Of the

Law of Nature
The disciplines of economics, ethics, and law cannot be detached from a historical background that was, it is increasingly recognized, religious in nature. Economists Adam Smith and Léon Walras drew on the work of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Spanish theologians who strove to understand the process of exchange and trade in order to better articulate subjective value, a dynamic theory of money, the role of the merchant, and the concept of marginal utility. Likewise, political theorists John Neville Figgis and Otto von Gierke drew on the work of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Dutch, Swiss, German, and Spanish jurists and ethicists who articulated concepts that laid the foundation for federalist political structures, constitutionalism, popular sovereignty, natural-law jurisprudence, and limited government in the Western legal tradition. After a long period in which economics, ethics, and law became detached from theology, many economists, legal scholars, political theorists, and theologians now see the benefit of studying early modern economic, ethical, and legal texts in their full cultural, often religious, context. This series, *Sources in Early Modern Economics, Ethics, and Law*, provides first-ever English translations and editions of some of the most formative but previously inaccessible texts that shaped the disciplines of economics, ethics, and law in the early modern era and beyond. These inexpensive translations of seminal texts will make substantive contributions to contemporary interdisciplinary discussion.
Of the

Law of Nature

Matthew Hale

Edited by David S. Sytsma
OF THE LAW OF NATURE

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ABBREVIATIONS

Manuscripts

British Library, London

B1  Add. 18235, fols. 41–147 (“Some Chapters touching the Law of Nature”)

B2  Harley 7159, fols. 1–266 (“Some Chapters touching the Law of Nature”)

B3  Hargrave 485 (“Treatise of the Nature of Lawes in Generall and touching the Law of Nature”)

Printed Works

Abridgment  [Sir Matthew Hale], “The Publisher’s Preface Directed to the Young Students of the Common-Law,” in Henry Rolle, Un abridgment des plusieurs cases et resolutions del common ley (London: A. Crooke, 1668)

Baxter, Add. Notes  Richard Baxter, Additional Notes on the Life and Death of Sir Matthew Hale, the late universally honoured and loved Lord Chief Justice of the Kings Bench (London: Richard Janeway, 1682)
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<td>DLGT</td>
<td>Richard A. Muller, <em>Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology</em> (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985)</td>
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<td>Burnet, Life</td>
<td>Gilbert Burnet, <em>The Life and Death of Sir Matthew Hale, Kt. sometime Lord Chief Justice of His Majesties Court of Kings Bench</em> (London: William Shrowsbery, 1681)</td>
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<td>Primitive</td>
<td>Sir Matthew Hale, <em>The Primitive Origination of Mankind, considered and examined according to the Light of Nature</em> (London: William Godbid, for William Shrowsbery, 1677)</td>
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The legal history of England and the United States of America is commonly recognized as following a unique path distinct from the rest of Europe. Whereas continental European nations followed the Roman civil law (*Corpus iuris civilis*) compiled by Justinian, England developed its own body of customary law known as common law.¹ Among legal historians of English common law, Sir Matthew Hale (1609–1676) ranks as one of the most familiar names along with Sir Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone. After an early career as a lawyer, during which time he served as counsel for the defense at the famous trials of Archbishop Laud in 1643 and Christopher

* I am grateful to Matthew T. Gaetano, Todd M. Rester, and Richard A. Muller for their many helpful comments.

Love in 1651, Hale was appointed Justice of the Common Pleas (1654–1658), and at the Restoration was appointed successively as Chief Baron of the Exchequer (1660–1671) and Chief Justice of the King’s Bench (1671–1676). In the judgment of one historian, he was not only “accounted by his contemporaries the most learned lawyer of the age” but was so well received over the course of centuries of scholarship that he is now known as “one of the greatest jurists of the modern common law.”

Hale’s reputation is in no small measure due to the posthumous publication and circulation of his manuscripts relating to common law. With the exception of his short introduction to Chief Justice Rolle’s Abridgment (1668), Hale chose not to publish his legal writings during his lifetime and even prohibited the posthumous publication of all his manuscripts in his will. Yet Hale’s manuscripts circulated and were copied among lawyers long after his death, and


4. [Sir Matthew Hale], “The Publisher’s Preface Directed to the Young Students of the Common-Law,” in Abridgment.


there were claims that Hale “changed his mind” regarding his prohibition on the publication of his manuscripts. In any case, after Hale's death many of his manuscripts were published. Of these published manuscripts, Hale’s *Historia placitorum coronae* (1736) and *History of the Common Law of England* (1713) exercised a great influence on two centuries of legal thought. According to Alan Cromartie, *Historia placitorum coronae* “became an unchallenged authority on English criminal law,” while the *History* provided a “sketch of the legal past that was unrivalled for two centuries.” This judgment is corroborated by Holdsworth, who nearly a century ago called Hale’s *History* “the ablest introductory sketch of a history of English law that appeared till the publication of Pollock and Maitland’s volumes in 1895.” Hale’s *Analysis of the Law* (1713) also had a large impact on Blackstone, who based his own *Analysis of the Laws of England* (1756) on that of Hale. Moreover, Blackstone appears to have been indebted to Hale's explanation of the common law as the embodiment of the accumulated wisdom of generations, an explanation which has often invited parallels between Hale and Edmund Burke.

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Unfortunately, most of Hale’s other manuscripts have suffered from centuries of neglect. Among these manuscripts is Hale’s undated Some Chapters touching the Law of Nature, likely written ca. 1668–1670 under the original title “Of the Law of Nature” (hereafter Law of Nature), which survives in multiple hand copies, although Hale’s original is lost.\textsuperscript{14} With the publication of Richard Tuck’s Natural Rights Theories (1979) and Cromartie’s Sir Matthew Hale (1995), interest in Hale’s natural-law theory revived.\textsuperscript{15} Hale’s Law of Nature has been called his “most elaborate statement of his general moral ideas”\textsuperscript{16} and the fullest articulation of a generally held view of the relationship between common law and natural law in seventeenth-century England.\textsuperscript{17} Even so, Hale’s Law of Nature has continued to be ignored or read in a highly selective manner. Harold Berman, lamenting that “no one of his written works constitutes an adequate statement of his legal philosophy,” attempted “to reconstruct the coherent legal philosophy” underlying Hale’s entire corpus, including Hale’s theory of natural law, but did so in apparent ignorance of the existence of Hale’s own treatise on natural law.\textsuperscript{18} The selective treatment of Hale’s Law of Nature is reflected in the focus of the secondary literature on questions of the relationship

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{14} See the Textual Introduction below for details.
\bibitem{16} Cromartie, Hale, 90.
\end{thebibliography}
between natural law and common law, the nature of property rights, and the influence of Hale’s mentor and friend John Selden (1584–1654). Furthermore, despite the fact that Hale’s Law of Nature has been referred to as belonging to a “hybrid” genre, “being partly legal and partly religious,” most treatments of it continue to neglect the theological dimension of the Law of Nature. Yet a proper reading of Hale’s Law of Nature requires recognition of the theological context within which seventeenth-century lawyers viewed their own discipline. It was not uncommon for English lawyers to admit that law borrowed principles from other sciences, and in particular from the discipline of theology. Hale himself produced a number of theological works alongside his legal works, and his Law of Nature is permeated with theology.

While most scholars have accepted the view that Hale largely followed Selden’s approach to natural law, I shall argue that Hale is far more eclectic in his use of Selden. To be sure, Hale does utilize


20. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 162–65; Cromartie, Hale, 90–97.


elements of Selden's account of natural law, but this eclectic reception takes place within a larger framework that shows strong continuity with Hale's early Reformed Puritanism and ideas gleaned from Francisco Suárez (1548–1617) and Hugo Grotius (1583–1645). And although Hale's view of natural law in *Law of Nature* remains in many respects continuous with his early Puritanism, it also represents a significant religious and soteriological shift in his later thought in the direction of Arminianism. This Arminian change is specifically reflected in Hale's argument that natural law serves the goal of making salvation possible for virtuous pagans with no knowledge of Judeo-Christian scripture. These points require clarification. In what follows, we will first survey some of the background relevant to Hale's intellectual development as it pertains to natural-law theory. This will provide some context for a synopsis of Hale's *Law of Nature* and an analysis of the main topics in the *Law of Nature*.

### Hale’s Scholastic Education and Religious Development

Since the theory of natural law concerns the foundations of morality, standing as it were at the intersection of theological, philosophical, and juridical disciplines, an account of Hale's intellectual development as it relates to these disciplines is necessary for understanding many of the features of his *Law of Nature*. Hale's early ethical and religious formation owed much to Puritan influences. Before he reached the age of five, Hale's parents died and his father's closest relative Anthony Kingscot, a man known to have “inclined to the way of those called Puritans,” assumed guardianship of the young Hale. At the age of sixteen, Hale was sent by Kingscot to Magdalen Hall, Oxford, where his tutor was Obadiah Sedgwick (d. 1658), who later became a well-known Puritan preacher.  


Hale’s early Puritan formation, which he found reinforced both at home and in school, left a lasting impression on his life and thought. Although Hale only remained at Oxford for about three years (1626–1629) before entering the law profession at Lincoln’s Inn, he is said to have “laid the foundation of some learning and knowledge which he afterwards built upon.”

The only knowledge we have of his reading at Oxford is the witness of one of Hale’s editors. The editor, likely Hale’s son-in-law Edward Stephens (d. 1706), had approached Hale regarding the occasion and extent of his knowledge of the scholastics. According to Stephens’ account, Hale replied, “At Oxford; and that he there read Aquinas, Scotus, and Suarez, and others, whom he particularly named; but these I remember.” This account appears accurate; Hale himself demonstrated familiarity with the opinions of Aquinas and Suárez, calling the latter “the acute and judicious Suarez.” Hale’s remarks are also representative of a positive reception Suárez enjoyed among many Puritans in early seventeenth-century England.

Richard Baxter (1615–1691), an


27. See the preface to Hale, Discourse, a3v. Cf. Charles B. Schmitt, John Case and Aristotelianism in Renaissance England (Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1983), 64–67. Cromartie attributes the preface in Discourse to Baxter, but J. B. Williams attributed it to Edward Stephens. See Cromartie, Hale, 141; and Williams, Memoirs, 408. Williams was likely correct, since the author refers to himself as “Mr. S,” and he took responsibility for publishing Hale’s Contemplations (1676), which we know was edited by Stephens. See Hale, Discourse, *3r, *4r. According to Baxter, Add. Notes, A7r, Stephens was “most familiar” with Hale and had planned to write on Hale’s life.

28. E.g., on the doctrine of creation: Hale, Primitive, 72, 81. Hale refers here to Suárez’s Metaphysicae Disputationes. See also below, p. 135.

29. See citations to Suárez’s De legibus regarding the natural law and law of nations in Richard Byfield, The Doctrine of the Sabbath Vindicated (London: Felix Kyngston for Philemon Stephens and Christopher Meredith, 1631), 12–13, 46–48; Anthony Tuckney, Praelectiones theologicae (Amsterdam: Stephan Swart, 1679), pars secunda, 316–20; and Nathaniel
intimate friend of Hale for the last decade of his life, praised Suárez’s *De legibus* as “one of the best [books] on that Subject that is extant among us”\(^{30}\) and observed—with possible reference to Hale—that “the Authors of Politicks and Laws, (especially Suarez *de Legibus* and Azorius) I find are commonly read by Lawyers…”\(^{31}\)

Besides an exposure to Suárez and medieval scholastics, Hale’s early education at Oxford’s Puritan “stronghold” also contributed to an early enthusiasm for Reformed religious beliefs and practices. According to Burnet, even after Hale began pursuing a profession in law, he directed his studies to theology above those in law, arithmetic, philosophy, and history:

> But above all these, he seemed to have made the Study of Divinity the chef of all others, to which he not only directed everything else, but also arrived at that pitch in it, that those who have read, what he has Written on these subjects, will think, they must have had most of his time and thoughts.\(^{32}\)


The best indication of Hale’s early beliefs is found in his theological treatise *A Discourse of the Knowledge of God, and of our Selves*, which was written when he was around the age of thirty or thirty-one (ca. 1639–1641), after he had already begun practicing law.33 There Hale espouses ideas typical of the Reformed theology that would shortly thereafter find expression in the Westminster Confession of Faith (1646).34 He argues for a covenant of works made with Adam,35 original sin and guilt,36 the resulting corruption of all the soul’s faculties,37 a total inability to will spiritual good,38 God’s providence through necessary, voluntary, and contingent secondary causes,39 predestination and effectual calling,40 Christ’s intentional and effectual satisfaction for the elect alone,41 and the perseverance of the saints.42 He was, we might say, at least a five-point Calvinist.

Hale’s religious practices were a mixture of seventeenth-century Reformed Anglicanism and the Puritanism of his youth.43 His non-Puritan Anglican sympathies are seen in his celebration of Christmas, as evidenced by his seventeen extant Christmas poems (ca. 1651–1668), in contrast to strict Puritans who decried the

practice. Yet the *Discourse* also reveals the impact of his early Puritan education in rigorous attention given to practical and affective matters, including the cultivation of spiritual “watchfulness,” particularly with reference to a strict Lord’s Day observance. Following standard Puritan practice, throughout his life Hale strictly observed the Lord’s Day (the only permissible activity being works of piety, charity, and necessity), spending up to two or three hours in theological meditation, and advising his children and grandchildren to do the same.

Hale’s early theological pursuits had a direct and lasting impact on his view of the natural law. Already in the *Discourse* we find Hale’s discussion of the natural law woven into the fabric of his exposition of Reformed theology. He addresses the natural law in relation to a variety of theological topics, including God, providence, humanity, Scripture, the covenant of works, redemption, mortification, and

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sanctification. While Hale’s views on soteriology later moved in an Arminian direction, most of the doctrine relating to law in the *Discourse* continued into his later thought, including the *Law of Nature*. From the *Discourse* onward, Hale expressed his theory of natural law against the background of a scholastic faculty psychology reflective of his Oxford training, in which the content of the natural law is grounded in a teleological account of human nature and its inclinations directed to a hierarchy of ends (a form of essentialism), known to the intellect through both inscribed principles and discursive reasoning, and applied through acts of the conscience. All of these aspects are consonant with a Puritan education. Hale at this time also followed the traditional notion that the Decalogue and the Sermon on the Mount constituted a republication and clarification of the natural law originally given to Adam but effaced with the fall. This republication of the natural law related directly to Hale’s Sabbatarianism. Early seventeenth-century Sabbatarians, drawing heavily on continental Reformed theologians such as Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590) and Franciscus Junius (1545–1602), argued that the Sabbath (aside from the particularity of the day)

47. Hale, *Discourse*, 23 (God); 33–35, 37–38 (providence); 46–47, 52–55, 92–96 (humanity); 102–3, 110–14 (Scripture); 153–57 (covenant of works); 228, 254–55 (redemption); 277–79, 367–69 (mortification); 438–46 (sanctification).


was part of the natural law established at the creation, republished in the Decalogue, and moved from the seventh to the first day by Christ.\(^{51}\) This was the same view held by Hale.\(^{52}\)

Sometime between writing the *Discourse* (ca. 1639–1641) and the *Law of Nature* (ca. 1668–1670) Hale’s religious perspective underwent a shift in the direction of Arminianism away from the Calvinism of his youth. According to his editor, in later years Hale “somewhat altered his opinion touching some Points in Controversie, especially between the Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants.”\(^{53}\) In a manuscript likely written in the late 1650s, Hale still affirmed the traditionally Calvinist belief that the light of nature is insufficient for salvation.\(^{54}\) But after the Restoration he moved toward an Arminian soteriology which understood the gospel of the new


53. Hale, *Discourse*, a1v. The editor is likely Edward Stephens (see note 27). Remonstrants and Contra-Remonstrants refer respectively to the Arminian party and their traditional Reformed opponents in the Netherlands.

covenant as offering forgiveness of sins by a condition of imperfect, sincere obedience.\textsuperscript{55} He also came to affirm the view, commonly associated with Arminianism, that virtuous pagans could be saved through obedience to the natural law (discussed below). In the last years of his life Hale professed that “Points controverted between the Arminians and Calvinists” regarding God’s decrees, his influence on the human will, the resistibility of grace, and so forth were impossible to determine and of “inconsiderable moment.”\textsuperscript{56} Yet, despite this Latitudinarian profession regarding disputed doctrines, Hale continued to struggle until the end of his life with predestination, and Baxter testifies that in the last year of his life Hale became an avid reader of Baxter’s \textit{Catholick Theologie} (1675), which Baxter claims to have helped resolve Hale’s indetermination just before death about points of controversy.\textsuperscript{57} Whether or not Hale changed his mind in the last year of his life, the soteriology present in his \textit{Law of Nature} is clearly representative of his Arminian turn.

