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## The ‘Intellected Thing’ (*res intellecta*) in Hervaeus Natalis\*

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### Abstract

This paper analyses the ontological status of the ‘intellected thing’ (*res intellecta*) in Hervaeus Natalis. For Hervaeus an intellected thing is not a thing in the outer world, but something radically different, namely an internal, mind-dependent entity, something having a peculiar mode of being, ‘*esse obiective*’. While Hervaeus often says that the act of intellection is directed upon real things, this does not mean that the act is directed upon things existing actually outside the mind. Hervaeus argues that the act of intellection is directed upon things existing ‘aptitudinally’ outside the mind, not actually outside the mind. A thing existing aptitudinally outside the mind is a mind-dependent entity, something having *esse obiective*. In order to establish this point, I will explain how the property ‘being intellected’ (*esse intellectum*) should be interpreted in Hervaeus’ philosophy. This property is a peculiar type of relation, namely a relation of reason that gives a peculiar ontological status to its bearer. To neglect the distinction between actually outside and aptitudinally outside could falsely lead one to ascribe to Hervaeus a theory of intellection where the mental act is directed upon mind-independent entities.

Hervaeus Natalis’ theory of intentionality is becoming increasingly interesting to historians of medieval philosophy. The most detailed considerations of Hervaeus concerning intentionality are found in his *Treatise on Second Intentions* (*Tractatus de secundis intentionibus*), composed between 1307 and 1317, most probably in 1313.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Two recent editions (one complete, the other partial) of the *Treatise* exist: Hervaeus Natalis, *On Second Intentions*, ed. and trans. J.P. Doyle (Milwaukee, 2008); Hervaeus Natalis, *De secundis intentionibus. Distinctiones I & II*, ed. J. Dijs, PhD dissertation, University of Leiden, 2012. Doyle’s Latin text is based on the Paris edition of 1489 of Hervaeus’ *Treatise* (*Tractatus magistri Hervei Doctoris perspicacissimi de secundis intentionibus*, Georgius Mitelhuss, Paris, 1489), emended on the basis of three manuscripts. Dijs provides a critical edition. Thus, I will use Dijs’ text for qq. 1-2 and Doyle’s text for the rest of the *Treatise*.

In this treatise, Hervaeus' main interest concerns logic. Indeed, the aim of the treatise is to study the nature of the subject of logic, namely second intentions, i.e., concepts of concepts, for example 'species' or 'genus', ascribed to first intentions, i.e., concepts of things, for example 'man' or 'animal'.<sup>2</sup> But an interesting feature of the treatise, from the point of view of the history of intentionality, is the complex analysis of intellection that it provides. Indeed, since both second and first intentions are objects of the intellect, Hervaeus, in his treatise, deals at length with their ontological status as objects, focusing on the notion of *esse obiective in intellectu* (being objectively in the intellect) or *esse intellectum* (being intellected) (for Hervaeus "*esse obiective in intellectu* is the same as *esse intellectum*"<sup>3</sup>). It is well known that some medieval philosophers consider *esse obiective* to be an ontological mode proper to objects of thought and distinct from the ontological mode of the things in the outer world.<sup>4</sup> More precisely, they distinguish the efficient cause of intellection from its term (*terminus*). The efficient cause is as a thing in the outer world, acting initially on the sense organs, and mediately on the intellect, by the intermediary of an internal sensory image or 'phantasm' (*phantasma*): the active part of the intellect, the agent intellect, abstracts an intelligible from the image of the thing and impresses this intelligible on the passive part of the intellect, the possible intellect.<sup>5</sup> As a result of this process, there is the act of intellection, which is intentionally directed upon an object. This object is the term (*terminus*) of the act of intellection. It has a peculiar mode of being, namely being in the mind, '*esse obiective in anima*'. In sum, these

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Unless otherwise specified, I will follow Doyle's translation; I will notably modify this translation when Dijs gives a different Latin text. For the dating of Hervaeus' work in general and the *Treatise* in particular, see Doyle, 'Introduction', in Hervaeus Natalis, *On Second Intentions*, 14-15, Dijs, 'Introduction', in Hervaeus Natalis, *De Secundis Intentionibus*, 7 and 81 and L.M. de Rijk, 'A Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate up to ca. 1350', in Giralduus Odonis, *Opera philosophica*, vol. II, ed. L.M. de Rijk (Leiden, 2005), 252. Another text worth noting concerning intentionality is q. 11 of Hervaeus' *Quodlibet IV* (ed. Venice 1513, ff. 110r-111r; for an English translation, see R.G. Wengert, 'Three Senses of Intuitive Cognition: A Quodlibetal Question of Harvey of Nedellec', *Franciscan Studies* 43 [1983], 408-431). Nevertheless, for the sake of prudence, I will not use this text, since its attribution is doubtful. David Piché attributes the text to Hervaeus (see D. Piché, 'Gerard of Bologna and Hervaeus Natalis on the Intuition of Non-Existent', *Quaestio* 10 [2010], 207-218, at 213), but according to Katherine Tachau, this text "depends upon the distinction between intuition and abstraction that [she] find[s] absent from Hervaeus's other work" (K. Tachau, *Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham. Optics, Epistemology and the Foundation of Semantics 1250-1345* [Leiden, 1988], 86-87, n. 5). Given the similarities with Peter Auriol's theses, Tachau suggests attributing this text to Auriol, but this attribution, in turn, "seems... unlikely" to Russell Friedman (R.L. Friedman, 'Dominican Quodlibetal Literature, ca. 1260-1330', in *Theological Quodlibeta in the Middle Ages. The Fourteenth Century*, ed. C. Schabel (Leiden, 2007), 401-492, at 437, n. 107; see also Piché, 'Gerard of Bologna and Hervaeus Natalis', 213-214).

<sup>2</sup> For a presentation of Hervaeus' general approach regarding logic in the *Treatise*, see G. Koridze, *Intentionale Grundlegung der Philosophischen Logik. Studien zur Intentionalität des Denkens bei Hervaeus Natalis im Traktat 'De Secundis Intentionibus'*, PhD dissertation, University of Tübingen, 2004.

<sup>3</sup> Hervaeus Natalis, *On Second Intentions*, q. 4, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 221, ed. Doyle, 492: "*esse obiective in intellectu idem est quod esse intellectum.*"

<sup>4</sup> See notably A. Maurer, "'*Ens diminutum*": A Note on its Origin and Meaning', *Mediaeval Studies* 12 (1950), 216-222.

