DICHOTOMOUS THINKING

by

MARION TAPPER

Bachelor of Arts, First Class Honours.
Thesis submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy,
in the School of History, Philosophy and Politics,
Macquarie University, September 1979.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

Dichotomous thinking is the systematic association of distinctions that are treated as dichotomies, as mutually exclusive and exhaustive. It always involves the attribution of values. It need not be explicit nor conscious, but it has a long history of determining the sorts of questions asked and the conception of possible answers in a wide range of discourses.

This thinking, this mode of classification, has been used unreflectingly, it has been claimed to be the basis of all thought, and occasionally, it has been criticised. But little attempt has been made to clarify it. This thesis sets out to investigate its structure, its mechanisms, its consequences, and to explore the possibility of other modes of thought.

The investigation is conducted by examining a variety of discourses where dichotomies are postulated or implied, to determine what is involved in dichotomies and how they are associated. It examines arguments that attempt to explain and justify this mode of classification, especially those of Levi-Strauss.

It then moves on to examine the manifestation of dichotomous thinking in philosophical texts, developing a method of textual analysis to expose the presence and operation of dichotomies. It examines the relationship between Rationalism, Empiricism and Phenomenology, concentrating in particular on the texts of Locke and Husserl. It shows the inevitable incoherence of any philosophy operating on this basis.

Finally, the nature and possibility of other modes of thought is explored. This is done through a reflection on the requirements of a methodology appropriate to expose dichotomous thinking, and on various theoretical strategies that imply a break with, or displacement of, the perennial concerns of philosophy. The writings of Heidegger form the focal point of this discussion.

This thesis, submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to Macquarie University, has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other university of institution. It is all my own work; where reference has been made to other sources, this is acknowledged in the notes.

INTRODUCTION

We ordinarily distinguish between concepts such as passive and active, inner and outer, feminine and masculine, emotion and reason. What is extraordinary is the frequency with which we treat these distinctions as if the concepts were mutually exclusive and exhaustive. We treat the distinction as a dichotomy. It then becomes a principle of classification used in a variety of circumstances. For instance, behaviour is classified according to a passive-active dichotomy and this is related to a feminine-masculine dichotomy; in explaining what motivates behaviour two sorts of mutually exclusive explanations are proferred, internal or external causes, and this becomes reflected in the free will-determinism debate. Each concept is defined or understood in terms of its relation to what it is not, to what it excludes, so that it becomes impossible to think, for example, how reason could have anything to do with emotions. The dichotomies are systematically associated with one another; which concepts are associated depending on the context: passivity is treated as properly feminine and this is considered to be manifested in a concern with the emotional side of life. Although the distinctions generally have an empirical basis, when they are turned into dichotomies, and systematically associated, all sorts of considerations are introduced to justify the associations. This fact enables us to see that a set of values is always involved, that it is the values which determine which concepts are associated, and this requires that the distinctions be conceived dichotomously.

This mode of classification is so pervasive that it is generally unnoticed and unquestioned; it appears as a given of discourse. Where it is noticed its very pervasiveness is considered evidence of its natural-ness and inevitability. There is a wide range of evidence indicating the prevalence of dichotomous classification. It includes the explicit use of dichotomies in theories from the Pythagorean 'table of opposites' to the 'binary logic' of the structuralists; it is reported in the ethnographic

studies of collective representations from societies all over the world; it is implicitly involved in everyday discourse and various abstract theoretical discourses. In this material there is a variety of types of distinction that are treated dichotomously and a variety of relations that come under the general term 'association'. These will be discussed and sorted out in the first part of the thesis. Some attempts have been made to explain this phenomenon, and these will also be considered in the first part as they tend to involve a priori considerations of a sort which implicate the explanations in further dichotomous classification.

Dichotomous thinking has three major characteristics: treating distinctions as dichotomies, systematically associating dichotomies, and attributing a positive value to one term and a negative value to the other. This thesis articulates the structure and operation of dichotomous thinking, it investigates the mechanisms whereby it is perpetuated and it explores the ramifications and implications of its deployment within particular texts, theories and discourses. Its direction is towards exposing the apparent naturalness or obviousness of dichotomous thinking, to show what is wrong with such thinking. It explores the possible strategies that might be effectively employed against it and the possible alternatives to it. Much of the discussion is concerned with philosophical discourse, as it is here that dichotomous thinking is most hidden, and here that we might least expect to find it, given the assumption that philosophical enquiry is most concerned to reflect upon and question its own presuppositions.

The remainder of this introduction discusses in a general way the characteristics of dichotomous thinking and the methodological implications these have.

When a distinction is made dichotomously the concepts are treated as if they were logical contradictories. In rejecting dichotomous thinking the law of non-contradiction is not rejected. Rather, the concern is with the misapplication of the notion of contradiction. In some cases this misapplication takes on a precise form. This is where one of the terms of the pair or dichotomy is used, by definition or deployment, as if it were the mere negation or privation of the other. For instance, where mind and physical world, or subject and object, are treated dichotomously the physical world is defined as that which is or contains everything which is not mental. The physical world is the absolute other than mind. Elsewhere the misapplication of the law is more vague. More emphasis is placed on the mutual exclusiveness of two concepts and they are only treated as exhaustive within a particular context. This occurs in attempts to establish a methodology for achieving absolute knowledge where reason and emotion are conceived as mutually exclusive such that all emotion must be excluded from the process. However in such attempts reason and emotion are not necessarily understood as exhausting the factors involved.

Not only is this thesis not concerned with the law of non-contradiction as such, it is also not concerned to reduce distinctions, to opt for a mystical one-ness. In fact it rejects the trend to reduce all distinctions to dichotomies or opposition. In doing this it brings out the possibility of a more subtle use of a wide range of distinctions and differences.

The tendency to transform distinctions into dichotomies, or more precisely to treat distinctions as if they were dichotomies, is not an isolated or isolatable phenomenon. If it were it could be remedied by greater precision in the delineation of concepts and their relationships. It would amount to a mistake at the level of the conscious articulation of a theory or problem and so could be isolated in particular texts and

resolved. But this is not the case. It is not necessarily conscious and

not necessarily explicitly present in a text. Such instances can be found,

but generally a series of associated dichotomies occur together - and not

just any dichotomies, nor associated in an accidental manner. Analysis of

various discourses reveals a particular set of recurring dichotomies each

of which has positive and negative values attached. They are associated in

such a way that a number of concepts are grouped together as the positive,

superior, full, original, sacred... over against or opposed to the negative,

inferior, empty, secondary, profane... This means that a positive term in one

context might be negative in another, but always a value will be attached

and it will always serve a purpose, though not necessarily consciously or

intentionally. For instance, when masculinity is associated with reason

it will be associated with objectivity and opposed to femininity, emotion

and subjectivity as inferior and necessarily excluded from the process of

attaining knowledge. When the subject is opposed to objects, masculinity

will be associated with subjectivity, with being a subject, and femininity

reduced to the bodily.

Not only are pairs of concepts, differences, 'arbitrarily' treated as

mutually exclusive and exhaustive, as dichotomies, but particular dichotomies

are sytematically related to one another. They are always determined as

positive or negative, in the sense of 'p' and its privation or good and

bad, and related to one another in these terms. A consequence, or concomitant

feature, is that the particular concepts become extremely narrowly and

rigidly defined, and this assists in perpetuating the mode of classi-

fication. This whole phenomenon is what is called dichotomous thinking.

It might be thought that this phenomenon is highly aribitrary and

accidental. It is, in the sense that there is no good reason

to treat these distinctions dichotomously, and it is not necessary for us to do so. But it cannot be understood if it is located at the level of conscious individual intentions or mistakes. Rather, it must be understood as a sedimented conceptual framework which is manifested in particular statements, arguments, assumptions and intentions. In describing this phenomenon as dichotomous thinking I do not mean to be concerned with a psychological phenomenon, with whether anyone actually thinks 'x' is opposed to 'y'. The thinking is dichotomous even though it is not always conscious or deliberate, and cannot always be located explicitly in the discourse. The question of the intentions of a speaker or author is not relevant to the working out of the presuppositions or conceptual framework of their discourse. If this is the case, the notion of thinking cannot be understood, as it is by dichotomous thinking, as that fully self-conscious, fully controlled process. Here we have a paradox.

While the existence of dichotomous thinking can only be established through an examination of specific texts, this analysis is not limited to the specific texts chosen. It aims to show, through those texts, the prevalence of dichotomous thinking in any discourse concerned with similar problems understood in a similar manner. The direction of the textual analysis will be to trace the deployment of concepts rather than questioning the intentions of an author or the validity of an argument. Where the dichotomies are not explicit we find a number of clues which expose their presence. Apparently innocent metaphors disguise an assumed dichotomy. The introduction of a concept or a stated theoretical ideal might involve a series of dichotomies which reinforce the plausibility of the ideal, but which undermine the possibility of resolving the problem concerned. An emotional or political opposition can be hidden in an apparently logical distinction, and this is shown up in the a priori explanations and justi-fications of it. Certain statements only make sense because of an assumed

dichotomy. Certain problems might be adopted which are already entangled in a set of dichotomies.

The fact that the operation of dichotomous thinking is not always explicit nor conscious requires the development of a method of reading or textual analysis which can enable us to detect this operation. The method must enable us to distinguish between the stated intentions of an author or objectives of a theory and the actual deployment of concepts, and to differentiate between the surface level of what is said and the presuppositions which make what is said possible. A distinction between a frame of reference and a problematic will be elaborated in the introduction to the analysis of philosophical texts in Part II. The distinction is between the consciously assumed presuppositions on the one hand, and on the other, the implicit epistemological and ontological components which sanction what can be said in a text. This distinction should not be understood dichotomously; the possibility and implication of the relationship between a problematic and a frame of reference will be explored in Part III.

The methodology must also allow us to recognise that individual logical mistakes can be made, that the term 'opposition' can be used, that oppositions or binary classifications can be reported, and that traditionally dichotomous concepts can be used, without this necessarily indicating that the text is working within the conceptual space delineated as dichotomous thinking.

We need to be able to make these distinctions without falling prey to the same mode of thought, without treating such distinctions as form and content, conscious and unconscious, surface and deep structure, explicit and implicit, distinction and dichotomy, as themselves dichotomies. And we need to be able to detect the appropriate clues without reading these clues dichotomously.

The intention to expose the presence of dichotomous thinking is caught
in a tension between the need to describe the structure of relationships
between concepts in a theory and the desire to criticise that structure.
No attempt is made to disguise that desire which is seen as a need;
recognising the structure of dichotomous thinking compels the criticism of
it. The criticism that is implied in the critique of dichotomous thinking
is not hidden, for one of the dichotomies the critique attempts to displace
is that between fact and value. This is done by exposing the values implicit
in the apparent 'facts' as stated or assumed by a theory, and by not pretending
that there are no values motivating this analysis of the dichotomous structure
of discourses.

We not only have a problem of a method for textual analysis, but also
of a style of writing and a question of strategies. If dichotomous thinking
is not simply a matter of individual mistakes but is embodied in our concepts
and ideals, if it does not occur here and there according to particular
circumstances, but pervades our whole culture, we cannot expect simply to
decide not to participate and to immediately adopt another mode of thought.
To expect this, or even to hope for it, is precisely to remain within the
dichotomous mode of thought, a central concept of which is that of an
a-historical fully self-determining consciousness which imagines it can
exclude its past. We need a method of reading which enables us to discern
dichotomies and a style of writing that does not perpetuate those dichotomies :
a method, a style and a strategy that is not unwittingly or unreflectingly
interior to that tradition. But the force of that tradition is such that
we cannot fully protect ourselves against it in advance by working out a
fool-proof method, style and strategy. There is no certain assurance.

One of the advantages of the pervasiveness of dichotomous thinking
and of the fact that it involves a systematic play of associations between

dichotomies is that an almost random or arbitrary selection of examples and texts could serve as material for analysis. I have however made deliberate selections of theoretical positions. The history of philosophy is often characterised as a set of mutually exclusive, opposed positions; philosophers establish a position by opposing it to another. Following this line my analysis plays off Rationalism and Empiricism against one another, developing the argument that they amount to reverse sides of a coin. Phenomenology is then played off against Empiricism as a way of showing that despite the phenomenological attack on empiricist dualism, they both belong to the problematic of dichomotous thinking. Reversing the order of this text, Structuralism is played off against Phenomenology. None of this is meant to deny the differences between these frames of reference. The theorists and commentators are correct in treating them as alternatives, though only at the frame of reference level. My aim is to show that and how they all, nevertheless, belong to the problematic of dichotomous thinking. An implication of this analysis is that a theoretical position cannot be overcome by adopting an opposite position at the same level. This is simply to repeat that position in reverse. This is especially the case when what constitutes each position is a set of dichotomies and where the difference between the positions amounts to the adoption of reversed values.

This refusal puts out of play a number of possible strategies against dichotomous thinking. Rationalism, Empiricism, Phenomenology and Structuralism - dichotomous thinking - cannot be simply opposed, as this would be to remain within the same problematic. Dialectics is no solution either. To attempt to mediate or overcome (in the sense of 'aufheben') particular dichotomies such as reason and experience, or, at the metatheoretical level, Phenomenology and Structuralism, by taking account of history and structure for instance, is still to take these dichotomies as given, as primary. It remains within the problematic, no doubt in an unusual manner.

The strategy of removing all distinctions has already been rejected in as much as where there is a dichotomy there is generally a need for a genuine distinction. The problem of strategies will be further considered in the final chapters.

No attempt has been made to limit the selection of particular dichotomies to investigate, the play of associations has been allowed to operate to show how it operates. However, due to the selection of certain theoretical positions there is more emphasis on some dichotomies rather than others. No attempt is made to prove that any one dichotomy is paradigmatic or the original. This possibility does raise some difficult and interesting questions. One has to do with the fact that there is always a positive and negative value attached to either term of a dichotomy. This is partly a definitional or criterial problem. Insofar as the dichotomised concepts are identified or delineated by the relation of exclusion and exhaustion such that one is the privation of the other, one concept will always be full or positive in relation to the other. Thus it might be thought that the positive-negative pair is paradigmatic and is properly a dichotomy. Taken by itself the positive-negative pair is properly a dichotomy, and hence is not paradigmatic of dichotomous thinking. For this is, in part, the misapplication of the law of non-contradiction. What is characteristic of dichotomous thinking is treating two concepts as modes of the positive-negative pair. For instance, where the mental is defined as what is not physical, not extended, not visible, where the mental is defined as negative in relation to the full and positive concept of the physical. Which concept is positive is ideologically and contextually determined, it is determined by the frame of reference adopted.

From different perspectives different dichotomies can appear as paradigmatic. One such is the feminine-masculine dichotomy. To follow this

up would involve working out the relations between the social, political, economic and theoretical conditions of discourse, of what is sayable. This would be another thesis, although within the present thesis hints at the relation between the social and the philosophical will be made. In order to keep within a graspable range of material, this thesis concentrates on theoretical, and, in particular, philosophical discourse, although the ramifications of the interaction between philosophical and everyday discourse are considered. Where anthropological and other theories are discussed it is in terms of their philosophical assumptions. For instance the point of interest in discussing accounts of collective representations is in how those representations are theoretically represented, not in the validity of the theory.

Within philosophical discourse, and thus within this text, one dichotomy that predominates, with variations in context and mode, is that between the internal and the external. These variations include the mind and body, individual freedom and social contraints, innate and learnt, self and other, mind and world, being internal to and external to a theory. Within a given theory they tend to be associated.

No attempt is made here to explain this predominance as this might involve psychological, political and philological enquiries. We might, for example, find it to be connected with an anxiety to protect oneself expressed in a fear of writing, of exposing oneself, of being wrong. Rather than undertake this vast enquiry I have limited myself to indicating the forms of its occurrence at difference levels, in different theories, and the backward and forward relatedness of these. It will be shown how the internal and external dichotomy is implicit in others such as the passive and active. For example, this latter dichotomy is clearly a contrary, but the way it is deployed in association with other dichotomies gives it a

stronger and different value, it reflects other philosophical and socio-
political preoccupations. The predominance of the internal-external
dichotomy will be reflected in my discussion of the strategies involved in
analysing and displacing dichotomous thinking, in the necessity and danger
of being both inside and outside that mode of thinking.

We cannot only examine dichotomies individually anymore than we can
limit the investigation to the exigencies of particular texts. Isolating
and rejecting individual instances would not fully come to terms with the
phenomenon that dichotomous thinking is. The notion of dichotomy involves
values, opposition, rejection and denial, the concepts are identified by
what they oppose and exclude, and they form a mutually supporting system.
This has the effect that we cannot easily or completely displace dichotomous
thinking by taking individual examples and undertaking a phenomenological
description of the situation. We can do this, and it might help to loosen
up the hardened, truncated concepts and allow for greater flexibility in
our descriptions and explanations. At times in the thesis I do this, with
particular dichotomies and by juxtaposing Husserl's insights against Locke's.
But this cannot, by itself, displace the whole system of dichotomies.

The thesis is divided into three parts. For the purpose of delineating
more precisely the structure of dichotomous thinking, Part I explores and
clarifies the range of material vaguely described elsewhere as oppositions
and binary or dual classification. It adduces considerable evidence for
the pervasiveness of this mode of classification, in the process indicating
the interplay of theoretical and non-theoretical discourse in this respect.
This further brings out the significance of the problem - that it is not
confined to the discourse of philosophers, nor to the mistakes or quirks of
individual thinkers.

The second section of Part I brings into account the systematic association made between dichotomies, emphasising the way in which this sustains and is sustained by an ideological bias. It examines the varied relations that come under the term 'association' and the arguments and explanations that have been proposed to justify this.

In the third section an analysis is undertaken of evidence for binary classification and the theoretical reflections on this presented by the structuralists, in particular Levi-Strauss. Levi-Strauss' thesis both supports and challenges my thesis, so this section attempts to undermine that challenge by questioning the underlying methodological and theoretical assumptions of structural analysis.

Part II moves directly into the area of philosophical discourse, where the use of dichotomous classification becomes increasingly refined, less at the surface of the text than in the conceptual (ontological and epistemological) assumptions that govern what can be said in a given discourse. Thus a method of reading, that enables us to read these assumptions, is outlined. Empiricism, and its shadow, Rationalism, are demonstrated to belong to the problematic of dichotomous thinking. Phenomenology, which sets itself up as the transcendental alternative to these objectivisms is then shown, despite its own intentions, to fall prey to that same thinking. The argument is based on a textual analysis of Locke and Husserl.

Part III proceeds as a reflection on the possibility that the methodology used here provides us with an instance of an 'other-than-dichotomous' thinking. It examines the risks involved in attempting to break with the tradition of dichotomous thinking. The structure of Heidegger's thinking is investigated, suggesting that his style of thinking opens up a theoretical space for the

exploration of alternative modes of thought. It concludes with a circling around, a doubling back and forth on the structures involved in dichotomous thinking, on the analysis of it, and of the strategies that can be deployed to displace or efface it.

PART I : The Characteristics of Dichotomous Thinking

*The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is <u>the faith in
antithetical values</u>. It has not even occurred to even the
most cautious of them to pause and doubt here on the
threshold, where however it was most needful they should...
For it may be doubted, firstly whether there exist any
antitheses at all, and secondly whether these popular
evaluations and value-antitheses, on which the metaphysics
have set their seal, are not merely foreground valuations,
merely provisional perspectives, perhaps moreover the
perspective of a hole-and-corner, perhaps from below, as
it were frog-perspectives,to borrow an expression employed
by painters.*

Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil.

CHAPTER I : Treating Distinctions as Dichotomies

Dichotomous thinking has three characteristics. Primarily it transforms distinctions into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories where this sort of difference is not given as such. Strictly, it is misleading to speak of a transformation here, for it is not as if in dichotomous thinking there is first a distinction made which is then turned into a dichotomy; rather, the distinction is made, or assumed, dichotomously in the first instance. However, I retain the term 'transformation' to indicate that where we find dichotomies there is generally a genuine distinction to be made, though not a dichotomous one, or, a genuine dichotomy is used in contexts where it is inappropriate. For instance, the internal-external distinction which might well be a dichotomy in some contexts is inappropriately treated as such in others, such as when the question is asked of the relation between an internal mental act and the external world. Thus dichotomous thinking is always the mis-taking of distinctions as dichotomies. But it is always more than a mistake, for it is a systematic mode of thinking that takes itself as the right, proper and only mode of <u>thinking</u>. The fact that particular dichotomies are mistakenly made dichotomously is merely an instance of a general tendency, of a mode of thinking that operates by forming distinctions dichotomously, by systematically associating dichotomies with one another, and by systematically treating one side of the dichotomy as the norm and the other as its privation. This last aspect serves to reproduce and sustain a set of values. It can only do this insofar as it dichotomises relations between concepts, for where there is only a matter of difference there is no reason to consider one term as primary. Dichotomous thinking operates by defining in terms of identity and difference, where identity is understood as sameness, fully self-enclosed with itself, and difference is understood in terms of negation and exclusion; the difference between two concepts (which are conceived as exhausting a given context) will be that one is positive and the other its privation. In characterising dichotomous thinking in terms of a <u>transformation</u> of distinctions

into dichotomies, I am not concerned with genuine dichotomies, as between

rational and irrational, but with thinking that treats, say, the reason-

emotion distinction as if it were the same relation as that between

rational and irrational. It does this because it operates by system-

atically associating 'dichotomies.' Thus when occasion arises to dis-

tinguish between say the mental and the physical, the mind and the body, or

thinking and acting, the distinction is made on the dichotomous model and

according to the values implicit in the rational-irrational dichotomy.

Dichotomous thinking is not merely a particular mistake, or even a series

of mistakes, but a systematic mode of thinking that distinguishes by

dichotomising, it systematically associates dichotomies and systematically

accords priority to one of the 'sides'. Given that it conceives of thinking

in this way, it is not surprising that dichotomous thinking conceives of

itself as the proper way to think - any other form of thinking appears as

non-thinking. This gives it an inbuilt form of sustaining itself and

dominating the very field of thinking. It is also not surprising that we

find a particular set of dichotomies predominating in dichotomous thinking -

between thinking and feeling, thinking and acting, reason and emotion, mind

and body, internal and external, passive and active and so on. And it is

not surprising that within the field of dichotomous thinking we find

theories opposed to one another according to which side of a given dichotomy,

or set of dichotomies, priority is accorded, for where concepts are related

by mutual exclusion, theories are related by negation. Where dichotomous

thinking predominates it makes little sense to argue in favour of, or

against, one theory or another for whichever way one argues, the dichotomies

are still presupposed and the mode of thinking remains.

Dichotomous thinking is a self-perpetuating, self-justifying mode of

thinking that arrogates to itself, from its nature, the ideal of thinking.

Evidence of its occurrence and its predominance can be found in most, if

not all, types of discourse - philosophical, political, sociological,

religious etc., and it operates within non-theoretical, theoretical and

meta-theoretical discourse. The dichotomies can be assumed, they can be

implicit or explicit, or they can be deliberate; they can govern the pre-

suppositions that produce a question as a question and the concepts in

which a theory is articulated, although rarely is the mode of thinking

that generates the dichotomies made explicit or conscious. My aim in

making the mode of thinking explicit, in unravelling its structure and its

mechanisms of perpetuating itself, is to expose its apparent obviousness

and to undermine its force, to show that it is not only not a compelling

mode or necessary requirement of thinking, but that it is not even a desir-

able mode or style of thinking. The difficulty with showing that dichotomous

thinking is not necessary or compelling, arises from the interplay of its

nature and of its pervasiveness. For despite the pervasiveness of dichotomous

thinking it is difficult to locate it in particular instances - and not

merely because it is not generally explicit or conscious. Perhaps this

difficulty arises not despite the pervasiveness of dichotomous thinking,

but is a manifestation of its pervasiveness and of its force. Its pervas-

iveness is its force, but its force is also an effect of its nature. Its

nature is such that its force resides in its identification with the norm

and ideal of rationality, in its penetration into the language and conceptual

frameworks available to us so that it appears as the natural and obvious

way to think. We take for granted that when we decide, judge, value and

experience, that we must do so between mutually exclusive alternatives -

to not choose is to be irrational or confused. Where a choice is presented

or assumed as either - or, to try to avoid the choice results in being

accused, on the basis of another dichotomy, of irrationality. This

expectation re-inforces, repeats and reflects back upon the same mode of

thought, but it also leads to a dilemma. For insofar as the other is

defined by negating the one, to not choose between them is illogical,

but then whichever way one chooses will merely be the reverse, the other,
and thus in a sense, the same. Choosing becomes a way of not choosing.
While proponents of both choices insist on the necessity for an exclusive
choice, the dichotomy appears inevitable and obvious. The only way out
of this dilemma is to reject the original choice, to show that and how
the distinction or alternative need not be conceived in terms of mutual
exclusion or exhaustion. This means that one side (either one) need not
be thought of in terms of identity, same-ness, at one with itself, self-
enclosed eternally, and that such identity need not be a condition of
stability, nor of rational discourse. All such identities and dichoto-
mies, and thus choices, are arbitrary – and they may or may not be useful.

We also have a difficulty with showing the undesirability of dichoto-
mous thinking. No doubt from within its own mode it appears as desirable
– insofar as it is what constitutes 'rationality', and no doubt it serves
some socio-political and psychological purposes. Thus it might appear that
it could be shown to be undesirable by uncovering its socio-political and
psychological origins or causes, and examining its social, political,
psychological and theoretical efects. This might be useful as a means
of undermining the efficacy of particular dichotomies. But, insofar as
it is a mode of thinking we are concerned with, exposing its causes and
effects and showing these to be undesirable will not achieve the displace-
ment of the mode of thinking itself. [1] Not only will the examination of
causes and effects not establish the undesirability of the mode of thinking,
it also leaves open the possibility that it is unavoidable. If this is   *what*?
so then any attempt to investigate the causes would be subject to, and
perpetuate, the same mode of thinking, it would be another manifestation
of it. It is also misleading to speak of effects of dichotomous thinking
because most of the things that appear as effects just are what dichotomous
thinking is, its mode of operation and its mechanisms.

What can be done is to articulate the structure of this operation and
mechanism in such a way as to show that there is nothing compelling about
it, but rather that its appearing compulsive is ideological, that is, that
it mystifies by making the arbitrary and historically constituted appear
necessary and inevitable, and that in doing so it restricts the possibilities
available to us for exploring and communicating with other modes of thought.

For instance, dichotomous thinking, in forcing us to choose, and to
choose in a particular manner, where no such choice is necessary, and in
defining by identity (interiority) and exclusion (exteriority) or negation,
requires us to both deny differences while emphasising distinctions of an
exclusive, ultimate kind. This leads to rejecting, fearing, despising the
'other', which has been invested with unacceptable and possibly extra-
ordinary - abnormal, frightening, magical - qualities.

My task here is to articulate the structure of dichotomous thinking
as it performs the operation of transforming distinctions into dichotomies
in particular instances. In the following chapter I will explore the
systematic aspect of this mode of thinking, indicating how and why it is
more than a coincidence of particular mistakes. In both chapters I will be
concerned to show the variety of types of distinctions - empirical, psycho-
logical, moral, conceptual, cultural - in which dichotomous thinking dis-
guises a variety of different relationships, by reducing them all to
dichotomies, in various types and levels of discourse.

Let us begin by examining an example from everyday life, where theo-
retical structures are not brought into play. Consider a situation where a
number of people are having dinner together and conversing with one another.
One person remains silent. Not infrequently that person is described,
judged, as passive. What are the conditions of possibility of such a

judgment? Firstly that active and passive are mutually exclusive and exhaustive concepts and secondly, that these have a particular or their own proper form of manifestation. That is, that active and passive are dichotomously conceived and that there is a conception of what is properly active and, by contrast, what properly passive. In such a situation there is generally an implication that passivity is improper, unsatisfactory, socially unacceptable behaviour. Silence is considered a non-contribution, a passivity, in a situation where what is expected is observable involvement... - this is the norm. (In other situations - for the wife, when a married couple are discussing finances with the bank manager - passivity might be regarded as proper for her, but in any case in such judgments, a moral implication is not far from the scene).

I want to approach the investigation of this example by starting with the somewhat inappropriate question, is such behaviour adequately described and explained as passive? The question is inappropriate insofar as it goes along with the active-passive dichotomy; by going along with it, I hope to show what it presupposes, what it prevents us from experiencing and understanding, and what effect it does have. The point is not with whether silence is passive or active, and in such situations proper or improper, but with the basis and effects of the deployment of dichotomies in experiencing, describing, judging and explaining behaviour. The initial point to be made is that such dichotomous thinking is far too simplistic to provide an adequate account of a person's behaviour and experience. If the person making the judgment was not operating with a dichotomous mode of thought and using this particular dichotomy, a whole range of possible understandings of the silence would be opened up. (This is to say nothing of the meaning of the silence for the silent person). Let us consider some of the possible reasons for and meanings of the silence in order to evaluate the efficacy and adequacy of the judgment that such silence means passivity.

Some possibilities which suggest that the silence is neither active nor passive are firstly, that the person is not attending to the conversation but thinking about something else; secondly, that the person may be tired or ill; and thirdly, that the person does not have enough knowledge of the topic discussed to feel able to participate. Alternatively, the person may be simply enjoying listening and have nothing more to contribute, in which case the person would be actively involved and silent. Or the person may not consider the conversation worth participating in and is trying to indicate this by refraining from comment, such silence is a way of aggressively disapproving. Another possibility is that the person may consider the atmosphere to be hostile to open discussion and thus not worthwhile attempting to put a contrary opinion. In these latter two cases, it might be said that the person ought to speak out, that not interfering is a form of passivity. Even so, at least in the case of aggressive silence, the labels 'active' and 'passive' are a long way from adequately capturing the complexity of the meaning of the behaviour. To insist on the label 'passive' and alternatively 'active' is to refuse to recognise the multiplicity of levels of meaning of a person's behaviour. Even if we accept the applicability of the categories active and passive to human behaviour, it is still open to question which behaviour is properly called active and which passive, and this may vary according to context, intention... And the possibility that any given behaviour, such as silence, may be both active and passive indicates that we need to question whether these categories need to be applied dichotomously. A parallel case to the silent one would be the sort of civil disobedience practiced by Mahatma Ghandi.

The point of all this is not merely that we need to think more carefully when we pass judgment on someone's behaviour, nor that we should not take for granted concepts traditionally assumed to be opposites. These

are of course important, just as (in the reverse) it is important to
remember that the concepts active and passive can still be employed to make
a useful distinction. [2] More important is to consider the mode of thought
involved in such judgments and the implications this has. We have seen
that it involves assuming a pair of mutually exclusive alternatives, active
and passive, and that any behaviour must be either active or passive. In
describing and judging behaviour we must choose — and this of course is
logically necessary if the concepts are dichotomously related. But what is
being assumed here is that these concepts are given as such as a dichotomy,
whereas it is more likely that a way of thinking, a long tradition of
pairing and opposing these concepts, is coming into play. This tradition
has been sedimented into our language and conceptual framework, it is taken
for granted and applied in a clicheed, stale and unthought-through manner.
If we think through what it involves we see that it treats that which is
not visible, as not-present, as absent, as nothingness, as non-existence,
as passivity. It treats one mode of existence — the visible — as that
which is, as the model, the form by which to judge and define anything
which does not conform to this model as negative, empty... If this remark
should appear as a criticism of the active and a support of the passive, I
would undermine it by noting how the same mode of thought using alterna-
tive values is subject to the same criticism. For instance, in theories
(beliefs) where that which is visible, present, is taken as the accidental,
even not really existent, and that which is essential lies hidden, behind. [3]
Whichever version one adopts, the same mode of thought is operating, and it
is thereby pointless to criticise one theory from the point of view of the
other insofar as, in a sense, they amount to the same thing. In both
cases, one quality, concept... is defined positively as the norm and the
model, another concept is placed, by negative definition, as its other —
and this leads to inflexible and truncated concepts, to simplistic judgments,
to futile arguments, and to the exclusion, rejection, and fear of the

other. In the example given, the silent person is considered anti-social, a boor - and yet there may also be an element of fear involved, the fear that the silent person is silently criticising. This fear shows up the unacknowledged recognition that silence may not mean passivity, which makes it even more important that the silent person be rejected, excluded, by being called passive. Thus we can see how dichotomous thinking carries with it and imposes a value judgment - it requires a certain type of behaviour as normal, demanding the denial of difference while turning difference into opposition so as to sustain its norm as normal. That which cannot be incorporated, which requires the recognition of complexity and difference, must be undermined by exclusion and rejection. Insofar as it remains as excluded, it comes to be feared. [4]

As a way of leading into instances of the operation of dichotomous thinking at the theoretical level, I will extend the passive-active example by relating it to the internal-external dichotomy.

The category 'passive' is applied, at least in this case, on the assumption that behaviour is motivated by 'internal' causes. If a person is silent the reason for this must be internal - something is wrong with them, they are passive. Even if the passive behaviour was given an 'external' motivation, the structure of the mode of thought involved in the description would be similar. In a similarly simplistic style, the range of alternatives to that of internal and external motivations is ignored, not to mention the possibility of interaction between the 'internal' and 'external'. For instance, silence could be a function of the time of day, the topic of discussion, the people present, a fear of exposing one's beliefs to possible criticism, or to arrogance. Again, even if we allow the internal-external distinction to be useful, it need not be made dichotomously. And making it dichotomously results in ruling out in practice, if not in principle, any interaction of internal and external factors.

We see the application of the passive-active and internal-external dichotomies when people judge behaviour according to whether it is internally motivated and thus active, free and responsible or externally motivated, determined, passive and the question of responsibility is irrelevant. Such questions still puzzle philosophers and non-philosophers, without question as to the basis, assumptions and mode of thought within which these can appear as questions. I will now examine such instances.

Ross Poole, writing in Radical Philosophy on "Freedom and Alienation"[5], considers it a precondition of freedom and responsibility that the individual determine and control his/her motivations and desires, that any external influence, insofar as it is not chosen or controlled... by the individual, is a limitation on freedom and autonomy.

Poole's argument is based on a conception of freedom as unconstrained activity. If such activity is to be genuinely unconstrained, then the wants which are to be realised must be independently formed, that is, the individual must be autonomous. Insofar as some of these wants require the participation of others, for example love and rational discussion, then freedom requires the mutual recognition of autonomy.

This conception of freedom and autonomy is governed by the dichotomies passive-active, internal-external, the latter taking the form of individual-society. "A person is autonomous when his actions, and the principles, beliefs, attitudes and emotions, on which he acts are properly ascribable to him and not through him to one or other of the many external influences to which he is and has been subjected." [6] Autonomy, that precondition of freedom, is granted by the manner in which the individual fills the gap between the external and the internal: an autonomous individual actively fills the gap by imposing his "prior set of attitudes and principles" [7]

on what is externally provided. And this prior set of attitudes and

principles must be autonomously developed, that is, actively chosen without

the interference of external constraints. "Where... patterns of my present

behaviour were fixed in some very early experiences (say, early socialisation)

in which I had no power of participation or intervention, then to that

extent I am not my own person, that is, I am not autonomous." [8] Poole

recognises the possibility that some thing might appear as internally

determined, wants which are in fact merely the internalisation of demands

expected by the social structure, and says that these "might or might not

correspond to what we would want if able to choose." [9] Such a view, and

the concomitant problem of how we could determine what such autonomous

wants would be, only gains plausibility on the basis of the assumption that

there is some essential human nature given independently of social and

historical and biological conditions. This essence can only be actively

realised by the exclusion of anything externally given or by the incorporation

of the externally given. And only if this incorporation can be achieved

autonomously, that is, on the basis of principles etc., not themselves

externally formed. According to Poole, "Autonomy has to do with the

primacy of the person over what is externally given" [10] - although this is

not meant to be construed as the primacy of one aspect of the person. Can

it not be so construed? Does not this grid of active-passive, external-

internal, individual-society, freedom-alienation, self-others, result in

the conception of the individual as a subjective self whose function is to

decide and to know what is externally given and what is internally, indepen-

dently, wanted. This internal, subjective self must know what it wants

prior (logically and temporally) to the influence of biological, social,

historical demands, prior to its insertion into the social and historical.

The essence of the human is to be found in the essence of the internal,

subjective self, not in the biological, social and historical person. As

Poole says "... the realisation that certain patterns of feeling and thinking

do not define the limits of our choosing and acting, but are themselves
matters of choice, to be accepted or rejected according to wants and
standards which transcend them. This is the moment at which a person
defines himself independently of some aspect of his social existence.
It is our sometime ability to achieve such moments of realisation and
redefinition that is perhaps the most significant expression of our
capacity for freedom." [11]

Nevertheless, Poole wants to say "... that freedom for a being with
intersubjective wants requires existence in a community with other inter-
subjective beings, each of whom recognises the autonomy of the others."
Such a community is not "a collection of autonomous selves; rather it would
be a collective in which autonomy of the self was recognised", "the we not
the I would be fundamental". [12] But is such an ideal achievable or consis-
tent with the conception of the free and autonomous individual? If the
individual is supposed to choose its wants independently of the influence
of others, of the social..., would not the other be, in principle, an
impediment on the individual's unconstrained activity, unless it just so
happened that both individuals' wants coincided? As Archer says in his
critique of Poole's paper, "the framework adopted is one... in which the
individual is pictured as confronting society. There are those wants which
are mine, the 'internal', and those of others, the 'external'. My autonomy
then has to do with what is unique and constitutive of me. The non-autonomous
is external, it emanates from society which is the source of my wants being
frustrated, and interfered with,in spite of the fact that some of my wants...
require that same society. My autonomy is maintained by my ability to keep
the external at bay or to intervene and transform it into the internal. To
be me nothing must bear the mark of the external." [13]

The general point to be made about all of this is that the questions concerning what constitutes freedom and autonomy and what sort of community is conducive to the realisation of freedom and autonomy - or at least the way in which these questions arise in theoretical frameworks such as Poole's - only make sense, only appear plausible, if we accept the dichotomous mode of thought that governs the questions and the conceptions of the terms that constitute each dichotomy, including the values inherent in these conceptions.

The problem of how to externalise or realise one's internal desires is a problem only in terms of the dichotomy between the internal individual self and the external social constraints, and where ideas, desires etc. are considered to be inwardly determined (if they are genuine desires).

Even though the individual is considered to be part of society, the conception of the individual is such as to make it opposed to that society. The primary conception of the relation between the individual and society is one of alienation; freedom and autonomy are achieved not by overcoming the alienation (for example recognising not merely that one is part of society but that one is at least partly socially constituted) but by reinforcing the internal-external dichotomy by ensuring that nothing external enters the internal unless it is transformed into the internal and is thus no longer external. Even if this process - of distancing "myself from some aspect of myself" and treating "it as if it were external" [14] - achieved autonomy, it could not overcome the alienation which was, after all, the purpose of the exercise.

My suggestion is that this failure is the direct - and necessary - outcome of the conceptual framework within which the question of the

conditions for freedom is raised. By conceptual framework I mean both the
tendency to treat the concepts dichotomously and the particular concepts
employed - especially that of the independent, self-determining individual.
It is the assumption of this conception of the individual which both requires
that it be related as opposed to society (other individuals) and which must
reinforce that opposition in its attempt to achieve autonomy. Here we have
a classic instance of the conception of the self whose existence as a self
is dependent on its sustaining its interior relation to itself; and this
sustaining must be done actively, willingly, consciously by the exclusion
of others, of its past (history), and of that which is supposed to be
exterior to it. This truncated concept of the self produces futile
arguments as to how to achieve community with others; futile because the
very concept of the interiority of the self as that which is true to it
must mean the excluding of the other for fear that it will penetrate,
against one's will, into the interior and pollute it, by undermining the
priviliged and valued self-relation, by inserting something not chosen or
desired, something divisive, something out of control into this ideally
self-enclosed 'space'. The other, as other, exterior, must be kept as
exterior, at bay, for me to maintain my sense of myself.

It would make little sense to argue against this conception of the
self or of the individual if the relationship between the individual and
the society is still conceived on the dichotomous model of the relationship
of interior and exterior. On this basis the criticism would amount either
to a reversal or negation or to a reduction of one of the terms to the
other. In the former case, the dichotomously related concepts would be
maintained, only, instead of emphasising the individual, the social would
be primary. In the latter case, the individual is reduced to a function of
its socio-historical and biological relations. In both cases Poole's
conception of the individual would be sustained although without the value

Poole invests in it, either as the interior self which is determined by the social, or by negating it, as nothing but a function of the social etc.

This illustrates one of the facets of dichotomous thinking, that once a dichotomy is accepted or assumed or taken for granted people will argue for one or other of the sides, denying the other, without questioning the basis on which the concepts are supposed to be opposed. To examine this facet of dichotomous thinking I will consider the sorts of arguments proposed by a phenomenologist and a structuralist concerning the relationship of freedom and meaning. [15]

The debate about the source of meaning is constructed around the concept of the individual (man) or self and the question of freedom. For the phenomenologist and existentialist, nothing is <u>given</u> with a meaning, meaning is produced in and through the web of desires, values, beliefs, etc., of an intentional consciousness. Meaning is consciously, freely and actively chosen. This is <u>not</u> to say that the things themselves, the world, history, sedimentations, play no part in the process, for meaning cannot be arbitrarily constructed. But rather that in the highest epistem-ological and ethical sense, that is, ultimately, responsibility for meaning resides in the transcendental subject, for Husserl, or 'the for-itself, consciousness, for Sartre. Acknowledging one's freedom and responsibility for producing meaning is thus the highest form of the ethical life. Landgrebe, describing Husserl's position, says that the phenomenological reduction of the world is "not only a methodological step which is necessary for epistemology" but leads to a "full, personal transformation of man". [16] In ordinary reflection the person "places himself over against the world in which he lives and moves and in this sense does not disappear in it". [17] The most extreme form of reflection occurs with the transcendental reduction to the

transcendental subject: "With this last step of the reflection he learns that he is in the position to make himself free from all the interests which guide his life in the world, that he can be called upon to situate himself over against them, to make himself free from these demands and from everything that is valid in this world. ... Only through such freedom is there a history of the world." [18] For the phenomenologist, the world, the social, history..., are understandable, are meaningful only through the freedom of man, and this freedom is made possible by, and consists in, divorcing oneself from the world.