Although Hale turned away from his early Calvinism later in life, he resisted the other major seventeenth-century intellectual shift, the new mechanical philosophy associated with René Descartes (1596–1650), Pierre Gassendi (1592–1655), and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679). Baxter, who conversed at length with Hale on philosophical questions, relates that overall Hale maintained an Aristotelian philosophical perspective regarding nature in the face of new ideas of motion and causality:


\textsuperscript{56} Sir Matthew Hale, \textit{The Judgment of the late Chief Justice Sir Matthew Hale, of the nature of True Religion, the Causes of its Corruption, and the Churches Calamity, by Mens Additions and Violences: With the desired Cure} (London: B. Simmons, 1684), First Discourse, 6, 13.

We neither of us approved of all of Aristotle; but [Hale] valued him more than I did. We both greatly disliked the Principles of Cartesius and Gassendus (much more of the Bruitists, Hobs and Spinosa); especially their doctrine de Motu [of motion], and their obscuring, or denying Nature it self, even the Principia Motus [principle of motion], the Virtutes formales [formal virtues], which are the Causes of Operations.  

In this respect, Hale stands apart from English Latitudinarians who had a reputation for embracing Cartesian and atomist philosophy over against the received Aristotelianism of the schools. Indeed, although Hale thought that new experiments could help to reform philosophy, he was critical of “our new philosophers, as some call the Cartesians,” and thought that “Aristotle was a man of far greater experience, as well as study, than they.” Accordingly, while Hale accepted non-Aristotelian explanations of non-living elements, he still retained a traditional Aristotelian hierarchy of vegetative, 

61. Hale, Primitive, 9–11. He is equally critical of Aristotelian, Gassendian, and Cartesian assumptions in this regard. For discussion of this aspect of Hale’s thought, see Cromartie, Hale, 195–217.
sensitive, and rational souls, and a basic commitment to faculty psychology, whereby the soul is characterized by various powers, habits, and acts.\textsuperscript{62} In his final years (ca. 1671–1676), Hale sought to reform Aristotle’s philosophy of the soul in light of Jan Baptist van Helmont’s (1579–1644) philosophy of “active virtues” which he correlated with Aristotelian substantial forms and qualities.\textsuperscript{63} But Hale did not intend this as a radical overthrow of Aristotelian philosophy, as is evident from his continued appeal to Aristotle’s definition of motion and his description of Aristotle as “the greatest Master of Experience and Observation” with respect to his On the Soul and Physics.\textsuperscript{64}

In Hale’s Law of Nature, there is little indication of his late Helmontian terminology.\textsuperscript{65} On the other hand, Aristotle retains his privileged status as the “most Learn’d” of the philosophers (52), “the Great Philosopher” (95), “the great master of Observation and Learning” (99), or simply “the great master” (127). Hale also assumes a concept of “Specifical Natures” or “internal & essential active forms” in relation to living things, “whereby they move themselves, in their growth and vegetation, and whereby they are determin’d within their several species” (131). This understanding of form as the principle of motion, growth, and natural kind suggests an Aristotelian perspective. And in his view of free choice, Hale arguably leans in a Thomistic direction whereby the exercise of the will depends on the intellect for the specification of the good (14).\textsuperscript{66} In a broad philosophical sense with respect to the nature of living beings, Hale’s Law of Nature still inhabits a similar world

\textsuperscript{62} Hale, Primitive, 52–64.
\textsuperscript{64} Hale, Principles of Natural Motions, 2, A4v.
\textsuperscript{65} I have not found a single example of the Helmontian terms virtus activa, vis activa, virtutes essentiales, vires essentiales, or “ferments” which Hale uses elsewhere, e.g., Principles of Natural Motions, 8–15.
\textsuperscript{66} Hale, Discourse, 57; Works, 1:385; Primitive, 57; Pleas, 1:15. Cf. Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II q. 9, a. 1; and Hugues Parent, “Histoire de l’acte volontaire en droit pénal anglais et canadien,” McGill Law Journal
of ideas with great medieval and early modern scholastics such as Aquinas and Suárez.

**Natural Law and Seventeenth-Century Common Law**

Besides his early scholastic education at Oxford, Hale’s legal training and practice certainly contributed to his views on natural law. When Hale entered Lincoln’s Inn, he joined a longstanding legal culture in which lawyers were trained to view natural law as both a source and rule for positive law. Throughout the last century most historians of English common law dismissed the natural law as of no practical relevance to the development of common law, a sentiment reflected in Roscoe Pound’s remark, “English lawyers have never had much concern with philosophy and natural law found little place in their books.” But the researches of legal historians Richard Helmholz and David Ibbetson have recently unearthed a wealth of evidence to the contrary. They argue that until the early nineteenth century natural law was widely accepted in theory and regularly used in judicial rulings, and as a result played a substantive role in the development of English and American common law. Helmholz writes, “Indeed it is difficult to discover a jurist...”

45 (2000): 975–1020, at 994–97. The description of the will’s “power to suspend” (14) may also point to an eclectic Scotist accent.


writing before 1850 who expressed any doubts about the existence and importance of the law of nature in the regulation of human society.” In his estimation, although ordinarily positive law and natural law were thought to harmonize, so that appeals to positive and natural law typically went hand in hand, judges in special cases could and did invoke natural law as a source of law. Such special cases normally involved situations where positive laws were silent, unclear, or the equitable application of the law required an exception to a particular case. In the extraordinary case of a direct conflict between natural and positive law, such positive law was thought to be “void” and no longer obligating in conscience, although in practice judges were reluctant to directly overturn a statute by an appeal to natural law. In the seventeenth century, natural law played a substantive role in legal practice, as an influential number of lawyers considered it as a source and rule for interpreting the customary common law. As one historian has put it, lawyers in


73. For the following I am indebted to Alan Cromartie, “The Idea of Common Law as Custom,” in *The Nature of Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives*, ed. Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James B. Murphy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 203–27; and
the tradition of Sir Edward Coke saw the common law as “natural law applied to English life.” The practical role of natural law can be clearly seen in the account given by early seventeenth-century lawyers regarding the construction of the general principles which they used as a guide in making particular judgments. By the early seventeenth century, a renewed attention to method and Aristotelian logic had transformed English legal literature, resulting in textbooks on legal maxims. In all likelihood, Hale studied from these books as well, for the attorney-general William Noy (1577–1634)—who “directed [Hale] in his Study” and befriended him to such an extent that Hale was called “young Noy”—had himself written a popular book of legal maxims. These maxims, which lawyers also called “grounds,” “principles,” “eruditions,” or “rules,” were thought to be midway between reason and law: a maxim is the “conclusion of reason” but the “foundation of Law.”


from two sources, natural law and custom, as summarized in the following definition of Sir John Doddridge (1555–1626):

A Rule or Principle of the Law of England, is a Conclusion either of the Law of Nature, or derived from some generall custome used within the Realme, containing in a short summe the reason and direction of many particular and speciall occurrences.\(^79\)

Since maxims summarized the grounds of legal reasoning, and were a kind of mixture of natural law and custom, maxims were subject to revision by natural law. According to Sir Henry Finch (ca. 1558–1625), the deductions of the natural law are the “Lords Paramount” of maxims, and “rule and overrule” them.\(^80\)

For lawyers such as Doddridge and Finch, the common law was certainly general custom, but it was also a product of a discursive rational process, practiced by a learned professional class. Lawyers drew upon the reasoning of past judicial rulings, formulated principles or maxims through a process of “disputation and argument,”\(^81\) and then used these maxims, in the words of Sir Francis Bacon, as “laws of lawes.”\(^82\) This view of law as the product and profession of trained reason found expression in the idea—shared by Doddridge and Coke (despite their differences)—that the common law was “reason,” however not unlearned reason but rather the “artificial” reason of those skilled in the law.\(^83\) Similarly, Finch called common

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law “nothing els but common reason: but what reason? not that which everie one doth frame unto himselfe: but refined reason.”

Hale’s mentor Noy said that maxims “shall alwayes be determined by the Judges, because they are knowne to none but the learned.”

By the mid-eighteenth century the early seventeenth-century view of common law as actively refined reason gave way to the idea that common law is general custom derived from popular consent, and Hale contributed to this shift. In conformity to his own description of law as the command of one in authority, Hale argued that the common law obligates not by force of its reason but from the tacit consent of legislative authority. However, the older perspective of common law as partly derivative of natural law and developed into the artificial reason of lawyers also found a place in Hale’s thought. Hale assumed that the common law prohibited many of the very same things as were also prohibited “by the laws of God and nature,” even though particular punishments were a determination of positive law. There is some indication that Hale accepted juridical reasoning as a source for new laws in his History of the Common Law. The view of the common law as “refined reason” is suggested by Hale’s comment that “Common Law does determine what of those Customs are good and reasonable, and what are unreasonable and void.” Hale accepted the view that the judge may make further deductions from the common law which harmonized with the “great Substratum” of existing common law, or even make decisions where the only guide is the “common Reason of the Thing.” He reserved a place for the courts and judges in:

84. Finch, Law, or, A Discourse Thereof, 75.
87. This appears plainly, e.g., in chapter 1 of our text (23–24).
89. See Cromartie, Hale, 106–7, who instances Hale, History, 40.
90. Hale, History, 18.
91. Hale, History, 46.
the reformation of law apart from parliament. Hale's view of the role of judicial reasoning is also reflected in his defense of common law against Hobbes' objections. Hobbes had objected that Coke's doctrine of “artificial reason” implied judicial authority beyond the will of the sovereign. According to Hobbes, “It is not Wisdom, but Authority that makes a Law.” Against this attack of Hobbes, Hale defended the necessity for a professional class of lawyers who excelled in acquired knowledge of their craft.

Hale's studies at Lincoln’s Inn formed him in the early seventeenth-century common law tradition. A second major influence on his life and thought was his deep friendship with John Selden, with whom he became close friends in the late 1630s. This friendship, which was to last until Selden's death in 1654, had an enduring impact on Hale's thought in general and in particular his natural-law theory. Baxter said of Hale late in life, “I know you are acquainted [with] how greatly he valued Mr. Selden, being one of his Executors; his Books and Picture being still near him.”

According to Burnet, Selden encouraged Hale to pursue a wide scope of learning, which included studies in the Roman civil law and both ancient and modern philosophy. One of the early works we can be sure that Hale read carefully is Hugo Grotius' *De jure bellii ac pacis* (1625), a work which Selden himself praised as “that outstanding” and “that incomparable” book. But the work which Hale cited more than

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any other in his *Law of Nature* is Selden’s *De jure naturali & gentium, juxta disciplinam Ebraeorum* (1640). In his *Law of Nature*, Hale does not cite many authorities other than the Bible, but he refers to Selden’s work on six separate occasions. When Hale mentions Selden it is always with the greatest respect, but his use of *De jure naturali* is eclectic, and as we shall see, not uncritical.

**Synopsis**

Hale’s *Law of Nature* appears to have been composed, at least in part, as a private exercise to help with his own meditations. He cites few authorities besides the Bible, which gives the impression of an exercise conducted largely from memory. Given the prominence of biblical citations and theological argument in *Law of Nature*, it is possible that it was composed, as was Hale’s custom in writing his other theological meditations, on Sunday afternoons between the evening sermon and supper. The main reason he wrote such manuscripts was to “fix” his thoughts and “keep them from wandring.”

An eyewitness to Hale’s actual writing reports that Hale wrote in a spontaneous manner:

> His usual Manner of writing these things was this: When he had resolved on the Subject, the first thing he usually did, was with his pen upon some loose piece of paper, and sometimes upon a corner or the margin of the Paper he wrote on, to draw a Scheme of his whole Discourse, or of so much of it as he designed at that time to consider. This done he tap’d his thoughts and let them run, as he expressed it to me himself; and they usually ran as fast as his hand (though a very ready one) could trace them; insomuch that in that space, as he hath told me, he often wrote two sheets, and at other times between one and two;

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See Cromartie, *Hale*, 6 who provides manuscript evidence showing this was Hale’s own stated reason for writing.
and I have my self known him write according to that proportion, when I have been reading in the same room with him, for divers hours together. So that these writings are plainly a kind of extempore Meditations, only they came from a Head and Heart well fraught with a rich Treasure of Humane and Divine Knowledge, which the famous Legislator Justinian makes the necessary qualifications of a compleat Lawyer.¹⁰⁰

The picture painted by this account is that of a fast and free-flowing writing style. Against this background, it is remarkable that Hale’s Law of Nature also evidences a great degree of order and method.

As the title of Hale’s Law of Nature indicates, almost the entire treatise is devoted to the law of nature. After three introductory chapters on the nature, effects, and kinds of laws comprising the treatment of laws in general and a “premise” to natural law (5), Hale turns to a discussion of natural law, which fills the remaining ten chapters. Near the beginning of chapter 4 Hale provides the reader with his own sketch of the contents of the remaining chapters:

And now to pursue the method propounded, I shall endeavour to shew first, what those Laws are that are thus given: Secondly that these Laws are given to Mankind by Almighty God and that not only as Rules of direction, but as obliging Law’s: 3. The Manner how they are given; 4. The End for which they are given; 5. I shall consider the Objections Against it. (41)

From this sketch, we can gather the internal organization of the remainder of the treatise. Hale organizes the remaining chapters along the lines of Aristotelian causality into material, formal, and final causes.¹⁰¹ In chapters 4 and 5, Hale begins to discuss what


¹⁰¹. Cf. Sir Matthew Hale, “Notes on circuitus autumnalis” [1668], fols. 15r–16r, the James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT. These initial notes of a plan for the present treatise organize the natural law into its efficient, final, formal, and material causes (fol. 16r). See the Textual Introduction for further details.
the laws of nature are (their material cause). Chapter 4 treats the question of sources or “the Media whereby the discovery of these Naturall Laws is made” (47). Chapter 5 gives “some account of the particulars” of the natural laws (57). These two chapters form a kind of summary of the material content of Hale's natural-law theory.

