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DEMOCRACY IN A GLOBAL WORLD

Human Rights and Political Participation in the 21st Century

Deen K. Chatterjee

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when it is politically achievable and ethnic groups loudly demand it. And there is nothing inconsistent about having small new countries along with European and world communities. Acknowledging nested multiple loyalties is something people do all the time.

Notes

1. Benjamin Barber, "Global Multiculturalism and the American Experiment," *World Policy Journal* 10 (1) 1993.

2. Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983); Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism Since 1780* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power," *The Partisan Review*, 46 (3) 337–58, 1979; William Pfaff, "Invitation to War," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (3) 97–109, 1993; former United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a 1995 television news interview.

3. Czeslaw Milosz, "Swing Shift in the Baltics," *The New York Review of Books*, November 4, 1993.

4. Habermas discusses *Verfassungspatriotismus* (constitutional patriotism) in his essay "Citizenship and National Identity, Reflections on the Future of Europe" ("Staatsbürgerschaft und Nationale Identität, Überlegungen zur Europäischen Zukunft") (St. Gallen, Switzerland: Erker-Verlag, 1991).

5. By acknowledging that everyone should have special regard for their own countries, sometimes it is claimed that obligations of loyalty actually are universalizable. This misses the point and is like saying that an egoist's judgment is universalizable and therefore isn't biased, if this egoist agrees that everybody may make egoistic judgments—that is, everyone may be biased.

6. Pfaff, "Invitation to War."

7. Pfaff, "Invitation to War."

8. Isaiah Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power."

9. See *The Non-Suicidal Society* (Indiana University Press, 1986) and "Loyalties," (*Journal of Philosophy*, 79, 173–93, 1982), where these ideas are explored at length.

10. Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power."

11. Berlin, "Nationalism: Past Neglect and Present Power."

12. I am grateful to my students at the University of Leipzig, summer semester 1994, for helping me with these distinctions, and which I discuss in "Einwanderungsland Deutschland?" ("Is Germany an Immigrant State?") in the anthology *Der Neue Nationalstaat* (*The New National State*), ed. Rüdiger Voigt (Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos, 1998).

6

Global Democracy: International, Not Cosmopolitan[1]

Kok-Chor Tan

A KEY IDEA OF LIBERAL NATIONALISM is that the nation-state is the primary site of deliberative democratic politics. Deliberative democracy is "a conception of democratic politics in which decisions and policies are justified in a process of discussion among free and equal citizens or their accountable representatives" (Gutmann and Thompson 2000, 161). Fundamentally, this means that a democratically arrived at public policy is one in which individuals affected by the policy could reasonably consent to. According to liberal nationalists, this ideal of democracy requires, foremost, that individuals share a common language, a vernacular with which to effectively debate and to collectively decide on matters that affect them (Kymlicka 2001, 213, 226–27). Moreover, democratic politics require a sufficient level of trust and mutual respect among citizens so as to motivate them to honor democratic decisions that are not in their favor, on the understanding that should decisions be in their favor next time, these would likewise be respected (Kymlicka 2001). Most democrats agree that democratic politics are possible only if citizens adequately trust and respect each other; but nationalists make the additional claim that a shared national identity best provides the sense of solidarity, the "fellow-feeling" necessary for generating and sustaining this mutual respect and trust among persons who are practically strangers to each other, as citizens generally are.

This nationalist-democratic thesis, or nationalist thesis for short, may be challenged by some liberal democrats, even though it is arguably implicit in much of the liberal democratic tradition.[2] J. S. Mill, perhaps, was more explicit than most liberal democrats when he wrote that "free institutions are next to

impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, cannot exist" (Mill 1991, 428).

It is not my aim in this chapter to argue for or against the basic premises of the nationalist thesis. What I wish to explore is whether and how the nationalist thesis, that the nation is the primary locus of democratic politics, can meet the new challenges brought about by globalization. As national boundaries become more permeable with respect to the decisions and practices of actors and forces outside the borders of nations, keeping democracy located at the national level appears to be insufficient for ensuring that individuals who would be affected by these decisions and practices have a decision in the matter. And this is plainly contrary to the deliberative democratic ideal that collective decisions ought to be those decisions that individuals affected could reasonably consent to. To counter this global democratic deficit that has been rendered more salient by the forces of globalization, some theorists argue that we need to develop an account of democracy that can transcend the limits of the nation-centric idea of democracy.

But what are the prospects for globalizing democracy if the "common sympathies" necessary for democratic deliberation exist between fellow members of a nation but "do not exist between them and any others" (Mill 1991, 427)? If the nationalist thesis is correct, how can we conceive of and achieve global democracy?

I proceed by recounting the nationalist thesis, pointing out why nationalists think that the nation is the basic site of deliberative democracy. In the second part of this chapter, I recall some of the familiar arguments as to why a nation-bound concept of democracy is thought to be inadequate in the face of increasing economic globalization. Next, I look at cosmopolitan democracy as a proposed solution to the challenge of globalization, and I clarify and identify the ways in which the cosmopolitan idea of democracy is at odds with the nationalist thesis. Then, in the fourth section, I examine an alternative to cosmopolitan democracy that does not contradict (but indeed builds on) the nationalist thesis. I will argue that global democracy conceived literally as an inter*national* democracy—that is, as a democracy of "democracies rooted in nation-states" (Holden 2000, 214)—can go some way toward correcting the global democratic deficit. Indeed, building on existing democratic institutions at the national level provides a more realistic and practical way of achieving global democracy than the cosmopolitan democratic approach. If the nationalist thesis is a necessity, this necessity can be turned into a virtue. Finally, in the fifth and last section, I clarify why the nationalist obstacle to cosmopolitan *democracy* does not undermine cosmopolitanism understood as an ideal about *justice*.

