Nature of Analytical Philosophy

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Abstract

This paper examines the nature of analytical philosophy, its need and the importance in the contemporary world. In this write up I will investigate the role of logic, mind and language in the field of analytical philosophy. It further determines the development of clarification of complex statements into simple statements. What makes analytical philosophy unique and what are the major significance that differentiates analytical philosophy from philosophy of mind, philosophy of logic and philosophy of language. Analytical philosophy is the process of analysis in which we proceed from complexity to simplicity and clarity. In analytical philosophy, philosophers are using analytical method to uncover those truths of the world and reality which are covered with linguistic ambiguity. Language plays an important role in analytical philosophy because the clarification and simplification is the business of analytical philosophy. World is made up of facts and facts are expressed and analyzed in language. Language is the representation of the world. I will also show the major contribution of analytical philosophers in explaining atomic world.

Keywords: Analytical Philosophy; Language; Logic; Mind; Analysis.

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Introduction

Analytic philosophy was practiced by Plato and reinterpreted in the modern era by Descartes. Descartes envisaged language to be the sign of thought (Sayre, 1976, p. 187). It was revived in two centers; Germany and England. In Germany Gottlob Frege was exploring the foundations of mathematics and logic. His efforts introduced new standards of rigidity that made their way into analytic philosophy. Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus* can be regarded as the peak of early period of analytic philosophy. Generally, through the work of Russell and Wittgenstein; Frege’s nature of language and logic has also become influential tools in the hands of later philosophies. In England, G. E. Moore on the contrary side started the analytic philosophy. He opposed British idealism and their claims *Esse est Perici* in his Article *Refutation of idealism* (1903). A critical part of that argument is what Moore’s claims about the concept of the sensation of yellow which contains two parts: the sensation that is unique to each person and the yellowness that can be perceived by many people, even when idealists enclosed that there was some kind of duality here, they insisted on a kind of inseparability. However, Analysis was first used by the Greek philosopher Aristotle in his work ‘*Posterior Analytics*’. 

Analytical philosophy is the branch of philosophy which attempts to examine and explore linguistic problems, logical problems, problems of mind. It has two strands; one emerged from Cambridge and other from Oxford. The philosophers in Cambridge side are Dummet, Quine, and Davidson and others who are from Oxford side are Austin, Urmson, and John Searle. Moreover the most important philosophical discipline which was developed in analytical philosophy is logical positivism which has brought significant verification of traditional philosophical theories to find logical relations, analysis and reference. Logical positivism has developed into two wings; Right wing and Left wing. Those philosophers who were associated with Right wing are Moritz Schlick and Waismann and they are known as Conservative Right Wing. They recognized liberalization and empiricism. However, the philosophers who were associated with Left Wing are Carnap and Neurath. They are known as Radical Left wing and they stressed on Fallibilism and Pragmaticism.

During the first half of the twentieth century, primarily in Great Britain and German speaking countries and later in North American, Australia and New Zealand, conceptual analysis was stressed and practiced which aims at “to break down complex concepts into simple concepts”. According to Moore, the process might lead ultimately to simple concepts of which no further analysis could be given. The designation that conceptual was supposed to distinguish the philosophical activity from various analysis applied to non-conceptual objects. Analytical physics break down atoms into protons, neutrons and electrons. Analytic Chemistry splits chemical compositions. Analytical mathematics breaks down numbers into rational, complex, irrational, and natural.
numbers. The analogy between the philosophy and science inspired the name ‘logical atomism’, a theory that flourished between 1920 and 1930. Wittgenstein and Russell maintained that there must be simple, un-analyzable objects at the fundamental level of reality. Wittgenstein thought that the simples existed independently of human experience. A sentence is meaningful if and only if it is either analytic or empirically verifiable. For philosophical problem arise when language is used customarily. Wittgenstein questioned many of the assumptions of analytic philosophy from the nature and necessity of analysis to the nature of language. His oracular aphorisms such as ‘don’t ask for the meaning, ask for the use’ and ‘to understand a sentence is to understand a language’. Once when Gilbert Harman was asked ‘what is analytic philosophy’? He said (tongue firmly in cheek) analytic philosophy is who you have lunch with? The famous analytical philosophers are Moore, Russell, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Quine, Davidson, Kripke, and Chomsky.  

