Relations and Intentionality in Brentano’s Last Texts

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Abstract

This paper will present an analysis of the relational aspect of Brentano’s last theory of intentionality. My main thesis is that Brentano, at the end of his life, considered relations (relatives) without existent terms to be genuine relations (relatives). Thus, intentionality is a non-reducible real relation (the thinking subject is a non-reducible real relative) regardless of whether or not the object exists. I will use unpublished texts from the Brentanian Nachlass to support my argument.

Introduction

In this paper, I will discuss the dominant interpretation of Brentano’s reistic theory of intentionality. I will show that intentionality, in Brentano’s last texts, is not a relation-like entity but a genuine relation (the thinking subject is not a relative-like entity, but a genuine relative). At the end of his life, Brentano tends towards a theory in which relations (relatives) without existent terms are genuine relations (relatives). Thus, intentionality is a non-reducible real relation (the thinking subject is a non-reducible real relative) regardless of whether or not the object exists. In other words, intentionality becomes for Brentano what scholars call an “abnormal relation” or a “non-extensional relation”. I will conclude this paper by offering a criticism of Brentano’s last theory of intentionality.

In the course of my argument, I will refer to two series of manuscripts from the Nachlass. The first series is composed of unpublished texts useful for understanding the evolution of Brentano’s thought concerning relations and intentionality. The second is composed of published texts used by A. Kastil in his edition of the Kategorienlehre. I will show that Kastil’s edition is not always faithful to the Brentanian Nachlass. This second draft was presented at the Brentano Conference in 2013 in Salzburg. I thank the participants of both conferences for their remarks, and especially D. Fisette and the anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful feedback.

1 I presented a first draft of this paper at a conference organized by L. Cesalli and C. Majolino in Lille in May 2012. During the conference, G. Fréchette told me that R. Rollinger had discovered significant differences between A. Kastil’s edition of the Kategorienlehre and the original Brentanian manuscripts. I therefore prepared a second draft of the paper, based on Brentano’s Nachlass. This second draft was presented at the Brentano Conference in 2013 in Salzburg. I thank the participants of both conferences for their remarks, and especially D. Fisette and the anonymous referee of this journal for their helpful feedback.
Relations and Relatives

Brentano’s concept of intentionality can be better understood by taking his theory of relations and relatives into account. This theory is inspired by Aristotle’s concept of πρός τι (pros ti), or “toward something” (Cat. VII, 6a36-8b24; Met. Δ, 15, 1020b26-1021b11). For Aristotle, “πρός τι” designates either relations or relatives (Met. Δ, 15, 1021b6-8). Relations, for Aristotle, are sui generis abstract accidents and form one of his categories; an example of a relation is ‘fatherhood’. Relatives are accidental compounds constituted of a substance, or relatum, and a relation; an example of a relative is ‘father’, which is constituted by a substance, or relatum, and the relation of fatherhood. Aristotle states that every relative has a correlative, i.e. that relatives are dependent on one another. This means that no relative can be presented if its correlative is not presented. For example, one cannot present a father without presenting a son, and vice versa. In other words, relatives are epistemologically dependent on one another. But relatives are not only epistemologically dependent. Indeed, no relative can exist without a correlative. Thus, relatives are also ontologically dependent on one another. This means that when a relative exists, namely when a substance bears a relation to another substance, the second substance also exists and has a converse relation to the first substance. For example, if Sophroniscus is the father of Socrates, Sophroniscus is the bearer of a relation, fatherhood; and in parallel, Socrates is the son, and is the bearer of the converse relation, sonship.

Brentano is faithful to Aristotle’s theory. Before the adoption of reism, he admits relations in his ontology, considers relatives to be accidental compounds made of substances and relations, and recognizes the epistemological and ontological dependences of relatives. One text of the Nachlass shows that:

A relation (a πρός τι) is given, when for two things, a predicate applied to one of them involves also the predication of a definite predicate of the other thing.
This is the reason why one says: the existence of one correlative is linked to that of the other, and also the knowledge of one of them is inseparable from that of the other.
Examples: Phaidon is taller than Socrates.
Socrates is shorter than Phaidon.

2 A new edition of the Kategorienlehre is a major Desiderat der Forschung. It would allow for controlling the whole of Kastil’s book. My paper, in contrast, only concerns the texts edited by Kastil on relations and relatives.
3 For the concept of an accidental compound in Aristotle, see Lewis 1991, p. 85–140.
A has a causal influence on B.  
B undergoes an effect due to A. (Ms. Ps 34, Von den Relationen, n°51088 (undated); my translation)⁴

This is an extract from a long manuscript about relations—manuscript Ps 34. This manuscript is partly undated and partly dated 1908. The quoted passage comes from the undated part of the manuscript. It is certainly pre-reistic, since it is written by Brentano himself, who started to have problems with his sight around 1904.⁵ However, here we are interested in reism. As we know, Brentano, after his reistic turn of 1904, reduces his ontology to concrete individual entities, namely things (Dinge), also called realities (Realia) (see Chrudzimski 2004, p. 176–210). Even if he continues to use abstract accidental nouns, for example “quality” and “whiteness”, or “relation” and “fatherhood” (and I follow him, by using “relation” and “intentionality” in this paper), he does not admit abstract accidents anymore—an accident does not exist in abstraction from a substance. Therefore, all accidents become concrete individual wholes with a substance as a part. Thus, for a correct view of a Brentanian correlation in reism, one should keep in mind Brentano’s rejection of abstract accidents. However, the scheme remains similar: a correlation, in reism, entails two interdependent, concrete, relative, accidental wholes, namely two relatives, for example father and son, each having a substance, or relatum, as a part, for example Sophroniscus and Socrates:

1. Brentanian reistic correlation


⁵On Brentano’s sight problems, see the letter from Marty from the 18th of September 1904, in Brentano 1977, p. 110, and Chisholm, Marek 1988, p. 1. In light of the material data from the quoted passage—pen, ink, paper—, G. Fréchette, whom I thank for the information, considers it to be from the end of 1890 or the beginning of 1900.
As we can see, the existence of each concrete relative accidental entity entails the existence of the substance that is part of it: if the father and the son exist, then Sophroniscus and Socrates exist. Now, if one applies this structure to intentionality, one has two relatives, namely a thinking subject and a thought-of thing, and two relata, namely a subject and a thing:

