Abstract

Brentano distinguishes between intentionality and reference. According to Brentano, all mental acts are intentionally directed toward something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. For Brentano, such acts, besides their intentionality, have a peculiar relation of similarity to their object. There is no mention of Brentano’s distinction between intentionality and reference in the literature. Drawing on some less well known texts, this paper aims both at showing that Brentano makes such a distinction and at underscoring the philosophical significance of his position.

Introduction

Brentano is widely known to be the thinker who introduced intentionality into contemporary debate. It is a fact that philosophers often cite his *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, where the notion of intentionality first appears. However, they
rarely discuss Brentano’s philosophy of mind in any detail. Yet his views merit more thorough consideration. Indeed, Brentano makes an important distinction between two aspects of mental acts, intentionality and reference, aspects that are sometimes assimilated, when not actually confused.

In recent years, some philosophers have suggested distinguishing between the intentionality of a mental act and its reference. Every mental act is ‘intentionally directed toward something’, i.e., ‘about something’, and this is independent of the existence of the object. But an act may also ‘refer to something’, which is the case solely for mental acts whose objects exist: when I think of a cat, if this cat exists in reality, then my act is not only about the cat, but it also refers to it (Horgan and Tienson 2002, 529; for a similar distinction, see Kriegel 2007, 2011, 154).

Now, one finds the same idea in Brentano. Indeed, according to Brentano, every mental act is intentionally directed toward an object, i.e., is about an object. However, when the object of the act exists in reality, a peculiar relation of similarity is added to the act, besides its intentionality. Thus, Brentano makes a clear distinction between intentionality and reference. Yet his distinction, although insightful, is not mentioned in any of the literature. This paper aims at filling the gap, by establishing that Brentano makes such a distinction and by underscoring its philosophical significance.

I will start with a brief presentation of Brentano’s different accounts of intentionality, from the publication of his Psychology to his later work. Then, I will draw on some less well known texts to argue that Brentano does indeed distinguish between intentionality and reference. I will show that reference, for Brentano, is a relation of similarity. I will discuss how Brentano’s account of reference fits with his theses on judgment and truth. I will then move on to evaluate his theory. I will focus neither on intentionality nor reference, but rather on Brentano’s distinction between them. First, I
will argue that this distinction provides a satisfactory account of both the first-person and the objective points of view in cognition. I will illustrate this by discussing Brentano’s disagreement with Marty, his closest pupil, over intentionality and reference. Second, I will argue that this distinction provides a solution to a major dilemma in philosophy of mind concerning the relational or non-relational nature of ‘intentionality’.

1. Brentano on Intentionality and Reference

a. Intentionality

In 1874, in his now-famous ‘intentionality quote’ from the *Psychology*, Brentano affirms (1924, 124–125; transl. Rancurello, Terrell, McAlister, slightly modified):

> Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, relation to a content, direction toward an object (which is not to be understood here as meaning something real), or immanent objectivity. Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself (...).

As this passage shows, ‘intentionality’ expresses the aboutness of the act, not reference. Indeed, for Brentano, that toward what the act is directed is something existing in the mind, an ‘immanent’ object. Every mental act has a relation to such an internal object, also called ‘content’. Brentano says that an ‘immanent’ object is not ‘something real’ (*eine Realität*). He develops this claim in a number of later works, notably in his lectures on psychology from the period 1880–1890 (Brentano 1982). In these lectures, Brentano affirms that an ‘immanent object’ is ‘unreal’. ‘Unreal’ does not mean ‘non-existent’. For Brentano, an ‘unreal entity’, also called ‘being of reason’ (from the Latin ‘*ens rationis*’), is
something which exists, but which cannot exercise nor suffer any causal influence (Brentano 1982, 21; on the distinction between real and unreal entities, see Brentano 2013). Thus, in Brentano’s view, when I think of a centaur, despite the fact that no centaur exists in reality, there is an internal, causally non-efficacious centaur toward which my act is directed.\[1\]