Frege is known as Grandfather of Analytical philosophy (Sosa, 2001). Frege’s work on the philosophy of mathematics provides the explanation of how deductive reasoning can extend our knowledge and a conception of the significance as well as the application of a theory to its foundations. It also challenges us to say on what our recognition of mathematical truth rests, if not on pure logic or more generally, on purely conceptual truths. It is believed that Moore, Russell rebelled against Kant and Hegel. According to Russell ‘all mathematics is a symbolic logic’. According to Wittgenstein, every mental image is a physical thing. I have a pain means that pain resides in things not a mental kind. There is no yellow or red color; it is actually the sensations of the objects which are giving us different colored impressions. Likely Frege gave the answer of the question ‘what is the number one’ in his work ‘The foundations of arithmetic’ and gave the answer that number one is a thing. It is the thing which is counted as one but not the number.  

Wittgenstein thought that it is just an ultimate fact about human beings that they find certain a priori inferences natural. Logicians are chiefly concerned with language used informatively in affirming or denying propositions, formulating arguments, evaluating arguments, and so on. Many other purposes are also served by language, however, and its informative use may be better understood when contrasted with other uses. The great philosopher of analytical tradition and notable logician insisted rightly in his work (Philosophical Investigations, 1953) that there are countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’, and ‘sentences’. Among the examples suggested by Wittgenstein are giving orders, describing an object or giving its measurements, reporting an event, speculating about an event, forming and testing a hypothesis, presenting the results of an experiment, making up a story, play-acting, singing, guessing riddles, telling a joke, solving a problem in arithmetic, translating
from one language into another, asking, cursing, greeting and praying. The object of analysis were said to be concepts or propositions, but by the 1930’s a linguistic turn became clearly noticeable and language came to be regarded as the fundamental object of analysis. Analytic philosophers were often called as linguistic early in the 20th century. Two English philosophers, Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead collaborated on the treatise known as Principia Mathematica which elaborates the fundamental rethinking of the relationship between mathematics and logic. In their Principia, Russell and Whitehead wanted to show that mathematics could ultimately reduced to logical principles. Among the techniques they developed was the use of the notational system of algebra, called Boolean notation, for expressing argument forms. Russell and Whitehead hoped Boolean notation could bring clarity to logic that therefore had been expressed only in natural languages, and in many respects they succeeded, developing a new form of logical expression called symbolic logic.

Symbolic logic is a many valued system; statements are either true or false. There is also three valued system in logic (true, false and undetermined), and model logic; which shows the logical relations among ‘necessarily p’, ‘in fact p’, and ‘may be p’, Tense logic, sometimes called fuzzy or vagueness’. Logic goes beyond truth-functional and analysis to develop decision procedures when truth values are more ambiguous. Computers are not about using numbers and computations but it is about logic, and computer code is a series of statements involving logical connections. Hence, Russell said about analysis as:

“The reason that I call my doctrine logical atomism is because the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the sort of last residue in analysis is logical atoms and not physical atoms. Some of them will be what I call ‘particulars’ such things as little patches of colors or sounds, momentary things and some of them will be predicates or relations and so on. The point is that the atom I wish to arrive at is the atom of logical analysis, not the atom of physical analysis. The process of sound philosophizing, to my mind, consist mainly in passing from those obvious, vague, ambiguous things, that we feel quite sure of, to something precise, clear, definite, which by reflection and analysis we find is involved in the vague thing that we start from, and is, so to speak, the real truth of which that vague thing is a sort of shadow”. (Russell B., 1921)

According to Russell; ‘language come first and thought follows its footsteps’ (Waldron, 1985). He didn’t admit the possibility of synthetic a-priori knowledge (Gerwert, 1998, p. 49). In contemporary period, logic contains three main aspects, constructive, critical and theoretical. Logic is concerned with all forms of symbolic reference and with the semantic function of language. Consequently all valid uses of language are logical, and all invalid uses can be shown to be such only by logical analysis. Logic is intrinsic to language at every stage of its development from primitive symbolization to the most
elaborate forms of theoretical discourse. Thus language hypothesis and logic are inseparable. Wittgenstein assumes that to understand a language is to take in a symbolism as a whole (Wittgenstein L., Philosophical Grammar, 1974).