2. Intentional correlation

But Brentano says, after his reistic turn, that “being thought” has no real significance (reale Bedeutung) for the thing of which it is said:

What distinguishes a relative determination from an absolute determination? The answer is this. Whenever one thinks a relative determination in recto, then one also presents something in obliquo. Thus, one who thinks of someone seeing is also thinking in obliquo of something colored that is thus seen. While that which is thought in recto is a relative determination of real significance for some substance, the correlative determination can be a mere denominatio extrinsea. For example, the correlate of that which is thinking is that which is thought, and nothing is changed in the thing by reason of its being thought; indeed, the thing need not even exist in order to be thought. The same holds for the agent which is correlative to something suffering. Nothing changes in the agent insofar as it is active, and a thing that produces aftereffects need not exist at all when he produces these effects. Thus, the correlates here are denominationes extrinsecae. (Kategorienlehre, p. 237–238 (02.03.1916); transl. R. M. Chisholm, N. Guterman, p. 171, slightly modified)\(^6\)

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\(^6\) "Fragt man, was eine relative Bestimmung im Unterschiede von einer absoluten sei, so ist zu antworten, wer eine relative Bestimmung in recto denkt, stellt immer auch etwas in obliquo vor. So denkt einer, der einen Sehenden denkt, in obliquo auch ein Farbiges, das von diesem gesehen wird. Wenn das in recto Vorgestellte eine relative Bestimmung ist, welche für eine Substanz reale Bedeutung hat, so kann die korrelative Bestimmung eine blosse denominatio extrinsea sein. So ist z. B. das Korrelat des Denkenden das Gedachte, und an dem Ding wird dadurch, dass es gedacht wird, nichts geändert; ja es braucht nicht einmal zu sein, um gedacht zu sein. Ähnliches gilt vom Wirkenden, das dem Leidenden als Korrelat entspricht. Am Wirken ändert sich nichts, insofern es wirkend ist, und ein Nachwirkendes braucht selbst gar nicht zu sein, wenn es nachwirkt. So sind denn hier die Korrelate denominationes extrinsecae." (From Ms. 88, Über die Kategorien, n°31006; no important modifications.)
Why? Because if the correlate of the act were real and existent, the second substance, as a part of it, would always be real and existent, since no substance can be part of a real and existent accident without being itself real and existent. Thus, thinking of non-existent objects would be impossible. To say this in non-reistic terms: the mental act is a relation that is sometimes directed upon things that do not exist, in other words a relation directed upon non-existent \textit{relata}. Therefore, a converse real relation in the object should not exist, or else the object would be real and existent, since a real relation cannot exist without being the relation of a real and existent bearer. Thus, as regards intentionality, the only thing that exists is a thinking subject (see Sauer 2006, p. 21–23):\footnote{Before reism, Brentano considered 'being thought' to be an essential attribute of an unreal, existent mind-dependent entity upon which the mental act was directed, namely a “mental correlate” or internal, “intentional object”. Thus, the intentional relation always had an existent term. Recently, some scholars have rejected this traditional interpretation of Brentano’s pre-reistic theory of intentionality: the “mental correlate” and the “intentional object” would not be one and the same entity. For further information, see Sauer 2006, Antonelli 2011 and Fréchette 2013. In this paper, I assume the traditional interpretation: before reism, Brentano admitted unreal existent mind-dependent correlates that were internal, intentional objects. In reism, Brentano rejects the existence of these entities. As a consequence, when the thinking subject thinks of non-existent objects, there is nothing upon which the intentional relation is directed.}

3. Brentanian reistic intentional “correlation”

The problem is that this theory of intentionality entails the existence of a relative, namely the thinking subject, which bears a relation that relates to nothing. Thus, it seems that Brentano admits what scholars call “abnormal” or “non-extensional relations”, namely relations that lack an existent term.\footnote{See Findlay 1968, p. 35, quoted in Haldane 1996, p. 97; for the expression “abnormal relation”, see Grossmann 1969, p. 31–32, 1984, p. 50–51 and 1992, p. 94–95; for the expressions “\textit{nicht-extensionale Relation}” and “non-extensional relation”, see Chrudzimski 2001, p. 239 and Chrudzimski, Smith 2004, p. 216.} Indeed, Brentano never stopped thinking of intentionality as a relation. The following text from 1916 shows this:

\begin{center}
\begin{tikzpicture}[node distance=2cm]
    \node (subject) [fill, circle, inner sep=1pt, text width=1cm, text centered] {Subject \textit{relatum}};
    \node (thought) [fill, circle, inner sep=1pt, text width=1cm, text centered, right of=subject, xshift=2cm, yshift=0.5cm] {Thought-of thing \textit{relatum}};
    \node (relative) [fill, circle, inner sep=1pt, text width=1cm, text centered, above of=subject] {Thinking subject \textit{relative}};

    \draw [dashed] (subject) to (thought);
    \draw (subject) to (relative);
    \draw (thought) to (relative);

\end{tikzpicture}
\end{center}
Whoever presents in recto one who is thinking as one who is thinking also presents in obliquo something which is the object upon which the one who is thinking is directed. One calls this an intentional relation. (Kategorienlehre, p. 282 (29.03.1916); transl. R. M. Chisholm, N. Guterman, p. 199, slightly modified)\(^9\)