I. Nationality and Democracy

Will Kymlicka writes that "democratic politics is politics in the vernacular" (2001, 213), meaning by this that democratic deliberation is possible only among individuals who share a common language. One reason for this is that ordinary people feel "comfortable debating political issues in their own tongue," and that, as a general rule, only elites can acquire fluency in more than one language. So to require people to deliberate in a language foreign to them is to defend a form of elitism at best, and at worst to exclude them from deliberative politics—a violation of the democratic ideal either way. Also, "political communication has a large ritualistic component" that a mere technical competence in a language may not be sensitive to (2001, 213). For example, Yael Tamir notes how the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, follows after the "Great Knesset," which was a central religious and political institution during the period of the Second Temple (Tamir 1993, 148). The Knesset's proceedings and procedures thus reflect a particular culture and background history that a merely technical understanding of Hebrew may not suffice to render comprehensible and familiar. Thus, Kymlicka concludes that "the more political debate is conducted in the vernacular, the more participatory it will be" (2001, 214).

In addition to the common language that shared nationality provides, another crucial role nationality plays in servicing democratic politics is that it provides a sense of solidarity and unity that is necessary for generating the requisite level of mutual respect and trust among individuals. Democracy requires individuals to respect the reasonable views of their fellow citizens even if they are in deep disagreement with each other, and conversely that they are to forward arguments and views that each can "reasonably be expected reasonably to endorse" (Rawls 1999, 140). It also requires a certain degree of trust so that the losers in a given democratic process can be motivated to honor the result, because they are confident that should the results be in their favor next time, their opponents would likewise honor these results (Kymlicka 2001, 226; also Miller 1995, 90).

Fellow nationals are, of course, not intimate with each other as, say, friends or kin are. But fellow feelings, nationalists argue, need not be restricted only to people who are closely related to one another. Co-nationals see themselves as part of a collective with a common past and a shared future, and even if

they are not actually acquainted with each other, "in the minds of each lives the image of their communion" (Anderson 1993, 6). It is for this reason that Benedict Anderson famously refers to the nation as "an imagined community," meaning by this not that the nation is a fictitious association that is unworthy of people's allegiances, but that it is a significant allegiance-generating association that is premised on a people's image or collective consciousness of its historic and communal distinctness.

Thus, David Miller writes that democratic politics "are likely to function most effectively when they embrace just a single national community" (Miller 1995, 90). This is because the virtues of mutual trust and respect, moderation and self-restraint, and, one might add, the idea of public reason (Rawls 1993, 1999), are crucial for a functioning democratic political community, and common nationality provides the "cement" for engendering and nurturing these virtues (see Canovan 1996).[3]

In sum, "national political forums with a single common language form the primary locus of democratic participation in the modern world, and are more genuinely participatory than political forums at higher levels that cut across language-lines" (Kymlicka 2001, 227). Nationality provides the cultural linguistic basis for democratic deliberation and the source of democratic trust and respect among citizens.[4]

II. Globalization and the Democratic Deficit

The nation-centric account of democracy is commonly said to be outmoded in an era of economic globalization. Economic globalization, or globalization for short, refers to the process of increasing integration and interdependency of national economies, the increasing mobility of capital and labor across national boundaries, the creation of new global markets and products (e.g., financial markets and their "products" such as investment schemes), and the creation of international organs and regulations to facilitate and govern these new interactions (e.g., the World Trade Organizaton). Globalization is the progression toward a boundless global economy (or at least the approximation of) in which national ties and membership are becoming less and less relevant with respect to economic practices and decisions.

Yet the burdens and benefits of the increasingly globalized economy are far from being equally shared among the world's population. In spite of this newly shared global economic space (or because of it, some say), global income disparity has risen rather than fallen. One basic reason for this increasing inequality against the backdrop of globalization is the so-called democratic deficit in the global sphere. Economic decisions are global in the scope

of their effects and implications, and are often even made by institutions and organizations, such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), multinational corporations (MNCs), and so on, that transcend national affiliation in the traditional sense. Yet these decisions are not regulated by procedures that reflect the will and views of individuals who are affected significantly by them. As John Dryzek points out, "globalization means that important issues increasingly elude the control of nation-states" (1999, 30). This lack of democratic control, especially on the part of individuals most vulnerable to the globalizing economy, over the terms and processes of globalization results in the unequal allocation of benefits and burdens among individuals globally.

As the scope of our economic interaction widens, so too should the scope of our democratic procedure in order to regulate this interaction on terms that all can accept. Normative considerations, in short, ought to be globalized as our economic decisions and practices take on a more global scope. Something like this is underscored by Hume when he wrote that if "several distinct societies maintain a kind of intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the boundary of justice still grows larger, in proportion to the largeness of men's view, and the force of their mutual connexions" (Hume 1777, 153). As members of nations, especially those in the developing world, become increasingly vulnerable to decisions of other countries as a result of increased enmeshment of national economies, limiting any democratic control they may exercise within their borders does not go far enough to ensure that decisions that have grave impact on them are decisions they could reasonably consent to.

III. Cosmopolitan Democracy, World State, and World Citizenship

But how can the current global democratic deficit be best corrected? How best to "globalize" democracy, so to speak? Some theorists argue that to counter the democratic deficit, we need to reconceptualize democracy, to rethink democracy as a global rather than a nationally rooted ideal. As one commentator puts it, "Democracy at the national level has become meaningless as real decisions are made at a higher level, and these higher-level institutions are largely exempt from democratic oversight or accountability" (Lynch 2000, 96). The overlapping "networks of interaction" between states, acerbated by a globalizing economy, do not coincide with the bounded territories within which democratic deliberation takes place. Thus, as David Held has put it, "the idea of a democratic order can no longer be simply defended as an idea suitable to a particular closed political community or state" (Held 2000, 19, 28; also Held 1995).