Chomsky’s philosophy of mind rests directly on philosophy of grammar. The term ‘grammar’ was used, in the 1960s, which refers not only a linguist’s description of a language, but to the basic knowledge of linguistic structures that every speaker of a language has acquired it in infancy. The central issues of linguistic theory are then posed as follows. First, we must ask what grammars are like: what form does a speaker’s basic knowledge of a language take? Second, we have to ask how speakers do in fact acquire this knowledge. Chomsky’s answer to the second question largely reflects his answer to first, and both are central to his view of mind in general. According to Chomsky, ‘certain well-founded conclusions about the nature of language are relevant to the problem of how knowledge is acquired and how the character of human knowledge is determined by certain general properties of the mind’. Chomsky elsewhere claims that these conclusions support ‘what might fairly be called a rationalist conception of the acquisition of knowledge’, as opposed, in particular, to an empiricist one. More specifically, he suggests that ‘contemporary research (in linguistic) supports a theory of psychologically a-priori principles that bears a striking resemblance to the classical doctrine of innate ideas’. Katz, among others joins Chomsky in making such claims, declaring that ‘adequate is now known in the theory of language to afford a substantial basis for deciding between the empiricist and rationalist hypothesis’, and concluding that such a decision favors a rationalist account of human learning. Cooper has argued, for instance, that Chomsky’s neo-rationalism is dissimilar enough from the rationalism of Descartes and Leibnitz so that ‘there is little of philosophical contention in Chomsky’s doctrine’. According to subjectivism, a grammar of a language describes the psychological basis of linguistic competence. According to linguistic mentalism, individual’s knowledge of a grammar provides the (psychological) basis for their linguistic competence. Linguistic mentalism is, then, just that version of linguistic subjectivism according to which a grammar provides the psychological basis for linguistic competence because it is known by the language user whose competence it describes. Linguistic mentalism, in other words, is just a species of linguistic subjectivism. The traditional philosophical debate between empiricists and rationalists was, however, not concerned with questions about the existence of innate mental structures of faculties. This debate was concerned with questions about the existence of innate ideas and innate knowledge. According to linguistic mentalism, language users know the grammar of their language. It seems more valuable here to consider what a grammar is taken by linguists and what kind of knowledge of a grammar does linguistic mentalists attribute to language users.
Kant revolutionized philosophical psychology by soliciting how our experience of the causal connection of events is possible, given that no such connection is manifested in sensation; and by answering that it is the human mind which imposes a causal connection between events which are in sensation merely successive. Likewise, Chomsky revolutionized linguistics by asking how our perceptions of the structure of sentence is possible, given that this structure may be nowhere openly marked in the sound signal which impinges on us; and by answering that the language-user imposes perceptual structure on events which are in sensation linguistically unstructured. The force of this common approach is to highlight that the individual is an active interpreter, rather than a merely passive recipient of sensations.

Analysis of Mind

Noam Chomsky described mind as the capacity and ability to learn, think, reason, doubt, perceive and so on. Wittgenstein uttered that ability is the state or mental process. Ability can mean various things. He thought that in order to understand the mind, it is useful to consider the less controversial question of how we study a complex physical system such as the human body. We assume that the species is characterized by a certain biological endowment. The embryo grows to the adult as its genetic program unfolds under the triggering and controlling effect of environment. The organism does not learn to grow arms or reach puberty. Rather, the general course of maturation is genetically determined, though the realization of the genetic plan depends in part on external factors. The result is a system of interacting organs; the heart, the visual system, etc. each with its structure and functions interacting in largely predetermined ways’ (Gregory, 1987).

What actually is the ‘world of mind’ or the ‘world of consciousness’? There we would like to say: ‘what goes on in my mind, what is going on in it now, what I see, hear. Couldn’t we simply say ‘what I am now seeing’? Wittgenstein’s arguments on privacy show that a reconsideration of our approach to the inner is necessary; however, the attempts carry out this task clashes with some of our deepest philosophical prejudices. The main source of resistance is the feeling that Wittgenstein’s approach denies the essence of our experience. Take a belief, for example. What is the content of consciousness when someone believes something? The normal suggestion is that believing something involves having a mental image which corresponds to the belief. Wittgenstein considered belief like:

