A NOTE ON THE DEMONSTRATIVE USES OF INDEXICALS

Tadeusz Ciecierski

Abstract

The paper discusses the answering machine puzzle and cases of non-standard uses of ‘I’. It offers an analysis of the phenomena that is conservative with respect to the Kaplanian account of indexicality. The point of departure of the paper is the observation that some proper indexicals have demonstrative uses. It is argued that treating some occurrences of ‘now’ as cases of such uses results in an intuitive and simple solution to the answering machine puzzle. At the same time, treating some occurrences of ‘I’ in an analogous manner explains away the impression that some non-standard uses of ‘I’ enforce a modification of the standard semantics of the first-person pronoun.

Keywords: Indexicals, Demonstratives, Answering Machine Puzzle, Kaplan

1. Introduction

Some uses of the following sentences might be true (cf. Vision 1985):

1. I am not here now.
2. I am now dead.
3. It is (now) Monday, but I do not believe that it is (now) Monday.

For instance, they could be recorded and played at my funeral on Monday, which might initially be surprising because typical uses of the sentences seem false and potentially self-refuting. Some think that the possibility of such uses requires a modification – at least with respect to the account of ‘now’ – in the Kaplanian logic of demonstratives.

Similarly, one might attach the following note to the door of an office that has never been in use (while intending to speak about the occupant of the office):

4. I exist.

and express a falsehood. This seems to also be at odds with the Kaplanian treatment of ‘I’.

Contrary to such opinions, I shall suggest below that the original Kaplanian framework has at its disposal a simple and intuitive analysis of true
utterances of 1–4. The analysis in question makes use of the concept of *demonstrative use* which I shall introduce in section II of the paper. This section contains, among other things, a discussion about the criteria of telling apart indexical and demonstrative uses of expressions. I argue that distinct criteria are in agreement that in cases of non-standard uses analogous to 1-4 we are dealing with examples of demonstrative uses of indexical expressions. In section III of the paper, I discuss how the idea of demonstrative use helps us to solve the problem of non-standard uses of indexicals, I compare also the idea with other solutions to the problem.

2. Demonstrative uses

In *Demonstratives* (Kaplan 1989a, 491), following Bennett’s suggestion, Kaplan observes that the proper indexical ‘here’ has demonstrative uses, as in:

5. In two weeks, I will be here [pointing to a city on a map].

Assuming the correctness of Kaplan’s observation, we might naturally wonder if similar claims are true of other indexical expressions, such as ‘now’ and ‘I’.

However, one has to be terminologically careful when addressing this question. In Kaplanian terminology, all indexicals can be divided into proper (or pure) indexicals and proper demonstratives. Kaplan stresses that his theory does not apply to the non-indexical uses of expressions (such as bound, anaphoric, noun and quote uses; cf. Kaplan 1989a, 489–490; Smith 1989, 168). Demonstrative uses analogous to the one illustrated in 5 are indexical uses that are not purely so.

In order to avoid terminological difficulties, it will be useful to follow the suggestion of Smith (1989, 189) who recommends that: ‘(…) instead of dividing indexicals into demonstratives and pure indexicals, we should divide uses of indexicals into demonstrative uses and pure indexical uses’. Our question is, therefore, whether ‘I’ and ‘now’ – in addition to pure indexical uses – have demonstrative ones.

What is, therefore, a difference between demonstrative and purely indexical uses? Before addressing the question two remarks are in order. Firstly, the literature on indexicality is dominated by an approach that attempts to draw a demarcation line not between *uses of expressions* but between *expressions*. Hence, instead of asking what distinguishes demonstrative and indexical uses, philosophers of language usually ask about the difference

