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## **EMOTIONS AND MORAL JUDGMENT: AN EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL EMOTION THEORIES**

*Abstract.* One desideratum for contemporary theories of emotion both in philosophy and affective science is an explanation of the relation between emotions and objects that illicit them. According to one research tradition in emotion theory, the *Evaluative Tradition*, the explanation is simple: emotions just *are* evaluative judgments about their objects. Growing research in affective science supports this claim suggesting that emotions constitute (or contribute to) evaluative judgments such as moral judgments about right and wrong. By contrast, recent scholarship in two historical emotion theories, Augustinian and Thomistic, emphasize their sharp distinction between cognitive judgments and affectivity or between reason and emotion. For these historical models, reason, not emotion, is responsible for moral judgment. Are the evaluative and historical models at irreconcilable odds? Should we discard old models that fail to satisfy intuitions about the intricate role of emotions in moral judgment? This paper compares these research programs and suggests a roadmap for collaboration.

Key words: *Emotion Theory* • *Moral Judgment* • *Augustine* • *Aquinas* • *Passions*

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**EMOTIONS AND MORAL JUDGMENT:  
AN EVALUATION OF CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL EMOTION THEORIES**

**0. Introduction**

Emotions have components. A moment of intense anger – say, because your lunch was stolen – involves more than just the phenomenological qualities of feeling angry. It also involves the physiological qualities of an increased heart rate, the motivational qualities of desiring revenge, and others. Plausibly, your anger over the stolen lunch also involves an *evaluative* quality: you are angry *about* something (your lunch being stolen) appraised as morally wrong. But now we come to a complexity: Is this evaluative quality merely the result of a cognitive, non-affective process (thinking that x is wrong) or is it instead bound up in the emotion itself (*feeling* that x is wrong)? The latter option seems to grant emotions intentionality.<sup>1</sup> It suggests that emotions are evaluations *of* some object in the world. I think this is correct. And many emotions theorists in philosophy and affective science share the intuition that intentionality is a component part of emotion. If this is right, then one desideratum for any theory of emotion, past or present, will be an explanation of this evaluative intentionality between emotions (e.g., resentment) and objects that illicit them (e.g., betrayal).

There are various research traditions in contemporary emotions theory, which includes philosophers and cognitive scientists. One tradition captures this intentionality very well.<sup>2</sup> This

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<sup>1</sup> For origins of intentionality with respect to emotion see Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and Linda L. McAlister (trans.), London: Routledge 1995 [1874]; and Alexius Meinong, *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werttheorie*, Haller & R. Kindinger (Hg.) (1968) [1894].

<sup>2</sup> For an overview of these traditions, see Andrea Scarantino, “The Philosophy of Emotions and Its Impact on Affective Science”, in Barrett, Lewis, & Haviland-Jones ed. *Handbook of Emotions* 2016. References for contemporary and historical traditions in this paper are not taken to be exhaustive. Instead, they are representative samples of these literatures.

tradition is called the *Evaluative Tradition* according to which emotions just *are* evaluative judgments about their objects.<sup>3</sup> Alongside philosophical arguments, growing research in affective science provides empirical evidence for the evaluative tradition by suggesting that our emotions constitute (or contribute to) evaluative judgments such as moral judgments about right and wrong.<sup>4</sup> Whereas on older psychological models moral judgments are the result of consciously controlled cognitions (thinking) and not of automatic affective processes (feeling) – a rationalist model – recent decades have seen a reverse.<sup>5</sup> Now emotion plays a much greater role.<sup>6</sup> More than others, the evaluative tradition contributes to this emphasis on emotion in evaluation.

By contrast, recent studies in the Augustinian and Thomistic traditions suggest that these historical emotion theories sharply distinguish between cognitive evaluative judgments and affectivity, between reason and emotion.<sup>7</sup> As with old rationalist psychological models, the implication is that these historical models give a top-down, rationalist account of moral judgment. If this is correct, do we have any reason to return to these historical models? Are they not at irreconcilable odds with contemporary insights? I think we do have reason to return to them, and we can do this without abandoning contemporary insights. In this paper, I will suggest a roadmap for future collaboration

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<sup>3</sup> For philosophical contributions to the evaluative tradition, see Anthony Kenny, *Action, Emotion and Will*, London, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, Humanities Press, 1963; Robert C. Roberts, *An Essay in Aid of Moral Psychology*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003; and Martha Nussbaum, *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. For affective psychology and neuroscience contributions, see Jonathan Haidt's landmark paper "The Emotional Dog and Its Rational Tail: A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment," *Psychological Review*, 108:814-834, 2001; and Christine Tappolet, *Emotions, Values, and Agency*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.