Around 1904, Brentano became unsatisfied with this theory of intentionality. Indeed, according to this theory, mental acts are not directed toward ‘real’ things, but rather toward internal, ‘unreal’ entities. Yet when I think of my cat, I am not thinking about some causally non-efficacious entity, but about a ‘real’ cat, which can act and suffer causal influences. Or as Brentano himself affirms, “it is paradoxical in the highest degree to say that what a man promises to marry is an ens rationis and that he keeps his word by marrying a real person” (Brentano 1930, 204 n. 135; transl. Chisholm, Politzer, Fischer). Put another way, to admit immanent objects would appear to forbid the cognitive access to the outer world. Faced with this problem, Brentano excluded objects of this nature from his ontology. As a consequence, he seems to have abandoned the relational account of intentionality at the ontological level. Indeed, in 1911, he is found to argue that intentionality is not a relation, but rather something ‘relative-like’ (etwas ‘Relativliches’) (Brentano 1925, 134; transl. Rancurrello, Terrell, McAlister, modified):

If someone thinks of something, the one who is thinking must certainly exist, but the object of his thinking need not exist at all. (...) For this reason, one could doubt whether we really are dealing with something relative here, and not, rather, with something somewhat similar to something relative in a certain respect, which might, therefore, better be called something ‘relative-like’. The similarity consists in the fact that, like someone who is thinking of something relative in the proper sense, someone who is thinking of a
mental activity is, in a certain way, thinking of two objects at the same time, one of them *in recto*, as it were, and the other *in obliquo*. If I think of someone who loves flowers, then the person who loves flowers is the object I am thinking of *in recto*, but the flowers are what I am thinking of *in obliquo*.

This text needs some explanation. According to Brentano (1925, 1933), relations have a direction. For example, the relation of heating between the sun and a stone goes *from* the sun *to* the stone. That *from which* a relation starts is the ‘fundament’ of the relation, and that *to which* the relation goes is the ‘term’ of the relation. The distinction between thinking *in recto* and *in obliquo* has to do with relations and their directionality: thinking of something *in recto* means thinking of it as the fundament of a relation, and thinking of something *in obliquo* means thinking of it as the term of a relation. As should be clear from the quote above, for Brentano, when one thinks of a thinking subject, one cannot but think of it as the fundament of a relation, and one cannot but think of an object as the term of this relation. Thus, Brentano, in this text, seems to defend the view that intentionality, although ontologically non-relational, cannot but be thought of as a relation (see Chrudzimski 2001, Chrudzimski and Smith 2004).

Brentano changed his mind on these questions again one or two years before his death. Indeed, in 1915–1916, he appeared to return to a relational account of intentionality at the ontological level. However, since he still rejected immanent objects, he admitted, from that point on, relations without two existing extremes (Brentano 1933, 237–238, 283). According to this account, when I think of a centaur, there is no centaur in reality, nor an ‘unreal’ centaur in my mind, but yet my act, insofar as it is *about* a centaur, is still relational. Thus, intentionality becomes a relation without two
extremes. I will come back to Brentano’s different accounts of intentionality in the evaluative section of this paper. Let us now turn to reference.

b. Reference

Intentionality is not the only relation to an object that Brentano admitted in his philosophy. Importantly, Brentano can be found to say that when the object of a mental act exists in reality, a relation of similarity, in addition to intentionality, holds between the act and the object. Thus, Brentano appears to admit in his theory a relation of reference understood as a sort of similarity. He does not give much explanation about the status of this similarity, except to argue that it is a ‘peculiar’ sort of similarity. In 1904, he writes (Brentano 1952–1966, 324):

The fact that every thinking being has an object, a content, does not mean that it is a relative faced with a correlative. It is directed toward something as an object. When the latter exists, a kind of relation exists, which we could call a similarity in a peculiarly modified sense, between the being that is taken as an object and the thinking being.