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1 Following Kaplan, the phrase within the square brackets is a description of the demonstration that accompanies the use of a particular expression.
between indexicals and demonstratives. For convenience’s sake, let’s coin terms for the two problems: *U-demarcation problem* for the question regarding the criteria for telling apart indexical and demonstrative uses and *E-demarcation problem* for the question regarding the criteria for telling apart indexical and demonstrative expressions. One might want to derive the difference between the two problems from two distinct ways in which one individuates objects of semantic analysis: use-related and form-related. The first treats linguistic forms as tools and introduces semantic categories in order to capture regularities in manners in which the forms are used by members of a particular linguistic community. The second individuates them solely in terms of their form. *Prima facie* this may look like a substantial difference between two competing accounts but I want to argue that the opposition between the two accounts is in fact illusory: the form-related approach is not a rival account of the individuation of semantic objects, it is rather (a justified) *idealization* that abstracts from particular distinctions that might be made within the use-related account. In other words: the E-demarcation problem is just a way of rephrasing U-demarcation problem given the idealization according to which forms of expressions correspond to relevant differences in manners of use (i.e. the idealization to the effect that each expression has exactly one manner of use). The main motivation behind it is negative: treating the form-related claim as idealization results in a charitable interpretation of the view that otherwise has problems with acknowledging such data as the existence of homonyms. I conclude, therefore, that we are justified to interpret various proposals formulated as answers to the E-demarcation problem as being in fact attempts to address the U-demarcation problem. Below I shall, therefore, use the criteria that are formulated as answers to the former problem as potential answers to the latter as well.

Secondly, there is no consensus among scholars addressing the demarcation problem, some scholars think even that no clear-cut distinction can be drawn (cf. Penco (2013) who argues that indexicals should be treated as complex demonstratives). The argumentative strategy I shall assume in this paper will not pursue the best possible demarcation criterion. I shall simply assume that some such criterion exists. I shall occasionally also raise some skepticism regarding the correctness of some of such criteria. My main aim, however, will be to discuss various candidates for such a criterion and check if – despite differences – they agree with respect to the treatment of answering machine cases and cases of non-standard uses of expressions such as ‘I’.

2 The two problems have counterparts concerning, for instance, the distinction between indexical and descriptive uses of pronouns and adverbs (cf. Nunberg 1992, Kijania-Placek 2015 & 2020).
The first criterion that can be proposed (and which is assumed in standard Kaplanian semantics, cf. Michaelson, 2014, 522) appeals to the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of certain types of intentions. The idea is that intention to refer to a particular object is ineffective when, for instance, I indexically use ‘I’ while the intention to refer to something accompanying demonstrative uses of ‘this’ is somehow relevant. The view usually adds to this basic assumption an observation that the relevant intention is not any referential intention – it is a referential intention of a specific sort, called (after Kaplan) a directing intention. John Perry describes the view that might be interpreted as a version of such theory in the following manner:

“(…) it is not just any referential intention that is relevant to demonstratives, but only the most basic ones, which I will call directing intention, following Kaplan (…) I take directing intention to be the intention to refer to an object X in virtue of the meaning of one’s words and the context, both pre-existing and supplied by the speaker. This sense of directing intentions applies to all indexicals, even ‘I’ (…) The issue is whether one’s lowest level intention can have an effect on what one designates.” (Perry 2012, 70–71)

Perry stresses here the fact that directing intentions are present not only when demonstratives are used (he applies the notion to other expressions, including proper names, see: Perry 2009, 198). The real issue is, therefore, not if such intentions accompany uses of certain expressions but whether they have an impact on what we refer to. This might be illustrated by comparing two scenarios (inspired by examples of Perry, cf. Perry 2009, 193). Suppose that I am going over various people in my head and I utter “He is from South Africa” when the thought about Elon Musk occurs. Here a directing intention is one to refer to Elon Musk by using “he”, the intention is referentially successful – I successfully referred to Elon Musk in this case. In an alternative scenario, I utter “I am from South Africa” when the thought about Elon Musk occurs. Here (if ‘I’ is used indexically), my directing intention has no effect on the referent: it is me of whom I said that is from South Africa. Directing intention is here the most basic intention to refer which is the starting point of a referential plan. The referential plan of an attempt to refer to something by referring to something (e.g. referring to Elon Musk by referring to the speaker, or refereeing to Elon Musk by refereeing to the person I have in mind).