One would like to say: “Everything speaks for, and nothing against the earth’s having existed long before” Yet might I not believe the contrary after all? But the question is: What would the practical effects of this belief be? Perhaps someone says: “That’s not the point. A belief is what it is whether it has any practical effects or not.” One thinks: It is the same adjustment of the human mind anyway. “I know” has a primitive
meaning similar to and related to “I see” and “I knew he was in the room, but he wasn’t in the room” is like “I saw him in the room, but he wasn’t there”. “I know” is supposed to express a relation, not between me and the sense of a proposition like “I believe”) but between me and a fact, so that the fact is taken into my consciousness. (Here is the reason why one wants to say that nothing that goes on in the outer world is really known, but only what happens in the domain of what are called sense-data.) This would give us a picture of knowing as the perception of an outer event through visual rays which project it as it is into the eye and the consciousness. Only then the question at once arises whether one can be certain of this projection. And this picture does indeed show how our imagination presents knowledge, but not what lies at the bottom of this presentation. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for this conviction? For if not, then after all he doesn’t know (Wittgenstein L., On Certainty, 1969)

Wittgenstein analysis of mind divides into intensions, beliefs, sensations and experience. When Hume divides experience into ideas and impressions, he takes the example of the mental image as his model for an impression and treats ideas as copies of these impressions. In this sense, impressions and more particularly visual sense impressions come to be treated as the paradigm of the world of the mind. Hume defined ‘mind just like a theatre in which the ideas are the players’. If mind assigns meaning to language, so also language enables and channels mind. Acquiring and trafficking in a language brings one concepts, thoughts and habits of thought, with all sorts of consequence. Indeed, having language is so crucial to our ability to frame the sophisticated thoughts that appear essential to language-use and understanding that many doubts whether Mind is ‘prior’ to language in any interesting sense.

The three main themes in Wittgenstein’s philosophy are:

i) The multiplicity or heterogeneity of mental concepts.

ii) The misapprehension of the essential privacy of states of consciousness.

iii) The nature and basis of mental representation or intentionality.

There are many mental activities and attributes like; abstraction, understanding, willing, thinking, judging, doubting, but the three basic mental activities are thinking, willing, and judging (Arendt, 1971, p. 69). The main characteristic of mental activities is their invisibility. Properly speaking, they never appear, though they manifest themselves into thinking, willing, or judging ego, which is aware of being active, yet lacks the ability or the urge to appear as such. The bold assertion that mental phenomena are entirely natural and caused by the Neuro-physiological activities of the brain is one of the theories. Russell asked us to consider a blind physicist who knows all of physics
but doesn’t know something we know: What it’s like to see the color blue: It is obvious that a man who can see knows things which a blind man cannot know; but a blind man can know the whole of physics. Thus the knowledge which other men have and he has not is not part of physics. Russell’s climax was that the natural sciences seek to discover ‘the causal skeleton of the world’. ‘Other aspects lie beyond their purview’ opening the door to novel and promising inquiries, a rejection of Cartesian mind-body dualism (Chomsky, On Mind and Language, 2007, pp. 12-14). Churchland argued that telepathy (mind reading), precognition (seeing the future), telekinesis (thought control of material objects), and clairvoyance (knowledge of distant objects); are mental processes as well as non physical.

We seem to have no doubt that pains, moods, images, and sentences which ‘flash before the mind’, dreams, hallucinations, beliefs, attitudes, desires, and intentions all count as ‘mental’ whereas the contractions of the stomach which cause the pain, the neural processes which accompany it, and everything else which can be given a firm location within the body count as non-mental. Our unhesitating classification suggests that not only have we a clear intuition of what ‘mentality’ is, but that it has something to do with non-spatiality and with the notion that even if the body were destroyed the mental entities or states might somehow remain. Even if we discard the notion of ‘mind-stuff’, even if we drop the notion of (res cogitans) as subject of predication, we seem able to distinguish mind from body nonetheless, and to do so in a more or less Cartesian way.

These professed intuitions serve to keep something like Cartesian dualism alive. Post-Wittgensteinian philosophers who oppose behaviorism and materialism tend to grant to Wittgenstein and Strawson that in some sense there is nothing there but the human organism, and that we must give up the notion of this organism as made out of a bit of (res cogitans) non-spatially associated with a bit of (res extensa). But, they say, the Cartesian intuition that the mental-physical distinction is unbridgeable by empirical means, that a mental state is no more like a disposition than it is like a neuron, and that no scientific discovery can reveal an identity remains. This intuition seems to them enough to establish an unbridgeable gap. But such neo-dualist philosophers are embarrassed by their own conclusions, since although their metaphysical intuitions seem to be Cartesian; they are not clear whether they are entitled to have such things as ‘metaphysical intuitions’. They tend to be unhappy, with the notion of a method of knowing about the world prior to and untouchable by empirical science (Rorty, 1979).