Some theorists have, therefore, proposed a cosmopolitan conception of democracy as a response to what they believe to be the increasing redundancy of the national ideal of the democratic ideal. As the primary arena of human social and economic life is no longer confined to the borders of the nation-state, so no longer should the primary arena of democratic politics be similarly confined. Keeping democracy nation-centered is anachronistic in light of the increasingly shared social and economic space of our world. The traditional presupposition of democracy—that it is a nationally bounded concept—has to be replaced by an unbounded concept of democracy to meet the new realities of globalization. Held thus recommends:

> Against this background [of globalization], democracy must be thought of as a "double-sided process"... [meaning] not just the deepening of democracy within a national community, but also the extension of democratic processes across territorial borders. Democracy for the new millennium must involve cosmopolitan citizens able to gain access to, and mediate between, and render accountable, the social, economic and political processes and flows which cuts across and transform their traditional community boundaries. (2000, 30)

Instead of continuing to regard democracy as primarily an ideal that must be anchored in the idea of a nation, cosmopolitan democrats propose that democracy be seen as primarily a transnational ideal that is directly applicable to individuals of the world taken as a single social scheme.

Cosmopolitan democrats do not deny that the nation is an important democratic site, but they hold that it is not necessarily the most important, and certainly not the only site to be governed by democratic principles. Individuals ought to engage in democratic deliberations with other individuals across national lines, as members of transnational or even global associations, which will enable them to better influence and regulate global decisions that have great effects on their lives. Cosmopolitan democrats may point to the fact of new and multiple transnational allegiances individuals are able to form and have as evidence of the possibility of transnational identity necessary for grounding cosmopolitan democracy.

Thus, basic to the idea of cosmopolitan democracy is that there ought to be overlapping transnational institutions and associations in which individuals have a direct deliberative role. People are not just democratic citizens of their state, but they are also members of the global community through their membership and participation in various associations and activities within and without their own countries. Some cosmopolitans propose the formation of a world parliament of a sort, in the form of democratically elected people's assembly—a world assembly of individuals elected directly by individuals independent of their nationalities to complement the United Nations General Assembly in which countries rather than individuals as such are represented (Archibugi et al. 2000).

Before exploring the cosmopolitan democratic idea more fully, it is useful to be clear on what the cosmopolitan democratic ideal entails. The term "cosmopolitan democracy" is potentially misleading because cosmopolitanism is commonly associated with a world state, a *cosmos polis*, and cosmopolitan democracy correspondingly is commonly thought to mean a democracy situated within this world state. But the idea of a world state is itself highly contentious for the reasons Kant has pointed out—namely, that a world state is likely to be a despotic state, if at all attainable or sustainable, given the vast expanse of geographical space and diversity of views it would have to contain. Indeed, the association of cosmopolitanism with world statism is one central reason why critics of cosmopolitanism are quick to reject it (cf. Zolo 1997)

But, in fact, few cosmopolitan democrats themselves actually advocate a world state. Held, for instance, stresses that his cosmopolitan theory proposes not a world state, but a network of transnational institutions and organizations, and individual commitments and interests that cut across national and territorial boundaries. So this misunderstanding with respect to the political context of cosmopolitan democracy is one that cosmopolitans can clear up. The notion of a world state is not one that cosmopolitans must commit themselves to.

But while the commitment to world statism is (often wrongly) attributed to cosmopolitan democrats rather than actually affirmed by them, cosmopolitan democrats often speak approvingly of a cosmopolitan or world citizenship. For instance, Held writes that "each person of a state must learn to become a cosmopolitan citizen—a person capable of mediating between national traditions, communities, and alternative forms of life" (Held 2000, 29; also Linklater 1999 and Heater 1990).

Concerning the idea of world citizenship, critics of cosmopolitanism charge that the idea of a world citizen absent a world state seems incoherent. Citizenship, properly understood, is a "bounded" concept that expresses a membership in a distinct polity that comes with certain obligations in addition to rights (Miller 1999). Citizenship is, in other words, a political-legal concept, and so world *citizenship* properly understood must entail a world state and a legal order within which the idea of world citizenship can be situated. But because cosmopolitans rarely call for a world state themselves, it is "misleading" to describe cosmopolitan democracy in terms of the "creation of democratic citizenship on the transnational level" (Kymlicka 2001, 325). Cosmopolitan democracy does not "create any form of collective deliberation and decision making that connects and binds individuals across national boundaries" with a common political identity (Kymlicka 2001, 325).

Thus, because cosmopolitans rarely affirm the idea of a world state, they can only mean by cosmopolitan citizenship something quite distinct from how we ordinarily conceive of citizenship. The fundamental inspiration behind Martha Nussbaum's call for world citizenship is not that of extending our ordinary conception of citizenship to a world polity as such, but to "make all human beings part of our community of dialogue and concern, base our political deliberations on interlocking commonality, and give the circle that defines our humanity special attention and respect" (Nussbaum 1996, 9). This is a moral aspiration rather than a legal-political reality. The world citizenship cosmopolitans aspire toward is a moral rather than legal category. Cosmopolitans are not bent on creating a world state as such, but the creation of a common moral world and the recognition of the membership of all humans in this moral world. Cosmopolitans, in short, intend their call for world citizens to be understood metaphorically, rather than literally.