There are at least two goals that Perry has in mind when discussing the concept of directing intention, however. The first (Perry 2009) is to offer an interpretation of one of Kaplan’s theories of demonstratives: the theory (from Afterthoughts, cf. Kaplan 1989b) according to which a directing intention completes demonstratives and gives a semantic value of a demonstrative in the context. Thusly interpreted the presence and effectiveness of directing intention is characteristic of demonstratives. Perry’s second aim – which is in tension with the first – is to capture the distinction between
the so-called automatic and discretionary indexicals. This distinction comes close to the one we want to have (between indexicals/indexical uses and demonstratives/demonstrative uses) but with some exceptions: ‘now’, ‘here’ and ‘there’, according to Perry, can be used discretionary due to the fact that they might refer to periods of time or areas that differ from one occasion to another. If we agree with Perry, then the effectiveness of directing intentions is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for singling out demonstrative uses. But even if we object to treating ‘here’, ‘now’, and ‘there’ as discretionary, there are other arguments indicating that the criterion is unable to address the demarcation problem. The reason is that there are clear cases of purely indexical uses where the basic intention to refer to an object in virtue of the meaning of one’s words and the context seems referentially effective and relevant. Consider, for instance:

6. Today is my birthday.

and compare two situations: in both, the utterance of 6 is temporally extended between Monday and Tuesday. In the first, the speaker intends to speak about the day on which the utterance starts while in the second she intends to speak about the day on which it finishes (in both cases she is aware that the utterance embraces two days). Depending on that intention, which is the discriminating intention in the sense just introduced, we are either referring to Monday or Tuesday. Nevertheless, ‘today’ in 6 is used purely indexically (cf. Ciecierski 2020 for a detailed discussion of such cases).

Some might be tempted to say that the context in which 6 occurs is improper: it is, for instance, similar to cases where the addressee is solely imagined (i.e. that she does not exist but the speaker thinks that there is an addressee) when the use of ‘you’ occurs. However, the proponent of such an approach must have a particular structure of the improper context in mind. But it is difficult to say what that structure is. The context is not similar to the one with ‘you’ and the absent (nonexistent) addressee since there are numerous instants of time that count as potential values of the time of utterance parameter, each located within the time span of the utterance of 6. Let me explain. A particular utterance \( u \) of 6 occupies a certain region of time. There are numerous ways in which we might assign a value to the time of utterance parameter by choosing a certain time span located in that region: it might be, for instance, the time before midnight which cooccurs

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3 I would like to thank Alex Radulescu for bringing that reaction to my attention. ‘Improper’ in the sense introduced by Kaplan in Demonstratives. Roughly speaking, the context is proper if a certain “coherence” (this is not the term Kaplan uses) relation holds between various contextual parameters, e.g. the speaker of the context is located a the time and place of the context. It is improper otherwise. Let us add that the usefulness of the idea of the structural constraints that determine the correctness of contexts has been convincingly criticized by some authors (cf. Predelli 2005).
partially with an event of producing \( u \). This time is related to one of potential referents of ‘today’. In the ‘you’ scenario there is no candidate for the relevant contextual parameter at all. The incorrectness of context is also not a matter of the relationship between parameters of the context: each of the instants is appropriately related to the agent of the context and the place of the context. Last but not least, the plurality of instants that are candidates for becoming the time of utterance should not worry us at all if we enable one of them to be intentionally selected. There are, therefore, no reasons for treating the context in which 6 occurs as improper.

If the criterion of effectiveness of certain kinds of intentions does not single out the class of purely indexical uses, we might rather attempt to indicate typical features that distinguish purely indexical uses of ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ and demonstrative uses of, for instance, ‘this’.

Firstly, a broadly conceived demonstration is present in typical cases of demonstrative uses. For instance, pointing with a finger accompanies the use of ‘here’ in the Bennett’s map scenario (5). The act of attaching a note to a particular door while uttering 4 can be seen as a case of a demonstration. Finally, the act of playing the recorded message could be seen as a demonstration in the case of 1–3.