The mind is what the brain does; specifically, the brain processes information, and thinking is a kind of computation. The mind is organized into modules or mental organs, each with a specialized design that makes it an expert in one arena of interaction with the world. The modules of basic logic are specified by our genetic program. Their
operation was shaped by natural selection to solve the problems of the hunting and gathering life led by our ancestors in most of our evolutionary history. The various problems for our ancestors were subtasks of one big problem for their genes, maximizing the number of copies that made it into the next generation.  

Wittgenstein held that in physics we may have an idea of certain processes going on inside elementary particles, but we may also think that we understand neither these processes nor the particles well enough, and so we see ourselves as struggling with yet unknown processes in a yet unexplored medium. Now we turn to mental phenomena and start talking about them, as if they, too, were yet unknown processes in a yet unexplored medium. We think of these processes as going on ‘in the mind’ and then include that the mind is something ethereal and difficult to understand. But, Wittgenstein suggests, the assumed analogy between the problems of physics and our questions about the mind is false and quickly falls apart. He does not tell us immediately how the analogy fails, but he is sure that it is mistaken and that it is only this mistaken analogy that drives us into our usual views about the mind. In order to understand how talk about physical particles differs from talk about the mind and its states and processes, we must look more closely at how statements about the human body are connected to psychological utterances. Here we must distinguish two cases: the case where we are speaking about a third person (He is in pain) and the case where we are speaking in the first person (I am in pain). He tells us, accordingly, that ‘My own relation to my words is wholly different from other people’s’. When I say of someone else that he is in pain, I depend directly on the availability of outer criteria for my assertion. I say that he is in pain because I see his pain-behavior (Hans Sluga and David, 1996). Accordingly, Wittgenstein writes about state of mind as:

“I noticed that he was out of humor.” Is this a report about his behavior or his state of mind?..... Both not side-by-side however but about the one via the other. A doctor asks: ‘How is he feeling?’ The nurse says: ‘He is groaning’. A report on his behavior (PI, p. 179).

**Analysis of Logic**

The contemporary method of analysis for the first time appeared in Russell’s philosophy. Who is notably known for his logical analysis, he states that language misleads us both by its ‘vocabulary’ and by its ‘syntax’. His theory of description is the best example of an analysis which undermines the metaphysical claims of realists. Moore and Russell agreed that the aim of philosophical analysis is to uncover the fundamental constituents of propositions. Russell understood this within a broader program of logical analysis. Russell and Moore rebelled against British idealism which became the base of origin of analytical philosophy. Russell himself announced that all sound philosophy
should begin with an analysis of propositions. Russell attacked the problem of Nominalists-realist controversy over the existence and nature of universals by distinguishing two types of symbols viz. subject-symbols and incomplete symbols (which are not meaningful in isolation). Excited with the success of philosophical application of logical technique, he came to believe that the grammar of ordinary language ought to be replaced by the strict syntax of logic combined with scientific terminology. Thus in his view, an ideal language or a logical-scientific language could be constructed, and it would reflect the nature of reality. Moore as the Cambridge analyst philosopher declared that he could solve philosophical problem, not by logical manipulations or by scientific methods, but by paying close attention to common sense and its language. Wittgenstein claims that the chief aim of philosophical activity is the logical classification of ideas rather than the formulation of theories, classification means to make explicit what is implicit in concepts. For Moore, ‘conceptual classification’ is the sole conclusion of philosophical analysis. We can easily discover at least two distinct uses of classifying analysis: one is to make obvious the hidden contradictions in philosophical theory. The purpose of such analysis is the testing of their truth-values. Russell also accepts the value of classifying analysis. According to him the most important part of the business of philosophy consists in criticizing and classifying notion which is apt to be regarded as fundamental and accepted uncritically. Wittgenstein strongly asserts that the result of philosophy is not a number of philosophical proposition but to make propositions clear. Russell, Moore, Wittgenstein and other logical positivists attempt to abandon speculative philosophy and set down the base for experimental philosophy. These philosophers are agreed on the assumption that the aim of philosophical analysis is to uncover the fundamental constituents of propositions atoms of the world. However, philosophy is classification, whether it is the classification or the meaning of concepts or terms, propositions or statements and whether it is the classification of uses or rules of language. Philosophy is the analysis of language in both its semantical and syntactical aspect. Analysis for Wittgenstein is a form of ‘linguistic transformation’. According to Carnap, Philosophy as engaged in the analysis of language of science, is a meta-science propounding meta-theories in meta-language. The analysis of the linguistic expressions of science is called by Carnap ‘logic of science’. It consists of two branches via logical syntax or formal analysis and semantic analysis while former studies the forms of linguistic expressions and latter considers the relations of linguistic expressions to objects designated by them. The purpose according to Carnap is analysis, interpretation, classification, or construction of language of communication, especially language of science. In the past, Plato and Aristotle adopted “semanticalanalysis” and in modern times, C. S. Pierce and Frege carried out semanticalanalysis on the basis of modern logic. Following Russell and Wittgenstein, and like other members of the Vienna Circle, Carnap maintained that logical analysis is an essential tool for the clarification of
language. Its application to the sentences of traditional philosophy reveals some deeply entrenched illusions that deceive us, and which philosophers have often fallen prey to. While sharing the diagnosis, Carnap had his own ideas on the kind of cure that philosophy needs. Particularly damaging, according to him, is the confusion between questions, which pertain to some domain of objects, and logical questions, which are concerned with terms, sentences, theories, and other linguistic elements which refer to the objects in the domain under consideration. Many problems of traditional philosophy which look like questions about object, Carnap maintained, are actually logical questions, and they should be treated as such. Philosophers are liable to such confusion, and they often entertain the illusion that they talk about things. When logical analysis reveals that what they say concerns the form of language. This easily leads to pseudo-problems, talks at cross purpose, and endless disputes. One important aspect of Carnap’s program is to provide a cure for this kind of trouble. So, all traditional philosophical problems are not systematically eliminated as such. It looks to me that the material mode of speech is ambiguous and problematic because of its common use of language. But it looks scientific to introduce formal mode of speech which should be clear and simple and which prevents us from falling into some of the logical traps of world-languages. This mode of speech depends on a logical method which provides, essentially, a system of sharply defined concepts, to be used as tools for logical clarification: ‘Analytic’, ‘synthetic’, ‘valid’, ‘contradictory’, ‘logical’, ‘consequence’, ‘derivable’, ‘equipollent’, and ‘implication’, are typical examples of concepts belonging to this system.\[26\]