To overcome the difficulty, many scholars have argued that Brentano’s last theory of intentionality is not a relational but an adverbial theory, namely a theory in which intentionality is an absolute feature of the subject. The main source of this interpretation is a text of 1911, namely the Appendix to the re-edition of his Psychology, where Brentano affirms that the thinking subject is not a relative but something relative-like (etwas “Relativliches”). Since R.M. Chisholm, interpreters have argued that Brentano denies, from an ontological point of view, the relational aspect of intentionality, and that he maintains only a relational “grammar” for intentionality (Chrudzimski, Smith 2004, p. 216; on the grammar of intentionality, see Chrudzimski 2001, p. 240). What does this mean, exactly? Brentano, in this famous Appendix, says that the difference between the intentional relation and other relations, namely comparative and causal relations, is that the intentional relation does not necessarily have a term, whereas the others always have a term. In other words, the existence of the intentional relation does not imply the existence of something else, so that the intentional relation occurs even when the term upon which it is directed does not exist. However, according to Brentano, the presentation, in modo recto, of someone thinking of something is impossible without the concomitant presentation, in modo obliquo, of the object upon which the thinking subject is directed.\(^10\) Now, in 1911, Brentano, faithful to his pre-reistic theory of relatives, considers that “relatives” whose existence does not imply the existence of something else are not ontologically relative. This seems quite reasonable. Thus, the intentional relation is not a relation from an ontological point of view. However, it is relational from an epistemological or “grammatical” point of view, since the presentation of the thinking subject entails the concomitant presentation of the object upon which the subject is directed. This is why Brentano says that the thinking subject is relative-like; and according to the standard interpretation, “relative-like”,

\(^9\) “[…] wer ein Denkendes als Denkendes in recto vorstellt, stellt auch etwas in obliquo vor, auf welches sich das Denkende als den Gegenstand seines Denkens bezieht. Man nennt das eine intentionale Beziehung.” (From Ms. M 89, Über die Kategorien, n°31050; no important modifications.)

\(^10\) The distinction between modus rectus and modus obliquus is not easy to understand. Following S. Körner and R. M. Chisholm (Körner, Chisholm 1976, p. XVI), I would say that a presentation in modo obliquo is an “indirect” presentation, accompanying another presentation, which is direct, or “normal”, i.e. in modo recto, when this other presentation is the presentation of a relative entity: a relative cannot be presented without a concomitant presentation of that to which it is relative. According to Brentano, these two modes are independent with respect to belief: I can believe that the entity presented in recto exists and at the same time believe that the entity presented in obliquo does not exist, for example when I think of someone thinking of phantoms (Brentano 1977, p. 284–285).
from an ontological point of view, means “non relative”, i.e. “absolute” (see Chrudzimski 2001, p. 235; Chrudzimski, Smith 2004, p. 215–216).

**Intentional Relation and Absolute Features of the Subject**

Traditionally, scholars consider the intentional relation, in Brentano’s reistic theory, to be nothing more than an absolute feature of the subject. However, to my knowledge, Brentano never explicitly affirms that intentionality is an absolute feature. I would now like to present a rather difficult, unpublished text where Brentano discusses interactions between the intentional relation and the absolute features of the subject. This text is from the afore-mentioned manuscript Ps 34, from the dated part of the manuscript. It is a text from 1908, i.e. from the reistic period. I provide a transcription of the text as an appendix to this paper (see Appendix 1).

In this text, Brentano studies three kinds of relations: relations of comparison, causal relations, and intentional relations. According to the text, relations can be founded upon three kinds of fundaments. The first kind of fundament is composed of absolute features that include no reference (Hinweis) to anything else, which means that they are not dependent, for their existence, on anything else. The second kind of fundament is composed of absolute features that include an indefinite reference (unbestimmter Hinweis) to something else, which means that they are dependent, for their existence, on any individual of a certain species. The third kind of fundament is composed of absolute features that include a definite reference (bestimmter Hinweis) to something else, which means that they are dependent, for their existence, on a certain individual. As an example of the first kind, Brentano mentions colours: colours are not dependent on anything else for their existence. As an example of the second kind, Brentano mentions suffering (Leiden): an effect is dependent, for its existence, on something else, namely on a cause; but this dependence is indefinite, in the sense that the same effect can be produced by different individual causes. Brentano gives no example of the third kind of fundament, namely of an absolute entity with a definite ontological dependence on something else. The three aforementioned kinds of relations are analysed according to the distinct kinds of fundaments. The relations of comparison are founded upon absolute features that include no reference to anything else, such as colours or heights: every colour or height can exist without the other. The relation between the effect and the cause is founded upon something that needs something else to exist, like suffering (Leiden): every effect requires a cause. Now, what about the intentional relation? The text is not easy to understand—in particular the following two sentences:

But what else could underlie here the one who is thinking except something absolute or something referring indefinitely? Certainly nothing; rather, it is always a particular
modification of that which we call "thinking" that makes it be something thinking, and it can never happen, like it happens for the one who is taller, that, without itself undergoing a modification, it stops being taller because something else has been modified through growth. (Ms. Ps 34, Von den Relationen, n°51043-51044 (13.05.1908); my translation)\(^\text{11}\)

It seems to me that Brentano establishes the following disjunction: either the intentional relation is founded upon something that is absolute in a strong sense, in other words upon something that does not include a reference to something else, or this relation is founded upon some absolute entity that includes an indefinite reference to something else. I suggest starting with the first part of the disjunction. Why does Brentano say that the intentional relation is founded upon something absolute in a strong sense, i.e. something that depends on nothing else for its existence? Brentano says that what makes something a thinking subject is always a particular modification (besondere Veränderung) of the subject. I believe what he wants to underscore in this text is that mental acts do not depend on something external for their occurrence, as is clear in cases where one thinks of non-exist objects (impossibilia, hallucinations, etc.). Thus, a mental act is the combination of an absolute property dependent only on its subject and an intentional relation joined to this property. Now, what about the second part of the disjunction? In what sense could the intentional relation be founded upon some absolute entity that includes an indefinite reference to something else? In this text, indefinite reference seems to be a matter of ontological dependence: everything referring indefinitely is dependent, for its existence, on any individual of a certain species. However, it seems clear that a mental act is never dependent, for its existence, on something else. Thus, when Brentano says that there is an indefinite reference of the fundament of the intentional relation to something else, he cannot mean that this fundament has an indefinite ontological dependence. In fact, Brentano explains later in the text how the indefinite reference should be understood: it simply means that the mental act can be directed upon indeterminate objects, i.e. universals. It does not mean, in opposition to the reference of the effect to some indeterminate cause, that the mental act is dependent, for its existence, on any individual of a certain species. Thus, in both parts of the disjunction, the intentional relation is founded upon an absolute feature that does not depend, for its existence, on something else. As regards the intentional relation itself, it occurs even when no term of the relation exists, which is not the case for the other relations. In consequence, Brentano says that the intentional

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\(^{11}\) “Aber was läge hier anderes dem Denkenden als absolutes oder nur unbestimmt Hinweisendes unter? Offenbar nichts, vielmehr ist es immer eine besondere Veränderung dessen was wir denkend nennen, die es zum Denkenden macht und nie kann es geschehen, dass es ähnlich wie bei dem Grösseren geschieht, dass es ohne selbst ein<e> Änderung zu erfahren, aufhört grösser zu sein, weil ein anderes durch Wachstum sich verändert hat.”
relation is not a genuine or “true” relation (*eine wahre Relation*). Thus, in 1908, as in 1911, Brentano does not consider relations without a term to be genuine relations. But the grammar of intentionality is relational, since at the end of the text Brentano affirms that the presentation of a thinking subject entails the presentation of the object upon which the subject is directed, just as in 1911.