<sup>4</sup> See, for example, JD Greene and Colleagues, "An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment," 293(5337): 2105-2108, 2001; Jonathan Haidt and Colleagues, "Disgust as Embodied Moral Judgment," *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 2008; and Norbert Schwartz, "Feelings-as-information Theory," in P.A.M Van Lange, A. W. Kruglanski, & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), *Handbook of Theories of Social Psychology*, 289-309, 2012.

<sup>5</sup> See for example, *Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions*, W W Norton & Co., 1988. For a brief history of the cognitivist revolution in early psychology, see Chelsea Helton and Kevin Oschner, "The Role of Emotion Regulation in Moral Judgment," *Neuroethics*, 11(3): 297-308, 2018.

<sup>6</sup> For a brief review of the affective turn in moral psychology, see Joshua Greene and Jonathan Haidt, "How (and Where) does Moral Judgment Work?" *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 6(12): 517-523, 2002.

<sup>7</sup> I discuss representative scholarship in these traditions in sections 2 and 3.

between new and old theories of emotion. I won't claim that the evaluative tradition can take on historical models wholesale, and nor should they, but I do think that these new and old traditions benefit from mutual collaboration. I think this because these historical traditions offer a more complex model involving different kinds of emotions which is missing in contemporary models, and in return, the evaluative tradition better depicts the integration of reason and emotion in moral judgment which is missing in historical models. Their synthesis suggests a promising roadmap toward a master theory of emotion.

### 1. The Evaluative Tradition in Contemporary Emotion Theory

While there is no consensus definition of an emotion in philosophy or cognitive science, most contemporary emotion theorists recognize common components necessary for an adequate account.<sup>8</sup> These components amount to challenges which shape various desiderata for any adequate theory of emotion. Andrea Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa (2018) group these challenges as follows:

*Differentiation:* How do we individuate emotions one from another?

*Motivation:* In what sense (if any) do emotions motivate behavior?

*Intentionality:* Are emotions object-directed, and can they be appropriate or inappropriate?

*Phenomenology:* In what way (if any) do emotions involve subjective experiences?

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<sup>8</sup> For a helpful overview of the literature including the following framework, see Scarantino and Ronald de Sousa's entry, "Emotions", in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2018.  
<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/emotion/#EvalTradAffeScieApprTheo>

For example, an adequate account of fear should tell us how fear differs from other emotions, how fear motivates self-preservation behaviors, whether fear is about some state of affairs and is appropriate or not, and in what way (if any) fear involves a unique subjective experience.

In this paper, I will set aside questions of differentiation and focus primarily on intentionality. This is because intentionality bears most heavily on the question of emotion's role in moral judgment. For example, if I feel belittled by your patronizing tone, my feeling belittled is cognitively about your tone in the sense that it represents or *evaluates* that tone as belittling. Plausibly, if emotions like feeling belittled are not properly directed toward any objects or events in some world, they will have little to do with moral judgments about that world. In what follows, I do not promise to settle disputes between contemporary traditions. Instead, I will assume that the evaluative tradition at least holds some plausible insights about the intentional nature of emotion.

From these challenges, three general traditions in theories of emotion emerge:

{ET} *The Evaluative Tradition*. As discussed, this tradition conceives of emotions as judgments or evaluations which aim to represent the world. Emotions are object-directed or intentional in that there is something that they are about. In turn, emotion is appraisal-apt, we can evaluate it as blameworthy or praiseworthy. This theory of emotion clearly answers the *intentionality* challenge posed above.<sup>9</sup>

{FT} *The Feelings Tradition*. This tradition conceives of emotion as a class of feelings tagged with specific kinds of subjective experiences. On one account, emotions are incited merely

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<sup>9</sup> For a representative psychological study of blame and praise in emotion, see Richard Lazarus, "Progress on a Cognitive-Motivational-Relational Theory of Emotion," *American Psychologist*, 46(8): 819-834, 1991; and *Emotion and Adaptation*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

by conscious recognition of physiological changes in the body. This theory of emotion focuses on answering the *phenomenology* challenge, that is, what it is like to have an emotion.<sup>10</sup>

{MT} *The Motivational Tradition*. This tradition conceives of emotion as largely answering to motivational impetus behaviors aimed at a goal. This theory of emotion answers the *motivational* challenge, explaining how emotions and actions are related. For example, fear of an oncoming predator motivates fleeing. This tradition is less concerned to show how emotions can be object-directed and potentially blameworthy or praiseworthy.<sup>11</sup>

These emotion theory traditions give us a workable picture of the contemporary landscape for both philosophers and affective scientists working in this field. As before, my primary interest in this paper is the evaluative component of emotions in moral judgment. So, before addressing those historical theories, I should give a bit more detail about {ET}.