Some commentators feel that this metaphorical use of "citizenship" may present more trouble than it is worth. Stephen Neff, for instance, says that it is, in the end, unfortunate that cosmopolitans speak freely of world citizenship given the distractions and confusion this poses, when they mean rather generally the attractive idea of a shared humanity (1999, 118). Indeed, the normative goals of cosmopolitanism, that of global justice, protecting human rights, and a more democratic global arena "can be brought about in ways," argues Neff, "which do not require a distinct concept of cosmopolitan citizenship" (119).

These are legitimate concerns. But perhaps too much has been made of the cosmopolitan invocation of world citizenship. Once it is clear how cosmopolitans are in fact using the term "citizenship," the idea of a world citizenship need not be objectionable, but can, on the contrary, be a useful counterforce to the tendencies of people to think *exclusively* in nationalistic terms. At any rate, once these utopian ideas—that of world government and world citizenship in the literal sense—are disentangled from the cosmopolitan ideal, seemingly serious contradictions between cosmopolitan democracy and the national-democratic thesis are circumvented.

Still, in spite of these clarifications, cosmopolitan democracy remains at odds with the nationalist thesis in a real and fundamental way. Basic to the cosmopolitan democratic view is that the nation-state cannot remain the primary locus of democratic decision making. Although cosmopolitan democrats need not go all the way and seek to replace nation-states with a world state, they advocate the creation of overlapping transnational and regional institutions that cut across national boundaries and in which individuals can have a direct participatory democratic role. The proposal of a people's assembly, as mentioned above, is one such example; in fact, the directly elected European Parliament is often seen as a prototype of such a world assembly (Held 2000, 29). Democratic citizenship in nation-states is only one among different democratic forms of memberships that individuals ought to have, and is certainly not necessarily the most basic or significant.

But, as mentioned above, nationalist theorists point out that nationhood provides the solidarity and common language necessary for democratic politics; yet "the cosmopolitan governance proposed by Held is for the most part silent on" this crucial point (Kymlicka 2001, 239). What would serve as the basis of solidarity and common understanding at the global level among people of diverse nationalities? If individuals are to be directly represented at global decision making irrespective of nationality, it is not clear if linguistic diversity can be overcome and if the diversity in worldviews and affinities can properly support a democratic deliberative order based on mutual trust and respect across national lines. Hypothetically, if we actually do establish a directly elected world parliament, how likely would it be for, say, a Canadian to seriously consider voting for, and to do so in an informed manner, an Indonesian candidate given the linguistic and cultural barriers between them? Indeed, as Bellamy and Jones point out, the European experience has shown this to be quite unlikely. In spite of the success of the European Union (EU) in bringing together democratic nations under a single formal/legal organization, the creation of a unified European demos remains elusive (2000, 211). Indeed, the diversity of national identification remains in spite of economic and monetary integration at the level of Europe. Polls show that most Europeans tend to see themselves as members of particular nations, rather than as members of a European polity (cited in Bellamy and Jones 2000, 211).[5]

Extending direct democratic participation beyond national boundaries may also undermine democratic accountability. Dennis Thompson observes that "when we look at the experience of extending governmental authority beyond national boundaries, we cannot be encouraged by what we see. As the EU has gained more power and become more effective, it has also drawn more criticism for its lack of democratic accountability" (1986, 115). As we increase the number of decision-making authorities that are directly accountable to individuals, as the cosmopolitan idea calls for, the more difficult it will be to actually hold these authorities accountable (Thompson 1986, 115–16). "By its very nature, such a network [of regional and international agencies and authorities] does not give those citizens outside particular agencies or assemblies any significant control, and does not provide any way for citizens within them to deal with the effects of the uncoordinated decisions of other agencies and assemblies" (Thompson 1986, 115–16). As we multiply democratic authorities, the more we undermine the democratic ideals of effective control and accountability. Thompson has aptly labeled this "the problem of many hands."

To be sure, the problem of many hands is not uniquely a problem for cosmopolitan democracy; it confounds domestic democrats as well to the extent that there are multiple democratically accountable decision-making entities within a society (Thompson 1986). But it is a problem that is compounded when attempting to extend deliberative democracy globally.

There is also the problem of fostering and securing a global civil society that can underpin a functioning democracy of individuals in the global arena. Democrats take as one important precondition for a flourishing democracy the presence of a flourishing civil society. Yet, it is not clear how a global civil society could be engendered. Richard Falk holds out hope, cautiously, that a global civil society may emerge as a result of globalization, in that "as the global village becomes more an experienced, daily reality" (Falk 2000, 176), individuals can come to see themselves as members of a shared community of fate. This optimism presupposes that the sense of solidarity and common sympathies and fellow-feelings that are the preconditions of civil society can be engendered globally because of people's common experiences and realities as a result of increased globalization. Yet shared experience and reality alone may not be sufficient. A prior sense of identity may be necessary before individuals can come to appreciate and perceive certain experiences and realities as *shared*. Why, for example, would Americans attempt to understand the effects of globalization on foreigners and to share in their worldview? The felt impact of free trade and economic liberalization for Americans and the Chinese workers are quite different; unless there is first a prior sense of affinity and mutual feeling between the two peoples, experiences need not be seen as shared and held in common.

One might propose that shared values and causes could provide the glue to bind individuals from different nations together, thus creating the global civil society needed to ground cosmopolitan democracy. Held points to the "new voices" motivated by shared principles in events such as the Rio Conference and the Beijing Conference on Women's Rights as hopeful signs of strengthening global ties and the founding of a global civil society. While Held acknowledges that these attempts to create "new forms of public life and new ways of debating regional and global issues" are still very nascent, and so it is too early to say whether these attempts to foster a global civil society will eventually succeed, he nonetheless thinks that "they point in the direction" of such possibilities (2000, 29).