What should we conclude from this? It seems that Brentano distinguishes the intentional relation from the absolute features of the subject, even if this relation is not a genuine relation. Indeed, he says that this “relation”, like every other relation, is founded upon an absolute feature. Some pages later in the manuscript, while summarizing his theory of relatives, he reduces, from an ontological point of view, relatives of comparison to the absolute features of their bearers—in other words to the fundaments. But he does not speak about a similar reduction with respect to intentionality:

2. Correlatives or correlates based on comparative-type determination. Of that which is compared, each one of them can be something absolute. And when the comparative-type determination is individual, thus it coincides, from the point of view of things, with the individual absolute one. But the correlative determinations commonly seem to be general.[…]

3. Thoughts of which the object is a thought. They are not possible without the object of this thought being also thought-of. In reality, it is not a matter of correlates here. The one thinking can be thought-of as individual, whereas the object upon which it is directed is general, and this one does not really have to be in order to be an object for a real thinker. […] (Ms. Ps 34, *Von den Relationen*, n°51058-51060 (13-14.05.1908); my translation)

The fact that he does not speak about a reduction with respect to intentionality is not proof of the absence of such a reduction, but it is somehow a clue to it—I will come back to the question of the general reduction of relatives in Brentano later in this paper. However, one could consider this system very odd. Why should Brentano, in his theory of intentionality, require, beyond the absolute features of the subject, a non-genuine relation to something else, a *sui generis* relation-like entity? Unfortunately I do not have a clear answer to this question. Maybe Brentano wants his ontology to correspond to the grammar of intentionality, because of what A.

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Chrudzimski calls Brentano’s “empiricism of concepts” (*Begriffsempirismus*), namely the theory advocating that our concepts are all derived from concrete empirical intuitions (Chrudzimski 2001, p. 71–74). Thus, if we have, grammatically, an irreducible concept of a relation without a term, which cannot be translated into a concept referring to an already-known reality—for example into a concept of something absolute—, then this irreducible concept must come from a concrete empirical intuition—in other words from something real that has this odd ontological structure. Thus, in 1908, the relational-like intentional relation seems to be a *sui generis* entity, distinct from the absolute features of the subject.

**Reversal: Relations (Relatives) Without Terms**

Apparently, in 1908, and probably in 1911, intentionality is neither a genuine relation nor an absolute feature of the subject, but a *sui generis* relation-like entity founded upon an absolute feature. Brentano's reason for rejecting the relational aspect of intentionality is the absence of a term for some mental acts. In other words, Brentano, in 1908 and 1911, considers an entity to be relative only if its existence implies the existence of a term. But I believe things change in 1915-1916. Indeed, in his last texts (Brentano died in 1917), Brentano affirms that there can be relatives without existent terms:

> It is clear that the terminus to which the relative determination relates need not always to exist in order for the relative determination to exist. This is obviously the case with the intentional relation between the one who is presenting and that which he presents, between the one who is denying and that which he denies, and between the one who is desiring and that which he desires. ([*Kategorienlehre*, p. 283 (29.03.1916); transl. R. M. Chisholm, N. Guterman, p. 200, slightly modified])

The text of [*Kategorienlehre*](https://www.zbw.eu/servlet/entry/25799) p. 237–238 quoted above also shows this. In fact, in 1915–1916, many relatives, for Brentano, are relatives without terms; and they are genuine relatives. The causal relatives, opposed in 1908 and 1911 to the intentional relative-like entities, are in 1915–1916 no longer considered to be necessarily directed upon an existent term; and they are still genuine relatives. In the aforementioned text of [*Kategorienlehre*](https://www.zbw.eu/servlet/entry/25799), p. 237–238, Brentano says that the cause of an aftereffect (*Nachwirkung*) can be non-existent when the aftereffect occurs. In brief, there is a reversal in Brentano’s ontology of relatives.

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13 “Es ist klar, dass nicht immer der Terminus, zu welchem die relative Bestimmung in Beziehung setzt, bestehen muss, damit die relative Bestimmung selbst Bestand habe. So ganz offenbar bei der intentionalen Beziehung des Vorstellenden zu dem, was er vorstellt, des Leugnenden zu dem, was er leugnet, des Begehrenden zu dem, was er begehrt.” (From Ms. M 89, Über die Kategorien, n°31051; no modifications.)
Brentano’s reversal concerning relatives is often thought to be established in a text of the *Kategorienlehre* called “On that which is relative to something” (*Von dem zu Etwas sich Verhaltenden*; p. 166–176 of the book, more specifically p. 169):

The question is easily answered if we take care to avoid mere verbal disputes and if we attend to the distinctive characteristic which holds of all relational thinking. Whether this thinking is merely presentational, or whether it involves judgment or emotion, it always involves a multiplicity of presentations, a presentation having different modes. One thing is presented *in modo recto* and another *in modo obliquo*.

*The thing presented in modo recto must exist, if the relation is to exist, but not the thing presented in modo obliquo*—except in some special cases, for example someone acknowledging with evidence cannot exist unless the thing that is acknowledged by him also exists.