For philosophers and some psychologists in {ET}, emotions do not just *involve* cognitions, they *consist of* cognitions. This is bound to lead to some confusion. If emotions just *are* cognitions, how are we to distinguish them from doxastic states (e.g. believing that water is H<sub>2</sub>O) which we do not normally take to involve emotion?<sup>9</sup> In response, some philosophers propose the following two claims about the intentionality of emotions

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<sup>10</sup> For historical roots, see William James, *The Principles of Psychology*, New York: Holt, 1890. For a hybrid evaluative-phenomenological view, see Mark Johnston, “The Authority of Affect,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 63(1): 2001.

<sup>11</sup> Examples include Julien Deonna and Fabrice Teroni, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*, London: Routledge, 2012; and Andrea Scarantino, “The Motivational Theory of Emotions,” in Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson (eds.), *Moral Psychology and Human Agency*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 156-185, 2014. For an action-oriented approach to emotion in cognitive science, see Daniel Shargel and Jesse Prinz, “An Enactivist Theory of Emotional Content,” in Hichem Naar and Fabrice Teroni (eds.), *The Ontology of Emotions*, Cambridge: Cambridge university Press, 110-129.

- (1) Emotions are differentiated according to both their *formal object* and their *particular object*.

And

- (2) There are alternative types of cognition, some of which are non-inferential and non-conceptual.<sup>12</sup>

According to (1), emotions are intentional in that they have a particular object (e.g. your speech) which instantiates a formal object (e.g. carrying a patronizing tone). They are thus fitting or appropriate when their particular object really instantiates their formal object represented by the emotion. So, to say that emotions are *cognitive* is to say that they constitute the judgment that their formal object is really instantiated in the world.<sup>13</sup>

According to (2), emotions may be evaluative perceptions which indirectly perceive their formal objects. Or else, emotions may be intentional feelings in the sense that these feelings are directed *at* an object and so are in some sense representational.<sup>14</sup> Philosophers who defend these views form an {ET} - {FT} hybrid tradition and maintain that emotions are evaluative feelings or perceptions instead of a unique form of non-conceptual judgment.

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<sup>12</sup> Anthony Kenny (1963) argues that since an emotion can be inappropriate just in case its formal object is not instantiated, emotions must involve conceptual relations. But feelings do not enter into conceptual relations. So, emotions need to be (or involve) some kind of cognitive evaluation. Robert Solomon (1980) follows the Stoics in identifying these evaluations with judgments that some object or event is good or bad. Augustine's theory also follows the stoics as I discuss in section 2. Robert Roberts (2003) and Johnston (2001) suggest that emotions are a kind of perception. If so, this allows our emotions to be cognitive in the same way sense perception can be cognitive: I know that I have two hands because I perceive that I have two hands.

<sup>13</sup> See Kenny (1963). Emotions may be unfitting or fitting instead of praise or blameworthy when their formal object is not instantiated. For example, see Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson, "The Moralistic Fallacy: On the 'Appropriateness' of Emotion," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 61: 65-90.

<sup>14</sup> For example, Bennett W. Helm, "Emotions and Recalcitrance: Reevaluating the Perceptual Model", *Dialectica*, 69(3): 417-433, 2015.

These explanations do some work to overcome the apparent implausibility of {ET}. They also form a potential link to historical theories which also individuate emotions according to formal objects.<sup>15</sup> However, we should be careful not to assume that concepts and explanations (e.g. the use of “formal object”) in this tradition (or the other two traditions) easily map onto concepts and explanations in historical traditions. Having introduced {ET} and its relation to moral judgments, I turn now to Augustine’s theory of emotions.

## 2. Augustinian Emotion Theory

My aim in this section is to sample two recent Augustinian studies of Augustine’s emotion theory as they relate to {ET}. I do not have space to give an exhaustive treatment of the literature, nor will I adjudicate between scholars on exegetical merits. This paper contributes one model for collaboration between these traditions, and it is sufficient for this project that these studies represent one plausible reading of Augustine. Let’s assume they do this. I will first look at Paul Griffiths’s (2011) paper on tears and weeping in Augustine’s *Confessions* and then turn to Sarah C. Byer’s (2013) extended study of emotions and moral motivation in Augustine.<sup>16</sup> I select representative passages relevant to our discussion.