Brentano clearly distinguishes this relation of similarity, which holds when the object of the act exists in reality, from intentionality, which holds independently of such existence. In a manuscript of 1908, concerning someone thinking of Jupiter, Brentano puts it very clearly (Ps 34, no. 51045–51046):

If Jupiter were not something imaginary, but something real and which truly exists, then it would enter, along with the thinking being, into a relation which could be described as a kind of correspondence; however, this relation would not be what we call the psychic relation from the thinking being to that which is thought of, but a correspondence of the
thinking being with the thing, on the basis of, on the one hand, the characteristics of the thinking being and, on the other hand, of the thing. Such a relation would have to be classified as a sub-species of the relations of identity and similarity understood in the usual sense.iii

Despite a lack of detail regarding this relation of reference, two points are certain: this relation is not to be confused with intentionality, and, although constituting a ‘peculiar’ relation of similarity, this relation is a genuine relation of similarity, i.e., a ‘sub-species’ of similarity.

Did Brentano maintain over the long term, specifically in his later works, his distinction between intentionality and reference understood as similarity? It appears that he did, since he still defended it in 1916, in a letter to Kraus, a pupil of Marty (Brentano 1952–1966, 309):

I cannot accept what you say about the presenting being, namely that when the presented thing exists, the relation becomes a different one, in the sense that it would be one whose correlate also exists. Rather, a second relation is added to the relation of the presenting being, insofar as the presenting being has something as an object which corresponds to him in reality.

This text is quite intricate. Brentano is criticizing Kraus for following Marty’s theory of intentionality. According to Marty, intentionality is a peculiar, sui generis similarity, called ‘ideal similarity’ (ideelle Ähnlichkeit), holding as a possible relation when a mental act is directed toward a non-existent, but possible object, and as an actual relation when the act is directed toward an existing object (Marty 1908, 421; on Marty’s philosophy, see Cesalli 2006–2009). According to Brentano, when someone thinks of something, if
this something exists, there is not one and the same relation passing from possibility to actuality, but there are two relations, i.e., besides intentionality, a second relation is added to the act, and this second relation expresses the fact that something ‘corresponds’ (entspricht) to the act in reality. I will return, in the evaluative section of this paper, to the reasons that may have led Brentano to reject Marty’s position on intentionality. For the moment, let us just note that in 1916 Brentano still defended his distinction between intentionality and reference.

c. Reference, judgment and truth

Before moving on to evaluate Brentano’s theory, I would like to say a few words on the way in which Brentano’s account of reference fits with his theses on judgment and truth.

As the above-mentioned letter to Kraus would appear to show (Brentano 1952–1966, 309), Brentano’s relation of reference holds at the level of ‘presentations’, not at that of judgments. A presentation, for Brentano, is a mere ‘thinking of’, without any existential commitment. Judgments, by contrast, are mental acts in which one either admits or rejects the existence of objects. Judgments are genuine truth-bearers, whereas presentations are neither true nor false. There is a logical and ontological primacy of presentations above judgments: one can present something without making a judgment about it, but one cannot make a judgment about something without presenting it (on these questions, see, in particular, Brentano 1924–1925, 1930, 1982 and Simons 2004). Now, there is an interesting point to note here: given that, for Brentano, reference holds at the level of presentations, the fact that a mental act refers to reality is independent of whether a thinker judges that the object of his or her presentation exists. As Marty puts it, when “an object corresponds to a presentation”, “the object can be given without that I judge that it is given” (Marty 1908, 417). However, there is clearly an intimate
connexion between the truth or falsity of judgments and the relation of reference that holds at the level of presentations: if I make a judgment about the object of a presentation that refers to reality ‘that this object exists’, my judgment is true, and if I make a judgment ‘that this object does not exist’, my judgment is false.⁴