The remaining chapters (chs. 6–13), with the exception of chapter 12 on human law, provide a more detailed elaboration on the natural law according to its material, formal, and final causes. In chapter 6 Hale treats the “matter” of natural law which he had begun discussing in chapter 5. The material content of the natural law consists of its “intrinsick Moral goodness” and “congruity to Right reason” prior to all other law (107). Chapters 7–10 deal with two aspects of the formal cause of natural law, namely its obligation and promulgation.102 In chapter 7 he argues that goodness alone is not sufficient to obligate, and so the “Formall reason” of natural law consists in God’s command as lawgiver. Hale proceeds in chapters 8–11 to a lengthy discussion of its promulgation. He divides this publication into two kinds: “primitive and natural” and “supplementall or adventitious” (121). Natural publication is discussed in chapters 8–10, which treat respectively God’s common irradiation through the intellectus agens (ch. 8), implanted common notions (ch. 9), and ratiocination and conscience (ch. 10). Supplemental publication is discussed in chapter 11, where Hale argues that the natural law was externally restored or repeated in four main epochs: Adam to the Deluge, the Deluge to Sinai, Sinai to Christ, and finally Christ to the present. Chapter 13, Hale’s most heavily theological section of the work, discusses the “end” or final cause of the natural law. Hale prefaces the chapter with remarks on God’s providential government in directing humanity to a higher end than the animals through natural law, and then proceeds to argue at length for the controversial claim that natural law is God’s means of salvation for virtuous pagans.

102. Hale, “Notes on circuitus autumnalis,” fol. 16r, Osborn Collection, places promulgation under the formal cause of natural law.
While chapters 6–13 fall into Hale’s treatment of the causality of natural law, chapter 12 on human laws sits uneasily within this framework. The likely solution to this discrepancy lies in Hale’s original “method” sketched at the beginning of chapter 4, where he tells the reader that in the fifth and final place he would “consider the Objections Against [natural law]” (41). In his introduction to chapter 12, Hale tells the reader that part of the purpose of the chapter is to “prevent or answer a tacite Objection that may arise.” The great objection that he seeks to address in this chapter is why human law is necessary since the natural law already “accomodates to the great End of the human Nature” with effectual publication both in nature and revelation (191). This retrospective glance at the end and publication of the natural law (i.e., ch. 13 and 8–11), when compared with Hale’s own sketch of his method for the treatise, suggests that chapter 12 was at least intended to be written, or was even in fact written, after the completion of the other chapters. Why Hale may have rearranged the final chapters I leave to the reader’s imagination.

**Law in General**

At the opening of his *Law of Nature*, Hale provides a definition of law in general which forms the basis for the entire ensuing discourse. Although he claims not to be bound by scholastic terms (5–6), his practice is nonetheless characteristic of a scholastic attention to precise definitions and terms. Law, he claims, consists of seven aspects: it is (1) a rule of reason for (2) moral actions, (3) instituted and promulgated to (4) rational creatures, (5) by one who has authority (6) to obligate by way of command and (7) to exact obedience. Terms (2) and (4) combine into the basic notion that law is properly for rational and not irrational creatures. The idea that law is a rule of reason in rational creatures and directing them to a good end is an ancient notion expressed in Cicero and Aquinas, and need not detain us.103 It is rather the description of law as a command given

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103. Cicero, *De legibus*, 1.6; Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, I-II q. 90 a. 4.
to rational creatures alone that requires some explanation, since it has invited the greatest amount of interpretation.

Hale’s definition of law as a command has rightly been taken as a basic continuity between him and Selden. As Cromartie, following in the steps of Tuck, recognized, “Selden regarded law as a command, imposed on a reasonable creature, with a penalty attached.” On this point, Cromartie observed, “Hale simply agreed with his mentor [Selden].” Yet since Hale does not cite Selden (or anyone else) on this particular point, it is an open question whether this definition is, as Tuck assumed, particularly “Seldenian.” Indeed, as Johann Sommerville has pointed out, this aspect of Selden’s thought is not unique; rather, it “was that of a conventional voluntarist,” and Selden was interpreted as such by contemporaries. There is also the added datum that Hale, writing ca. 1639–1641, when he was largely recapitulating his early scholastic and Puritan education at Oxford, already presents law as a command imposed on rational creatures with obligation and penalty. Are we to believe that after only recently becoming acquainted with Selden in the late

104. Cromartie, Hale, 90. This view is succinctly expressed in Selden, De jure naturali, 92–93: “For pure, unaided reason merely persuades or demonstrates; it does not order, nor bind anyone to their duty, unless it is accompanied by the authority of someone who is superior to the man in question.” (Quin ratio, quatenus talis solum & simplex, suadet & demonstrat, non jubet, aut ad officium, nisi superioris eo qui jubetur accedat simul auctoritas, obligat.). I follow the translation provided in Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 93–94.

105. Tuck, Natural Rights Theories, 162.


107. Hale, Discourse, 22–23: “In respect of Obligation … A Law commanding or forbidding a thing under a pain…. A power to exact an Obedience to that Law, and to inflict the punishment that follows upon the breach of this Law.” The same view appears in Discourse, 155–57. That law properly applies to rational, and not irrational, creatures, can be gathered from Hale’s comments at Discourse, 22; and Discourse, 54: “We find in the Creatures, several Instincts, incident almost to every Creature, which are
1630s, Hale rapidly absorbed a specific “Seldenian” theory of law as command? No, the most plausible sources for Hale’s early views are the scholastic authors Hale is known to have been reading (Scotus, Aquinas, and Suárez). Given this datum of Hale’s early expression of law as command applicable to rational creatures, and the fact that Hale provides no indication in chapter 1 of his *Law of Nature* regarding whom he is following in his definition of law, it is surprising that alternative possibilities to Selden’s influence have rarely been entertained. But if we look beyond Selden for possible sources of Hale’s definition of law among authors whom Hale, along with his close friends Selden and Baxter, is known to have read, Suárez is an obvious candidate.

A comparison between Suárez and Hale on the nature of law in fact yields remarkable parallels. Suárez opened his *De legibus* by objecting that Aquinas’ definition of law as a rule for action was too general since it would also apply both to irrational creatures and various arts such as grammar. Instead, Suárez insisted, law should be more narrowly construed as applicable to the moral acts. This is the same reasoning employed by Hale, who argues that a rule by itself is “too large and comprehensive” a notion that could apply to the arts of rhetoric, logic, and medicine (6). Therefore, like Suárez, Hale specifies that law refers properly to moral acts (9). Both Suárez and Hale, moreover, restrict the application of law to rational creatures capable of free acts, for the reason that such is necessary for moral government by command (13).

These similarities on their own may not suffice to prove definitively a distinctively Suárezian influence. After all, Puritans such as Ames similarly excluded the inclinations of irrational creatures connatural with it … yet are not Laws or Principles of Nature.” On Hale’s education see above.

108. Postema, “Classical Common Law Jurisprudence (Part II),” 25, suggests a parallel to Suárez but does not develop the point further.


110. Suárez, *De legibus*, 1.3.2–3 (Opera, 5:7–8).
from the proper definition of law. But when these continuities with Suárez are combined with the evidence produced below for continuity with Suárez on the foundations and content of the natural law, the case appears quite strong. We should also observe that despite strong continuities with Suárez, Hale does integrate some distinctive points from Selden with respect to the natural law and its publication, as Cromartie has rightly observed, and upon which we will touch below.

**Divine Foundation of Natural Law**

The reader who is already familiar with the older English treatises of Sir John Fortescue and Christopher St German will notice a striking difference in the opening chapters of Hale's *Law of Nature*. The term eternal law (*lex aeternae*) is nowhere to be found. Instead of the familiar Thomistic description of natural law as the “participation of the eternal law in a rational creature” found in the earlier authors, Hale’s typology of law begins with divine and human law, and then subdivides divine law into natural and positive law (35). There was some precedent for Hale’s typology of law. Of the lawyers, Henry Finch omitted eternal law and divided all laws into divine and human, although unlike Hale, Finch placed natural and positive law under human law. Of the theologians, William Ames in his popular *De conscientia et eius iure, vel casibus* closely approximated the typology of Hale. However, the most likely


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source for Hale’s typology of law is Selden, who set forth the same division and subdivision.\footnote{Selden, De jure naturali, 102.}

Despite first appearances, the difference between Hale and the older Thomistic description of natural law as rooted in eternal law should not be exaggerated. The best precedents for Hale’s typology did not intend any radical break with the notion of eternal law. Ames’ definition of natural law reads, “the natural law is the same as what is ordinarily called eternal law. But it is called eternal, insofar as it is in God himself from eternity, while [it is called] natural insofar as it is implanted and impressed in human nature by the author of nature.”\footnote{Ames, De conscientia, 5.1.6: “Jus naturale, vel lex naturalis est eadem quae dicitex solet lex aeterna. Sed aeterna dicitur, quatenus est in ipso Deo ab aeterno: naturalis autem [quatenus indita est, & impressa naturae hominum ab authore naturae.”}

With Selden, the relation to the Thomistic definition is explicit. He says, citing Alexander of Hales, Aquinas, and Suárez, that recent theologians “say that [the natural law] is the participation of the eternal law in a rational creature, and indeed divine.”\footnote{Selden, De jure naturali, 102: “Primum autem aiunt [*] esse participationem Legis aeternae in rationali creatura, adeoque divinum.” The marginal note at [*] reads: “Alexander Alensis part. 3, quaest. 26. art. 4. S. Thom. I. secundae q. 19 [= 91]. art. 2. Suarez. de legibus lib. I. cap. 3. & lib. 2. cap. 6. §. 13. &c.” Selden continues to cite a number of theologians (Luis de Molina, Alonso de Castro) and jurists (Fernando Vázquez de Menchaca, Joachim Mynsinger von Frundeck, et al.).}

If Selden is to be believed, divine law and eternal law could be taken synonymously.

More important than the terminology is the reality which the concept of eternal law pointed to, viz., the exemplary pattern and providence of God directing all natures to their specific ends, with the natural law being the participation of the rational creature in this pattern and governance.\footnote{Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II q. 91 a. 1–2; q. 93 a. 1; Suárez, De legibus, 1.3.6–8 (Opera, 5:8–9).}

It is not difficult to establish Hale’s conceptual continuity with these ideas. Hale’s agreement with the...
concept of natural law as a participation in God’s exemplary wisdom is clear from his description of the natural law as “little and finite transcripts of the perfect and infinite Exemplar” (110), “small Modeles” and “impressions and strictures of the Divine Exemplar” (108). Hale also places the natural law given to rational creatures within the overall context of God’s providence directing the “several Ends” of creatures “suitable to their kinds and Natures” (37). While Hale still retains the conception of natural law as rooted in God’s exemplary wisdom and part of God’s providence, he declines to call this eternal law.

Hale’s silence with respect to eternal law could be due to his position—shared with Suárez, Ames, Baxter, and others—that law is properly a moral rule that binds rational creatures, and can only be metaphorically applied to the inclinations of irrational creatures (10). Suárez had already objected that the use of eternal “law” as a designation for God’s providence is “highly metaphorical,” although he still retained the terminology on other grounds. Given Hale’s similar premises that limited the proper scope of law to rational creatures, his substitution of divine law for eternal law may have been his way of jettisoning terminology incompatible with his basic definition of law. In any event, Hale, unlike scholastics such as Suárez, preferred not to be bound by the forms of traditional terms and expressions, so long as the meaning remained clear (5).

While Hale is silent regarding eternal law, he does discuss another question in which he is clearly indebted to Suárez. Within the context of the formal reason (ratio formalis) of the natural law, Suárez had addressed a long-running scholastic debate on whether the


121. Cf. Suárez, De legibus, 2.1.5 (Opera, 5:86–87).
natural law is properly understood to be indicative \((\textit{lex indicativa})\) or prescriptive \((\textit{lex praeceptiva})\). According to Suárez, the former intellectualist view would entail that the natural law does not depend on God as legislator, whereas the latter voluntarist view would entail that acts are good simply because God wills them. Suárez took a \textit{via media} between these extremes by arguing that the natural law is both indicative and prescriptive.\textsuperscript{122} Now Hale follows Suárez’s solution quite closely in chapter 7 of \textit{Law of Nature}, even framing the chapter title in terms of the “Formall reason” of the natural law (111). Having altered the traditional terminology (from \textit{lex} to \textit{vis}), Hale writes that the natural law consists of two things: \textit{vis indicativa} as the “natural goodness & natural evill” of the natural law, and “\textit{vis praeceptiva}, or \textit{imperativa}, that gives this that we call the Law of Nature, the true formall reason of a Law, and there upon induceth an Obligation” (112–13). The \textit{vis indicativa} is the expression of God’s wisdom and power as found in human inclinations (or “propensions”) and the rational faculty whereby good and evil is discerned. The \textit{vis praeceptiva} “proceeds from the sovereign will of God as the Supream Rector and Legislator of Mankind” (113).\textsuperscript{123} Like Suárez, Hale also thinks that the \textit{vis praeceptiva} superadds obligation regarding things that are intrinsically good or evil (114).\textsuperscript{124} We have then, in chapter 7 of Hale’s \textit{Law of Nature}, a recapitulation of Suárez’s \textit{via media} between intellectualism and voluntarism, according to which the divine wisdom is the foundation for the intrinsic goodness of the natural law while the divine will is the foundation for the obligation of the natural law.

The picture that emerges from Hale’s various remarks on the divine foundations of the natural law is one that is neither entirely intellectualist nor entirely voluntarist. In its broad outlines it appears


close to Suárez’s attempt at a *via media* between those extremes. Although Hale omits the terminology of eternal law, he nevertheless finds the ultimate foundation of the content of natural law in God’s eternal exemplary wisdom and the proximate foundation in the inclinations and rational nature of humanity. This aspect of the natural law ensures an essentialist or realist foundation for the natural law. For Hale, God’s will gives to natural law its formal character as “law,” providing the additional binding force required to obligate rational creatures.

**Sources and Content of Natural Law**

The question of whether or to what extent seventeenth-century theories of natural law, beginning with Grotius, constitute an intellectual revolution and the inauguration of a “modern” natural law theory is an ongoing debate. Among the proponents of a distinctively “modern” idea of natural law, Richard Tuck has argued that beginning with Grotius the contents of the natural law became “minimalist,” or reduced to the principles of self-preservation and not doing harm to others.125 An alternative theory, as argued by Merio Scattola, locates an intellectual revolution not in Grotius but in Samuel Pufendorf (1632–1694) and Christian Thomasius (1655–1728), who are said to have constructed a novel moral epistemology independent of theology and set over against the perspective of the older scholasticism.126 My present concern is not with the


126. Merio Scattola, “Scientific Revolution in the Moral Sciences: The Controversy between Samuel Pufendorf and the Lutheran Theologians of the Late Seventeenth Century,” in *Controversies within the Scientific*
merits of these arguments, but rather as a point of comparison with Hale. For it can be easily shown that Hale’s view of the content of natural law is neither minimalist nor independent of theology nor anti-scholastic. Instead, Hale is directly critical of a minimalist approach to natural law and sets forth an account of the kinds of precepts of natural law that is nearly identical to that of Suárez.