“Emotion” didn’t take its current English use until the 19<sup>th</sup> century.<sup>17</sup> Augustine and Aquinas will instead talk of “passions” (*passiones*) and “affections” (*affectiones*). While Griffiths does not

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<sup>15</sup> Thomas Aquinas individuates powers (including emotions or “passions”) according to their formal object, and he individuates manifestations (acts) of powers according to their particular object, *Summa Theologica* I, Q77, a3; Q.78, a.3.

<sup>16</sup> Paul Griffiths, “Tears and Weeping: An Augustinian View”, in *Faith and Philosophy*, 28(1): 19-28, 2011; Sarah C. Byers, *Perception, Sensibility, and Moral Motivation in Augustine: A Stoic-Platonic Synthesis*, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

<sup>17</sup> See Thomas Dixon, *From Passions to Emotions: The Creation of a Secular Psychological Category*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.



give us an explicit definition of “passion” in the text, we can tease out the following two claims about passions:

(3) The passions are judgments which aim to represent the world

And

(4) The passions can and should be controlled by reason.

In support of (3), Griffiths says:

Augustine’s youthful tears for his dead friend are in part different from Monica’s for him [that he would return to the Christian faith], and in part the same. In both cases, **they are knowledge-bearing judgments about the state of things.**<sup>18</sup>

And in support of (4), Griffiths says:

A particular movement of the soul, understood as a passion, **may then be separated from reason** in the sense of being intimate with a false understanding of what there is, and therefore active in opposition to true understandings. **It may also be in accord with reason**, and when it is it involves or is concomitant with a love of the good, which is also a love of the Lord.<sup>19</sup>

And,

Our task, as Augustine sees it, a task we cannot accomplish without grace, is **to order our passions so that they are in harmony with reason** [...] so that we want what is good for us.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Griffiths 2011, 21. Emphasis mine (and all following emphases mine).

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 27. Also, on 25, “He [Augustine] is consistent in depicting tears as responsive to an ascetical **discipline of the passions**: he can undertake, with struggle, not to cry even when moved by grief, just as he can undertake to yield to tears.”

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 28.

At first, (3) and (4) might seem inconsistent. How can the passions be both judgments which represent the world *and* under the control of reason which, presumably, is our judgment making faculty? But Griffiths is not telling us that Augustine takes passions to *consist* in judgments. Instead, Griffiths is likely suggesting that Augustinian passions *involve* judgments. If so, then (3) should *not* be understood as equivalent to (1) from {ET} according to which emotions *consist* in the judgment that its formal object is instantiated. In support of this, consider the following passage on whether animals have Augustinian passions:

Your dog is certainly, in Augustinian terms, an appetitive being: he is moved by appetites toward or away from things. But these amount neither to desires nor to passions [...] because **they bear no relation to the intellect's capacity to discern and judge** what is good.<sup>21</sup>

What emerges from these passages is that on Griffiths's reading Augustinian passions bear a close relation to cognition. However, reason, not emotion, does all the heavy lifting in moral judgment. Emotions are only "rational" or cognitive insofar as they respond obediently to the evaluative judgments of reason. Sarah Byers's study supports this reading. According to Byers, Augustinian "emotions" break down into "affections" or praiseworthy emotions and "passions" or blameworthy emotions. All of these are caused by (not consisting in) cognitive evaluations or thoughts. Says Byers,

Also like the Stoics, Augustine thinks that the assessment of value which **causes morally good and bad emotions** is, in both cases, an **act of the mind**. The "irrational" passions are not nonrational, but are **caused by false judgment**. (Both

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<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 27.

the affection of joy and the passion of joy are caused by “thoughts,” for example.) Hence, when he says a passion is an emotion that is “against reason,” he means it contravenes right reason.<sup>22</sup>

In support of this, Byers quotes a passage from Augustine’s *City of God*:

[The Ciceronian term] “perturbation” (*perturbatio*) is *pathos* in Greek . . . *passio*, the literal rendering of *pathos*, is said to be a movement of the rational soul contrary to reason (*motus animi contra rationem*). . . . If anything of a similar kind appears in the beasts, it is not a perturbation (*perturbatio*), because it is not contrary to reason, which the beasts lack. Again, when these perturbations occur in humans, this is brought about by foolishness or unhappiness (*stultitia vel miseria*); for we are not yet blessed by that perfection of wisdom which is promised to us at the end [in heaven].<sup>23</sup>