Thus we have succeeded in finding the unitary concept we were looking for all relatives: when we are concerned with that which is relative to something, we are concerned with nothing other than determinations which are such that, in presenting them, one presents something *in recto* and something *in obliquo*. (*Kategorienlehre*, p. 169; transl. R. M. Chisholm, N. Guterman, p. 127, modified)\(^\text{14}\)

However, this text is a construction of Kastil’s. Indeed, Kastil combines two different manuscripts, namely the manuscript Ps 8, “*Von dem zu Etwas sich Verhaltenden*”, dated January 1915, and the manuscript M 76, *Zur “Metaphysik”*, dated December 1915 (see Appendix 2a and 2b). The text of the *Kategorienlehre* seems to say that the requirement of the existence of a term should be rejected for all relatives. Indeed, after having rejected this requirement for the intentional relatives, the text says: “Thus we have succeeded in finding the unitary concept we were looking for for all relatives” (*Und damit haben wir auch schon den gesuchten einheitlichen Begriff für alles Relative gefunden*). Now, this sentence, that Kastil uses to link two passages from the two different manuscripts, is very probably his own work, since it is absent from both manuscripts. In the manuscript M 76, right before the passage used by Kastil, Brentano talks about relatives of comparison, and seems to say that they do not always require a term. Right after the passage, the manuscript contains a text

\(^{14}\)“*Die Frage löst sich leicht, wenn man Sorge trägt, allen Wortstreit zu vermeiden und auf die Eigentümlichkeit achtet, welche dem beziehenden Denken allgemein zukommt. Mag dieses ein blass vorstellendes oder auch ein urteilendes oder sich gemütlich beziehendes sein, immer handelt es sich dabei um eine Mehrheit von Vorstellen, um ein Vorstellen mit verschiedenen Modis. Es wird ein Ding in modo recto und eines in modo obliquo vorgestellt. Das in modo recto Vorgestellte muss sein, wenn das Relative sein soll, das in modo obliquo Vorgestellte aber nicht, ausser in ganz besonderen Fällen, wie z. B. ein evident Anerkennender nicht sein kann, ohne dass das von ihm anerkannte Ding existiert. Und damit haben wir auch schon den gesuchten einheitlichen Begriff für alles Relative gefunden: Es handelt sich bei dem zu etwas sich Verhaltenden um nichts anderes als um solche Bestimmungen, wo man, indem man sie vorstellt, etwas in recto und etwas in obliquo vorstellt.*”
edited by Kastil five pages later in his book (p. 174; I will quote this text below). The second part of the text comes from the manuscript Ps 8. The manuscript says only that some relatives probably do not require a term. Thus, even if in these manuscripts Brentano is saying that intentional relatives and relatives of comparison do not require a term, he does not explicitly apply this to all relatives, and nor does he talk about a “unitary concept” (einheitlicher Begriff). In brief, the text of Kategorienlehre, p. 169, is not as decisive as it looks. It is useful to emend this text, since scholars quote it frequently. Nevertheless, despite this emendation, the other texts I have mentioned, namely Kategorienlehre, p. 237–238 and p. 283, show that Brentano changed his ontology of relatives around 1915: here, many relatives lack an existent term, and they are genuine relatives.

**Rejection of Relations (Relatives)?**

Of course, even if Brentano apparently admits these odd relatives without terms, one could object that this reversal does not imply that these relatives are real. A counterargument could be that Brentano generally thinks that relatives are not real. This would somehow save Brentano: since in general, Brentano is not a realist about relatives, he does not admit these odd real relatives without terms. Brentano’s anti-realism with regard to relations is defended by B. Smith and A. Chrudzimski (Smith 1994, p. 100–102; Chrudzimski 2004, p. 183–188). Smith thinks that relations in Brentano, or “relative determinations” (relative Bestimmungen), are not real accidents, but are instead subjective (at least according to Brentano’s “official theory”; i.e. Smith recognizes that there seem to be passages in which Brentano defends a realist position on relations). Smith says that a relative determination, for Brentano, is a point of view on something. Thus, I can either present something absolute as the absolute it really is, or I can present it as a relative, i.e. I can mentally link it to something else. Smith claims to follow Marty’s correct interpretation of Brentano’s (“official”) theory. Now, it seems to me that Smith misunderstands Marty. Indeed, Marty, in Raum und Zeit, says that relations in Brentano are not real. But he does not affirm that they are subjective; rather he says that they are objective modes of presentation (Vorstellungsmodi). This means that relations, in Brentano, are ways of presenting two entities as linked together, according to the modes of presentation in recto and in obliquo, but with the possibility of having true or false judgements based on these complex presentations. The possibility of true or false judgements

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15 See Gilson 1955, p. 139, who studies in detail Brentano’s evolution concerning relatives, and rightly insists on the admission, by Brentano, of real relatives without existent terms; Smith 1994, p. 100; Chrudzimski 2001, p. 239; Sauer 2006, p. 21, who briefly presents the evolution of Brentano concerning relatives; Antonelli 2011, p. XLVI. Probably that the first author who identified a reversal in Brentano’s theory of relatives was O. Kraus, but he did it before Kastil’s edition of the Kategorienlehre (see Kraus 1924, p. XXIV-XL).
would not be given if relations were subjective (Marty 1916, p. 148–150). Thus, Smith’s interpretation of Marty is not correct. Moreover, and above all, Brentano refuses the anti-realist interpretation Marty makes. He says clearly to Kraus that it is wrong to consider relations—or, in reistic terms, “relatives”—to be modes of presentation (Vorstellungsmodi); on the contrary, he strongly affirms that they are real:

So, according to me, a relation (I would prefer to say a relative) would not be an object of presentation, but a peculiar mode of presentation. This is perfectly false. A relative can be presented in modo recto and in modo obliquo, like an absolute. Moreover, it can have existence, as it is the case for an absolute; indeed, I include it in reality, as it is the case for an absolute. The relative is not a mode of presentation; but what is true is that the one who is presenting the fundament of a relative in modo recto presents its correlative terminus in modo obliquo. (Die Abkehr vom Nichtrealen, p. 310-311 (05.07.1916); my translation)16