Wittgenstein said that ‘To interpret is to think, to do something; seeing has genuine duration: one can ask for how long one saw the drawing as a duck before it changed to a rabbit, whereas it sounds inconsistent to ask for the duration of an interpretation.\[27\]Wittgenstein has often taken to arguing that thought is impossible unless certain specified relations hold between the individual and society. However, he assumed that thought is normative (Hawthorne, 1994).

There is no universal logic that covers all aspects of linguistic meaning and characterizes all valid arguments or relationships between the meanings of linguistic expressions. Different logical systems have been and are being developed for linguistic semantics and the best known along with widespread is predicate logic, in which properties of sets of objects can be expressed via predicates, logical connectives, and quantifiers. This is done by providing ‘syntax’ (i.e., a specification of how the elements of the logical language can be combined to form well-formed logical expressions) and a ‘semantics’ (an interpretation of the logical expressions, a specification of what these expressions mean within the logical system). Examples of predicate logic representations are given in (2a) and (2b), which represent the semantic interpretation or meaning of the sentences in (1a) and (2a), respectively. In these formulae, x is a ‘variable,’ k a ‘term’ (denoting a particular object or entity), politician, philosopher, like, etc. are
predicates (of different kind), ‘‘, ‘‘, ‘‘, are ‘connectives,’ and ‘‘, ‘‘are the existential quantifier and universal quantifier, respectively. Negation can also be expressed in predicate logic, using the symbol or curl.

1) a. Some politicians are Philosophers.
   b. “x (politician(x) ‘‘ Philosophers(x))
      (There is an x (at least one) so that x is a politician and x is Philosopher).

(2) a. All Australian students like Ricky Pointing.
   b. “x ((student(x) ‘‘ Australian(x)) ‘‘like(x, R))
      (For all x with x being a student and Australian, x likes Ricky Pointing).

Notice that, as mentioned, there is no analysis of the meanings of the predicates, which correspond to the lexical items in the original sentences, for example, politician, philosopher, student, etc. Notice also the “constructed” and somewhat artificial sounding character of the example sentences concerned, which is typical of much work in the logical tradition (Schalley, 2010).