At first sight, Brentano’s admission of a relation of reference understood as similarity seems to conflict with his position on the correspondence theory of truth. Brentano (1930) criticised the correspondence theory, above all in its classical, medieval form, namely the theory of the ‘adequation of the thing and the intellect’ (adaequatio rei et intellectus).⁵ According to the adequation theory, truth is a relation of similarity between mental acts and reality, more precisely between judgments and reality (see, for example, Aquinas 1970–1976). Brentano considers that this definition of truth cannot apply to true negative existential judgments such as ‘there is no centaur’, since in these cases there is nothing in the world to which the judgment could have a relation of similarity (Brentano does not admit negative truth-makers such as ‘the non-existence of a centaur’) (Brentano 1930, 124). Thus, one might ask whether a conflict exists between Brentano’s account of reference understood as similarity and his criticism of the adequation theory of truth. In my opinion, there are no grounds for conflict. As argued above, Brentano’s relation of reference holds at the level of presentations, not of judgments. Yet the problem created for the adequation theory by true negative existential judgments has no equivalent at the level of presentations. Indeed, for Brentano, there are no negative presentations, for example, no presentations such as ‘non-centaur’ (see Brentano 1924–1925 and Seron 2015, 170). Consequently, it is not possible to claim, against Brentano, that a relation of similarity could not hold between this kind of presentation and reality, contrary to what is the case with true negative existential judgments.
2. In Favour of Brentano

I would like now to move on and evaluate Brentano's position. It should first be said that, in my opinion, the most valuable point in Brentano’s theory is neither his account of intentionality nor his account of reference, but rather the fact that he makes a clear distinction between these two aspects of mental acts. I will therefore devote only a few words to intentionality and a few words to reference before turning my attention to the philosophical significance of Brentano’s distinction itself.

a. Intentionality, again

Brentano himself criticized his early theory of intentionality, in which he admitted ‘immanent objects’. The admission of such ‘unreal’ objects would appear to preclude the cognitive access to the outer world. Indeed, how could my act of thinking of cats refer to cats if it is, in fact, about unreal, causally non-eficacious cats? There are no such cats in the outer world (for more on this, see section 1a above).

Brentano’s view in his very last works, in which intentionality is a relation without two existing extremes, would also appear to be problematic, although not for reasons linked to intentionality itself, but rather for ontological considerations on relations. Indeed, Brentano’s admission of relations without two extremes seems contradictory: relations are precisely the kind of things that need (at least) two existing entities in order to be instantiated.

One possible reason why Brentano maintained a relational account of intentionality is that he wanted the ontology of intentionality to correspond to its phenomenology. Some contemporary authors argue that intentionality is an experience in which something ‘foreign’ is given to the cognizer, both in perception and in intellectual cognition. In other words, in intentionality as experienced, there is, ‘in front
of the cognizer, an ‘ob-jectum’ or a ‘Gegen-stand’, something to which the cognizer relates (see Kriegel 2011, Frey 2013). Now, even if one admits that Brentano is in line with such a description of the experience of intentionality, it would be difficult to accept the possible ontological conclusions he might draw from phenomenology, since this would conflate the way things are experienced and the way they actually are.

What about Brentano in 1911? Usually, Brentano’s interpreters consider that, at that time, he defended an ‘adverbial’ theory of intentionality (see Chisholm 1957, Chrudzimski 2001, Chrudzimski and Smith 2004). As Chrudzimski puts it (2004, 190), according to this view, mental acts are monadic properties, i.e., non-relational properties, acquiring their content thanks to “second-order’ properties (properties of psychic properties) that are typically brought to expression through adverbs”. Thus, to think of a centaur does not entail any relation to anything, but is rather a way of thinking: thinking ‘centaur-ly’ (on adverbialism, see Ducasse 1968, Chisholm 1957).

Although there is no explicit mention of an ‘adverbial’ understanding of intentionality in Brentano, he appears indeed to hold, in 1911, that intentionality is ontologically non-relational. To be sure, a non-relational account of intentionality does not create such obvious problems as those which arise from admitting immanent objects or relations without two existing extremes: it does not preclude the cognitive access to the outer world, nor does it entail any ontological contradiction. To this extent, Brentano’s 1911 account of intentionality is better than all the other accounts he maintained over the years. Yet Brentano also seems to say that intentionality, although ontologically non-relational, can only be thought of as a relation (see Chrudzimski 2001, Chrudzimski and Smith 2004). But then, it becomes difficult to understand how one can still hold that intentionality is ontologically non-relational, given, precisely, that it can only be thought of as a relation. One solution would be to say that Brentano’s claim is weaker than it
might appear: he would argue that the ‘surface grammar’ of intentionality is relational, i.e., that usual reports of intentionality are relational (‘seeing something’, ‘thinking of something’, etc.), and not that one can only think of intentionality as a relation.