<sup>5</sup> Of course, this general outline of the causal process in cognition has numerous variations in the Middle Ages. For large-scale comparisons of medieval theories of cognition, see Tachau, *Vision and Certitude*, R. Pasnau, *Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages* (Cambridge, 1997) and D. Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter* (Frankfurt am Main, 2004).

medieval authors distinguish the causal relation between the act and its efficient cause from the intentional relation, holding between the act and its ‘terminative’ object, which is ‘*obiective in anima*’.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, some medieval philosophers say that *esse obiective* is a relation founded on the object and directed upon the act.<sup>7</sup> Hervaeus seems to be in accordance with this tradition. Indeed, he strictly distinguishes the causal relation and the intentional relation: “that relation of representing to represented, or *vice versa*, is not a relation of effect to cause or of cause to effect.”<sup>8</sup> Besides, he defends the following point of view: *esse obiective in intellectu* or *esse intellectum* is a peculiar ontological mode distinct from that of the things in the outer world,<sup>9</sup> and it is a relation of reason founded on the object and directed upon the act<sup>10</sup> (this relation is also called ‘*intentionalitas*’<sup>11</sup>). Now, the challenge for every interpreter of Hervaeus is to explain why, if the object of the intellect has the peculiar ontological mode of *esse obiective*, Hervaeus often says that the act of intellection is

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<sup>6</sup> The distinction between the causal relation and the intentional relation is quite widespread in the time of Hervaeus. For example, John Duns Scotus admits between act and object, besides a causal relation, a relation “of the terminated to that which terminates it” (*terminati ad terminans*); see *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, pars. 3, q. 2, ed. C. Balic et al., *Opera Omnia* (Vatican City, 1950), 3: 286.21-287.2, no. 479, and *Quodlibet*, q. 13, §11, *Cuestiones Cuodlibetales*, ed. F. Alluntis (Madrid, 1968), 459, no. 35, as well as G. Pini, ‘Can God Create My Thoughts? Scotus’s Case against the Causal Account of Intentionality’, *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 49 (2011), 39-63.

<sup>7</sup> Before Hervaeus, see James of Metz, *In primum Sententiarum*, d. 25a, q. 1, ed. L. M. de Rijk, in Giraldus Odonis, *Opera philosophica*, vol. II, 622.7-13, and 622.17-23: “...relationem rationis [ut esse intellectum vel representatum]...” (“...a relation of reason, for example being intellected or presented...”), and John Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 36, 6: 284.22-285.19 and 292.13-293.3, no. 35-36 and no. 54, where “esse in anima” (being in the soul) is said to be a “relatio... deminuens ens in quo fundatur” (“relation... that diminishes the being on which it is founded”); after Hervaeus, see Francis of Meyronnes, *Conflatus (in libros Sententiarum)*, Prologue, q. 10, ed. Venice, 1520, 7G: “esse cognitum est respectus rationis in objecto” (“being cognized is a relation of reason in the object”), quoted in L. Cesalli, ‘Objects and Relations in Correlational Theories of Intentionality. The Case of Franciscus de Mayronis’, *Quaestio* 10 (2010), 267-283, at 277, n. 40.

<sup>8</sup> Q. 4, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 189, ed. Doyle, 463: “illa relatio repraesentantis ad repraesentatum, vel e converso, non est relatio effectus ad causam vel causae ad effectum.”

<sup>9</sup> See q. 1, a. 4, trans. Doyle, 73, ed. Dijks, 152.20-153.10, ed. Doyle, 359-360 and trans. Doyle, 74, ed. Dijks, 154.12-23, ed. Doyle, 361, which will be discussed below. See also q. 3, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 140, ed. Doyle, 421, where Hervaeus says that being objectively in the intellect is opposed to being outside the intellect. I will also come back to this point below.

<sup>10</sup> Q. 4, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 222: “for that very being objectively in the intellect is also a certain respect or relation of reason of the object itself to the intellect in act,” ed. Doyle, 494: “nam et ipsum esse obiective in intellectu est quaedam habitudo sive relatio rationis ipsius objecti ad intellectum in actu.” A real relation is a mind-independent relation; a relation of reason is a mind-dependent relation.

<sup>11</sup> See q. 3, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 148, slightly modified: “that very being objectively in the intellect is formally that relation of the intellected thing to the intellect, by which is meant intentionality itself,” ed. Doyle, 428: “ipsum esse in intellectu obiective formaliter est illa habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum qua dicitur intentionalitas ipsa.” On the fact that *intentionalitas* has an opposite direction compared to our concept of *intentionality* (*intentionalitas* goes from the object to the act), see J.P. Doyle, ‘Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality: its Direction and some Aftermath’, in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. S. F. Brown, T. Dewender, and T. Kobusch (Leiden, 2009), 261-283, at 262 (for a more extensive, earlier version of this paper, see J.P. Doyle, ‘Hervaeus Natalis, O.P. [d. 1323] on Intentionality: its Direction, Context, and some Aftermath’, *The Modern Schoolman* 83 [2006], 85-124) and F. Amerini and C. Rode, ‘A Brief Historical Sketch of the Concept of Being of Reason’, in Franciscus de Prato, *Tractatus de ente rationis*, ed. F. Amerini and C. Rode, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 76 (2009), 261-312, at 267, n. 25. See also J. Dijks, ‘Hervaeus Natalis on the Proper Subject of Logic’, *Quaestio* 10 (2010), 197-205, at 201-202.

intentionally directed upon a real thing (*res*).<sup>12</sup> If *esse obiective* is distinct from the ontological mode of the things in the outer world, how can the act be directed upon an entity which has *esse obiective* and which is real? L.M. de Rijk considers, from a general point of view, that Hervaeus' *Treatise* is not "fully consistent."<sup>13</sup> I agree with this. Nevertheless, I believe that it is possible to get a clear view of Hervaeus' theory of intellection if one decides to enter into the details of this tortuous text. I will show that Hervaeus attributes the peculiar ontological mode of *esse obiective* to the object upon which the act of intellection is directed, and that he distinguishes the real thing (*res*) *obiective in intellectu* from the real thing existing actually outside the mind. Thus, "real thing" ("*res*") does not necessarily refer to something existing actually in the outer world. For Hervaeus, the act is not directed upon a real thing actually outside the mind, but upon something radically different, namely upon a real thing actually *inside* the mind, and thus upon a mind-dependent entity.

