination, and matter” (LA 106). His understanding of concrete essence works on the basis that it potentially accounts for the thing itself by not excluding that which is determined further below it. The conception of “this” as I understand it functions more precisely to include the individual thing in that “this” designates or points out the individual thing. McInerny cannot account for “this” since “this,” as it functions in the direct exercise of judgment, as irreducible subject of predication, is not also a predicate. Since McInerny has a compound predicate involving the quiddity of the thing taken with the conception of matter, there is no subject, or “this” to which the predicates refer, resulting in a purely abstract *res significata*! Although he claims that one has knowledge of things themselves, his understanding of how things are understood results in an essentialism in which concepts remain separate or abstracted from all singular things in themselves (this or that).

To gain a better understanding of how “this” functions in the direct exercise of judgment we recall that when a thing becomes available to a person to be known, it shows itself via the perception of the senses. In this way, the senses designate it as a particular thing. This is what we mean by “this,” a pointing to a thing as it exists individually for the senses. That is, “the ‘this’ of a judgment stands for the thing itself prior to understanding” (PB 309).

McInerny’s misapprehension, in which only concepts of things may be known, has great import for his understanding of naming. It is no wonder that McInerny concludes that naming is fully reducible to logic since he thinks that his conception of “this” and “what” are reducible to logical definition and categorization, confusing metaphysics with logic. In addition, McInerny’s misunderstanding of naming results in a failure to see how a science of nature or the exercise of judgment regarding nature as well as in metaphysics encompasses some reference to actuality in critical reflection over and above mere conceptualizations.

### III

McInerny’s exclusion of a proper subject in his understanding of how things are understood through concepts has a profound effect on his logic of naming. The result is that he thinks that things can only be named through logical definition. However, I argue that when we name things themselves, we are not merely naming according to a determination alone, as McInerny asserts, but rather we are naming according to the concrete synthesis of “this” and “what.” Therefore, if we name two different things with the same quiddity, for example, “rational animal,” we do not just have in mind the logical univocal name, but also the name as applied to “this,” and “that.” “This” individual man is named as “this,” and “that” individual man is named as “that.” In exercising judgment, we name not just according to our logical notion, but our logical notion as applied to a particular individual. Therefore, when we name different “thises,” even though we have the same quidditative determination for each, we are in a sense using two different names, “this this,” and “that this” for each thing. We do not reduce the individual to some abstract or

logical designation. This opens up the possibility of analogy according to being and not according to meaning.

When we do not reduce the concrete essence merely to some formal determination, but include individuals within one and the same univocal categorization, we notice that these individuals are other from one another: “this” man is other than “that” man. Are they equivocal? If, hypothetically speaking, there existed just “this” and “that,” and “that”—only individuals—without any determination or quiddity to speak of, then individuals would be purely equivocal, or purely universal in their abstraction as merely “this.” However, we know things according to a mode of concretion, and so, we understand individuals under a common mode of knowing. In this sense then, although individuals are different one from the other, we know them according to a common notion. Therefore, there is analogy according to being and not according to meaning. There is involved in our understanding of things a relation *per prius et posterius*, a characteristic in common with analogous names.

However, I agree with McInerney that just because there is a *per prius et posterius* relationship analogy is not necessarily involved. However, in this case, I argue that there is a case of analogous naming. It is noted that there are indeed *per prius et posterius* relationships among logical categories that still do not constitute analogy. For example, there is a *per prius et posterius* relationship between the determinations of body and living and non-living when taken only as logical categories. Living and non-living, although different from each other, are in *per prius et posterius* relationship to the meaning of body. Despite this ordering, the order is logically univocal without being the least bit analogous.

Nevertheless, the relationship that different individual things of the same kind have to their logically univocal meaning is a case of analogy, precisely because we are not dealing with a relationship of purely logical categories. Rather, we are talking about the concrete synthesis of a determination (or logical intention) and a “this.” The “this” points to the individual material thing and “that” points to another individual material thing. These individuals, although their determination can be reduced to a logical category, cannot as individuals be reduced to a logical category. There is a similar relationship regarding species and its genus and individual things and their species “as determinate under indeterminate” (AA 84). That is, an individual is in a sense a further determination than its species just as a species is a further determination of its genus. However, the difference is that the further determination of an individual to its species is not fully reducible to a determination or essence where a species as a further determination of its genus is fully reducible to a determination. This difference causes a naming of two individuals that fall under the same species to be named differently as regarding their being. Therefore, things can be named analogously according to being and not according to meaning.