A capacious enough (for our theoretical purposes) concept of demonstration has been introduced recently by Carlo Penco (cf. Penco 2021). He defines demonstrations as ‘joint-attention-guiding physical actions including gaze and postures in a physical surrounding that are a necessary completion of a demonstrative expression to make the speaker’s and hearer’s attention converge towards a particular object.’ (Penco 2021, 274). There are some modifications I would introduce in Penco’s definition, however. The first is replacing ‘physical action’ with ‘intentional action’. This is required to avoid excluding refrainings from the class of possible actions. The second is to replace “make” with “make or keep”. This change is required to make the definition applicable to situations in which keeping the attentional state of the speaker and hearer is the goal of an action. The third is to replace the notion of a hearer with a more general notion of an interpreter. This makes the definition applicable to a broader class of communicative situations than simple face-to-face conversations. The slightly modified Penco’s definition of broadly conceived demonstration becomes:

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\text{Demonstrations (broadly conceived) = joint-attention-guiding intentional actions including gaze and postures in a physical surrounding that are a necessary completion of a demonstrative expression to make or keep the speaker’s and interpreter’s attention converge towards a particular object.}
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Even the cases involving salience or recognitional uses of demonstratives (Diessel 1999) like:

7. I could not sleep. That dog next door kept me awake. (Diessel 1999, 106)
involves executions of such procedures which might be actions of refraining from overt actions or even the actions of using particular words (as sortals or even as predicates that introduce categorial restrictions on the elements of an extension). It is natural to think that, at least in regular cases, the absence of such a demonstrating procedure (a lack of execution) or its bad execution results in the incompleteness of demonstrative use.

Secondly, ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’ might all have incomplete uses. As noted by Kaplan himself: ‘(…) it is clear that one can distinguish a demonstrative with a vacuous demonstration: no referent; from a demonstrative with no associated demonstration: incomplete’ (Kaplan 1989, 491). In the map scenario one might fail to perform a demonstration, and in the one involving ‘I’ the note might not be attached to a door at all, while in those involving ‘now’ the recorded messages might be never played or might be performed in the incorrect circumstances (for instance, by archaeologists, 200 years after being recorded). In all such cases the respective uses of the three expressions will be incomplete.

Thirdly, the reference of the typical purely indexical uses of ‘now’, ‘here’ and ‘I’ is secured on each occasion4, while nothing similar applies to ‘this’, the use of which might be vacuous in some contexts. Now consider the following three scenarios:

*Here*. Back in the eighteenth century, Voltaire uttered, ‘In two weeks, I will be here’, pointing to a phantom island called ‘Brasil’ on a map (such an island had been depicted on various maps between 1325 and 1865).

*Now*. I falsely believe that Napoleon died in 1850, I utter (intending to speak about some moment in 1832, the year Napoleon’s son died), ‘Napoleon reads the letter from France; he is now grieving over the death of his son’.

This scenario is a case of the so-called historical present (cf. Smith 1989, 170–172). Note that as the particular moment in 1832 is determined only relatively to the non-existent action of Napoleon, no particular moment in 1832 is the referent of ‘now’5.

*I*. Nobody has ever used the office next to mine. I notice, however, that several people approach it and knock on the door, so I believe that the office is used by someone. Therefore, I decide to pin a note to the door that says, ‘I am not in the office’ (cf. Corazza, Fish, & Gorvett 2002, 5).

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4 This observation is, for instance, an important part of the account of indexicals as hybrid names defended by Künne and others (cf. Künne 1992 & 2010). It cannot be, however, extended to indexicals other than ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ (cf. Ciecierski 2019)

5 I.e. the moment is introduced relative to the action described in the narration (that of reading the letter). The action that actually never took place.
The respective uses of ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’ in the scenarios are vacuous, just like ‘this’ when imagining a demonstratum\(^6\).