But in reply to Held, nationalists would urge that we should not be too hasty to conflate transnational activism motivated by shared goals and interests with transnational democratic deliberation. The former kind of coalition is unraveled once goals and interests diverge; democratic associations, on the other hand, ought to be able to withstand such value disagreements. Indeed,

democratic associations presuppose divergent goals among its members, and hence the need for democratic deliberation to fairly and reasonably adjudicate divergent claims. The ties that bind a democratic order together cannot be secured by shared interests or principles, for these are not robust and permanent enough to generate the kinds of shared sympathies, and mutual respect and trust, necessary for actual deliberative democracy (Kymlicka 2001, 325).

VI. A Democracy of National Democracies

For the above reasons, nationalist theorists remain skeptical about the prospects for cosmopolitan democracy. Defenders of cosmopolitan democracy have, of course, challenged the claims of the nationalists. They argue that, contra the nationalist thesis, deliberative democratic associations larger than the nation, and that cut across national and other boundaries, can be formed, fostered, and sustained, the lack of shared nationality and language notwithstanding (e.g., Weinstock 2001). Indeed, they may point out that nationalists are guilty of a certain double standard by holding cosmopolitans to a higher standard of deliberative ideal than is expected of deliberative democrats in the national context. After all, the ideal of deliberation *within* multicultural countries faces the same issues of linguistic and cultural diversity that nationalists say cosmopolitans must surmount; also, deliberative democracy in modern nation-states, which are certainly not intimate associations, does not require *direct* individual involvement in all matters, but that individuals may be represented indirectly at different levels through different constituencies and other subnational associations. So cosmopolitans are not alone guilty of assuming a higher degree of direct individual involvement than is realistically possible. Perhaps the most challenging of the nationalist objections against the cosmopolitan concerns the basis of solidarity and affinity for democratic politics. Yet, as some cosmopolitans have countered, it is important not to underestimate the malleability of people's sense of solidarity and fellow-feeling with others. Indeed, if nationalism is properly seen as a morally expansionist project—that is, a project that seeks to compel people to overcome their parochial ties of kinship and tribalism in order to include strangers (i.e., their co-nationals) within their arc of moral concern, rather than as a morally limiting project—then there is no immediate reason to think that this expansion of human moral motivation cannot be developed beyond the bounds of the nation (Jones 1999)

Be that as it may, I leave this dispute over the nationalist thesis aside, and I want to examine the possibility of global democracy on the assumption that the thesis is correct. What are the prospects for global democracy if the nation is indeed the basic and exclusive site of genuine democratic deliberation? Are

there alternative ways of conceptualizing global democracy other than on cosmopolitan terms?

The obvious alternative to cosmopolitan democracy is to conceive of global democracy as a democracy of nation-states. The nationalist thesis does not force one to the dismal conclusion that the forces of globalization are beyond democratic control, that the democratic deficit is an inevitable aspect of a world made up of distinct nationalities. Nationalists, in particular liberal nationalists, hold out the possibility that greater democracy both within and between democratic nation-states can serve as a solution to the democratic deficit. On this view, we do not need so much as a cosmopolitan democracy—that is, a democracy of individuals across national boundaries—but an international democracy—a democracy of democratic nations.

The important difference between this account of global democracy and that of cosmopolitan democracy is that instead of taking individuals to be *directly* represented in the international arena through their direct membership in various transnational associations, the nationalist takes individuals to have only an *indirect* role at the international level. The global democracy strictly speaking is not between individuals as such, but between nations, or more correctly, between representatives of nations.

Conceiving global democracy literally as an inter*national* democracy rather than cosmopolitan democracy conforms to the nationalist thesis that the nation is the primary site of real deliberative democracy among individuals. Individuals will democratically elect representatives to represent them in the global deliberations, democratically decide on the sorts of issues that would be their concern, and their representatives can in turn democratically deliberate these matters with other democratically elected representatives from other nations. Thus, the nationalist thesis does not preclude the possibility of democratic deliberation between nations (represented by democratically elected representatives democratically accountable to their own nationals), and they certainly concur with cosmopolitans that we need more democracy at the global level—and that this may require reforming existing institutions as well as establishing new ones. But in the view of national democrats, the current global deficit is not due to the lack of *direct* individual participation in global institutions, but rather, the fact that some nations are not democratically represented at important global institutions on the one side and the lack of democracy at the national level on the other. The decision-making procedures of important institutions like the World Bank and the IMF are cases in point. Should global institutions be reformed and democratized by having a fairer and more proportionate representation of nations, and by restructuring their decision-making procedures along more democratic lines, much of the democratic deficit may be corrected without the need to envisage a global democracy in which individuals are represented directly regardless of nationality.

Democratic nations can also regulate the conduct of nonnational institutions like MNCs without necessarily adopting the cosmopolitan approach of direct individual involvement. What this requires is the democratization of these institutions to allow for better representation by countries. There is no reason why the democratic deficit has to be corrected by allowing individuals direct participation in these organizations. To be sure, no cosmopolitan democrats would recommend that individuals be directly consulted when decisions are being made by highly specialized institutions. But they would expect that the decision makers in these institutions be directly accountable to individuals. More importantly, they require the downplaying of national-level democracy in some respects; indeed, they take national democracy to be one of the reasons for the global democratic deficit. International democracy, on the other hand, takes greater national-level democracy to provide a solution to the global democratic deficit.