It seems to me that this text from July 1916 is proof of Brentano’s realism concerning relations. However, this seems to contradict some of his other texts, in which he questions the reality of relations. Brentano says that something can become relative or stop being relative through a modification occurring in something else; he mentions this point in a text of the Kategorienlehre, p. 120–121, quoted by Chrudzimski (Chrudzimski 2004, p. 184 n. 177). As such, one could infer that Brentano rejects the reality of relatives, since these entities do not fall under the criterion of causality that defines reality: real entities have proper generation and corruption and can enter by themselves into causal interactions, whereas unreal entities have generation and corruption depending on the generation and corruption of something else, and cannot enter by themselves into causal interactions.17 Yet we cannot be certain that Brentano thinks, in his last texts, that something becomes relative or stops being relative through a modification occurring in something else. Indeed, he admits that some relative entities, namely comparative relatives and intentional relatives, subsist even if their correlate changes or disappears:

In many cases the linguistic expression concerning relativa says more than the mere


17 On this definition of reality in Brentano, see Brentano Ms. Ps 34, Von den Relationen, n°51075 (undated part), Ms. M 74, Das Seiende (für Marty), n°30867 (undated), and Brentano 2013, p. 466-467, already discussed before its publication in Chrudzimski 2004, p. 138–139.
relating, since it also expresses the acknowledgement of something that lies outside that which is thought of in modo recto. This is what happens if I say “Caius is taller than Titus” which comes to the same thing as “Caius is taller than Titus is.” Just this fact, that an assertion is here being made about something outside the subject, leads one to suppose that the relative attribute were lost without there being a modification in the subject. But this illusion is dispelled once we have brought into clear focus the pure relative attribute.

But with this also disappears all motivation for refusing to consider the relative determinations that we ascribe to things as real as every absolute one. (Kategorienlehre, p. 174 (16.12.1915); transl. R. M. Chisholm, N. Guterman, p. 130–131, modified)\(^\text{18}\)

Aristotle himself allows one exception, for he says, with respect to one of his classes of relations, that it is real but that it does not have a real correlate. Here he is speaking of the relation of the one who is thinking to that which is thought. That which is thought is merely an ens rationis. When we consider this accurately, thus, what Aristotle affirms concerning the other classes does not hold for this one – namely, that the relative attribute can come into being or pass away without there being any modification of the subject. To be sure, that which the one who is thinking thinks need not exist. This is obvious in the case of a thinker who denies something with evidence, for this case rules out the being of the thing denied. (Kategorienlehre, p. 167-168 (16.12.1915); transl. R. M. Chisholm, N. Guterman, p. 126, modified)\(^\text{19}\)

In a letter to Kraus (3\(^\text{rd}\) of April 1915), Brentano affirms that Gaius is still taller than Titus when Titus disappears, since Gaius is still taller than Titus was when the comparison was made (Brentano 1977, p. 284–285). The idea seems to be that the

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\(^{18}\) “Der sprachliche Ausdruck für Relativa besagt in vielen Fällen mehr als das blose Beziehen, indem er nämlich auch die Anerkennung von etwas ausspricht, was ausserhalb des in modo recto Gedachten liegt. So ist es, wenn ich sage, „Caius ist grösser als Titus“, was ja so viel heisst wie „Caius ist grösser, als Titus ist“. Eben dieser Umstand, dass hier noch über etwas ausserhalb des Subjektes eine Aussage gemacht wird, erzeugt den Anschein, als ginge das relative Attribut verloren ohne Änderung am Subjekte. Sobald wir aber das, was blass relatives Attribut ist, rein herausheben, verschwindet dieser Schein. Damit entfällt aber auch jedes Motiv, die relativen Bestimmungen, die wir den Dingen beilegen, nicht ebenso gut als reale gelten zu lassen wie irgend eine Absolute.” (From Ms. M 76, Zur “Metaphysik”, n°30878; important modifications. However, Kastil’s edition is faithful to the meaning of the manuscript; for the original text, see Appendix 3.)

\(^{19}\) “Aristoteles selbst lässt von dem Satze eine Ausnahme gelten, indem er von einer seiner Relationsklassen lehrt, dass sie zwar real sei, aber kein reales Korrelat habe. Es ist dies die Relation des Denkenden zum Gedachten. Das Gedachte ist ja blass ens rationis. Sieht man genau zu, so gilt von dieser Klasse nicht, was Aristoteles von den andern behauptet, dass das relative Attribut ohne Änderung am Subjekt entstehen oder vergehen könne. Das, was das Denkende denkt, braucht ja nicht zu sein. Recht klar tritt das hervor im Falle, wo ein Denkendes etwas mit Evidenz leugnet. Hier ist ja das Sein des Geleugneten ausgeschlossen.” (From Ms. M 76, Zur “Metaphysik”, n°30876-30877; important modifications. However, Kastil’s edition is faithful to the meaning of the manuscript; for the original text, see Appendix 4.)
disappearance of Titus does not make Gaius shorter or taller than something having the height that Titus had before he disappeared. As for the intentional relation, it does not disappear when the object changes, in the sense that I can continue to think of something as such and such even if it undergoes change and is not such anymore. Moreover, I think that Brentano abandoned the causal definition of reality during his reistic period, and thought that the concept of reality was a primitive concept. In another letter to Kraus (8th of November 1914), Brentano affirms that Marty is wrong when he says that "real" is equivalent to "able to have a causal effect" (Wirkungskräftig). Indeed, reality, or "thing", Ding, is the highest and simplest concept, and cannot be analysed by using a particular accidental category, which, as every accidental category, is subordinated to the concept of reality (Brentano 1930, p. 107–109 and 1977, p. 250–252). Thus, the concept of reality does not include causality as a logical part. In sum, even if the acquisition or loss of a relation occurs without any causal influence on its bearer, it is not certain that this fact would exclude its reality for the later Brentano.