Sartre rejects the transcendental subject and the concomitant conception of the self as (originally and ideally) wholly interior to itself. [19] But his conception of consciousness, of the for-itself, as "essentially" a lack which implies, or constitutes, its total freedom and responsibility to choose how it is in the world, remains within the general conception of the individual described here. The difference is that, for Sartre, man finds himself thrown into the world, but, if he is not to live in bad faith he must both perpetually detach himself from what is and project himself onto and engage himself with it - and, crucially, he must acknowledge that he does so and accept responsibility for so doing and for how he does so.

In 1948, Marcuse gave a devastating materialist critique of this position. [20] But rather than follow this up, I will turn to the way the structuralists have formulated their position in opposition to the predominance of the concept of man and the subject in phenomenological and existentialist philosophy. Proponents of both sides see each other as a danger and an obstacle. Annette Lavers: "The emphasis they [phenomenologists and existentialists] put on freedom, lucidity, self-knowledge and activity make their proponents fear the passivity and fatalism which according to them must accompany the acknowledgement of the all-conquering structuralism." [21]

Norman Geras: "... the human sciences must forego the use of the concept of man, as subject, in favour of a structural determinism, if they are to become truly scientific".[22] Contrast this with Husserl, who considered that philosphy would only become truly scientific through a radical turn toward subjectivity. The interesting point is that both sides, in opposing man, the subject, to the world, society, over-emphasise and over-value one side of the dichotomy at the expense of the other - and over-exaggerate their difference from and the danger of their opponents.

Structuralist theory attempts to de-centre the subject, man. This means that instead of explaining meaning in terms of the intentions or projects of man, it studies the rules of language, of desire, of social and theoretical formations which produce a set of circumstances which give something its meaning. Meaning is the effect of a set of relations governed by rules which are generally unconscious. The unconscious is not a secret internal reservoir of causes but an external, subject-independent system of rules. Thus to understand the meaning of a fluctuation in desire is not to investigate the intentions of the subject, not to probe the subjects' hidden, conscious 'intentions' but to investigate the set of circumstances in which this occurred. That is, to the system of rules and relations which enable it to have meaning, the meaning it has. Thus for structuralism the individual is described, explained, understood from the side of the social, material, historical and not from its interior relation to itself: the individual, the meaning of a particular act or object is the set of (exterior) relations in which it is circumscribed.

My attitude to both these positions - phenomenological/existentialist and structuralist/semiological - is that in insisting on explaining every-thing from either the wholly individual, internal, interior, free act, or the wholly external, social, unconscious system of rules and relations,

and denying any value to the other, they are insisting on limiting themselves to a too narrow, exclusive view. They assume the dichotomous method of relating concepts such that either term must be complete in itself. This has the effect that the particular concepts become so extreme that they must exclude all else and exhaust the possibilities. Of course, given the dichotomies they both presuppose, it is logically correct to view the relation between these theories as mutually exclusive so that in adopting the one, one must reject the other. But this is only to say they are both variations on the same - the variation being due to the different values adopted. Apart from this different emphasis, both agree on the value of humanism and scientificity, (although no doubt they understand these values differently), and both operate with the same mode of thought - dichotomous thinking. Structuralist theory does this self-consciously and for methodological and ontological reasons; phenomenology and existentialism primarily for ethical reasons, to preserve the uniqueness of man in the face of, in confrontation with, an ever more imposing world.

What needs to be criticised in both these positions is that when one theory criticises the other and formulates its difference from the other, it does so by denying or negating the other. It assumes the same dichotomies and reverses the emphasis or reduces one side of a dichotomy to the other. For example, structuralism insists that the intentions of the subject have nothing to do with meaning, or it reduces the intentions to a function of the external conditions. In reverse, phenomenology insists that the subject is fully in control and fully responsible for meaning: for phenomenology, to investigate the meaning of an action or speech is to enquire into what the subject intended by that action, what it means for them. When phenomenology does this, it invests the concept of intentionality with an ethical value - is it accidental that Sartre's description of self-deception,

of not acknowledging one's responsibility for the meaning and value of one's actions, is as bad-faith? And when structuralism denies the existence or role of intentionality, it introduces a socio-political value into the meaning of meaning. Either, meanings are given by the socio-political and historically constituted system in which the individual is inserted, or, when history is expelled from the analysis of meanings, the meaning of something is given by its system of relations and is inevitable. Either way, how the individual understands him or herself is irrelevant. However, while there are genuine distinctions to be made, for example between the individual and the social and between intentions and systems of relations as productive of meaning, either as indicating empirical differences or useful conceptual distinctions, what is not generally questioned is (a) whether these distinctions need to be made dichotomously; (b) whether as a dichotomy they are appropriate in the context of the problem under discussion; and (c) whether useful distinctions are made unnecessarily dichotomous and used in inappropriate contexts because they can be used to enforce and disguise ideological considerations. If so, they can only be effective to the extent to which the distinctions appear to be necessarily a dichotomy. When this happens, and I suggest it happens often, the phenomena are mis-described and the theoretical arguments become destructive or futile. The phenomena are misdescribed because the concepts employed are narrowly and rigidly defined by excluding what need not be excluded, and the concepts are used inappropriately, and this introduces category mistakes and confusions of logical types. Ryle's criticisms of the use of internal-external distinction to account for the relationship between a mental act and its object, [23] and Wilden's criticism of the use of concepts from phonemics in ethnographic descriptions, are good illustrations of this. [24] Theoretical arguments are futile if they delimit and misemploy concepts in this way, and proceed by criticising by negating, while operating at the same level and with the same dichotomies, and simply reversing the values.

This amounts to little more than a shouting match. When arguments proceed with one side insisting that meanings are completely, freely intentional and the other side insisting on total social determination, there can be little worthwhile interaction and communcation. In such situations, dichotomies are taken for granted within a theory and the dichotomous mode of thinking is reflected in the meta-theoretical discussion of theories: theories are opposed because they work within dichotomous thinking. Given a dichotomy, a theory which uses one of its terms as a principle of explanation must either exclude the other, 'opposite', term or reduce it to a function of the first. Alternative theories, in presupposing the same dichotomy, simply adopt alternative terms as the principle of explanation. In this way the relationship between the theories reflects that of the relationship between the terms - it is treated dichotomously. This means that to adopt one theory is to deny or negate anything that cannot be fully enclosed within that position. This is especially the case in the example discussed above.

Where each theory works out its conception of experience by pro-ceeding as if the internal-external distinction is appropriate and treats this distinction as a dichotomy with one side as the norm, this same dichotomy is then applied to the relation between theories. The point in criticising this situation is not that there is necessarily anything wrong with the internal-external distinction, but that this is no reason to treat the mind as internal and the world as external to it, and it is not that this may not be a useful distinction but that if it is, this is still no reason to treat it as a dichotomy.

We have seen how particular distinctions are treated dichotomously in non-theoretical and theoretical discourse, and how this is reflected in the relationships between theories which assume dichotomies. We can now investi-gate the systematic nature of this mode of thinking.

NOTES

1. Some attempts to explain and justify the prevalence of dichotomies on the basis of a cause external to the mode of thinking, for example on the basis of the two parts of the brain, will be discussed in the following chapter. Chapter three examines Levi-Strauss' theory that "binary classification" is a universal, and necessary, mode of thought.

2. For example, Zaner distinguishes different sorts of consciousness as active – those where the ego is busied with its objects of awareness, or as passive – those where not only is the ego not busy but in principle could not be. See Zaner, R.M., "Passivity and Activity of Consciousness in Husserl" in Analecta – Husserliana, Vol. III, pp.199-202.

3. Plato's distinction between Forms and Particulars is an example of this. It also coincides with Althusser's account of empiricism. See Althusser, Louis and Balibar, Etienne, Reading Capital, translated by Ben Brewster, London; New Left Books, 1970, pp.35-41.

4. Similar examples could be drawn from the denial of life that is involved in the refusal to recognise, or fear of, ageing and death as part of the process of life; or the way in which a political group becomes more powerful and more feared once it is denied participation in the accepted institutions and so forced underground. Consider the Black Panthers for example.

5. Poole, Ross. "Freedom and Alienation", in Radical Philosophy, Winter 1975, pp.11-17.

6. Poole, op.cit., p.13.

7. ibid.

8. ibid.

9. op.cit., p.17.

10. op.cit., p.13.

11. op.cit., p.16.

12. op.cit., p.17.

NOTES (continued)

13. Archer, Richard, "Personal Autonomy and Historical Materialism" in Radical Philosophy 15, Autumn 1976, p.10.

14. Poole, op.cit., p.13.

15. I only present here a general characterisation of these positions. No doubt proponents of each would consider my account an oversimplification, but the generalities are sufficient for the purpose here; and besides, in criticising each other's position phenomenologists and structuralists make these very oversimplifications of their opponents. Both positions are discussed in more detail in later chapters.

16. Landgrebe, Ludwig, "The Phenomenological Concept of Experience" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34, September 1973, p.13.

17. ibid.

18. ibid.

19. Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes, New York; Citadel Press, 1968. See for example Part I, Chapter I.V. "The Origin of Nothingness", and passim.

20. Marcuse, Herbert, "Existentialism : Remarks on Jean-Paul Sartre's L'Etre et Le Neant" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 8, March 1948, pp.309-336.

21. Lavers, Annette, "Man, Meaning and Subject, A Current Reappraisal" in The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, I, no. 3, 1970. p.44.

22. Geras, Norman M., "Levi-Strauss and Philosophy" in The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, I, no. 3, 1970. p.56.

23. Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind. Middlesex; Penguin Books, 1963. See for example Chapter I.

24. Wilden, Anthony, System and Structure. London; Tavistock Publications, 1972. pp.7-11.

*Woman... is in touch with herself by herself and in herself
without the necessity of a mediation and prior to any distinc-
tion between activity and passivity. Woman 'touches herself'
all the time, moreover without anyone being able to forbid her
to do so, for her sex is made up of two lips which embrace each
other continuously. Thus, in herself, she is already two - but
indivisable into ones - which affect, are affected by, are
attached to each other.*

*That sex which offers nothing to see no longer has any form of
its own. And if woman enjoys precisely that incompleteness of
form in her sex which makes it indefinitely reciprocate its
own touch, that jouissance is denied by a civilization which
privileges phallomorphism. The value accorded to the only
definable form bars the form in play in feminine auto-eroticism.
The one of the form, of the individual, of the sex, of the
proper name, of the proper sense... supercedes, in separating
and dividing, that touching of at least two (lips) which maintain
the woman in contact with herself, but without any possible dis-
crimination of that which is in touch with itself.*

*Whence that mystery which she represents in a culture that claims
to enumerate everything by units. She is neither one nor two...
And her sex, which is not one sex, is counted as no sex. The
negative, the inversion, the other side of the only sex which is
visible and morphologically designatable : The penis.*

Luce Irigaray, That Sex Which is Not One.

CHAPTER 2 : Dichotomous Thinking as a Mode of Thought

It has already been pointed out that the nature of dichotomous thinking is such that it is not merely a matter of particular distinctions being formulated in an unnecessarily rigid manner. Our concern then cannot only be to locate instances of dichotomies and redescribe the phenomenon or to re-state the theoretical problem and re-solve it. It is a _mode_ of thinking we are concerned with, and this mode of thinking is also characterised by its systematic associating of dichotomies. This means that even if we dissolved one dichotomy, the system of dichotomies would remain. Further, even if we dissolved each and every particular dichotomy as it arose, our task would not be complete as the mode of thinking could still predominate. And it is of the nature of dichotomous thinking that it systematically denies the possibility of other ways of thinking such that to think dichotomously appears as natural and necessary. Its nature is such that it is self-justifying and self-perpetuating - it is its nature that explains its predominance and its persistence. This is assisted by the fact of its systematic nature, that the dichotomies are not isolated or isolatable; and it is re-inforced by the fact that the mode of thinking is rarely made explicit and that it generally operates unconsciously. [1] It is also striking that a particular set, or system, of dichotomies has predominated in dichotomous thinking, and it is my suggestion that while there may be nothing necessary about the relation of _this_ set to the mode of thinking, it is not merely accidental either, that this set is symptomatic of the mode of thinking. But already a number of separate, albeit related, issues have been raised. They will be dealt with in more detail as we proceed, in this chapter, to more fully understand the nature and force of this mode of thinking. My procedure will be to approach the mode of thinking through its systematic aspect, its systematic associating of dichotomies. This will be done in the first instance by considering the evidence for such association, by examining the nature and role of the associations as well as some of the explanations and justifications that

have been brought forward for it - both of particular associations and of
the associating as such. There has already been published a great deal of
evidence of the association of opposites, mostly concerning the ancient
Greeks and 'primitive' collective representations, and a number of explana-
tions of it. [2] On the whole, I will be critical of this material, not
because it misrepresents the phenomena, but because it misunderstands the
phenomena and in the process simply serves to repeat and reproduce it. It
fails to recognise that there is a <u>mode</u> of thinking involved and that this
is largely unconscious, and it thereby fails to recognise that and where it
is still operating in thinking that does not explicitly use 'opposites'.
In this failure, and in its search for external causes or motivations for
the use of opposites, it serves to perpetuate the mode of thinking. It
fails to clarify, much less question, what is going on in speculating,
arguing, describing, organising... in terms of opposites, and in associating
opposites, and it fails to clarify what is involved in the notions of
'opposition' and 'association'. I have switched to speaking of 'opposites'
here rather than dichotomies not because I assume they are equivalent, but
partly because many writers use this term, and I use it to mark a confusion
in their writing, or at least an unclarified assumption. It is partly the
failure to clarify the notion of opposition, its difference from or equival-
ence with contrary, contradictory, polarity, dichotomy, etc., and the lack
of precision that has resulted from this, as well as the failure to settle
the question of from whose point of view the opposites are such, that has
led to so much confusion in discussions of this phenomena. I have reserved
the term 'dichotomy' for the <u>treatment</u> of a distinction between two concepts
<u>as</u> mutually exclusive and exhaustive when they are <u>not</u> logical contradictions,
in order to attempt to keep at least my points relatively clear. I do not
assume that what are ordinarily called opposites or contraries are dichoto-
mies, nor that they are being used as such (in my sense) - in each case
this needs to be shown.

I also do not assume when I speak of a dichotomy, or even a system of dichotomies, and differentitate this from the dichotomous mode of thinking, that they are two separate things, not even related as form and content or abstract and concrete. Even if they were understood in terms of the latter distinctions, they would not be considered, as is usually done, as a dichotomy. It is not as if we first have a form of thinking which then finds instantiation in a concrete dichotomy or vice versa. Rather the mode of thinking is the systematic associating of dichotomies, although no particular dichotomy or system of dichotomies is the mode of thinking. This is why we cannot deal with the mode of thinking simply by dealing with particular dichotomies or particular systems, although we cannot deal with it except by dealing with these. The mode of thinking is the condition of possibility of the various dichotomies, it is not reducible to these, but it is also not separable from them either. The mode of thinking is always already involved in the formulation of a dichotomy, not as something additional but as the way in which it is formulated and what enables it to be formulated as such and to appear obvious or efficacious. Only by recognising and understanding the mode of thinking can we understand the predominance and persistence of thinking dichotomously.

We have now a number of issues to deal with. Firstly, to present some evidence of the systematic association of dichotomies and to discuss the nature of the relation of 'association'. Some explanations and justifications of this will then be considered. This will lead into a general discussion of the nature of the mode of thinking such that it produces its own mechanisms for justifying and perpetuating itself, and in such a way as to appear the natural, necessary and desirable way to think. This is because it always, and necessarily, carries a set of values. This we will see reflected in the particular set of dichotomies that has predominated in dichotomous thinking.

A considerable amount of evidence has been collected by ethnographers which suggests that the collective representations of many societies throughout the world conform to what ethnographers call a dual classificatory framework. [3] Classicists have described a similar framework operating in the speculations, theories and arguments found in the writings from ancient Greece. Stan Gooch in Total Man describes the persistence of dual categories in the myths, legends, literature, theories and collective representations that prevail in contemporary western societies. In some recent philosophical writings it has become commonplace to refer to the system of oppositions which governs the western tradition of philosophy. Although I am not primarily concerned with 'primitive' collective representations, nor the writings of the Greeks, and although I do not agree with the speculations of Gooch, it is instructive to examine the way in which the evidence of dual classification is presented, discussed and explained. As Needham says, in introducing a collection of ethnographic analyses on the predominance of symbolic classification according to a right-left distinction, all the papers "agree in two basic analytical regards : that oppositions can be validly established and that these can be systematically interrelated." [4] Regardless of which oppositions are adopted they are always systematically associated, and regardless of how they are associated - that is, which terms are associated, and according to what principle - one side will always be regarded as positive and superior in relation to the other. Which side is positive can vary, but always one side will be positive. I do not propose to relate all this evidence here : I hope the evidence of the predominance of dichotomies in philosophical thought which is presented in other chapters is sufficient to be convincing, and examples will be discussed in this chapter as they illustrate the general theoretical problems involved. These problems concern the nature of the associations and the role they play in dichotomous thinking.

Nevertheless, I will introduce the discussion of the theoretical problems by outlining one general example of associations, and then show how it is effected in the philosophy of Descartes. My claim that dichotomies are systematically associated is, of course, an empirical claim, but it is more than this, for I hope to show that it is not accidental that dichotomous thinking has this feature. I adduce these examples to provide a basis for discussing this question, for it influences the approach to be taken to 'explanations' of the association of dichotomies and has some consequences for what is involved in 'criticising' dichotomous thinking.

The example I want to start with is the age old search for a means of distinguishing between humans and other animals. This problem is interpreted in terms of looking for the essential qualities of humans, that without which we would not be who or what we are. There is a long tradition going back at least as far as Aristotle, of judging that the distinguishing, and hence essential, quality is the capacity to reason. While the way in which rationality has been understood may have changed since Aristotle, the place the concept of reason occupies in discourse about human nature, has not. (Though not that everyone agrees of course). There are, of course, limits within which the concept of reason can vary, and it is striking that in the tradition of philosophy these limits have largely been determined by assumptions about what must be excluded from reason. The point is that reason is not defined by excluding its logical contradictory, but by other concepts which are treated as if they were mutually exclusive of reason. Which concepts are so treated depends on the questions being asked and a-priori, value-laden, considerations which will provide a 'desirable' answer. The whole procedure gains credence through the assumption of the necessity of dichotomously related concepts - which requires that one concept be positive, and the association of concepts, that is, through the dichotomous mode of thought. Let us see how this works. The quality that distinguishes humans

from other animals is considered to be the capacity to reason and this capacity is conceived in terms of its not-being-feeling or emotions, not-being-sensual, bodily experience, since feelings, emotions and bodily experiencing is also a capacity of non-human animals. That is, reason is contrasted with feelings, emotions, experience. But a mere contrast is not sufficient to sustain the superiority of humans, this requires a difference in kind, not of degree; so reason is not merely distinguished from feeling, it is defined as the antithesis of feeling. To be rational is considered to involve excluding feelings, feeling is not just non-rational, it is irrational. This nexus sets up, by presupposing a conception of the human capacities as a combination of reason and feeling, a problem of the relation of mind and body. Reason is considered the peculiarly and properly mental faculty, distinct from the body and its subordination to its feelings. By virtue of the association between feelings, emotions, bodily experience, all as antithetical and inferior to reason, the conceptions of knowledge and truth become associated with pure reason, with reasoning properly, and this comes to be understood not just as requiring the excluding of emotions and feelings, but also – in extreme cases – past experience, sense-experience, intuition, interests and involvements (the detached, objective, 'observer' – whose sense of observing is not sensual). If it was sexual knowledge which precipitated the 'fall' of man from the animal kingdom and gave him the need to be a moral agent, it is now, by excluding the sensual from knowledge that man can remain virtuous. Only because he has the capacity to know, to reason, can man know what is moral, and thus be moral, and this re-inforces his superiority over the other animals – he is now in a kingdom apart. It is not accidental that we speak of 'man' here for in discussions of human nature one of the traditional problems was whether women were part of the species, man, or another species altogether. [5] This debate was conducted in terms of whether or not women also had the capacity to reason : if so they were of the same species, but even so they were still

inferior because they had this capacity to a lesser degree, or at best they had a different type of reasoning. Either way women were considered more emotional and more affected by the body, more sensual and thus less virtuous.

In these contexts, reason is associated with humans, males, mind, know-ledge, truth and virtue, in opposition to the related set: animal, female, body, ignorance, falsity, and a lack (of the possibility) of virtue. Reason becomes understood as a mental activity that strives to separate itself off from the effect of the material body with its animal passions and ignorance. When this separation is extended to involve abstracting from the things known through the bodily senses, from empirical evidence, we get the attempt to develop a purely formal logic conceived to be the necessary (and in some cases, sufficient) condition for knowledge and truth. And the possibility for knowledge and truth provide the possibility for virtue. To the extent to which experience, understood as sense-experience, or as in "being-experienced", is considered necessary for knowledge and virtue it must be subordinated to reason.

Now I am not suggesting that anyone argues in quite so crude a manner as this - although there are passages in even great philosophers like Aristotle, Descartes, Spinoza and Hume which are not far off. My point in outlining the example so crudely, is that it enables us to see more clearly the dichotomous mode of thought implicit in highly sophisticated arguments. The point is not to show that, for example, it is because Aristotle considers men superior to women and other animals that he conceives humans as rational animals, claims that women lack the capacity to reason and that he formalises logic. The point is rather to see how dichotomous thinking enables such arguments to be made - that they work by dichotomously distinguishing con-cepts, relating those concepts, and persistently imposing a set of pre-conceived values through the way the concepts are associated and distinguished.

Let us see briefly how this is effected in Descartes' philosophy. [6]

It is not necessary to produce quotes from Descartes to show that he asked, for example, 'is it mental or is it physical?', or that he explicitly associates reason and masculinity. The point is to show that the sorts of questions Descartes could ask, and the sorts of possible answers, were already conceived within a dichotomous mode of thought; specifically within the set of dichotomies, mind-body, mental-physical, reason-emotion, male-female... For example, for Descartes to doubt that he had a body, and to asked what is this 'I' that cannot be doubted, presupposes a conceptual framework in which the 'I' and the body are not merely distinct, but mutually exclusive concepts, such that whatever he conceives to be bodily cannot in principle have anything mental involved in it. Even if we accept a distinction between mind and body we need not exclude the possibility of something participating in both, for example, the emotions; but Descartes does and must, as is clear if we consider what makes it possible for him to raise the question of proving the existence of the body, that is, knowing that the body exists. We can approach this problem by considering Descartes' theory of knowledge, both the methodology for achieving knowledge and the conception of what knowledge is. Briefly, knowledge is the having of clear and distinct ideas, of intuitions which come from the light of Reason alone. We can extend this knowledge by deduction, by the proper ordering and connecting of intuitions, by the process of reasoning. Only in these cases can we be absolutely certain. Knowledge can only be achieved by excluding the emotional, the sensuous and the imaginative from the intellect. Only what is thus freed from the sensuous, from the corporeal, can be clear and distinct; it is purely spiritual. We cannot be absolutely certain of the existence of the body because the testimony or evidence for it can only come from the senses, and these are unreliable. It makes sense for Descartes to ask the question of the existence of the body because his theory of

knowledge presupposes dichotomies of the mental and physical, reason and emotion, and reason and sense experience - and it makes sense for him to deny knowledge of the body because of these dichotomies and the association between them, between reason, mind, knowledge and truth, and between experience, body and necessarily inadequate evidence Reason is not merely a faculty of the mind, it is in what the mind's activity properly consists; the emotions etc. are not merely subordinated to reason, they are expelled from the sphere of the mental, reduced to the mere bodily. As G. Lloyd, in her essay "The Man of Reason" points out, with this polarisation of the sensuous and the rational it now makes sense to exclude women from training in Reason. [7] This training means learning to exclude the emotions, the imagination, the sensuous - and this is precisely what women cannot do. If the relation between the emotions and reason is conceived dichotomously, (and associated with a female-male dichotomy), the difference between men and women cannot be a difference with respect to rationality, but a difference between rational men and emotional women. To quote Lloyd: "We now have a bifurcation of functions backed by a theory of mind. Given an already existing situation of sexual inequality, Reason, the godlike, the spark of the divine in man, is assigned to the male; he is trained in Reason; the emotions, the sensuous in general, are assigned to women, to provide comfort, relief, entertainment and generally solace for the austerity which being a Man of Reason demands." [8]

However, my concern here is not with sexual inequality, nor primarily with Lloyd's concern with the maleness of the Man of Reason. I present these arguments to indicate the way in which assumed associations between dichotomies, and the values implicit in them, enable certain arguments and theories to get underway. And my concern is not particularly with the rational animal conception and Descartes' philosophy, nor with these particular associations. My concern is with showing that it is not accidental

that these theories systematically associate dichotomies. The particular

association made may be due to individual or social idiosyncrasies, although

a more proper explanation would involve historical and political consider-

ations. That the particular associations made are not necessary can be

seen by considering arguments by feminists who use the same dichotomies to

propose the superiority of women. What is necessary in this mode of thinking

is that some such associations are made and that they involve conceiving

one of the sides as superior or positive. By claiming that it is necessary,

I do not mean to suggest that there is a necessary and sufficient cause

external to the mode of thinking which compels us to associate dichotomies,

but that the mode of thought is constituted in this way. For this reason

it would be just as much a mistake to reduce the problem to the psychological

or intellectual blindness of individual thinkers. This is why I insist that

the problem concerns a mode of thinking and not merely particular mistakes.

It is because it is a mode of thinking that is operating that we do

not expect to produce quotes, say from Descartes, for the mode of thinking

need not be an often is not explicit. Instead we ask about conditions of

possibility of a discourse. This same problem arises in ethnographic

studies of collective representations. As Needham points out, in attributing

a dual classificatory framework to the collective representations of a society,

the ethnographer is not assuming that individual members of the society think

in oppositions, much less that they could provide the ethnographer with an

account of the framework. [9] He stresses that there should be no confusion

between the individual's thought processes and the system of collective

representations reported by the enthographer; nevertheless the evidence for

the system must come from the behaviour and statements of the members of

society without reducing it to a psychological question. It is perhaps,

partly because the system is not conscious and not explicit that it is not

questioned, that it can remain powerful. This means that criticising

dichotomous thinking does not amount to showing what is wrong with Descartes,
or anyone else. Nothing would be achieved, for instance by removing Descartes'
tests from philosophy course. The aim is to expose the mode of thinking
that allows for certain questions, processes theories, conceptions, judgments,
and behaviour, and the value judgments they embody.

We can now attempt to formulate a general characterisation of the
relation of association with dichotomies. It will be shown that 'association'
actually covers a variety of relationships, what they have in common is
the role they play in the mode of thinking. Examining this role will enable
us to understand in what way the associating is systematic and how this
serves to perpetuate the mode of thinking and to reproduce a set of values,
a set of values that provides the justification for the mode of thinking.

What then is the nature of 'association'? This discussion will be
based on Needham's collection of essays on Right and Left, for a range of
arguments and suggestions are provided there by the different authors.
In his introduction, Needham argues that the basis for tabulating dichoto-
mies into a two column scheme, for associating dichotomies, is not that
terms in the same column have an attribute in common or resemble each
other, but rests in analogy. That is, that there is "a perfect similarity
of relations between quite dissimilar things", not "an imperfect similarity
between two things". [10] It would be correct, in cases where it is shown
that the relationship between relevant terms in each column is one of
dichotomy, that the relationship between dichotomies is one of analogy in
this sense, but Needham's remarks fail to grasp this crucial point. The
analogy argument fails to determine whey the terms are placed in the columns
they are, and not vice versa. For instance, why it is a : b : : c : d and
not a : b : : d : c. Prima facie Needham is correct that the reason cannot
be because a and c have an attribute in common, at least not always and not

as a general rule. One reason for this is that the dichotomies associated might not be of the same type - one might be a logical distinction, for example, right and left, and the other might be an empirical contrast such as male and female. Another reason is that if the association were based on an empirical resemblance or common attribute we could not explain how terms can move between columns, for instance how in a different context right and female might be associated. However, all these possibilities can be taken into account if we pay attention to the notion of opposition or dichotomy that is involved - and this means that one term of a dichotomy is always considered the positive, always valued highly <u>vis a vis</u> its pair in the other column. The basis for associating terms can then be understood in the context of which terms are considered positive. Where terms are used to symbolise values any term might suffice provided it can be placed in a dichotomy. For instance in patriarchal societies whichever of the right-left pair is considered, say, auspicious will be associated with the male - not because the right hand, say, really is superior, but because, by virtue of its 'opposition' to the left, it can be used to stand for or symbolise masculinity. As superior to, or more highly valued than, the left, the right hand is associated with masculinity, which is similarly superior to femininity, and thus the male-female relationship is analogous to the right-left relationship. Given a different set of assumptions, even within patriarchy, the left could have served equally well. This example, supported by a great deal of evidence from the ethnographic data presented in Needham's collection, is fairly instructive insofar as it brings out how context dependent, and in a sense how arbitrary, is the reason for the association of certain terms. What is not arbitrary, within the mode of thinking, is that some associations between dichotomies are made and that they will be based on the values according to which terms are treated as dichotomies and which of the terms is treated as the positive. The suggestion that it is arbitrary which terms are valued, and so associated, might appear

inconclusive or doubtful if we consider the prevalence of say the "right-
male-superior" association throughout the world. But, it is only arbitrary
at a certain level - that is, it is not based on any non-apriori considerations
except self-fulfilling ones. It is not arbitrary if considered in the
context of patriarchy - and here it is striking that the superiority of the
right hand has to be enforced, even to the point of tying up the left hand
to make it weak and useless, not merely to prevent unnecessary use of such
an inauspicious instrument. [11] Why so, if the right is naturally superior?
And similarly, why must women be legally prevented from doing certain
things if they are naturally incapable of doing them?

There are, of course, often empirical, conceptual, and even linguistic
reasons for associating terms and where this is so we should be wary, for
it usually conceals or obscures the value judgements that underly the
associating. Consider, for instance, the association between the dichotomies
of mind and body, reason and emotion, male and female. We have already
discussed the context of this set of associations in philosophy, namely, in
the quest for the distinguishing characteristics of humans. All animals
have a body but not all reason; those animals, humans, which reason have a
mind as well as a body. We might say that there is some empirical connection
or evidence for the association between body and emotion; and from one
point of view that the association between mind and reason is of a definitional
kind, although from the point of view of those making the mind-body distinction
it is probably meant as an experiential claim. But it is also more than
this, for the emotions have to be excluded from reasoning; but why, we
might ask, must they be excluded unless they are not already 'outside' the
mind? Further, reason is associated with the proper functioning of the
mind because this can serve to differentiate humans from the animals, to
make us human, more God-like, closer to God. In making humans superior,
reason must likewise be superior. And the association between male-ness,

reason and mind? Should anyone think this association no longer relevant they need only be referred to the sorts of justifications still given for excluding women from certain jobs such as managerial positions or airline pilots. Or alternatively, to consider arguments given for the superiority of women precisely in terms of their being more in touch with the emotional side of life, with the bodily, the sensual. But either way, that is whether female emotionality is considered a sign of superiority or inferiority, the association is always based on an ideology although it is presented as empirically justified. In calling a claim ideological I refer to purported empirical claims which are presented as such in order to justify certain behaviour and beliefs desired by a pre-conceived set of values, or likewise claims purporting to be facts about nature when instead they serve to disguise the historically conditioned. The only extent to which the male, reason and mind association could be an empirical claim is the extent to which it is a self-fulfilling judgement. Consider the two following possibilities. Firstly, that insofar as women were assumed or deemed to be less rational or non-rational they were excluded from activities that would have enabled them to develop the powers of reasoning – education, for instance – and so women resorted to developing the emotional and psychological aspects of life as a source of power through manipulation, guilt for instance. Thus it becomes 'true' that women 'are' more emotional. Secondly, that the concept of reason has been so reduced and narrowed as to exlcude anything that might involve emotions, feelings or personal experience, that is, anything that might appear to be of concern and use to people restricted to a particular socio-political life, that is the domestic and familial life of women. Thus it becomes 'true' that women are not concerned with reason.

Another traditional association is between female and moon, and hence with night and dark. Perhaps this has its origin with earlier forms of

religion, perhaps it is 'justified' by the 'coincidence' of the moon's

monthly movement and the female's monthly cycle of menstruation. But even

here we find ideological overtones. Menstruation is supposed to affect the

ability to reason, to make women more emotional, more affected by and

dependent on her body - she is reduced to the bodily. This is supported by

the fact that during physical processes such as sleeping, being in pain,

making love... the capacity for reasoning is reduced. Thus the association

between body, sensual experience, emotion, confusion, night, dark, moon and

female, and their opposition to the mind and its rational capacity producing

truth and knowledge and so on, appears to have some credence. By metaphorical

association the night-day and dark-light opposites are connected to those

of confusion-clarity, opinion-knowledge, and falsehood-truth, as we see in

such phrases as 'light of reason', 'the dark ages', the enlightenment',

'clear and distinct ideas', and they are supported by the fact that we can

see more clearly in the light of day and clarity is important for knowledge.

But these associations, the value-judgements implicit in them, and the

judgements made on the basis of them, are based on a very restricted concept

of reason. It excludes or reduces the importance of sense-experience,

imagination, dreaming, guessing, gaining a wide range of experience, playing

around with ideas, and so on, for understanding. And it is used to downgrade

the supposedly feminine and all that is associated with it.

We have then a range of types of associations : the empirical - moon,

dark, night, and body, emotions; the conceptual or theoretical - truth,

knowledge, reason, mind, clarity; the religious or symbolic - moon, female;

and the linguistic - right, right hand; and the blatantly ideological

- reason, male, right (in both senses). In what way and to what extent

they all serve to sustain or reproduce and extend a set of values is what

concerns us. In what way can these sorts of associations be used to disguise,

while reinforcing, the opposing and excluding involved in treating distinctions

as dichotomies. These issues can be identified by examining some of the sorts of explanations for the associations that have already been proposed. There are several questions involved here. Firstly, why are dichotomies associated at all? Secondly, why are particular dichotomies associated? By examining instances of the latter level of explanation I will draw out a general answer to the first question that will show that associating is not an accidental and additional feature of dichotomous thinking. In the following chapter a theory which attempts to explain - and justify - dichotomous thinking on the basis of something outside the mode of thinking, that is, in terms of the nature of the mind/brain, will be discussed and rejected.

In the collection of ethnographic analyses of Right and Left a number of the authors, in contradistinction to Needham's claim that opposites stand in analogical relation to one another, suggest that the opposites are associated because they share some attribute in common or are perceived as such, or they are used to symbolise the same thing. They, of course, are discussing different societies, but it is the general principles of analysis and interpretation which are of interest here - not the details of any particular society. Beidelman states that "each item listed in a set of categories is not only in opposition to its corresponding item in the other category or column but shares some attributes with several other items in its own category. Thus, for example, fluidity, water, blood, red, danger, all seem to share some attributes also held by femininity". [12] On a more general level, Littlejohn says that the right and what is associated with it symbolises "being in-proper-relations-with-others". [13] Chelhod speaks of the "undeniable superiority" of the right hand which "extends to all beings and things which are assigned a place on the same side". [14] Others could be quoted to similar effect. The congruence of these explanations can be understood if we look at what attributes the terms are supposed

to have in common or what they are meant to symbolise. What is then clear
is that terms are associated because they can thereby serve to express or
symbolise and maintain a set of social, political and religious values. On
the more specific level of explanation, of why particular terms are associ-
ated, we can see that, for example, male and right are associated because
the values of the society under consideration include male superiority and
this is expressed through the 'superiority' of the right hand. Although we
might find attempts to prove empirically that both males and right hands
really are superior, this must be seen as an attempt to rationalise and
justify a set of pre-conceived values, not the other way round. It is not
because the right hand and males are superior that they are associated, but
in the empirical arguments supporting such superiority the values have
priority, followed by the association and the rationalisation.

Lloyd's study of the speculative theories of the Greeks supports this
view. He says, for instance, that "We cannot say what evidence (if any)
Parmenides and others may have appealed to, in order to establish their
theories, but it seems clear that the symbolic associations of these opposites
contributed to fortify the belief in a connection between the positive or
superior terms, male and right, on the one hand, and between the negative
or inferior terms, female and left, on the other." [15] And of Aristotle,
that "... when he encounters an obvious and important fact which apparently
runs counter to his doctrine of the superiority and greater nobility of the
right-hand side, he does not abandon that doctrine, but refers to a second
arbitrary assumption..." [16] Lloyd's assessment is that Greek theories
based on the association of opposites, reflect both empirical and a priori
considerations.

The point is not that there is never any empirical justification for associations but that even when there is an empirical basis there is also an underlying value judgement which can be obscured if we take the empirical explanations at face value. We can see this clearly in the explanations Hertz considers for the predominance of superiority of the right hand. [17] One is that temples face the sun in the east so that in prayer people face the sun. Thus the right side is to the south, and left to the north. From the south comes the sun and warm weather. So south, warmth, light are all associated with the right side and considered sacred or of positive value vis a vis the left. A second argument is that the right hand is naturally stronger and more adept and so is used for providing food, self-defence and so on, and so is associated with what is valuable. A third argument is that we are right handed, and value the right side, because we are left-brained. Against these sorts of arguments there are fairly obvious objections. The first only applies in the northern hemisphere. To the second : if the right hand is naturally stronger why do so many societies attempt to make the left hand inoperable and to re-inforce the right? It cannot be because the left is inauspicious for this is to beg the question. And the third argument is of the "which came first? chicken or egg?" variety. In the right-left case, there are genuine reasons for associating right with south, light, strength and so on in a given context, but there is nothing necessary about these associations, as is shown by the fact that they are not universal. More importantly, the reason why they are associated can only be understood in the context of the values they are used to express. The general point arising from Hertz' discussion is that in most, if not all, societies a fundamental dichotomy between the sacred and the profane is symbolised by concrete, natural, empirical distinctions such as the right and the left. These distinctions must be made dichotomously to fulfill this function. Which terms, distinctions, are used and which sides are valued is relatively arbitrary - at least it is a function of other,

say social or environmental factors, although it will always be the case
that the terms which are associated on one side will be so because they
are considered to symbolise the sacred. Whether or not these associations
have a 'genuine' connection is beside the point.

What all of this shows about dichotomous thinking is that it always
involves values, whether they be moral, political, religious or epistemo-
logical, or a combination of these. And the value lies not only in the
dichotomous relation, that is treating one concept as primary and the other
as its privation, but it also lies in the association between dichotomies,
where one concept, by association with another, is used to symbolise,
represent or somehow express the value of the other. For instance, the
right hand by association with masculinity is used to express the superiority
of masculinity over femininity and at the same time the pre-conceived value
accorded the right hand reinforces the alleged superiority of masculinity
by association with it and in this manner serves to make the value system
not appear as such. In making it seem natural or obvious it not only
sustains and reproduces the particular values held, but it also perpetuates,
while making obvious, the mode of thinking. It makes it appear not merely
the right and proper way to think, but the way to think. And not just at
the level of justifying the particular dichotomies involved, say making it
obvious to treat the distinction between masculine and feminine as a dichotomy,
but in making it obvious in general to differentitate by dichotomising and
to associate dichotomies according to the dominant values. In this way the
mode of thinking becomes self-perpetuating and self-justifying. The systematic
association of dichotomies is not an additional and accidental feature of
the mode of thought. It is its mode of operation, regardless of which set
of values are involved and which terms are used to express them. These
depend on the context and are, at the logical level if not the socio-political

or theoretical level, arbitrary. What we can be sure of is that whatever

reasons for, or explanations of, particular associations are given that

a priori considerations will always underly, if not override, any other

considerations.

Notes

1. By 'unconscious' here I mean the sense in which one is unaware of the structure and presuppositions of a way of thinking, that it is not reflected upon, rather than a reference to the Freudian or any other theoretical concept of the unconscious.

2. See for example, Needham, Rodney, (ed), Right and Left. Essays on Dual Symbolic Classification. Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1973.

3. See for example, Lloyd, G.E.R., Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1966; Needham (ed), op. cit.; Gooch, Stan, Total Man. London; Allen Lane Penguin Press, 1972; Hillman, James, "First Adam, Then Eve : Fantasies of Female Inferiority in Changing Consciousness', in Art International, Vol. XIV, No. 7, Sept. 1970, pp.30-40; Levi-Strauss, Claude, The Savage Mind. London; Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1972.

4. Needham (ed), op.cit. p.xviii.

5. See Lloyd, G., "The Man of Reason" which is to be published in the January 1979 issue of Metaphilosophy. At the time of writing this issue had not yet appeared. My quotes are from an unpublished version.

6. Descartes, Rene, Philosophical Works, translated by E. S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1968. See especially the Meditations and the Rules for the Direction of the Mind.

7. See Note 6. This point is from p.14 of the unpublished paper.

8. pp. 16-17 of the unpublished paper.

9. Needham (ed), op.cit., pp.xix-xx.

10. op. cit., p.xxix.

11. See for example, Hertz, Robert, "The Pre-eminence of the Right Hand : A Study in Religious Polarity" in Needham (ed), op. cit., p.5.

12. Beidelman, T.O., "Kaguru Symbolic Classification" in Needham (ed), op. cit., p.132.

Notes (continued)

13. Littlejohn, James, "Temne Right and Left : An Essay on the Chore-
    ography of Everyday Life" in Needham (ed), op. cit., p.292.

14. Chelhod, J., "A Contribution to the Problem of the Pre-eminence of
    the Right, Based upon Arabic Evidence" in Needham (ed), op. cit. p.239.

15. Lloyd, G.E.R., Polarity and Anology, p.51.

16. op. cit., p.53.

17. Hertz, op. cit., pp.3-30.

CHAPTER 3 : The Challenge of Structuralism

The reader will notice that the binary classification of concepts seems frequent in structural thought, as if the metalanguage of the linguist reproduced, like a mirror, the binary structure of the system it is describing; ... it would probably be very instructive to study the pre-eminence of binary classification in the discourse of contemporary social sciences. The taxonomy of these sciences, if it were well known, would undoubtedly provide a great deal of information on what might be called the field of intellectual imagination in our time.

Roland Barthes, Elements of Semiology.

Following the principles of Saussure's structural linguistics, structuralist and semiotic theory presupposes that social facts, be they linguistic, economic, kinship..... facts, are produced by a system of relations, of difference, such that what a fact means is determined by its position within the system. Social facts have no intrinsic identity or meaning. Within the wide group of theorists who adopt this presupposition, there are some who would reduce the relations that constitute the system or structure to binary relations, vaguely called oppositions. These presuppositions are used as methodological principles for analysing social systems. It is considered appropriate to analyse social systems by this method because it is claimed that this is how such systems operate, because this is what they consist in : systems of binary relations - differences, oppositions - which produce meaningful elements.