## 1. Two Meanings of '*intellectum*' (Intellected)

We should start the investigation with an analysis of the predicate '*intellectum*' in Hervaeus. Hervaeus admits two meanings of '*intellectum*' (intellected). Firstly, he says that a '*res intellecta*' is nothing more than a real thing to which an extrinsic denomination is ascribed: "no one says that in an intellected thing, with regard to the being it has in the nature of things, there is posited something real from the fact that it is intellected"; so, "something, as it is intellected... is denominated from an act of intellection by an extrinsic denomination."<sup>14</sup> As John P. Doyle says, an extrinsic denomination is "a designation of something, not from anything inherent in itself, but from some disposition, coordination, or relationship which it has toward or with something else."<sup>15</sup> Since an act of intellection is an immanent action having no effect outside the agent, it posits nothing in that upon which it is directed. Therefore, when something is called '*intellectum*', this denomination is not based on a real effect inherent in it; '*intellectum*' is an extrinsic denomination, and simply means that there is an act of intellection taking this thing as an object. Yet, according to Hervaeus,

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<sup>12</sup> See for example q. 1, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 69, ed. Dijs, 147.5-7, ed. Doyle, 356, as well as Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, ed. P. Stella, *Salesianum* 1959 (21), 125-170, at 164.2-6 and Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* II, q. 7, ed. Venice 1513, f. 43r, all quoted below.

<sup>13</sup> De Rijk, 'A Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate', 294.

<sup>14</sup> Q. 2, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 106, slightly modified, ed. Dijs, 199.1-2: "nullus ponit quod in re intellecta quantum ad esse quod habet extra animam ponatur aliquid reale ex hoc quod intelligitur" (ed. Doyle, 391), and q. 5, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 303, slightly modified, ed. Doyle, 574: "aliqua res, ut est intellecta, denominatur ab actu intelligendi, denominatione extrinseca."

<sup>15</sup> J.P. Doyle, 'Prolegomena to a Study of Extrinsic Denomination in the Works of Francis Suárez, S.J.', *Vivarium* 22 (1984), 121-156; I use the reprint in J.P. Doyle, *Collected Studies on Francisco Suárez S.J. (1548-1617)*, ed. V.M. Salas (Leuven, 2010), 123-160, at 125. For more information on extrinsic denomination in the history of intentionality, see A. de Libera, *Archéologie du sujet II. La quête de l'identité* (Paris, 2008), 341-402.

there is a second meaning of *'intellectum'*, also based on a denomination, but on an intrinsic one:

For, when 'as intellected' is said, the 'as intellected' can be taken either insofar as the thing is denominated from the act itself of intellection, and then the sense is that the thing as intellected is the thing as the act of intellection corresponds to it, or it can be taken insofar as the thing is denominated from the relation itself of reason that it has to the act of intellection, and then the sense is the thing as intellected is the thing as it has the relation to the act of intellection.<sup>16</sup>

Thus, according to the second meaning of *'intellectum'*, a thing is denominated *intellectum* from a relation of reason of which it is the bearer, namely the relation *'esse intellectum'*.<sup>17</sup> *Esse intellectum* is a relation, and as every relation, it denominates *intrinsically* the thing on which it is founded:

there are certain denominations from outside [i.e., extrinsic]... There are other denominations from inside [i.e., intrinsic], where whatever is in something subjectively is called 'inside'; for example, something is said to be white from a whiteness inhering in it; and relation denominates in that way.<sup>18</sup>

Intrinsic denomination normally is the linguistic counterpart of an ontological fact, which is that of being affected by a property. A property in medieval philosophy can be described as a 'formal cause' that posits its 'formal effect' in the thing of which it is a property. Denomination is used to express this kind of ontological process. The property, or formal cause, is named abstractly, whereas the substance affected by the effect is named concretely through denomination. For example, whiteness (named abstractly) renders a substance white (named concretely through denomination), and fatherhood (named abstractly) renders a substance a father (named concretely through denomination). In brief, the affection of the substance is linguistically expressed by denomination: since *x* has *y*-ness or *y*-hood, *x* is (a) *y*. In Hervaeus, the interactions between *esse obiective in intellectu* and its bearer are described according to intrinsic denomination. Indeed, we find Hervaeus saying that because it

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<sup>16</sup> Q. 4, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 223, slightly modified, ed. Doyle, 494: "Quod quando dicitur ut intellecta, li ut intellecta potest accipi vel prout res denominatur ab ipso actu intelligendi et tunc est sensus res ut intellecta id est res ut sibi correspondet actus intelligendi vel potest accipi prout res denominatur ab ipsa habitudine rationis quam habet ad actum intelligendi et tunc est sensus res ut intellecta, id est, res ut habet habitudinem ad actum intelligendi."

<sup>17</sup> Recall that in Hervaeus *'esse intellectum'*, *'esse obiective in intellectu'* and *'intentionalitas'* are equivalent and are a relation of reason. See q. 4, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 221: "esse obiective in intellectu is the same as esse intellectum," ed. Doyle, 492: "esse obiective in intellectu idem est quod esse intellectum," and q. 3, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 148, slightly modified: "that very being objectively in the intellect is formally that relation of the intellected thing to the intellect, by which is meant intentionality itself," ed. Doyle, 428: "ipsum esse in intellectu obiective formaliter est illa habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum qua dicitur intentionalitas ipsa."

<sup>18</sup> Q. 2, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 104 (my additions, for the sake of clarity), ed. Dijks, 195.10-15: "sunt quaedam denominationes ab extrinseco... Aliae sunt denominationes ab intrinseco, vocando intrinsecum omne quod inest rei alicui subjective, sicut dicitur aliquod album ab albedine sibi inhaerente. Et isto modo denominat relatio" (ed. Doyle, 388-389).

has *esse obiective in intellectu*, being objectively in the intellect (named abstractly), the thing upon which the act of intellection is directed is an *ens existens in intellectu obiective*, a being existing objectively in the intellect (named concretely through denomination).<sup>19</sup> From an ontological point of view, it means that the relation *esse obiective in intellectu* or *esse intellectum* is a kind of property affecting its bearer and that it posits its formal effect in the thing of which it is a property. More precisely, the thing upon which the act is directed is affected in its very mode of being by *esse obiective in intellectu*, since the property makes of it an ontologically peculiar kind of entity (an *ens in intellectu*).<sup>20</sup> Contrary to what happens when a real property is attributed to something, this relation, which is unreal, does not have a ‘real’ formal effect, but a ‘derealizing’ one: it gives to its bearer a peculiar, unreal mode of being, *esse obiective in anima*. To understand more precisely what mode of being the object of thought has, I suggest an analysis of Hervaeus’ ontology.

## 2. Ontological Perspectives

The main distinction in Hervaeus’ ontology is the opposition between real being (*esse reale*) and being of reason (*esse rationis*).<sup>21</sup> There is not an intermediary between them: “between being of reason and real being there is no medium.”<sup>22</sup> According to Hervaeus, ‘real being’ and ‘being of reason’ are the highest notions in ontology, and there is no science of anything superior, because a higher notion could only be said equivocally of them.<sup>23</sup> Usually, real being is the ontological mode belonging to the members of the Aristotelian categories. It concerns all the entities that exist in the outer world. Being of reason is an ontological mode opposed to real being. Derived from the Aristotelian being in the sense of truth, it is usually the mode of being that belongs to all mind-dependent entities.<sup>24</sup> Hervaeus says that an *ens reale* is an entity that does not include a relation to the intellect in its notion (*ratio*), whereas an *ens*

<sup>19</sup> Q. 3, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 140, ed. Doyle, 421, which will be discussed in detail below.