The three criteria, however, should not be applied uncritically, as prima facie exceptions are possible: explicit demonstration might be omitted if the object is salient, some specific demonstrative uses might be such that they cannot fail to refer (as in: ‘Harvey can speak only this loud’ (cf. Levinson 1983) where we are referring to an abstract object such as loudness by imitating the loudness of Harvey’s manner of speaking). What makes such uses demonstrative is the intention to refer to a particular object by means of some identifying procedure or broadly conceived demonstration about which the speaker thinks that its execution will contribute to securing reference of an expression on a particular occasion.

Demonstrative uses of ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’ share this feature with standard demonstrative uses: they involve the intention to refer to a particular object by means of some demonstrating procedure of which the speaker thinks that its execution will contribute to securing the semantic reference. Therefore, they involve broadly conceived demonstrations, and they might also be incomplete and vacuous.

I would like to stress, however, that other criteria are available here and that they – when applied to the cases under discussion – will yield similar results. Radulescu, for instance, proposed the following role-playing criterion:

\((\ldots)\text{indexicals are those deictics which depend for their semantic value only on context parameters which are fixed independently of which sentence is being uttered. Demonstratives, by contrast, are those which depend, at least to some extent, on parameters which are fixed specifically for the particular sentence being uttered. (Radulescu 2018, 3178)\) 

The idea is that in the case of pure indexicals it makes sense to ask if a particular contextual parameter is fixed just for this particular utterance or for any whatsoever. The role of the speaker (speaker parameter) is fixed no matter what words are used in the utterance (it does not have to contain ‘I’ at all, etc.). In the case of demonstratives, on the other hand, the relevant aspect of the context (be it a demonstratum or demonstration) is non-obligatory for some utterances: in order to make sense of the question regarding the demonstration or demonstratum we have to appeal to a use

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\(^6\) There is an alternative manner to describe the cases by treating them as examples of deixis-in-imagination in the sense of Bühler (Bühler 1934, Stukenbrock 2014). I have nothing against analyzing such cases in this manner: if this is the interpretation we want, our criterion appealing to potential emptiness must be replaced with the one appealing to having (potentially) a purely imaginative referent. Thusly interpreted the criterion corresponds to a suggestion of Dolcini (Dolcini 2016) who postulates dual semantics for indexicals with different semantical rules for regular and in-imagination uses. I intentionally avoid here entering the debate if the uses of indexicals in imagination are empty or refer to some sort of abstract entities like fictional characters.
or to a token of a demonstrative. Similar motivations underlie John Perry’s
distinction between narrow and wide deictic expressions (Perry 2012)
although Perry explicitly mentions the relevant aspects of contexts: the
speaker, time, and location. The role-playing criterion embraces such
aspects, but enables others. Additionally, Radulescu links the criterion to
the presence of certain types of intentions: ‘word-indifferent’, in the case
of indexicals, and ‘word-specific’ in the case of demonstratives.

When we apply this criterion to the cases discussed above we see that it
makes sense to ask about the demonstratum or demonstration only relative
to the occurrences of ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’. In all these cases neither the
contextual parameter nor the referent of the respective expressions is word-
indifferent.

In a nutshell, we have considered several criteria for singling out the
class of demonstrative uses. The criterion that appeals to the effectiveness of
certain kinds of intentions is problematic. The same can be said of criteria
appealing to factors such as the presence of narrowly conceived demonstration,
potential incompleteness, and emptiness. The criteria that look better either
appeal to the presence of a broadly conceived demonstration or identifying
procedure and treat demonstratives as essentially involving them, or appeal
to Radulescu’s clever observation that demonstratives involve word-specific
determination of relevant contextual parameters. The important fact is that
both criteria agree when applied to the discussed uses of ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’.

3. Addressing the puzzles

The observation that ‘now’ has demonstrative uses can help solve the
answering machine puzzle. Let us use the subscript DEM to mark the
demonstrative use of an expression. We might now treat the true uses of
sentences 1–3 as cases of:

1*. I am not here at now_{DEM}.
2*. I am dead at now_{DEM}.
3*. It is now_{DEM} Monday, but I do not believe at now_{DEM} that it is Mon-
day.