These theorists, for convenience called structuralists [1], are of extreme interest as far as my thesis is concerned. They provide further evidence for my thesis in demonstrating the widespread use of binary classification. More importantly, they articulate their own theory and methodology precisely in the terms that I have called dichotomous thinking. At the same time, they reject the direction and deny the validity of my questioning by insisting on the universality and necessity for binary, dichotomous, classification. By demonstrating the way in which structuralist theory is a classic instance of dichotomous thinking, I intend to undermine the import of that position. I will not be primarily concerned with the validity of the analyses of collective representations as structured by a system of opposites. If accurate, these analyses only support my thesis. Of more interest is the terms in which these collective representations are represented at the theoretical level. What is disturbing is the naive, confused and uncritical way in which the purported structure of the objects of the discourse is incorporated or reflected in the theoretical discourse. This is done unreflectingly and unquestioningly although deliberately, as if the theory were itself a given.

It is naive in assuming that the structure of a theory must reflect that of its object. This means that it shifts from using the notion of structural relations as a method of analysing socio-cultural systems, to believing that those systems consist in structural relations. Further, it is naive in accepting the 'oppositions' as simply given, as natural, inevitable, obvious. The effect of this double naivity is that in articulating the theoretical frame-work it unreflectingly employs traditional dichotomies - system versus history, for instance - without questioning the 'obviousness' of their presupposed relation of opposition. This produces a series of confusions : between logical contradiction and the traditional system of opposites, between difference and mututal exclusion and between opposition as a logical relation and as a political relation. These confusions allow the unreflected upon application of methods applicable in context-free systems such as logic and phonetics to systems where the context is relevant, such as myth and kinship.

Little attempt is made to clarify the sense in which the data analysed is supposed to be structured by binary relations or oppositions, nor to clarify the terms in which the theory accounting for this structuring is articulated. Even a cursory investigation of the texts shows up a curious lack of specificity about what the notion of opposition involves, not only in its use but also in those rare instances where the notion and its theoretical role is explicitly discussed.

In order to examine the presuppositions and tenets of structuralist theories, and to expose the difficulties and inadequacies involved in them, I will concentrate on the texts of Claude Levi-Strauss. Rather than discussing the conception of linguistics and language held by Saussure and other linguists I will consider how Levi-Strauss understands and uses them. This is partly a matter of economy. But primarily, the reason for focussing on Levi-Strauss is that his conception of the aim of social anthropology (understood in

Saussure's sense of semiology) is that it gives us insight into the structure of the mind. Thus, according to his conception, the results of empirical investigations of social systems are not merely empirically true. If true, they are necessarily true because they are manifestations of the structure of the mind. Levi-Strauss' sustained thesis is that social structures and thus mental structures, consist in binary relations or oppositions: this is how collective representations are organised, classified, structured, and this is evidence of how the mind operates. If this is true, dichotomous thinking would be necessary and natural, according to Levi-Strauss' theory. Thus the phenomena investigated, the investigator's model, and the theory accounting for both would all be appropriately understood in terms of dichotomies. My argument against Levi-Strauss will not be to show that his position conforms to the mode of dichotomous thinking - after all, this is what it professes to do. Rather, it will be to demonstrate the inadequacy of his position : that the way it accepts the phenomena as structured by opposites is naively empiricist; that in attributing this structure to the structure of the mind, it is idealist [2]; that it is reductionist in treating all relations as oppositions; and that in articulating the method and theory it makes the confusions and shifts mentioned above. Levi-Strauss' case is an interesting one insofar as he is aware of these difficulties and possible confusions, and warns against them. Nevertheless, the force of the linguistic model he adopts is such that he cannot fully avoid them.

The underlying concern of Levi-Strauss' work is to uncover the universal characteristics of humans, the universal features of human life. In the 'Overture' to The Raw and the Cooked he tells us that his research has been 'guided by the search for the constraining structures of the mind." [3] This may initially seem a narrower goal than the one I attribute to him, but as we proceed in this analysis, I will show that my extension of "constraining structures of the mind" to universal characteristics of

humans is justified. What primarily concerns us here is Levi-Strauss'
claim that the mind is constrained to classify by means of binary relations,
oppositions, dichotomies. This constraint is supposed to be universal and
necessary. Such a claim is made throughout his work, from The Elementary
Structures of Kinship to the Mythologiques; it operates both as a "starting
point of any attempt at explanation", as a fact about the world, and as a
methodological principle of interpretation. Thus Levi-Strauss analyses
kinship systems and myths by means of a system of binary relations, and
claims that the social structures consist of binary relations. I intend to
examine two distinct, but overlapping, arguments for this universal mode of
classification that is a mode of the structure of the mind. The first is
based on a comparison of language and social systems - that they are phenomena
of the same type such that the methods of linguistics can be used as a
model for analysing social systems. The second has to do with one of the
constitutive elements of these phenomena - that they are forms of reciprocal
exchange. Both arguments will be shown to be inadequate and to involve a
number of confusions and unwarranted shifts.

Before examining these arguments in detail, we need to determine what
Levi-Strauss understands by "constraining structures of the mind" and what
methodological principles underly his "search" for universals, and the results.
These assumptions and principles will enable us to understand why he regards
binary classification not merely as universally true of collective represen-
tations but as an essential and structural feature of thought. The former
possibility might be settled by empirical research; the latter is a claim
about necessity and hence only makes sense within a given theoretical and
methodological apparatus.

Let us begin by noting that an implication of Levi-Strauss' "search for the constraining structures of the mind", given that Levi-Strauss is interested in the human mind as such and not any particular person or culture only, is that he believes that all minds are fundamentally the same, or have essentially the same features. This position is argued for in The Savage Mind. To what extent this belief is merely an assumption will depend on the method Levi-Strauss uses in his "search", that is, depending on whether he arbitrarily interprets his data to conform to this principle of same-ness, or whether the principle emerges from the data. Levi-Strauss seems to be aware that this is a problem, and resolves it by claiming that unlike the philosopher who assumes a "universal form of understanding", the ethnographer studies "empirically collective forms of understanding, whose properties have been solidified, as it were, and are revealed to him in countless concrete representational systems." [4] (Herein lies the 'clue' to the 'extension' mentioned above.) Not only must his approach be empirical, it must ensure that the "inventory of mental patterns" must be inherent in the data, not invented or brought in from without. And this is meant in two senses : firstly, the ethnographer must not impose patterns on the data; and secondly, the patterns, or universal laws, in the collective phenomena must be determined by the nature or structure of the mind, not a result of environmental factors. However, if we examine scientific procedure we realise that some hypothesis or theory is the basis for research – we cannot start without an hypothesis – and that Levi-Strauss' "guiding light" is the principle of universality, that all minds are the same. It is clear then, that Levi-Strauss avoids an a-prioristic enquiry – he insists that the ethnographer work from empirical analysis – but neither is it thoroughly empirical, and neither could it be. Rather, he operates in the medium between these extremes : reading off the structure from the data in terms of a general principle. The principle is to be proven by empirical research.

For instance, the principle that all minds are essentially and structurally the same in that they operate with a binary logic is demonstrated through an investigation of past and present cultural systems. Clearly, it could not be done by investigating minds. This method involves the assumption that the mind is the organising force behind culture. This is not too great an assumption, and one that could be argued for once the 'tabla rasa' notion of the mind held by Locke and other naive empiricists is rejected. The argument then involves a move from the structure of cultural systems to the structure of the mind. Levi-Strauss employs this sort of argument in his analysis of socio-cultural systems.

Levi-Strauss analyses myths in his search for the constraining structures of the mind, partly because he considers myths to be a pure form of thought; it is thought that is not concerned with any practical activity, but only with exploring thought, in play and playing with itself. It is thus less likely to be affected by environmental factors. This fact, he claims, will make the conclusions "decisive". [5] But myth is also a "solidified collective representation", so the study of myth enables him to avoid an a-prioristic enquiry. His mythology utilises the general principle of a universal mental structure which consists in binary operations, and other principles which will be discussed later, for example, that myth can be analysed like a language. However, in the process of his analyses he alters his methodological principal that the structures should be inherent in the material and not imposed. He now announces that it does not matter whether the structure is imposed, given the underlying purpose of analysing myth, because the principle that all minds are the same means that the structure imposed by the mythologist will be the same as the inherent structure. [6] The analysis of myths is the myth of mythology.

Levi-Strauss also analyses other aspects of human life such as kinship structures, cooking, art...with fundamentally the same aim: to uncover the constraining structures of the mind. In order to comprehend how Levi-Strauss proposes to discover mental structures from an analysis of kinship patterns, we need to draw out a few other general principles or assumptions. The first is that the mind organises or structures our experiences, and hence its laws will be displayed in the social organisation; this includes the thesis of the primacy of the intellect over the social. [7]

The second principle, a consequence of the first, is that there is a discoverable homology between the structure of the mind and the structure of the various social systems. [8] This introduces the further methodological principle that in order to reveal the homologies it is essential only to compare things on the same level. This principle will be discussed in more detail later.

The argument states that because the mind is displayed in kinship systems, if we uncover kinship structures we are in fact uncovering mental structures. And since all minds are the same, so are all kinship structures. Now while it may in some sense be obvious that all minds are the same, it is clearly not obviously true that kinship systems, languages... are the same. We need to be clear here that Levi-Strauss is not saying that, for example, dual organisation is the same as a generalised exchange system but that each has the same structure : this is the point he made about the search for homologies. To make this wider thesis tenable, Levi-Strauss relies on two further principles. [9] These clarify the sense in which Levi-Strauss is not strictly an empiricist even though he insists that we can only discover structures through empirical research.

One principle is that structures are not on the empirical level, the
other is that structures operate unconsciously. Structures are the organ-
ising principles or laws of phenomena, they are not part of the content of
phenomena. This makes it clear that we should not expect food to be selected,
prepared and presented in the same way all over the world, nor all people
to have the same language, rather we should expect to find the same underlying
rules according to which the empirical elements are related to one another.
But remember the homology rule: only compare the same sorts of things on
the same level. Grammar should not be compared with foodstuffs.

This also makes it clearer why the structures are said to operate
unconsciously - we could not and do not need to think about the rules as we
use them. Rather the rules are manifested in our behaviour. This does not
rule out the possibility of discovering the structural rules as Levi-Strauss
shows by an analogy with language. We can use a language without formally
knowing its grammar, (in fact it is difficult, if not impossible, to be
thinking of the grammar while using the language), but people with sufficient
interest can work out what the grammar is.

When it comes to understanding the structure of non-linguistic social
phenomena, Levi-Strauss says that these tend to give rise to secondary
explanations by the natives, and these he says are to be treated as part of
the empirical level, at least initially, until it can be determined whether
the explanation coincides with the structure. [10]

If the structures are not empirically observable and operate uncon-
sciously, how can we determine what they are? This could be fairly easily
answered if it were the case that the structural rules could be said to be
learned during the process of socialisation and language learning, but

Levi-Strauss does not accept this view. He says they are innate, genetically transmitted. Levi-Strauss proposes that the structure of social phenomena, and of the mind, can be determined by using the models and methods of structural linguistics.

Levi-Strauss' method for understanding and analysing social systems is based on an argument concerning the relationship between languages and other aspects of social life, and between linguistics and anthropology. [11] Levi-Strauss wonders whether the succesful techniques, the terminology, and the methodology of linguistics might not also be applied in social anthropology. This he admits requires treating non-linguistic social phenomena - art, religion, cooking, fashion... as kinds of languages, as being of substantially the same nature as language. [12] What then is the nature of language, and of linguistic analysis? This must be such as to enable a comparison or application to be made without distortion of the non-linguistic phenomena.

Language, claims Levi-Strauss, is a form of communication, by which he understands exchange of information by means of signs. Such exchange, or communication, takes place between individuals and groups, and between groups, and can occur whenever anything is treated as a sign. In the case of language, it is words, though sometimes phrases and sentences, that become signs. "The conception of the spoken word as communication", he says, "represents a universal feature of the human mind". [13] In other words, all people communicate by means of words, and this is one way in which communication binds people together. Levi-Strauss believes that language, not the use of manufactured tools, is the defining element of human culture.

Levi-Strauss states that structural linguistics has demonstrated that language "is a system of behaviour that represents the projection on the

level of conscious and socialised thought, of universal laws which regulate the unconscious activities of the mind." [14] Non-linguistic phenomena are to be regarded in the same light. There are a number of assumptions involved in this description of systems of behaviour that need to be clarified. Firstly, that systems of behaviour are organised by universal laws, and secondly that these universal laws are neither conscious nor empirically observable, but unconscious. These unconscious universal laws are the structures and they can only be revealed by analysis of the empirical phenomena. For example the laws governing the syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships between the words in a sentence are employed every time we communicate something verbally although we are not consciously employing them. If they were not common to the users of a language we could not understand each other, but if we want to know what those laws are we can only discover them by the analysis of actual sentences, not by introspection. They operate independently from any intentional consciousness. Levi-Strauss wants to say that the same applies to the production of meaningful gestures, works of art, myths, fashion.

The aim of a structural analysis of language is to uncover the system of law-like relations that unconsciously generate meaning. This means that emphasis is placed more on the relations between the elements, and on the system of relations, than on the elements themselves. The elements or signs can only be meaningful within such a system of relationships; the meaning of a sign is determined by its position within the system. If this is so it can be added that a change in any one element alters all the others, and the system itself, insofar as the system is more than the sum of its parts. It is not merely claimed that this is a convenient means of understanding language. It is claimed that language _is_ a system of relations, that the meaning of a sign is determined by its relations with other signs in the system, and that signs are not independently meaningful entities. The study of language, says Levi-Strauss, has arrived at "fundamental and

objective realities consisting of systems of relations". [15] Referring to

Troubetzkoy's program for a structural linguistics, he claims that the

notion of system is introduced because systems are found. [16] It must be

remembered though that he is speaking of the structure of language, that

the structure is the law-like relations. This operates unconsciously and

is not empirically observable.

We get to the crux of the problem when Levi-Strauss, following the

phonologists, reduces these logical relations of difference to oppositions.

This we will see to be the source and result of a number of confusions.

Levi-Strauss wants to use this model of language and the methods of

linguistics in the analysis of socio-cultural phenomena. [17] There are two

general points to be shown : firstly that language and socio-cultural

phenomena are comparable, substantially and operationally; and secondly,

that because a logical model of language is already "more accurate and

better known" than that for other phenomena, it can be used as a principle

of interpretation valid for those phenomena. [18] If the first point can be

shown, the second seems reasonable enough.

Levi-Strauss gives three reasons why we should accept that language

and socio-cultural phenomena are comparable. Firstly, speaking of the

relationship between language and culture, Levi-Strauss states that lang-

uage is part of culture, a result of or reflection of culture, and a con-

dition of culture. The latter applies in two senses : it is the means of

learning about a culture; and language and culture are said to be built up

from the same material, that is logical relations, oppositions, correlations

and the like. [19] This last point is crucial.

Secondly, culture, like language, is a manifestation of unconscious rules, and the two have a similar history. [20] A parallel can be drawn between the use of language and its generally unconscious grammatical structure, and the unconscious structure of other systems such as kinship. This is part of the argument that structures are unconscious, not part of empirical reality, although they determine that reality and can be made conscious.

Thirdly, culture is also a form of exchange, of communication, and whatever is a form of exchange can be treated as a language. The elements exchanged function as signs, whether they are women, food, or manufactured goods. [21]

Now given the similarity between language and other social phenomena on the operational and substantial levels as suggested by Levi-Strauss - both are forms of exchange and both are made up of logical relations - together with the purported success of structural linguistics, it becomes clear why Levi-Strauss wishes to apply the methods and principles of linguistic analysis in anthropological research. Language is to serve as a paradigm, not because Levi-Strauss understood it first, as is sometimes suggested, nor because language is the origin of social phenomena. Levi-Strauss criticises Gurvitch [22] for interpreting him to mean that language is the origin of culture, though to be fair to Gurvitch, Levi-Strauss does lend himself to such an interpretation when he says that language is "a kind of foundation for the more complex structures which correspond to the difference aspects of culture", [23] and that it is through the use of language that humans become cultural. But the sense in which language is a foundation of culture is one of the senses in which it is a paradigm of culture. It is language which "molds discourse beyond the consciousness of the individual, imposing on his thought conceptual schemes which are taken

as objective categories", [24] and it is these conceptual schemes which are given primacy over the social in that they are realised in the formation of systems of cultural relations.

We must now turn to the question regarding - not the success or otherwise of Levi-Strauss' approach, for this can only be answered empirically - the validity of his approach. Can the project be ruled out a-priori, for instance on the ground that non-linguistic aspects of social life are not comparable to language?

In Structural Anthropology Levi-Strauss speaks of the need to ascertain whether "there are not only 'operational' but also 'substantial comparabilities'" between language and other social phenomena, and if so, whether these are not so because they derive from "identical unconscious structures". [25] We have already outlined Levi-Strauss' reasons for supposing that there are such comparabilities and such a common basis, we can now examine the adequacy of his conception of language and whether or not social phenomena exemplify this conception. The examination rests largely on three questions. The first concerns the conception of language as the exchange of signs, the second concerns the conception of signs, and the third the notion of relations as binary relations.

Let us begin by considering the conception of language as the communication of information. Several writers have criticised this, arguing that language is "considerably impoverished if it is used solely for the exchange of information or the communication of messages" and have cited examples of some other use of language, particularly the poetic. [26] But does Levi-Strauss claim that communication or exchange is the only use of language? Notice that the critics do not cite evidence of this belief and notice also that

in the 'overture' to The Raw and the Cooked Levi-Strauss does speak of the
various functions of language : the phatic, the connative and the cognitive. [27]
This suggests that Levi-Strauss does not believe that exchange is the only
aspect of language, though he could argue that the exchange aspect is the
crucial one for the analysis of language. Further, even if Levi-Strauss
does treat language as if exchange of information was its only aspect,
would he be as mistaken as his critics suppose? Let us consider Munz'
criticisms further.

Munz argues that an instance of the use of language that is not for
the purpose of exchanging information is when a "child will point to a car
and repeat 'car' a thousand times even when it is fully aware that the
adult watching has got the message". [28] The purpose of such language use
is supposed to be simply pleasure in the enunciation of a word. Certainly,
the child is playing with the word, its sound, method of production etc., -
but it is also communicating the discoveries made to itself and any listener.
And as we have seen, Levi-Strauss agrees with Munz that words are not only
signs, they are also objects, and no doubt would agree that the child is
taking an interest in the word as an object - although as I have suggested,
this is not all it is doing.

Munz, like Paz and others, also cites poetry as an instance of non-
communicative use of language. "A poem is a structure of words : not a
means of communicating something which could in fact be communicated more
clearly and directly in prose". [29] But because the message of poetry, and
even everyday language, can be made more simply and clearly and without
ambiguity, this does not refute the claim that there is a message, a communi-
cative function. Why write poetry if not to communicate? And besides,
poetry is written because that is the deepest and richest way of expressing
what the poet wishes to communicate. Prose may not do it justice, for
there is as much of the message in the form as in the content.

Levi-Strauss is no doubt correct in saying that language is used to exchange information, to communicate. This is especially so if the terms, 'communication' and 'exchanging information' are understood broadly to include how something is said as well as what is said as part of the message conveyed. But we still have a problem with the claim that language consists in logical relations and with the nature of the signs. These are instances of a general methodological problem that I will outline prior to examining the details, for it is reflected in the argument that we can compare socio-cultural systems with the system of language.

The general problem concerns a tension between the discoveries about language that a structural methodology allows us to make and claims about the nature of language. The same tension applies in the analysis of socio-cultural systems. A structural analysis enables us to see language and other social phenomena as systems of signs, it enables us to see meaning as generated by a system of relationships governed by unconscious rules, it enables us to see the unconscious. Levi-Strauss says that the principle of categorisation "takes on the character of an autonomous object, independent of any subject". [30] This means that to understand the meaning and order of human phenomena we must see them, not as the products or expressions of individual conscious intentionality however influenced by social patterns, but as expressions of universal unconscious laws which generate meaning through a system of relationships.

The order of things is not produced by an intentional consciousness, nor can it be adequately represented in the order of words, in language. Further, language can not take its place somewhere between an intentional consciousness and the things in the world and serve as a value-neutral instrument for representing the order of things ascribed by consciousness.

For language is just another thing in the world, whose order and meaning is also governed by universal unconscious rules. Language is not something we control, not a transparent medium for consciousness to use to represent its thoughts and its ordering of the world, but something that governs us, that determines both our thoughts and the order of the things in the world.

The point of the structuralist conception of language is that it enables the dissolution of the traditional conception of man. Man, the transcendental subject, is no longer at the centre of things; man is no longer the sole arbitrator and dispenser of meanings. Accepting this enables the possibility of treating non-linguistic social phenomena as systems of signs like language governed by universal unconscious rules, rather than as expressions of intentionality. We no more order our myths, our novels, our gestures, our fashion, our food, our art, than we order our words and sentences. Intentional consciousness is no longer in control; all social phenomena are meaningful systems of signs governed by universal unconscious rules.

However, a problem arises when instead of understanding these points as effects of the methodology - for instance, understanding the unconscious as produced by the theory of structural relations governing meaning - it is claimed that this is what language, kinship etc. is. If it is claimed that language is a system of relationships, that the identity and meaning of a sign is nothing but its difference from other signs, that words and things are only signs, the theory is not only confusing methodological and onto-logical questions, it is also already engaged in thinking dichotomously. In a paradoxical way the structure of the theory does reflect the structure of its objects through the methodological constraints. The methodology requires the determination of binary relations, oppositions, as it is these which produce signs; the meaning of the sign is determined by its position

within the system of relations. Saussure goes as far as to claim that signs are nothing but a function of relationships, that in language there are no positive elements, only differences. [31] Once it is said that language _is_ a system of differences (oppositions), and that signs have no independent existence or meaning, then an ontological claim is being made, but merely as a result of certain methodological prescriptions. And once it is claimed that meaning is _only_ generated by structural relations then a dichotomy is introduced between meaning as the effect of intentions and meaning as the effect of a system of relations. Saussure's thesis of the arbitrary or unmotivated nature of the sign reinforces this dichotomy. The arbitrariness of the sign (a relationship between a signifier and a signified) means that the signifier, the sound-image, has no natural connection with the signified, the concept; it means that the signified has nothing to do with the production of meaning. This is reflected in Saussure's exclusion of diachronic analysis from the proper study of language.

The excluding of intentions from questions about the meaning of signs is taken over by Levi-Strauss and semiotics in general. It is taken over in a way that amounts to an extension of Saussure's thesis. It is now said that meaning is produced unconsciously, and a dichotomy is introduced between consciousness and the unconscious when both are understood as real objects. The analysis of meaning is the analysis of the unconscious, of the structural rules or law-like relations that produce meaning. It is, as we saw, the shift to the unconscious production of meaning that allows Levi-Strauss to use the model of linguistics in the analysis of non-linguistic phenomena. It involves the study of formal relations, where the content - concept or object - is irrelevant. Saussure is adamant on this point, that linguistics analyses forms. [32] If this argument makes sense anywhere it may be with linguistics and mathematics, and even here is is questionable.

But when it is used in the study of socio-cultural systems, it runs the
risk of formalism and of treating particular socio-cultural systems as
eternally and necessarily true. The unconscious, as a system of law-like
relations, produces meaning in a way that is unaffected by historical and
material elements, and by the needs and desires of individuals. Insofar as
a structural analysis is a formal analysis no amount of additional historical
and material investigations could succeed in integrating the material with
the formal.

Levi-Strauss' suggestion that diachronic research is important for
structural analysis, and that signs are not wholly arbitrary and are also
values, [33] cannot overcome the effects of formulating the theory and method-
ology in such a way as to institute dichotomies. A dichotomous conception
of meaning is central to structural theory and analysis. The failure of
Levi-Strauss' attempts to supplement it with historical, material, and even
psychological and physiological factors is indicative of the force of that
original dichotomy and of the self-perpetuating mode of thinking that comes
into effect with it.

When Levi-Strauss recommends the continuance of diachronic research
it can only be as an addition to structural analysis, not an integral part
of it, for the very notion of a structural analysis excludes any interest
in historical factors: it analyses systems of relations as they exist at a
given time such that questions of origin or of cause are irrelevant.
Furthermore, the conception of a sign as a relational entity, that is, as
constituted by its relations at a given time and not as independently
existing through time, implies the exclusion of historical concerns.
However, as mentioned above, it is not clear that Levi-Strauss is committed
to the view that signs are purely relational entities. That they are

relational entities is a consequence of the arbitrariness of the signifier-signified relation, [34] and on this point Levi-Strauss says that "the linguistic sign is arbitrary a-priori, but ceases to be arbitrary a-posteriori." [35] But he fails to point out that the sense in which they are arbitary - no external connections or motivation between signifier and signified - is different from the sense in which they are not arbitrary. This latter sense has to do with the cultural and psychological connotations and associations that connect the signifier and signified after we have learnt the sign. These a-posteriori connections have nothing to do with the constitution of the sign, they do not affect the arbitrariness thesis, and a structural analysis is only concerned with the arbitrary relation. [36] In Totemism and The Savage Mind Levi-Strauss is interested in the logic of classification, in the relationships between signifiers. His claim there is that while the relations between signifiers remains the same - they will always be relations of opposition and correlation - what is used to signify varies, it is arbitrary. That two birds are used to signify the relation of opposition between two social groups is simply a matter of accident and environmental effect. [37]

Levi-Strauss appears to avoid the criticisms of the notion of a sign as a purely relational entity by suggesting that signs are also things or values. If they are things, then he also avoids the criticism of the arbitrary thesis because the thing that a sign signifies would be crucial to its meaning. Insofar as he thinks this he is not a structuralist, not doing semiotics in Saussure's sense. But again, Levi-Strauss' suggestion is irrelevant. Of course, signs are also things, they are women, trousers, cars, buildings, but their thinghood has nothing to do with their role as signs in a semiotic system. Again, in Levi-Strauss' analyses, the only aspect of women, totems... that is of interest is how they function as

signs in a system of relations with other signs. He is not interested in women as people, or in the animals that serve as totems, and no semiologist is interested in trousers for their physical comfort or bread for its nutritional value. In fact, it is the purpose - and interest - of semiological or structural studies to put aside these concerns. Levi-Strauss' concern with the particular women exchanged or the particular animals used as totems is limited to the extent to which such knowledge clarifies their use as signs, for example, how two birds can serve to express opposition. And so it must be if his analysis is to be structural.

A structural analysis must presuppose a dichotomy between intentions and relations as producers of meaning. It is one thing to set up a problem on the basis of a dichotomy, for example to point out two ways of considering meaning and to decide to concentrate on one aspect. If the dichotomy remains at the methodological level at worst we might accuse the methodology of distorting the phenomenon. But when the methodological prescription is transformed into an ontological claim it is more dangerous. Like Saussure, Levi-Strauss makes this shift from methodology to ontology. He starts by analysing social systems in terms of the binary relations or laws which are unconscious and not empirically observable, and shifts to claiming that the systems or structures <u>are</u> the unconscious laws, thereby confusing a theoretically constructed, or discursive object, with a real object given to the analysis. We have already seen one form of this shift implied in his claim that the investigator's model is homologous with the structure of the phenomena investigated, and both with the structure of the mind. This was the basis of the claim that his mythology was another variant of the myths. The confusion is also involved in his repeated claims, as the basis for comparing language with other systems of behaviour - that they are both made up of, or consist in, logical relations. The shift also occurs in <u>The Elementary Structures of Kinship</u>. [38] Levi-Strauss says that by treating marriage

customs as "different modalities of the laws of exchange" they become
"perfectly clear", that is, if treated "as a kind of language, a set of
processes permitting the establishment between individuals and groups of a
certain type of communication". But he goes on to add that treating kin-
ship rules as a kind of language is not an imposition on the material for
"it is always a system of exchange that we _find_ at the origin of rules of
marriage". Exchange "emerges as the fundamental and common basis of all
modalities of the institution of marriage".

The danger involved in instituting the dichotomy in an ontological
claim is that historical and material considerations and the concerns and
interests of individuals and groups, are excluded from the analysis of
language and other systems of behaviour. They are not excluded merely for
methodological reasons but because - it must be claimed - they are not part
of those systems of behaviour. These consist only in systems of relations.
Apart from making it impossible to explain meaning formation, it also makes
it impossible to explain change. Coupled with Levi-Strauss' extra thesis
concerning the mind/brain it is not only impossible to explain change, but
change is impossible. Apparent changes in social systems would merely be
transformations of the same structure and these transformations are inexplicable
in the terms of structural theory. And it would make no sense for individuals
or groups to press for changes, as again only transformations of the same
would be possible. Thus the shift to ontological claims is a shift to
ideological claims; instead of using structural relations as a means of
analysing social systems, the systems are reduced to the relations and
treated as necessary, what is becomes what necessarily is. Levi-Strauss'
original opposition between nature and culture, where culture is defined as
whatever is governed by a conventional rule, and not by necessity, is
reduced. The conventional rules become necessary and natural and universally
true - at the structural, unconscious level - as manifestations of the
structure of the mind.

The rule whose purported necessity I am concerned to undermine is that structures consist in binary relations, that the mind works by classifying dichotomously. Before approaching this problem directly I will briefly discuss one of the arguments involved in transposing linguistic methods onto the analysis of non-linguistic phenomena. This is the argument that it is essential to only make comparisons and only to search for homologies between language and culture by considering the same sorts of things on the same level, for instance to compare phonemes with mythenes. This argument relates back to that concerning the conception of signs as relational entities and is involved in any argument concerning the applicability of linguistic methods to other phenomena. Levi-Strauss criticises Whorf for trying to compare incomparables, "this linguistic structure" with "a crude, superficial, empirical view of culture". [39] The task Levi-Strauss sets for linguists and anthropologists is to determine the level at which correlations between language and culture are to be found, and the sorts of things to be correlated. Two criticisms of Levi-Strauss' actual procedure need to be made. One is that in comparing phomenes with mythemes or in treating women as signs exchanged by men, he is shifting from a context-free system, the phonemic system, to systems where the context, that is the socio-political and economic conditions, are crucial. [40] Even if it could be shown that phonemes are purely relational entities, relevant only in the phonemic system, it is an enormous jump to saying the same of mythemes or women. Even if women can be used and are used as signs, this is different from saying women are signs, and to add, as an optional extra, that of course women are also values, serves only to perpetuate the original mis-construal of the problem.

The second criticism concerns the relations between phonemes and the transposition of these onto other phenomena. Levi-Strauss follows the phonologists, such as Jakobson, in calling these relations oppositions.

What he fails to recognise is the difference between the use of the term 'opposition' in a context-free system like phonetics and its use and meaning in context-dependent systems. In phonetics it carries none of the socio-political connotations and implications involved in say a kinship system. The difference between marked and unmarked or voiced and unvoiced phonemes is not that between self and other, or even right and left. To speak of the brain as like a digital computer, as some of Levi-Strauss' followers do, is to further the confusion. [41]

Levi-Strauss' mistake in adopting the methods of linguistics is that he confuses, and fails to clarify, the variety of senses of opposition. It leads to the reduction of all relations to binary relations of opposition, to dichotomies. For even if we agreed that language and other systems consist in logical relations, it does not follow that these relations are binary ones. In a previous chapter we have discussed this variety and confusion. I will now consider the arguments and evidence put forward by Levi-Strauss for the thesis that thinking is universally and necessarily in terms of oppositions. This will involve a general consideration of the notion of opposition. I will not be primarily concerned with Levi-Strauss' justifications for adopting linguistic methodology, as with his use of it in anthropological research. The texts considered are The Elementary Structures of Kinship and to a lesser degree, Totemism and The Savage Mind.

In The Elementary Structures of Kinship we are asked to acknowledge: "That duality, alternation, opposition and symmetry, whether presented in definite forms or imprecise forms, are not so much matters to be explained, as basic and immediate data of mental and social reality which should be the starting point of any attempt at explanation". [42]

The point is repeated in Totemism [43] and in The Savage Mind. The relations of opposition and correlation are repeatedly used as the basis for analysing systems of classification, as the logical principle on which phenomena are classified. [44] To determine the basis for this belief, I will trace Levi-Strauss' argument in Elementary Structures. [45]

The argument begins with the universality of the prohibition of incest. Incest is understood, not as a relation between biological brothers and sisters, but as a relation between groups of people classified for cultural reasons as 'brothers' and 'sisters'. Levi-Strauss goes on to examine the nature, purport, and function of the prohibition. Nature, he argues, leaves marriage to chance, so culture intervenes and introduces some order by classifying people into groups of potential and prohibited spouses. In the process it initiates social organisation, thereby enabling the survival of the group as a group (p.43). (We can note here, as it will come up again, that this implies that Levi-Strauss regards the natural relations between humans as hostile/competitive, social organisation or culture turns this aggressive energy into co-operation through regulation - though of course the cultural is natural for humans.) "Considered as a prohibition", he says (p.45) "the prohibition of incest merely affirms, in a field vital to the group's survival, the pre-eminence of the social over the natural, the collective over the individual, organisation over the arbitrary". He then goes on to show how, taken as a positive rule, it also produces the same results. The negative stipulation has a positive counterpart (p.51). But primarily and fundamentally the purpose and meaning of the incest prohibition is to guarantee and establish exchange (p.51). It is this that enables the survival of the group, through organisation and regulation, by effecting the transition from hostility to alliance. If exchange is to enable the survival of the group and all that this involves, then it must involve reciprocal obligation - and if it is that which enables group

survival, then it will be a "universal mode of culture" (p.33). All reciprocal exchanges - whether of women, food, goods, knowledge - "are phenomena of the same type" (p.61): their purpose is not to secure economic advantage (p.53), but to "effect the transition from hostility to alliance, from anxiety to confidence, and from fear to friendship" (p.68). This effects the transition from nature to culture. The ostensible reason for exchanges may be for profit, to increase status or prestige, to honour someone, but the underlying reason is always to ensure social survival.

In The Elementary Structures Levi-Strauss is primarily concerned with exchange as the exchange of women in kinship or marriage systems. The outcome of the foregoing analysis of the relation between incest (of which marriage systems are the modalities) and reciprocal exchange is that marriage systems must be understood as expressions of the principle of reciprocity, and not vice versa. Levi-Strauss argues that dual organisation is a principle of organisation with various applications and if we are to "understand their common basis" we need to enquire into "certain fundamental structures of the human mind", not into environmental factors. (p.75). This same argument can be applied to all marriage systems, not only to the varieties of dual organisation. We can see why Levi-Strauss argues that we understand the common basis of the various marriage systems if we understand the structure of the mind when we recall his other principle of the primacy of the intellect over the social.

What are these mental structures? To quote Levi-Strauss (p.84): "It seems there are three: (i) the exigency of the rule as rule; (2) the action of reciprocity regarded as the most immediate form of integrating the opposition between the self and other; and finally, (3) the synthetic

nature of the gift, that is that the agreed transfer of a valuable from one individual to another makes those individuals into partners, and adds a new quality to the valuable transferred." It is primarily the second mental structure that is relevant here.

So far we have seen how Levi-Strauss established the universality of reciprocal exchange, now we see that the reason for its universality is that it is a mental structure. How has Levi-Strauss established this? He relies largely on an interpretation of Susan Isaacs' study of child thought - arguing that young children are less influenced by a particular culture, and that the reason children's thought can be compared with primitive or psychopathic thought is not because children are primitive or psychopathic, nor because primitives or psychopaths are child like, but because child thought is a "common denominator for all thoughts and all cultures" (p.94). Children have the whole range of adult cultural systems from which the child learns to identify with one set of them, the other sets are suppressed. Infant thought, he says "provides a common basis of mental structures and schemes of sociability for all cultures, each of which draws on certain elements for its own model" (p.85). For instance each culture selects for its marriage system one of the modalities of the principle of reciprocity. But what evidence in children's thought establishes reciprocity as a mental structure?

Levi-Strauss adopts Isaacs' account of children wanting exclusive possession of something, not because of its intrinsic value but because it is desired by some-one else. The child, she says, will accept arbitration and exchange only when it realises it cannot gain exclusive possession. The child desires such possession for security, from fear that the other will take complete possession. Rather than allow this possibility the child will be willing to share, it learns that it can only receive by being willing to give (pp.85-87).

What is the outcome of all this? That the principle of reciprocity
is a mental structure which explains the prevalence of reciprocal exchange
in (most) cultural phenomena, for example in marriage systems. We now
need to show how the notion of opposition is involved in that of reciprocity,
and not only in some of its empirical modalities. Three factors from
Elementary Structures are used to establish this: firstly, reciprocal
exchange is always between two groups or individuals, whether or not they
are in a chain of exchange; secondly, reciprocal exchange is an attempt to
overcome the fundamental opposition between the self and others - to create
alliance/culture rather than hostility/nature and this enables humans to
live together and be human; and thirdly, the evidence from children. The
child cannot have everything because the reason for wanting something is
because someone else has it, and when a child cannot get what it wants, it
decides to press for equality and exchange.

What is the relationship between reciprocity, as a structure of mind,
and the opposition between the self and others? Levi-Strauss says the
notion of opposition is more basic, and reciprocal exchange is an attempt
to overcome the opposition. The notion of reciprocal exchange involves the
notion of two-ness: opposition and correlation, and reciprocal exchange
arises from the basic opposition between the self and others as an attempt
to diffuse possible hostilities, to get the best deal etc. - but more
importantly, to enable the survival of the group.

If the notion of opposition is to fulfill such a crucial function in
accounting for the establishment and maintenance of social groups, we
should expect Levi-Strauss to elaborate and clarify it. Instead, we find a
series of assumptions, confusions, and shifts in meaning.

It appears as if the thesis that the mind universally and necessarily operates by a process of binary distinctions, oppositions or dichotomies, rests on the assumption of an original opposition between the self and others. Overcoming this opposition through reciprocal exchange is supposed to enable humans to be human. This argument involves a shift between opposition as a logical relation and opposition as an emotional or political relation. Even if it is true that the first awareness of social relations is in terms of an opposition between self and others, how does this relate to the system of oppositions that is supposed to be characteristic of collective representations, of all modes of classification? Is it the same sense of opposition: is the one not an emotional relation and the other a logical relation? Is it true that there is an opposition between the self and others and what does this mean? Is Levi-Strauss not confusing empirical and structural considerations? And is it the case that binary relations are necessarily oppositions or that oppositions as always binary oppositions? [46]

Let us consider first the alleged opposition between the self and others. From Levi-Strauss' description of children it seems that this is meant to be understood as an experience intrinsic to the process of becoming aware of oneself. That through becoming aware of others as hostile, others whose desires and needs conflict with the possibility of satisfying one's own desires and needs, we become conscious of ourselves. [47] To the extent that we are aware of others we are aware that we cannot control them and they might come to control us. Levi-Strauss argues that as each individual realises it cannot satisfy its own needs without the co-operation of others the opposition is overcome. Hostility becomes alliance through a process of reciprocal exchange and obligation. But opposition is primary, and although the relation between self and others is one of mutual exclusion and exhaustion, its meaning in this context is emotional and political.

Although this account raises an important fact about human life —
that we are each individual although we can only be an individual within
the context of a human group — need the relation between individual and
group, or self and others, be understood in terms of hostility or competi-
tion? Could not the same phenomena be described in terms of difference,
not opposition? For instance that we experience ourselves as different
from others and recognising this difference means recognising ourselves.
And that recognising ourselves involves recognising others who are like
ourselves and whom we cannot do without. That we integrate ourselves with
others by learning the cultural and linguistic patterns.

But given this fundamental opposition does it constitute a ground for
employing a logic of oppositions, or for assuming that such a logic is
intrinsic to the process of thought? Levi-Strauss' argument seems to be
that we experience this opposition between self and other because opposition
is a mental structure. That all the oppositions are modalities of a mental
structure, only the self-other opposition is more fundamental. It is not
that binary thinking is derived from the opposition between self and others
such that we understand or classify things by generalising from the familiar
or original. Rather, it is that the original opposition is, like the
others, a realisation of the mental structure which consists in differentiating
by opposing. The supporting evidence for this comes from the universality
of binary classification as manifested in all social phenomena — myths,
kinship, politics, religion, cooking and so on. In Elementary Structures
Levi-Strauss tells us that women are differentiated according to whether
they are given or received. [48] In The Savage Mind [49] he describes a large
number of distinctions or classifications — between feminine and masculine,
high and low, sacred and profane, right and left, day and night, and so on.
But it is confusing to call all these relationships oppositions, and thus
to think of them all as the same sort of relationship.

The reduction of all relationships to oppositions seems to be an effect of the application of linguistic methods and terminology, rather than a result of investigating the nature of these relationships, and nowhere is the meaning of 'opposition' discussed. As we have seen, Levi-Strauss' use of linguistic methodology involves the application of context-free systems of relations to systems where the context is crucial – and this has the effect, not only of reducing all relations to oppositions, but in confusing logical with political and emotional sensesof 'opposition'. It is sometimes suggested that the opposites the structuralist is interested in are those "perceived as such within specific contexts." [50] This may be so, and it may also be true that the use of such opposites is extremely widespread. But this does not justify Levi-Strauss in treating these relationships as if they are opposites, in the strong sense of mutual exclusion and exhaustion, as he is required to do in order to claim that such relationships are what structures consist in. Moreover, it does not justify Levi-Strauss in treating binary classification as necessary even if it could be shown that structures consist in logical oppositions. The argument to necessity is based on the claim that the mind operates by binary classification, and this is argued for on the basis of the supposed empirical evidence of binary classification in the systems of kinship etc., at the structural level. But both arguments are based on the flagrantly idealist assumption that the structure of the mind is realised in the structure of socio-cultural systems; that the mind imposes "forms upon content which are fundamentally the same for all minds"; that is, the thesis of the primacy of the intellect over the social. And it is precisely this assumption that enables Levi-Strauss to fail to recognise the historical, material and political forces involved in the apparent necessity of binary classification and thus to slip between political and logical senses of opposition.

NOTES

1. Without entering into an argument as to who is 'really' a structuralist, and without attempting to precisely differentiate between structuralism, semiology and semiotics, I mean to include anyone working within the theoretical framework of Saussurian type linguistics, whatever field of discourse or analysis this be applied to.