Now, there are other arguments against the admission of relations in Brentano. One could say that Brentano is a moderate realist when it comes to relations: relations are real, but reducible to absolute features of their bearers. Indeed, Brentano sometimes says himself that relatives are constituted by nothing more than a collection of absolute features, for example in the aforementioned text of the Kategorienlehre, p. 120–121. Now, Kastil argues, in the notes of his edition, that this text is part of Brentano’s antepenultimate theory of categories—the ultimate theory being that of 1916.20 I agree with this chronology. Indeed, I believe that in 1916 Brentano refuses to reduce all relations to absolute features of their bearers. In the manuscript M 76, Zur “Metaphysik”, of December 1915, Brentano argues that relations—or “relative determinations” (relative Bestimmungen)—are real, but reducible to the categories of the absolute accidents on which they depend. Thus, they do not form a proper category of accidents:

It follows from that which has already been discussed that even if the relative determinations are as real as the absolute one, no definite class of relative accidents should be admitted. (Ms. M 76, Zur “Metaphysik”, n°30888 (16.12.1915); my translation)21

Neither for the "How tall?", nor for the "Where?", nor for the "When?", nor for doing, nor for wearing, nor for the position, nor for the relation should definite categories be

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21 "Aus dem bereits Erörterten ergibt sich, dass wie immer die relativen Bestimmungen ebensogut real sind, wie die absoluten, doch keine besondere Klasse von relativen Akzidenzien angenommen werden darf"
It is false to consider relative determinations to be non real determinations, but it is also false to consider them to be real determinations from another category than the absolute to which they belong [...]. (Ms. M 76, Zur "Metaphysik", n°30906 (16.12.1915); my translation)22

But in 1916, in a text published in the Kategorienlehre, p. 239–242, taken from the manuscript M 88, Über die Kategorien, of March 1916, Brentano affirms that relative determinations do form a proper category of accidents. Indeed, he talks of “relative accidental determinations" (relative akzidentelle Bestimmungen); and this expression is not Kastil’s (see Brentano Ms. M 88, Über die Kategorien, n°31008 (02.03.1916)). Therefore, Brentano rejects what he defended in 1915, and now admits proper classes of relational accidents. This seems to me to forgo any general reduction of relations in Brentano’s philosophy. Moreover, in a text of 1916 published in the Kategorienlehre, Brentano gives the following list of relations: categorial, causal, boundary, intentional, and comparative relations. Then, he says that the last class, that of relations of comparison, is reducible to absolute properties of the bearer—a relation of comparison is nothing more than an absolute property given in an indeterminate way (for example, 'shorter than 1m 85' is a height given in an indeterminate way). Thus, by contrast, this is not the case for the other classes of relations:

These modes of real relation further include the previously mentioned relations of the one who is suffering to the agent, of boundary to bounded, and of the one who is thinking to that which is thought. Comparative determinations were also possible in all cases. They coincided, when one discounted the denominationes extrinsecæ they contained, with the substantial or accidental reality which is underlying them as fundament, just as the reality of a universal determination coincides with the individual reality. (Kategorienlehre, p. 259 (02.03.1916); transl. R. M. Chisholm, N. Guterman, p. 185, modified)24

22 “Weder für das "Wie gross?"<,> noch für das "Wo?"<,> noch für das "Wann?", noch für das Tun, noch für das Anhaben, noch für die Lage, noch für die Relation sind eigene Kategorien anzunehmen."

23 “Dass die relativen Bestimmungen nicht reale Bestimmungen seien, ist falsch, aber auch, dass sie reale Bestimmungen von anderer Kategorie seien, als das Absolute, dem sie zukommen [...].”

24 “Zu diesen Weisen realer Beziehung kommen dann noch die schon genannten des Leidenden zum Tuenden, der Grenze zum Begrenzten und des Denkenden zum Gedachten. Die Vergleichsbestimmungen waren auch überall möglich. Sie fielen, wenn man von dem absah, was sie von denomination extrinsecæ enthielten, mit dem ihnen als Fundament unterliegenden substanziellen oder akzidentellen Realen zusammen, ähnlich wie das Reale einer universellen Bestimmung mit der individuellen Realität.” (From Ms. M 88, Über die Kategorien, n°31025 (02.03.1916); no important modifications.)
Thus, since in 1916 relations without terms are admitted, since they are real, since relations constitute a proper accidental category, and since only comparative relations are reducible to absolute features of their bearer, it becomes difficult to explain how the intentional relation could be anything other than a non-reducible real relation.

**Conclusion**

Brentano’s last theory of intentionality is not easy to accept. Saying that a relation can exist without a term seems to be a contradictory affirmation. Husserl, in his third *Logical Investigation*, § 11, says that it is an “analytic necessity” (*analytische Notwendigkeit*) that no relative exists without an existent correlative (Husserl 1901/1984, vol. 1, 257.5–9). Brentano himself, in 1911, in *Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung*, argues that this rule is an “axiom”, in other words an *a priori* knowledge, or an “immediate evident negative judgement” (Brentano 1911/1977, p. 33–35). Thus, it is rather odd to see Brentano change his mind a few years later by admitting relations without terms. And, as I pointed out earlier, it doesn’t seem possible to argue that Brentano is not a realist of relations or that he reduces them to absolute features. Indeed, I think that Brentano’s problem is his realism of relations. His radical realism leads him to admit relations without terms. It is not a problem to think of the grammar of intentionality as relational. But why should we conclude that this grammar entails the admission of a corresponding real relation without a term? In the same spirit, it is not a problem to admit that aftereffects exist. But why should we say that a relation to a non-existent cause is real? A conceptualism of relations would have been a better solution. Now, as I have pointed out, Brentano’s “empiricism of concepts” (*Begriffsempirismus*), which requires all our concepts to come from concrete empirical intuitions, probably leads him to admit, for every primitive untranslatable concept, a corresponding real entity. Thus, he is somehow forced to admit real relations without terms. Be that as it may, as regards intentionality I think that Brentano could have avoided the problem of relations without terms. I think that Brentano’s last theory of intentionality is the result of a complex conjunction of incompatible philosophical decisions. Many other solutions would have been possible. A first solution would have been to say that intentionality is an absolute feature of the subject. But Brentano seemingly refused this solution. A second solution would have been to admit a peculiar ontological mode of being for non-existent objects, as he did before reism with his “intentional object”, and as Meinong did too. Thus, a relation to a non-existent object would not have been a relation without a term. A third solution would have been to say that intentionality is a potential relation to an object, like Marty does in his last theory of intentionality: if the object exists, the relation is actual, and if the object does not exist, the relation is potential (Marty 1908, p. 408–413). But Brentano does not adopt these solutions: the
more-than-peculiar intentional relation without a term seems to be his last word concerning intentionality. For our part, we should take from this that if we want intentionality to always be a real, actual relation, we have to admit intentional or Meinongian objects in some cases; if we refuse to do this, then we should treat intentionality, at least in these cases, as an absolute feature of the subject.
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Appendix 1