b. Reference, again

Brentano does not have a great deal to say about reference. He holds it to be a ‘peculiar’ relation of similarity. It may be peculiar, but it remains a sort a similarity: Brentano clearly states that it is a ‘sub-species’ of similarity. There is no mention of this similarity being a sort of ‘depiction’, nor any talk of anything like ‘pictures’ or ‘images’. One should be relieved not to find such statements in Brentano, since a theory of mental acts understood as pictures is not convincing, at least if taken too literally: are we thinking of sounds, of values, of numbers, etc., through pictures? As Husserl ironically asks, is maybe “the reproduction of my book case (...) a picture of literature and science?” (Husserl 1990–1991, 143; transl. Rollinger). To my knowledge, unfortunately, there is no text where Brentano provides any further explanation of the nature of the similarity in question. However, it should be noted that a substantial part of Brentano’s Nachlass remains unknown (on this Nachlass, see Binder 2012). It is therefore conceivable that further information on these matters may come to light in the future.

c. The distinction itself

Now, as I have already said, in my opinion, the most valuable point in Brentano’s theory is the very distinction itself between intentionality and reference.

To begin with, Brentano’s distinction provides a satisfactory account of the opposition between the first-person and the objective points of view in cognition. This is crucial when it comes to handling false beliefs, including illusions and hallucinations. If
someone, for example, were to hallucinate a cup of coffee on his or her desk, there is,
from the first-person point of view, a cup of coffee on his or her desk, but, from an
objective point of view, no such cup. In Brentanian terms, one would say that the act is
about a cup of coffee, but that there is no relation of reference to such a cup. In a
situation where the cup of coffee were to exist, nothing would change from the first-
person point of view: there would be the visual experience of a particular cup of coffee.
However, from an objective point of view, this time there would be a cup on the desk. In
Brentanian terms, one would say that the act is about a cup of coffee, and that it has also
a relation of reference to the cup in question. From the first-person point of view, there
is no difference between the hallucinatory case and the non-hallucinatory case, but only
from the objective point of view. In Brentanian terms, it is easy to account for this: the
cases are identical in terms of intentionality, but they differ as regards the relation of
reference.

In a theory in which there is no clear distinction between intentionality and
reference, it can prove difficult to account for the opposition between the first-person
and the objective points of view. I would like to illustrate this by returning to the
comparison between Brentano and Marty on intentionality and reference. Brentano’s
views on reference recall Marty’s later position on intentionality. For the late Marty, who
follows Brentano in abandoning ‘immanent objects’, intentionality is a possible or actual
‘ideal similarity’ between a mental act and its object. As Marty puts it (Marty 1908, 421):

We discovered the true meaning of the theory according to which every presentation (or
every consciousness whatsoever) is a relation to an object in that, that each is an actual or
possible ideal assimilation to something (which is precisely called an object).
However, it is important to note that Brentano rejects this view of Marty. Indeed, Brentano thinks that there is not a single relation that is possible when the object is possible and actual when the object exists. As Brentano clearly states in the aforementioned letter to Kraus (Brentano 1952–1966, 309), in every mental act, there is an intentional relation to an object, and if the object exists, a second relation, a relation of similarity, is added to the act. Now, one of the reasons that may have led Brentano to reject Marty’s theory has to do with the opposition between the first-person and the objective points of view. In the example of the cup of coffee above, from the first-person point of view, one and the same thing occurs both in the hallucinatory case and in the non-hallucinatory case: there is a visual experience of a particular cup of coffee. For Marty, in the hallucinatory case, the mental act would have a possible relation of similarity to the cup, and in the non-hallucinatory case, the act would have an actual relation of similarity to the cup. Now, Marty explicitly places his relation of similarity at the level of ‘consciousness’. This would appear to oblige him to conclude that the structure of the mental act is different from the first-person point of view in the hallucinatory case and in the non-hallucinatory one. Yet this conclusion is false: there is only a difference from the objective point of view. Thus, whereas Brentano’s strict distinction between intentionality and reference affords a satisfactory account both of the first-person and the objective points of view, Marty’s conflation of intentionality and reference precludes such an account.