2. An interesting contrast with Marx can be made here. Marx analyses capitalism in terms of structural relations because in a capitalist society any element is a function of its relations, but he does not take this to be necessarily and eternally true of the possible relationships, between people for example. The possibility of change is left open, in a way that it is not for anyone who claims that what a thing is is its synchronic relations.

3. Levi-Strauss, Claude. The Raw and the Cooked, translated by John and Doreen Weightman. London; Jonathon Cape 1970. p.10.

4. op. cit. p.11.

5. op.cit., p.10.

6. op.cit., p.12.

7. Levi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology, translated by Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf. Middlesex; Penguin, 1968. p.21; and Totemism, translated by Rodney Needham. Middlesex; Penguin, 1969. pp.169-70.

8. This is implied, for example, in The Raw and the Cooked, pp.10-11 and in Structural Anthropology, p.71.

9. See Structural Anthropology III, "Language and the Analysis of Social Laws".

10. op. cit., I. p.19.

11. op.cit., II. pp.33-34.

12. op. cit., III. pp.61-62.

NOTES continued

13. Levi-Strauss, Claude. The Elementary Structures of Kinship, translated by J. H. Bell, J. R. von Sturmer, and Rodney Needham. London; Tavistock, 1970. p.494.

14. Structural Anthropology III. p.59.

15. op.cit., III. p.58.

16. op.cit., II. p.33.

17. op.cit., Part I, Chapters II-V.

18. op.cit., I. p.21; V. p.83.

19. op.cit., IV. pp.68-69.

20. op.cit., IV. p.71.

21. Elementary Structures, p.61, p.494; Structural Anthropology III. p.61f, V. p.83.

22. Structural Anthropology IV. p.69.

23. ibid.

24. op.cit., I. p.19.

25. op.cit., III. p.62.

26. Munz, Peter, When the Golden Bough Breaks. London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973. p.15.

27. The Raw and the Cooked, p.29.

28. When the Golden Bough Breaks, p.15.

29. ibid.

30. The Raw and the Cooked, p.11.

31. Saussure, Ferdinand de, Course in General Linguistics. New York; McGraw Hill, 1966. p.120.

32. op.cit., p.122.

33. Structural Anthropology V. pp.88-96; III. p.61; Elementary Structures, p.456.

34. Culler, Jonathon, Saussure. Glasgow; Fontana, 1976. pp.19-23.

NOTES continued

35. Structural Anthropology V. p.91.

36. Levi-Strauss makes an unacknowledged shift here from Saussure's signifier-signified relation to that between words and things.

37. Levi-Strauss, Claude. The Savage Mind. London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972. pp.53-55, 140.

38. Elementary Structures, p.492f; Structural Anthropology III. p.60-61.

39. Structural Anthropology IV. pp.73, 85.

40. This is argued by Wilden, Anthony, System and Structure. London; Tavistock, 1972. pp.7-11; and by Jacka, Campioni and Brennan, "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back" in Working Papers in Sex, Science and Culture I, no. 1, Jan. 1976. pp.25-26.

41. See for example: Leach, Edmund, Genesis as Myth. London; Jonathon Cape, 1969 and Levi-Strauss. London; Fontana, 1970.

42. Elementary Structures, p.136

43. Levi-Strauss, Claude, Totemism, translated by Rodney Needham. Middlesex; Penguin, 1969. p.170.

44. The Savage Mind, Chapter II, and p.75.

45. All page references given in the text are from Elementary Structures.

46. On this point see Barthes, Roland, The Elements of Semiology, translated by Annette Lavers and Colin Smith. London; Jonathon Cape, 1967. III.3.5 and passim.

47. This view is not unlike Hegel's master and slave, or Sartre's lover and mistress. See Hegel, G.W.F., The Phenomenology of Mind, translated by Sir James Baillee. London; George, Allen and Unwin, 1971. pp.229-240; and Sartre, Jean-Paul, Being and Nothingness, translated by Hazel E. Barnes. New York; Citadel Press, 1968, on love, p.340ff.

48. Elementary Structures, pp.136, 138.

49. The Savage Mind, Chapters II and V.

50. Lane, Michael (ed), Structuralism. London; Jonathon Cape, 1970. p.16.

PART II   :   The Hiddenness of Dichotomous Thinking
in Philosophical Texts.

CHAPTER 4 : The Method of Reading Philosophical Texts

In philosophical thought one might least expect to find dichotomous thinking given the notion of philosophical enquiry as based on the questioning and clarifying of presuppositions. But this is not the case. Many philosophical problems, and the concepts in which they are formulated, presuppose dichotomies; and the postulation and resolution of these problems is undertaken within a dichotomous mode of thought. This may not appear to be obviously true as it is not often that we find dichotomies explicitly stated in a philosophical text. And if it is true that we find dichotomies a difficulty arises as to how to account for the fact that there are different, and mutually exclusive, philosophical positions. For instance, what sense does it make to say that rationalism and empiricism are both instances of dichotomous thinking when they are mutually exclusive positions? The fact that they are mutually exclusive will be shown to be one of the indicators of, and one of the effects of, their being instances of dichotomous thinking.

An appropriate method of reading philosophical texts is required in order to bring out the way in which various different, even mutually exclusive, philosophical positions involve dichotomous thinking. Since this involvement is not generally explicit, and not conscious, the reading must read beyond the surface of the text, beyond what is stated in the text without resorting to questions about the authors' intentions and without positing another text which lies outside the given text and is supposed to justify the reading of that text. The sort of reading that is required must enable us to discern the operation of dichotomous thinking in a text where dichotomies are not explicitly stated and in such a way as to not treat what is present and absent in the surface of the text as all there is in the text. And it must show how, in what is said and how it is said, and in what is thereby excluded, not said, absent, that more can be said without its being explicitly stated and without this 'more' being external to

the text. This means that what is not said can be just as important as what is said. To facilitate this reading I will adopt Benjamin's distinction between a frame of reference and a problematic. The "problematic is the epistemological and ontological components of the text that first sanction the existence of what appears in the text and secondly cannot be identified automatically in the text." The frame of reference is the "consciously assumed presuppositions," the "set of methodological and theoretical presuppositions" which determine "where set questions can and cannot be asked." [1] "The distinction between a problematic and a frame of reference is that the problematic allows for the conceptual existence of what can be consciously identified within a frame of reference." [2] In the terms of this thesis rationalism, empiricism, and phenomenology are frames of reference, and they all belong to what, for the sake of brevity, could be called the problematic of the subject. And this problematic is already conceived within the dichotomous mode of thinking.

How does this distinction between a frame of reference and a problematic enable us to discern dichotomous thinking, and how does the method of reading implied by this distinction differ from other readings and differ in such a way as to not itself be involved in dichotomous thinking? Following Benjamin this method will be called a symptomatic reading. This is not merely a matter of convenience, the title enables us to clarify what is distinctive about this method. For what such a reading of texts for their involvement in dichotomous thinking allows us to do is to treat certain elements of a text as symptoms or clues of something not explicit but nevertheless present; present as what makes possible what is explicit. Identifying the conditions of possibility of what is said - the problems raised, the answers posed, and the concepts used to do so - through various symptoms is not looking for causes, partly because a cause would be external to the text so the search for causes would be mere speculation. And partly

because searching for causes would involve a category mistake insofar as the relationship between aspects of thinking, between the theoretical conditions of what is sayable and what is said, or even between the socio-political conditions of discourse and a given discourse, cannot be causal relation. In the case of dichotomous thinking, given that it is a _mode_ of thinking, the way in which the theoretical and/or socio-political conditions were understood would be further instances of dichotomous thinking. Where a cause is postulated the cause would be understood in terms of dichotomies and the relationships between cause and effect, as something external to a theory causing that theory, is itself a dichotomy. This is why to look for the causes of dichtomous thinking would be to perpetuate that mode of thinking, and why a symptomatic reading understands the conditions of what is said as other than what is said without being external to what is said. The conditions are present yet absent, present in what is said without being said. This means that a symptomatic reading, while not postulating something outside the text, does not remain merely at the surface of the text. It does not take what is such in a text at face value, literally. It does not take the problems posed in a text for granted, as problems simply given as such and needing to be resolved. And it is not concerned directly with what the author claims to be doing - this is just another symptom; nor does it enquire about the author's intentions as something external to the text, again as a cause of the text. A symptomatic reading can enable us to recognise how a metaphor is appropriate, how a problem appears as a problem, how a concept is delineated, how an ideal is postulated, how a theory is rejected... how all of these appear efficacious, obvious, sensible, necessary, where distinctions are presupposed dichotomously, where concepts are associated because they are related dichotomously with other concepts and reproduce a pre-conceived value, that is, where the dichtotomous mode of thinking is operating. And it should be able to read these clues as clues of dichotomous thinking without treating the distinctions

between a symptom and what it is as symptom of, between a frame of reference and a problematic, and between the dichotomous mode of thinking and an instantiation of it, as themselves dichotomies. Dichotomous thinking is not an abstract mode of thought which is then applied to specific problems, it is already involved in the way problems are formulated, concepts defined etc. - this is its mode of existence. Similarly, a problematic or a symptom is not external to and other than, without at the same time being reducible to, its possible frames of reference or that of which it is a symptom.

A symptomatic reading of a text is different from the other modes of reading which look for causes or for the author's intentions, or which reduce a text to its surface, and the mode of thinking that is involved in a symptomatic reading is thus different from dichotomous thinking. Dichotomous thinking cannot read a text for dichotomies for in taking the dichotomies for granted, as obvious and necessary, it simply perpetuates that thinking. More generally, it cannot read problematics through frames of reference without postulating their relationship dichotomously. This raises some complex and difficult problems concerning the implications of methods of reading and modes of thinking. If we need a non-dichotomous mode of thinking to detect dichotomous thinking, what is the relationship between these modes? Alternative, mutually exclusive, problematics? If so, does this introduce a self-refuting paradox into the critique of dichotomous thinking? This question will be taken up in Part III of the thesis. Here I will comment on the nature of the criticism that is involved in this critique.

It will not be difficult for the reader to detect the critical tone in my analysis of dichotomous thinking, and indeed it has already been stated, (in the Introduction) that one of the dichotomies that needs to be overcome is that between fact and value. This means that the descrip-

tion of a theory as dichotomous carried with it a criticism of that theory.
This raises the difficulty that in being against dichotomous thinking one
is remaining at the same level as that thinking and proposing an alternative
to it - and this raises the possibility that in being against one is remaining
within that thinking. To avoid this a style of criticism is required that
does not remain at the same level and is not reducible to mere exegesis or
commentary. The sorts of criticisms that are made here of empiricism and
phenomenology are that, given their presuppositions, the sorts of problems
they raise - and are required to solve - cannot be resolved within those
presuppositions. For instance, discrepancies arise between the presuppositions
of a question and those of the answers; or, a frame of reference collapses
into the frame of reference it is supposed to be an alternative to. In
some places I use one frame of reference to indicate the inadequacies of
another. For instance, the phenomenological concept of intentionality can
be used to show the inadequacies of the empiricist presupposition of dualism,
that given the problem they are both trying to solve - the conditions and
nature of experience and knowledge - a dualist cannot coherently resolve
it. I also try to show how the presuppositions of this problem, as it is
posed within the problematic of dichotomous thinking - knowledge as absolute
certainty, experience as a subject-object relation, and the conception of
the subject - means that phenomenology cannot resolve it either without
relapsing into dualism and a kind of empiricism also. The conception of
truth as correspondence and the conception of knowledge as absolute means
that, even for phenomenology with its turn to the subject as source of
meaning and knowledge, what is experienced must be taken as simply given as
such. Furthermore, experience, as a problem, is understood as given. What
neither of these frames of reference can allow for, given their conception
of truth, is that their presuppositions and their way of approaching the
given already structure the given in a certain way. In criticising their
presuppositions, what I try to avoid is taking the given as given and

attempting to construct an alternative theory of it. Instead I play off one way of approaching the given against another. The criticism of these approaches as presupposing dichotomies is not meant to show that the world, the given, is not really composed of dichotomies and hence those interpretations are wrong, for this would presuppose that I know how the world really is and so I can compare those interpretations with the world and see that they do not correspond with it. Rather the criticism amounts to showing that dichotomies are not given, that thinking dichotomously is a mode of thinking and it is a mode that creates certain unnecessary problems of various types - how can I know that I have a body?, the exclusion of women from various roles, a neurotic fear of exposing oneself, the exclusion of other modes of thinking... - and that it cannot resolve the theoretical problems it raises, that there are other modes of thinking which are denied by dichotomous thinking, and that dichotomous thinking operates by a series of logical errors - treating relationships as one of contradictions when it is not so, making category mistakes in applying a general dichotomy in a context where it is inappropriate, criticising by negating... In criticising this mode of thinking I am not proposing an alternative theory of the same facts but questioning the way in which dichotomous thinking postulates or presupposes certain things as facts when instead they are effects of that mode of thinking, or, more precisely, that dichotomous thinking is the presupposing that certain things are mutually exclusive and exhaustive together with the presupposition that this is how things are insofar as it fails to see itself as a mode of thinking. In this way it thinks of truth as correspondence and thinking as representation - thinking represents, reflects the world and thereby, if it makes no mistakes in removing or does not judge beyond the given or brackets its prejudices, corresponds to the world. In this way dichotomous thinking is empiricist.

The specific aim of this part of the thesis is to show how Empiricism and Phenomenology, despite their differences, belong to the problematic of dichotomous thinking. In particular, the texts of Locke and Husserl will be considered. The point in the comparison of Locke and Husserl, rather than say Locke and Descartes, is that Husserl's frame of reference is outside of, or overcomes, the empiricist-rationalist alternative. In not consciously presupposing objectivism or dualism, Husserl's stance marks a break with rationalism and empiricism, although my argument will be that insofar as phenomenology remains within dichotomous thinking, it ultimately cannot avoid those presuppositions. The relationship between rationalism and empiricism differs from that between empiricism and phenomenology: the former pair are more like reversals, or perhaps shadows, of one another.

However, the analysis of these philosophical positions should not be understood as restricted to the exigencies of these particular authors or texts. Not the authors, firstly because to restrict ourselves to the question of what the author really meant or really thought, as distinct from what is said, will not allow us to read through the surface of the text except in a way that leads to postulating what cannot be known, that is, the author's private intentions. Secondly, the question of what the author really meant or thought is not relevant to determining what is presupposed by what is said in a text, and the author may not have been conscious of the presuppositions or the mode of thinking involved and its implications. To ask what the author really meant as if this were the crucial question in understanding a text is to presuppose that the author could be fully conscious; and if it is thought that what the author really meant is not in the text then this is to assume an inexplicable gap between the real thought and the expressed thoughts. The reader would have no means of determining the real thoughts. A reading that attempts to dis-cover the real thoughts presupposes a dichotomy between the expressed

thoughts (the text) and the real, internal, hidden, unexpressed thoughts. This dichotomy, and its implications for understanding and interpreting texts, has already been unredeemingly criticised by Wittgenstein in his attack on the possibility of a private language, [3] and by Ryle in his exposition of the Cartesian dichotomies of internal and external and mental and physical, implicit in such a concept of the relationship between thinking and saying. [4] It would be self defeating to use such a notion of reading to expose dichotomous thinking. It is worth noting that Freud's theory of dream interpretation does not make the same mistake in the relationship betwen the manifest content and the latent thoughts of a dream. Here the latent thoughts, which cannot be expressed as such, are expressed in a disguised form in the manifest dream. This makes it possible to uncover the latent thoughts, the real thoughts, when the code of the disguise has been worked out, a possibility that does not exist where the relationship between the expressed and the unexpressed is treated dichotomously. [5]

The analysis is also not meant to be restricted to the exigencies of the particular texts discussed. The point here is that any text, any philosophical enquiry or argument, that is formulated within the empiricist or phenomenological frames of reference will be within a dichotomous problematic and thereby subject to the same or similar criticisms. The problem is not confined to the texts of Locke and Husserl but concerns philosophical frames of reference which only make sense insofar as they are sanctioned by a dichotomous mode of thought. The analysis has been confined to particular texts to give a depth of analysis rather than a wide-ranging and superficial treatment of many related theories.

The problem I will concentrate on in discussing these frames of reference concerns the constitution and conditions of possibility of

experience and knowledge. What will be shown is that and how the various conceptions of the problem, and thus the answers produced, are conceived dichotomously. To recapitulate, this means that conceptual distinctions are made dichotomously, that in each case one of the terms is accorded a positive value in relation to the other, and that the dichotomies are systematically related. It will also be shown how it is not an accidental fact, nor a mere mistake, that in a particular theory the concept of reason, for example, is formulated or treated as mutually exclusive and exhaustive vis a vis the concept of experience, that one concept is identified and delineated by means of opposing it to another.

One of the reasons why it is not an accidental, individual or incidental fact that philosophical thinking is dichotomous is that the history of philosophy is characterised by the way philosophers have taken over problems, together with their presuppositions, as if the problems were 'given' as problems. In this way the efficacy of a problem is taken for granted and the presuppositions of the way the problem is posed only allows for a restricted range of solutions. Where this is the case it is not surprising that a 'new' solution remains a variation on a theme. This is accentuated in philosophers who, like Husserl, conceive history teleologically. Husserl's approach is basically that the failure of Descartes and Locke to solve the problem of the objectivity of subjective experience can be explained in terms of their assumptions, not that the construction and structure of the problem makes it un-solvable. He then attempts to solve the (same) problem using new assumptions, namely transcendentalism. My approach to these problems of experience and knowledge, will not be to attempt to resolve them but to show within what conceptual apparatus (problematic) they can appear as problems, and what additional assumptions (at the frame of reference level) produce different solutions. The presuppositions of the problem, that is, the conceptual apparatus within

which it appears as a problem, allows a number of possible solutions which vary according to the frame of reference adopted. [6] In dichotomous thinking, that different solutions appear as variations on a theme is reinforced by the structure of the thinking. In this case the sedimentation of philosophical problems is not an accidental historical fact about the attitude of philosophers to previous writers, but is governed by the mode of thought involved. Where a problem is conceived in terms of, or presupposes, an associated set of dichotomously related concepts the possible solutions to it must be formulated as championing one side of the set and reducing, denigrating or denying the other side. To reject one solution is to negate it and to adopt the opposite alternative, and thereby to perpetuate the mode of thought both within the position adopted and at the meta-theoretical level. What accounts for the different solutions is the different values adopted, that is which side is championed, and why. The same dichotomies and the same concepts might be employed, or if the content of the concepts varies, the same dichotomous relationship between the concepts, and thus the structure of the argument, is maintained. [7] The only way to escape this grid is to shift to another level, to ask different sorts of questions, namely those about the problematic.

More generally, it is not accidental that philosophical problems are conceived dichotomously and this is because the mode of thinking generates certain problems. By this I mean that philosophical problems are not arbitrarily adopted or invented by individual thinkers but are produced and governed, made possible, by a conceptual framework, a problematic, and a mode of thinking. The question of the possibility of knowledge of the external world, for instance, only makes sense and could only arise within thinking that already presupposes a set of related dichotomies. The form the answers might take is governed by additional assumptions and values, an analysis of which could proceed along the lines of Heidegger's deconstruction

of metaphysics as subjectivist, or Derrida's notion of logocentrism, or phallocentrism. But this is not meant to suggest that there are abstract forms or modes of thought whose content or matter is later added on, for the mode of thinking just is the way certain problems are formulated and thought about. This analysis of philosophical texts aims to uncover the assumptions and the mode of thinking that underlies the possibility of certain problems and the terms in which they have been formulated and resolved. It does not attempt another answer to those problems, it articulates the structure of the thinking that allows them to be problems, and for this we need the distinction between a problematic and a frame of reference.

Notes

1. Benjamin, Andrew, "A Theory of Reading with Respect to Freud and Lacan" in Working Papers in Sex, Science and Culture Vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 1976. p.56.

2. op. cit p.57.

3. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford; Blackwells, 1968. §§258-271.

4. Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind. Middlesex; Penguin, 1963. pp.50-59.

5. Freud, Sigmund, The Interpretation of Dreams, translated by James Strachey. Middlesex; Pelican, 1976. Chapter VI, "The Dream - Work". Jacques Derrida argues that the manifest content and the latent thoughts cannot be treated as two texts in "Freud and the Scene of Writing", translated by Jeffrey Mehlman, in Yale French Studies no. 48, 1972. See especially p.91f.

6. This argument is similar to Hindess' account of empiricism: that the empiricist conception of the problem of knowledge allows for a range of possible solutions which vary according to the different conceptions of the subject or object adopted, although logically they are equivalent. See Hindess, Barry, "Transcendentalism and History : the problem of the history of philosophy and the sciences in the later philosophy of Husserl", in Economy and Society 2, 1973. pp.312-317; and also "Models and Marks : empiricist conceptions of the conditions of scientific knowledge" in Economy and Society 2, 1973. pp.233-235.

7. Hacking uses a similar framework in which to discuss the relationship between what he calls the 'heyday of ideas' and the 'heyday of sentences' : that they have the same structure but different content. See Hacking, Ian, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1975. Chapter 13.

*The whole pose of "man against the world", of man as a
"world-negating" principle, of man as the measure of the
value of things, as judge of the world who in the end
places existence itself upon his scales and finds it
wanting - the monstrous insipidity of this pose has
finally come home to us and we are sick of it. We
laugh as soon as we encounter the juxtaposition of
"man and world," separated by the sublime presumption
of the little word "and".*

Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science.

CHAPTER 5 : Locke.

In this chapter I will make explicit Locke's empiricist frame of reference and the problematic that makes this possible by examining Locke's arguments for certain solutions to epistemological problems. In particular, I intend to examine Locke's conception of experience, and to show how this conception arises within a dichotomous mode of forming concepts. I will then show what is wrong with such a conception of experience and the dichotomous framework through which it is produced. I intend to bring in two levels of criticism. Firstly, criticisms from the Husserlian frame of reference, which indicate that even within the same problematic Locke's epistemology is severely limited, that for example it cannot have a notion of intentionality. Secondly, criticisms internal to the empiricist frame of reference - more specifically that the empiricist conception of experience cannot be maintained without producing discrepancies.

The general point is that if Locke maintains his empiricist frame of reference then he is open to a wide range of phenomenological objections. If he does not maintain it, and I will argue that he cannot because it is basically incoherent, then his is not much different from a rationalist frame of reference.

I am focussing on Locke's theory as an instance of an empiricist epistemology. Any empiricist, however more refined and subtle than Locke, will ultimately be committed to the same sorts of mistakes, as in more general terms would anyone still working within the metaphysical, dichotomous problematic.

Turning now to Locke, I want to concentrate on the conception of experience which is to provide the basis of, and justification for, the empiricist epistemology. Locke begins by defining ideas as the "objects of the understanding", as the "contents of the mind" - that is, as that

of which and through which we have knowledge (Essay I, i, 8; II, i, 1). [1]

In Book IV, (i,2) Locke says that "knowledge is the perception of the
agreement or disagreement of two ideas". In terms of these presupposi-
tions, or this frame of reference, it is possible and necessary for Locke
to establish the origin of ideas, to determine "how they come into the
mind". It is necessary because he wants to establish the certainty and
extent of knowledge and because ideas are said to be the means to knowledge.

In explaining the origin of ideas as the source of knowledge, Locke
argues that there can be no innate ideas understood as particular ideas of
sense, as principles, or as capacities for ideas or principles (I, ii). I
will concentrate on the latter claim, partly because no-one now seriously
adopts the view that we have innate ideas of sense, and because the rejec-
tion of innate capacities is crucial to Locke's position and to my analysis
of it. Locke argues (I, ii, 4 and 5) that if any capacities are to be
innate then the most likely would be the capacity to know the maxims
'Whatever is, is' and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to
be', that is, the laws of identity and non-contradiction. But even these,
he argues, cannot be innate because children have not thought of them and
it is not intelligible that something could be in the mind unrecognised.
He argues further, that it cannot be said that what is innate is the capa-
city to know these laws because this is not saying anything other than that
the mind is capable of knowing certain things (which nobody denies).
Admitting this capacity, he says, does not help determine the origin of
these ideas. He later argues that knowledge of these laws or maxims is
intuitive. At this point I will draw attention to two assumptions embodied
in this argument: firstly, that we cannot have ideas we are not conscious
of; and secondly, Locke's way of talking about the maxims (and ideas
generally, as I will discuss later) is as if they are entities. This is
connected to the first assumption and to the general rejection of innate-

ness: that if ideas are reified it is hard to conceive our being conscious of them, or their being innate.

We now come to the crucial point: Locke rejects innate ideas and assumes that if they are not innate they must be adventitious, that all ideas come from experience (II, i, 2). This claim - and its justification, that there are no innate ideas, that the mind is initially empty - can be read both as an assumption that justifies the rejection of innate ideas, and as a consequence of that rejection. Now, what is meant by, and involved in the claim that all ideas come from experience? And what, at the theoretical level, produces it or makes it possible? We need to go on to describe and analyse the way in which Locke explicates his conception of experience and of idea so as to justify the claim that all ideas and knowledge come from experience.

As is well known, Locke, having rejected the possibility of innate ideas or capacities or principles, describes the mind prior to experience as like an "empty cabinet" or "blank page" To have a content, ideas, the mind must be acted upon by something external and foreign to it, which it can then act upon to produce knowledge. This means that the mind, through the senses, passively receives ideas. When it has a sufficient number it may begin to reflect on them, to compare and contrast them, to abstract from them, to name them and so on. These mental activities are the source of the possibility of knowledge.

There are three points I wish to draw attention to in Locke's account of how the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and how it turns these into knowledge. It is not so much that he states these points, as that they are implied by what he does say. Firstly, the conception of ideas as received is of discrete entities. In Book I (ii, 15) he says the

senses "let in <u>particular</u> ideas," and in Book II (i, 3) that the senses

convey "distinct perceptions of things", for example, the ideas of "yellow,

white, heat". One of the reasons for rejecting the possibility of anything

being innate to the mind is that ideas are conceived as discrete entities. [2]

Secondly, his conception of the process of the reception of ideas is of a

<u>succession.</u> The discrete entities enter the mind one after the other, as

perhaps they must if they are discrete entities. This point is made

explicitly in Book II (vii, 9 and xiv, 3), as a description of experience,

and will be crucial for the problem of explaining the objective signifi-

cance of particular ideas, of how we come to see that the successive ideas

of yellow, hard, round, etc., are ideas of a ball. Thirdly, Locke conceives

the action of the mind on its ideas as <u>subsequent</u> to their reception, even

as something that might not occur. It is as if the ideas in the mind are

like objects on a shelf which we may distinguish, compare and so on as we

choose. In Book II (xi, 6), in describing the mental operations he speaks

as if we first have a series of disconnected particular ideas which we then

compare, compound, and so on, into complex ideas. For example, we add up

the simple ideas of secondary qualities to produce an idea of a three

dimensional object. That ideas of sensation are not mediated by mental

activities in the process of being received is implied by the argument

against innateness, that people, until taught, do not know the proposition

'whatever is, is' even though they are experientially identifying particulars.

It is also implicit in the conception of knowledge as the agreement between

ideas, the agreement being determined by the activity of the mind on its

ideas. [3]

The claim that the mental operations are subsequent to the reception

of ideas means that the ideas as received are unmediated and unqualified by

any mental activity. I take this to imply that the ideas as received

have no logical properties. This is a crucial point in Locke's argument

though he makes little of it. It is the basis of a number of discrepancies

in the text because it can not be sustained, and it is one of the point

criticised from the phenomenological frame of reference. More importantly, it acts as a focal point through which a series of dichotomies are produced and assumed. In putting the mental activities, the activities of reason, subsequent to experience and not necessarily a part of any experience, Locke treats reason and experience as a dichotomy and subordinates reason to experience by giving it a secondary part to play. It is subordinate in the double sense of not being essential to experience and in coming after experience. In Locke's narrower sense of reason, as one of the mental operations, it is even more subordinate.

These notions of discreteness, succession and, especially, subsequence, mean that the sense of the claim that all ideas, and hence knowledge, derive from experience is more than just that experience is a prerequisite of thought and knowledge, and that the mind is passive insofar as we have little choice in what we perceive. In fact the position seems to me to be almost unsayable. This is because it implies that ideas of objects come ready-made and yet the examples of ideas that Locke gives are of secondary qualities. This description of experience is inadequate phenomenologically. If what we receive are ideas of secondary qualities but what we perceive are ideas of objects, it must be the mental activities which 'make' the objects we see. It must be the mental activities which account for what we actually experience, but these are said to come after experience.

To conclude this description of Locke's conception of experience I will repeat, and thus stress, those points I consider to be central to the empiricist frame of reference. Experience is conceived as a succession of discrete ideas of sensation passively received by the mind and subsequently acted on by the mind in reflection, and in the various mental operations such as comparing, contrasting, deducing from and abstracting from, which are involved in the process of knowing.

I will now attempt to show the sorts of criticisms of this conception of experience that can be made by an Husserlian phenomenologist. This is not meant to be an exegesis of Husserl but is rather a use of some of Husserl's general conclusions. This will indicate that even within the problematic it is possible to develop a more adequate frame of reference than empiricism in order to resolve the sorts of questions raised by the problematic.

The criticisms are based on a rejection of the conception of ideas as <u>discrete</u> entities; on the conception of experience as a <u>succession</u> of ideas; and on the conception of the mental operations as <u>subsequent</u> to the reception of ideas.

We can start with the obvious point, that insofar as Locke treats ideas as discrete entities and as the objects of perception, then he is automatically confronted with the impossibility of having knowledge or experience of the world external to the mind. That world of objects is presumed to be the cause of the ideas in the mind and that which they represent. This problem is a direct result of the presupposition at the level of the empiricist frame of reference that the mind and the world are mutually exclusive and exhaustive spheres of being. It is a problem that Husserl avoids by starting from the position that consciousness is intentional, that it is always conscious of objects and that objects are objects for consciousness. But more of this later.

I will put aside these worries about the possibility of knowledge of the world, and attend to the 'discreteness' aspect of ideas. We can see, on the basis of Husserl's analysis of experience, that experience does not consist in a series of ideas of particular objects, much less of qualities.

Objects are always present to consciousness in a context. This context includes other objects, persons, values, culture, and in a more general sense, objects are always presented against a perceptual background. We can of course abstract from this background - for instance, if we focus on a particular object - but this is an abstraction from experience, not what experience consists in.

Furthermore, if we follow up the connection between the discreteness aspect of ideas and the description of experience as a succession of ideas, we see that the rejection of discreteness leads to the rejection of mere succession. Each idea, or experience, is already laden with past and future horizons, or in Husserl's terminology retention or sedimentation and protention, such that consciousness is not and cannot be a uni-dimensional temporal flow. Each present experience always refers to other past and anticipated experiences, or perhaps more accurately, they refer through the past to the future. This is partly the case because the consciousness for whom the past and future horizons are past and future is not a passive recipient in this process. Rather, it is through the active participation of that consciousness in its present experiences that they come to have past and future horizons. We could add here, that for Husserl, it is not just a matter of 'for consciousness', because part of the fulfilling of anticipations involves using the other senses, the body. For example, we fulfill our anticipation that the perceived object is actual or three dimensional by walking over and touching it. As Landgrebe says, "There is no point at which consciousness is a mere succession of ideas"... "no moment is ... completely saturated with a sensation", and this is because an experience always, necessarily, refers to possible future experience.[4] This means, that at no point is consciousness merely a passive receiver of ideas of sensation, at no point is sensation completely divorced from mental activity. We must reject Locke's notion that ideas are passively

received and only later acted upon because the aspects of retaining and expecting that are involved in any particular experience require that that experience involves some level of what Locke calls mental activity, or Husserl, intentionality. Again of course, we can abstract and focus on a particular experience, but this does not mean that experience is of a succession of instances.

The empiricist conception of experience as a succession of discrete ideas makes it impossible to explain the objective significance of ideas, how a series of ideas can refer to an object. For example, in Locke's case, how the ideas of yellowness, hardness and roundness can be recognised as ideas of a yellow ball. It also makes it difficult to explain, as Hume recognised, how the succession of ideas can be ideas of one mind or con- sciousness. Again, this is not a problem for the phenomenologist insofar as consciousness is intentional and objects are given to a consciousness, although there may be problems in working out exactly what this means and in what it consists.

Further, it is not just the temporal structuring of experience that leads the phenemenologist to reject Locke's claim that the mental opera- tions are activities imposed on ideas subsequent to experience - and this in two respects. Firstly, we can take up Locke's own conceptions of the mental operations - identifying, comparing, contrasting and so on. Locke has argued against the possibility of innate ideas as principles or capacities, and in particular that the maxims 'whatever is, is' and 'its impossible for the same thing to be and not to be' are not inherent in experience, because we are not conscious of using them. I think this conception is self-contradictory, and will argue later that Locke cannot and does not sustain it. Here I will just briefly describe an alternative conception. Each idea, in order for us to have it is already distinguished

from others and recognised as itself, however vaguely it is brought under a concept. That is, we do not subsequently place our ideas in a logical order as we might building blocks. This is not to suggest that we cannot later re-order our ideas or refine the order, only that they are already ordered in the process of having them. This means that it is a condition of experience that the maxims be applied, though not necessarily consciously; and this means that we do not have to know the maxims to use them, but we do have to use them to experience. Because the maxims are a condition of experience we cannot first experience and later intuit or deduce the maxims, although this should not be confused with the fact that it is clearly possible for some people to never make the maxims explicit to themselves. This is similar to the now banal point that we need to use grammar to speak but we do not need to be conscious of the grammatical rules in order to apply them, for grammar is a condition of meaningful speech. The rejection of Locke's conception is based on a rejection of his assumption that there can be nothing in the mind we are not conscious of. It will be shown later that he cannot sustain this assumption although it dominates much of his conception of experience.

The second respect in which 'mental activities' are not subsequent to experience but are <u>involved</u> in experience, involves a type of 'mental activity' that Locke does not consider, and perhaps could not have considered. This sort of involvement in experience occurs in different sorts of ways, some of which I will briefly describe. Firstly in the sense that our interests and purposes - or intentions in the ordinary sense - influence what we experience. For example, some people are more sensitive to other people's emotional states than others. Again, if we go into the garden to find out whether a tree has begun to put on new leaves we probably will not notice the snails eating the vegetables as we go by. Secondly, our prior knowledge and experience, our beliefs and theories about the world influence

the way we interpret present experiences. This is Husserl's notion of
sedimentation. Thirdly, our cultural and class background influences the
way we approach the world.

So far I have outlined Locke's empiricist frame of reference and posed
certain fundamental objections to it from the phenomenological frame of
reference. I want to argue now that the problem of understanding Locke's
Essay is not as straightforward as analysing and criticising the frame of
reference it presupposes. The argument is that Locke cannot resolve the
questions that are produced by the empiricist frame of reference whilst
maintaining the empiricist conception of experience. Discrepancies arise
between the presuppositions within which the problems are conceived and the
account of experience which is to explicate and justify those presuppositions.
Locke's problem is to describe and account for the "original, certainty and
extent" of experience and knowledge. The conception of experience that is
presupposed in setting the problem cannot be sustained in resolving that
problem. This is because the empiricist conception of experience is funda-
mentally conceived in terms of dichotomies and this makes experience inexpli-
cable. The basis and implications of this will become clearer once the
discrepancies in the text are exposed.

Before going on to show this in detail, I want to insist that the
questions I am interested in are how and why these discrepancies are
produced. This can only be answered in terms of the text's theoretical
position. The attempt, by commentators, such as Woozley, to deny that
Locke's statements mean what they appear to mean is not only not doing
justice to Locke, by not taking him at his word or by not recognising his
willingness to follow through an investigation even when it conflicts with
his assumptions but it is also an entirely inappropriate method of textual
analysis. For instance, Woozley invokes psychological explanations - that

Locke was intelligent enough to have recognised the failure of the theory
it is purported he had, or biographical explanations that Locke was not a
full-time philosopher and did not have time to check for discrepancies; or
claims that, regardless of what the text says in part, it is not what
Locke intended to argue.[5]

A further point on the assumptions of this method of textual analysis
needs to be made. It is not necessary to produce quotes from Locke, as a
proof that, for instance, he explicitly treats reason and experience dichoto-
mously. The problem is not as literal as this. What is necessary is to show
that and how Locke is able to say what he does because reason and experience
are treated as if they are related dichotomously; that if this dichotomy
were not assumed there would be no theoretical justification for the statements
he makes.

That Locke's epistemology contains discrepancies is not a question of
intelligence or dogmatism or whatever, but a consequence of the terms in
which the problems were conceived. We need to determine those factors in
Locke's frame of reference that produce the discrepancies. This means that
we are not interested in the validity of Locke's arguments so much as in
their structure and presuppositions, in what makes them possible.

To some extent the complexity of the problems Locke sets himself and
the difficulties that arise within his attempts to solve them, force Locke
out of the empiricist frame of reference. The frame of reference cannot be
maintained, though Locke does not, and perhaps cannot, recognise the extent
to which this occurs. The difficulties are due to the narrowness of the
concepts produced by a dichotomous mode of thought.

What then are the discrepancies of Locke's epistemology? I will
concentrate on two related discrepancies. The rejection of innate ideas
understood as capacities was, we saw, crucial to Locke's account of the
origin of ideas as coming from experience, and thus to his account of
experience and knowledge. Experience was conceived as the passive reception
of particular ideas, which provided the material for the mind to act on to
produce knowledge. In this general context, there are two particular
points of interest. Firstly, there is Locke's claim that the maxim
'whatever is, is' is not innate, is not involved in experience even though
we are experientially identifying particulars. As he says, "the senses let
in particular ideas". The maxim is not innate, he argues, because we are
not conscious of applying it, and being conscious of an idea is, for Locke,
a criterion of its being in the mind. Secondly, there is the claim, both
implied by the rejection of innate capacities and also explicitly stated by
Locke, that the mind is passive or receptive in experience.

These points are part of the empiricist presuppositions related to the
principle that all ideas come from experience. The presuppositions are in
turn produced by a set of dichotomies: innate-experience, logical-empirical,
active-passive. Locke is forced to make the following claims. Ideas
cannot come from the mind so they must come from experience. If ideas come
from experience the mind must be passive. No logical principles can be
involved in the process of receiving ideas for the mind is empty and passive.

However, when Locke explains the ideas we do have, and the possibility
of knowledge, he needs to bring in what he calls the mental operations of
comparing, contrasting, deducing and reasoning. These do not come from
experience. On the assumption that everything in the mind must be either
innate or have come from experience, Locke is required to admit that the
mental operations must be innate. But the possibility of anything innate
has been rejected. In order to account for knowledge Locke requires the

mental operations, but he cannot explain the existence and possibility of these mental operations while holding the presuppositions that ideas are from experience or innate, and that nothing is innate. This is the first discrepancy.

To make matters worse, having treated mind and world dichotomously, Locke has to say that what we perceive are our own ideas, that "knowledge is the perception of the agreement and disagreement of two ideas" (IV,i,2). One of these sorts of agreement is that of identity. Let me quote Locke fully on this: (IV,i,4).

> "It is the first act of the mind, when it has any sentiments or ideas at all, to perceive its ideas; and so far as it perceives them, to know each what it is, and thereby also to perceive their difference, and that one is not another. This is so absolutely necessary that without it there could be no knowledge, no reasoning, no imagination, no distinct thoughts at all. By this the mind clearly and infallibly perceives each idea to agree with itself, and to be what it is, and all distinct ideas to disagree, i.e. the one not to be the other; and this it does without pains, labour or deduction, but at first view, by its natural power of perception and distinction. And though men of art have reduced this into those general rules 'What is, is' and 'it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be', for ready application in all cases, wherein there may be occasion to reflect on it, yet it is certain that the first exercise of this faculty is about particular ideas. A man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his mind, that the ideas he calls white and round are the very ideas they are, and that they are not other ideas he calls red or square... if there is any doubt about it, it will always be found to be about the names, and not the ideas themselves...".

Here Locke brings in unexplained mental operations and thereby contra-
dicts his empiricist presuppositions. This involves avoiding the
innate-experience and active-passive dichotomies. More particularly
he treats the logical maxims as involved in experiencing rather than
subsequent to experience and this conflicts with the rejection of innate
capacities. There is no logical-empirical dichotomy if the logical
maxims are involved in experience, and this is necessary if experience
and knowledge are to be adequately described and explained. This means
that Locke does not sustain his frame of reference, which as we saw
presupposes these dichotomies.

It might be objected that there is an ambiguity in Locke's statement.
That the discrepancy between the presuppositions of the question and the
implications of the answer only arises by selecting one interpretation,
that is, treating the mind's perception of its ideas as equivalent to the
having of ideas. If this passage is interpreted such that Locke means that
perception is an action of the mind on the ideas it already has, then this
only points to a further discrepancy. If Locke treats perception as a
perceiving of ideas which are already in the mind, then this is in conflict
with the claim against innateness that there can be nothing in the mind we
are not conscious of. Further, the act of perception would be inexplicable
since no capacities are innate. This could only not be a discrepancy if,
for Locke, being conscious is not co-extensive with perceiving. But he
explicitly says that perception accompanies any impression on the body made
by an external object, that perception accompanies sensation (II,xix,1) and
that perception is passive - it is when the mind receives an impression
(II,ix,1).

So far I have described the way Locke explicates the empiricist claim
that all ideas come from experience and have shown, by examining empiricism

from the phenomenological frame of reference, that empiricism is untenable. It is also untenable because it is inconsistent. In order to explicate the concept of experiience which is required by the presupposition of his frame of reference Locke has to state things that imply a rejection of that frame of reference. The remainder of this chapter works out how Locke's difficulties are produced by the presuppositions of the empiricist frame of reference, and uncovers the problematic that governs and justifies those presuppositions.

I have said that the notions of discreteness, succession and sub-sequence are central to the attempt to explicate the sense in which all ideas come from experience. They also provided a basis for producing some of the phenomenological criticisms of empiricism and the discrepancies within empiricism. I will now show why Locke presupposes these notions.