If the above is right, global democracy can be achieved in a two-stage procedure as an alternative to the single-stage procedure envisioned by cosmopolitan democrats. The first stage concerns fostering and improving democracy within nations, and the second stage concerns democratizing existing international institutions, or even establishing new ones to regulate international activities not yet regulated. This requires democratization at both national and international levels, but the premises of the nationalist thesis are preserved. Genuine deliberation between individuals is still at the national level, and greater democratization of international institutions allows representatives of all nations to present their constituents' concerns and decisions to others in a democratic global setting.

This, of course, means that global democracy can be attained only if national democracy is first achieved, that representatives at the global level are indeed democratic representatives. A global democratic forum represented by undemocratically appointed national delegates would not fix the global democratic deficit. A democracy of tyrants by definition cannot be, strictly speaking, a global democracy, even if tyrants deliberate democratically among themselves at the international level. Global democracy needs foremost national democracy. To be sure, not many countries in our world would qualify as democratic, and so we are a long way from even satisfying the first stage of the two-level approach to global democracy. But unlike the case of cosmopolitan democracy, nationalists would argue that on this two-stage approach, the basic sites to be democratized are already present, and the potential for democratizing them are real. Indeed, the first task is to further democratize these

existing sites, not to erode the political relevance of these sites, as the cosmopolitan democratic ideal might imply.

One concern cosmopolitans might have with the two-stage approach to global democracy is that not all nation-states are democratic states, and so a global democracy among states cannot sufficiently ensure that *individuals* are empowered to have control over decisions that have implications for them. But this points out a challenge for the democratic nationalist approach, not its refutation. It only means that the nationalist democrats need to further the process of democratization within countries and not neglect their importance. Ensuring greater democracy within countries is a goal toward greater global democracy and not an obstacle to it. Nationalism provides the building blocks, therefore, for global democracy, not its obstacles.

Another cosmopolitan concern is that democracies within nations need not necessarily entail democracy between nations. What is to prevent a democratic society from dealing with other societies on undemocratic terms? Is there not the fear that a society of democratic citizens might want their representatives to narrowly pursue and protect their democratically arrived at interests in the global arena, even if this means not deliberating with representatives of other countries on fair terms? Democratic politics within states could be consistent with power politics between states, one might allege. It is for this reason, among others, that cosmopolitans worry that keeping democracy limited to the nation-state cannot fully motivate the development of a genuine global democracy. Thus, the nationalist's concentration on inculcating deliberative democracy on the national level may be an impediment to democracy at the global level, rather than serving as its entry point.

But this objection underestimates the moral character and scope of democratic citizenship. Democratic citizens are motivated not just to deliberate about their own national interests to the exclusion of the interests of foreigners. The nationalist thesis, as described above, is not incompatible with what Amy Gutmann has called democratic humanism. "Democratic humanism supports an education that encourages citizens to deliberate about justice as part of their political culture—justice for their fellow citizens as well as for their fellow human beings, who are citizens of other societies" (1996, 70). Truly democratic citizens would be interested in dealing justly and fairly with other nations, and this would involve minimally the requirement that their representatives deal with other representatives on fair and democratic terms in the global plane. As Frederick Engels puts it, a nation cannot be truly free if it continues to oppress other nations (Cunningham 1994, 104). Democratic citizens, therefore, are not so limited in their moral sight as to hold the ideal of democratic respect to be exclusive to compatriots and not applicable to nonnationals. It is just that on the nationalistic view, they will not be deliberating *directly* with other individuals from different nations; the main deliberations between individuals are situated at the national level, but individuals are still able to deal democratically with other citizens through their national representatives. Democratic citizens are thus able to transcend their limited national interests to take into account the interests of others. The ideal "statesman," to borrow from Rawls, will take one of the crucial aims of democratic development to be that of extending her people's scope of moral concern beyond their political boundaries, so that they can learn to relate to other peoples on terms other than narrowly defined self-interested ones (1999, 112–13).

The crucial role of democratic citizenship for global justice makes the nationalist thesis even more poignant. We must take education for democratic *citizenship* at the national level seriously if this is necessary for greater global democracy, and if the nation is the place where individuals can best act effectively to promote justice both at home and abroad. With respect to the last point, Gutmann writes: "Democratic citizens have institutional means at their disposal that solidarity individuals, or citizens of the world only, do not" (1996, 71). Global democracy, in short, begins with the education of democratic *citizens*.

This last point is especially useful, for it highlights the strategic role of nationalizing democracy for the end of global democracy. Unlike the cosmopolitan democratic approach, which will call for the creation of new forms of governance, the nationalist approach calls on democrats to improve on existing global institutions and structures, and, importantly, to strengthen democratic national governments. The latter is thus not only more realistic, but it also more clearly shows the way. It points out that one crucial way toward achieving global democracy is to strengthen domestic democracy.

The above suggests that a democracy of national democracies is not only more likely, but also more attractive in terms of clearly identifying a site that needs to be rendered democratic. Indeed, the ethical significance of democratic nation building should not be overlooked. Michael Ignatieff, referring to the Balkans, Somalia, and most notably Afghanistan, points out that the anarchy that results from failed or collapsed states "is the chief cause" of human rights abuses today. In a sense then, "state sovereignty, instead of being the enemy of human rights, has to be seen as their basic condition" (Ignatieff 2002). Similarly, Bellamy and Jones point out that in the absence of a world authority, weakening democracy at the national level (as one might risk doing by striving for unrooted forms of democracy) could result in what they call a "regulatory hole" that could be filled by undemocratic elements of power (2000, 212; also Hirst and Thompson 2000a, 2000b), thus compromising not only democratic ideals, but also world security and very basic human rights.