In chapter 4, after briefly defining natural law as implanted common notions directing humanity to pursue good and avoid evil (41–42), Hale begins with a warning to the reader regarding two major errors in the approach to natural law taken by “moderne” philosophers. These are over-speculation and reductionism. Among recent philosophers, argues Hale, some have over-speculated on the particulars of natural law, thereby drawing conclusions about the natural law “not intended as the common Rule for all Mankind,” whereas others have minimized or “shrunk up” the natural law making self-preservation “the only Cardinall Law” from which the rest are deduced (42–43). While it is unclear which over-speculative

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philosophers he has in mind, the reduction of natural law to self-preservation and deductions thereof is certainly a reference to Hobbes.128 This was an entirely conventional reading of Hobbes’ natural-law theory.129

In the seventeenth century, there was no agreement on the method of determining which precepts belong to the natural law. One option, taken by the Calvinist jurist Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), was to collate principles from legal, philosophical, and theological sources in light of biblical law, particularly the Decalogue.130 Grotius summarized other options which did not entail a direct appeal to biblical revelation: one could proceed a priori by reasoning that conforms to reasonable nature itself, or a posteriori from effects by collecting the general opinions of “all nations, or such as are more civilized” (omnes gentes, aut moratores omnes tale).131 Grotius himself employed both of his proposed methods, and he was followed by Nathaniel Culverwell (1619–1651), who praised Grotius as a model for deriving natural law from the agreement of

131. Hugo Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis libri tres (Amsterdam: Joannes Blaeu, 1667), 1.1.12.
nations (*consensus gentium*). But the argument from common agreement also had its critics. Hobbes, Pufendorf, John Locke, and many others into the eighteenth century rejected this approach. Selden, whose position on this question is unique and has been characterized as “diametrically opposed to the Dutchman [Grotius],” rejected the derivation of natural law from either reason alone or the more civilized nations as unreliable guides, favoring in their place the Jewish tradition.

In light of the consistent portrayal in the secondary literature of Hale as “Seldenian” it may come as some surprise that on such a foundational matter as determining the common notions of natural law Hale gently sets aside the method of his friend (55–56). In fact, Hale’s view of the matter is close to that of Grotius, and is best seen as an adaptation of the position of the Dutchman. Hale argues, using the same term as Grotius, that the opinions of the more civilized nations (*gentes moratiores*), when taken together with other means, provide a guide to the most general notions of natural law (47–49). While no one means is sufficient by itself, the concurrence of *gentes moratiores*, the wisest philosophers, the “unpassionate” judgment of one’s own reason and conscience, and


135. Contra Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories*, 163: “[Hale] proceeded to outline the source of the natural laws in very Seldenian terms: they were not naturally intuited, but had been made known historically to mankind, first through the seven *praeccepta Noachidarum* and then through the Decalogue.” Hale’s view is exactly opposite: the natural law is naturally intuited.
the agreement or suitability with human nature together allow for an induction of common notions (47). To put this another way, Hale argues that the most general concepts of natural law ought to (1) agree with the essence of humanity, (2) meet the internal approval of a sound mind, and (3) meet with external approval by the wisest people, whether individuals or nations, spread across time and space. Although this method of concurrence among several sources is reminiscent of the method of concordance advocated by the Calvinist jurist Althusius, it differs in that Hale declines to give biblical revelation special priority in the determination of common notions. The reason for this difference is not a radically secular mindset on Hale’s part (he agrees that Scripture provides easier and clearer access to natural law; 63),

but a methodological problem: Scripture is not as broadly communicated to humanity and Scripture itself does not provide a rule by which to distinguish natural from positive laws contained therein (45–46).

As far as the enumeration of the “heads of the natural law” (Capita Legis Naturalis) is concerned (38), Hale follows a path already tread by Suárez. In his De legibus, Suárez helpfully summarized four possible ways of distinguishing natural law precepts into various “heads” (capita). First, they can be distinguished objectively with respect to the beings to whom they are ordered (God, neighbor, and self). Second, they can be distinguished by virtues (justice, charity, natural love, etc.). Third, they can be distinguished by their order to the intellect according to whether they are more or less well known. Fourth, they can be distinguished according to human inclinations. Suárez ascribes the third and fourth ways to Thomas Aquinas and Thomas de Vio (Cajetan).

For his part, although Hale assumes that natural law can be described as virtues or inclinations (ways two and four), he organizes the capita of the natural law in only two main ways: the epistemic order of the intellect (63–69) and the objective order of beings (69–106). By his own account, Hale omits discussion of various virtues such as charity and distributive

137. Suárez, De legibus, 2.8.3–4 (Opera, 5:116–17).
and commutative justice (106). He does, however, discuss human inclinations both in relation to the formation of society (97–99) and more at length in the publication of the natural law (144–63).

Hale’s account of natural law principles distinguished by their relation to the intellect is nearly identical to that of Suárez. Aquinas, assuming an Aristotelian epistemology that moves from general to particular knowledge, had distinguished between primary principles of practical reason and their proximate conclusions as secondary principles. Suárez expanded on this view by distinguishing three kinds (triplici genere) of precepts. The first two kinds were primary principles. He divided the primary principles into the most general principles (prima principia generalia; e.g., do good and avoid evil) and the more determinate and particular principles (principia magis determinata et particularia; e.g., one must live temperately), the latter being known in themselves (per se nota ex terminis). The third kind of precepts were comprised of conclusions, whether more easily known by many or known with difficulty and reflection by few. Hale describes this same division of principles and conclusions but employs some different terms and examples, and distinguishes the precepts into four kinds (now with two distinct types of conclusions). For Hale, the first type of natural law consists of principles “most universall” or “most remote from any particular determination.” The second type consists of “much more restrictive” principles which have “self evidence in them” and are immediately assented to “without Argumentation.” As with Suárez’s description of conclusions, Hale’s third and fourth types consist respectively of easily deducible conclusions or more remote and “not easily elicited” conclusions (63–67).

With the remaining part of chapter 5, Hale provides a description of the capita of the natural law as they relate to God, self, and


139. Suárez, De legibus, 2.7.5 (Opera, 5:113). This division of conclusions into more or less easily known is similar to Aquinas, Summa theologiae, I-II q. 100 a. 1. Cf. Armstrong, Primary and Secondary Precepts, 99–107.
others. By Hale’s own account, this is not an exhaustive account, but his own approximation of the principles and most immediate conclusions of natural law. Accordingly, he eschews consideration of those “secondary or deducible Laws of Nature” which English lawyers typically identified with the “maxims” of common law (68). 140 Within this exposition Hale includes a comparatively large account of the natural law as it relates to the foundations of civil government, whether antecedent, preparatory, or following its institution (85–106). In this account, Hale incorporates a traditionally Aristotelian view of political society as originating from the sociable nature of humanity (95, 99) and attacks Hobbes’ “Imaginary state of warr” (86). Human government, in Hale’s estimation, also derives its obligation from an antecedent natural law of keeping promises (87). This notion can be found in Grotius but Hale’s particular expression of it, “faith must be kept” (fides est servanda), is identical to that found in Selden. 141

A notable aspect of Hale’s account of natural law is his lengthy account of property rights within a framework of natural rights (89–96). The early modern idea of subjective natural rights is now recognized not as of uniquely modern origin, but as having both deep roots in medieval canon law (ca. 1150–1250) and a strong reception among Protestants. 142 Brian Tierney has argued for the centrality of two ideas stemming from medieval natural rights discourse. “These were,” he claims, “the idea of a permissive natural law and the idea of self-dominion.” Permissive natural law refers to that which is permitted but not commanded by natural law, whereas self-dominion refers to the mastery and self-ownership (under God)

140. Cf. Cromartie, Hale, 38–39; and comments in our text at p. 68.
141. Grotius, De jure belli, Prol. 15, 2.11.1–5; Selden, De jure naturali, 107; Selden, Table Talk, 70, 100; Selden, Mare clausum seu de dominio maris (London: R. Meighen, 1635), 16. Cf. Cromartie, Hale, 91–92.
that one has over one’s own actions and things as a consequence of free choice.143 Together, these concepts of permissive natural law and self-dominion carve out a significant area for human freedom within a larger framework of natural law precepts. Hale clearly agrees with these concepts. He asserts that besides the precepts of the natural law, “there is that which they call Lex permissiva [permissive law]” which refers to things indifferent or undetermined by the natural law (192, 25). He also asserts a dominion rooted in free choice but under the greater dominion (sub graviore regno) of God (14). By this dominion, which is antecedent to positive law, one is said to have a property in oneself, and consequently may give oneself to another by contract (marriage and slavery) and protect oneself from injury (88).144 This dominion also forms the basis for property rights (89).

Due to the assumption that property was originally the common right of all, the question of the institution of private property became a commonly discussed problem in the medieval era. One answer provided by canon lawyers was that private property is a matter belonging to the natural law not by command or prohibition, but rather by permission.145 To this explanation some canonists added the argument of first possession: since the act of acquiring property is not injurious to others and things had no owner, individuals ought to be permitted personal use of property. The institution of private property itself is a matter permitted by natural law, but upon its institution by human agreement it is protected by natural


144. Cf. Tierney, “Dominion of Self,” 192, who reads Hale as similar to Suárez.

law. We find this line of argument appropriated by Suárez.\textsuperscript{146} This is also the general argument of Hale. Like Suárez, Hale agrees that while “most of the methods of acquisition of property seems to be by institution,” there is also a right of “first possession” which is “superadded somewhat by his industry” to that “primitive right in common.” A key reason shared with Suárez for this first acquisition is that “no Man hath a right totally to exclude another” from what is common to all (89–90).\textsuperscript{147} Accordingly, Hale’s argument for first acquisition ought not be read only as a reaction to Hobbes’ merely contractual basis for property, but also as an adaptation of an older tradition of thought.\textsuperscript{148} Yet within this shared framework of thought, Hale differs quite radically from the earlier medieval tradition on the specific question of the case of extreme necessity. It was a commonplace of medieval theology and canon law, and subsequently of early modern rights discourse, that in case of extreme necessity someone may rightly take from another since in such a time all things become common.\textsuperscript{149} Hale disagreed. He objected that the principle of extreme necessity could be easily abused and opened up private property to a “strange insecurity.” Hale argued instead that the civil magistrate provides sufficiently for necessi-

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\textsuperscript{148} Cromartie, \textit{Hale}, 93–94; Tuck, \textit{Natural Rights Theories}, 164–65. Like Tuck, Cromartie rightly views Hale as going to an opposite “extreme” from Selden and Hobbes, but omits the traditional pedigree of Hale’s position.

\end{flushright}
ties through poor relief.\textsuperscript{150} In so doing, Hale shifted the relief for extreme necessity from the realm of natural to positive law. This strong defense of property rights was, as Cromartie comments, an “unusual legal theory.”\textsuperscript{151}

\section*{Publication of Natural Law}

For Hale, the publication or communication of the natural law is principally twofold. First, God publishes the natural law in human nature. Second, God republishes the natural law in special revelation communicated in various ages from Adam to Christ. There is nothing original about this general framework. In fact, with the exception of Hale’s description of the agent intellect in chapter 8, there is little substantive difference between his mature account of the publication of the natural law and that of his early Puritan treatise \textit{Discourse of the Knowledge of God, and of our Selves}. In comparison with the \textit{Discourse}, Hale’s \textit{Law of Nature} provides a more detailed account of the publication of the natural law first in the heart and then in special revelation, but grafts onto this account Selden’s distinctive theory of the enlightening work of God’s active intellect (\textit{intellectus agens}).

Hale identifies four means of publication to human nature: (1) God’s irradiation through \textit{intellectus agens}, (2) implanted common notions and inclinations, (3) the exercise of reason, and (4) conscience (122). The first of these, irradiation through \textit{intellectus agens}, is certainly a Seldenian influence. Hale, following Selden, argues for a common illuminating principle, \textit{intellectus agens}, which supplies all human minds with eternal truths or first speculative and practical principles (126). He also steers clear of the heterodoxy of Averroism which would replace individual intellects with a created universal \textit{intellectus agens}. Instead, he identifies \textit{intellectus agens} with the uncreated divine intellectual light in a way that would

\begin{footnotes}{\footnotesize
\end{footnotes}
harmonize with a biblical description of God’s enlightening agency (126–30, 136–38).\textsuperscript{152}

According to Hale, the natural law is manifested in human nature through both implanted common notions and inclinations. He uses a variety of synonyms to describe these notions and inclinations. Common notions he calls “imprinted Characters,” “connaturall implanted principles,” “impressed noticies,” “common notices,” and “congenite & ingrafted Principles.” Inclinations he calls “tendencys,” “propensions,” “instincts,” and “by’ass[es]” (144–70).\textsuperscript{153} These notions and inclinations are distinct from one another and analogous to the instincts of animals, but they are also “weak and confused” at first and thus can be either improved by exercise or corrupted by sensual appetite, idleness, bad customs, and bad education (146). Following the conventional Protestant exegesis of Romans 2:14–15, Hale identifies common notions both with the law written on the heart and Stoic preconceptions (41–42, 150–51).\textsuperscript{154} He describes inclinations in a manner similar to Aquinas and Protestant scholastics as teleological tendencies to “proper Ends” antecedent to the “actuall exercise of the ratiocination or will” (158).\textsuperscript{155}

Reason and conscience participate in the publication of the natural law by drawing out the consequences and applying these

\textsuperscript{152} Cromartie, \textit{Hale}, 91, 168–70.
common notions and inclinations to particular circumstances. By “reason” Hale means discursive exercise of the rational faculty which organizes, compares, and improves on speculative and practical principles about good and evil (165–71). In his _Law of Nature_, Hale describes “conscience” as that which persuades a person of the divine obligation of the natural law and applies the natural law to particular circumstances. This application takes place by means of a syllogism, wherein right reason supplies the major premise of the general rule and conscience provides the minor premise of a particular circumstance and then draws a conclusion either of absolution or condemnation (171–72). In this description of conscience, Hale maintains strong continuity with Reformed scholasticism, which typically described the conscience as the application of a practical syllogism. Although it is unclear from _Law of Nature_ whether Hale viewed conscience precisely as a faculty, habit, or act of the soul (a point of scholastic debate), elsewhere he clearly placed conscience under the nature of the soul’s acts (as distinct from faculties and habits). This view of conscience as an act was recognized by Hale’s contemporaries as both distinctively Thomistic and the “most common opinion” of Reformed theologians. It is therefore

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158. Robert Sanderson, _Bishop Sanderson’s Lectures on Conscience and Human Law_, trans. Christopher Wordsworth (Lincoln: James Williamson, 1877), 14: “Aquinas … resolves it to be an Act, whose opinion is received
probable that, despite a passing reference to “faculty of Conscience” (171), Hale’s description of the “actings” of the conscience in *Law of Nature* (119, 166) reflects this “most common” Thomistic and Reformed position that he expresses in his other writings.