Certainly, a defence of Marty is possible. Marty sometimes appears to contrast, for every presentation, or for every act of consciousness, an underlying ‘psychic process’ and a relation founded on this process (see, for example, Marty 1916, 58). In this case, intentionality would constitute a feature of the underlying, non-relational ‘psychic process’, i.e., the psychic process alone would be responsible for ‘aboutness’. The
relation of similarity would be added to the ‘aboutness’ and would serve to express the fact that the psychic process in question refers, or can refer, to reality.\textsuperscript{x} Note, however, that defending Marty in these terms places him in a position similar to that of Brentano. In other words, Marty’s theory becomes admissible only insofar as he adopts the Brentanian distinction between intentionality and reference.

At a more general level, I think that Brentano’s distinction is a prerequisite of any satisfactory theory of ‘intentionality’ whatsoever. Indeed, in philosophy of mind, intentionality, i.e., aboutness, and reference are not always strictly separated, and this leads to problems at a very basic theoretical level. The great majority of philosophers in the analytic tradition are, broadly speaking, realists, and consider that there is a mind-independent world. Moreover, they consider that it is possible for human beings, as thinking beings, to have cognitive access to this world. Now, such access would appear to amount to a relation of some sort, be it of similarity, or something else, like causality. This leads these philosophers to argue that ‘intentionality’ (i.e., reference) is a relation. However, given that some mental acts are directed toward non-existent objects, it seems difficult to admit that ‘intentionality’ (i.e., aboutness) is a relation. Thus, these philosophers are faced with a dilemma: they want ‘intentionality’ (i.e., reference) to be a relation in order to account for the cognitive access to the world, while they are forced to admit that ‘intentionality’ (i.e., aboutness) cannot always be a relation, since some objects are non-existent. The problem evidently arises from the fact that ‘intentionality’ is used here with two different meanings. This particular dilemma appears clearly in the following passage from Haldane (1996, 96; see also Grossmann 1969, 31):

In any case, and notwithstanding the difficulties in the way of explaining how a thinker can be related to a non-existent, there are significant, prima facie reasons to retain the
assumption that intentionality is a relational phenomenon. For one thing this accords with the grammatical and apparently logical structures of intentional ascriptions; for another it appears to be a necessary condition for the truth of the claim that thought enables us to engage with a mind-independent world.

From a Brentanian view, in which a clear distinction is drawn between, on the one hand, ‘intentionality’, i.e., aboutness, and, on the other hand, reference, one is not forced to conclude from the fact that “thought enables us to engage with a mind-independent world” to the fact that “intentionality is a relational phenomenon”. Our engagement with a mind-independent world does indeed depend on something like a relation, but this relation, precisely, expresses the fact that our mental acts refer to reality, not that they are intentionally directed toward, i.e., about, an object.\textsuperscript{xii} There is nothing incompatible between understanding the cognitive access to the world in terms of a relation and ‘intentionality’, i.e., aboutness, in terms of a monadic property.\textsuperscript{xii}