Notice that both Griffiths and Byers read Augustine as closely associating moral judgment and emotion. There are morally good and bad emotions, and these are involved in the spiritual part of us responsible for making rational (or irrational) evaluations about the world. As such, both readings observe a kind of intentionality in emotions, emotions are responding to their morally good or bad objects.<sup>24</sup> However, it would be mistaken to think that intentionality here parallels intentionality in {ET}. We can only loosely say that Augustinian emotions are evaluations; more accurately, Augustinian emotions respond to and reflect the evaluations of reason. Byers refers to

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<sup>22</sup> Byers, 2013, ch. 13 “Emotions”, 64.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 66 n.51. Byers’s study highlights the Stoic influence on Augustine’s theory of emotion at ch.13.3.4. Peter King (2010) sees an affinity between {ET} and the Stoics who identify emotions with judgments about good and bad. See King, “Emotions in Medieval Thought”, in Peter Goldie (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. However, whereas Byers sometimes identifies emotions and judgments in the Stoic theory, she always talks of judgments *causing* emotions in Augustine.

both Augustine's and the Stoic's model as a Stoic cognitive psychology and cognitive psychotherapy.<sup>25</sup> This will not help our cause, however, since as before, cognitive science no longer operates under a reason-dominant model of moral judgment. So in this regard, those psychologists working in {ET} (notwithstanding philosophers already mentioned) will see Augustinian emotion theory as old hat.

On the other hand, there are some more promising observations from these studies. Notably, Augustinian emotions look to be not merely physiological changes or subjective feeling states but also objectually related to moral goods and bads. This does some work in satisfying the intentionality desideratum for emotions. Also, both Griffiths and Byers bring out a division in kinds of emotions that may be useful to {ET} and other traditions. *Affections* (morally good) emotions are not *passions* (morally bad) emotions even though both are Augustinian emotions according to Byers. Even if this good/bad division turns out false, it may still be useful to contemporary studies to parse emotions into two kinds: one less cognitive and more impulsive, the other more cognitive and controlled. Recently, there has been some debate in cognitive science about the utility of dual-process models (cognitive/emotional duality) which are models of the causes of motivational states.<sup>26</sup> When I am morally motivated in some way, is my motivational state mostly the result of affective or of cognitive processes? Inconsistency in empirical results from

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<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 57.

<sup>26</sup> For a defense of the approach, see Joshua Greene, "Dual-process morality and the personal/impersonal distinction: A reply to McGuire, Langdon, Coltheart, and Mackenzie", *Journal of Experimental Psychology* 45: 581-584, 2009; Lotte Van Dillen, "On the Role of Attention and Emotion in Morality: Attentional Control Modulates Unrelated Disgust in Moral Judgments", *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 38(9): 1221-1231; And for approaches that see emotion and reason as mutual partners in evaluation and decision making see Ochsner and Colleagues, "For better or for worse: neural systems supporting the cognitive down- and up-regulation of negative emotion", *NeuroImage* 23: 483-499, 2004; and "What is the role of control in emotional life?" in M. S. Gazzaniga & G. R. Mangun (Eds.), *The Cognitive Neurosciences*, MIT Press: 719-730; And Chelsea Helion and David Pizarro, "Beyond Dual-Processes: The Interplay of Reason and Emotion in Moral Judgment", *Handbook of Neuroethics*, 109-125.

dual-process studies might result from a failure to make divisions in fundamental kinds of emotional states.

In summary, the Augustinian model fails to account for the evaluative component of emotions found in {ET}, however it may provide a useful division in kinds of emotions. I turn next to the Thomistic emotion theory to see if it fares any better.