<sup>20</sup> Hervaeus does not explicitly say that *esse obiective* has a “formal effect”, but the fact that *esse obiective* gives to its bearer a peculiar mode of being opposed to the mode of being of the things outside implies that this accident or “form” has an effect on its bearer (see q. 3, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 140, ed. Doyle, 421, discussed below). Francis of Meyronnes expressly affirms that *esse obiective* (in his words “*esse cognitum*”), as a relation, posits its “formal effect” in its bearer: “No relation destroys the proper fundament, but posits only its formal effect in it. But being cognized is a relation of reason in the object. Thus, it does not destroy the formal nature of the object, but posits only its formal effect in it.” (“*Nulla relatio destruit proprium fundamentum, sed tantum ibi ponit suum effectum formalem. Sed esse cognitum est respectus rationis in objecto. Ergo non destruit rationem formalem objecti, sed tantum ponit in eo suum effectum formalem.*”) (*Conflatus*, Prologue, q. 10, ed. cit., 7G).

<sup>21</sup> Q. 1, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 62: “the first distinction of being is into real being and being of reason,” ed. Dijs, 138.9: “*prima distinctio essendi est in esse rei et esse rationis*” (ed. Doyle, 350). On the distinction between *esse reale* and *esse rationis* in Hervaeus, see Doyle, ‘Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality’, 276 and 281-282.

<sup>22</sup> Q. 3, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 150, ed. Doyle, 430: “*inter ens rationis et ens reale non est dare medium.*”

<sup>23</sup> Q. 5, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 265-266, slightly modified: “such a common [notion] seems to be only a certain equivocal [one], about which there is no science,” ed. Doyle, 537: “*tale commune non videtur esse nisi quoddam equivocum de quo non est scientia.*”

<sup>24</sup> See Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Δ, 7, 1017a31-35, and E, 4, 1027b17-1028a6.

*rationis* is an entity that includes a relation to the intellect in its notion.<sup>25</sup> The distinction between real being and being of reason in Hervaeus seems to correspond to the distinction between the two classes of knowable entities (*intelligibilia*), first and second intentions. A first intention is everything that “belongs to things, with [every] operation of the intellect circumscribed,” for example man or ox.<sup>26</sup> A second intention is everything that “belongs to things insofar as they are objectively in the intellect,” for example genus or species.<sup>27</sup> More clearly, Hervaeus also says that a second intention is every knowable entity that includes a relation to the intellect in its notion, whereas, on the contrary, a first intention is every knowable entity that does not include a relation to the intellect in its notion.<sup>28</sup> Whereas the class of second intentions seems to have the same extension as the class of *entia rationis*, one could think, concerning the class of first intentions, that it is broader than the one of *entia realia*, since the class of first intentions includes *privativa*, *negativa*, and *ficta*, namely knowable entities that do not have a relation to the intellect in their notion but that do not exist in the outer world.<sup>29</sup> Indeed, on one hand, according to Hervaeus, *privativa*, *negativa*, and *ficta* do not include a relation to the intellect in their notion. For example, the definition of blindness, namely “the lack of sight in something that

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<sup>25</sup> A text saying literally both that an *ens reale* is an entity that does not include a relation to the intellect in its notion and that an *ens rationis* is an entity that includes a relation to the intellect in its notion is to be found in Doyle’s edition of q. 1, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 61, slightly modified: “real being is taken, either affirmatively or negatively, as everything that belongs to things in their reality, either true or fictive, when every operation of intellect is circumscribed, in such way, that is, that in its notion it does not include a relation to intellect nor any mode that belongs to things as they are objectively in an intellect. But that is called being of reason which follows as things are objectively in an intellect and which includes in its notion a relation to an intellect or to an act of intellection,” ed. Doyle, 349: “Accipitur esse reale, sive affirmative sive negative, omne illud quod rebus convenit in sua realitate vel vera vel ficta, circumscripto omni operatione intellectus, sic, scilicet, quod in sua ratione non includit habitudinem ad intellectum nec aliquem modum convenientem rebus ut sunt objective in intellectu. Esse autem rationis dicitur illud quod consequitur ut res sunt objective in intellectu et includit in sua ratione habitudinem ad intellectum sive ad actum intelligendi.” De Rijk affirms that there is here a haplography in all the manuscripts, and that they all end that way: “aliquem modum convenientem rebus ut sunt objective in intellectu.” De Rijk and Dijs suggest respectively the following emendations: “aliquem modum convenientem rebus <ut sunt objective in intellectu. Dicitur autem esse rationis omne illud esse quod convenit rebus> ut sunt objective in intellectu” and “aliquem modum convenientem rebus <ut sunt objective in intellectu. Accipitur autem secundum esse rationis esse illud quod convenit rebus> ut sunt objective in intellectu” (de Rijk, ‘A Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate’, 259-260, and ed. Dijs, 136.23-137.2). Thus, the passage “Esse autem rationis dicitur illud quod consequitur ut res sunt objective in intellectu et includit in sua ratione habitudinem ad intellectum sive ad actum intelligendi,” which is to be found in Doyle’s edition, seems to be absent from all the manuscripts. It comes probably from the Paris edition of 1489, which is the basis of Doyle’s edition. Even if Doyle’s text is not reliable, its meaning is correct: since a real being is that which *in sua ratione non includit habitudinem ad intellectum*, a being of reason, by opposition, is that which *in sua ratione includit habitudinem ad intellectum sive ad actum intelligendi*. On philological information about Hervaeus’ *Treatise*, see Doyle, ‘Introduction’, in Hervaeus Natalis, *On Second Intentions*, 14-15.

<sup>26</sup> Q. 1, a. 4, trans. Doyle, 72, ed. Dijs, 151.4: “hoc quod convenit rebus circumscripto opere intellectus” (ed. Doyle, 358).

<sup>27</sup> Q. 1, a. 4, trans. Doyle, 72, ed. Dijs, 151.6-8 and 10.11: “Aliud vero genus intelligibilium est quod dicit esse rationis; et hoc est esse illud quod convenit rebus prout sunt objective in intellectu” and “omnia illa quae conveniunt rebus prout sunt objective in intellectu, pertinent ad secundam intentionem” (ed. Doyle, 358).