Locke enquires after the origin of ideas and argues that they cannot be innate so they must be adventitious, they must come from experience. In taking up the question of the origin, Locke takes over its presuppositions. What are these in this case? In arguing against innate ideas Locke, together with the rationalists who argue for innate ideas, presupposes that ideas come from somewhere and that they can only come from the mind or the exter-nal world, can only be innate or adventitious. In doing so he is treating the innate-experience distinction as a dichotomy, as mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories. He does not argue that they are such, he assumes they are - and he does this by taking up the question of the possibility of innate ideas without questioning its presupposition. His answer to the question takes the form: either ideas are innate or they must come from experience.[6] Now underlying this innate-experience dichotomy is the treat-ment of mind/subject and world/object as a dichotomy. This is partly because the issue is put in the form that all ideas come from the mind or all are caused by the world, but there is a more fundamental reason than this, as we shall see.

The effect of, and possibly a presupposition of, conceiving the question of origin in these terms is that Locke describes the mind as a "blank page" and as an "empty cabinet". These metaphors may seem like unhappy accidents. They are certainly unhappy, but not accidental, and this can be shown by indicating their role in the empiricist frame of reference. This will be considered in two respects - that of the "page" or "cabinet" aspect, conceiving the mind as an object; and the "emptiness", "blankness" aspect.

The description of the mind as an object influences the way Locke conceives of ideas - as if they are objects. It is partly because he conceives ideas as reified that he has to deny the possibility of their being innate. It also leads to conceiving the having of ideas as a succession and it influences the way Locke conceives of the relation between the mind or subject and the things it has ideas of, the objects.

The description of the mind as empty is a result of the rejection of innateness, and this implies passivity insofar as the rejection of innateness includes innate capacities. The passivity is connected to seeing the mind as an object. Its effect is that it produces the conception of experience as the simple unqualified, un-mediated reception of ideas. The mental operations, whose origin and possibility are unexplained and inexplicable in Locke's frame of reference, are subsequent to experience.

Now these presuppositions, this way of conceiving experience, forces Locke to hold certain untenable positions. For example, he cannot explain the objective significance of what is experienced, nor the unity of experience, because he has no notion of intentionality and cannot have one while he maintains the dichotomy of mind and world. He has to posit certain mental operations in order to explain how we achieve knowledge from

experience, but he cannot explain their origin or possibility while he insists that the mind is like an empty cabinet until affected by experience. This notion makes it impossible for him to explain the possibility of the general concepts of substance, quality etc., which cannot come from mere experience as conceived by Locke, nor from the empty mind - and yet Locke insists that we have them. He cannot explain these concepts while he conceives the problem of the origin of ideas in terms of an innate-empirical dichotomy because this leaves no option for a priori concepts - and yet Locke is required to account for these general concepts in terms of his frame of reference. As we have seen he does not sustain the logical-empirical dichotomy.

A further problem that arises for Locke from treating the mind and world (or subject and object) as a dichotomy is that he is committed to the notion that ideas of secondary qualities have these qualities, for example, that an idea of red is red. He wants to say that ideas of sensation are caused in the mind by the primary qualities of the objects external to it. Primary qualities directly affect us, secondary qualities are powers to produce sensations in us and they depend on the primary qualities. Secondary qualities are not part of the object, the object is not red. The argument for this is along the lines that if you remove either the perceiver or the light source, the object has no colour, whereas it still has extension whether it is perceived or not. Now while Locke does not say that because the redness is not in the object (which causes the idea of red in the mind) it must be the idea (in the mind) which is red, this is the position he is committed to insofar as his conception of ideas is that they are objects in the in mind, and insofar as his ontology is a dualist one of mental and physical. This is what forces him to say that what we perceive are our own ideas, and consequently that ideas have the secondary qualities. Husserl rejects this notion that the real world is the world of primary qualities,

the world of the physicists. For Husserl, the world which consciousness

relates to, the world of experience, is the real world and it, not our

idea, is red.

As I have hinted throughout, what underlies this conception of experi-

ence and inevitably produces the problems displayed, is a set of dichotomously

conceived concepts. Initially mind or subject and world or object are

conceived as exclusive and exhaustive spheres of being, so the question of

the origin of ideas is posed in terms of, either innate to the mind or all

from experience. Then experience is conceived dichotomously: objects act

on a passive mind, and no interaction is possible given the mutual exclusion

of mind and world. This means that the mind, whose function in the production

of knowledge is to act on what is given to it, that is, in general terms to

reason, or more specifically to apply logical principles, receives its

ideas without the aid of the logical principles or mental operations. A

strange reversal, that produces and indicates a dichotomy between the

logical and empirical, understood as a specific version of the reason-

experience dichotomy which is related to the original mind-world dichotomy.

Thus, the analysis of Locke's empiricism operates at several levels:

firstly the question of the origin of ideas and hence knowledge, secondly

the empiricist presuppositions which determine the possible answers to

this question and even the validity of the question; and thirdly the dichoto-

mies that underly the presuppositions.

I will now examine the problematic that governs the frame of reference

of empiricism, as exemplified by Locke. To recapitulate, the "problematic

is the epistemological and ontological components of the text that firstly

sanction what appears in the text, and secondly cannot be identified auto-

matically in the text." I have argued that a set of dichotomies underlies

the empiricist presuppositions. What connection do these have with the epistemological and ontological components?

This can be brought out by following two converging lines of ontological assumptions which, when they converge, have epistemological implications. The one line begins with the conception of subject in terms of substance and the other with the conception of being or object in terms of presence.[7] What is distinctive about Locke's empiricism is that he conceives the mind as a substance, he conceives the mental in terms of analogies borrowed from the physical world. As Husserl says "...the domain of 'ideas' is thought.... according to the ontology of the spatial world."[8] Thus we can see the strongest sense in which the metaphor of the mind as like an "empty cabinet" is not accidental.

A consequence of this reification of the mind or subject is that its contents, the ideas, are likewise reified. They are conceived as like objects lined up on a shelf in the cabinet. However, despite the fact that the mental and physical are both conceived in terms of substance, and the mind is treated as like a physical substance which implies that there is only one type of substance – despite this, Locke allows the dualist presupposition to predominate. The minds' receptivity is understood as passivity, it has no innate capacities. Objects act, they cause ideas in the mind. All ideas come from experience to fill the originally empty receptacle. The combination of a dualist ontology and conceiving the mental according to the conception of physical substance requires Locke to hold the unsustainable theory that experience is the passive reception by one entity, the mind, of the other entities, ideas, which are caused by objects external to the mind.

Although the mind is conceived by analogy with physical substance, the conception of substance - of objects, bodies, of that which is - is in terms of presence, of what is present to the mind. Locke assumes the existence of the external world as what causes ideas in the mind. The mind knows the objects in the world through their presence to the mind in an idea. What is, is what is represented in the mind by an idea and what causes that idea. The mind knows itself by perceiving its own ideas, by perceiving what is present to it. Both 'types' of substance are conceived in terms of and known by their presence to one of the substances. According to Locke, what is known in an infallible way, in a way we can be certain of, is what appears in an actual sensation. An idea of sensation is the present appearance of a second-ary quality, it is the present instant and what appears in it. We only make mistakes with the introduction of the mental operations to form complex ideas.

This brings us to the epistemological implications of the onto-logical assumptions. What is, is what is present to the mind in the present instant. What the mind perceives are its own ideas and these are ideas of secondary qualities. They are discrete entitites and have been passively received by the mind. This means that while Locke assumes the existence of an external world and wants to determine the possibility of our knowledge of it, the result of his presupposition is that we can only be certain of the ideas of secondary qualities as given in the present moment in which they are sensed. We can only know what is in our own minds. The ideas are not merely ideas of secondary qualities, the ideas have those qualities. The argument shifts from knowing the object through our idea of its present appearance to knowing the idea which is that appearance. Instead of the object it is the idea which is real, which is knowable.

Locke enquires after the "original, certainty and extent" of knowledge and establishes an empiricist frame of reference within which to undertake the enquiry, but the presuppositions of the frame of reference push him in the direction of an idealist epistemology. His conception of experience as the successive and passive reception of ideas subsequently acted on by the mind, his conception of ideas as discrete entities, and the conception of knowledge as the agreement between ideas have the effect that what is known is not the external world but the ideas in the mind. The empiricist frame of reference presupposes the existence of the external world as the cause and the object of knowledge. In the process of explicating how this is possible ideas become reified such that what is known are the ideas, not their causes. At best the external is known only derivately, as that which ideas represent. Knowledge of the external world collapses into knowledge as the agreement between ideas. The criterion of knowledge of the real, that the idea corresponds to or represents the real becomes the conformity of one idea to another.

An empiricist frame of reference that presupposes a dualist ontology is incoherent. It is incoherent in the sense that it is unsustainable. It cannot explain what it sets out to explain while is sustains the presuppositions that determine what is to be explained and how this is understood. The questions are put with empiricist presuppositions and the answers have idealist implications. This is due to the set of dichotomies that are associated with the original dichotomy of mind and world, of mental and physical. This leads to each concept being defined so narrowly and inflexibly that it cannot adequately explain anything. Either the explanation fails or there is a shift in how the concepts are understood or used. If the mental and physical are conceived dichotomously, and associated with dichotomies of

passive and active, of innate and caused from outside, then experience –
which is after all, understood as the interaction of the mental and
physical – will be inexplicable.

This applies not only to Locke but to any empiricist. And it applies
to a rationalism that likewise assumes dualism and the associated dichotomies
even though it reverses the emphasis. We shall see that transcendental
phenomenology which does not presuppose dualism, is forced into a dualist
position by taking over the concepts and problems that have already been
formed by a dichotomous mode of thought.

Notes:

1. Locke, John, <u>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</u>, ed A. D. Woozley.
   London, Collins, 1964. All further references to the <u>Essay</u> are given
   in the text by the number of the book, chapter and section.

2. It is interesting to notice that these examples of ideas are secondary
   qualities, not objects. We can see here the origins of the later
   empiricist notice of sense-data.

3. The argument against the innateness of the logical principle 'whatever
   is, is' indicates that the dichotomy between the logical and the
   empirical is assumed from the beginning of the text and is fundamental
   to the empiricist frame of reference.

4. Landgrebe, Ludwig, "The Phenomenological Conception of Experience"
   <u>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</u>, Sept. 1973, page 8.

5. Woozley makes these excuses in his Introduction to the <u>Essay</u>. For an
   account of a more appropriate method of textual analysis, see
   Hindess, B., "Transcendentalism and History : The Problem of the History
   of Philosophy and the Sciences in the later philosophy of Husserl."
   in <u>Economy and Society</u>, vol. 2, pp. 316-7.

6. This supports my general argument that empiricism and rationalism
   employ the same dichotomies, their difference amounting to a difference
   of emphasis on either side of the dichotomy. In this instance,
   empiricism emphasises experience and rationalism emphasises innate
   capacities. This argument is continuing in the philosophy of language
   debate about language acquisition.

7. Heidegger traces these conceptions through the history of ontology.
   See, for instance, <u>Being and Time</u>. For a clear and concise account
   of how they determine the Cartesian philosophy, see Ricoeur, P.
   "The Critique of Subjectivity and Cogito in the Philosophy of
   Heidegger" in Frings, M.S. (ed), <u>Heidegger and the Quest for Truth</u>,
   Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 1968.

8. Landgrebe, Ludwig, "The Phenomenological Concept of Experience"
   in <u>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</u> 34, 1973, pp. 1-13.

CHAPTER 6 : Husserl.

Husserl's Phenomenology marks a break with the traditional Empiricist and Rationalist frames of reference, while at the same time remaining within, and re-inforcing, the problematic of dichotomous thinking. This chapter traces that double movement, indicating that despite Husserl's intention, and relative success, of overcoming the traditional dichotomy between subject and object, or mind and world, the conceptual framework within which this break takes place serves to undermine that intention. In this philosophy we have a clear instance of the way in which dichotomous thinking comes into effect with the introduction of certain concepts which are conceived in terms of what they exclude. They are conceived in terms of their relation to other concepts, and that relation is assumed to be one of mutual exclusion. In this instance, the dichotomy need never be made explicit, but it nevertheless intrudes into the objectives of the theory and infects the whole conceptual framework within which that theory is worked out. This we will see with Husserl's desire for philosophy as a rigorous science with absolute foundations - a desire that can only be fulfilled - and thereby denied - through a conception of the subject that excludes everything worldly. Not only is this conception of the subject already dichotomous, but the presuppositions which sustain it - as the sole source of the absolute foundation - indicate that the dichotomous mode of thought was already operative, though disguised. This shows precisely how dichotomous thinking involves a systematic association of dichotomies and not merely individual dichotomies - such that once one dichotomy is introduced, a series of dichotomies is implied.

In the first part of this chapter I argue that by not treating mind and world dichotomously, Husserl is able to provide a fuller account of experience and to resolve some of the epistemological problems necessarily left open by Empiricism and Rationalism. The central notion of Phenomenology

which both indicates the non-dichotomous conception of mind and world and enables us to understand the relationship between them is the notion of intentionality understood as noetic-noematic correlation and as constitution. Husserl's concept of experience is described and interpreted in such a way as to direct attention to the decisive break that occurs with Husserl, and the radical significance inherent in his conception. More specifically, intentionality as noetic-noematic correlativity is interpreted as showing that objective unities are given through the multiform and multiplicity of noetic and noematic variations. And constitution as a function of intentionality, is interpreted as showing how it is possible that such objective unities are intended. The purpose is to show that consciousness and the world with its objects are not foreign to one another, that the character and content of subjectivity cannot be described without reference to an inter-subjectively locatable world, so that we can understand how the world as world, and any object as object, comes to have sense for us, that is, comes to be experiencable. Transcendental Idealism will be interpreted accordingly.

In the second section the concept of intentionality is re-placed within the wider frame of reference of Husserl's phenomenology as Transcendental Phenomenology, to show that and how it remains within the problematic of dichotomous thinking. Two interrelated themes are discussed : the conceptions of knowledge, presence and subjectivity, and the role they play in the search for certainty, in the achievement of an absolute foundation. This will bring out the tension within Husserl's work between the recognition of the need to break with the traditional metaphysics – and the significant discoveries this produces – while the terms within which the break will be undertaken remain within that tradition – thereby undermining the force of those discoveries.

It is interesting that Husserl's understanding of the relationship

of Phenomenology to the tradition is more or less in these terms. In

The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology he des-

cribes Phenomenology as fulfilling the telos of western philosophy, of

metaphysics - not overcoming it, but being the first to truly understand

it, (its secret desire?). He understands the history of philosophy as

dealing with a common problem which the Empiricists and Rationalists have

been unable to resolve because they did not really understand the nature of

the problem. [1] He sees Phenomenology as realising the significance of the

problem and thereby being able to resolve it - the work that remains is

then a filling in of details, not a fundamental shift of ground. If we can

state and clarify this problem it could provide a clue to uncover the

problematic that is common to Phenomenology, Empiricism and Rationalism.

This will enable clarification of the different presuppositions they hold

such that they interpret the significance of the problem in different terms

and thus have different frames of reference.

In the Cartesian Meditations (§41) Husserl asks:

"..... as a natural man, can I ask seriously and transcendentally

how I get outside my island of consciousness and how what presents

itself in my consciousness as a subjective - evidence process can

acquire Objective significance? [2]

In this question, and in the nexus of problems raised by it, can be found

two important grounds on which Husserl's account of experience can be

contrasted with the tradition - or at least themes and assumptions inherent

in the tradition. The one ground is methodological, and concerns the

importance of enquiring at the transcendental level. Husserl saw the

decisive break between his own and other philosophies as resting on their

failure to take the transcendental turn, and his thoroughgoing practice

of it. Without the transcendental reduction, Husserl argues, it is
impossible to reach the ultimate ground of experience and knowledge, and
to uncover the essential laws governing Being. A philosophy remaining
within the natural attitude remains one science or psychology amongst
others, concerned with particular facts.

Empiricism and Rationalism both, though in different ways, take this
objectivity and the possibility of objective knowledge for granted.
Philosophy is understood as the most comprehensive science; 'standing' on
the 'ground' of the world, objectivist philosophies enquire into one of its
regions - the psychic - and ask how it can be related to another region -
the physical - such that experience and knowledge are possible. Knowledge
is conceived as the subjects certainty that its idea of the object corres-
ponds to, is adequately representative of, the object. For Descartes the
certainty is achieved by the clarity and distinctness of the idea which is
ultimately guaranteed by God; for Locke the certainty of the representation
is guaranteed by its causal relation to the object. Husserl rejects this
objectivist presupposition as an inadequate starting point for epistemology
and insists on the necessity for the transcendental reduction. This methodo-
logical requirement both marks his break with the tradition, at the level
of frames of reference, and produces his conformity with the tradition at
the level of the problematic.

The other ground of Husserl's difference from Rationalism and Empiricism
concerns the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity. An ontological
dualism is presupposed by Rationalism and Empiricism. In both frames of
reference, the psychic or mental is conceived as separate from the phsyical;
in Descartes, the meantal is defined as what the physical is not - it is
not material, not mechanical etc., although it is still, in a sense, con-
ceived on the model of substance; in Locke, the mental is conceived by

analogy to the physical although it remains a separate sphere of being.
Husserl rejects this presupposition of dualism as leading to absurdity. In
Ideas he presents specific criticisms that are re-inforced in the discussions
of objectivism in the Cartesian Meditations and in The Crisis of European
Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, but as we shall see, he inadver-
tently re-introduces dualism at the transcendental level.

Husserl argues that Empiricism results in scepticism and absurdity
when it identifies experience with sense-experience and hence regards facts
of nature as the only possible facts. To be consistent, such an Empiricism
would be unable to justify its own principles and methodology, just as it
rejects ideas and essences as metaphysical entities. Husserl adds further
criticisms when this Empiricism is associated with realism. [3] It then
treats physical nature as an absolute which can never be apprehended
itself, but is the cause of subjective appearances and empirical experi-
ences.

The Rationalist and idealist frames of reference are criticised in
Ideas for failing to recognise the fact of pure intuition and so treating
self-evidence as a feeling. More importantly, Husserl is concerned to
distinguish his own position from that of subjective idealism for he
rejects the idealist transformation of the world into subjective illusion. [4]

It appears that the criticism of the empiricist-realist and rationalist-
idealist frames of reference is based on the former treating the world as
absolute, and the latter treating the world as illusion. Husserl would
relate the absurdity of these positions to their failure to take the tran-
scendental turn. Another source of this absurdity consists in starting
with the assumption that consciousness is closed and the world opaque to
it, such that the possibility of experience as anything other than private

becomes a problem. There is also a problem in explaining how it is that we are conscious of identical and continuing objects as external to our sphere of consciousness. If we unquestioningly adopt this assumption of two exclusive spheres of being, only one of which we are directly aware, and that is our consciousness, then our solution to the problems of how we can experience identical objects, and how these can have objective significance, will be formulated in terms of idealism and realism. We can follow Berkeley and Hume and deny the existence of a transcendent world, or at least deny our possible knowledge of it, and attribute our experience of identical objects to the imagination. Alternatively, we can follow Descartes and Locke in saying our ideas of objects are representations caused by the objects, and the guarantee of the identity of the represented objects and of their external existence is God or science. Either way, we are forced to neglect the world or to neglect consciousness.

The significance of Husserl's theory is that it goes beyond these alternatives. It may seem odd that the quotation I have given from Husserl to formulate the grounds of his difference from the tradition, appears to adopt the same traditional framework. To repeat, Husserl asks:

"..... can I ask seriously and transcendentally, how I get

outside my island of consciousness and how what presents itself

in my consciousness as a subjective-evidence process can acquire

Objective significance?"

Here consciousness is presented as an island which I have a problem getting out of. Ultimately, this is what Husserl's philosophy amounts to. At this stage, where we are concerned to differentiate frames of reference, it is important to note that it is not part of Husserl's consciously assumed presuppositions to postulate consciousness and world as two closed and self-contained spheres of being. The concept of intentionality undercuts that dichotomy while allowing a distinction.

How then does Husserl's frame of reference resolve the problem of the possibility of subjective knowledge of the objective, of what is other than consciousness, without presupposing objectivism or dualism?

I. Husserl's Concept of Experience

For Husserl consciousness is a stream of experiences characterised by its multiplicity of everchanging modes of experiencing – such as perceiving, reflecting, remembering, willing – with their multiplicity of everchanging contents or objects. For the time being the question of the ego will be left aside, and attention will be directed toward the two sides of experience already mentioned – the act of experiencing and its object. These aspects of experience need to be further characterised : the particular acts, for instance, according to variations in the levels of clarity and the strength of focus on the objects. [5] In perception we may be focussing on an object whose background environment we are only vaguely aware of, though we may turn our attention to it. The object of experience is given through various perspectival appearances according to manners of appearing such as blurred or bright, and always in relation to other things such as its other sides or aspects, and its environment.

Already it is becoming clear that for Husserl consciousness is an activity, not a receptacle, and that it is not closed to the world. On the contrary, it is characterised by its activity of opening up the world for us. The problem though, is to understand how it is that through the multiplicity of acts and manners of appearing of objects and so on, objects are given such that we recognise them as the same. In Ideas (§33) Husserl puts the problem more generally, saying he is interested in the essence of consciousness in general, and also in how the 'natural' fact world comes to be known.

Husserl argues that we can only understand how this experience of the 'natural' fact world, how this givenness of identical objects, is possible if we refrain from making the existential commitment involved in the natural experience, and, 'standing back', reflect on the experience as experienced. It is crucial to note here, that the refraining from the existential commitment is not a doubting or denying of existence. For instance, in preceiving a green leaf I naturally assume that just such a leaf is there in the world and belongs to the tree which equally exists. Husserl is asking us to put aside the question of whether the leaf and its tree really exist, whether the leaf is really green, and to examine what is involved in the perceiving of a green leaf, which includes of course that the perceiving involves a belief that the perceived leaf exists. That is, we reflect on the perceptual experience as a perceiving-perceived relation. We reflect on the experience of ourselves experiencing the world and its objects, accepting that the experiencing posits the world while the reflecting experience leaves this position aside. The world is given, but we do not concern ourselves with justifying its givenness, rather we accept that it is given and explore how it is given and how this is possible. This means that our own experiences and acts of experiencing are possible objects of further reflective experiences, [6] and this is made possible by the relative transparency of consciousness.

We are now in a position to describe the structures of consciousness which make possible the experience of the 'natural' fact world as we experience it, according to Husserl.

Ii.   Intentionality as Noetic-Noematic Correlation

Husserl argues that if we are to understand how we experience the world as we do we must refrain from the natural attitude. In that attitude

we relate directly to the world, and on that basis we might enquire into
the validity or accuracy of our experience. Husserl is not concerned with
these questions. With the bracketing of the natural attitude we are
concerned with the world and its objects merely as given in experience, and
we enquire into how they are given and how this is possible. This enquiry
leads Husserl to the intentional character of consciousness. Intentionality
is that transcending of consciousness into what is other than itself, where
consciousness meets what is given to it and intends it. After the reduction
to consciousness what is given is no longer the object itself but its
being-for-consciousness. At this point in the exposition of Husserl, I
will concentrate on this correlation between the object for consciousness
and the consciousness of it. The argument that it is consciousness which
accomplishes objectivity will be considered later.

Husserl describes intentional experiences according to what is involved
in the act of experiencing and according to the intentional correlate of
the act. A distinction is made between those intentional experiences which
fully focus on the object and are properly called acts, and those unfulfilled,
not yet focussed, experiences which are nevertheless intentional. These
include our awareness of the background of an object when we perceive the
object and our 'stirrings' of pleasure. [7] Husserl calls the act of experi-
encing noesis. It is composed of the act proper and the hyle, otherwise
known as sense-data or sensations. The hyle are formed or synthesised by
the act proper in the process through which the whole act points to an
object. [8]

As mentioned earlier, there are many types of intentional acts -
perceiving distrusting, remembering, and so on. Within these we can
distinguish between levels of clarity, focus, attention and so on. What
is common to the acts is that they all refer to an object. For every

perceiving something is perceived. This should serve as a preliminary characterisation of intentional acts. Perhaps we should add here that Husserl, like Locke, regards perception as the primordial act of 'outer' experience. In any willing, desiring, valuing, the thing desired or whatever must also be perceived. [9]

The intentional correlate of the act has a similarly complex description. Husserl calls this correlate the noema. In perception the noema is the "perceived as such". [10] The noetic-noematic relation is such that evey noesis has a noema - and if we distinguish phases within these we can follow Husserl in saying "No noetic phase without a noematic phase that belongs specifically to it". [11] That is, noesis and noema are correlated. Husserl stresses that the relationship between consciousness and its object is not the same as that between noesis and noema:

> "We must stress this point in advance, that the parallelism between the unity of the noematically 'intended' object, of the object we have in 'mind', and the constituting formations of consciousness ..... should not be confused with the parallelism between noesis and noema, understood in particular as parallelism of noetic and corresponding noematic characters." [12] Rather, it is through the noemata that the object is reached. [13]

We could clarify this through an example of perception of an object, and in the process draw out further features of intentionality. In perception the perceived object is known through its modes of appearing, and these change in various respects. They change if the object changes - say a tree in the wind; they change if we change our position relative to the object - we move closer to the tree; they change according to the degree of attention we are paying to the object, and so on. An object is intended through all these changing appearances, and while the object and

its appearances are inseparable, we do need to draw the distinction conceptually. The "perceived as such" are the appearances which are correlatives of the noeses. While maintaining a perceptual noesis I have a variety of perceptions - as I move closer to the tree and it blows in the wind. The "perceived as such" which Husserl calls noema are a multiplicity which refer to a self-same object. Thus we can see that for every noesis there is a corresponding noema and that through the noema or noemata one or several noeses can intend an identical object. Thus the noema parallel the noesis insofar as they are similarly intentional. But we can also see that for any variation in the noesis there will be a corresponding variation in the noema. If the intentional act is only a vague attention which is then clearly focussed, the noema will correspondingly alter from say indistinct to distinct. [14]

Husserl is much more specific, and provides more detail of the noematic meaning and intending by, and through, which the object is given. However, for our purposes we can be content with the statement by J.N. Mohanty that:

"The reference of consciousness to its object is made possible

through   (a)   the correlation (between noesis and noema), and,

(b)   the noematic 'nucleus' by virtue of which the noema also refers to the object, and

(c)   the consequent noematic intentionality." [15]

Perhaps we need to add as a point of clarification, that all reference to objects in the foregoing discussion must be understood as bracketed objects, insofar as we are not concerned with the question of whether they really exist. The significance of this "change of signature" as Husserl calls it, may be questioned though, for Husserl repeatedly mentions that whatever is said of the modified objectivity must find a correspondence in the unmodified objectivity. [16]

One other problem concerns the phenomenological status of the concept of noema. Is it part of experience, a methodological device, or a metaphysical construct? Since we are not here undertaking a phenomenological description of experience we are not in a position to resolve this question. What we can say, so far as the argument is concerned, is that if the possibility of accepting the noema as phenomenologically given is to remain open, then the noema must <u>not</u> be interpreted as opaque. It does not stand between consciousness and its object and obstruct their relation, rather it must be understood as the transparent medium through which the object is intended or given. Further, the noema is not caused by the object, nor is it representative of it.

On the basis of this brief description of intentionality as noetic-noematic correlativity we can draw out the themes that enable Husserl to go beyond realism and idealism. Fundamentally, the significance of intentionality is that we can no longer postulate an isolated, closed, receptacle conception of consciousness over and against which is an opaque and absolute world. Intentionality makes consciousness an activity of transcending itself, projecting out into the world through the dispensing of meaning. The world is now meaningfully open to us. It is not so much that a chasm between consciousness and world has been bridged, as that consciousness and world are seen as interdependent and interpenetrating.

The noetic-noematic correlativity through which consciousness intends the world and its objects suggests that we are not an empty consciousness waiting for objects to cause representative ideas in us, as implied in the empiricist-realist view; nor are we a full consciousness independently of a relation to objects, as implied in the rationalist-idealist view. Intentional experience involves the interaction of both act and object, which means that neither world nor consciousness can be denied, and sense-experience

and the activity of consciousness cannot be neglected.

We will return to, and expand on these themes, after we have further
exhibited Husserl's concept of experience.

Iii. <u>Intentionality as Constitution</u>

Intentionality understood as noetic-noematic correlativity has been
interpreted as showing <u>that</u> something is always intended or meant in any
act of consciousness, and that objective unities are given despite the
constant flux of consciousness with its multiplicity of modes of conscious-
ness and manners of appearing of objects. Husserl goes further than
showing <u>that</u> it is always objects that are experienced. By describing the
function of intentionality known as constitution he shows <u>how</u> it is that
objects are given, <u>how</u> it is that a multiplicity of noema come to have
objective sense.

In <u>Cartesian Meditations</u> II Husserl says that intentional analysis

"brings the highly diverse anonymous processes into the field

comprising those that function 'constitutively' in relation to the

objective sense of the cogitatum in question," and that through this

analysis we can make understandable

"how, within the immanency of conscious life and in thus and so

determined modes of consciousness belonging to this incessant flux,

anything like <u>fixed and abiding objective unities</u> can become intended

and in particular, how this marvellous work of 'constituting' identical

objects is done <u>in the case of each category of objects</u>." [17]

Raising the question of the constitution of objective unities involves
raising some highly contentious issues; for example, whether talk of
constitution can be phenomenologically justified, and whether it means
creation of objects in a sense which would commit us to subjective idealism.

However, I want to stress that it is not my purpose here to justify and reconcile everything Husserl said about constitution. Rather, without avoiding the problem areas, I hope to draw out a consistent interpretation of constitution which shows how it is that objective unities are given without reducing them to subjective illusions.

Husserl's aim is to show how "fixed and abiding objective unities" can be intended, even though they are given through varying manners of appearing and a mutliplicity of modes of consciousness. [18] This concerns anything which is a possible object for consciousness, including subjective processes, although here the constitution of the unity of consciousness will be left aside.

Fixed and abiding objective unities are constituted through a process of combination of manners of appearing and of intentional acts called synthesis. [19] That this unity is not a mere connectedness [20] can be seen if we refer back to the discussion of the meant object, the "determinable X" intended by a noesis in Ideas. [21] There the objective unity was that of which appearances are appearances, that of which certain predicates are predicated, and which is inseparable from them. Here, similarly, it is that to which a multiplicity of acts of consciousness are directed through a succession of appearances. And synthesis is the process whereby we recognise the same object through a multiplicity of appearances. [22] Through a synthesis multiple modes of appearances become constituted, are invested as having objective sense.

Synthesis gives rise to a consciousness of identity - whether it be of something self-identical, or of a multiplicity of things intended unitarily. [23] That is, there are both monothetic and polythetic synthetic acts, through which an objective sense is intended.

Husserl insists that the intentional synthesis whereby a unity of objective sense is constituted, despite noetic and noematic variations, is not arbitrary, but operates according to strict concepts of types of consciousness and types of objects. [24]

Furthermore, because of the aspect of intentionality whereby every intentional object is surrounded by horizons that can be further explicated, and all conscious focal acts refer to further potential ones implicit in them, [25] the process of constitution and the analysis of constituting intentionalities remains forever incomplete. The constitution of an objective unity can never be fully laid bare because it always refers to something else. [26] Completeness would mean perfect knowledge, a fully transparent consciousness.

We now come to the question of whether, or to what extent, constitution is creative or productive of its object. Initially, Husserl states that the object is synthetically constituted regardless of whether the process is active or passive on the part of the ego. [27] He later gives both active and passive synthesis a part to play in experience, although the latter is more fundamental in that all active syntheses are shown to presuppose ongoing passive syntheses. [28] Passive synthesis is based on association to which belongs "sensuous configuration in co-existence and in succession". "Subjective processes, as objects in immanent time" and "all real natural objects belonging to the Objective spatio-temporal world" are said to be passively constituted. [29] Although Husserl does not make it quite clear, it seems as if passive synthesis applies primarily to perception of physical objects, and we will realise the significance of this if we recall the remark made earlier that, for Husserl, perception is the fundamental experience. We need to add that passive synthesis is governed by eidetic laws, and earlier meanings sedimented in the history of the particular synthesis. [30]

It seems reasonably clear that this passive synthesis, as the funda-
mental one, is not creative of its object. Perhaps a more appropriate
expression would be that the object constitutes itself in consciousness,
rather than that consciousness creates the object. As passive, it also
seems to be anonymous: we do not consciously constitute the perceptual
object, although the constituting or synthesising involved can be uncovered
by intentional analysis.

On the other hand, Husserl is quite explicit about the active synthesis
being "productively constitutive". [31] But it must be remembered that
these new objects are produced "on the basis of objects already given".
The sorts of things that are actively synthesised are cultural products
and ideal objects such as numbers. But this is not surprising - that the
specifically cultural is a conscious creation hardly amounts to the claim
that the world and its objects are merely products of my imagination. On
the contrary, it gives us a means of examining the relation between thought
and culture, and the ways in which the world is meaningful for us.

If we insist on interpreting constitution as the process whereby a
multiplicity of acts of consciousness are synthesised to refer to one
object, or a multiplicity of appearances are identified as appearances of
the one object, and thereby conferring objective sense, we can avoid
suggestions that constituting means creating the object, and that the
concept of constitution leads to subjective idealism. It is true that
Husserl speaks of an active, productive synthesis, but only in relation to
ideal objects such as numbers and cultural objects. Further, this active
synthesis can only be achieved on the basis of passive syntheses.

But there is still a problem. If constitution is not understood as
creativity, are we forced back into a distinction between the thing-in-
itself and the thing-for-us? Must something in-itself be give for us to
confer sense on it? Definitely not, according to Husserl - what is given
must always be meaningful, if it were not we could not experience it.
Constituting synthesis does not mean that we first receive a series of
meaningless data which we then proceed to make meaningful through synthesis.
Rather, we experience a flow of appearances as appearances of an object in
a contextual field and with sedimented meanings, and so on. (This indicates
that consciousness is not temporally uni-dimensional). Synthesis is the
process whereby the appearances are recognised as appearances of an object.
We cannot experience them except as of an object. In this way the realms
of being and sense are the same, anything outside the meaningful is outside
the world and outside the experienceable. It is not that consciousness
creates being and sense, but that only in relation to consciousness does
being have sense. However, a difficulty arises as soon as we say this,
for it is easily construed as a return to the thing-in-itself and thing-
for-us distinction, or a relapse into subjective idealism where consciousness
creates whatever there is. We may try to clarify the perceived difficulty
in the claim that the realms of being and sense - of objectivity and
subjectivity - are co-extensive by turning to a discussion of what Husserl
called the doctrine of Transcendental Idealism.

This doctrine has, I think, been variously misinterpreted, and rejected,
as resulting in subjective idealism. Perhaps part of the reason for this
lies in the ambiguity of some of Husserl's expressions, including even the
title of the doctrine. Notwithstanding, we proceed to interpret it as
standing between, or above, idealism and realism.

The first point is that Husserl did not deny the existence of the world, nor even doubt it. On the contrary, he insists that the world is transcendent of consciousness, and indubitably there as the intentional correlate of consciousness. The difference is that we can logically question the existence of the world, but not that of our consciousness of the world. In this sense the world is relative to consciousness. But consciousness without world would be empty, and world without consciousness would be meaningless. Consciousness is intentional as we have seen, consciousness and world are inextricably interrelated. When we put aside the question of the existence of the world, what we do is turn our attention to the modes of givenness of the world and its objects, and to the structures of our consciousness of it.

The world is transcendent of consciousness and is given to, or experienced by, consciousness primarily through a passive constituting process wherein that which is given is experienced as meaningful. World and objects only have the sense, being a world, and being an object, in relation to subjectivity. Being a world or an object means having a sense, and having a sense means having a 'sense for' - not any particular person, but in relation to a possible consciousness of it.

To be an object is to be in relation to a subject, and to be a subject is to be in relation to an object. As Quentin Lauer puts it:

"The subject is subject not merely because it is related to objects but because the relation is constitutive of the very objectivity of objects. Conversely, objects are not merely related to subjects; their relatedness constitutes the very subjectivity of subjects."[32]

It is not that the subject creates the world, rather that only in the reciprocity of subject and world can the world be a world for the subject.

To explicate the ways in which the world and its objects are given to
consciousness, is to explicate this reciprocity. This is what we take
Husserl to mean when he says that a sense-explication

> "carried out as regards every type of existent ever conceivable....
> as regards the transcendency actually given to me beforehand through
> experience" signifies a "systematic uncovering of the constituting
> intentionality itself." [33]

Iiii. Some Consequences

We are now in a position to realise the full significance, and potential
of Husserl's concept of experience. As we have said, intentionality under-
stood as noetic-noematic correlation shows us that experience is always of
objects, that consciousness is directed to something other than itself.
This means that consciousness is not a closed receptacle only aware of its
own ideas, but is an activity directly involved with the world, through
which we can understand both ourselves and the world.

Once we accept that consciousness is not closed, the sense in which
knowledge is not a mental state becomes clearer. This is the sense that
to describe what we know is not to describe another mental state, but to
describe the thing known. This is made possible by the relative trans-
parency of consciousness - a transparency we have discovered in the
possibility of intentional and reflective experience.

Not only is consciousness not closed, but the world cannot be opaque
to consciousness, or merely in-itself. The world and its objects are
necessarily related to consciousness; in and through this relationship
objective sense is achieved. Objectivity and subjectivity are interdependent
and interrelated.

Not only does the theory of intentionality show us that we experience objects, that acts of consciousness can have objective significance; it also, in its constitutive function, shows us how it is possible for us to experience objects as the same. Through syntheses of identification based on association, we recognise a multiplicity of acts of consciousness and modes of appearances as referring to an object. We can only identify an object through its appearances, but this is not to suggest that the thing is something other than what appears. This recognition of "fixed and abiding objective unities" points to a multidimensional temporal character of consciousness.

With Husserl's concept of intentional experience we no longer need to fall into the metaphysical trap of denying the existence of the world and its objects, treating them as subjective illusions. Neither do we need to resort to a representative theory of ideas, or causal theory of mind, to explain that and how we come to experience objects in a world horizon as having objective significance.

II. The World as Subjective-Accomplishment and the Return of Dichotomies

Husserl's concept of intentionality offers the possibility of a theory of experience not based on a subject-object dichotomy. It resolves by avoiding, the epistemological problems that persist in rationalist and empiricist philosophies while they presuppose that dichotomy. However, to fully understand the concept of intentionality, we have to place it in the context of the system of concepts in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology. Intentionality is not given to experience, it is not an ordinary object there for empirical investigation, but a theoretical construct that allows Husserl to explain how the world is there for us as it is. To discover, or to recognise, intentionality involves accepting Husserl's theoretical framework.

To describe intentionality as correlation and constitution is to limit ourselves to certain aspects of that theoretical framework. It allows us to see Husserl's difference from the tradition. When we bring into play the full theoretical framework the difference appears as a modification of, and not a break with, the tradition, and the radical potential of the concept of intentionality is undermined. The subject-object dichotomy reappears, now at the transcendental level, that is, at the level where the world, including empirical subjectivity, is transformed into a phenomenon, where Husserl is concerned with the cognitive structures through which we relate to the world in order to uncover the ultimate source of all knowledge.

This is not surprising given that Husserl understood phenomenology as fulfilling the telos of Western metaphysics, as carrying on the tradition rather than deconstructing it or breaking with it. He takes for granted the concepts and problems of metaphysics, and questions the presuppositions on the basis of which metaphysics has attempted to resolve those problems. These presuppositions are dualism and objectivism, the "natural attitude." Husserl wants to solve the problem of the relation between the subject and the object, of how something subjective can have objective significance, of how experience can become knowledge. He takes for granted that knowledge is absolutely certain knowledge and argues that we cannot determine the proper conditions for experience and such knowledge while we assume the natural attitude. Husserl argues that in order to understand how objective significance or knowledge is possible, we have to suspend the natural attitude, to undertake the transcendental reduction. Only then can we 'discover' intentionality, that subject and object are not opposed, and — and here we take the crucial step — that it is transcendental subjectivity which accomplishes, through intentionality, the world as objective, as transcendent.

The transcendental ego, as "above" the world, can 'see' the correlation of world and world-consciousness at the empirical level. It can see how, within the natural attitude, intentionality means the interdependence of subject and object as a pre-requisite for the constitution of sense and the possibility of experience. In the previous section we described Husserl's account of intentional correlation and showed how it made Husserl's account of experience radically different from that of the objectivists. This was because it does not presuppose a subject-object dichotomy, and because the concept of intentionality allows such a difference without turning it into a dichotomy. It describes experience as the interdependence, the correlativity, of subject and object. With the introduction of the total transcendental reduction, and the radical subjectivism this implies for Husserl, the subject-object difference reappears as a dichotomy.

The remainder of this chapter indicates those elements of transcendental phenomenology which requires this shift from a subject-object difference to a subject-object dichotomy. These elements ultimately determine the significance of the concept of intentionality and undermine its radical potential. The problem is to work out the phenomenological frame of reference so as to understand why it is that Husserl's attempt at overcoming the subject-object dichotomy serves to re-produce it. It will be shown that three presuppositions of phenomenology necessitate the return to a subject-object dichotomy. The first is the conception of philosophy as a rigorous science, a science without presuppositions but with an absolute foundation. The second is that subjectivity can be that absolute foundation. The third concerns the principle of evidence that will justify that conception of subjectivity - the principle of presence. These presuppositions will be shown to have a dichotomous basis, to be based on concepts formulated according to a relation of mutual exclusion and exhaustion. This analysis will make it clear how the dichotomies form a system; how one dichotomy

cannot be rejected if others are retained without it re-appearing at a different level or in a different form. It will show how a philosophy based on dichotomous thinking is ultimately incoherent.

The analysis proceeds from two inter-related themes : the conception and function of knowledge and of subjectivity. These will be discussed according to how they both motivate and fulfill the fully fledged transcendental phenomenology and produce tensions within it. The central problem concerns the question of the possibility of the objectivity of subjective experience. Husserl resolves this question with the concept of intentionality. He does not denigrate subjective experience by reducing it to the subject-relative, nor by arguing that objectivity can only be attained by excluding the subjective. On the contrary, Husserl claims that subjective experience underlies all the sciences, that it is the basis of all knowledge and that, insofar as it is intersubjective, subjective experience is objective. Thus it should not be excluded from the work of philosophy understood as a rigorous science, but placed at the highest and most fundamental level. According to Husserl's "principle of all principles" what is most certain or true is what is known through an intuition, through what is immediately present. This is the life-world, the world of subjective experience, not the "'objective-true' world of science". [34] To make this life-world thematic, to develop a rigorous science of it, we need to undertake, not just a bracketing of the objective sciences, but a total transformation of the natural attitude. This transformation is the transcendental reduction.