**Salvation of Virtuous Pagans**

Although in other respects Hale maintains much continuity with his Reformed Protestant youth, when he comes to discuss the end of the natural law in chapter 13 he clearly favors a position closer to his Arminian or Latitudinarian contemporaries. During the 1640s and 1650s a number of theologians, called by their contemporaries Latitudinarians (and by modern scholars Cambridge Platonists), challenged the then-dominant Augustinian theology, embodied in Protestant confessions including the Thirty-Nine Articles, which denied salvation apart from special grace and revealed knowledge of Christ.159 By the Restoration the Latitudinarians had gained a reputation for inclining toward Arminianism and being specifically favorable to the salvation of virtuous pagans. Baxter described the Latitudinarians as “many of them Arminians with some Additions, having more charitable Thoughts than others of the Salvation of Heathens and Infidels.”160 John Humfrey (1621–1719) also identified

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the salvation of pagans with later Arminian theology: “I remember Arminius in some place of his works, does expressly exclude all Heathens from salvation; though many that have tread in his steps otherwise, have been more kind to the Nations.” Hale was friendly with a number of theologians who inclined toward Arminian theology, including Isaac Barrow (1630–1677) and the Latitudinarians John Tillotson (1630–1694) and Edward Stillingfleet (1635–1699). Selden also inclined in this direction and affirmed the salvation of virtuous pagans. It is possible that Hale, who cited Selden’s opinion on the matter favorably (216), came to accept a more Arminian perspective through the influence of such friendships.

In his final chapter, Hale boils the controversy over the salvation of pagans down to the question of whether those without an “explicit knowledge of Christ” can be saved by means of following the natural law. He argues that it is “more than probable” that this is true (204). Among the numerous arguments Hale provides in support of his position, at least two point to an Arminian repudiation of the Reformed position. First, Hale appeals to the principle “to the one who does as much as is in oneself grace is not denied” (agenti quantum in se est non denegatur gratia) as a basis for concluding that God will be merciful to those who follow the natural law (210). This expression is nearly identical to the so-called late-medieval facientibus principle so strenuously rejected by the sixteenth-century


Protestants, but later revived by Arminius.\textsuperscript{164} Second, Hale rejects the view that pagan virtues are “splendid sins” (\textit{splendida peccata}) as “uncharitable” and “unsound” since that position would negate any possibility of reward to those who seek to do good (214). In so doing, Hale repudiates an identifiable early modern Augustinian opinion affirmed not only by traditional Calvinists such as Anthony Tuckney (1599–1670) and Francis Turretin (1623–1687), but also, on the Roman Catholic side, by Michael Baius (1513–1589) and the Jansenists. While affirming the objective goodness of virtue inasmuch as it conformed with the demands of the moral law, such theologians nonetheless contended that virtues lacking faith were formally sinful before God on account of proceeding from a sinful heart and intention in a fallen state of sin.\textsuperscript{165}

The cumulative weight of Hale’s arguments for the salvation of pagans points toward an understanding of grace which is universally available and identified in the first place not with the special work of the Holy Spirit, but rather with the general working of God’s \textit{intellectus agens} giving light to all humanity (205).\textsuperscript{166} Such a view contrasts sharply not only with Hale’s youth, but also with those more moderate Reformed theologians who held out hope for the salvation of pagans. For the latter appealed not to a general grace,
but rather to the possibility of God’s extraordinary mercy within a framework of special grace and the means of faith. Granting this discontinuity, the innovative character of Hale’s position ought not to be exaggerated as an anticipation of universalism. For despite opening the door of salvation to the most virtuous pagans, Hale still believes that the means available to reason alone pales in comparison to the ease and clarity of the gospel. The “light of Nature,” concludes Hale, “are like the *Tabulae post naufragium* [planks after a shipwreck] which may bring men to the Shore, thô not without great difficulty and hazard, but the light and means of the Gospel is like the passage in a safe & strong ship which is better fitted to chide Storms and dangers of the Sea” (217–18).

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Textual Introduction

David S. Sytsma

The Manuscripts*

In Gilbert Burnet’s early list of Hale manuscripts (printed 1681), there is a record of a work, “Of the Law of Nature, Fol.” The autograph is unfortunately no longer extant, but three copies, including a seventeenth-century copy of the autograph, survive. Burnet’s list of titles matches closely the titles of extant manuscripts written in Hale’s own hand, so the original title of the autograph was presumably “Of the Law of Nature.”

Hale had drafted three pages of notes for a “treatise on natural law” (De lege naturali tractatus) in the autumn of 1668, and these notes are without doubt an initial outline of Hale’s “Of the Law of Nature.” Therefore the treatise itself was likely composed sometime

* I am grateful to Zoe Stansell and the staff of the manuscript collections at the British Library for their assistance regarding these manuscripts and their digital reproduction.


3. Sir Matthew Hale, “Notes on circuitus autumnalis” [1668], fols. 15r–16r, the James Marshall and Marie-Louise Osborn Collection, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven, CT. The top of fol. 15r reads “De lege naturali tractatus”. There are two pages of notes under the heading “de lege in genere” which reflect details of the content.
late 1668 or shortly thereafter.\textsuperscript{4} Internal evidence is consistent with this date of composition. Around 1664 Hale seems to have favored traducianism with respect to the origin of the soul, but by 1672 he certainly held the position of creationism,\textsuperscript{5} and this latter creationist doctrine is favored in the present treatise (143). Between ca. 1664 and 1673 Hale composed a number of works which discuss the nature of the animal soul,\textsuperscript{6} and in the present treatise he refers to his previous detailed description of animal instincts, “which I have elsewhere done” (156). At least from 1671 Hale began incorporating Helmontian philosophical terminology in his description of the soul,\textsuperscript{7} but this terminology is absent from the present treatise, which seems to preclude a date of composition ca. 1671–1676. With these observations, we can suggest a date of composition ca. 1668–1670.

The three witnesses to Hale’s “Of the Law of Nature” are housed at the British Library, London: 

of chapter 1 of the finished treatise (fols. 15v–16r). On the last page under the heading “de lege naturali” is the outline “1 Quid sit lex naturalis / 2 An sit aliqua talis lex / 3 De causis huius legis” and under this some notes regarding the efficient, final, formal, and material causes of natural law (fol. 16r). The material cause includes subpoints “in habitudine ad / deum / alium / seipsum” (in relation to God, others, oneself), which correspond to the “three relations, habitudes or ranks” of natural law in chapter 5 of the finished treatise (B1, 72v). For a partial transcription of this MS, lacking the last pages, see Maija Jansson, “Matthew Hale on Judges and Judging,” \textit{Journal of Legal History} 9, no. 2 (1988): 201–13. I am grateful to June Can of the Beinecke Library for help with this MS.


\textsuperscript{5} See Cromartie, \textit{Hale}, 225–29, who shows that creationism is present in Hale’s 1672 treatise “De generatione vegetabilium et animalium” (Lambeth MS 3504). Creationism is also present in Hale’s \textit{Primitive}, 352, which was composed at intervals between the late 1660s and his death (Cromartie, \textit{Hale}, 198).

\textsuperscript{6} Cromartie, \textit{Hale}, 218n3, 226n51.

\textsuperscript{7} See Cromartie, \textit{Hale}, 206–9, 223; and Sir Matthew Hale, Preface to \textit{Observations touching the Principles of Natural Motions} (London: W. Godbid for W. Shrowsbury, 1677), 8–15. Key Helmontian terms include \textit{virtus activa, vis activa, virtutes essentiales, vires essentiales}, and ferments.

\textit{lviii}
1. Add. MS 18235, fols. 41–147 (B1). This is a copy of the autograph and the copy-text for the present transcription. It is written in an exceptionally legible hand. The title page reads: “Some Chapters touching the Law of Nature. By the late Lord Cheif Justice Hale and copied From his owne Writing Lent to Sr Robt Southwell by his Grand Son Mathew Hale of Lincolns-Inn Esq 1693” (B1, 41r).

2. Harley MS 7159, fols. 1–266 (B2). This is a copy made from B1 in 1696. The title page reads: “Some Chapters touching the Law of Nature By the late Lord Cheif Justice Hale and copied from his own Writing. Lent to Sr Robert Southwell by his Grand Son Mathew Hale of Lincolns-Inn Esq 1693 And copied from the same Aug: 19. 1696.” (B2, 1r).

3. Hargrave MS 485 (B3). This copy is derivative of B1 and B2 and is written in a late-eighteenth century hand. The title page reads: “Treatise of the Nature of Lawes in Generall and touching the Law of nature. By Sir Mathew Hale” (B3, 1r).

Although scholars have long known of all three copies, little attention has been given to the question of their relationship. Alan Cromartie included B3 in his select bibliography of “most authoritative” copies of Hale manuscripts and as a result most subsequent


scholars have drawn on this copy. But this judgment is mistaken. Whereas the orthography of B1 and B2 is consistent with a late-seventeenth century dating, the orthography of B3 certainly post-dates 1760. By comparison with B1 and B2, the hand of B3 uses initial capitals sparsely; B3 rarely uses capitals for words other than proper nouns and the first letter of the sentence. As N.E. Osselton has demonstrated with respect to printed material, the early modern English practice of capitalizing the initial letter of common nouns steadily rose until it reached its zenith around 1750 (resembling modern German), when around 1760 there was a precipitous drop in this practice and by 1795 it was no longer in vogue. In addition, eighteenth-century handwriting lagged behind the fashion of the printers, as is illustrated by the persistence of initial capitals in the manuscript of the Declaration of Independence (1776) but a sharp decline of initial capitals in the U.S. Bill of Rights (1789). If we allow for such a delay in the change of handwriting style, B3 should probably be dated sometime in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Indeed, the practice of capitalization in B3 is closer to the Bill of Rights than the Declaration. We should also observe that by the mid-1780s Francis Hargrave was hard at work collecting and editing Hale’s manuscripts for publication, so that, granting a late-eighteenth century date for B3, we can conjecture that Hargrave was involved in the production of this copy as part


of his ultimately unsuccessful plan to publish a “complete edition” of Hale’s legal manuscripts.\textsuperscript{16}

While \(B_2\) is obviously a copy of \(B_1\), the relation of \(B_3\) to \(B_1\) and \(B_2\) requires further comment. \(B_3\) is an eclectic edition based on both \(B_1\) and \(B_2\). \(B_3\)’s reliance on \(B_1\) is clear from \(B_3\)’s paragraph breaks, which closely follow \(B_1\). It is impossible that \(B_3\) could have followed \(B_2\) in this regard, since \(B_2\)’s frequent paragraph breaks bear little resemblance to \(B_1\). \(B_3\) also follows word sequences unique to either \(B_1\) or \(B_2\), and in some cases supplies an omission in one manuscript with the help of the other. Consider the following passages from \(B_1\).

Passage 1:

\begin{quote}
… there are certaine rights of Natural Law and Justice instituted by almighty God and obliging every Person of Mankind: 
For I do suppose it unquestionable that the originall Domin-
ion and propriety of all things is in Almighty God: And that he hath given … (\(B_1\), 83v)
\end{quote}

Passage 2:

\begin{quote}
… as after the institution of Civil Government neither hath the institution of Civil Government or any Laws induced … (\(B_1\), 87v)
\end{quote}

In Passage 1, \(B_2\) (109r) omits the underlined portion, but \(B_3\) (37r) includes both the same words and paragraph break. In Passage 2, \(B_2\) (118r) omits the underlined portion, but in \(B_3\) (40r) this underlined portion appears as an interlinear insertion. Whereas Passage 1 illustrates \(B_3\)’s dependence on \(B_1\) at one point, Passage 2 illustrates \(B_3\)’s initial dependence on \(B_2\), with a subsequent emendation in light of \(B_1\). Thus \(B_3\) draws on both \(B_1\) and \(B_2\) at different points, but apparently without privileging either as the preferred copy-text.

The choice of B1 as the copy-text is straightforward. It is a complete and, presumably from the title page, a direct copy of the autograph. By contrast, both B2 and B3 contain numerous corruptions, which in B3 sometimes result in a meaning far removed from B1. For example, the word “profection” in B1 (52r) becomes “perfection” in B2 (27v) and then in B3 (10v) is copied as “protection” which in turn has a strike-through and is replaced with the interlinear insertion “promanation.” Like B2, B3 on occasion also makes substantive omissions. For example, the two lines from B1, “And certain Structures and Delineations of that Divine Exemplar drawn by the finger of God, upon the human Nature” (94v), are found in B2 (135v) but omitted (by homeoarchy) from B3 (46r). There is, however, a significant deficiency in B1 in its present form: the pages of B1 have been physically trimmed resulting in some loss of text on the outside margin for many folios.17 In nearly all cases the loss is minimal, resulting in occasional loss of one or two missing letters or the occasional punctuation mark. On one page, however, B1 (50r) includes multiple lines of inserted text in the margin which are now only partially visible. Thankfully, B2 had access to the original untrimmed version of B1, so such lost text can be restored from B2. Since in most cases the loss of a letter or two in the margin of B1 is easily recoverable from the context and a collation with B2 and B3, I have judged that it is unnecessary to note these cases in the apparatus, and therefore I have in most cases silently supplied such missing letters.

In preparation of this transcription, I have used digital reproductions. The copy-text B1 is based on 300 dpi grayscale images taken directly of the original (not from existing microfilm) and provided by the British Library. The images are of sufficiently high quality that even faint hairline commas are visible upon close inspection.

17. B1, fols. 67r–69r, 71r, 73r, 74r, 75r, 76r, 77r, 78r, 80v, 82r, 83r–88r, 90r, 92v–93r, 94r–96r, 97r, 98r–v, 99v–100v, 101v, 106r, 109r, 110r–v, 112v–113r, 115r, 121r–125r, 128r–130r, 131r, 138r, 139r, 140r, 141r, 142r, 145r–v.
Editorial Principles and Practices

In editing a manuscript significant to intellectual historians, I have sought to follow the general advice of Peter Nidditch and Michael Hunter, who through experience with their readership independently arrived at the conclusion that a compromise between palaeographical fidelity (reproducing as exactly as possible the original) and readability is most beneficial for the reader. Accordingly, I have aimed to reproduce the original spelling and punctuation as closely as possible while noting deletions, insertions, and emendations in the textual apparatus. Nearly all the insertions in B1, as evidenced by their later inclusion in B2, are prior to B2. Since these insertions were made at a time when the scribe of B1 presumably had access to the autograph, they carry the presumption of continuity with the autograph. I have therefore incorporated the insertions from B1 into the body of the text while noting their status as insertions in the apparatus.

Since B1 is the closest witness to the autograph, I have sought to produce an edition based on B1 as the copy-text with minimal emendation after consulting B2 and B3. In most cases the copy-text is emended with respect to accidentals involving the addition of punctuation marks and the correction of words misspelled by the standards of the seventeenth century. In some cases I have made substantive emendations to words which I determined to be clearly erroneous based on parallel usage or context found in B1. For all emendations my first recourse has been to an option provided by B2 or B3. I have found B3 the most helpful in resolving problems in the copy-text. For example, in one place B1 states that the state of war “is connatural to the State of Nature but accidentall a Disease & disorder” (86v). The passage is obviously meant to contrast “is

connatural” with “but accidentall a Disease & disorder,” but this can only make sense if Hale is denying that war is “connatural” to the state of nature. Accordingly, I have followed B3 (39v) in emending the text to read “is not connatural.”