<sup>28</sup> A second intention is “that intelligible which in its notion includes being of reason” (q. 1, a. 5, trans. Doyle, 76, slightly modified, ed. Dijs, 157.5-6: “illud intelligibile quod in sua ratione includit tale esse rationis” [ed. Doyle, 363]).

<sup>29</sup> On *privativa* and *negativa*, see q. 1, a. 4; on *ficta*, see q. 1, a. 5.

is naturally apt to have it,” or the definition of a golden mountain, “a mountain of gold,” do not include a predicate like “being thought-of.”<sup>30</sup> Hence, blindness and a golden mountain are not second intentions. On the other hand, Hervaeus says that *privativa* and *negativa* are “negation[s] of a real being,” whereas *ficta* are not “[something] that may have real being.”<sup>31</sup> Is, then, the class of first intentions broader than the class of real being? I do not think so, since Hervaeus claims that

real being is taken, either affirmatively or *negatively*, as everything that belongs to things in their reality, either true or *fictive*, when every operation of intellect is circumscribed, in such way, that is, that in its notion it does not include a relation to intellect nor any mode that belongs to things as they are objectively in an intellect.<sup>32</sup>

Accordingly, *privativa*, *negativa* and *ficta* seem to be real, perhaps because *privativa* and *negativa* are predicated of real being, and because *ficta* are combinations of real being. Thus, one could say that they form an exception in the class of *realia*, since they are “conceptually real” (they do not have a relation to the intellect in their notion) but do not exist in the outer world.<sup>33</sup> In the end, one could say that Hervaeus’ theory of *privativa*, *negativa* and *ficta* should have been more developed.

We can now ask: what kind of ontological mode is *esse obiective in intellectu*? One thing is sure: *esse obiective in intellectu* is a positive mode of being. Hervaeus says that when an act of intellection is directed upon *privativa* or *negativa*, even these entities are considered “as somehow something positive” (*quasi quaedam positiva*).<sup>34</sup> Now, some medieval philosophers consider that *esse obiective* is an ontological mode intermediary between *esse reale* and *esse rationis*.<sup>35</sup> But Hervaeus, as we have seen, refuses any intermediary between *esse reale* and *esse rationis*. Accordingly, one is forced to admit that Hervaeus considers *esse obiective* as reducible to *esse rationis*. This seems to be confirmed by what he says about *privativa* and *negativa* taken as positive entities terminating the act of intellection: “and so taken as if positively, they designate being of reason” or “to take them so, i.e., as certain positive things, is being

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<sup>30</sup> Q. 1, a. 4, trans. Doyle, 72, ed. Dijs, 172.7-8: “carentia visus in apto nato habere” (ed. Doyle, 359), and q. 1, a. 5, trans. Doyle, 76, ed. Dijs, 157.14-15: “unde si definiretur mons aureus, diceretur quod est mons de auro” (ed. Doyle, 363), as well as trans. Doyle, 78, ed. Dijs, 159.2-13, ed. Doyle, 364.

<sup>31</sup> See q. 1, a. 4, trans. Doyle, 74, slightly modified: “but when they are taken in themselves and absolutely, they designate only the negation of a real being, and they belong to first intention in the aforesaid way,” ed. Dijs, 154.18-19: “sed quando accipiuntur secundum se et absolute, non dicunt nisi negationem entis realis et pertinent ad primam intentionem modo praedicto” (ed. Doyle, 361), and q. 1, a. 5, trans. Doyle, 78, slightly modified: “I say that such entities, essentially speaking, neither designate being a figment nor anything else that may have real being,” ed. Dijs, 160.1-2: “dicendum quod talia, essentialiter loquendo, nec esse figmentum dicunt nec esse aliquid quod habeat esse reale” (ed. Doyle, 365).

<sup>32</sup> Q. 1, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 61, ed. Dijs, 136.23-137.1, ed. Doyle, 349, quoted above (my emphasis).

<sup>33</sup> Maybe one could extend to *privativa* and *negativa* what Fabrizio Amerini says about *ficta* in Hervaeus, namely that “they are definitionally mind-independent. However, they are metaphysically unreal things”: F. Amerini, ‘What is Real. A Reply to Ockham’s Ontological Program’, *Vivarium* 43 (2005), 187-212, at 200.

<sup>34</sup> Q. 1, a. 4, trans. Doyle, 74, modified, ed. Dijs, 154.16-17: “quasi quaedam positiva” (ed. Doyle, 361).

<sup>35</sup> Dominik Perler showed that such a tripartite ontology is given in James of Ascoli; see Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, 230-239.



according to the mind and being according to reason only.”<sup>36</sup> So, every entity that is the term of an act of intellection has, as object of intellection, a kind of minimal positive being, namely *esse obiective*, which is apparently identical to *esse rationis*.

According to this system, a question arises: if every entity upon which the act of intellection is directed has *esse obiective*, and if we admit that *esse obiective* is equivalent to *esse rationis*, how should we distinguish between acts directed upon beings of reason and acts directed upon real beings (or acts directed upon second intentions and acts directed upon first intentions)?<sup>37</sup> Hervaeus says that everything that does not have a relation to the intellect in its notion is a real thing, or everything that does not have *esse obiective* or *esse rationis* in its notion is a real thing. On this basis, one can distinguish between acts directed upon beings of reason and acts directed upon real beings (or acts directed upon second intentions and acts directed upon first intentions) by distinguishing the way the relation “being thought-of” is linked to the object: if it is internal to the notion of the object, the object is an *ens rationis*; if it is not internal, the object is a *res* having *esse rationis*.

### 3. The Thing Existing Outside Aptitudinally

According to Hervaeus, everything given to the intellect has *esse obiective*, *esse intellectum* or *esse rationis*. So, upon what kind of entity is the act of intellection directed? The answer seems to be that the act is directed upon a mind-dependent entity, something having the peculiar ontological mode of *esse obiective*, something that is radically different from a thing in the outer world. Unfortunately, the point is not that clear. Indeed, there is textual evidence to reject the claim that the act is directed upon a mind-dependent entity. Certainly, Hervaeus often says that the act is directed upon a real thing. In a text against Henry of Ghent, probably written between 1301 and 1307, Hervaeus affirms:

When it is said that every real being is singular, it is true in its being real. But the same real being, according to the objective being it has in the mind, is universal and abstract. Indeed, even if this objective being is a being of reason, that to which it belongs is a real being. Now, the primary object of the intellect is not that objective being itself, but

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<sup>36</sup> Q. 1, a. 4, trans. Doyle, 73, slightly modified, ed. Dijs, 152.20-153.10: “Et sic accepta scilicet quasi positive dicunt esse rationis” (ed. Doyle, 359-360), and trans. Doyle, 74, ed. Dijs, 154.16-17: “sic accipere ea quasi quaedam positiva est esse secundum animam et esse secundum rationem tantum” (ed. Doyle, 361).