Two questions need to be asked at this point. Firstly, why do we need to thematise the life-world? Secondly, why and how is the transcendental reduction necessary for such a thematisation? The answers return us to the themes of knowledge and subjectivity. It will be easier if we begin with a brief and general answer. Husserl conceives philosophy as a rigorous

science. At least initially, he wanted to provide an absolute foundation
for all knowledge in the old style of philosophy as the science of the
sciences. According to Husserl's conceptions of knowledge, truth and
evidence this can only be achieved if we reduce the field of investigation
to that of the subjective. Only within the subjective can we achieve the
absolute certainty which is a criterion of a foundation.

Let us now examine this in more detail. The direction will be to
determine the deployment of the concepts in relation to each other rather
than to examine the adequacy of Husserl's arguments. As we noted, Husserl
recognises the importance of the natural attitude, of the life-world. In
this attitude we take for granted the existence of the objects we experience
as continuing objects with temporal, spatial, and meaningful horizons
despite the multiplicity of appearances and our changing perspectives. We
conceive of ourselves as a part of the world, though a special part.
Husserl argues that we cannot understand how this is possible and we cannot
attain knowledge of how and what we experience while we remain within this
natural attitude. We cannot understand it while we take for granted what
we are trying to explain. [35] We cannot achieve a rigorous science of the
life-world while we content ourselves with a level at which we will always
have uncertainties and the possibililty of doubt and error. What is required
is a method of arriving at a level where we can be certain. Before going
on to consider this 'method' and 'level' I want to point out the conceptual
framework that motivates this move. Husserl is operating with, or assuming,
a conception of knowledge and evidence as absolute certainty, incorrigibility.
He is assuming that absolute knowledge is possible and this is conceived in
terms of certainty, indubitability, and unchangability.

Husserl wants philosophy to be a rigorous science, to be without presuppositions. [36] To achieve this we need a realm of absolute givenness, of absolute certainty, that can serve as the foundation for the edifice of knowledge. In Ideas he states his "principle of all principles" :

"That the most primordial giving intuition is the source of authority for knowledge, that whatever presents itself in intuition in primordial form (as it were in its 'bodily' reality) is simply to be accepted as it gives itself to be, though only within the limits in which it then presents itself." [37]

One of the reasons for undertaking the transcendental reduction is that our perception of the external world is not given with adequate evidence, it is not totally clear and completely full, and neither is it apodictic. There is always the possibility of change in what is presented as evidence, and always the possibility of error and doubt. This is not supposed to be the case within pure consciousness - only here can we have an absolute foundation. The point here is not to go into the arguments for and against the inadequacy of transcendent perception, the adequacy of immanent perception and the apodicticity of the transcendental ego. The point is to indicate that Husserl's ideal of evidence and his conception of knowledge is one of indubitability, incorrigibility, absolute certainty. He admits that we cannot achieve this with transcendent perception, but still the ideal of evidence in this realm is one of adequacy. It is to achieve this ideal that we must undertake the transcendental reduction and restrict our investigation to the realm of pure consciousness. This means that Husserl's conception of reason and knowledge must be seen as conceived according to the dichotomous pattern. Knowledge, the ideal of knowledge, must be absolute; evidence must be perfect. Husserl requires certainty, absolute presence or givenness, and everything doubtful, irrational, or not

fully present is excluded in principle from his ideal, despite the evidence from Husserl's own investigations that experience is not and cannot be like this. [38]

An interesting tension occurs in Husserl's philosophy at this point. His commitment to describing what is actually given in experience enables him to recognise that nothing can ever be fully present to or in consciousness. Every experience always points to some absence, to spatial and temporal horizons, to sedimented meanings. But recognising this does not lead Husserl to reject the rationalist conception of knowledge as inappropriate or illconceived. Instead, in principle, it leads Husserl to expel experience from the field of the absolutely given, to restrict the enquiry to the realm of pure consciousness. At the extreme, only the actual present is apodictically given, although Husserl does not and could not follow this up. [39]

It is the search for certainty which requires the reduction and the emphasis on subjectivity. The evidence for the world is always incomplete and dubitable whereas within consciousness we can achieve absolute givenness. Further, Husserl argues, consciousness is absolute and the world relative to it. Consciousness is absolute in the sense that it can be conceived apart from the world, but the world cannot be conceived apart from consciousness. Consciousness gives the world its sense, it accomplishes the world as world. [40] When we bracket the world and turn to consciousness, we do not lose the world; it remains as constituted by consciousness.

This emphasis on subjectivity occurs at two levels. The first is the level of the relation between particular intentional acts and their objects. It is the act which is primordial, which enables objects to be present to consciousness. Experience is a correlation of intentional act and intended object. But Husserl wants to say that what makes it possible for something

which is not a real part of consciousness to enter into consciousness in experience is the act in which it is given. This is what is intentional about the correlation.

The second level is that of the relation between the transcendental ego and the whole world. This level is crucial because it is here that the dichotomy appears. There are two lines of thought involved. Husserl wants to establish something whose existence is absolutely given so that it can provide an absolute foundation for knowledge. This, he claims, is subjectivity. The conception of knowledge and the principle of evidence based on presence leads Husserl to a particular conception of absolute subjectivity. It must be a disembodied consciousness, for a body is part of the world and so the evidence for it would be inadequate and dubitable. It must not include any notion of a soul or psychological ego. Again, this is justified by the principle of evidence. A psychological ego is part of the world, it includes sedimentations, and this introduces uncertainty insofar as sedimentations involve non-presence. The pure transcendental ego is not, and cannot be, part of the world. The whole world is its intentional correlate; the transcendental ego gives the world its sense 'transcendent', 'objective'. [41]

Husserl's positing of a transcendental ego apart from the world involves a dichotomy, and this means that there must have been a shift in the concept of intentionality. I argued that the intentional correlation between subject and object at the level of experience within the world horizon does not posit or presuppose a subject-object dichotomy. I now want to argue that, at the level of the intentional correlation between the transcendental ego and the transcendent world, a dichotomy is posited. My argument was that within the world horizon the subject and object are interdependent, that the object is suffused with subjectivity and the subject with objectivity.

The transcendental ego cannot be suffused with the world because if it were it would not be a pure ego. If it is not a pure ego, then it cannot fulfill the requirements Husserl desired; it cannot be an absolute foundation for knowledge and the constitution of sense. Any admixture of anything worldly would lend uncertainty to the transcendental ego and prevent it attaining pure presence; it cannot even include the psychological. [42] Furthermore, the transcendental ego is absolute in that it could exist without a world, whereas the world could not exist without the transcendental ego. The transcendental ego constitutes the sense of the world. [43] This means that the world and the transcendental ego are not genuine correlatives and are not interdependent according to Husserl's own arguments. In other words, to suggest that the relation between the psychological and transcendental egos is one of parallelism, as Husserl does, is a mistake. [44]

One of the difficulties in sustaining the argument that a dichotomy is introduced is that it is based on a reading of Husserl which sees the transcendental ego as a 'thing', as something there to be discovered if we follow the correct method. This reading is not generally agreed upon. Husserl says a number of things about the transcendental ego, and this allows for different interpretations. In some passages it appears that the transcendental ego is conceived as a thing; at others, that it is a theoretical object or construct. Elsewhere Husserl seems to be saying that there is one ego which can operate intentionally at different levels, the psychological and the transcendental. A different way to understand this multiplicity of conceptions would be to say that, for Husserl, the conception of the transcendental ego includes all these. We might get around this difficulty by insisting that we are only interested in those appearances of the transcendental ego in the texts where it functions as an object. This would leave us open to the objection that we have not taken the texts seriously and have not understood the concept, that we have not grasped the enigma that the transcendental ego is.

Against this, or in spite of it, my argument is that in the texts it
is spoken of as a thing, as something we could describe. Furthermore, if
it is going to fulfill the role ascribed to it in relation to other elements
in the texts, then it must be conceived as a thing. Husserl requires
something absolute, apodictically given, even if only to itself. This can
then serve as the foundation for the rigorous science of phenomenology and
as the source of the constitution of sense. It can serve as the foundation
because it is the source. Husserl assumes that it is transcendental
subjectivity which accomplishes sense. He gives an argument that only
subjectivity is adequately and apodictically given, but this is different
from an argument that transcendental subjectivity is absolute in the sense
of being the source of the constitution of sense. [45] Whatever its validity,
the argument about apodicticity is only intended to, and could only, show
that we must undertake the reduction rather than remain in the natural
attitude. If the transcendental subject is to be absolute in the required
sense, it cannot be part of the world and it cannot have anything worldy
about it.

Once the transcendental ego is posited outside the world, it cannot
be described, and if it cannot be described, it is not a thing. [46] To
attempt to describe it is a logical mistake. Husserl's conception of the
transcendental ego, as a thing, implies that it could be described. To
admit that it cannot be described is to deny its thinghood, it is to
reduce transcendence to a function of the psychological ego and thus to a
part of the world. Transcendence would then amount to the transcending of
particular acts and existential judgements, to little more than ordinary
reflection. The possibility of total transcendence might still remain
open, although it is hard to conceive of what this might mean for a psycho-
logical ego.

Part of the difficulty in Husserl's conception of the transcendental ego is that it must be different from the psychological ego, but the difference cannot be a real difference. A real difference would make it a difference between two things in the world and the transcendental ego is not part of the world. This is what leads to the interpretation of the transcendental ego as a theoretical or discursive object. Even if it were clear what this means, the interpretation cannot rest at this point. If the transcendental ego is to be an absolute, then the "principle of all principles" — the principle of presence — must apply to it. The transcendental ego must be present, if only to itself in a pure self-relation occuring in the non-extended present moment. The difficulty of understanding Husserl's conception amounts to a difficulty in understanding how something can be experienceable and not part of the world; and it cannot of course belong to another world. It might be suggested that the transcendental ego be understood by analogy with essences which are ideal entities similarly outside the flow of time. However, Husserl distinguishes between ideal and fictitious 'entities', and this distinction implies that ideal entities are part of the world. The crucial argument against the interpretation of the transcendental ego as a theoretical object is that the principle of presence must apply to the transcendental ego and so it must be experienceable.

The question of whether the transcendental ego is a theoretical or experienceable object is not decisive for the argument about the re-introduction of a dichotomy. For this argument all that we require is that in the texts the transcendental ego functions dichotomously in relation to the world. For this to be the case, the transcendental ego must not be a function of the psychological ego for this would make it part of the world. Husserl's argument requires that nothing of the transcendental ego be part of the world, and conversely, that nothing of the world be part of the transcendental ego. If this were not so, the

transcendental ego would not be pure and absolute and would not satisfy
the requirements for the foundation of knowledge and the source of sense.
Husserl must place the transcendental ego outside the world, and as soon as
he does, he introduces a dichotomy between the transcendental ego and the
transcendent world, a transcendental version of the subject-object dichotomy.

Husserl's theory of intentionality avoided a subject-object dichotomy
at the empirical level. It appears at the transcendental level for several
reasons. One reason is that Husserl runs together two, in principle,
independent enquiries: the search for certainty and the question of the
possibility of total transcendence. This is because he takes for granted
that _only_ subjectivity can be the source of sense, and thus the only
candidate for certainty would be the subject, if it can achieve total
transcendence.

The more significant reason is that Husserl's concepts of knowledge,
truth, and subjectivity are ultimately conceived dichotomously. They are
bound together in the history of metaphysics in such a way that the retention
of some elements will inevitably require the appearance of the others. It
is not surprising, nor accidental, that Husserl runs together the search
for certainty and the positing of an absolute transcendental subject. The
conception of knowledge as absolute certainty and the conception of truth
as pure and full presence produce, and are produced by, the conception of
philosophy as a rigorous science with an absolute foundation. The subject
must then be conceived as that fully conscious, controlling, willing ego
which can divorce itself from the passions, the bodily, and the worldy,
which can be fully present to itself, as Derrida says, "in the blink of an
eye". [47] To achieve knowledge, such a consciousness has no need of past
experiences, culture, or other people; it aims to free itself from such
concerns, interests and involvements, and assures itself that what is

known or true is what is present to it. It achieves this by adopting as a

criterion of adequate evidence only what is fully present.

All these conceptions are delineated by means of exclusion or opposition.

The subject is reduced to what is not worldly, even if this must involve

excluding the psychological and the bodily. What is known is reduced to

what is given fully in the present, excluding past experiences, sedimented

meanings and anticipations. The ideal consciousness is the one that is

fully conscious, and thus able to fully control itself and be fully responsible

for itself. The unconscious, the social, the emotional, the aesthetic,

must all be excluded in the process of attaining knowledge. No passivity,

and no playfulness, can be admitted in this ego. By remaining within its

own sphere it can attain complete clarity, a purely rational theory of all

that is universally and eternally true. Philosophy as a rigorous science

excludes all worldly interests and values; the philosopher is reduced to

the "detached observer", the subject who is wholly 'objective'.

It is not accidental that Husserl makes these moves, any more than

these conceptions form an ad hoc collection. Rather, the history of

philosophy is the history of the systematic association of these con-

ceptions. It is the history of a set of problems formulated within a

system of opposed concepts, of dichotomies. In taking up one of these

problems, the search for certainty, Husserl is taking over this system of

dichotomous concepts.

Husserl's desire for a philosophy with an absolute foundation leads

him to assume a conception of knowledge as the absolute certitude of the

knowing subject. Despite his intentions, the terms in which Husserl

understands and attempts to attain this desire already involve dichotomously

conceived concepts and this results in a dichotomy between the subject and

the object at the transcendental level. The effect of this is a series of tensions between Husserl's descriptions of experience within the life-world and the conceptual framework in which he explains how such experience is possible. This tension results in the virtual dissolution of the possibility of any genuine knowledge and communication. This chapter, the chapter of phenomenology, therefore closes with the description of these tensions.

Husserl disclosed the horizonal struture of time, of perception, of consciousness, through the analysis of experience as intentional correlation. Time is understood as the flux of past, present and future, so any given experience involves earlies ones through the sedimentation of meanings, and involves our anticipations or expectations.

Husserl's description of the life-world shows that experience always involves presuppositions and beliefs, ultimately the natural attitude. It shows that experience involves the psychological ego and that it is bodily, as is indicated by the kinastheses involved in fulfilling anticipations. It shows that the world is constituted intersubjectively, that I do not live alone, and that cultural and social factors influence my understanding of the world. It is Husserl who has shown that pure presence is impossible, that it is always 'polluted' by non-presence, that experience involves elements we are not and cannot be fully conscious of. This means that in analysing an experience we can always enquire further back and uncover things that we were not previously conscious of but which motivated us and influenced what we experienced and how we interpreted it. For instance, the way in which an emotional state, of fear or desire perhaps, affects what we experience. On the side of the object we always have a perceptual background, and a social, political, or cultural, background which influences the meaning it has for us.

These descriptions remain as late as the Crisis, if anything they have an even stronger force in this text. [48] Despite them, Husserl still insists that the world is my subjective accomplishment, where the "I-myself" means a pure, individual transcendental ego. The "I" is the ultimate source of sense, it constitutes the whole world - even other transcendental egos are ultimately constituted as others by myself. In order to achieve the absolute foundation of all knowledge, to uncover the ultimate source of sense, the psychological, the bodily, and the presence of others must all be removed from the sphere of pure consciousness. Any element of non-presence must be excluded. [49] Time is modelled on the present, the instant. The ideal of experience, that which will give us knowledge, is what is given purely in the present. Perception of transcendent objects (Erfahrung), even when reduced to their being-for-me, is inadequate for knowledge since it involves spatial, temporal and meaningful horizons, and so the object can never be fully given. Immanent experience (Erlebnis) was found to have temporal horizons - sedimented meanings and expectations which modify the present but are not themselves fully present. The experience of other egos is only given in analogical appresentation. Knowledge is possible only in the isolated mental life of a pure consciousness stripped of its past and future, of intersubjectivity. Knowledge is possible of only what is given in full in the now instant, ultimately, of the transcendental ego's pure self-presence.

The transcendental reduction reduces phenomenology to absurdity and inconsistency. As Husserl says of Locke: the foundation of his naiveties, inconsistency, idealism and absurdity lies in the assumption "that the sole indubitable ground of all knowledge is self-experience and its realm of immanent data". [50] We might add that the foundation of this assumption is dichotomous thinking.

NOTES

1 Husserl, Edmund, _The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental_
   Phenomenology, trans. by David Carr, Evanston; Northwestern University

2 Husserl, Edmund, _Cartesian Meditations_, trans. by Dorian Cairns,
   The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. §41.

3 Husserl, Edmund, _Ideas_, trans. by W.R. Boyce Gibson, London; George
   Allen and Unwin, 1931. §§19, 20, 52.

4 _Ideas_ §55.

5 _Ideas_ §§35, 44.

6 _Ideas_ §38.

7 _Ideas_ §84.

8 _Ideas_ §85. The role of the hyle has been strongly criticised. In
   Cartesian Meditations §16 Husserl argues that it should not be treated
   in an atomistic fashion. To deal with this question properly would
   involve discussion of bodily intentionalities which is beyond the
   scope of the argument at this point. I will leave the question open
   except to say that the concept of hyle must be accepted and accounted
   for in some way – to reject it is to reject the role of the body and
   its sense organs in experience.

9 _Ideas_ §95. Perception is also emphasised in the _Crisis_, see §46.

10 _Ideas_ §88.

11 _Ideas_ §93.

12 _Ideas_ §98.

13 _Ideas_ §101, especially pp 129-31.

14 _Ideas_ §92.

15 Mohanty, J.N. "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality" in Tymieniecka,
   A.T. (ed), _Analecta Husserliana_, Vol. I, p109.

16 For example, _Ideas_ §93.

17 _Cartesian Meditations_ §20.

18 _Cartesian Meditations_ §17.

19   Cartesian Meditations §17.

20   Cartesian Meditations §18.

21   Ideas §131.

22   Cartesian Meditations §18.

23   Cartesian Meditations §18.

24   Cartesian Meditations §§20-22.

25   Cartesian Meditations §19.

26   Cartesian Meditations §28.

27   Cartesian Meditations §18.

28   Cartesian Meditations §38.

29   Cartesian Meditations §39.

30   Cartesian Meditations §38.

31   Cartesian Meditations §38.

32   Lauer, Quentin, "The Subjectivity of Objectivity" in

      Edmund Husserl 1859-1959. La Haye; Martinus Nijhoff, 1959

      pp.171-2.

33   Cartesian Meditations §41.

34   Crisis §34.

35   Husserl makes this sort of criticism of Descartes in
      Crisis §§18, 19.

36   Husserl's desire that philosophy become a rigorous science

      is repeatedly mentioned in the Crisis, and fully discussed

      in the essay "Philosophy as Rigorous Science" in Husserl,

      Edmund Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, trans.

      by Quentin Lauer, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1965.

37   Ideas §24.

38   The desire that philosophy be a rigorous science has the effect

      that, for Husserl, what there is is only what can be rationally

      known. He thus adopts the traditional rationalist conception of

      reality. See the fourth section of Ideas, 'Reason and Reality'.

Notes: continued

39   Robert Sokolowski traces this implication through the arguments

of Husserl's, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness.

See Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution,

The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970, See esp. pp 159-162, 199-201.

40   See Crisis §46 and passim.

41   It is an unjustified assumption on Husserl's part that it is

consciousness which gives sense, that consciousness constitutes

the world which is thereby relative to it. This assumption, and

its implication that consciousness is separate from and "above"

the world, is reinforced by a misleading parallel. Every object

presented to consciousness has an act which intends it. The world

is the horizon for all acts and objects so there must be something

which intends this horizon. This is the pure transcendental ego,

says Husserl.

42   Crisis §54, Cartesian Meditations §§10, 11.

43   Crisis §§38-44 and passim.

44   Cartesian Meditations §§14, 57 and the English preface to Ideas,

pp.13-16.

45   Crisis §§30, 55. Cf. Sokolowski, op cit p218f.

46   This is the basis of Sartre's rejection of the transcendental ego.

47   Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena, trans. by David B. Allison,

Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1973. p. 59.

48   In Crisis, §§46-50, Husserl gives this full description of experi-

ence; in §§53-55 the shift to the pure "I-myself" as the absolutely

unique, ultimately functioning ego takes place.

49   These arguments, given in the Cartesian Meditations, are discussed

by David Levin, Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology,

Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1970.

50   Crisis §23.

PART III : Strategies for the Displacement of Dichotomous Thinking.

*The concept of the Imaginary order in human relationships
revolves around the function of mirror-like oppositions as
the correlative of identity. Positive or negative identi-
fication with the other as the oppressor is politically
and psychologically dangerous, for it entails an acceptance
or a rejection of a code of values defined by the other.
In other words, it implies a simple reversal of the relation-
ships between master and slave, or between executioner and
victim. .... There is only one escape from the dilemmas
of oppositions and identity, and it makes no difference
whether one is talking in epistemological, ideological, or
political terms. If dissent is to escape its own self-
alienation... then dissent must transcend the status of
negative identification. In a word, all dissent must be
of a higher logical type than that to which it is opposed.*

Anthony Wilden, System and Structure.

CHAPTER 7 : The In-Side-Out-Of Dichotomous Thinking.

In the preceding chapters dichotomous thinking has been described, analysed, and criticised. At the outset it was shown to involve more than the occasional and accidental misuse of concepts in particular instances. It involves the systematic formation of concepts according to a dichotomous pattern, and these concepts are systematically associated according to a set of values. The values are not imposed additionally, they are not brought in from without. They not only characterise but also constitute the way in which the concepts are formulated, thought, and used. It is the "way in which" that we must focus on, for what we are concerned with here is not merely a set of concepts, a particular theory or set of theories, but a mode of thinking. The mode of thinking is the style, the orientation, the prejudice, they way in which concepts are thought, problems are raised and theories are produced; it is the basis on which a metaphor - a rhetoric - appears appropriate. It is the way in which it appears obvious to formulate a concept as self-identical, eternally enclosed within itself, excluding what it is not - and such that what is not it appears not merely as other but as its opposite. This we saw in the case of a particular argument where it is taken for granted that the individual is external to, must exclude and must oppose the social and its attempts to penetrate the individual. We also saw how this leads to, because it already involves or presupposes, the associating of sets of dichotomies. Those which are associated are the terms of the dichotomies already thought as the positive, the norm, the valuable. As a mode of thinking this procedure is not carried out explicitly, it is not even recognised or acknowledged. As a way in which we think without even thinking about it it has become all pervasive and self-perpetuating; and as a way of thinking it has its own self-justifying, and thereby further self-perpetuating, mechanisms. This meant that when, in Part II of the thesis, we attempted to expose its operation in philosophical texts, having explored its characteristics in Part I, a method of reading had to be adopted that would enable us to detect as clues those elements on

the surface of the text which instituted, perpetuated, disguised, which

allowed for - which were - dichotomous thinking. In reading philosophical

texts a double difficulty was expected. Firstly, that while philosophical

thinking might be characterised by its performance of clarifying pre-

suppositions, and challenging arguments at this level, the possibility of

these presuppositions as presuppositions is rarely questioned - and it is

here that the dichotomous mode of thinking is most hidden and most effective.

Secondly, the history of philosophy is a history of (apparently) alternative

theories, whereas it was suspected that despite these differences they are

mostly effected within dichotmous thinking. Husserl, for instance, rejected

the presuppositions of objectivism and dualism which he exposed as underlying

Rationalism and Empiricism and adopted instead a transcendental method and

a theory of intentionality to overcome the difficulties arising from a

dichotomy between subject and object. But when we investigated further

Husserl's philosophy we found not just the presence of a few dichotomies

but that his thinking was conducted dichotomously. It was this that Husserl

did not detect and could not challenge in Descartes and Locke. To work out

and to show that and how this was the case a distinction was made between

frames of references and problematics. A frame of reference, as the con-

sciously assumed methodological and theoretical presuppositions, is found

on the surface of the text. Locke, for instance, assumes that all ideas

come from experience; Husserl, that we cannot understand the possibility of

the objectivity of the object of experience while we think within the

natural attitude. A problematic is the ontological and epistemological

components of the text that are not found at the surface - they are not

stated, but they sanction the conceptual existence of what is stated. It

was shown that while Locke and Husserl have different frames of reference

they work within the same problematic. Both frames of reference are

sanctioned by a conception of knowledge as certainty, of evidence in terms

of presence, and of the subject as the source, guarantor, representer and

judge of certainty and presence. More importantly, it was shown that the concepts constituting this problematic are already thought dichotomously. This, we found, had the effect for Husserl that no matter how radically he attempted to adopt a different frame of reference and to overcome the subject-object dichotomy through the theory of intentionality, he remained caught within the dichotomous mode of thinking and inevitably re-introduced that same dichotomy in a modified form, at the transcendental level. Thus we found that even though a dichotomy might never appear on the surface or be stated in a text, a metaphor such as the mind as an empty cabinet, and an ideal such as that of absolute knowledge will appear appropriate, will be justified, can be carried because of, or insofar as, the concepts that sanctioned them are formulated, oriented in terms of, prejudiced in favour of dichotomous thinking. That the terms in which and the way in which certain problems are raised, theories worked out... already involves - is - dichotomous thinking.

It is now possible to see that structuralism, even though it does not work within the problematic of the subject (of phenomenology), remains within the dichotomous mode of thinking - and not merely because of its thesis of the universality of and necessity for binary thinking. For as a mode of thinking, dichotomous thinking is not identifiable with any partic- ular thesis. It is not a thesis or theory but a style, a prejudice that operates in the way in which theories are formulated.

In the introduction to the analyses of Locke and Husserl, when dis- cussing our methodology, it was said that the relation between a problematic and a frame of reference must not be thought dichotomously. This requirement raised some general problems concerning the relationship between methods of reading and modes of thinking. The following question was asked: "If we need a non-dichotomous mode of thinking to detect dichotomous thinking, what

is the relationship between these modes?". The question was left aside –
it could not have been answered in advance, and our concern then was to
uncover the operation of dichotomous thinking in certain texts. We can
turn now to reflect on the point reached so far in the light of aim the
to displace dichotomous thinking. This reflection will be a consideration
of the methodology used; to determine what it enabled us to achieve and
what problems it posed, and to ask, what are its limitations and whether
or not it is adequate for a critique of dichotomous thinking qua a mode
of thinking?

The method of reading was directed towards exposing the problematic
that governed a frame of reference. This enabled us to show that certain
theories or frames of reference, regardless of whether or not they explicitly
espoused or even mentioned dichotomies, could only ask the sorts of questions
they do because the conceptual framework in which the questions are posed
operates within the dichotomous mode of thinking.

Since the problematic, as the conditions of possibility of what is
stated in the frame of reference of a text, is not itself stated two
methodological problems became apparent. Firstly, what sort of status does
a problematic have vis a vis a text, and secondly, how are they identified?
Obviously the nature of their status will determine how problematics are
identified. If the procedure that was used can be clarified this will
provide a greater understanding of what is involved in the reading of
problematics, and in critically doing so. And understanding this will
enable us to determine the extent to which this methodology is adequate to
deal with modes of thinking and in particular, the dichotomous mode. This
question arises from the difference between problematics and modes of
thinking, for it is not yet clear how the thinking involved in identifying
problematics stands in relation to dichotomous thinking. By what is

<u>involved</u> in reading problematics I mean something different from the
question of how problematics are <u>identified</u>. This difference will become
clearer as we proceed.

A problematic is different from a frame of reference without existing
independantly. It is 'in' the frame of reference of a text without being
reducible to the frame of reference, it governs what can be said in a text
without itself being said; it is not outside the text and not another text
that could be identified/produced separately; and it is not a separate
level within the one text. We have instead a relation of difference, a
double system in a single text when the differing, the doubling, does not
mean separately existing entities. If they were separate we would require
a code or a set of rules for translating or inferring from one to the
other, where each text or level is independantly identified. But the
reading of a problematic through a frame of reference did not involve
inference - that if, for example, Locke says x then he must have pre
supposed y; and from a problematic we cannot infer the existence of a
particular frame of reference. And the reading is not a translating, (a)
because the problematic and the frame of reference are not the same sorts
of 'things', and therefore, (b) an element in one does not have an equiva-
lent in the other, and (c) the elements are not significant in themselves.
In a translation the two texts are already given, in reading a text for a
problematic, the problematic is uncovered in the reading. Uncovered, but
not discovered as this would imply that it already existed separately.
The problematic and the frame of reference are not separate as wholly
exterior to one another, and more specifically, not separate as mutually
exclusive and exhaustive, but both interdependent and constituted by a
relationship of difference in a context. To exist in a relationship of
difference is not to <u>be</u> different but to belong to the same <u>by</u> <u>differing</u>.
The emphasis resides in the relating not in what is related. This means

that the methodological apparatus of problematics and frames of reference must not be understood as having any ontological status, any absolute value. Problematics and frames of reference are not discovered and then matched up accordingly; rather, from a given perspective a particular problematic can be constructed to explain certain theoretical phenomena. When we examined the texts of Locke and Husserl from the perspective of a concern with dichotomous thinking we were looking for the theoretical conditions that made those texts possible. For instance, under what conditions is the question of how ideas enter the mind possible, under what conditions is the metaphor of the mind as an empty cabinet possible? This question and this metaphor are not <u>given</u> as elements of a frame of reference, they are selected as significant from a certain perspective. From this perspective and for the frame of reference that has been determined, particular epistemological and ontological components of the text will appear as the conditions of possibility, the problematic, of that frame of reference. [From a difference perspective, say an interest in liberalism, different elements will appear as significant...] What counts as a problematic and a frame of reference are not given as such, they exist in a particular context; and the elements of each do not exist in the text in the same sort of way for the problematic is in the text without being stated.

The relationship between a problematic and a frame of reference has been specified as a non-dichotomous one - their difference is not that of separate, mutually exclusive, entities. The problematic is inside, but other than, the frame of reference. This is not merely a fortunate fact, nor is it arbitrary or accidental. For the methodology is not an abstract formula of interest on its own account; it is not the sort of thing of and for which we may or may not find instantiations, and which we may or may not use. It was constructed, developed, adopted in the context of an enquiry into the nature and force of dichotomous thinking and with the aim of

displacing that thinking. The problematic - frame of reference distinction was contructed so as to enable us to detect dichotomous thinking, and the distinction was made non-dichotomously so as to enable us to not simply repeat and reflect that thinking. Just as a particular problematic is not given as such but is constructed in a context from a particular perspective, so the methodological apparatus is not given but constructed so as to serve a purpose in a particular enquiry. There are not two separate problems, one of determining one's theoretical position and then another added on, of finding an appropriate methodology - as if the theoretical and methodo-logical positions one employs can be abstracted from the context of the issues one regards as important, or conversely, as if one can speculate about means and only afterwards concern oneself with the ends to which they are applied. Questions of method do not make sense outside a context of problems to be solved, and to pretend they do is to adopt an ideological position the epistemological underpinnings of which is dichotomous thinking. The means one adopts already include the ends to which they are applicable, and if the means one adopts are thought dichotomously, then one is already caught up in one of the systems of dichotomies that constitutes the proble-matics that generate certain frames of reference. With dichotomous thinking the methodological issues of its critique unavoidably involves the substantive question of its nature. This is why we must ask what purpose the methodology used here served, whether or not, or how, it could come to terms with the mode of prevailing of dichotomous thinking, and what sort of critique it allowed for. The methodological apparatus adopted here was not constructed on the basis of dichotomous relationships. And this had consequences for how the problematic could be identified and for the sorts of criticisms that were appropriate and possible.

In reading a text for its problematic the relationship between the 'position' of the reader the the 'position' of the text was not thought

dichotomously, and how it could be read was generated/determined by the problematic - frame of reference relationship. The problematic for a given frame of reference, say empiricism, could not be identified from within that frame of reference, nor from another frame of reference within the same problematic, say phenomenology, for the problematic and the frame of reference are not separate entities and so any attempt to identify it from within would simply be a repetition of it. Furthermore, there is a special reason why a problematic involving dichotomous thinking cannot be identified from within that problematic - and that is that within such a problematic the problematic - frame of reference distinction could not be made other than dichotomously, which means that it cannot be made at all. This is because, insofar as it treats the inside-outside distinction as a dichotomy, it would have to insist that everything is fully inside the text (on its surface - the frame of reference), or, that if anything is outside it is fully outside. Both options deny the distinction in denying the possibility of the problematic not being outside the text while not being part of the frame of reference.

Conversely, a problematic could not be identified from outside that problematic from within another problematic. This is ruled out in principle from the nature of a problematic as the conditions under which questions and possible answers are produced. Within a problematic certain things are taken for granted and one proceeds to resolve the questions raised. This means that from within a problematic one cannot investigate that problematic, and it also means that from within one problematic another cannot be identified because this is not to proceed within one's problematic. A structuralist, say, can ask certain sorts of questions about phenomenology, but, qua structuralist, not about its problematic. A structuralist can attempt to give a different sort of answer to the questions raised by phenomenology, for instance about the meaning of certain phenomena; or the structuralist

can apply structural questions to a phenomenological text, attempting to identify the structure of relations for instance. But neither of these moves is attempting to read the problematic of phenomenology. To ask questions about a problematic is to ask difference sorts of questions than those which are raised within a problematic.

A problematic is such that it cannot be identified from inside nor outside that problematic inside one another. This is a general principle – and it had peculiar implications in the context of identifying problematics that involved dichotomous thinking. A problematic involving dichotomous thinking assumes that the only positions to adopt are the mutually exclusive inside or outside positions. In attempting to identify such a problematic, if we were not to be inside it, we had to avoid thinking the inside-outside relation dichotomously. And in order to be outside the problematic, the way of being outside had to be such that it did not exclude being inside – otherwise this would be just another way of being inside. That is, a problematic within dichotomous thinking could be exposed neither from within nor fromwithout it but only from both simultaneously, and in such a way that the within and without, the interior and exterior, the inside and outside, is not thought as mutually exclusive and exhaustive. Thus the relationship between the 'position' of the reader and the 'position' of the text had a certain parallel with the relationship between the problematic and the frame of reference of the text. As we have seen the problematic is inside the frame of reference insofar as it is not anywhere else but it is not the same as the frame of reference, it is not explicit or present on the surface of the text. In reading a problematic we had to be inside it but at a distance, not adopting it. Without being to some extent inside it would have been impossible to detect the appropriate clues, while in order to recognise them as clues we had to be not working within that problematic. This is perhaps similar to a parody where the actor must succeed in imitating

a character without simply repeating or imitating. There needs to be a subtle difference if the parody is to work as a parody and not merely be the acting out of a role. This approach meant that rather than describing the theory and then arguing against it, offering a different theory, we had to present the theory in a critical mode, showing what Locke and Husserl could and could not achieve, and what moves they were compelled to make given how and why they said what they did.

The methodological apparatus was thus useful for critically circum-scribing the problematic that sanctioned the empiricist and phenomenological frames of reference, and for detecting and exposing the dichotomous thinking involved in that problematic. It enabled us to avoid criticising empiricism and phenomenology only at the frame of reference level and to locate their difficulties in the problematic, thereby avoiding the danger of simply adding a further theory within the problematic. That is, rather than just arguing that their answers are wrong, we could see how the difficulties arose in the conceptual relationships within which their problems were formulated - in the dichotomous thinking involved in the assumptions of dualism, of the principle of presence, of knowledge as certainty and in the conception of the subject. The methodology enabled us to maintain the differences between the frames of reference while simultaneously detecting these other sorts of similarities. In doing so it provided a means of analysing theories without repeating them and without proposing an alterna-tive theory at the same level, within the same mode of thought. Furthermore, in exposing this difference-in-the-same, the methodology exposed its own mode of thought as different from the mode of thought involved in the frames of reference being analysed. In not operating with the inside-outside distinction as a dichotomy, it was possible to have a concept such as that of difference-in-the-same, a concept that is impossible for dichotomous thinking. In working with non-dichotomous conceptual relationships it marks a break with dichotomous thinking.

But the thinking involved in this methodology is difficult to sustain in the face of dichotomous thinking, partly due to the force and nature of dichotomous thinking and partly because the other thinking is set up 'in the face of' dichotomous thinking. The direction of dichotomous thinking is always to insist on the complete separation of the internal and external and any thinking which attempts to avoid this direction is constantly tempted back into the well worn tracks. This is why it matters how we attempt to avoid it, and this is why we must return to the question of whether or not, or to what extent, the thinking of the methodology is appropriate for a critique of the dichotomous mode of thinking. Even though we cannot be certain in advance of where alternative tracks might lead - even if it were accepted that such certainty were a valuable ideal - we can tell how the type of track being followed relates to the mainstream road. For instance, in refusing to accept the presupposition of dichotomous thinking that the only theoretical positions from which to employ a methodology for analysing theories are those inside that theory, taking its presuppositions for granted, or outside it, working from the presupposition of a different theory, and in refusing to accept that these must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive alternatives, it then becomes difficult to identify what position we are in. Being required to say, and to say in advance, assumes that an answer could be given in the abstract apart from the process of analysing a particular theory - and this assumption the critique of dichotomous thinking desires and needs to avoid. And further, the requirement requires that the position be specified at the same level and in the same terms as the inside and outside positions. If we reject the latter two positions and accept the requirement we are attempting to specify a third alternative the possibility of which is precisely what is denied by the assumption of the requirement. And it is this assumption, this train of thought, that the critique of dichotomous thinking desires not to repeat or retrace. But the methodology of problematics and frames of reference encourages

the question 'from what position can a problematic be read?' This question
presupposes the inside-outside dichotomy, and however much we try to avoid
the dichotomy by describing the position as inside-while-outside we are
involved in using a metaphor and adopting a style that is dangerously close
to dichotomous thinking. Not only is the description of the position
dangerously close, but also the using of the methodology is dangerously
inside-outside that which it is analysing. In accepting the question of
'position' it is perpetually at risk of simply adopting another - 'opposite'
- problematic and through this, of being incorporated into dichotomous
thinking. For although the 'position' from which the problematic is identi-
fied is not constructed in terms of the inside-outside dichotomy, and from
that position the problematic-frame of reference distinction is not thought
dichotomously, it is not clear that the mode of thinking this position, and
more generally of adopting any position vis a vis dichotomous thinking, is
not of the same style as that of dichotomous thinking. This is why we
asked 'what is involved in the reading of problematics?', and we now under-
stand by this question what style, what orientation, what rhetoric is
involved. In adopting the methodology of problematics in order to detect
the operation of dichotomous thinking in philosophical texts one is tempted
to adopt a position against that thinking. This is what the force and
nature of dichotomous thinking encourages - this is its force, this is how
it operates, how it seduces, for in being against we are adopting the
rhetoric of dichotomous thinking. This rhetoric is the rhetoric of con-
frontation, of setting up alternatives as opposites, of excluding, of
denying the power of, of denying. And in setting up a position against
dichotomous thinking we are tempted to think of dichotomous thinking as the
positive, the one-with-itself against which we have non-dichotomous thinking,
its privation, not separately characterisable but characterised in terms
of what it is not. And this thinking is the mode of dichotomous thinking.

But this effect by no means suggests that the analysis of philosophical texts has been wasted. Firstly, the methodology did enable us to circum-scribe the problematic and to understand how it involves dichotomous thinking, and the consequence of this. Secondly, and no less importantly, even in the process of being seduced by dichotomous thinking we were able to further understand it, to see more fully its force, its powers of seduction, and to understand more precisely - and perhaps more forcefully - how and why it is so pervasive, so self-perpetuating and self-justifying. Even so we are not left with no further possible moves. We have seen how the methodology used can enable us to circumscribe a problematic and learnt that, while a mode of thinking may be involved in that problematic, the mode of thinking is not the sort of thing that can be circumscribed. It makes sense to be 'outside' a problematic but not outside a mode of thinking for a mode of thinking is not the sort of 'thing' that has an 'inside' to be 'outside' of. To attempt to circumscribe it in the case of dichotomous thinking is misleading for a mode of thinking is not a position one adopts. So to disrupt a mode of thinking we need to do more than to criticise its problematics and we have to avoid adopting an alternative position. This method may be a useful technique for identifying and exposing the enemy, the mode of thinking, but it is too blatant, too blunt, too conventional to be effective in disrupting, displacing, effacing something as subtle, as slippery, as ephemeral as a mode of thinking. The method has too much of the rhetoric and style of dichotomous thinking and so it is all the more easily, subtly, unnoticeably seduced by it. This is especially the case with dichotomous thinking, for here there is the extra danger that in repeating the rhetoric one becomes the reverse side of the coin and thus not genuinely other. What then would be effective in displacing and dis-rupting dichotomous thinking? What style, what rhetoric, what mode of thinking, would be adequate for a critique of dichotomous thinking qua a mode of thinking? We know that we must break with the thinking of

problematics, and we know that we must be developing a new mode of thinking, not a new position. One thinker who has dealt with these sorts of problems is Heidegger; to clarify the issues involved I will consider his critique of the metaphysical mode of thinking. The concern will not be primarily with the effectiveness of his stratagies for his task but will be directed towards determining their appropriateness for the critique of dichotomous thinking. What possibilities does his thinking offer for the task at hand and what options does it show are not appropriate?

CHAPTER 8 : Heidegger's Deconstructive Strategy.

Heidegger's treatment of the origin and constitution of metaphysics, and his attempt to overcome metaphysics, offers a parallel with the critique of dichotomous thinking. If the structure and content of Heidegger's thinking about metaphysics can be clarified it could facilitate the clarification of the possibilities for breaking with dichotomous thinking, not only by the suggestion Heidegger's work offers, but by providing something concrete against which to differentiate my own approach. [1] But more important than this is that Heidegger's mode of thinking is not dichotomous, and working out how he thinks will enable us to clarify what is involved in not thinking dichotomously.