### 3. Thomistic Emotion Theory

Recent scholarship on Thomistic emotion theory has given detailed and valuable monographs of Aquinas's treatment of the passions in his *Summa Theologiae I-II Questions 22-48*.<sup>27</sup> However, these monographs only address one way Aquinas talks about "passions", and that is insofar as they belong to what Aquinas calls the "sensitive appetite". Aquinas, following Aristotle, divides the soul's powers into three types: rational, sensitive, and vegetative.<sup>28</sup> By definition, the sensitive part of the soul is non-cognitive and lower than reason, so "passions" in this sense will not support {ET}.<sup>29</sup> For this reason, I turn instead to Eleonore Stump's study of multiple senses of "passion" in Aquinas.<sup>30</sup>

Stump begins her analysis of Aquinas's theory of the passions by this basic sense of "passions" as acts of the sensitive power of the soul. Says Stump,

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<sup>27</sup> See the following monographs: Nicholas Kahn, *Aquinas's Participation in Reason*, Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2019; Diana Fritz Cates, *Aquinas on the Emotions*, Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009; Robert Miner, *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae, Ia2ae22-48*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009; Nicholas E. Lombardo, *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion* Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011. Of these, Kahn's says the most about emotions role in moral judgment, but on his reading, Aquinas has reason despotically ruling over the passions, and the passions are never praise or blameworthy.

<sup>28</sup> Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I Q.78 a.1.

<sup>29</sup> For an alternative reading, see Daniel de Haan, "Moral Perception and the Function of the *Vis Cogitativa* in Thomas Aquinas's Doctrine of Antecedent and Consequent Passions", *Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale*, XXV, 2014.

<sup>30</sup> Eleonore Stump, "The Non-Aristotelian Character of Aquinas's Ethics: Aquinas on the Passions" in *Faith and Philosophy*, 40, 2011.

In its most basic sense as a motion of the sensory appetite, a passion is a response on the part of the sensory appetite to the direct and intuitive input from the senses [...] If a passion is taken in this lowest level sense, it is in its own nature neither good nor bad.<sup>31</sup>

On Stump's reading of Aquinas's emotion theory, there is more to the story. Stump suggests that "passion can also be understood in an extended sense."<sup>32</sup> This extended sense "is not in the sensory appetite but rather in the intellective appetite." Stump notes in Aquinas an analogue to the passions of the sensory appetite, namely, those of the intellectual appetite. Stump explains, "When a person recognizes that what he is smelling is bread and when in those circumstances, all things considered, he wants to get and eat what he recognizes as bread, the desire in question is in the intellective appetite or will, not in the sensory appetite [alone]."<sup>33</sup> For Aquinas, there is a sense of "passion" which responds to the intellect's judgments and not merely to sensory apprehension of objects pleasing to the senses.

The intellect, being a rational power capable of apprehending universals like "immoral", directs the will not just towards sensory goods but towards moral goods. However, since Aquinas thinks that the will is free to reject invitations to pursue the moral good, the passions of the will (analogues to the passions) *can* be appraised as appropriate or inappropriate, good or evil.<sup>34</sup>

Furthermore, on Stump's reading there is a third sense of "passions" in Aquinas, namely, the Fruits of the Holy Spirit. Says Stump,

As Aquinas explains the first five fruits of the Holy Spirit, they are in fact all consequences of shared love between a human person and God. The remaining seven have to do, one

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<sup>31</sup> Stump (2011), 40.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 41.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>34</sup> See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q.83. a.1

way or another, with the love of one's neighbor understood as beloved of God or with suitable love of oneself and one's body. Like the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and unlike the passions in their most basic sense, all the fruits of the Holy Spirit are second-personal in character. Aquinas explains them as the emotional condition of someone who is connected in love with God.<sup>35</sup>

This third sense of "passion" is not beholden to the will the way the analogue-passions are. In fact, these Fruits are not beholden to any of the powers of the soul, sensory or intellectual, the way the other passions are. Instead, the Fruits such as the emotions of love, joy, and peace transcend purely first-person desires or goals enabling the person to experience second-personal desires (e.g. the desire for relationship with God) and to love others besides myself. If Stump's reading is plausible, collaboration between Thomistic and {ET} emotion theories looks more promising than with the Augustinian model. By extending "passions" to include analogues to the will and second-personal emotions not caused by reason, the Thomistic account leaves room for evaluative emotions as in {ET} while offering a three-fold distinction of emotion to help disambiguate contemporary studies.

#### 4. Conclusion

This paper sketches one model for future collaboration between historical and contemporary emotion theories. The Augustinian and Thomistic accounts of the passions is a longstanding one in the Catholic philosophical tradition, and one worth re-examining in light of contemporary insights, especially if synthesis is possible toward a master theory of emotion. I have suggested that the Thomistic account fares better than the Augustinian vis-à-vis desiderata driving the evaluative

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<sup>35</sup> Stump 2011, 42.

tradition in emotions theory. Future work should aim to discover prospects for collaboration in other respects.



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