These detach the reference of ‘now’ from the moment at which 1–3 are
recorded. If we agree that the descriptions within the scope of dthat play a
role of Kaplanian ‘describing as a form of pointing’, they might be even
treated as variants of:

1**. I am not here at dthat (the moment when the message is expected
to be played).
2**. I am dead at dthat (the moment when the message is expected to
be played).
3**. It is Monday at *dthat* (the moment when the message is expected to be played), but I do not believe at *dthat* (the moment when the message is expected to be played) that it is Monday.7

I do not want to defend here the analysis of demonstrative uses of ‘now’ in terms of *dthat*, however: such analysis remains an interesting option, but the important point is simply that ‘now’ might be interpreted demonstratively in the cases under discussion.

This account of the answering machine puzzle does not require a modification in the logic of demonstratives, because it assumes that semantic rules for ‘now’ apply to purely indexical uses of that expression.

The solution differs from other proposals offered in the literature8. It is not committed to the notion of remote utterance (Sidelle 1991, Briciu 2018); it does not require the notion of an intentionally provided contextual parameter involved in the interpretation of a particular indexical (cf. Predelli 1998 & 2005, for a speaker-oriented view and Romdenh-Romluc 2006, for an audience-oriented one). In addition, it avoids relativising semantics for ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’ to special conventions (Corazza, Fish, & Gorvett 2002) or communicative channels (Michaelson 2014); it does not require an interpretation of untypical uses of ‘now’ and ‘here’ in anaphoric terms (Corazza 2004) or treat pure indexicals as cases of complex demonstratives (cf. Krisner 2006); it does not use the Reichenbachian machinery originally designed to deal with tenses (Vicente & Zeman 2020) or the notion of detonation conditions (Radulescu manuscript). Finally, it is not committed to the view that true utterances of sentences 1–3 are cases of pretended utterances or utterances lacking the appropriate assertoric force (cf. Stevens 2009; Volutolini 2006).

The most similar analysis to that defended above is the ambiguity view (Smith 1989), but the similarity does not delve deeply into the interpretation in terms of demonstrative uses and does not claim that proper indexicals manifest production-tokening ambiguity. First, it remains oblivious to the issue of the ambiguity in question being semantic or if it is even an ambiguity at all. Second, even if – despite the skepticism just expressed – we treat it as a version of the ambiguity view, it is not prone to criticism of ambiguity views that can be found in the literature. For instance, Cohen and Michaelson (2013) claim that ‘here’ and ‘now’ fail some ambiguity tests when the context remains fixed because there are no true readings of sentences, such as:

8. Aloysius is here, but Aloysius is not here.

7 The present tense is crucial to reading this sentence paradoxically.
8 For a comprehensive discussion of analyses of the problem, see Cohen & Michaelson (2013).
This prediction is incorrect, however, as one may truly utter sentence 8 if one of the uses of 'here' is demonstrative (e.g. I point to a distant place on a map while second uttering 'here' with Aloysius sitting in front of me). As Cohen and Michaelson (2013) require, this reading keeps the context fixed.

It is more difficult to find an analogous reading of:

9. Aloysius is present now, but Aloysius is not present now.

One reason for this, however, is the use of the present tense that reinforces the effect of 'now' in 9. If we keep in mind that ‘is’ should be tenseless, then sentence 9 should read as follows:

9*. Aloysius is (tenseless) present now, but Aloysius is (tenseless) not present now.

Here again, there is no problem in finding the contexts in which 9* is true: think of Aloysius sitting in front of me while I am watching a video recording without Aloysius being present in a scene displayed on the screen.

Another approach that bears some resemblance to the view presented in this article is the treatment of some uses of indexicals as having “shifty characters.” A theory of this kind is presented Michaelson’s paper cited above (Michaelson 2014). As I mentioned above, Michaelson’s original approach, unlike the theory I present here, relativizes the semantics of indexicals to communication channels, channels that are assumed to correspond to different types of contexts (face-to-face conversational contexts, recorder message contexts, etc.). The relevant context types determine what role is to be played by the object, in order to qualify for a relevant contextual parameter (the agent, the time or the place of the context). This theory, as Michaelson (2014, 530) notes, can be interpreted as posing meta-characters of indexicals, by assuming that for every indexical expression there is a function from context type into character.