In posing the question of Being as an historical question, Heidegger confronts the problem of the relationship between Being and the various metaphysical theories which involve a conception of Being without ontologically clarifying it. This is similar to the relationship between a problematic and its various frames of reference. Heidegger also confronts the problem of the relationship between metaphysics – as the oblivion of the question of the sense of Being – and his own thought which proceeds from the question of Being in his attempted de-struction and overcoming of metaphysics. This is similar to the problem of attempting to break with dichotomous thinking. In Heidegger's work neither of these relationships is thought dichotomously, nor is the relationship between these relationships, that is the relationship between the uncovering of the hidden sense of Being that governs a metaphysics and the overcoming of metaphysics. Thus working out the structure of these relationships in Heidegger's work will assist us in determining the relationship between dichotomous thinking and its various manifestations. It might also help clarify the relationship between the mode of thinking that is dichotomous and the particular system of dichotomies that is entrenched in much philosophical thought. The parallel with Heidegger is as follows:

working out an adequate methodology for an investigation of the dichotomous problematic underlying many philosophical questions, concepts, ideals and theories involves working toward a non-dichotomous mode of thought which must be reflected in the methodology. For Heidegger, posing the question of Being involves him in showing how Being has been dissimulated in the history of metaphysics in such a way that the question of Being could not be posed by metaphysics and such that posing the question of Being is a step out of - into the ground of - metaphysics.

Although Heidegger's thinking is not dichotomous he does not raise the problem of dichotomies as a theoretical issue. He does occasionally speak of the structure of his questioning - as a backward and forward relatedness - and of the structure of his thought - as circling, tautologous, and he does differentiate his own thought from dialectical thinking. [2] His critique of meta-physics as onto-theology points out the mutually exclusive domains of beings that constitutes the metaphysical conception of the world: being and becoming, being and thought, being and ought... And his characterisation of metaphysics as subjectivism suggests that he understands metaphysics to be founded on the subject-object dichotomy. [3] But these issues are not the focal point or aim of Heidegger's critique. In focussing on these issues my critique of dichotomous thinking to some extent overlaps with Heidegger's critique of metaphysics but it is not co-extensive with it. To some extent Heidegger's account of the origin and constitution of metaphysics provides us with a theoretical space within which to account for the constitution and working - if not the origin - of dichotomous thinking. Not the origin because I do not think the origin of dichotomous thinking can be located in the forgetting or dissimulation of Being - but this question will have to be left aside, it would lead us too far astray as I am not concerned here with origins.

The concern here with Heidegger's work is not with the question of Being as such but rather with the mode of thought that allows and requires Heidegger to pose it as a question in the way that he does, and with the structure of conceptual relationships that is produced in and through the analysis of this question. The task to be undertaken here is to show that and how Heidegger's thinking is not dichotomous. This will be done by considering the way in which Heidegger's way of posing the Being question in Being and Time produces an existential analytic of Dasein that is not founded on a subject-object or mind-world dichotomy. It will be shown how the question of Being and the interpretation of Dasein produce the necessity for what Heidegger, in Being and Time, called the "The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology", of metaphysics. [4] The analysis of Heidegger's mode of thought will be concerned to explicate the intersection of these two themes: of the destruction and overcoming of metaphysics with some aspects of the alternative frame of reference that emerges from the destruction. For instance, Being-in-the-world and the concept of truth. The way in which these themes intersect can be seen from a brief mention of an argument from Being and Time which will be discussed in more detail later. The analytic of Dasein shows that, at best, the conceptual framework, the questions, the problems of metaphysics are interpretations based on a founded mode of Being which has not been made ontologically determinate; at worst, they are not genuine questions at all for if we clarified the presuppositions of, for example, the question of how we can have knowledge of the external world, and made this ontologically determinate, we could not raise such a question. On the other hand, Heidegger does want to show how they arise as questions and this means showing how they are based on possible modes of being for Dasein. [5]

We can see how these sorts of issues relate to the dichotomies question once we realise that metaphysics involves a systematically dichotomous form-

ation of concepts and that the history of metaphysics involves the deployment
of a particular set of dichotomies. The existential analytic of Dasein
does not employ this set of dichotomies, nor is it articulated dichotomously.
It thus does not belong to metaphysical thinking, nor to dichotomous thinking.
Heidegger's de-constructing of the history of metaphysics involves constructing
an alternative frame of reference while this latter requires, perhaps is, a
de-construction of metaphysics. [6]

The point of the interest in both these themes - the de-construction
and construction - and in their intersection is in the structure of the
conceptual relationships involved.

The direction of the analysis will be to explicate a detail from
Being and Time, showing that it is not in the dichotomous problematic.
This will then be placed in the wider framework of Heidegger's attempt to
question the sense of Being, to think Being, in order to show how, in a
deeper sense and level, his thinking is not dichotomous.

Prior to this I will consider certain aspects of Heidegger's methodo-
logy, firstly of questioning and interpretation, and secondly of destruction
and retrieve. This will have two purposes. One is to show how the method-
ology reflects and produces the question and conception of Being since this
will give a clue to understanding what Heidegger considers the proper
approach to Being. By understanding his conceptions of questioning and
interpretation we can understand why it is that Dasein is interpreted as a
means to uncovering the sense of Being, and why Heidegger concentrates on
particular aspects of Dasein. It also gives a clue to understanding the
relationship between Dasein and Being. Through this we can recognise the
necessity of a de-struction of metaphysics for the analytic of Dasein to be
able to yield the sense of Being and also why the analytic fails and compels

Heidegger to re-pose the Being question. The interpretation of Dasein is dropped in favour of the deconstruction of metaphysics, and this now includes the de-construction of the existential analytic. [7] Heidegger understood more than anyone that an existential analytic and a fundamental ontology must remain within metaphysics, that to approach Being through its "there" (Da-sein) is once again to think Being in terms of presence. Nevertheless, Heidegger continued to emphasise the belonging together, the appropriation, of man and Being, although later in terms of the relationship rather than in respect of that which is related. [8] This shift in Heidegger's thinking involves an interesting relationship (between the earlier and the later) which reflects the structure of Heidegger's relationship to metaphysics, and that of Being to metaphysics, which I will explicate when I come to discussing the structure of de-construction.

This brings me to the other purpose of initially considering Heidegger's methodology and this is to furnish a preliminary clarification of the structure of Heidegger's thought, of the sorts of conceptual relationships he operates with. This will assist in the later clarification of the mode of thought manifested in the details of the frame of reference. Without this understanding it is difficult to appreciate the force of Heidegger's thinking; for instance, why the conception of the possibility of a new beginning for thinking is not to be understood as a mere speculation about ideal circumstances, why its possibility is aroused by the thinking through of metaphysics and yet cannot remain metaphysical, why this thinking is a re-call, and why the step back into the ground of metaphysics is a break with metaphysics. Heidegger's conception of the possibility of a new beginning is not dichotomous − the old versus the new, metaphysics versus thinking; and it is not dialectical − thinking as incorporating and trans-forming metaphysics into a larger, higher totality. How these relationships are understood we can now turn to consider.

Heidegger opens Being and Time with the statement that the question of the meaning of Being has been forgotten. This question, he says, needs to be formulated. Only by formulating the question appropriately can the meaning of Being be interpreted properly. Heidegger's conception of questioning, of enquiry, produces the proper means for explicating and clarifying the meaning of (the question of) Being. This means is the interpretation of the Being of Dasein, that is, of that being whose Being is an issue, or question, for it. The structure of Heidegger's conception of interpretation reflects that of the structure of questioning and, not accidentally, it reflects the structure of the modes of Being of Dasein and of the relationship between Being and Dasein. It is this structure I hope to clarify as it is by working with relationships of this sort that Heidegger does not think dichotomously.

According to Heidegger, any enquiry has a three sided structure: that which is asked about, that which is interrogated, and that which is to be found out by the asking (p.24). The crucial point of interest here is that any enquiry is "guided beforehand by what is sought" (p.25). In a question, that about which the question is asked must already be disclosed in some way, we must already have some understanding of it, though not necessarily thematised.

Thus in order to question the meaning of Being - which it is claimed has been forgotten - in order for there to be such a question, we must already have some understanding of Being. This complex and seemingly paradoxical thought has several decisive consequences for Heidegger. This requirement of the enquiry, together with the fact that any enquiry requires an enquirer provides Heidegger with a clue as to which entity to interrogate regarding its Being as a means to uncovering the meaning of Being. [9] The sort of entity which enquires is the sort of entity for

whom its Being is an issue, who comports itself towards its Being. As
such, this entity has an already-there understanding of Being, although
unthematised. By making this understanding thematic, by interpreting it,
Heidegger hopes to reach "that which is to be found out by asking," namely
the meaning of Being.

Thus we have an entity, Dasein, whose mode of Being is such that it
can ask the question of the meaning of Being, and it can do this because
its mode of Being is such that its Being is an issue for it, because it
always already has an understanding of (its) Being. The question of the
meaning of Being can only be asked because the meaning is already understood
in some way. Dasein is to be interrogated because it "is ontically signifi-
cant in that it is ontological" (p.32).

But Dasein's understanding of (its) Being is not yet thematic, it
remains to be interpreted. 'Understanding' here does not mean knowing or
cognition or comprehension by a pure Reason; [10] these, says Heidegger,
are secondary or founded modes of understanding. Rather, understanding is
a way of Being-in-the-world whereby through our concernful and interested
involvement with other people and things we are aware of the meaningful
relationships of things to one another and of each to the totality.
Encountering entities is possible because it occurs within a context where
significant relationships are disclosed, because it occurs within a world
(the matrix of significations). Dasein's understanding of Being is its
familiarity with the world. "Dasein, in its familiarity with significance,
is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which
are encountered in a world with involvement (readiness-to-hand) as their
kind of Being and which can make themselves known as they are in themselves"
(p.120). This familiarity or understanding is an ontological condition for
interpreting, in which "the understanding appropriates understandingly that
which is understood by it" (p.188), it becomes explicitly understood.

Because understanding is our familiarity with the world, if Heidegger

aims to interpret Dasein's understanding he must explicate how Dasein is

"proximally and for the most part - in its average everydayness" (pp.37-

38). This notion of everydayness is a difficult one to be clear about.

It is through the analysis of everyday modes of Being-in-the-world that

Heidegger expects to uncover what he calls the existentialia, the ontological

conditions of being a Dasein, a "who". But everydayness can be, and is,

inauthentic, and interpretations of it are often overladen with misunder-

standings, with the application of inappropriate categories that have

partly been handed down by the tradition of philosophy and are partly a

reflection of inauthentic modes of Being-in-the-world. In particular,

Heidegger suggests that Dasein has traditionally been interpreted according

to categories which are proper to what Dasein is not, namely entities

present-at-hand. Dasein often understands itself in this manner, as one

entity related to others. Discussing Being-in-the-world, Heidegger says

that

> "... for the most part this phenomenon has been explained in a way
>
> which is basically wrong, or interpreted in an ontologically inadequate
>
> manner. On the other hand, this 'seeming in a certain way and yet for
>
> the most part wrongly explaining' is itself based upon nothing else
>
> than this very state of Dasein's Being, which is such that Dasein
>
> itself - and this means also its Being-in-the-world - gets its ontological
>
> understanding of itself in the first instance from those entities
>
> which it itself is not but which it encounters 'within' its world, and
>
> from the Being which they possess" (p. 85).

This is exemplified in discussions about the relationship between the soul

and the world, of how a subject is related to an object, of perception as

"a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness

after one has gone out and grasped it" (p. 89), and of man as a "spiritual

thing along with a corporeal thing" (p. 82). In rejecting these sorts of

interpretations of Dasein it might seem that Heidegger's task is to separate the essence of Dasein from its historically conditioned accidental misunderstandings and false self-misinterpretations, to separate the genuine and pure from the false. That this is not the case we can see by considering Heidegger's distinctions between deficient and positive modes and between founded and primordial modes. [11] Everydayness might involve regarding oneself as a body which additionally has a mind, and perception might be interpreted as a relation between an internal mind and an external object. But the former instance is a deficient mode of understanding oneself that is only possible for a Dasein; similarly, withdrawing from people is a deficient mode of being-with - being alone and being-with are not to be understood as mutually exclusive ways of being. In the latter instance, this interpretation of perception must be founded upon the fact that we are always already "'outside' alongside entities" encountered, and these "belong to a world already discovered" (p.89). Such a misinterpretation is a possible interpretation because it is dependent on our primordial Being-in-the-world. Heidegger's interpretation of everydayness does not involve separating the essential from the inessential and making them mutually exclusive; rather it involves showing precisely how our general ways of Being-in-the-world and how our theories which reflect and justify these are modes of a more primordial and positive way of Being-in-the-world. [12] The point is a little clearer if we add that Heidegger takes it that in order to interpret something, that which is to be interpreted must already be understood or disclosed in some way, and this way includes the possibility that it always was understood wrongly. Interpretation can show how a wrong understanding is a mode of a right understanding, can show that and how it is an understanding.

If interpretation is to make explicit what is already understood, [13] if the analytic of everydayness is to expose what is primordial and con-

stitutive of Dasein's Being in such a way as to reveal what are founded, inauthentic and deficient modes of Being as such, then this can only be because the existentialia and the meaning of Being are already understood, already present though forgotten, disguised, concealed. We can only un-cover that which is already there as covered. It is by disclosing that which is hidden in what appears obvious and natural, by showing how the hidden is always already there making possible, founding, the 'obvious' that Heidegger interprets. It is because the existentialia are implicit though disguised that it makes sense to attempt to interpret Dasein's everydayness: only because we are already and always in-a-world can the question of the possibility of knowing the world arise, and Heidegger interprets this question as a founded mode of Being-in, knowing the world. And it is because Being is present though concealed, because we have an understanding of Being although we forget that we do so, that it makes sense for Heidegger to question the meaning of Being. Our Being-in-the-world is a way of understanding Being which we pay no attention to in our everyday dealings with entities, but this dealing with is only possible and meaningful within-a-world. If Heidegger can interpret it appropriately, he thinks it will provide a clue to uncovering the meaning of Being that we already understand.

However the problem of interpretation becomes more complicated once the temporal and historical dimension of Dasein and Being is taken account of. [14] It is not so much an added dimension, rather the historicity of Dasein and of Being means that they can only be understood through this dimension. Being is revealed in and through time, as evidenced partly by the different ways in which Dasein has understood and interpreted it. This has the effect that Heidegger cannot pronounce the essence, in the ultimate and eternal sense, of Being; he can only show how it has revealed itself and is revealing itself. And in revealing itself Being always conceals

itself - and this for essential reasons. In <u>Being and Time</u> this was under-
stood in terms of Dasein's facticity, its tendency to turn away from its
anxiety in the face of Being and towards beings in the world, to transform
this anxiety into particular fears. [15] Later Being's concealing itself in
revealing beings was understood from the 'nature' of Being. [16] Being, in
enabling beings to be unconcealed conceals itself in this unconcealment.
The tendency is then to concentrate on that which is unconcealed, so the
way in which Being has been interpreted can only be seen through the ways
beings have been understood. In the focus on beings, which Heidegger
claims characterises the history of metaphysics, (although this history is
differentitated according to the ways in which beings, and thereby Being,
have been understood and interpreted), Being is concealed. The history of
the ways in which Dasein has understood and interpreted itself is the
history of the way in which Being has concealed itself in revealing itself. [17]
Throughout Heidegger's work the questions of the sense of Being and of
human nature belong together. [18] When Heidegger relinquishes the approach
to Being via Dasein he pursues it by de-constructing the history of ontology,
to uncover the hidden senses of Being as given in the history of the epochal
transformations of it. In a sense, this includes his own approach in
<u>Being and Time</u> which he came to recognise as remaining in the metaphysical
tradition. The attempt to think the difference (of Being and beings, of
Being and man) as such will be discussed later. In the meantime, I will
turn to this methodology of destruction for it is here that Heidegger
clarifies the relationship between Being and its "there" by showing what is
required if we are to un-cover, and thereby recover, Being as that which
calls on us to think.

The destruction is first mentioned in <u>Being and Time</u>; it is later
carried out in the Kant and Nietzsche books and in various essays on
Plato, Descartes, Hegel, and where numerous other philosophers are mentioned. [19]

But nowhere does it mean a destroying, or even a rejecting. Destruction
is understood as an un-building, a de-construction, and it is always
supplemented by a re-trieve. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
Heidegger describes his purpose as "to liberate and preserve that interior
force that renders (the) problem in its innermost essence possible as a
problem". [20] The re-trieve is concurrent with the de-struction, it "belongs
together" with it, not as one and then the other, and not as if we could
have one without the other. This double structure of de-struction retrieve
is not an analysis of a theory in the sense of displaying its articulation
followed by the proposal of revisions or an alternative theory. That which
is de-constructed and that which is re-trieved are not on the same level in
the way in which two alternative theories are. But this is not to say
they are on different levels either. The "force" is interior to, but other
than, the problem. Heidegger attempts to disclose it, and thus re-trieve
or preserve it, by de-constructing the problem it renders possible. Kant's
problem of the conditions of the objectivity of the object being at the
same time the conditions of the subjectivity of the subject is, according
to Heidegger, rendered possible by a certain conception of Being. [21] This
conception can only be retrieved, and thus the only way we can properly
understand Kant, is by de-constructing Kant's construction of the problem.
The point is not to argue against Kant, to show where he went wrong and to
attempt to show the 'true' conditions of objectivity but to show under what
conditions this problem is a problem for Kant. To argue against Kant would
be to misconstrue the historicity of Being and hence the historicity of
philosophy. This is not to say that Heidegger is uncritical, for his
conception of the proper sort of criticism is different from that which
argues against from within a position or argues against by comparing or
imposing a different position with or on an earlier one. Heidegger criti-
cises by showing how an ontology has not clarified its own ground, its own
ontological presuppositions. [22] This is why he attempts to un-cover the

hidden senses of Being in Descartes, Kant, Hegel... By looking back to these philosophers and clarifying their presuppositions which is to un-cover the way in which Being has concealed itself while revealing beings, we might be able to move forward by thinking that which has not yet been thought, that is, Being itself.

This methodology with its doubling, circling, de-constructing, re-trieving "relatedness backward and forward" is not seen by Heidegger as arbitrary or imposed but as required by the nature of that which it renders open - by the essential dissimulation of Being in the history of philosophy as metaphysics, by the essential historicity and finitude of Being, and by the relationship of Being to its 'there', (first Dasein and later language). [23]

Heidegger's methodology is already a break with metaphysics. No doubt the question of Being became subverted into a fundamental ontology via an existential analytic of Dasein but the question of Being, in its structure, is a de-centering of epistemology, not another epistemology, and in intention at least, not another ontology. Again, the de-construc-tion of the history of ontology may not have been an other than metaphysical thinking - as if there were some 'other' into which Heidegger could have moved - but at the same time it is not interior to that history; it does not work within and attempt to resolve metaphysical questions and neither does it argue against those questions. As Heidegger says - ironically echoing Kant's worry about the proof of the external world - "the 'scandal of philosophy' is not that this proof has yet to be given, but that such proofs are attempted again and again" (p.249). In Heidegger's thinking the methodology and style is the break with metaphysics and this is possible because the thinking is not dichotomous. We have seen how the interpretation of Dasein was to yield the sense of Being and the possibility of this resides in Dasein's already being its understanding of Being although this

understanding has been forgotten, and this double structure reflects and produces Dasein's double structure of ontic and ontological, everyday and primordial, and inauthentic and authentic : a being for whom its Being is an issue in such a way that it does not make an issue of it. This reflects the structure of Being, that it is unconcealed in concealment, present yet hidden, forgotten yet governing. This reciprocity in structure of the relationship between Dasein and Being enables, even compels, the ontologically inappropriate, metaphysical interpretations of Dasein and Being. Heidegger's deconstructions do not claim that these interpretations are wrong, nor does he reject them; for, and within, metaphysics they are not only possible interpretations but perhaps necessary ones : necessitated by the nature of metaphysics, the metaphysical nature of man and the essential nature of Being. Heidegger's notion of de-construction, his sense of criticism, is not governed by the dichotomy of right and wrong, for as we saw his notion of interpretation means that a wrong understanding is a mode of a right understanding, it is an understanding, it appropriately understands something. Similarly, inauthenticity is a mode of authenticity; it makes no sense to moralistically tell people they ought to live authentically. This is why Heidegger insists that his notions of 'idle talk', 'curiosity', 'deficient'... should not be understood as moral criticisms. [24] Just as Being is always concealed in being revealed, authenticity and inauthenticity belong together. It is Heidegger's conception of truth as the play of revealing concealing that enables us to make sense of these non-dichotomous conceptual relation- ships. [25] Again, Heidegger does not use this conception of truth to criticise the conception of truth as correspondence, to show that it does not truly correspond to the 'true' conception of truth - the correspondence version (and its variants) is a derivative mode of truth, appropriate in its own proper place. And again, the conception of truth cannot be separated from the methodology and question of Being. The methodology allows us to see, is the seeing of, this uncovering covering and compelled Heidegger to

de-construct and retrieve that which is covered in the uncovering and that which is uncovered in the covering, and, to affirm both.

After this long excursion into Heidegger's methodology which shows how Heidegger's approach to philosophical questions and texts is not dichotomous, we must turn to the consideration of the content of his thoughts. It has already been pointed out that these two aspects cannot properly be separated in Heidegger; this means that in getting down to the details, there will inevitably be some repetition, although hopefully it will not be merely repetition but further clarification and expansion as the earlier points are incorporated into a wider framework. Throughout Heidegger's work the question of the sense of Being and the attempts to think Being predominate. As we have seen, his first approach is through the interpretation of Dasein's Being-in-the-world, his second is to de-construct the history of ontology, and his third is to make the step back into the ground of metaphysics, to think the difference as difference. My analysis will follow this pattern; its direction will be towards uncovering the non-dichotomous structure of the conceptual relationships, and it will conclude with a discussion of the nature of the relationships.

In _Being and Time_ Heidegger characterises Dasein as that entity for whom its Being is an issue and says this has a double consequence: that is essence lies in its existence, in the possible ways to be and that it is in each case mine (p.67). Because of this Dasein cannot be understood ontologically as present-at-hand and cannot be interpreted ontologically according to the categories, but according to what Heidegger designates as existentialia, that is, the constitutive modes of Being proper to a Dasein (p.70). These existentialia are to be uncovered by an analysis of the kind of Being that Dasein has "proximally and for the most part — its average _everydayness_ (pp.37-38, 69). The analysis proceeds on the

basis of the fact that the two characteristics of Dasein – that it exists and that it is mine – are grounded in the basic state of Dasein designated as Being-in-the-world (p.78). Heidegger considers this to be a unitary phenomenon, but one whose constitutive items, if examined separately while keeping in mind the whole phenomenon, can give us a fuller understanding of it. Thus Heidegger analyses the ontological structure of the world (I,3), of that entity which has Being-in-the-world (I,4), and the notion of Being-in (I,5). This gives the basis for understanding the meaning of the Being of Dasein as Care (I,6). Rather than undertake an analysis and explication of Being-in-the-world in general or in all its details, I will concentrate on one of the distinctive features of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Through this it should be possible to indicate what some of the existentialia of Dasein are, how these are manifested in average everydayness and how some characteristics of this average everydayness tend to produce inappropriate ontological interpretations. This last point is, as I suggested earlier, somewhat difficult as Heidegger wants to be able to show how traditional conceptions of, for example, knowing the world came about, how they reflect possible modes of Being-in-the-world and also how they are ontologically inappropriate and hence, in a sense, non-problems. But we also need to understand how and why Dasein, in its everydayness, has these as possibilities. Thus we have everydayness as an indefinite, inauthentic mode of Being-in-the-world but one which, as deficient, still 'carries' the existentialia – and how could it do otherwise, and metaphysical interpretations of this everydayness which treat it as primordial.

The distinctive feature of Dasein to be considered here is its Being-in-the-world alongside entities which is characterised by circumspective concern. [26] Heidegger discusses the way we are in our everyday environment. What we encounter, he says, is entities determined according to an "in-order-to", that is, equipment. We find hammers, houses, trees, clothes,

cooking utensils. All of these have a reference or assignment to other entities of the same sort : hammers to nails and wood for a workbench, and a reference to entities of a different sort : people who will use the workbench to make chairs for other people to sit on. These first sort of entities Heidegger characterises as ready-to-hand, and we relate to them with concern. Concern is not theoretical, but more importantly, it is not the attitude of a pure subject or consciousness perceiving a mere external thing present-at-hand. Concern is directed towards the readiness of the equipment ready-to-hand. This shows up more clearly when that which is ready-to-hand is not ready, when it is broken, or missing, or when something else obstructs our using it. When entities are directly ready-to-hand or usable for our purposes we do not recognise their being-ready-to-hand, we forget ourselves and get on and use them. When they become un-ready-to-hand the fact that they are primordially as ready-to-hand in-order-to do something becomes apparent, precisely because we cannot get on and do it. In everydayness we usually do not notice the significance of things, we are too busy using equipment, but we can only use equipment because it has this significance, because we are in-a-world.

What this analysis brings out is the context of the ready-to-hand as equipment and of our concerns. Concern is our mode of Being-in-the-world with entities, and here the world shows itself, not as the totality of entities in some mode of being equipment, but as the relational totality of the meanings of an understanding of the in-order-to. This is already familiar to us although we do not, in our everyday being, think it explicity.

On the basis of Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world alongside entities ready-to-hand we can see the way in which the traditional conception of the relationship between consciousness or the subject and the world and its objects is thoroughly inadequate. [27] It presupposes that the

world is just the totality of objects which are conceived as things merely present to an object whose aim is to perceive and know them. Both the subject and the object (one object, or the world as object) are conceived as entities present-at-hand to one another, and they may or may not additionally be endowed with values of useful, beautiful, in-the-way, concerned. According to this view insofar as things do have these values then this is secondary to their being objects of perception. From Heidegger's analysis it is clear that Being-in-the-world is not perception of objects which can additionally be attributed with subjective values. Entities are always given in a mode of readiness-to-hand within a totality of assignments whose significance necessarily refers to the Being of that being who understands. Concern is not an attitude we might or might not have for entities after we have perceived them, concern is our Being-in-the-world alongside entities, even if in the mode of not being concerned. The philosophers' 'perception' and 'cognition' is a derivative mode of Being-in.

But if Heidegger wants to show how our Being-in-the-world is primordially an interpretative involvement with equipment, he also wants to indicate how it is possible that we traditionally conceive of it in terms of relationships between entities present-at-hand, between objects and a subject for whom the objects are present. That this is a way we interpret ourselves "proximally and for the most part", that this is a possible mode of Being in the world, is undoubted — we have plenty of testimony for it. What Heidegger argues is that this is an inauthentic, derivative, founded mode of Being-in [28] : inauthentic, in that it misconceives the "essence" of Dasein in interpreting it according to the categories applicable to what is other than Dasein; founded, in that while it is a possible mode it is only possible because we are already always in-the-world. What is wrong with this interpretation is that it mis-takes what is a founded mode for the only mode, the primordial mode — it conceals its own possibility.

It is this possible mode of Being-in-the-world that provides the basis for epistemologies that conceive of knowledge as a relationship between a subject and an object, both of which are conceived of as entities present-at-hand - the subject as present to itself, objects as present to the subject, and that gives rise to questions such as how can the subject know the object? Heidegger attempts to show how these 'problems' arise and appear as obvious, that is, as the theoretical reflection of an inauthentic everyday mode of Being-in-the world. As Heidegger says:

> "... the specific kind of Being of ontology hitherto, and the vicissitudes of its enquiries, its findings, and its failures, have been necessitated in the very character of Dasein" (p.40).

> "The kind of Being which belongs to Dasein is rather such that, in understanding its own Being, it has a tendency to do so in terms of that entity towards which it comports itself proximally and in a way which is essentially constant - in terms of the 'world'. In Dasein itself, and therefore in its own understanding of Being, the way in which the world is understood is ... reflected back ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted" (pp.36-37).

Despite the fact that such ontologies do reflect something experienced and understood, they are, in a sense, mistaken insofar as they do not clarify their own ontological presuppositions. For instance the question of how it is possible to know the world is only possible because we are already in a world; the interpretation of Dasein as present-at-hand is only possible because Dasin is a Dasein (a being who interprets) and not merely present at hand. Heidegger is not attempting to show that such epistemologies and ontologies are wrong and to propose an alternative one but to bring out their origins and conditions of possibility.

From this detail of the existential analytic we can see that and how Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's Being-in-the-world is not undertaken

on the presupposition of a set of dichotomies - on the contrary, in indicating
the inappropriateness of epistemologies that work within this presupposition
for clarifying Dasein's special mode of Being, Heidegger undermines the
taken-for-granted obviousness of such dichotomies. Dasein is not interpreted
as a pure subject or ego for whom the body and the rest of the 'external
world' is added on, any more than objects are mere entities present-at-hand
which may or may not have values, significance, added on by the subject who
perceives them. Further, Dasein is not a subject who cognises, perceives
entities, asserts something about them, who may or may not also have practical,
emotional, rhetorical characteristics - for Dasein is always already involved
in its world, in a mode of concern for what is ready to hand alongside it -
in positive and negative modes. [29]

There is here no dichotomy between subject and object, mind and
world, theory and practice, fact and value - and not just because the
subject also has a body or entities also a use, but because the framework
within which Being-in-the-world is explicated employs concepts that are
prior to these distinctions as dichotomies. Precisely what this priority
means we have yet to investigate. [30]

If we place this detail from Being and Time back into its context of
the question concerning the sense of Being a more profound respect in
which Heidegger's thought is not dichotomous can be uncovered. Without
considering that this covers everything to be said, we can say that, for
Heidegger, the sense of Being is the process of un-concealment and at the
same time the Open, the clearing, the world, within which this unconceal-
ment takes place. [31] In this way, the sense of Being is the truth of
Being and, always, it involves concealing. This also means that Being must
be understood in terms of time, that Being is finite and historical. How
beings as beings, in their Being, are interpreted in a given epoch will

provide a clue to the meaning of Being. This meaning, Being, will be dissimulated; Being will be concealed though involved in how beings appear and how they are interpreted. Heidegger argues that the question about the sense of Being has been forgotten in the history of philosophy as metaphysics, as onto-theology. [32] The self-concealing of Being in the un-concealing of beings, the essential dissimulation of Being, has been effective. Metaphysics has enquired into beings as beings, has understood Being as the Being of beings, as first and highest ground or cause and thereby, by thinking Being as another being (albeit a superior being) has forgotten the ontological difference. This is what requires Heidegger to undertake the de-struction of the history of metaphysics, and this in effect is a re-trieve of the inner possibility of the question of metaphysics, an uncovering of the sense of Being that made possible the ways in which beings, and hence Being, have been understood. The 'reversal' from the existential analytic, as the pathway to the sense of Being, to the de-struction of metaphysics takes place when Da-sein, as the "there" of Sein, and thus, Being, has been shown to be historical. [33] This is why, firstly, Heidegger cannot pronounce the sense of Being but only uncover its "mittences" in the history of metaphysics; [34] secondly, the destruction as uncovering the ways in which Being has dissimulated itself remains a hermeneutics of sorts; and thirdly, why the de-structions lead to the "step-back" into the ground of metaphysics, the attempt to think the difference as difference to open up the possibility for new ways of thinking. [35]

What then is Heidegger's relationship to metaphysics? What is the relationship between "the thought of the difference" and metaphysics? We have seen how, in the existential analytic, Heidegger's conceptual relationships are not dichotomous and we have seen that his methodology is not thought dichotomously. How does this thinking work when it analyses a particular metaphysical conception; when it de-constructs a

metaphysical theory; and when it attempts to overcome metaphysics? If
metaphysics is involved in Being in such a way that Being is forgotten,
concealed, how is the thought of Being or the thought of the difference
not metaphysics? And is this 'not', not a dichotomy?

We can start by considering how Heidegger deals with the metaphysical
conception of man as the rational animal. [36] He does not deny or reject
this conception but argues that it is not fundamental enough, that it does
not conceive the humanitas highly enough. Certainly man has a body and is
rational, but this fails to recognise what is distinctive about man and
this is the relationship with Being. The rational animal conception may be
appropriate anthropologically, but ontologically it is inappropriate. It
misses man's existence, its Being-in-the-world. Even when it emphasises
the 'rational' aspect it fails to see that this is a derivative mode of
Being-in. Similarly, when Heidegger criticises humanism it is not because
he is anti-human, [37] as many critics have suggested, anymore than when he
criticises the domination of reason in philosophy that he is proposing
irrationality. His point is that the thinking which emphasises reason is
not rigorous enough. Like humanism it fails to clarify its ontological
presuppositions.

The structure of this style of criticism is repeated when Heidegger
de-constructs a metaphysical theory. Consider his critique of Descartes. [38]
Heidegger does not proceed by pointing out inconsistencies, raising objec-
tions to the arguments or the conclusions and suggesting what Descartes
should or might have said. He does not argue about whether the supposed
inference from Cogito to Sum is valid. He addresses himself to what
governs Descartes' thinking, its context and its procedure. On what basis,
his enquiry asks, does the I become the subjectum? This is "because he
posits the mathematical as the absolute ground and seeks for all knowledge

a foundation that will be in accord with it. It is a question of not only

finding a fundamental law for the realm of nature, but finding the highest

basic principle for the Being of beings in general". [39] Heidegger places

Descartes squarely within the Aristotelian tradition of the quest for the

Being of beings, the thingness of things, the categories - as is suggested

by Descartes' title, Meditations de prima philosophia. [40] The decisive

effect of Descartes' interest in the mathematical as mathesis universalis

is that Descartes requires absolutely certain, intuitively evident proposi-

tions as the ground of what can be known of "what is in being and what

Being means". [41] The one proposition which fulfills this condition - and

this conditions the whole of modern philosophy - is the Sum, the I am which

lies in and underlies the 'I think' that accompanies any proposition.

Hereafter "The Being of being is determined out of the 'I am' as the

certainty of the positing". [42] When the 'I' becomes subjectum, first

ground, the existent becomes object, that which is present to the subject

and represented by it, and in this representation lies the truth. Truth,

or knowledge, is the certainty of the representation, and in the 'I think'

whose fundamental act is reason, all being is judged. "Pure reason...

becomes the guideline and standard of metaphysics, that is, the court of

appeal for the determination of the Being of beings, the thingness of

things". [43]

With this shift to the subject-object relation, understood in terms

of the subject's representation of the object, the belonging together of

Dasein and Being is dissimulated, and truth becomes understood as certainty,

covering up truth as the process of un-concealment. [44] What Heidegger's

critique has done is undermine the apparent absoluteness of the Cogito

as first truth and first ground and shown that and how it belongs to an

age, an epoch - "the age of the world view". In Being and Time Heidegger

has shown how Descartes' ontology arises against the background of Aristotle and the Scholastics by taking his ontological orientation from Being as constant presence-at-hand (p.129). The Cartesian ontology does reflect a possible mode of Being of Dasein, as any ontology does, and it is thereby one of the ways in which Being has revealed itself - but, revealed itself in such a way that the worldhood of the world and the Being of Dasein get passed over. They are interpreted in terms of substantiality, and this idea is not only not ontologically clarified, but appears in no need of clarification. [45] What is concealed, in the way that it is concealed, means that the concealing itself gets concealed. Heidegger's task was to effect the unconcealment, to de-construct what Descartes built up on the basis of ontologically unclarified presuppositions. His method is not to reject Cartesianism, as if this would make any sense, nor to effect an Hegelian "aufheben" of it. He places it historically as one of the "mittences" of Being, he enquires after its ground, its understanding of Being, showing how this understanding of Being means the oblivion of Being insofar as Being is understood as presence-at-hand, substance. The one type of substance, the subject, is present to itself, the other type of substance is present to the subject and re-presented by it. The subject becomes the self-grounding "court of appeal" for Being.

If this is the style of Heidegger's de-construction of a metaphysical theory, what is the meaning and force of the need to overcome metaphysics? How is it possible and what would it involve? Metaphysics, as ontotheology, is characterised by the forgetting, the oblivion of Being. [46] In Being and Time this forgetting is understood in terms of Dasein's turning away from Being toward beings, although this forgetting, this turning away from is not a psychological act but an existential determination that has its origin in everydayness and is re-inforced by ontological interpretations based on subject-object epistemologies. To think of

'forgetting' as psychological would be to think of Being as a being (some-
thing forgotten) which would be precisely to participate in that forgetting.
The later writings make this clearer by emphasising that it is of the
nature of Being to be concealed while allowing beings to dominate, to be
present. [47] What is forgotten, hidden, is the difference between Being
and beings. That the difference holds, that Being participates, is shown
by Heidegger's de-constructions where he shows the ways in which Being has
been presupposed. That the difference holds, that Being participates, is
what enables and compels Heidegger to raise the question of the sense of
Being, to turn toward the difference, to attempt to think the difference as
such. It is Being, he says, which calls on us to think. [48] This thinking
cannot be done within metaphysics for although metaphysics is constituted
by the difference it is at the same time constituted by the oblivion of the
difference. The history of metaphysics is the history of the transformations
of Being's unconcealing keeping in concealment. [49] The thought of the
difference as such involves stepping outside metaphysics: "the step back
thus moves out of metaphysics into the essential nature of metaphysics". [50]
Heidegger says he is:

> "... thinking of the difference as a perdurance so as to clarify to
> what extent the onto-theological constitution of metaphysics has its
> essential origin in the perdurance that begins the history of meta-
> physics, governs all of its epochs, and yet remains everywhere con-
> cealed as perdurance, and thus forgotten in an oblivion which even
> escapes itself." [51]

Thus Heidegger shifts from re-trieving the hidden sense of Being to
thinking the difference as difference and this means stepping outside or
overcoming metaphysics. Overcoming is not understood as destroying,
rejecting, nor as surpassing ("aufheben") but as stepping back into the
ground of metaphysics. [52] Any thinking, according to Heidegger, involves
Being : in the metaphysical mode Being is involved as dissimulated.

When metaphysics treats Being as the Being of beings (as cause or ground) it does not acknowledge the difference between Being and beings, it treats Being as another being. [53] When Heidegger attempts to think the difference as such he is no longer thinking metaphysically.

To understand the relationship of Heidegger's thinking to metaphysical thinking it would help to clarify the relationship between Being and beings and the relationship between the metaphysical conception of Being and the sense of Being that Heidegger is saying is concealed in metaphysics. The latter case could be described by saying that metaphysics reduces the difference by treating Being as a being and then marks a difference - a dichotomy -between two realms of being. This is indicated even by the name meta-ta-physika. This we have seen reflected in the Cartesian dichotomies between subject and object, mental and physical, mind and body, where there are two realms of being (substance),one with precedence as cause; subjectivity is the determination of Being in Cartesian philosophy. This is the sense of Being which is hidden and not made explicit by Descartes. How then does Heidegger sustain the difference without turning it into a dichotomy? The relationship is not one of cause and effect, this can only occur between two beings. Heidegger speaks of it in terms of a mutual appropriation, of belonging together, with the emphasis on the belonging to emphasise the difference rather than the unity.

> "... the Being of beings means Being which is beings. The 'is' here
> speaks transitively, in transition. Being here becomes present in the
> manner of a transition to beings. But Being does not leave its own
> place and go over to beings, as though beings were first without Being
> and could be approached by Being subsequently. Being transits (that),
> comes unconcealingly over (that) which arrives as something of itself
> unconcealed only by that coming-over". [54] ... "Being in the sense of
> unconcealing overwhelming, and beings as such in the sense of arrival

that keeps itself concealed, are present and thus differentiated, by

virtue of the Same, the differentiation." [55]

The attempt to think non-metaphysically is a step back into the

ground of metaphysics. In _Identity and Difference_, Heidegger speaks of it

as a leap, a spring, and asks whether this is a spring into an abyss. [56]

It is, he says, from the viewpoint of metaphysics, but not otherwise for

we must always already have some understanding of Being. The task is to

face this directly, to let ourselves be open to the clearing, the Open,

the Between, in which both Being and beings are given, as being apart and

toward one another. This will be the Event of Appropriation, in which

both beings and Being come into their own, as the proper of each other. [57]

Metaphysics is not incorporated into a higher level. Heidegger

appears to be critical of metaphysics, as not having thought through its

presuppositions - but then this appears to be necessary; as metaphysics it

cannot be achieved. This is why another mode of thought is needed, but

this is not a wild leap into something 'new', and not a mere possibility, [58]

it is an uncovering of the origins and it requires rigour and courage.

Technicity [59] and everydayness are criticised as undermining the most

essential possibilities and yet they are one of the possible modes of Being

and they are the outcome of a long history of the oblivion of Being.

Perhaps they are unavoidable but, since Being has always been present and

Appropriation has always been a concealed possibility, we can achieve the

transformation. Thus Heidegger does not reject metaphysics, he takes up

its ownmost origin and possibility; but he does not transform metaphysics -

he points to a new beginning, to other possibilities of thought. [60]

There are of course a number of questions we could raise about all

of this, for instance whether or not Heidegger conceives of a sense of

Being that somehow governs the various "mittences" revealed in the history

of metaphysics, or whether Heidegger's own interpretation is not simply one

more "mittence". [61] Richardson queries the relationship between an individual

thinker and their epoch and between thinkers in different epochs. [62] These

questions may be crucial for a Heideggerian exegesis and criticism but are

not to the point here. What needs further clarification here is the non-

dichotomous structure of Heidegger's mode of thought. This will be facili-

tated if we first briefly discuss certain aspects of Heidegger's conception

of time and historicity. [63]

Heidegger's conception of temporality is not based on the continuous

succession or progression of present moments but on an "intro-play of the

three temporal 'ecstases'". [64] According to Joseph Fell, "... this

means... that the being which appears to be ... merely present is ...

found to be co-formed by its 'contemporaneous' or 'simultaneous' relation

to all three temporal dimensions." [65] The past is never merely past -

forgotten and powerless - but lasting, and hence involved in the present

and future, such that the future is never a mere possibility. Thus when

Heidegger speaks of the origin it is not to be understood as a previous,

finished event but as still presencing. In the case of the de-struction

of ontology as the step back into the ground or origin of metaphysics,

Heidegger does not mean going back into the 'past' as the cause of later

events, but the un-covering of that still 'governing' origin. [66] In order

to understand this we need to relate it to the notions of privative modes

and dissimulation. Heidegger's texts abound with examples. If we think

back to the conception of phenomenology that dominates the analysis in

Being and Time we can see how Heidegger's own past is still present

in the later works, although in a different mode. In Being and Time, in

an appearance, in what is present, we also have that which for the most

part does not show itself. [67] In What is called Thinking? it is shown

how the double structure of 'to be' covers both the act of being and the being which is. [68] Being is, as not present, as concealed. Kant's conditions of experience - the conditions of the objectivity of the object is at the same time conditions of the subjectivity of the subject - is a mode of Parmenides saying - Being and Thinking are the same. [69] The existentialia are uncovered through the analysis of everydayness which is a mode of Being what we are without appearing it. Being-alone is a privative mode of being-with, and the privative modes are only possible on the basis of (being modes of) originary modes - not as past causes but present as dissimulated, and not as alternative modes of the same thing. [70] Thinking as calculating is a privative mode of thinking as "letting-lie-before-us and taking-to-heart," while its very possibility conceals that possibility. [71] The thought of Being, of the difference, the event of Appropriation, must not be understood as a merely possible future possibility but as only possible as the ad-vent or arrival of what has been and in a dissimulated way still is. This is why in being open to that which calls on us to think we are re-calling. We can only be re-called insofar as that which calls is always already 'there'. This means that the overcoming of metaphysics only makes sense for Heidegger if it is understood as the re-covering of an original possibility that is concealed in and by metaphysics. It means re-calling that aspect of 'to-be' that has been forgotten in the concentration on beings; it means facing 'the Same', the belonging together of Being and thinking that is prior to and enables their opposition; it means thinking the difference in the ontological difference. Unless Being was already there it could not be un-concealed. As things stand, its mode of Being there is concealed in everydayness, in metaphysics, in technicity. All the epochs of metaphysics are "mittences" of Being that conceal their origin, their being "mittences". Metaphysics is the thinking of Being that - in the mode of not thinking it but representing it - dissimulates it.