Sieht man aber näher zu, so findet man, dass ein solches andere hier überhaupt gar nicht im eigentlichen Sinne existiert. In dem der Denkende denkend wird, geschieht es dass man sich auch des Ausdrucks bedienen kann, das was e denkend[e] zum Objekt habe, werde von ihm gedacht, möge es nun sein oder nicht sein, wie ja z. B. auch wenn einer Jupiter denkt, gesagt werden kann, dass Jupiter von ihm gedacht werde, obwohl derselbe nicht sei. Sollte es sich nicht um etwas Imaginäres in Jupiter handeln, sondern um etwas Reelles und wirklich Existierendes, so würde zwar von diesem gelten, dass es mit dem Denkenden in einer Relation sei, die als eine Art Übereinstimmung bezeichnet werden könnte, allein diese wäre nicht die s.g. psychische Beziehung des Denkenden zum Gedachten, sondern eine Übereinstimmung des Denkenden mit dem Dinge aufgrund der Eigentümlichkeit des Denkenden
einerseits und des Dinges anderseits. Es wäre eine Relation, welche als eine Abart denen der Gleichheit und Ähnlichkeit im gewöhnlichen Sinne zuzuordnen wäre. Man hat es also nicht wie bei den auf Vergleich beruhenden Relationen und bei den auf Leiden und Tun eruhenden mit einer wahren Relation zu tun, vielmehr hat der Fall noch eher Ähnlichkeit mit dem des Leidenden in dem Sinn, in welchem es sich um denselben Leidenden handelt kann, während das Tätige wechselt; er bleibt ja wie wir sagten als Leidender dasselbe, nur freilich erscheint im allgemeinen ein Tätiges gefordert. Wie das Gedachte etwas an sich gar nicht Existierendes sein kann, so kann es, da wir ja manchmal allgemeine Gedanken denken, auch etwas unbestimmtes sein. Indess sehen wir, dass der Fall des Leidens sowohl als der des Denkens, wenn auch beide nicht als solche zu den Relationen zu rechnen sind, doch insofern eine Ähnlichkeit damit haben, als auch hier der, welcher am Leidenden oder Denkenden denkt, sich als solcher mit mehreren Objekten zugleich befasst; der, welcher den Leidenden denkt, befasst sich auch mit einem Tätigen wenn auch unbestimmt[,] (welcher) und wer den Denkenden denkt auch mit dem, was Gegenstand des Denkens ist, mag es nun existieren oder nicht. Und dieser Ähnlichkeit wird es ein Bedürfnis sein, auch sprachlich Ausdruck zu geben und so tun wir indem wir sagen, es beziehe sich das Leidende auf ein Tätiges und das Denkende auf ein Gedachtes. Dies kann keinen Schaden bringen, so lange man sich die wesentliche[n] Verschiedenheit der betreffenden Fälle klar im Bewusstsein erhält.

Ms. Ps 34, Von den Relationen, n°51040-51048 (13.05.1908)

Appendix 2a

Die Streitfrage löst sich leicht, wenn man Sorge trägt, alle Wortstreitigkeiten zu vermeiden (...) Um volle Klarheit in die Sache zu bringen, wird es gut sein auf die Eigentümlichkeit des Denkens aufmerksam zu machen, welche dem beziehenden Denken allgemein zukommt. Mag dasselbe ein bloss Vorstellendes oder auch ein Urteilendes oder sich gemütlich Beziehendes sein. Immer handelt es sich dabei um eine Mehrheit von Vorstellen und um ein Vorstellen mit verschiedenen Modis. Es wird ein Objekt in modo recto und ein Objekt in modo obliquo vorgestellt. Das in modo recto Vorgestellte Objekt muss sein, wenn das relativ sein soll, das in modo obliquo Vorgestellte aber nicht, ausser in ganz besonderen Fällen, wie z. B. ein evident Anerkennender nicht sein kann, ohne dass das von ihm anerkannte Objekt existiert.

Ms. M 76, Zur "Metaphysik", n°30877-30878 (16.12.1915); source of Kategorienlehre, p. 169
Appendix 2b

Wenn man nur alles das erwägt, so möchte man vielleicht sagen, dass es sich bei dem zu etwas sich Verhaltenden um nichts anderes als solche Bestimmungen handle, bei welchen man, wenn man sie vorstellt, etwas in recto und etwas in obliquo vorstellt.

Ms. Ps 8, Vom dem zu etwas sich Verhaltenden, n°50028 (08.01.1915); source of Kategorienlehre, p. 169

Appendix 3

Allein es geschieht oft, dass der sprachliche Ausdruck auch in anderen Fällen mehr sagt, als das blosse Beziehen und auch noch über etwas, was ausserhalb des in modo recto Gedachten liegt, eine Anerkennung enthält. Und so ist es, wenn ich sage, Caju ist grösser als Titus, was ja soviel heisst wie: ist grösser als Titus ist. Damit dass hier auch noch über etwas, was ganz ausser dem Subjekte liegt, eine Aussage gemacht wird, ist klar, warum das scheinbar bloss relative Attribut verloren gehen kann, ohne Änderung an dem Subjekte. Es ist aber ebenso klar, dass sobald wir das, was bloss relatives Attribut ist, rein herausheben, diese Möglichkeit entfällt. Damit entfällt dann aber auch jeder Schein, als ob die relativen Bestimmungen, die wir einem Dinge beilegen, nicht ebensogut als real gelten sollten, als irgendein Absolutes.

Ms. M 76, Zur "Metaphysik", n°30878 (16.12.1915); source of Kategorienlehre, p. 174

Appendix 4

Eigentümlich ist da, dass Aristoteles, indem er mehrere Klassen von Relativen unterscheidet, bei einer von ihnen lehrt, dass sie zwar real sei, aber kein reales Korrelat habe. Es ist dies die Relation des Denkens zum Gedachten. Das Gedachte ist ja bloss ens rationis. Sieht man genau zu, so gilt von dieser Klasse nicht, was Aristoteles von den anderen behauptet, dass das relative Attribut ohne Änderung am Subjekt gewonnen oder verloren werden könne.