Contractions, abbreviations, and ligatures have been silently modernized and expanded. The thorn (y), long “s,” “fs” (= ss), “ff” (= F), “ij” (= ii), u/v, i/j, y/ÿ, have all been modernized, and the ligatures æ and œ rendered as “ae” and “oe.” For example, “yכ,” “wכh,” “governmכnt,” and “comon” appear as “the,” “which,” “government,” and “common.” I have retained the use of “&” (= and) and “&c.” (= etc.). Italics have been added for Latin words and biblical citations. Punctuation is original unless otherwise noted in the apparatus, with one exception: the use of periods for numerical lists in B1 is inconsistent, so I have normalized such lists with silently added periods for the sake of consistency and readability.

I have also attempted to retain original capitalization since capitals were used to indicate emphasis or especially remarkable words in the seventeenth century.19 However, the hand of B1 uses large or uppercase forms for some letters indiscriminately (notably letters a, c, e, n, o, and s), which makes the intended capital difficult to distinguish from the intended lowercase letter. In such uncertain cases, although the choice of capitalization is admittedly subjective, I have tried to approximate contemporary late seventeenth-century usage. We know that authors of this period typically reserved the initial capital for specific or concrete substantive nouns and occasional adjectives, whereas adverbs, adjectives, prepositions, articles, and nouns of greater generality (e.g., “thing,” “view”) typically appeared without the initial capital.20 I have also tried to approximate usage by example through keyword searches of Hale’s Primitive Origenation of Mankind (1677) and other digitized works in the public domain (ca. 1670–1700).

Editorial brackets are used principally for Latin translations and clear biblical allusions or citations. Latin phrases are translated with

the exception of technical terms still commonly used in modern English (e.g., *de facto*) or those which are clear from the explanation provided by Hale in the text. In exceptional cases involving the addition of a phrase or sentence, the additional text is supplied in editorial brackets with an explanation in the apparatus. In order to facilitate the identification of material in longer chapters, I have taken the liberty of including in brackets subsection titles that are clearly intended by the organization of the text. All other comments relating to content are provided in notes separate from the textual apparatus.

**The Apparatus**

Substantive differences between the witnesses are noted in the apparatus, so in the absence of any references to *B2* or *B3* the reader should assume substantive agreement between the variants (with the exception of accidental differences in spelling and punctuation). The following symbols are used for the apparatus:

- `<text>` Insertion in source text
- `text` Deletion in source text
- `italic` Foreign words; biblical citations
- `text[?]` Partially illegible word
- `[ ? ]` One totally illegible word
- `[ ? ? ]` Multiple illegible words (? = one word)
- `[?text]` Editorial conjecture
- `[text]` Editorial insertion
- `lemma` Textual note
- `em.` Editorial emendation of *B1*
- `om.` Omitted text in *B2* or *B3*
- `|` Separation of annotations
- `/` End of line
- `/fol. 41r/` Page breaks following folio numbers for *B1*

All emendations are noted in the textual apparatus by “*em.***” In cases of substantive emendation the apparatus supplies all three variants for comparison, while for corrections involving accidentals
(e.g., spelling, punctuation marks) I have typically noted only the
original text from B1 in the apparatus. The typical format for a tex-
tual note is “lemma]” followed by a comparison of variants. Here
are some examples taken from the text which illustrate this format:

profection] perfection B2 | protection ‹promanation› B3

Here where the word “profection” is found in the text, the copy-text
B1 has “profection”; B2 has “perfection”; and B3 has “protection”
with a strike-through and in its place the insertion “promanation.”


Here the words “and Earth.” in the text have been emended from
“and Eearth.” in the copy-text B1. The variant B2 has “and Earth.”
but both words are omitted in B3.

of civil government› B3

Here the words in the text running from “neither” to “Govern-
ment” are found in B1 but are omitted in B2. The phrase “Neither
hath the institution of civil government” is inserted at this place
in B3.

abridged] a[?]ged ‹abridged›

Here a partially illegible word “a[?]ged” with a strike-through has
been replaced with the interlinear insertion “abridged” in the copy-
text B1. The absence of B2 and B3 indicates substantive agreement
with B1, so both B2 and B3 also have the word “abridged,” although
altered spelling, if present, would not be noted.

21. For the format of the apparatus I am indebted to the examples in
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter Nidditch
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); and Rhodri Lewis, William Petty on the
Order of Nature: An Unpublished Manuscript Treatise (Tempe, AZ: Arizona
Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2012).
Of the

Law of Nature
SOME CHAPTERS TOUCHING THE LAW OF NATURE.

By the late Lord Chief Justice Hale
and copied From his owne Writing
Lent to Sir Robert Southwell
by his Grand Son Mathew Hale
of Lincolns-Inn Esquire 1693
Chapter 1

TOUCHING THE NATURE OF LAW IN GENERALL

Being now about to write some what concerning the Law of Nature, it may be convenient to premise some what concerning Law in generall wherein as also in the subsequent Discourses I shall neither bind my self to the Sentiments of other Men that have written touching this Subject, nor to those forms of expressions that others have used, nor to their method or order of Writing. But shall follow my own thoughts and conceptions and render them under such termes and expressions as I shall think sufficient to give an Account of my thoughts, and render them legible and Intelligible though perchance not in the Phrases or the appropriate words of the Philosophers, School-Men Divines, or Philologers; And since words and Phrases are but a sort of Institutions chosen or agreed upon to signify things or Notions, I shall take the Liberty to be
Master of my Words and use such as I think fitt and sufficient to be the Image of my thoughts, without being solicitous of Useing those Modes, or obliging my self to the strict Rules or artificiall Termes now or formerly in fashion among many Learned Men;

A Law therefore I take to be a Rule of Morall Actions given to a being endued with understanding and will; by him that hath power or authority to give the same, and to exact obedience thereunto, per modum imperii [by way of authority], commanding or forbidding such actions under some penalty express’d or implicitly contain’d in such Law;

I have chosen this Long Discription of law because it takes in most of the several Ingredients necessary to be consider’d in the Notion of a Law.

[ I. Law is a Rule ]

First I call it a Rule; this is the generall terme, under which I describe a Law: but yet singly in it selfe it is too large and comprehensive and extends to such Rules as are not properly Laws, and therefore I have subjoin’d those restrictive differences that confine the Generallity of it, to the formall or proper Notion of a Law;

Almost in all kind of Naturall and Artificiall Actions there are certaine prescript Rules, which are but directions to attaine certain Ends propos’d to those Actions which yet are not properly & strictly Laws; the Grammarian hath his Rules of Words, and their

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1. Cf. Hale’s early description of law in relation to obligation:

   In respect of Obligation; for there can be nothing imaginably Unjust, without these two considerations, viz.

   1. A law commanding or forbidding a thing under a pain: whatsoever falls not within the command or Prohibition is permitted, and cannot be unjust.

   2. A power to exact an Obedience to that Law, and to inflict the punishment that follows upon the breach of this Law. Otherwise the Law were ridiculous and vain. (Discourse, 22–23)
Composition into Sentences; the Rhetorician hath his Rules of Expression, perswation and gesture; the Logician hath his Rules, for Argumentation; the Physician hath his Rules for administering Physick and prescribing Diet and the Patient in order to the attaining of his health is under the Direction of those Rules, nay every Mechanicall Art or Operation hath its Rules whereby the Artifice is to be effected and without the due observance of those Rules none of these can well attain their Ends: But yet these come not under the strict Denomination of Laws, thô in respect of their Analogy there unto they are often so call’d; The Physician prescribes a Rule of Diet to his sick Patient, and tells him that if he observe it not, his sickness will increase, and probably become Mortall; And the Patient obediently observes this direction, and the Opinion he hath of the skill & fidelity of his Physician, the Love and desire of health, the incommodity and painfulness of Sicknes, and the fear of Death are strong & forcible and powerfull Motives of his Observance; but all this while the prescription of the Physician is not his Law, for it is a rule indeed, but not iuncta cum imperio [conjoined with authority], he will dye perchance, if he observe it not but the Physician hath no authority to exact his observance under any Penalty to be inflicted by him, or by his Authority but only to withdraw himself, and leave his unruely Patient to taste and undergo the fruit and inconvenience of his own wilfullness;

And upon this account if Atheisticall Persons could as they would exterminate the great God of Heaven from having to do in this World; That which they call Reason, & the Law of Reason

would be indeed a Rule but not truely & Formally a Law;\textsuperscript{3} For let us supose any one\textsuperscript{a} Man to be of the most exquisite Reason That human Nature is\textsuperscript{b} capable of, and\textsuperscript{b} hath that Reason chalked out to him the just End\textsuperscript{c} and exquisite Measure and Order of all his Morall Actions in order there unto yet this Rule of Reason would not be a Law to him,\textsuperscript{d} \textit{per modum imperii et sub ratione legis} [by way of authority and under the aspect of law]; for he could bee under no obligation to observe this Rule of Reason, but only to himself; and therefore may absolve himself by the Liberty of his will, from observing\textsuperscript{e} of that Rule and from all Obligations\textsuperscript{f} to it; As he is Lord of himselfe,\textsuperscript{g} so he would be Lord of that Rule, which they call the Law of Reason, and keep it or break it at his pleasure without giving account thereof to any but himself; for thô he remain a reasonable Creature and is well acquainted with the Rule of his reason, yet he remains still\textsuperscript{h} a free and voluntary Agent, and as to the exercise of his actions and\textsuperscript{i} is Lord still of himselfe\textsuperscript{j} and them;

And what is said of the Rule of Reason of a single Man, the same will be if that Rule of reason were as to perfect\textsuperscript{k} exercise thereof universally and equally and uniformely comunicated to all Mankind; if once we seclude\textsuperscript{l} the Supream Legislator out of the World with Epicurists and Atheists this Rule of reason will not, cannot be a Law, what is said of one Man will be said of any, of every Man he will not be under the Law of Reason, as truely a Law, because he may absolve himself\textsuperscript{m} from any Obligation to any thing whereof he is Lord.\textsuperscript{n} And tho perchance /fol. 44r/ Feare of other superinducted
Laws and Government, mutuall pactions and such like, may\textsuperscript{a} give an external and adventitious coercion to him to observe those Common Rules of Reason by which such Lawes are superinducted, and in conformity whereunto they are made; yett still the Rule of Reason simply consider'd (excluding the authority of the Supream Legislator) would still\textsuperscript{b} be without the true formall Nature of a Law, because thô it were an excellent Rule, yet it would induce no Obligation upon him that hath it but he might use, or not use it\textsuperscript{c} at his pleasure, if he can but deliver himself from the Difficultys of other external supervenient Government\textsuperscript{d} Laws or Penaltyes either by Secrecy or Power.

So that every Rule, nay the best of human Rules,\textsuperscript{e} the Rule of Reason it self consider'd abstractively\textsuperscript{f} from any superiour authority, is not a Law, or a Rule \textit{iuncta cum imperio}; But of this more hereafter.

\textbf{[II. Law is a Rule of Moral Actions ]}

2. It is a Rule of Actions Morall, some Actions, especially of the\textsuperscript{g} human Nature are simply Naturall that have no Influx of the will; nor any spontaneity in them, but are perform'd without the immediate Concurrence of either; thus the hart beats, the Blood Circulates the Meat when once received in the stomach is Digested and distributed, These and the like Actions are not properly the Subject of this Law whereof we speak, Indeed there is somthing Analogicall to a Law by which these actions that are simply Naturall /fol. 44v/ are govern'd, namely the wise disposition and order that the great God of Heaven and Earth hath substituted in things and which appear's in things inanimate, as well as Animall;\textsuperscript{h} thus the Elementary Bodyes act according to the prevalence of active qualitys, heavy things descend, vegetables are nourish'd grow and increase according to that

\textsuperscript{a} may\textsuperscript{om. B2} \textsuperscript{b} stil\textsuperscript{B1, B2} \textsuperscript{c} it\textsuperscript{em.} \textsuperscript{d} Government\textsuperscript{om. B3} \textsuperscript{e} Rules\textsuperscript{em.} \textsuperscript{f} abstractedly\textsuperscript{B1, B2} \textsuperscript{g} the\textsuperscript{em.} \textsuperscript{h} Animall\textsuperscript{B1, B3} things Animall: B2
preinstituted\textsuperscript{a} order\textsuperscript{b} that the Divine wisdom hath settl'd which we ordinarily call the Law of Nature,

And to this Law indeed the vital and natural actions in Man are subject but this as it is not properly a law so it is not that Law where\textsuperscript{c} we are speaking but of this more hereafter;

Again 2. There\textsuperscript{d} be some actions that are mixt partly natural & partly voluntary, or at least spontaneous; And such are most of the spontaneous actions that are subservient to, and flow from the Animall life in Man \textit{quò talis}\textsuperscript{e} [in such a kind] which are in a great measure common to the human and animal Nature; The condition of our animall Nature makes it natural for us to eat\textsuperscript{f} and Drink and sleep and the like because other wise our individuall Nature could not be suport'\textsuperscript{d}, the Desires of Sexes are Naturall because otherwise our Species could not be preserved; It is naturall for us to preserve our selves from the injurys of the weather & to defend our selves from other Injuries but the tymeing of those Elections,\textsuperscript{g} the Measure the Manner the Order the degrees of those actions, are subject to our Choice and Election; I can eat now or forbear for a while, I can eat thus much or of this kind, and forbeare the rest, and so in other things; /fol. 45r/

Now althô these spontaneous actions belonging to the Animall life are in a great measure common to the human and brutall\textsuperscript{h} Nature, yet there is this difference universally between them, that\textsuperscript{i} thô those are in a great measure even spontaneous in the Brutes and other animals, yet they are under the Regiment only of their Phantasy\textsuperscript{j} & naturall appetite.\textsuperscript{4} But in Men they are in a great measure under the Regiment of a superiour faculty, namely the

\textsuperscript{4} \textit{OED}, s.v. \textit{phantasy}, def. 1a: “Mental apprehension of an object of perception; the faculty by which this is performed.”
understanding and will, and therefore they are not only natural
and spontaneous as in Bruits, and directed to a natural end and use:
But they are also voluntary & under the Regiment of that governing
facultie in Man namely his will and that will, thô not commanded
by his Reason yet inlighten'd and directed by it.