The second stage of achieving a democracy between democracies—namely, the democratization of international institutions and the creation of new ones where required—is crucial, of course, and nationalists do not deny this point. A world of democratic nations would be of no effect against the global democratic deficit if these democracies do not deal with each other democratically. Where the nationalists differ importantly from cosmopolitans is that they do not think that these democratic international institutions must represent individuals directly in a way that transcend their nationalities. The fact that the IMF, World Bank, and World Trade Organization ought to be more democratic, as commonly called for, does not mean that individuals of the world are now to directly elect representatives to these organizations, but that these organizations become more widely representative and be held more accountable to countries affected by their decisions. The reform called for is thus not the reconceptualization of these institutions as cosmopolitan bodies in which individuals are directly represented, but the more modest one of allowing greater representation of countries within existing institutional structures.

That democracy is limited by nationalist constraints need not, therefore, rule out the possibility of a global democratic order if that is conceived as a democracy between democratic nations. The global democratic deficit can be overcome by strengthening democracies within nations and by improving on our existing international structures to make them more democratic. The cosmopolitan democratic idea of a democracy beyond nations is not the only available response to the global democratic deficit. And if the nationalist thesis is right, it cannot be a successful option. Reaffirming the importance of the nation as the site of democracy thus does not contradict the aspiration for global democracy.

I do not want to overstate the difference between the internationalist democratic approach and the idea of cosmopolitan democracy. Both are concerned with the global democratic deficit; and the cosmopolitan democrat need not reject the importance of democracy at the national level. But cosmopolitan democrats want to deny that the nation should be the *fundamental* site of democracy if global democracy is to be achieved, and thus argue that the traditional association between democracy and nationality be transcended and that new sites of democratic deliberation that cut across national boundaries be created. By contrast, nationalists do not think that nationality and democratic deliberation can be separated in this way. But this need not spell doom for global democracy. For nationalists who are also concerned about global democracy, democratic institutions at the national level provide citizens with the levers for promoting global democracy. Rather than seeing the nation as an obstacle to global democratization, and hence whose privileged association with deliberative democracy is to be challenged, nationalists would treat the nation as the necessary starting point of global democracy and argue that global democracy is achievable only by strengthening, not weakening, national democracy. If the nationalist thesis is a necessity in the sense that it aptly describes a basic fact of the world, democratic internationalists turn this necessity into a virtue.

V. Nationalism and Cosmopolitan Justice

If the nationalist thesis is right, global democracy can nonetheless be achieved if conceived as a democracy of "democracies rooted in nation-states" (Holden 2000, 214), rather than as a democracy of individuals in the world taken as a single scheme as called for by cosmopolitan democracy. As we saw, this means that global democracy is best seen as a two-level procedure—first as a democracy of individuals within nations, and then as a democracy between (representatives of) nations.

This approach to global democracy seems to closely follow Rawls's global theory of justice in *The Law of Peoples* where the principles of international justice are determined by representatives of peoples rather than by individuals as such (Rawls 1999). One might think then that this rejection of cosmopolitan democracy entails a rejection of cosmopolitan justice, namely, the idea that the basic principles of justice ought to be determined from a point of view that is impartial to individuals' nationality. But this need not follow. First, the ideal of democratic deliberation operates at a different conceptual level from that of deliberation about *justice*. Consequently, and secondly, the nationalist worries against cosmopolitan democracy do not apply to deliberations about justice. That is, the nationalist limitations against deliberative democracy do not impose on deliberations about justice.

Let me explain these points in order. Unlike deliberations about justice, which operate at the abstract level of determining general principles by which to regulate the basic institutions of society, the ideal of deliberative democracy operates in what Gutmann and Thompson have called "the middle range of abstraction, between foundational principles and institutional rules" (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 5). To make this point on Rawlsian terms, deliberative democracy is concerned with the legislative stage of justice, whereas deliberations about justice concern the basic principles that would regulate the social setting within which such legislative deliberations take place. More importantly, while deliberative democracy concerns actual deliberation between actually socially situated persons about how best to realize the requirements of justice, deliberation about justice is seen as a hypothetical deliberation, indeed as a deliberation that may be undertaken by a single person herself "here and

now" (Rawls 1971). As Samuel Freeman neatly puts it, deliberative democracy is a normative "model of deliberation that legislative and other decision-making bodies are to emulate. . . . As a model of decision-making, it is to be distinguished from the theoretical construct of hypothetical agreement that typifies contractarian theory [of justice]" (Freeman 2000, 379). The ideal conditions for democratic deliberation and deliberation about justice are quite different then, as are their aims. To put it differently, deliberation about justice aims to provide principles to regulate institutions; deliberative democracy aims to clarify laws and the rules of institutions in light of these principles.

My claim above has been that when it comes to deciding on specific institutional rules and procedures to regulate decisions that affect global society, we adopt a two-stage democratic procedure as opposed to a single-stage (cosmopolitan) approach in which individuals are directly represented in global democratic deliberations. Specific issues need to be actually deliberated, and here genuine deliberation would have to meet the test of comprehensibility and mutual trust and respect. But if deliberation about justice is a different form of deliberation, if it is a hypothetical deliberation about abstract principles, then it need not necessarily be wedded to this two-stage procedure, but can instead take on a cosmopolitan form in which individuals abstracted from nations, rather than representatives of nations, can individually reflect on, and draw conclusions about, the terms of global justice.