How does this analysis relate to the conception of how things are known through concepts? Next, it is important to understand how things are analogous according to be but not according to meaning by reflecting on the direct exercise of judgment.

Let us say that we have two acts of judgments relating to two things that are named univocally. On the one hand, we have “This is a tree.” On the other hand, we have “That is a tree also.” Both “this” and “that” are named as trees. However, at the

same time, we have a difference. “This tree” is not “that tree,” and “that tree” is not “this tree.” Therefore, “this tree” has a different name than “that tree” according to being since we understand that they are different from each other. They are named differently in that two different beings in particular are named as different from one another. It is not the case that if we have the same predicate and at the same time we have the logically indeterminate subject in our judgment that the same particular being is named. The logically indeterminate subject is not entirely indeterminate insofar as it denotes difference among particular things. However, if we treat “this” and “that” as a determination in which they have the same name, as McInerny does, the result will be that there is no difference depicted in a judgment other than the difference in kind that is supplied as the determination.

#### IV

Finally, we reach our purpose: a discussion of analogy of being as analogous according to both meaning and being. Whereas McInerny understands being as analogous only according to meaning, I proceed from my conclusion that things can be named analogously according to meaning to a fuller notion of how things are understood as analogous according to meaning and being. McInerny approaches being through a conception of substance, so this is the best place to begin.

McInerny begins with Aristotle’s dual conception of substance. Primary substance is “that which is said neither of a subject nor in a subject, e.g., individual man or individual horse” (AA 58). Secondary substances are the species through which primary substances are known. I note here that primary substances are known logically through secondary substance.

However, as I concluded above, McInerny has no way of including “this” in his way of understanding things through concepts, and hence he does not account for how we know the things themselves. This misunderstanding translates into a misunderstanding of substance. McInerny thinks that his account of secondary substances includes a proper reference to individuals, or primary substances, but this is not the case. Instead, McInerny’s conception yields an understanding in which secondary substances are the species through which secondary substances are known. Secondary substance is what McInerny calls *modus significandi*, and substance is the *res significata*. However, although he has secondary substance, primary substance is not made available but is merely a concrete conception of the *modus significandi*. For McInerny, the primary substance is a further determination of a *res significata*. *Res significata* does not explicitly exclude the primary substance.

McInerny’s conflation of the *res significata* with the *modus significandi*, insofar as he treats the concretizing aspect of the *res significata* as another determination translates into a misunderstanding of primary substance. He conceives of the primary substance merely as a determination and as a consequence disjoins it from its proper role of standing for a thing itself.

Such an understanding of substance has a bearing on how McInerny understands being. The category of substance is that through which being is understood, since all that we say “is” relates in one way or another to the conception of substance. Both

accidental and essential statements that we make have reference to substance. Therefore, we understand being through an understanding of substance. That is, when we understand being, we relate our understanding to an understanding of substance.

McInerny's understanding of substance is as concrete, but at the same time it is not analogous according to being. Therefore, McInerny understands being to include all concrete species of things, and all concrete accidents in relation to concrete species but not things as found in their differences as "this" and "that." Certainly, McInerny's conception of being is analogous, but analogous according to meaning and not according to being. I disagree with this conclusion and assert that in order to understand being as a structured notion through reflection on the direct exercise of judgment, we must include actual differences in our conception of being.

I understand the relationship between secondary substance and primary substance differently. Both primary and secondary substance are called substances, so there is a commonality among them. Therefore, we must not irrevocably divide them as McInerny does, but rather, we must properly understand secondary substances as a mode of knowing primary substance itself. This means that we conceive primary substance as the proper subject of predication. Secondary substance is not divorced from primary substance but includes it with the addition of intelligible determination or predication of the primary substance.

We understand substance, therefore, as analogous only according to being and not according to meaning since substance is understood through substance taken as the supreme univocal category. Substance is not sufficient to account for being which is analogous according to both meaning and being.

We have seen that the analogy of being is possible only if things are named concretely as a non-predicable subject, or "this," which nonetheless expresses difference according to being. Such naming allows things to be known in themselves so that things can be known analogously according to being. Since things may be named according to being, we bring in analogy according to meaning to understand how being itself is analogous. Such an analogous conception of being as analogous according to both meaning and being allows us to understand being as it is found according to its diversity (according to meaning) and according to its multiplicity (according to being). Being as being is not found among the predicamental order which prescind from individuals, but rather, being is to be understood transcendently as the sum of all particular things of all kinds as they are found in actuality.<sup>5</sup>

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