And by this Power or Facultie those spontaneous actions of the
animall life which in Brutes became almost necessary yett in Man
are in a greate Measure arbitrary or voluntary, at least as to the times
seasons degrees Measure order and other Circumstances accompa-
ing their exertions; And in this respect these mixt actions thô they
come not under a Law properly so call'd in Bruites, yet in Men they are
the proper subject of a true and formall Law: Sobriety, Chastity Tem-
perance Moderation of Pasions and many more morall vertues being
to be exercis'd about these animal actions of the human Nature
because thô the actions themselves are such as belong to the Province
of the animall life in him, yet the Circumstances and Modification;
thereof are under the Regiment of the superiour facultys
of the Rational Nature, namely understanding & will, and conse-
sequently the Subject of a Law properly so call'd; for thô the actions
themselves are in their kind Naturall, yet the Modifications and
Circumstances thereof render them Moral and capable to be under
the Sanction of a Law in Man;

Again 3. There be some actions that are purely and simply mor-
all, and such as can only concerne the reasonable or Intellectuall
Nature, and are imediately & simply Directed to the concernes of
a rationall life; such are those that either are relative to Almighty
God; as the Love fear and obedience of his Commands Sincerity
Integrity and worship of Him, or such as concern directly humane
Society, as Justice and Equity Charity, Friendship, Beneficence,
Longanimity, Veracity and the various offices of human Society,
and these and\(^a\) like, are, called Actions Morall, and come under the commanding and the contrary under the prohibiting Sanction of a Law properly so\(^b\) called;

[III. Law is Given]

3. This Law is to be given by which I intend these two things. 1.\(^c\) The institution or application of the Law to the persons or things for which it is intended 2. The promulgation of that Law to the persons whom it is intended to oblige: This\(^d\) promulgation of a Law\(^e\) is not of one kind only but different in its manner.\(^f\) Thus in some Laws the promulgation thereof is by Printing or Publick inscription thereof in Tables or upon Pillars, in some by\(^g\) Proclamation /fol. 46r/ as was in\(^h\) others by constant and known\(^i\) Usage; And we shall find\(^j\) that among the Laws of Almighty God himself, there were\(^k\) various kinds of promulgations of his Laws, some were Delivered by an audible voice from Sinai with Thunder, some were immediately received by Moses, and by him declared to the People; And as we shall have occasion\(^l\) hereafter to instance the Natural Law whereof we Treat was secretly insinuated and ingraven in the mind and conscience, yet so that stil voice, that\(^m\) silent promulgation is as real and true\(^n\) promulgation, as if it had been given by the Trumpet of Sinai, and the voice of Thunder.
[IV. Law is Given to Rational Nature]

4. The Person for whom it is institut’d are Natures indued with understanding and will; And these Natures are for outh we know only the Angelicall and human Nature;

The understanding faculty is requisite, because without it the Law cannot be knowne as a Law, and the will, and consequently the intrinsick Liberty thereof is required, because other wise it cannot be obeyed as a Law, neither can the obedience or disobedience thereof reasonably be attended with their reward, or punishment properly so called, For if we shall suppose the Subject to whom such Law is given to be already necessarily determined, (I say necessarily) to observe the tenor of what is commanded as a Law the Law is needless, if he be necessarily determin’d /fol. 46v/ to the contrary, the Law would be unreasonable because impossible to be observed, and it were unreasonable to exact a punishment by the Sanction of a Law from one that were under an invincible intrinsick necessity to disobey it, or not to obey it; It is requisite therefore that the subjectum cui [subject to whom], the person or being to whom a Law properly and formally so called is given should have a liberty ad oppositum [to the opposite] at least intrinsick and connaturall to him which is that we call will;

It is true, that the true stating of the libertie of the will what it is wherein it consist whither it be determined intrinsically by the Judgment or Decision of the understanding what kind of Liberty of will the glorious Angels or Glorified Soules have or shall have

5. The faculties of understanding and will are treated at greater length in Discourse, 45–60; and Primitive, 54–64. See also Pleas, 1:14–15; and Works, 1:385.
who are yet capable of a Law are enquirys that at this time are not pertinent to my purpose, That which I designe, is, the disquisition touching Laws as they relate to those Natures, with which we are acquainted;

And althô possibly it may be true, that in the true method and actings of the reasonable Soul, and in its proper and orderly Motion the will being a reasonable faculty, should follow the decision of the understanding, and possibly the understanding and will are not so much two distinct facultys, but rather the will, is the last Act of the Soul in things practicall, and as it were the Consummation of the Act of the practical understanding yet it is certain we find in our selves a power to suspend the decision of the understanding & a some times we act contrary to it, video Meliora deteriora sequor [I see the better, I follow the worse]. Soe that there is some kind of regent power in the human Nature, that is free opposita [to opposites], which we call the will and the Liberty and Dominion thereof, where in the Soul exerciseth, whereby a Man hath within himself a Dominion over what he doth, thô it be regnum sub graviore regno [a dominion under a greater dominion], namely the Determining and Commanding Power of God;

And upon this account it is, that the Brutal or bare Animal Nature, is not a proper Subject of a Law properly so called, for thô the Animal Nature hath in its Constitution a kind of inferiour Shadow or Analogy to the rational Nature (his Phantasy carryes something analogical to intellect and his Appetite something analogical to will

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and his Spontaneity something analogical to Liberty)\textsuperscript{a} yet certain it is that he hath not the very facultys or prerogative of intellection, will or Liberty; But is more rigorously determin'd in and to the Actions of an Animal life which seem to have som spontaneity then the human Nature, is even in relation to Actions of the same kind.

[ V. The Lawgiver ]

5. I mention the Author of a Law: and under this part of the Description above given of a Law, there are these things implyed or expressed.

1. That for the Constitution of a Law\textsuperscript{b} truely & properly so called, there\textsuperscript{c} must be an Author thereof, as a legislator\textsuperscript{d}

2. That the person that is the Law-giver\textsuperscript{e} *Nomothetes\textsuperscript{7}* must be distinct from the Person, to whom it is given, or that is to be obliged by it;

And the reason is plaine because there doth & must /fol. 47v/ necessarily by every Law truely and formerly\textsuperscript{f} so called, arise an Obligation from the Party to whom the Law is given unto the Party by whom it is given to observe and perform it otherwise it is but a nominal Law and not a real or true Law: And in all obligacions,\textsuperscript{g} because it is a terme of Relation, there must be *correlata*\textsuperscript{h} [correlates]: No Man can oblige himself simply to him self for he cannot

\textsuperscript{a} (his … Liberty)\textsuperscript{]} (his phantasy carryes something analogicall to intellect, and his Apetite something analogicall to Will and his spontaneity some thing analogicall to Liberty) \textsuperscript{B2} |, his phantasy carryes something analogical to intellect, and his appetite something analogical to will, and his spontaneity something analogical to liberty; \textsuperscript{B3} Ed. note: text from \textsuperscript{B2} and \textsuperscript{B3} supplied in brackets. \textsuperscript{b} there are these … Law\textsuperscript{]} \textsuperscript{B1}, \textsuperscript{B2} | (there are these things implied or expressed. 1. That for the constitution of a law\textsuperscript{]} \textsuperscript{B3} \textsuperscript{c} there\textsuperscript{]} \textsuperscript{B1}, \textsuperscript{B2} | (1.) \textsuperscript{t:T:here} \textsuperscript{B3} \textsuperscript{d} legislator.] legislator[.] \textsuperscript{e} Law-giver\textsuperscript{]} Law giver or \textsuperscript{B2} | lawgiver or \textsuperscript{B3} \textsuperscript{f} formerly\textsuperscript{]} \textsuperscript{B1}, \textsuperscript{B2} | properly \textsuperscript{B3} \textsuperscript{g} obligacions,] obligation \textsuperscript{B2}, \textsuperscript{B3} \textsuperscript{h} correlata\textsuperscript{]} em. | correlata \textsuperscript{B1}, \textsuperscript{B2} | correlata \textsuperscript{B3}

7. OED, s.v. nomothetes: “In ancient Greece: a lawgiver; a legislator (now hist.).” From νομο (law) and τιθέναι (to put, place).
from himself exact an obedience to himself; But is absolved at his owne Pleasure;

It is true, in the Case of human Laws and Constitutions a Legislator may be constituted by the Persons, who are to be afterwards obliged by that authority that he himself either wholly, or at least as one of Community transfers to that Person, as these Persons to whom this Nomothetical Power is thus Transacted; And therefore if we should supose the new erection either of a Kingly or Aristocratical or Democratical Government, by the paction or stipulation of any Society or Community of Men; by this paction if I am one of that Community I do together with the rest transfer to this Government a Power to oblige me by the Laws which such Governors shall make.

And per circuitum [by circumloction] it may be said, I oblige my self by my owne Laws, that is by such Laws which my Governor hath made by a Power derived from my self at least as one of the Community;

But there are in this two things to be observed which salve the difficulty, for 1. Thô the Legislator may in some cases have an authority in their first Constitution partly derived from me, yet here are distinction of Persons the legislator is one and I that am obliged am another Person and between us there may arise an Obligation. But 2. this is not all he that rests here, rests before he comes at his Journys End. By the pact and stipulation that is made whereby the Government is transfered to another person, or Company of Men I have given my faith to that Person or Society that I will obey them and their Laws; And this faith I am bound to keep, not only by an Obligation between me and the Party, to whom it is given, for then if I could avoid his coertion, I may loosen my self again. But I am obliged hereunto by a more soveraigne and

\[a\text{from} \text{em.} | \text{form} B1 | \text{from} B2, B3 \text{ to be afterwards} B1, B3 | \text{afterwards to be} B2 \text{ or} B3 \text{ of} \text{the} B2, B3 \text{ as these} B1, B2 | \text{as these or those} B3 \text{ Transacted;} B1, B2 | \text{Transacted} \text{ entrusted.} B3 \text{ a} \text{ om. B3 g paction} B1, B2 | \text{partition} \text{ paction} B3 \text{ h which such} B1, B3 | \text{which} B2 \text{ it} \text{ em.} | \text{in} B1 | \text{it} B2, B3 \text{ I End.} \text{ End[.] k pact} \text{ em.} | \text{part B1, B2} | \text{pact B3} \text{ l again.] again[.} \]
uncontroleable Law, the Law of Almighty God who hath given this Law, to, me and to all mankind\(^a\) that *fides est servanda* [faith must be kept], and till God himself shall cancell that Obligacion which I owe thereby to Almighty God, I cannot deliver my self from the Obligation that I have given by my faith to my Governors;\(^b\) And this is the great foundation of the Obligacion of all civil contracts made between Man and Man and the root of all Civil Government *fides est servanda* which is the uncontroleable Law of the Soveraigne Lord of Heaven and Earth.\(^b\)

And this Consideration salves that common mistake, that some Casuists have taken up\(^c\) even upon this very Consideration, /fol. 48v/ who because a Man cannot oblige him self to himself, have thought that no legislator is bound by his own Laws; and this is true in two Cases. 1. When the Laws in themselves, and in their matter concern not the Legislator, but the Community or some of them. 2. When the absolute power of making Laws\(^d\) is solely and simply in that Legislator, for then he may retract his Law when & how he please, and so may set himself lose even from those Laws that otherwise might for the matter have concerned himself;

But in other Cases of human Law's and human legislators according to the various Constitutions\(^e\) of Government and the various pacts and contracts, that either at first or in Proces of time intervened between the Governors and Governed, it may fall out that the Governor\(^f\) not only civilly, but by the Law of God himself may be bound by his own Law's because the Governors in such cases are bound under that soveraign Law of *fides servanda* as well as the Govern'd, if such pactions can sufficiently appear either by the pacts themselves or by long usage interpretatively evidenceing them.\(^g\) They are under the directive Obligation of their own Laws and

\(^a\) mankind | em. | mankind \(^b\) and Earth. | em. | and Earth. B1 | and Earth. B2 | om. B3 \(^c\) up | up B1 | up B2, B3 \(^d\) Laws | B1, B3 \(^e\) Constitutions | Constitution B2 | constitution B3 \(^f\) Governor | B1, B2 \(^g\) them. | in them. B1 | them. B2 | them, B3

sometimes under the protectors and rulers thereof thô according
to the Constitution of such Government they may not be under
any externall coertion to inforce their observance of them but this
is not the present business.\footnote{a}

And now if any shall object that in Commonwealths \footnote{b}purely Popular, and where the Nomotheticall power is lodged in
the whole Comunity there the same Persons\footnote{b} oblige themselves by
their own Laws, I say 1.\footnote{c} That the Comunity consider’d as a Com-
munity is a distinct thing from the particular Persons that are the
integrals of that Comunity and so the Law-giver is not the same
with the Persons obliged to the Law, but there may be a separate
Obligation from every particular Person of that Comunity to the
aggregate Body of the Comunity; as any, yea every free-man of
London personally and individually consider’d may be bound in a
bond to the Mayor & Comonalty. 2.\footnote{d} Still there is this\footnote{e} Further to
be remember’d that every particular Person of the Comonalty
having bound themselves by the faith, or paction to obey the Laws of
that Comonalty there lyes a higher and another Obligation upon
the particular Persons to observe their faith namely the Soveraign
Law of God that saith \textit{fides est servanda} so long as the Comonalty
continues, and the matter of that stipulation is not alter’d.\footnote{f} And so
as\footnote{g} there is a distance\footnote{h} of Persons civilly consider’d between the
Comonalty and every particular Person there\footnote{i} naturally consider’d
which may sustain the relation of an Obligation so there is a Third
Person, (with humility be it spoken) the Glorious God of Heaven,
whose Law requires the observance of the faith as well of the Co-
munity, as of every particular Person; \footnote{f}
And as a this is so in Matters relating to Lawes and Government, so there is the very same Obligation of Contracts between Man and Man.

Titius promiseth Gaius a Sum of Money for his goods if Titius were bound to himself only by his promise, he were loose if he please, if he were only bound to Gaius, if Gaius had no power to exact the performance of his Obligation, it were fruitless and nothing; But here lyeth the strength of the Obligation by the Divine Law of Almighty God, that saith fides est servanda. Titius is bound to the Soveraigne Power of Almighty God: And all thô a kind of inter-venient right of propriety happens between Titius and Gaius by this promise; And therefore Gaius may change the matter of it by releasing that Obligation, yet so long as that Obligation continues not so releas’d the Contract, stands under the Signature and Law of Almighty God, who in the voice of Nature hath proclaimed this Law to be observed by all Men, fides est servanda; And under the Obligation of that Law, Titius demands as long as the matter of his promise stands unalter’d by the consent of Gaius.

3. The third thing observable in this particular of the Author is the necessary qualification of the author of Law; namely authority to give, and power to exact obedience to such Law.

For the former of these namely Nomothetical Authority is of two kinds, Natural or Civil, The Naturall Authority, Nomotheticall is again of two kinds /fol. 50r/ either absolute or limited.