The reason, and this takes us to the second point, why one can expect a single global procedure when deliberating about justice but not in the case of democratic deliberation about legislation and institutional specifics is that in the former, the deliberation is hypothetical, whereas in the latter, it is actual (e.g., Freeman 2000, 380; also Gutmann and Thompson 2000). The original position is one famous hypothetical device of representation any person, "here and now," may invoke in deciding what justice demands.[6] The original position construction presents a deliberative model that is thus not constrained by considerations of language, national affinity, and so on because it operates at a level of abstraction that is independent of such real limitations. "Hypothetical agreements (such as the original position . . .) contain conditions that are not realizable in the world," as Freeman writes (Freeman 2000, 379); but being hypothetical, it need not be bound by real constraints. Thus, the construct of hypothetical agreements, like Rawls's original position for determining principles of justice, is not necessary to deliberative democracy (Freeman 2000). Conversely, and more to my point, the conditions for deliberative democracy, such as shared language, mutual feelings, and the like, do not apply to the construction of hypothetical agreements about justice. These are different kinds of deliberation for which different idealized conditions are

required, and in the case of deliberations about justice, differences in nationality may be put to one side. Indeed, they must be put to one side.

The nationalistic worries that plague cosmopolitan democracy, therefore, need not plague cosmopolitan justice—any individual here and now may reflect on what cosmopolitan justice requires; no actual deliberation is required, so the linguistic and cultural solidarity problems do not even arise. Just as it is possible for a single citizen to conceive behind the veil of ignorance principles of justice for her entire society, so it is possible, by extension, for a single person to conceive of principles for the world. Deliberations about justice are hypothetical deliberations rather than actual, and so unlike the actual deliberation of democracy, are not confounded by the real problems and limitations of language and solidarity identified by the nationalist thesis.

I have not given any arguments why principles of justice ought to be conceived on cosmopolitan terms; my aim in this section has been to show the nationalist objections against cosmopolitan democracy do not affect arguments for cosmopolitan justice because the nationalist claims affect only the conditions for democratic deliberation (which is a real-world deliberation), but not the hypothetical deliberation about justice that can take place in the mind of a single individual.[7] The realization of cosmopolitan democracy requires certain conditions that the nationalist thesis preempts; cosmopolitan justice, on the contrary, requires different kinds of idealized conditions that are not precluded by the nationalist thesis. One could endorse the cosmopolitan view about justice, yet be skeptical that the specific policy issues that arise within the framework of cosmopolitan justice could be resolved by individuals *directly* in a way that cut across the diverse linguistic and cultural ties of nationality.[8]

In summary, even if the nationalist thesis that the nation is the primary site of democracy is correct, the prospects for global democracy need not be hopeless. Nationalists recognize the need for greater democratization of international institutions and associations, but they also see the need to emphasize greater democracy at the national level, and indeed see this to be a necessary condition for genuine global democracy. The nation is not seen as an obstacle to global democracy, and so whose demise is to be encouraged, but as its basic starting point. On this view, democratic nations are the seeds of global democracy. Unlike cosmopolitan democrats who would wish to disperse the locus of democratic politics away from the nation upward toward transnational institutions, the nationalists argue that the global context does not provide the basic preconditions for deliberative democracy, and that attempts to diminish the importance of the nation as a site of democracy might have the contrary effect of undermining the only available conditions for genuine deliberation. A democracy of nationally rooted democracies provides the best

available approach to global democracy that builds on rather than disrupts these conditions of democracy, and provides a realistic solution to the global democratic deficit.

Notes

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2. See, for example, Kymlicka (1995) and Tamir (1993) who point out the ways in which the nationalist ideal is assumed in much of contemporary liberal theory.

3. Some nationalists go on to point out that the ideal of distributive justice must also presuppose a community in which "members recognize such obligations of justice to one another" (Miller 1995, 93). Thus, shared nationality is basic to an egalitarian democratic state. "Where citizens of a state are also compatriots [i.e., co-nationals], the mutual trust that this engenders makes it more likely that they will be able to solve collective action problems, to support redistributive principles of justice, and to practice deliberative forms of democracy" (Miller 1995, 98).

4. Indeed, some may argue that attempts to transplant the nation as the basic site of democratic politics risk undermining the conditions—the shared sympathies and common understandings—that make democratic politics possible in the first place by overstraining and taxing these sympathies and commitments.

5. The noticeable conservative shift in attitudes toward non-European immigration among Europeans can be seen as a response to the threat of Europeanization on national identity.

6. Rawls's original position procedure, to recall, conceives of parties to the deliberation about justice as free and equal. This condition of equality and freedom is ensured by means of the "veil of ignorance" behind which parties to the deliberation are to imagine that they do not know contingent and specific facts about themselves, such as their social class, the talents they have, their own conception of the good, and so on.

7. Rawls has given reasons for rejecting the cosmopolitan account of justice (Rawls 1999); see also Freeman's creative construction and defense of Rawls's international theory (2006). But my aim, as said, is only to show that cosmopolitan democracy and cosmopolitan justice are two different demands, and arguments against cosmopolitan democracy need not affect cosmopolitan justice. For my views on cosmopolitan justice and Rawls, see Tan (2000) and (2001).

8. This last point raises questions concerning the relationship between justice and democratic legitimacy. Democratic legitimacy holds that coercive force be exercised only on terms that parties concerned can reasonably accept as reasonable. The worry then might be that my disengagement of cosmopolitan justice from democratic deliberation will allow some parties (e.g., liberal democratic peoples) to illegitimately impose their vision of a just world order on other (nonliberal) peoples. As I said, this is not the place to defend the legitimacy of liberal cosmopolitan justice. Suffice it to say that the Rawlsian contractarian approach that some cosmopolitans have adopted for the purpose of arriving at principles of cosmopolitan justice is defended as a procedure consistent with the diversity of ends that peoples as corporate units are supposed to have (see, e.g., Beitz [1999]). So understood, cosmopolitan justice does not violate the norms of democratic legitimacy because it presents principles of justice that all reasonable peoples are presumed to find reasonable. I am grateful to Deen Chatterjee for helpful comments here.

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