<sup>37</sup> This troubling question arises every time *esse cognitum* is reduced to *esse rationis*. To avoid the confusion between things as they are cognized (*res cognita*) and mere beings of reason (*entia rationis*) is probably one of the goals of a strict distinction between *esse cognitum* and *esse rationis* by medieval philosophers. Hervaeus is not the only medieval philosopher who identifies *esse cognitum* and *esse rationis*. For example, Armand Maurer considers that in Scotus, *ens cognitum*, *ens diminutum* and *ens rationis* are equivalent: “*ens diminutum* is always *ens rationis*, *ens cognitum*”: Maurer, “*Ens diminutum*”, 221); T. Kobusch, *Sein und Sprache. Historische Grundlegung einer Ontologie der Sprache* (Leiden, 1987), 109-110, considers that an *ens cognitum* is a kind of *ens rationis* in Scotus.

the thing to which it belongs.<sup>38</sup>

Moreover, in his *Quodlibet* II, question 7, probably written in 1308, Hervaeus affirms: “the intellected thing that is thought-of in this unitary way is the real thing outside the mind. Thus, for example, when I think of man in an indeterminate way, man designates a real thing existing outside the mind”<sup>39</sup>; or in the *Treatise*, he says: “a thing that is intellected or signified universally, for example, man or ox, is a thing existing outside the mind. Otherwise, there would be no science of things having real being outside the mind.”<sup>40</sup> So, there are reasons for admitting that on Hervaeus’ view the intellect is directed upon real things (*res*) existing outside the mind.<sup>41</sup> We have to ask: if the act of intellection is directed upon a mind-dependent entity, why does Hervaeus say that the thing upon which the act is directed is a real thing (*res*) existing outside? In fact, as surprising as it may be, the expression ‘*res* outside’ can designate a mind-dependent entity in Hervaeus!

Hervaeus’ most detailed discussion concerning the ontological status of the object of intellection is in the first article of question 3 of his *Treatise*. According to Hervaeus, when one is thinking, the act is directed upon a real thing ontologically modified by the property *esse obiective*. However, this real thing can also exist without this property.<sup>42</sup> Then, in one sense, the real thing upon which the act is directed is a real thing outside; indeed, it is ‘*aptitudinally outside*’, in the sense that it *can* exist without a relation to the intellect. Hervaeus compares this situation to the one between whiteness and its bearer. When something bears whiteness, it is called ‘white’ through intrinsic denomination, which indicates that the bearer is affected by the formal effect of whiteness. Now, since whiteness is a separable property, Hervaeus says that something bearing whiteness is *aptitudinally non-white*.<sup>43</sup> In

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<sup>38</sup> Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, ed. Stella, 164.2-6: “Et quando dicitur quod omne ens reale est singulare, verum est in suo esse reali, et idem etiam ens reale, secundum esse obiectivum quod habet in anima, est universale et abstractum. Licet enim illud esse obiectivum sit esse rationis, illud tamen cui convenit est ens reale. Objectum autem primum intellectus non est illud esse obiectivum, sed res cui convenit.” For the dating of this text, see Stella, in Hervaeus Natalis, *De intellectu et specie*, 135, Dijs, ‘Introduction’, 7, n. 16, and de Rijk, ‘A Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate’, 252.

<sup>39</sup> Hervaeus Natalis, *Quodlibet* II, q. 7, ed. Venice, 1513, f. 43r: “Res tamen intellecta quae sic unite intelligitur est vera res extra animam. Unde sicut quando intelligo hominem indeterminate, homo dicit rem veram existentem extra animam.” For the dating of this text, see Dijs, ‘Introduction’, 7.

<sup>40</sup> Q. 1, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 69, slightly modified, ed. Dijs, 147.5-7: “res quae universaliter intelligitur vel significatur, puta homo vel bos, est res extra animam existens. Alioquin nulla scientia esset de rebus habentibus esse reale extra animam” (ed. Doyle, 356).

<sup>41</sup> For a moderate ‘phenomenalist’ interpretation, see Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, 297-299. For a direct realist interpretation, see F. Amerini, ‘Realism and Intentionality: Hervaeus Natalis, Peter Aureoli, and William Ockham in Discussion’, in *Philosophical Debates at Paris in the Early Fourteenth Century*, ed. Brown, Dewender, and Kobusch, 239-260, at 245-246.

<sup>42</sup> This certainly does not apply to *privativa*, *negativa* and *facta*, since these entities, even if they are included in the class of *realia*, do not exist in the outer world.

<sup>43</sup> Q. 3, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 138: “For it is impossible that something be actually the foundation of whiteness and that it not be actually joined with whiteness. But according to habitual aptitude and existence, if one formally takes [something] white in that way, namely, for what is joined to whiteness, it is possible that whiteness be founded upon non-white, because it is founded upon that which is naturally apt to be conjoined with whiteness, even if it were not [actually] joined to whiteness,” ed. Doyle, 419: “Quia impossibile est quod aliquid sit actu fundamentum albedinis et non sit actu coniunctum albedini. Sed secundum habitualem

other words, as soon as a property like whiteness is inhering in its bearer, its formal effect is ‘effective’, so that we cannot say that the bearer is non-white; it *is* affected by the property. Nevertheless, it *can* be non-white, as it was before the inherence of the property. Thus, it is aptitudinally non-white. Hervaeus considers that the interactions between the relation *esse obiective* and the thing upon which it is founded are the same as the one between whiteness and its bearer (of course, with the important distinction that whiteness, as an accidental property, does not modify the ontological status of its bearer). The thing upon which the act is directed is a *res actually* objectively in the intellect. It is named ‘*ens obiective in intellectu*’ through intrinsic denomination, which means that the bearer is affected by the formal effect of *esse obiective in intellectu*. However, it is *aptitudinally* a thing outside, since it can exist without *esse obiective in intellectu*. When there is an inherence of whiteness in a thing, the thing can be said to be non-white, but only *aptitudinally*; in the same way, when there is an inherence of the relation *esse obiective in intellectu* in a real thing, the real thing can be said to be non-*objective in intellectu*, but only *aptitudinally*. As a matter of fact, Hervaeus says:

For just as it is impossible that whiteness be founded on some subject that is not actually white (even though it is aptitudinally non-white inasmuch as it can exist with whiteness circumscribed, on the supposition that whiteness is a separable accident), so it is impossible that the intentionality<sup>44</sup> in question, which is a relation of an intellected thing to an actually intellegizing intellect, be founded upon some thing unless something is in an actual way objectively in the intellect. It is, however, aptitudinally outside [the intellect] because it can exist without the existence of the act of the one intelligizing.<sup>45</sup>

Thus, that upon which the act is directed, in other words the object of the act, is something outside, but *aptitudinally* outside. Taken not aptitudinally, but actually, it is a being existing in the intellect objectively (“*ens existens in intellectu obiective*”), and is distinct from the thing in the outer world. Hervaeus says:

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aptitudinem et existentiam accipiendo formaliter album isto modo, scilicet, pro coniuncto albedini, possibile est quod albedo fundetur super non album, quia fundatur super illud quod natum est esse coniunctum albedini etiam si non esset coniunctum albedini.”