That Nomothetical Authority that is absolute, ariseth from the absolute dependance of one thing upon another, both as to Being and to preservation or support in such a case, the being upon
which any thing hath such an absolute dependance, must needs have
naturally a plenitude and absoluteness of power of imposing, a Law
upon such dependent being because he is absolute Lord thereof;
And upon this account the Great God of heaven and earth, & only
he, hath naturally the soveraign and absolute Authority of giving
a Law to any created Being for all things have their original Being
and their preservation [from Him, and their dependance upon Him;
And therefore he is most Absolute Lord Governor and proprietor of
all things,]\(^a\) and consequently hath most naturally a just Authority
independant upon any one Creature, to give that a Law to which
he not\(^b\) only gave, but continues a Being.\(^c\)

If it were possible to conceive, that any thing had a Being from
Almighty God, but having once obtain’d it could preserve it self in
that being by its own power it might abate somewhat of the plenitude
of the naturall Nomotheticall Authority of Almighty God: But all
things are essentially depending upon him, both for their origina-
tion and preservation: And he is therefore the most absolute Lord
and Proprietor and Governor of all things in Heaven and Earth,
Angels\(^d\) and Men, and not only their Lord and Creator but also
their bountifull Benefactor and filleth every thing according to
their severall Capacitys with goodness so that upon all accounts by
the greatest justice and reason Imaginable and by the very nature
of things he hath the most absolute Nomotheticall\(^e\) Authority to

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\(^a\) have their original … things,) \em. | \(\cdot\) have their original Being and their
preservation [MS. trimmed] \(\cdot\) B1 | have their original Being and their pres-
servation from Him, and their dependance upon Him; / And therefore he is
most Absolute Lord Governor and proprietor of all things, B2 | have their
original being and their preservation from him and their dependance upon
him; and therefore he is most absolute Lord governor and proprietor of all
things, B3. Ed. note: the insertion in B1 was written perpendicularly in the
margin at the edge of the page, which was subsequently trimmed, resulting
in partial loss of text. The missing text, which is now unverifiable from
B1, but presumably available to the copyist of B2, has been supplied from
B2 in the bracketed portion. \(^b\) to which he not] to which he \(\cdot\) not\(\cdot\) B1 | to
which he hath not B2 | which he not B3 \(^c\) Being.] B\(^2\)g Being. \(^d\) Angels\(^e\) Nomotheticall\(\cdot\) em. | Nemothetical
give Law to his Creatures of all kinds, and they do most naturally owe an universal\textsuperscript{a} Obedience to him;

And as his\textsuperscript{b} Authority to give Law’s to his Creature\textsuperscript{c} is most Just and Natural and Universall so his power to exact obedience to those Law’s is plenary and sufficient it being infinite and boundless;

1.\textsuperscript{d} That other Natural authority which I call limited is the Parental power which Certainly till the necessity of Civill Authority was superinduced upon it, was very large yet limited, not only by Civil Constitution, and Government superinduced, but even in its owne Nature;

This Parental Nomotheticall Authority is therefore natural, first\textsuperscript{e} because the Child subordinately unto the Divine causality\textsuperscript{f} and influence, had his being from his Parents, especially the Father, or at least the chief active Instrument under God of his generation 2. Because during Minority the Child hath a great dependance upon the care and provision of the Parent.

But yet it is a limited authority, 1. By Nature,\textsuperscript{g} because the Child owes more of his being and Preservation to Almighty God, then he can possible owe\textsuperscript{h} to his Parents, and therefore the Parental\textsuperscript{l} Nomothetical Authority is naturaly subordinate to the Nomotheticall authority of Almighty God, and controleable by it. 2. because after a competent Age, the Child hath a less dependance upon his Parent, then in his infancy\textsuperscript{i} for suport and\textsuperscript{k} Gradually the Parentall \textsuperscript{51r} Authority Nomotheticall doth decline, and by emancipation after a compleat Age, seems to decay;

Again it is limitted Civily by superinduced Civill Government which in all ages and places hath much abridged\textsuperscript{l} that parentall authority which naturally he had before instituted civil Government. And according to degrees of parentall Nomothetical authority
such are the Degrees of the parental Executive Power limited and restrain’d upon the same account that the nomotheticall parental Power is limited or abridged.\textsuperscript{a} And thus far concerning the Natural authority Nomotheticall and the Executive Power in order thereunto;

As touching the Civil authority nomothetical and the Executive power in order thereunto, I need not say much, it is the subject of infinite Political Discourses,\textsuperscript{9}

Only thus much the means of acquisition of the legislative authority\textsuperscript{b} are various, sometimes it is acquir’d by descent, sometimes by Investitive Ordination from another that hath it,\textsuperscript{c} some times by victory or conquest some times by Pact and Convension between the Governors & Govern’d and that either in the first institution of that Government or by succeeding Conventions or Concessions or Capitulation\textsuperscript{e} between the Governors and Governed;

It is hard to find any Conquest so absolute but as to the Modification of the Legislative authority there is something of convention or agreement which directs or qualifies that authority either by pactions interveneing between the Conquer’d and Conquerors, or upon dedition\textsuperscript{10} or subsequent Capitulations or even among the victors themselves where /fol. 51v/ the very Army or Officers modell or moderate or order their futur Government\textsuperscript{f} by pactions among themselves;

And upon this Account it comes to pass that the Nomotheticall Authority is variously modifyed in several States and Kingdomes and in the same States or\textsuperscript{g} Kingdomes variously in severall seasons

\textsuperscript{a} abridged.] abridged[.] \textsuperscript{b} authority] om. B2 \textsuperscript{c} sometimes … hath it,] \textsuperscript{d} sometimes by Investitive Ordination from another that hath it,\textsuperscript{B2} \textsuperscript{e}sometimes by investiture Ordination from another that hath it: B2 | sometimes by investiture \textsuperscript{or} ordination from another that hath it: B3 \textsuperscript{f}Governors\textsuperscript{B1}, B2 | governor B3 \textsuperscript{g}Capitulation| Capitations B2 | capitulations B3 \textsuperscript{h}future Government| em. | futer Government B1 | future Governments B2 | future governments B3 \textsuperscript{i} or] B1, B2 | and B3


10. \textit{OED}, s.v. \textit{dedition}: “Giving up, yielding, surrender.”
in some Kingdomes it seems to be more absolutely settled in the Prince alone, in some it is placed in the Prince with the Assent of the Nobility, or optimates, in some there is also necessary the Assent of the People, or their Delegates; in some the Legislative Authority is lodged in one Society, as in Rome, in the Senate and the Executive power in others as in the Consuls, in som both the Legislative Authority and the Executive Power is lodged in the same Person;

And thus among Men the Legislative Authority is variously modelled according to various Customes, pactions and Concessions and Capitulations.

And thus far touching that which I call Authority Nomothetical which is nothing else but a Just Right of making Laws to oblige others whether that right be acquired *jure naturae* [by right of nature], or *jure civili* [by civil right], or *jure belli* [by right of war] which is partly a civil right introduced upon necessity to avoid worse inconveniences: This is that which the Greeks call εξουσία or authority,¹¹ *Ius ferendi leges* [the right of legislating] which is essentially necessary to the due Constitution of a Law.

Customary Law’s introduced by long usage do obtain the force of Law's thô their original or first perfection from the legislative authority be not extant upon two accounts both consonant to what is deliver'd. 1. Because by long usage they carry a presumtion of their origination and profection at first from the Just legislative authority of him or them that at first had it. 2. Because the long Usage carryes with it not only the Consent of the Community that is bound by it but also of the legislative authority

¹¹. *DLGT*, s.v. *exousia* (ἐξουσία): “the freedom or right to act, choose, or decide; thus, ability, authority, or power.”

¹². *OED*, s.v. *profection*, def. 1: “The setting forward or promotion of a person or thing; furthermore, advancement. *Obs.”
that tacitly consents to it, and so thô it hath not the formality of other instituted Laws, yet in\(^9\) it hath the Substance and Equivalence of an institution by the Legislative Authority, I mean in relation\(^b\) to Civill Laws;\(^{13}\)

But besides this \(\epsilon\varepsilon\omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\) or \(\textit{authoritas}\)\(^d\) \textit{Nomothetica} [legislative authority] which is essentall to the due Constitution of a Law, so to the due Execution of a Law there is required Power that which the Greeks call \(\delta\nu\nu\alpha\mu\varsigma\).\(^{14}\)

This alone is not\(^e\) sufficient without the former, for the Constitution of a Law for there may be a Power over a Man inforcing him to do a thing which nevertheless doth not truly obtain the right of a Law, as when a Man falls into the hands of a Company of Robbers or riotous Persons that are too strong for him.

Neither doth the absence of this power or force alway’s invalidate the Efficacy of a Law, for a Prince or State having a lawfull authority may make a Law that is obliging to his Subjects, when yet by reason of some Emergency as of a sudden commotion\(^f\) or rebellion or tumult, the Executive Power of that prince or state is suspended.

But this \(\delta\nu\nu\alpha\mu\varsigma\) power to execute the Laws when made is necessary to be some where as to the\(^g\) End & Efficacy of a Law which without it will be dead and ineffectuall\(^h\) to the end\(^i\) of its institution; /fol. 52v/

And thus far concerning the Qualification of the Law giver.


\[^{14}\] \textit{DLGT}, s.v. \textit{dynamis} (\(\delta\nu\nu\alpha\mu\varsigma\)): “power; in philosophy, the power to accomplish change, i.e., potency.”
VI. The Empire of Law

6. I have in the Description of a Law said, that it is not simply a Rule, but *regula Iuncta cum imperio* [a rule conjoined with authority] where by it is distinguish’d from a bare Rule of direction and from a bare counsell or advice, But of this enough before; And this Empire of a Law consist’s commonly in these two branches of commands & prohibitions according to the various Objects of either for as to that of permission or *Lex permissiva* [permissive law], it is nothing else but an omission of any thing out of a law at least as to some Circumstances of Person time or place which leaves the thing indifferent or free to be don or omitted, till that indifferency be determin’d by some human Law;

VII. The Sanction of Law

7. We have this Description the Sanction or *sepimentum legis* [the fence of the law]: Namely the penalty or pain of the violation of it which is punishment either expressed or determined as in some Law’s or left undetermin’d to the *arbitrium iudicis* [judgment of the judge] to inflict prudentially under various degrees proportionable to the Circumstances of the Offence or contempt as is in other Laws;

Punishments or penaltyes either expressly or implicitly annexed to Law’s, have three special ends or uses.

First, to be a Satisfaction or Compensation of that debt which is contracted by the violation of the Law: For as we have before shewn, and shall more fully shew in the next Chapter; there is an Obligation in case of every Law truely so caused to the obedience of it, and by the Act of Disobedience there grows a kind of forfeiture to the Governor from the Govern’d, which because what is done by such violation cannot be *infectum* [ undone]: thence there arises a
just Exaction of a penalty or Mulct\textsuperscript{15} upon the /fol. 53r/ Offender as the compensation or retribution thereof in point of Justice but this I take to be the less principall reason, or end of the penalty\textsuperscript{a} a broken Law;

Secondly\textsuperscript{b} the principall end of the Sanction annex’d to a Law is not so much that the penalty may be inflicted as that the Law may be observed and the Penalty avoided. The exacting of the penalty is the thing least intended by every good and wise Legislator.\textsuperscript{c} But the principal End is thereby to secure the Law from violation by the feare of the Penalty annex’d to it so that the penalty annex’d to the Law is as I before said the Security and sepimentum Legis\textsuperscript{d} [the fence of the law] the Meanes, to keep the Subject in obedience to it and not so much or at least not primarily intended to be the Satisfaction for the disobedience of it;

Thirdly, and as thus the Sanction of the Law is principally intended to contain Subjects in their duty, soe the punishment when inflicted is neither purely nor principaly for the retribution or satisfaction of the Offence by the party offending but to be exemplary and medicinal to others; And therefore the wise Lawgiver in his injunction of penaltys doth so frequently repeat this Clause, \textit{that all Israel may hear and fear, and do no more so wickedly} [Deut. 13:11].

It is true that these two Ends of punishment doe not answer altogether the institutions\textsuperscript{e} of everlasting punishment by the great God of Heaven upon the contemtuous\textsuperscript{f} violators of his Law, as shall in their due time be shewn.

But this everlasting punishment is inflicted upon other accounts 1. As to a Just retribution of the contempt of the Divine Justice and Goodness in respect whereof Almighty God as\textsuperscript{g} Just Judge, and \textit{per modum vindictae}\textsuperscript{h} [by way of vengeance] inflicts that /fol.

\textsuperscript{a} penalty| B1, B2 | penalty of B3 \textsuperscript{b} Secondly| em. | Secondly \textsuperscript{c} Legislator.|\textsuperscript{d} B1 | Legislator: B2 | legislature. B3 \textsuperscript{e} institutions| institution B2, B3 \textsuperscript{f} contemtuous|\textsuperscript{g} as| as a B2 | is a B3 \textsuperscript{h} vindictae|\textsuperscript{15} OED, s.v. \textit{mulct}, def. 1: “A fine imposed for an offence.”
53v/ everlasting poena\textsuperscript{a} sensūs [punishment of the senses] as an instituted\textsuperscript{b} punishment of their Contempt and willfull rebellion.

2. As a kind of necessary Consequence or Naturall Effect of that ataxy\textsuperscript{c} and disorder occasioned by it, parting from that\textsuperscript{d} Station which God Almighty hath ordain'd for the human Nature whereby it comes to pass that by a kind of naturall Consequence they may suffer the poena\textsuperscript{e} damni [punishment of the damned], and at least some measure of the poena\textsuperscript{f} sensūs, that the damned must suffer;\textsuperscript{16}

As the\textsuperscript{g} sickness or feaver\textsuperscript{h} or Palsy of\textsuperscript{i} an intemperate Man\textsuperscript{j} is not only the just punishment, but the naturall consequence of that intemperance the Poverty of a sloathfull negligent or profuse Man, is as well the effect as the punishment\textsuperscript{k} of his fault;\textsuperscript{l} And Death the naturall consequence as well as the punishment of him, that Destroyes himself or rejects the necessary meanes of preserveing life; but of this hereafter;\textsuperscript{17}

As touching the other incentive of obedience, namely rewards of obedience, thô the bounty and goodness of\textsuperscript{m} God hath for the most part annext to his Laws as well Rewards of obedience or\textsuperscript{n} punishments of disobedience as appeares both in the Mosaical\textsuperscript{o} and Evangelical Laws, yet it is not always necessary that express Rewards be annexed to Laws partly because obedience is the duty of every Subject to a just Law, and therefore not\textsuperscript{p} necessary to be

\textsuperscript{a}poena] B1, B2 | penae B3 \textsuperscript{b}as an instituted] of an instituted B2 | as an inflicted B3 \textsuperscript{c}ataxy] em. | at. axy \textsuperscript{d}that] B1, B2 | the B3 \textsuperscript{e}poena] em. | pena B1, B2 | poena B3 \textsuperscript{f}poena] em. | pena B1, B2 | poena B3 \textsuperscript{g}As the] B1, B2 | \textsuperscript{h}feaver] em. | favor \textsuperscript{i}of] B1, B2 | \textsuperscript{j}Man] em. | Man. \textsuperscript{k}punishment] pu‹nish› \textsuperscript{l}ment | \textsuperscript{m}of] \textsuperscript{n}or] B1, B2 | or \textsuperscript{o}Mosaical] em. | Mosiacal \textsuperscript{p}not} \textsuperscript{q}not

\textsuperscript{16} DLGT, s.v. poena: “[Protestant scholastics] distinguish eternal punishment into poena damni, the punishment of the damned, which is the pain of eternal separation from God, and poena sensus, the punishment of the senses, which is the actual torment in body and soul suffered by those who are denied the fellowship of God in eternity.”

\textsuperscript{17} On ataxy and punishment, see also Discourse, 52–53, 83.
purchased by the annexation of rewards, and partly because every just and wise Law carryes with it self and in it self\textsuperscript{a} a benefit to those that obey it, or at least to the Comunity whereof they are members;

And thus much touching the formal nature of Laws and the necessary incidents to their Constitution; I shall /fol. 54r/ subjoin a few words touching\textsuperscript{b} the Effects of Laws which shall be the Subject of the next Chapter;

\textsuperscript{a} with it self and in it self\textsuperscript{b} touching | \textsuperscript{B1, B3} in it selfe and with it selfe | \textsuperscript{B2} touching