Analysis of Language

According to Chomsky, language faculty is in the human beings just as in the sense they have visual and auditory faculties (Otero, 1994, p. 435). We must acknowledge that a language is essentially a set of items, what Hudson calls 'linguistic items,' such entities as sounds, words, grammatical structures, and so on. It is these items, their status, and their arrangements that language theorists such as Chomsky concern themselves with. Language is not innately given (Innatism) nor is it an externally given (empiricism). It is the creation of a composite evolutionary process, it is rather the means whereby we systematize our experience and learn to think. If we misuse it, we lead ourselves lost. If we use it rightly we achieve understanding. Language provides each of us with a new symbolic dimension which enables us to examine, associate, enhance and even it corrects our information which could be of purely sensory origin. Man differs from other creatures by this very faculty. If we are ever to understand ourselves, therefore we need to understand how this faculty arises, how it develops, and when we misuse it we fall into error and fallacy. Language and languages are extra-human entities with a remarkable capacity to evolve and adapt with respect to human masses. As Humboldt arguably holds that Language is ‘infinite use of finite means’. These creatures are not only extra-human, but apparently outside the biological world altogether. Chomsky studied linguistics and also obtained a thorough grounding in mathematics, logic and philosophy. He spent much productive time with philosophers like Quine, John Austin and Nelson Goodman. This unusual combination would be a significant factor in his subsequent intellectual breakthrough. As Alfred North Whitehead
once observed, ‘novel ideas are more appropriate to spring from an unusual collection of knowledge, not necessarily from vast knowledge, but from a thorough conception of the methods and ideas of distinct lines of thought (Fernandes, 2005).

We may think of the theorist as given an empirical pairing of collections of primary linguistic data associated with grammars that are constructed by the device on the bases of such data, much information can be obtained about the primary data that constitute the input and the grammar that is the ‘output’ of such a device and the theorist has the problem of determining the intrinsic properties of a device capable of mediating this input-output connection. The empiricist approach has understood that the structure of the acquisition device is limited to certain elementary ‘perceptual processing mechanism’ for e.g. in recent times, an innate ‘quality space’ with an innate ‘distance’ defined on it as per Quine’s knowledge of innatism. The device has certain analytical data processing mechanism or inductive principles of a very elementary kind, for example, certain principles of association, weak principles of ‘generalization’ involving gradients along the dimensions of the given quality space, or in our case, taxonomic principles of segmentation and classification such as those that have been developed with some case in modern linguistics. According to rationalists about mental processes, held that beyond the peripheral processing mechanisms, there are innate ideas and principles of various kinds that determine the form of the acquired knowledge. A condition for innate mechanisms to become activated is that suitable stimulation must be presented. Thus for Descartes, the innate ideas are those arising from the faculty of thinking rather than from external objects. Chomsky further argued that from the ideas of ideas, it is described that ‘nothing examines our mind from external objects through the organs of sense beyond certain corporeal movements’, but even these movements, and the figures which arise from them, are not conceived by us in the shape they assume in the organs of sense, hence it follows that the ideas of the movement and figures are themselves innate in us, so the ideas of pain, color, sound, and the like be innate, that our mind may, on occasion of certain corporeal movements, envisage these ideas, for they have no likeness to the physical movements. Sight presents nothing beyond pictures, and hearing nothing beyond voices or sounds, so that all these things that we think of beyond their voices or pictures, as being symbolized by them, are presented to us by means of ideas which come from no other source than our faculty of thinking, and are accordingly together with that faculty innate in us, that is always existing in us potentially, for existence in any faculty is not actual but merely potential existence, since the very word “faculty” designates nothing more or less than a potentiality. Thus ideas are innate in the sense that in some faculty’s generosity is, innate diseases like gout or gravel, not that on this account the babies of the families suffer from these diseases in their mother’s womb, but because they are born with a certain disposition or inclination for contracting them.
The main questions regarding language are

i) What constitutes knowledge of language?

ii) How is knowledge of language acquired?

iii) How is knowledge of language put to use?

In Chomsky’s work ‘Language and problems of knowledge’ the fundamental four questions arise in the study of language; the above three questions and fourth which is:

iv) What are the physical mechanisms involved in the representation, acquisition, and use of this language.