Michaelson’s idea might be generalized, and one can pose “shifty characters” of (some) indexicals regardless of whether one adopts any particular taxonomy of contexts. Therefore, one can ask whether the view presented in this paper is some version of the shifty-character view, thusly generalized⁹. The answer to this question, I believe, is negative. The difference between the approach sketched in this article and the shifty character view lies in how it treats formal semantic frameworks such as Kaplan’s. To illustrate the difference, let’s consider Kaplan’s original semantics. It contains rules for assigning content to certain expressions types paired with contexts. These rules are the characters of the relevant expressions types. One can treat this correspondence between the rules and particular syntactic forms (expression types) as an essential part of Kaplanian semantics, but one

⁹ I would like to thank both anonymous reviewers for bringing this to my attention.
might also think of it as a kind of idealization or simplification, analogous to the one I wrote about earlier when the distinction between two versions of the demarcation problem was briefly discussed. If we follow the first route and want our semantics to be applicable to cases of non-standard uses of indexicals, we have to modify it somehow, e.g. in the manner suggested by Michaelson\textsuperscript{10}. However, we might choose another route and recognize that lexemes such as “I,” “now,” “here,” and “this,” when they appear in Kaplan’s semantics, represent certain classes of uses of expressions that are not necessarily uses of expressions that have the same form (although in the dominant number of cases they are uses of expression that equal in form). Following this path, we can even replace the relevant constants in Kaplan’s logic of demonstratives with some artificial expression-types (e.g., indexing the original expressions with an asterisk) and say that Kaplan’s semantics characterizes the class of uses of expressions to which the semantic mechanism presented in the theory applies. From this point of view, some uses of “now” will fall under the corresponding semantic type (“now\*”), while others will not (while they may fall under the semantic type “this\*” or even “\textit{dthat (the F)\*}”). This interpretation does not postulate shifty characters for “now”, “I” and “here”, but constant characters for “now\*”, “I\*” and “here\*”, i.e. constant characters for types of uses.

Michaelson, when introducing a shifty character view suggested that:

The answering machine problem forces us to make a choice: we can either take our truth-judgments at face value and attempt to modify semantic theory in light of them, or we can preserve Kaplan’s semantics and reject the initial truth-judgments. (Michaelson 2014, 523)

The view sketched in this paper avoids this dilemma: it preserves Kaplan’s semantics and accepts our truth-value judgments. It achieves this goal by paying closer attention to the question of what the lexemes (constant non-logical symbols) of the logic of demonstratives actually represent.

Another important worry that might be raised here concerns the relation between demonstrative uses and characters of expressions: it seems that characters of indexicals (or characters shared by some indexical uses) must be somehow relevant for demonstrative uses\textsuperscript{11}. For instance, both in the case of indexical and demonstrative use of “now” we are referring to times, in the case of indexical and demonstrative use of “here” we are referring to locations while in the case of indexical and demonstrative use of “I” we are referring to agents. This is undoubtedly true but the question is if this

\textsuperscript{10} Michaelson himself (2014, 524) proposes another way of spelling out the shifty character view. According to this interpretation, the view provides an informal interpretation of Kaplan’s semantics. The two ways of spelling out the view are treated by Michaelson as equivalent.

\textsuperscript{11} I would like to thank one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this issue to my attention.
supports (perhaps) some version of the shifty character view. I am far from being convinced that such a conclusion is inevitable. What remains stable between indexical and demonstrative uses is a categorial character of potential referent: a general classificatory feature an object must possess in order to be a candidate for a referent. But this does not mean that the character is preserved. Characters are rules anchored in particular aspects of the context of utterance (represented as contextual parameters), not in arbitrary objects that have the same categorical characteristics as particular aspects of the context. It might be helpful to invoke here a category introduced by Nunberg in his analysis of indexicality (cf. Nunberg 1992): Nunberg stressed that each indexical and demonstrative contains a certain classificatory component that imposes some constraints on interpretation (reference) of the relevant expressions. We may say that what is common to indexical and demonstrative uses here is a general classificatory component. This, however, does not entail that the similarity in question is grounded in the sameness of character.