<sup>44</sup> Be reminded that the relation named ‘intentionality’ and the one named ‘being objectively in the intellect’ are identical: “that very being objectively in the intellect is formally that relation of the intellected thing to the intellect, by which is meant intentionality itself”: q. 3, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 148, slightly modified, ed. Doyle, 428: “ipsum esse in intellectu obiective formaliter est illa habitudo rei intellectae ad intellectum qua dicitur intentionalitas ipsa.”

<sup>45</sup> Q. 3, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 141, slightly modified, ed. Doyle, 421-422: “sicut enim impossibile est quod albedo fundetur super aliquod obiectum quod non sit actu album, aptitudine tamen est non album, quia potest esse circumscripita albedine, supposito quod albedo sit accidens separabile, ita est impossibile quod praedicta intentionalitas quae est relatio rei intellectae ad intellectum actu intelligentem fundetur super aliquam rem nisi sit actu intellectum obiective. Est tamen aptitudine extra quia potest esse non existente actu intelligentis.” (One could read ‘*intellectam*’ instead of the second ‘*intellectum*’, and translate as Doyle does: “unless it is in an actual way objectively in the intellect.”)

[If we] ask whether that upon which first intentionality is founded is a being outside the intellect in opposition to being objectively in the intellect, it must be said that... [it] is not a being outside the intellect objectively and actually. Rather, it actually is a being existing objectively in the intellect (*ens existens in intellectu obiective*), even if it is not this very being in the intellect itself (*ipsum esse in intellectu*)... But in aptitude and in proximate potency it is a being outside the mind, which is by opposition distinct from being objectively in the intellect.<sup>46</sup>

So, if we want to know in what sense the object of the act is a *res* outside, we should distinguish between actuality and aptitude. The *res* upon which the act is directed is a “*res* actually intellected” (*res actu intellecta*); this *res* actually intellected is a “being existing objectively in the intellect” (*ens existens in intellectu obiective*). But this entity is also a “*res* existing outside aptitudinally” (*res extra existens aptitudine*), i.e., an aptitudinal *res* outside<sup>47</sup>. In brief, the act is not directed upon a thing actually existing in the outer world. Thus, when the word ‘*res*’ is used to refer to the object of the act, it always concerns a mind-dependent entity. In that case, the determination ‘outside’ can be added to the word ‘*res*’, but with the supplementary addition: ‘aptitudinally’. So, a *res intellecta* is a real thing existing outside aptitudinally. It is important to underscore that, according to Hervaeus, the act of intellection is never related to the object without the object having the relation *esse intellectum* founded on it. The emergence of the relation from the act to the object and the emergence of the relation from the object to the act are concomitant:

therefore, when these things exist, namely, an intellected thing and an act of intellection, two relations follow. One is real, which is of the intellect itself to the thing intellected, and the second is of reason, which is of the intellected thing to the intellect actually intellegizing.<sup>48</sup>

As a consequence, the intellect is never related to the object unless the object is related to the intellect by the relation *esse intellectum*; and as soon as this occurs, the object is *aptitudinally* outside. Thus, the intellect is never related to something actually outside. To sum up, the intellect is sometimes directed upon entities that *can* exist without a relation to the intellect, i.e., entities that, when they are given to the intellect, have the peculiar mode of being *esse obiective in intellectu* or *esse rationis*,

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<sup>46</sup> Q. 3, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 140, ed. Doyle, 421: “utrum illud super quod fundatur prima intentionalitas sit ens extra intellectum per oppositum ad esse in intellectu obiective, dicendum quod... non est ens extra intellectum obiective et actu. Immo actu est ens existens in intellectu obiective, licet non sit ipsum esse in intellectu... Sed aptitudine et in potentia propinqua est ens extra animam <distinctum> per oppositum ad esse in intellectu obiective” (Doyle reads “distinctam,” but translates it as if it were “distinctum”). See also q. 3, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 161, ed. Doyle, 440-441.

<sup>47</sup> Q. 3, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 140 and 143, slightly modified, ed. Doyle, 421 and 424. Indeed, one could consider that “*res extra existens aptitudine*” should be translated as “thing outside existing aptitudinally.” But this would not change the meaning of the text.

<sup>48</sup> Q. 3, a. 2, trans. Doyle, 148, slightly modified, ed. Doyle, 428: “Existentibus ergo istis, scilicet, re intellecta et actu intelligendi, consequuntur duae relationes: una realis quae est ipsius intellectus ad rem intellectam, et alia rationis quae est rei intellectae ad intellectum actu intelligentem.”

i.e., entities that are real things aptitudinally outside. The intellect is never directed upon real things existing *actually* outside.<sup>49</sup> Indeed, in every text of Hervaeus in which he says that the first object of intellection is “a real thing (*res*) outside,” “a real thing (*res*) outside” should be understood as “a real thing existing outside aptitudinally,” that is, a *res extra existens aptitudine*.

Admittedly, these statements of Hervaeus are not easy to understand. In my opinion, they should be interpreted in the following manner: a real thing can have two modes of being, it can exist actually outside the intellect, according to *esse reale*, and actually inside the intellect, according to *esse intellectum, obiective* or *rationis*.<sup>50</sup> For every real thing, when the intellect is not directed upon it, this thing has its ‘standard’ mode of being, the one it has outside the intellect: *esse reale*; when the intellect is directed upon it, this real thing acquires, in addition, a second mode of being, the one it has inside the intellect: *esse intellectum, obiective* or *rationis*. Thus, each time the intellect directs itself upon a real thing, this real thing exists in two distinct manners: one outside, and one inside the intellect. Whereas its being actually inside the intellect depends on the existence of the act of intellection, its being actually outside the intellect does not depend on it. The intellect is not reaching the thing as actually outside the intellect, but as actually inside the intellect. In the final analysis, the intellect is directed upon an internal, mind-dependent entity, upon something radically different from the thing actually outside, upon something having the peculiar ontological mode of *esse obiective*.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> Indeed, there seems to be here a very peculiar ontological process: a real thing actually *in rerum natura* being fundamentally modified in its mode of being by the acquisition of a relation. This point seems to be criticized by Peter Auriol, in a text against Hervaeus: “no fundament of a relation admits to be made by a relation; on the contrary, it is the relation that proceeds from the fundament” (“nullum fundamentum relationis capit quod fit per relationem, ymo magis econverso relatio oritur ex fundamento”): Peter Auriol, *Scriptum in primum librum Sententiarum*, d. 23, ed. L.M. de Rijk, in Giraldu Odonis, *Opera philosophica*, vol. II, 722.23-24; see also ed. D. Perler, ‘Peter Aureol vs. Hervaeus Natalis on Intentionality: A Text Edition with Introductory Remarks’, *Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge* 61 (1994), 227-262, at 251, no. 34, who reads “*sit*” instead of “*fit*.”