The answer to the first question is basically descriptive: in pursuing it, we attempt to construct a grammar, a theory of particular language that describes how this language assigns specific mental representations to each linguistic expression, determining its form and meaning. The second is a logical question but Chomsky explained it as to construct a universal grammar and to set parameters for its acquisition. But it seems to me that Chomsky would provide good thesis if he would have used the analysis accessed by Kant; that knowledge of the language can be acquired by the synthesis of sensation and reflection. Language learning is not really something that the child does; it is something that happens to the child placed in an appropriate environment, much as the child’s body grows and matures in a predetermined way when provided with appropriate nutrition and environmental stimulation. The language that constitutes the proper object of linguistic study is internalized language (I-language), distinguished by Chomsky from socially shareable, public ‘external’ language used within a given community (E-language). The former is individual, internal, intentional language, specific to each individual person, constituting a part of their mental endowment; it is comprised of computational procedures and a lexicon. The latter is simply an idealized object, commonly called Polish, English, Chinese, Arabic, Kashmiri, Urdu, Hebrew, etc., that has no ontological status of its own (is just a characteristic epiphenomenon). Grammar in this context is a linguistic theory which contains objects in I-language.

Conclusion

Thus the nature of analytical philosophy is analytical which studies the clarification, form and meaning of the propositions. Its attitude and methodology depends upon the scientific investigation and verification of the problems. Analytical philosophy has brought world so close and simplified that today every complex problem can be resolved through analysis. The chief task of analytical philosophy is to break down complex problems of philosophy into simple ones. It has not only resolved problems in
philosophy discipline rather it has resolved complex problems in other disciplines like education, sociology, physics, chemistry, Biology, Anthropology, mathematics and so on. In philosophy, analytical philosophy has brought revolution in other fields of philosophy, like philosophy of mind, philosophy of logic and philosophy of language.

Consequently, analytical philosophy appeared as an instrument to comprehend those philosophical problems which were being measured as vacuous and ambiguous. These problems have occurred only due to ordinary language use in our diversified speech and location. However, language is the manifestation of our thoughts. Analytical philosophers has assumed that all philosophical ideas are implicitly and explicitly stated in different languages and since these language have different forms and meanings contextually. So, it is necessary for a philosophical discourse to analyze and verify these languages. Ordinary language is full of errors and ambiguities that is why analytical philosophers have devised and developed scientific language or symbolic language. Analytical philosophy is a method of philosophy used by the philosophers from time to time. Nevertheless, analytical philosophy connects philosophy with practicality, verifiability, symbolism, form, language, thought, and meaning.

Thus the analysis of basic concepts has always been a major concern of philosophers. In the Dialogue of Plato, Socrates is represented as spending a great deal of his time asking questions, like ‘What is truth’, ‘What is Knowledge’, ‘What is Justice’, ‘What is Virtue’, and these questions are explored in an analytical approach. However, there are three importantly different ways of formulating a problem in analytical philosophy, whether we are dealing with causation, truth, and knowledge (moral obligation). To take the problem of knowledge of our model, we observe that first, we are investigating the nature of knowledge, second, we are analyzing the concept of knowledge, and third, we are trying to make explicit what one is saying when he says that he knows something to be the case. Therefore, the analytical philosophy is always concerned with language and it brings out basic features of the use or meaning of various words and forms of statement. It is essential for an analytical philosopher to proceed on the basis of some general conception of the nature of linguistic use and meaning. This becomes especially important when analytical philosophers become involved in frequent disputes over what a word means, or over whether two expressions or forms of expression have the same or different meaning.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

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4 See, M. A. Beaney, What is Analytic Philosophy, p. 12.
6 Ibid., p. 18-24.
7 D. Pears, Questions in the Philosophy of Mind, 1975, pp. 98-109
8 Vagueness is a term, which is said to be vague if there are cases in which there is no definite answer as to whether the term applies i.e. ‘middle aged is vague’. At the age 5 and age 80, one is not middle-aged at age 50. Therefore, following statements involve literal and metaphysical uses of words.
13 Ibid., p. 65.
14 See Wittgenstein, Philosophical Grammar, p. 6.
16 N. Chomsky, Modular Approaches to the Study of the Mind, p. 23.
23 M. A. Beaney, What is Analytic Philosophy, p. 7.
24 Ibid., p.9
28 In symbolic logic we are using symbols; ““, “!”, “,”, “\n”, which represents conjunction, implication, existential quantifier, universal quantifier, and negation.
30 Waldron, T. P. (1985), p. 75
31 N. Chomsky. (2002), p. 80
34 Ibid., 134