**Conclusion**

Brentano is famous for having introduced intentionality into contemporary debate, arguing that every mental act is intentionally related to an object. He is less widely known for having made a clear distinction between intentionality and reference. As should now be evident, this distinction clearly exists in his philosophy. For Brentano, intentionality belongs to every mental act, i.e., every mental act is about something. Some mental acts also refer to something, which is the case when their object exists in reality. Brentano changed his views on intentionality on many occasions. In his early work, he had a relational account of intentionality, and admitted ‘immanent objects’ in his ontology. Later, after having rejected such objects, he held that intentionality is
'relative-like', i.e., intentionality is ontologically non-relational, but one cannot think of someone thinking without thinking of him or her as related to an object. At the end of his life, Brentano apparently came back to a relational account of intentionality, by admitting relations without two extremes. As regards reference, Brentano talks of it as a relation, more precisely as a 'peculiar' sort of similarity. There is little more than that to say according to the texts available today. Brentano's accounts of intentionality can certainly be criticized, particularly the first and the last, and his account of reference has not been fully developed, at least in the texts at our disposal. However, the significant point in Brentano's philosophy is the very fact that he makes a distinction between intentionality and reference. As I have argued above, this distinction provides a satisfactory account of the opposition between the first-person and the objective points of view in cognition. Moreover, the absence of such a distinction gives rise to a dilemma at a very basic level in philosophy of mind: one might be tempted to maintain, at one and the same time, that 'intentionality' is a relation, since we are cognizing a mind-independent world, and that 'intentionality' cannot be a relation, since some objects are non-existent. Yet, in fact, there is no such dilemma: 'intentionality', i.e., aboutness, can be a monadic property and our cognitive access to the world can be a relation. In sum, a strict distinction must be drawn between intentionality and reference, as Brentano has shown.
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As a rule, in this paper, I will talk of ‘objects’ in accordance with Brentano in his later works (e.g., 1933, 1952-1966): ‘a is an object’ simply means, from an ontological point of view, that there is a mental act about a; it neither implies that a does exist in reality, nor that a does not exist in reality; furthermore, nor does it mean that a has any kind of existence in the mind of the thinker. To be sure, prior to 1904, Brentano did admit ‘immanent objects’, i.e., internal, mind-dependent entities with a peculiar ontological status. Whenever I discuss objects of this nature, I say it explicitly.

This interpretation of Brentano’s notion of ‘immanent object’ is defended, in particular, in Chisholm 1972, Mulligan and Smith 1985, Chrudzimski 2001. For an alternative reading, which I will not discuss here, see Antonelli 2001, Sauer 2006. On intentionality in the Middle Ages, see Perler 2002.

Sollte es sich nicht um etwas Imaginäres in Jupiter handeln, sondern um etwas Reelles und wirklich Existierendes, so würde zwar von diesem gelten, daß es mit dem Denkenden in einer Relation sei, die als eine Art Übereinstimmung bezeichnet werden könnte, allein diese wäre nicht die s.g. psychische Beziehung des Denkenden zum Gedachten, sondern eine Übereinstimmung des Denkenden mit dem Dinge aufgrund der Eigentümlichkeit des Denkenden einerseits und des Dinges andererseits. Es wäre eine Relation, welche als eine Abart denen der Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit im gewöhnlichen Sinne zuzuordnen wäre. (Franz Clemens Brentano Compositions [MS Ger 230], Houghton Library, Harvard University)

Such statements, even if they are not to be found explicitly in Brentano, can be found in Marty 1908, 417.

For Brentano’s (complicated) theory of truth and his evolution on the topic, see Rojszczak 1994 and Srzednicki 1965.

‘Object’ in Latin, meaning literally ‘thrown in front of’. 
‘Object’ in German, meaning literally ‘staying in front of’.

Note that it would go far beyond the scope of this paper to undertake a general defence of non-relational accounts of intentionality. For a recent defence of adverbialism, see Kriegel 2011.

Brentano’s manuscripts are available to download, with an access code, from the websites of the Franz Brentano Archiv Graz (gams.uni-graz.at/context:bag) and the Houghton Library of Harvard (oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hou01635).

For the attribution of a non-relational theory of intentionality to Marty, see Chrudzimski 2014.

Of course, one could decide to call the cognitive access to the world ‘intentionality’, or even ‘aboutness’, and give another name, for example ‘directedness’, to what Brentano calls ‘intentionality’. But the Brentanian distinction would still remain, albeit called differently. The important point is to make the distinction, regardless of how it is expressed.

Recently, this view was adopted by Kriegel 2011. Furthermore, I recall that the difference between intentionality and reference in contemporary discussions is to be found in Horgan and Tienson 2002, 529.

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