<sup>50</sup> Again, this does not apply to *privativa, negativa* and *facta*, since they do not exist in the outer world.

<sup>51</sup> In order to preserve a direct realist interpretation of Hervaeus’ theory of intellection, Amerini makes a distinction between “that which is cognized” and “what is cognized about” it. He considers that for every act of intellection, that which is cognized is a particular real thing actually outside the mind, for example Socrates, whereas what is cognized about it is something general, for example man, and is a “mental object.” This solution would preserve direct realism, since the act, in one sense, would be directed upon a real thing actually outside, in our example Socrates (see Amerini, ‘Realism and Intentionality’, 245-246). Yet, this interpretation seems to me to entail two problems. First, there is an exegetical argument against this reading. Indeed, Hervaeus himself says that for man to be objectively in the intellect means being “in the gaze of the intellect as an object known, without Socrates or Plato being known”: q. 1, a. 1, trans. Doyle, 46, ed. Dijs, 119.17-120.5: “in conspectu intellectus sicut obiectum cognitum non cognito Sorte vel Platone” (ed. Doyle, 335); see also q. 4, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 225, ed. Doyle, 496. Thus, when one cognizes man, one cognizes it separately from any particular entity, which would not be the case if by cognizing man Socrates were “that which is cognized.” The fact that the causal process that leads to the intellection of man starts from Socrates does not imply that one *cognizes* Socrates when one cognizes man (as said in my introduction, Hervaeus strictly distinguishes the causal relation and the intentional relation). Second, even if one admits that Socrates is somehow co-cognized when one cognizes man, it would not entail that Hervaeus has a direct realist theory of intellection. Indeed, for Hervaeus, a particular, when it is cognized by the intellect, also bears the relation ‘*intentionalitas*’, i.e., ‘*esse intellectum*’; see q. 1, a. 3, trans. Doyle, 67-68, ed. Dijs, 145.9-24, ed. Doyle, 355. In other words, for Hervaeus, an intellected particular is a thing aptitudinally outside the

## Conclusion

For Hervaeus, the object of intellection is a mind-dependent entity. Bearing the relation *esse obiective in intellectu* or *esse intellectum*, the object upon which the act is directed is a thing aptitudinally outside, not actually outside. It is actually a being existing objectively in the intellect (*ens existens in intellectu obiective*). Once a thing is combined with the afore-mentioned relation, this relation posits its formal effect in the thing, which implies that the thing has a modified mode of being. As a matter of fact, such a modified thing is an internal, mind-dependent entity, something radically different from a thing existing actually outside the mind.

Now, to conclude, we have to ask the following question: since for Hervaeus the act of intellection is directed upon a mind-dependent entity, does it mean that he loses access to the outer world in his theory? Even when the act of intellection is directed upon a mind-dependent entity, medieval philosophers do not necessarily think that this implies a split between mind and reality. As de Rijk says, there is an “optimistic (Ancient and) Medieval epistemological view” concerning internal objects:

To the Medieval mind, the idea that it is human beings who create or invent truth would be outrageous. For this reason, the Ancients’ and Medievals’ conceptual engineering was quite naturally concerned with grasping the things of the outside world through concepts that designate the extramental things, *including* their being taken qua conceived of... Nothing could prevent people, of course, from taking the objects of our thinking, on occasion, simply in their own right, quite apart, that is, from our different ways of conceiving them. But it never occurred to anyone to construe an antagonistic opposition between the outside things as existing by themselves and their being conceived of. Let alone that their existence should ever, in a quasi-Kantian fashion, be set apart as belonging to a domain of ‘things by themselves’ (*‘Dinge an sich’*), which are in principle unaccessible to thought. Likewise nobody could fancy the idea that the things’ existence in the extramental world should be opposed to their being as conceived of, as though there would exist two incongruous areas, one of real being, the other the mental domain of our conceptual engineering, to be regarded as an *autonomous* area produced by our mental activities.<sup>52</sup>

Certainly, Hervaeus should be considered a defender of this kind of epistemology. Indeed, Hervaeus says that the internal object upon which the act is directed is

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mind, and actually inside the mind, a mind-dependent entity, something having the peculiar ontological mode of *esse obiective*.

<sup>52</sup> De Rijk, ‘A Study on the Medieval Intentionality Debate’, 347 and 334 (author’s emphasis). Although it correctly expresses an important tendency in medieval philosophy, this affirmation of de Rijk is certainly too strong. Some philosophers in the Middle Ages were opposed to internal objects in their theories of cognition, considering them to be entities forbidding the access to the outer world, notably Ockham, who rejected the notion of *esse obiective in anima* for this reason; see C. Panaccio, *Ockham on Concepts* (Aldershot, 2004), 24, and the references Panaccio gives, 38, n. 30, to other medieval philosophers opposed to internal objects, for example Peter John Olivi.

nothing else than the real thing outside as it is thought-of. As Perler says, the “intentional object” in Hervaeus is “qualitatively identical” to the “material object,” due to the fact that the former is linked to the latter through a “grounding relation”<sup>53</sup>; this relation could probably be explained in terms of causality, intellection being the result of a causal process initiated by the things in the outer world. In other words, even if the act of intellection is directed upon a mind-dependent entity, the grasping of this mind-dependent entity, for Hervaeus, is ‘qualitatively identical’ to the knowledge of the outer world.

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<sup>53</sup> Perler, *Theorien der Intentionalität im Mittelalter*, 299: “Aber dennoch denken wir an etwas, was im Normalfall in einer Fundierungsrelation zu materiellen Gegenstände steht und sich nicht von diesen unterscheiden lässt... Wir sind nicht in einer Welt von Phänomenen gefangen, die nur im Intellekt existieren, sondern wir haben Zugang zu objektiv (oder intentional) existierenden Gegenständen, die unmittelbar auf materiellen Gegenständen beruhen und mit diesen qualitativ identisch sind.”