In Kaplanian semantics ‘I’ refers to the agent of the context. The dominant trend in the literature discussing this assumption (cf. Corazza, Fish, & Gorvett 2002; Dodd & Sweeney 2010) is to explain the potential counterexamples to this rule in terms of manners in which the entity that plays the role of an agent of a context is determined (the shifty character view belongs to the class of such theories as well). For instance, when I am sending someone to deliver a message on my behalf, I – not the person who delivers (and uses) the message – play the role of the agent of the context. When I am using the ‘I’-containing note prepared by someone else to say something about me, I play the role of the agent of the context, not the person who produced the note. Agents of contexts are, on many occasions, speakers of contexts, but this is not generalized to all cases.

It is important to stress that the possibility of demonstrative uses of ‘I’ does not fly in the face of this trend. It states only that one has to carefully restrict the relevance of considerations regarding the manners in which the agent of the context might be determined to purely indexical uses of ‘I’. In other words, it states that before we employ the considerations regarding the agent of the context, we should determine if ‘I’ is used purely indexically at all. As I have argued above, for instance, the cases of attaching the ‘I’ note to someone’s door are not examples of such purely indexical uses. Interestingly, the analysis in terms of demonstrative uses extends beyond such cases. Consider:

10. I am now in jail.

as uttered by someone playing *Monopoly*. ‘I’ in 10 seems to refer to a character within a particular *Monopoly* play. This is, I think, possible because ‘I’ is used demonstratively: the speaker has the intention to refer
to a particular object (character in the game) by means of some identifying procedure (placing the pawn on a particular square) of which the speaker thinks that its execution will secure the reference of ‘I’. The Radulescu’s criterion is also met on this occasion: the value of the relevant contextual parameter is word-specific.

The fact that there is no conflict between the theory presented in this paper and the theories that stress the importance of manners in which values of particular contextual parameters are determined does not mean that there are no differences between the two approaches. The most important is that the latter view (but not the former) assumes certain semantic uniformity with respect to all uses of expressions like ‘I’, ‘here’ or ‘now’. The latter view might either take a shifty character form or a fixed character form. The uniformity of the shifty character theories derives from the fact that the relevant shift in character (determined by a change between types of contexts) concerns the class of potential values of a contextual parameter such as an agent of the context. In other words: the type of context constrains the potential values of the parameter in question. At the very same time, the contextual parameter itself remains the same across distinct types of contexts: it is always an agent of the context. According to the demonstrative use approach, the change between uses (indexical and demonstrative) involves a change in the relevant aspect of the context (type of contextual parameter). In the case of ‘I’, for instance, the change is from an agent of the context into the factor that would normally be linked to demonstratives: be it a demonstration or an appropriate intention, or a salience (the first option is the one favoured by the author but the issue we are considering in this paragraph does not depend on one’s favourite theory of demonstrative reference). The fixed character theories do not differ in that respect from shifty character theories. I conclude, therefore, that the approach defended in this paper deserves to be treated as an independent theoretical proposal.

4. Conclusion

This paper does not provide an argument against alternative treatments of the answering machine puzzle or accounts of non-standard uses of ‘I’. Although my general impression is that the analysis of the phenomena in terms of demonstrative uses outrivals alternative accounts with regard to simplicity, such pragmatic features can hardly be taken as indicators of theoretical correctness in philosophy. The aim of the paper, therefore, is rather to enrich the logical space of possible accounts of the puzzling phenomena. I believe that the approach sketched above, as well as the notion of demonstrative use deserve broader attention and further investigation. If the framework sketched in this paper is on the right track, the Kaplanian
logic of demonstratives is actually the logic of particular kinds of uses of expressions: purely indexical and demonstrative uses.

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Tadeusz Ciecierski
University of Warsaw, Faculty of Philosophy, Poland
Email address: taci@uw.edu.pl
http://pts.edu.pl/tc/