The complexity of the structure of conceptual relationships in Heidegger's thinking - as manifested by such notions as contemporaneity, dissimulation, unconcealing keeping in concealment, the arrival of what has been and still is - is difficult to characterise in a general way. We can try by taking as a clue what he says in Identity and Difference. Heidegger attempts to re-think the notion of identity, from that of one-ness to that of "belonging together" - with the emphasis on the belonging such that we get belonging together in a mode of difference. Rather than focussing on the entities differentiated Heidegger insists on the differ-ence as difference, as the holding together while holding apart. [72] The nature of this belonging is not that of one and another, whose alternative would be one or the other, it lies prior to this and/or distinction. The difficulty of accounting for it cannot be overcome by speaking of parts or elements, as if some elements are the same and others different. If we consider what Heidegger says in "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics" [73] in trying to clarify how metaphysics has its origin in the difference that it conceals while concealing the concealment, we can see an instance of the "belonging together". Metaphysics is said to represent beings in respect of what differs in the difference without heeding the difference as difference. [74] But in the not heeding, in the forgetting of the difference and concentrating on the elements differentiated metaphysics remains involved in the difference. [75] That is how we have the difference (Being) concealed while still governing what is thought and how, and meta-physics obliterating the difference while remaining involved in it. We have an unconcealing concealment, an involved detachment, a towards while away from, that does not operate with a logic of one and, one or, one then, one-ness - but belonging together in difference. Heidegger here and else-where describes this as a circling. [76] In Being and Time he rejects the usefulness of criticising his interpretation of Dasein's Being-in-the-world as a vicious circle. He accepts its circular structure but argues that

this reflects the structure of Dasein, of understanding. This cannot be comprehended by a logic of premises and conclusions, causes and effects. He says,

> "the 'circle' in understanding belongs to the structure of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein - that is, in the understanding which interprets. An entity for which, as Being-in-the-world, its Being is itself an issue, has, ontologically a circular structure" (p.195).

Heidegger's work begins as an hermeneutic, but when it moves to the de-structuring re-trieve and then to the step-back it retains this circling structure, both in detail and overall as I have tried to indicate. This circling, this belonging together in difference, is prior to dichotomies while enabling them to arise from it while forgetting that from which they arose. Hence the logic of dichotomies, which defines both by excluding and by insisting on the efficacy of the one-with-itself, cannot comprehend the thought of belonging together. Even when dichotomous thinking takes into account the logical interdependence of what is mutually exclusive it falls short of belonging together for the relation of interdependence is not equivalent to Heidegger's sense of belonging together in the Same, the differentiation. Heidegger's style, his language, indicates that in order to think the differentiation, he needs to go beyond a subject-predicate, propositional logic. [77] This logic is tied up with a subject-object epistemology. He goes beyond by recalling that from which the subject-predicate and subject-object arose - not as a form of mysticism, but as a more rigorous form of thought. A form of thought, and a style of language, that is closer to in responding to that which calls on us to think. Logic is not rejected, it retains its place; it is replaced where it is appropriate in the effort to appropriate that which is most proper to thought. [78] When logic resumes its proper place as one of the ways in which language

speaks of things rather than as the "court of appeal" of Being, Dasein can turn to a more appropriate mode of letting Being give itself, and this will involve a more original style of language. [79] Propositional language cannot appropriate Being because Being is not a thing of which qualities can be predicated; propositions, predicates, are only proper to beings.

We can only understand Heidegger's thought if we give up the logic of either/or, of mutual exclusion and exhaustion, of the one-with-itself, and if we allow the possibility that circling, paradoxical and apparently contradictory statements can still be saying something. We do not have to be involved with the concern with Being to acknowledge that Heidegger's mode of thinking cannot be contained within the mode of dichotomous thinking.

Notes

1.   This attempt to write about Heideggers' thinking has presented
     enormous difficulties. The first concerns how great a distance
     and what sort of distance it is appropriate to maintain from
     Heidegger's problems and language given the nature of my interest
     here in his work. This difficulty is accentuated by the complexity,
     and often obtuseness, of both his problems and language. I have
     tried to follow his thinking without either making a commitment to
     it or attempting to criticise it, no doubt without fully succeeding,
     and perhaps at times being caught in a position between commitment
     and criticism, of simply repeating it. The second difficulty has
     to do with providing adequate references without providing textual
     justification for every sentence. I have compromised by giving
     detailed references where I quote and general references where I am
     describing a feature of Heidegger's thinking that is developed in a
     number of texts, or is conveyed in the way an argument proceeds
     rather than explicitly stated. All page numbers in this text are
     references to Being and Time — see Note 2.

2.   On the structure see Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, translated
     by John Macquarie and Edward Robinson. Oxford; Basil Blackwell,
     1967. pp.27-28, 194. All pagination is to the English text. That
     it is not dialectical see Heidegger, Martin, Identity and Difference,
     translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York; Harper and Row, 1969. p.49.
     Also "Overcoming Metaphysics" in The End of Philosophy, translated
     by Joan Stambaugh. London; Souvenir Press, 1975.

3.   On the critique of metaphysics see Heidegger, Martin, Introduction
     to Metaphysics, translated by Ralph Manheim. New York; Anchor Books,
     1961. Part 4 : "The Limitation of Being". Also, "The Way Back Into
     the Ground of Metaphysics" in W. Barret and H. Aiken (ed), Philosophy
     in the Twentieth Century, Random House, 1962. p.214f.

Notes (continued)

4. <u>Being and Time</u> §6.

5. <u>Being and Time</u>, see for example, I.2. §13. "A founded mode in which Being-in is exemplified, Knowing the World." pp.86-90.

6. I sometimes use the word 'de-construction' rather than 'destruction' because it suggests a more positive approach - and Heidegger makes clear in <u>Being and Time</u> and elsewhere that he does not mean destroying. For a fuller explanation of what is involved, see below.

7. Heidegger does not of course explicitly carry out the de-construction of the existential analytic although the necessity for it is implicit in some of his later remarks on <u>Being and Time</u>. See "Letter on Humanism" in Krell, David Farrell (ed), <u>Martin Heidegger. Basic Writings</u>. London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. pp.208, 235; and "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics" in Barret and Aiken (ed), <u>op. cit.</u>, pp.216-7 where Heidegger mentions the attempt of <u>Being and Time</u> to be a fundamental ontology; and "The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking" in Krell (ed), <u>op. cit.</u>, p.373. See also Heidegger's discussion of his "reversal" in the letter to Richardson, published as the Preface to Richardson, William J., <u>Heidegger. Through Phenomenology to Thought</u>. The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Richardson discusses the process of the reversal at some length. See Part II, Chapters I and II, Part II, Section B, Chapters VI and XII.

8. <u>Identity and Difference</u>, p.31; "Recollection in Metaphysics" in <u>The End of Philosophy</u>, p.82.

9. <u>Being and Time</u>, §4.

10. On understanding, see <u>Being and Time</u>, §18 especially pp.118f, and §31.

11. On deficient modes, see <u>Being and Time</u>, pp.83, 156-7.
    On founded modes, see <u>Being and Time</u>, §§13, 20, 44a.

12. This view presents its own difficulties which I will return to in the following chapter; my concern here is just to indicate that the thought is not dichotomous.

Notes (continued)

13. On interpretation and understanding, and the making explicit of what
    is implicit, hidden, concealed... see Being and Time, §§5, 12, 29,
    31, 32, 34, 44.

14. See Being and Time, pp.39f, 277-8.

15. Being and Time, § 40. See also "What is Metaphysics?" in Krell (ed),
    op. cit.

16. This movement comes to fruition in Introduction to Metaphysics, See
    the concluding pages, and Richardson's account of this text in his
    Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought pp.259-99.

17. Identity and Difference, pp.64-65 especially.

18. This comes out through following Heidegger's response to What is
    Called Thinking?, from that which calls and who is called. See
    for example, Part II, lecture IV.

19. Being and Time §6 is entitled "The Task of Destroying the History of
    Ontology", and discusses the basis of the necessity of this task and
    its positive and negative elements. As is well known, this task, which
    was to have been carried out in Part II of Being and Time, was never
    published as such, although it can reasonably be said to have been
    realised in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, the two volumes of
    Nietzsche, and in essays such as "Hegel and the Concept of Experience"
    and "Plato's Doctrine of Truth" and in the discussion of Descartes
    that forms B.I.5 of What is a Thing?

20. Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, translated by James S. Churchill.
    Bloomington; Indiana University Press, 1962. Section Four, p.211.
    I have used Richardson's translation of this phrase rather than
    Churchill's, as the latter's rendering of Weiderholung as 'repetition'
    is misleading with regard to what Heidegger is actually doing. The
    paragraph from which this phrase is taken makes this clear, so I will
    quote it in full (in Richardson's translation).

Notes (continued)

20. continued....

"By the re-trieve of a fundamental problem we understand the dis-

closure of those original possibilities of the problem which up to

the present have lain hidden. By the elaboration of these possibilities,

the problem itself is transformed and thus for the first time is con-

ceived in its proper context. To preserve a problem however, means

to liberate and preserve that interior force that renders this problem

in its innermost essence possible as a problem." Richardson, William J.,

Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought. The Hague; Martinus

Nijhoff, 1963. p.29. Footnote 4. For a slight variation on this

translation see Richardson p.93. Heidegger's reading of other

philosophers makes it abundantly clear that he does not aim to repeat

the past, and his understanding of temporality and history would make

such an attempt nonsensical. See, for instance, Being and Time,

§68(a) and §74, and the translator's footnote on Weiderholung on p.437.

21. This, of course, is a general point that Heidegger would make about

any metaphysics, that as such it presupposes a conception of Being

even if understood as the Being of beings. See Kant and the Problem

of Metaphysics, §§1 and 40; and for a general discussion of the con-

stitution of metaphysics, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics"

in Barret and Aiken (ed), op. cit. and "The Onto-Theological Constitution

of Metaphysics" in Identity and Difference.

22. See for example, Being and Time, §§19-21 on Descartes' interpretation

of the world; and any of Heidegger's writings on other philosophers.

23. This is the direction of Heidegger's enquiry right from the outset.

In Being and Time we are told that "... what is asked about has an

essential pertinence to the enquiry itself..." §2. The theme that

if we are to think Being we must learn to approach it properly, and

that this means being open to the call of Being rather than thinking

metaphysically, covers the entire writings of Heidegger. The inter-

Notes   (continued)

23.   continued

pretation of the question of the book titled <u>What is called Thinking</u>
as the question 'what calls on us to think?', and the thinking through
of this, is a case in point. But see also Heidegger's letter to
Richardson, published as the preface to the latter's book, where
Heidegger insists that his thinking, including the "reversal", is
"... determined by the way Being is granted..." p.xx.

24.   <u>Being and Time</u> p. 211. See also the "Letter of Humanism", in Krell
<u>op. cit</u>. p. 212.

25.   On the conception of truth, see <u>Being and Time</u>, §44 and "On the
essence of truth" in Krell, <u>op. cit</u>., pp.117-141.

26.   The following discussion is based on <u>Being and Time</u>, §§15, 16.

27.   Heidegger's criticism of epistemologies based on the subject-object
relation can be found in <u>Being and Time</u>, pp.85-86, 168f.

28.   That the subject-object interpretation of Being-in-the-World is a
mis-interpretation, see <u>Being and Time</u>, p.85; that it is a founded
mode of interpreting the phenomenon, see §16, especially p.88.

29.   See <u>Being and Time</u>, §§12, 13 for a concise account (which is developed
in the following Chapters) of the way in which Dasein's Being-in-the-
World is not understood in terms of these dichotomies.

30.   The sense in which Heidegger's thinking thinks <u>prior</u> to dichotomies
will be discussed in the following Chapter.

31.   In his letter to Richardson, speaking of the "intrinsically manifold
matter of Being", Heidegger says that "Only a [commensurately] manifold
thought succeeds in uttering the heart of this matter in a way that
cor-responds with it." Richardson, <u>op. cit</u>., Preface p. xxii. This
at least makes sense of the multiplicity of characterisations of the
sense of Being to be found in Heidegger's writings; it must be added
that there is a unity within this multiplicity although not in such a
way that one could define the essence of Being. "On the Essence of
Truth" is one essay in which the way in which the manifold senses of
Being belong together can be relatively easily followed.

Notes (continued)

32. On metaphysics as onto-theology see "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics" in Barret and Aiken, op. cit and "The Onto-Theological Constitution of Metaphysics" in Identity and Difference.

33. On the reversal see Note 6.

34. The neologism "mittence" was coined by Richardson to translate Geschick. See Richardson, op. cit. pp.20-21. In the plural it suggests the ways in which Being has given or sent or emitted itself in different epochs and induced a commitment on the thinkers in those epochs to understand Being in a certain way. Thus the title "Metaphysics as history of Being" in The End of Philosophy. Geschick is related to Geschichte, history. Despite the ugliness of this neologism it will be used here for purposes of abbreviation.

35. That the "step-back" is the thought of the difference see "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics" in Identity and Difference, pp.50-51, 66f.

36. Heidegger discusses the rational animal conception in "Letter on Humanism", in Krell, op. cit., see especially p.210. Where it is discussed in other texts this is largely repititious of the argument in the "Letter".

37. "Letter on Humanism", pp.225f.

38. The critique of Descartes is from Being and Time, §§19-21, and What is a Thing? I have used the version in Krell, op. cit., "Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics" pp.247-282.

39. "Modern Science, Metaphysics and Mathematics" in Krell, op. cit. p.278.

40. Krell, op. cit. p.274.

41. op. cit. p.277.

42. op. cit. p.279.

43. op. cit. p.282.

44. On the connection between the subject, certainty and representation
    see Riceour, Paul, "The Critique of Subjectivity and Cogito in the
    Philosophy of Heidegger" in Frings, M.S. (ed), Heidegger and the
    Quest for Truth. Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 1968; especially pp.66-69.

45. Being and Time, p.127.

46. See for example, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics" in
    Barret and Aiken, op. cit., pp.207-218.

47. op. cit., p.210f and "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics".

48. See What is called Thinking?, Part II, Lectures IX, X, XI.

49. Identity and Difference, pp.51, 64-65.

50. op.cit., p.51.

51. op. cit., p.68. 'Perdurance' is a translation of Austrag, otherwise
    translated by Richardson as 'issue', although he says it is always as
    'dif-ference'. See Richardson op. cit., p.579 and Note 6 to that page.
    Stambaugh, after consultation with Heidegger says that "the Austrag is
    the carrying out of the 'relation' of Being and beings, endured with
    an intensity that never lets up." See translator's Introduction to
    Identity and Difference, p.17. It should be noted that Heidegger's
    point is that Being and beings are not two separate entities in relation
    but are differentiated within a single dimension, according to Richardson,
    "as if they shared a common centre which remains interior to each...
    and out of which both 'issue forth'." p.579.

52. See Identity and Difference, pp.49f, 64f and "Overcoming Metaphysics"
    in The End of Philosophy.

53. "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics" in Barret and Aiken,
    op. cit., pp.207-210.

54. Identity and Difference, p.64.

55. op. cit., p.65.

56. op. cit., p.30.

57. op. cit., p.36f. 'Event of Appropriation' is a translation of

    Ereignis. In this text Heidegger comments on his use of the term,

    as it differs from its usage in ordinary speech as event, happening,

    occurrence. "The event of appropriation is that realm... through

    which man and Being reach each other in their nature, achieve their

    active nature by losing those qualities with which metaphysics has

    endowed them." op. cit., p.37. Stambaugh points out in her intro-

    duction to the text that Heidegger is relying on the roots of the word :

    "eigen = own, thus to come into one's own, to come to where one belongs"

    and auge = eye... thus to catch sight of, to see with the mind's eye,

    to see face-to-face. op. cit., p.14. See also "Recollection in

    Metaphysics" and "Overcoming Metaphysics" in The End of Philosophy,

    p.79f p.84; where it appears that the Event of Appropriation is not

    another epoch in the history of Being. On the implications of

    Heidegger's metaphorical use of 'proper' see Derrida, Jacques, "The

    Ends of Man" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Sept. 1969.

    See pp.44f.

58. That the 'new' beginning is not something which has simply not happened

    yet but is a possibility see Fell, Joseph P., "Heidegger's Notion of

    Two Beginnings", Review of Metaphysics, XXV, Dec. 1971, pp.213-237.

59. On the world of technology see Identity and Difference, p.33f.

60. End of Philosophy, pp.95-96.

61. These sorts of issues are raised by Otto Poggeler in his "Heidegger's

    Topology of Being" in Kockelmans Joseph (ed), On Heidegger and Language.

    Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1972. p.121.

62. Richardson, op. cit., p 635.

63. It is interesting to note the difference of Heidegger's conception of

    time from those of Locke and Husserl, given the role their conception

    of time as a series of now-points played in the undoing - vis a vis

    dichotomous thinking - of their philosophies.

Notes (continued)

64. Fell, op. cit., p.221. See also Being and Time, p.376f.

65. Fell, ibid.

66. Heidegger repeatedly stressed that his interest in the Greeks was not of an antiquarian nature and that he did not understand their thought as finished.

67. Being and Time, §7.

68. What is called Thinking?, Part II, Lecture X.

69. What is called Thinking?, pp.242-3.

70. That they are not alternatives but that one is the origin of the other, and not origin in the sense of a past, see Fell, op. cit, pp.217-8.

71. What is called Thinking?, Part II, Lecture IX.

72. Identity and Difference, p.65.

73. op. cit., pp.42-74.

74. op. cit., p.70.

75. op. cit., p.71.

76. op. cit., p.69.

77. Erasmus Schöfer has worked out the role and significance of the circle and the tautology in Heidegger's language. See "Heidegger's Language : Metalogical Forms of Thought and Grammatical Specialities" in Kockelmans (ed), op. cit., pp.281-301.

78. The metaphor of placing and replacing must be understood within Heidegger's conception of space, a conception that goes back as far as Being and Time. There space is not primordially measurable distance but de-severance and directionality. Thus the metaphor does not imply separate, distinct, exclusive and exhaustive spaces externally related to one another but must be thought in terms of belonging to a specific place, being situated in a proper context, which is remote or close to Dasein depending on Dasein's concerns.

79. In What is called Thinking? Heidegger suggests that originally words had a double meaning which were later separated out and opposed. His style especially in the later works, re-thinks the original, the belonging-together in-the-same.

CHAPTER 9 : The Possibility of a Critique of Dichotomous Thinking.

In what ways and to what extent does Heidegger's critique of meta-
physics facilitate our quest for an appropriate style for a critique of
the dichotomous mode of thinking? Heidegger's relationship to metaphysics
has been discussed in terms of two moves : firstly, the de-constructing
re-trieve, and secondly, the step-back. Our problem now is to consider
the style and the rhetoric of each move with a view to the possibilities
for overcoming, displacing and criticising dichotomous thinking which
these moves open up and close off. The concern is not so much with the
intricacies of Heidegger's thought as with the suggestions it offers.

The de-constructing re-trieve of a metaphysical theory, as the
"disclosure of those original possibilities of the problem which up to the
present have remained hidden", does not involve criticism of the theory in
any ordinary sense of the word. It can uncover that which has not been
said and perhaps could not have been said within that theory but which has
nevertheless been governing the theory, namely, its sense of Being. It can
show that and how a theory is ontologically inappropriate and how it failed
to clarify its presuppositions, but, as the descriptive 'name' of the
methodology suggests, its direction is not towards criticising, destroying,
or undermining, but towards re-trieving. Heidegger does not argue against :
in showing that an interpretation is inappropriate he allows that it is an
interpretation, appropriate for what it interprets, but it fails to delve
deeply enough into what makes the interpretation, and the phenomena interpreted,
possible. In re-trieving Heidegger is not presenting an other-than-metaphysical
theory, nor an alteration to a particular theory, and neither is his thought
operating interior to metaphysics. The re-trieve is a break with metaphysics;
in disclosing the constitution of metaphysics, its essence or inner conditions
of possibility and in showing how its problems arise as problems, Heidegger
shows that its problems are not given as such, that metaphysics is not the
only way to think, and this raises the possibility of an 'outside' of meta-

physics. But the way in which the re-trieve is still concerned with meta-physics, to uncover its possibility, means that this thought remains meta-physical, albeit in a transferred, transformed, mode. The attempt to re-cover the hidden senses of Being in the epochal transformations of the history of metaphysics could only be a first step in the effort to overcome metaphysics - it places metaphysics, it does not displace it. It remains involved in the language of metaphysics, it still thinks the ontic-ontological difference in terms of what differs. As Derrida says of Heidegger's destruc-tion of metaphysical humanism:

> It "attempt(s) the sortie and the de-construction without changing ground, by repeating what is implicit in the founding concepts and in original problematics, by using against the edifice the instru-ments or the stones available in the house, which means in language as well. The risk here is to constantly confirm, consolidate, or 'relever', at a depth which is ever more sure, precisely that which we are deconstructing. A continuous explicitation which proceeds towards the opening risks falling into a closed autism." 1

With the awareness and in the face of these risks Heidegger attempted the step-back into the ground of metaphysics as the step outside or over-coming of metaphysics. This move has a certain structural parallel with the re-trieve in that both are concerned with re-covering that which, as covered, allowed for the possibility of metaphysics; but, unlike the re-trieve, the step-back is no longer engaged with metaphysics. It attempts to think the difference as such, not its manifestations and dissimulations within the history of metaphysics. It no longer thinks Being in terms of beings, as presence, but of the Same, the Appropriation. And this, it is said, opens up other possibilities for thought, other than metaphysical thought. This move opens up two possibilities, depending on how we under-stand the 'other' than metaphysics and what remains of metaphysics. This latter question is crucial insofar as it has repercussions on what is

involved in the break with metaphysics and what its 'outside' means. The question concerns whether Heidegger thinks of the completion of metaphysics in terms of its coming to an end, or whether man remains a metaphysical animal and the sense of completion is rather that of being restricted to its proper place, not dominating thought, and leaving room for other ways of thinking.

Apart from seeming decidedly un-Heideggerian, the first possibility, given the rhetoric of the 'step-back', is involved in the dilemma of attempting to abruptly change ground by stepping-away-from while the step, as away from implicates it in what it is stepping away from. It still refers to metaphysics. We will return to a discussion of the possibility of this sort of move shortly.

The second move has its own difficulties. Heidegger suggests that metaphysics has gone through the range of its pre-figured possibilities, but this does not mean that it is finished. Man remains the metaphysical animal and will continue to think metaphysically. Given this, Heidegger does not criticise in the sense of rejecting metaphysics for it is one of the possibilities for man; he de-limits it, puts it in its proper place. Metaphysics has its limits - it cannot, for example, think the difference as difference - but it cannot be closed off. Heidegger's thought is that metaphysics is not the only possibility for thought and language, and it is not the most original or profound. The step-back into the ground of metaphysics - the Appropriation, the difference - is a step away from metaphysics that is no longer concerned with metaphysics, not even as something to step away from. It thus cannot be conceived as a critique of metaphysics, as disrupting or displacing metaphysics except insofar as in not thinking metaphysically it shows the limits of metaphysics. It moves into the ground from which metaphysics emerged; it breaks with metaphysics

but not in a way that generates a rupture within metaphysics. Metaphysics

remains, and Heidegger moves into another realm. The move of the step-

back, as the move to the prior, is a double-edged sword. In moving prior

to metaphysics it is other than metaphysics and enables us to see the

limitations of metaphysics, but at the same time, in leaving metaphysics

alone, it allows for the re-emergence of metaphysics. The only hope is

that in thinking what was previously un-thought Heidegger could avert this

possibility.

If we think this move vis a vis dichotomous thinking, it clearly

opens up the possibility of other-than-dichotomous relationships. But

where the other-than is thought as prior to the separation into dichotomy

it apears as a move which, in not challenging the dichotomy, leaves the

dichotomy intact though restricted in its area of relevance. Furthermore,

in being prior to the separation that results in a dichotomy it allows for

the possibility of the recurrence or repitition of the dichotomy - in not

being critical of the dichotomy it does nothing to fore-stall, much less

prevent, this recurrence. This is not unlike Derrida's notion of differance,

of which he says himself that it "is not simply active; it rather indicates

the middle voice, it precedes and sets up the opposition between passivity

and activity" (my italics). [2] This move is perhaps the reverse side of a

dialectics which, starting from the opposition sublates it, but only for it

to re-emerge at a different level and transformed. As such, the principle

of opposition, and the particular dichotomies involved, remains taken for

granted. Neither move allows for the disruption of that principle, at best

we learn that it is not the only possible principle. This, of course, is

itself disruptive of dichotomous thinking which conceives itself as the

only thinking, but, as occurred with the thinking involved in the reading

of problematics, it is easily converted into two competing modes or principles.

Neither of Heidegger's moves offers an appropriate style of critique : one is too closely engaged with metaphysics in a non-disruptive style, the other, as not engaged, is not a critique and leaves metaphysics intact. We can however develop the possibilities of other-than dichotomous relationships into the means for a critique of dichotomous thinking. But why do we need a critique of this mode of thinking? Why not, like Heidegger, having exposed it turn to developing other modes of thought? In some of the earlier analyses, for instance of Poole's argument about freedom and alienation, it was shown that dichotomous thinking involves certain logical errors, category mistakes etc. It reduces distinctions to dichotomies when the distinction is not a logical contradictory. It proceeds as if it is directly describing the world, as if the world is divided into mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories, and insofar as it does argue for this procedure, the arguments are justified by a priori considerations which bring to light the values implicit in the descriptions and judgments - values and judgments which produce undesirable socio-political problems. In the dicussion of the way in which proponents of Structuralism and Phenomenology criticise each others' position, by negation, it became clear that dichotomous thinking has the effect of undermining serious communication. And in the analyses of Locke and Husserl it was found that the dichotomous thinking involved in their common problematic produced unsolvable theoretical problems. If this were all dichotomous thinking involved, we could just develop a different theory using different conceptual relationships and different values and proceed to redescribe the world and to change attitudes. But this is not all it involves for as a mode of thinking it is a restrictive prejudice which insists on its prejudicial approach and pre-judges all other approaches as not-thinking. It is negative and oppositionist, excluding and denying all that which it does not include and from whichever values it adopts it refuses to recognise its 'others' as anything but privations. It restricts possibilities and disguises its

ideological basis in pretending to be <u>the</u> truth, the only way to think -

and its mode of doing this is such as to make it appear obvious and

compelling. In this way it becomes self-perpetuating and self-justifying.

It is thus not enough just to show that dichotomous thinking is not the

only possible mode of thinking and that it is not compelling by exposing it

as a mode and indicating the possibility of other relationships. This is

not enough because as a mode of thought dichotomous thinking has ways of

subverting, of seducing, of incorporating and of transforming its other

into itself. In one respect this emerged in the analysis of Husserl's

attempt to avoid the dichotomy of subject and object. In this case

developing an alternative frame of reference resulted in the dichotomy re-

appearing at a different level. In the case of structuralism, which

proposes an alternative problematic the mode of thinking remained. And

thinking which tries to criticise dichotomous thinking by opposing, denying,

negating and confronting it gets seduced by the rhetoric of dichotomous

thinking and thereby incorporated into it. Most importantly, thinking

which attempts to expose dichotomous thinking is at risk of repeating it,

of attempting to capture the totality of dichotomous thinking so it can be

stepped outside of, of attempting to grasp the essence of dichotomous

thinking without, or while, recognising that to grasp the essence, to

capture the totality, to insist on the exclusivity of the inside and

outside is precisely the rhetoric of dichotomous thinking. Dichotomous

thinking needs to be criticised, not so much because of what it effects,

but because as a mode of thinking it is a mode of prevalence, a mode of

domination. It is not simply that we need to criticise it, but rather

that, as a dominating mode, it provokes criticism, it constantly raises

the question of counter-<u>action</u>. This is why we have to be careful of

how we are provoked, of how we criticise it, for its force, its style

of dominance and provocation is such that it tends to transform exposures

and criticisms into counter-<u>positions</u> and thereby into variations of itself.

The problem of how it can appropriately and effectively be criticised
must take account of how it prevails; in other words, the methodological
issues of its critique unavoidably becomes the substantive question of
its de-prevalence. This is how, despite the parallels, dichotomous
thinking is different from metaphysical thinking and why the Heideggerian
strategies are inappropriate for, and ineffective against, dichotomous
thinking. Metaphysics may have come to be dominant, especially in
philosophy, but dichotomous thinking does not just happen to be dominant,
it is a dominating mode, and it dominates, prevails, everywhere. Like
metaphysical thinking dichotomous thinking is not essential to thought;
it may be compulsive but it is not compelling, and this is what makes
it possible to develop other modes of thought. But unlike metaphysics,
dichotomous thinking does not have a proper place in thought. Heidegger's
critique shows that although man is a metaphysical animal, that metaphysics
is proper to thought, it is not the only possibility for thought and should
not be allowed to dominate thinking. Thus his critique appropriately
suggests that either we do metaphysics or we leave it alone and explore
the other possibilities; and that there is no point in criticising meta-
physics apart from showing that it is not the only, and not the most
fundamental, mode of thought. But this strategy is inappropriate for
dichotomous thinking. Such thinking does not occupy a place but marks
a style of domination; it is not primarily that we cannot leave it alone
but that it will not leave us alone. This is why we need a style and a
strategy for a critique that does not attempt to put it in a place and
leave it alone, and does not attempt to confront it.

There is no point in opposing dichotomous thinking - this is only
to be its other. Furthermore, we cannot simply and effectively decide
to overcome dichotomous thinking, in any sense of overcoming where this
means adopting another mode of thinking, even if this other is not thought

in terms of other-than. This sort of move is suggested by Althusser vis a vis empiricism. Althusser claims that Heidegger is unable to leave the circle (of ideological philosophy) by thinking "in an 'openness' the absolute condition of possibility of this closure." He says:

"It is impossible to leave a closed space simply by taking up a position merely outside it, either in its exterior or its profundity: so long as this outside or profundity remains its outside or profundity they still belong to that circle, to that closed space, as its 'repetition' in its other-than-itself. Not the repetition but the non-repetition of this space is the way out of this circle: the sole theoretically sound flight - which is precisely not a flight, which is always committed to what it is fleeing from, but the radical foundation of a new space, a new problematic which allows the real problem to be posed." [3]

However if such a move is possible vis a vis problematics this is not so of modes of thinking, and for essential reasons. One is that a mode of thinking is not a closed space, so to think we could step outside it, even where 'outside' is not its outside, would be to misrecognise its nature. A mode of thinking is not the sort of thing that has an inside to be outside of. This is so, even given Althusser's reason for describing ideological, empiricist, philosophy as a closed circle; and there are structural similarities with dichotomous thinking, as emerged from the analysis of its self-perpetuating and self-justifying nature. Althusser describes empiricism as circular because its problems are posed in terms of answers already established on other - ideological - grounds. In this circumstance, there is no point in attempting to answer empiricist problems differently, the only solution is to pose a different problem. The circular structure of dichotomous thinking lies in the way it systematically sets up a mutually exclusive alternative between which we must choose and such that not to choose is to be irrational. But the choice is such that to choose

amounts to not choosing for the one choice is simply the negation, the reverse, of the other. Both choosing and not choosing repeat and reflect back upon the mode of thought and it is this mode which insisted on the dichotomous alternative in the first instance. But this is a circular movement in the operation of dichotomous thinking; it is one of the ways in which that thinking is articulated; it is the way it pre-judges and imposes values, and, in forcing its repetition, it sustains itself. The thinking itself, being a mode and not a theory nor a problematic, is not a closed system or space. It is characterisable but not circumscribable; it is more like the principle of a series the next element of which we cannot predict although we can afterwards determine the principle by which it could count as an element in the series. Dichotomous thinking, as a mode of thinking, has its limits, but not of the sort that would enable us to confidently assert that we had captured it in its totality. It is not only not a closed space, it is not a space at all -- and this is why we cannot simply locate it, pin it down, and move on to other things. Unlike meta-physics? and unlike empiricism, the 'flight' from dichotomous thinking cannot be a 'flight' to an-other place since it does not occupy a place; it is a style of domination. And to leave it alone would be yet another way of recognising its power.

A second, related, essential reason why we cannot effect a move 'outside' dichotomous thinking has to do with the nature of thinking. To think we could just decide to adopt another mode of thinking is to think of consciousness as fully self-aware, fully present to itself, and fully in control of itself. It is to think of consciousness as a-historical, as outside the historically constituted conceptual and socio-political frameworks such that it can simply decide what and how it will think. This conception of consciousness we found to be implicated in dichotomous thinking, and this conception we found, in the analysis of dichotomous

thinking, to be false. The dichotomous mode of thinking was not something the thinkers thinking within it were aware of. A mode of thinking is more ephemeral than a theory and so more powerful and less graspable. Not only are we never fully conscious for we always say more, and less, than we mean for instance, but also how and why we say what we do is never fully in our control, it is conditioned by factors - linguistic and cultural to name a few - over which we have little control. The desire for totality, to capture all levels and aspects of thought at once, is an impossible desire. And the dichotomous mode of thinking is so embedded, sedimented, in our culture, in our language and conceptual frameworks, in our values and ideals, and it is embedded in such a way that it does not often appear as such for it is not explicit, not stated and not conscious and so all the more effective, that we could never be confident of having fully, once and for all, located it, circumscribed it, and supplanted it. There is, as we said at the outset, no foolproof method, no certain assurance, and we found this to be true in the procedure of attempting to expose dichotomous thinking. We cannot just decide to change modes of thinking, to put the old one completely away, as if writing without a trace. And the traces of dichotomous thinking are so engrained that they are the most easily facilitated. And we cannot even specify another mode of thinking in advance, we do not have the means to do so. Like explorers, not knowing what the terrain ahead will be like, we do not know in advance what equipment will be needed. And just as the dichotomous mode of thinking is not circumscribable, neither is any mode that would count as an alternative. Unlike Althusser's situation, there is not another particular problem waiting to be posed and resolved, another theory waiting to be constructed - not because there are not others, but because there is no single one and none given in advance. Modes of thinking do not generate problematics, nor particular theories or particular problems; rather, the latter operate within, employ, deploy, manipulate modes of thinking. This is why we can appreciate that Heidegger

does not think dichotomously without being committed to his philosopical position.

None of this means that dichotomous thinking, as a mode of thinking, cannot be disrupted, displaced from its dominance, perhaps even effaced. It does not mean that the idea of a critique is inappropriate, the problem is to work out an appropriate style of critique. The circular, self-sustaining, structure of dichotomous thinking can be broken. Since dichotomous thinking has no interior and does not occupy a place it has no externality. We cannot step outside it and either leave it alone or confront it. Rather than opposing dichotomous thinking, adopting the rhetoric of confrontation, and rather than attempting to change ground abruptly, adopting the rhetoric of 'laissez faire' we need instead to be engaged with while other than dichotomous thinking, in an appropriate style - a style that we must now proceed to work out in the interplay of what is involved in dichotomous thinking and the other-than-dichotomous relationships already conceived.

Clearly, whatever risks are involved, a major task which is necessary for a critique of dichotomous thinking is the exposure of and analysis of the characteristics of that mode of thinking. As Wilden says:

"If dissent is to escape its own self-alienation... [it] must transcend the status of negative identification. In a word, all dissent must be of a higher logical type than that to which it is opposed ... What is required... is a guerilla rhetoric. And for a guerilla rhetoric you must know what your enemy knows, why and how he knows it, and how to contest him on any ground." [4]

Guerilla rhetoric is not merely adopted as a tactic, it is demanded by the situation, by the nature and force of the style of dominance that dichotomous thinking is. And it is senseless to confront a dominant force.

The exposure of dichotomous thinking undertaken here, as exposure, means that dichotomous thinking has already been placed in a wider context, thus viewed from a higher logical level, insofar as dichotomous thinking sees itself as thinking whereas the exposure reveals it as a mode of thinking. More precisely it does not see itself as such, it proceeds as if there are no other ways to think; it fails to recognise itself as a mode of thinking and not in the sense of making a mistake for its nature is such that it cannot recognise itself as a mode. Thus the exposure is a criticism of dichotomous thinking in demonstrating that it is not 'natural', necessary, and not compelling. But as has become clear, the exposure alone will not suffice to undermine it as its mode involves a tendency to dominate thinking, even to incorporate or transform exposes of it into variations of itself. As a mode of thinking, which means that it is not circumscribable and not restricted to particular theories, beliefs and concepts, it can re-form, adopt other disguises, move further underground – and in the process outmanoeuvre attempts to expose it, and seduce the thinking of its exposure into perpetuating it, into re-thinking it. This will always be a danger and a risk that needs to be taken, for we have to be engaged with dichotomous thinking in order to expose and appropriately criticise it. But it is a danger against which certain measures can be taken, and these concern how we are engaged with it. We have, to a certain extent and in a certain way, to be inside that mode of thinking in order to recognise its traces, its clues, its disguises, its maneouvres as its traces etc. Like the reading of a problematic, the mode of thinking cannot be recognised wholly from within as it is not identifiable with nor completely separate from the texts in which it occurs; to be naively within it would be to repeat it. And neither can it be detected wholly from without, as in this case the traces of dichotomous thinking could not be recognised as traces, which would increase the likelihood of repetition. This is because of the mode of existence of the mode of thinking in the text, and because, unlike the

reading of a problematic, the mode of thinking cannot, once and for all, be located, circumscribed ... pinned down. The subtlety of the relationship of difference in which the mode of thinking and the texts in which it occurs exist means that, like the interpretation of a dream, we cannot know in advance and from the outside, what will be a clue, what will be signficant, what an element will mean and how it will be expressed. It might always be condensed and/or displaced other than where and how we might expect to find it. This means that we must be always on the alert, ever ready to change approach and tactics, never to rest on previous discoveries and clues. But we do have some general guidelines, some general characteristics of dichotomous thinking on which to base the enquiry, and we do have a means of being within and engaged with the mode of thinking without belonging to it and without repeating it. This we learnt from the method of reading problematics. This inside while outside manoeuvre provided a way of being engaged with while other than, of being engaged without being committed in such a way as to not re-trace that with which we were engaged and to not stand outside and oppose. However this time we must be careful not to adopt a position, and while we use concepts such as belonging-together-in-difference to transgress and subvert the conceptual boundaries that dichotomous thinking presumes we must not belong-together, even in difference, to that thinking. The inside while outside must be understood as a movement which, perpetually renewing itself, expands and shifts as fast as dichotomous thinking expands and shifts to force it into a consolidated position so as to incorporate it.

How then can these sorts of relationships - of inside-while-outside, of belonging-together-in-difference and so on - be used to undermine the style of delineating and relating concepts that we found to be typical of dichotomous thinking. Earlier it was said that "Dichotomous thinking operates by defining in terms of identity and difference, where identity

247.

is understood as same-ness, fully self-enclosed with itself, and differ-
ence is understood in terms of negation and exclusion : the difference
between two concepts (which are conceived as exhausting a given context)
will be that one is positive and the other its privation." Thus was
produced the internal versus the external, and reason versus emotion,
for instance. Now instead of taking it for granted that we know what it
is to be internal and that it always and completely excludes its external
we can drop these boundaries and allow, what from a dichotomous point of
view is a paradoxical situation, the possibility of being both internal
and external simultaneously in the same respect. The 'and' here is
crucial, for it is not as if dichotomous thinking does not know what it
is to be internal and what it is to be external such that we are one or
the other, or one and then the other. What dichotomous thinking cannot
conceive is being one while the other, and this means of course that in
such situations the internal and the external are not conceived as one
and its other, as the positive and its privation. And we do not just
mean that what is from one point of view internal is from another,
external. Similarly, in breaking down the reason-emotion dichotomy we
do not just want to say that we have reasons for emotions, or that an
emotional response can be the most rational response in some circum-
stances, or that reasons have emotional bases. These thoughts are of
course important, just as it is important to ask how reason and emotion
can be related other than as mutually exclusive. But to stop at this
point would be misleading, it would misconstrue the problem in taking
for granted the dichotomous relationship, which includes the conception
of each term given thereby, and then attempting to alter it. More
appropriate would be to rethink the phenomenon such that the exclusion
does not and could not arise in the first place - which is not to say
that there will not be differences. And it needs to be rethought
without thinking prior to the relation of opposition, for, as we saw

with Heidegger, this leaves open the possibility of the re-emergence of
the opposition. This need to rethink and how it can be achieved is diffi-
cult to express because the language we must use carries with it the
connotations, the sedimentations, the rhetoric of dichotomous thinking.
To attempt to express the need to rethink the problems in which reason
and emotion emerge as a dichotomy is already to enter into the conceptual
system in which they form a dichotomy. This is an unavoidable risk and
instead of trying to avoid it we need to find a way of using language
that exploits it.

The problem of how to express the re-thinking is reinforced by the
problems engendered by the fact that we cannot deal with dichotomies sep-
arately. In the analysis of dichotomous thinking we found that the partic-
ular dichotomies which constitute the history of philosophy are not acci-
dental and arbitrary, and not separable. They form a system, and under-
mining one by itself does little toward shifting the rest of the system;
we cannot properly consider one dichotomy without considering it in its
system of differences. Further we cannot properly consider the dichotomies
other than in their historical, philosophical and ideological context.
And most importantly, we cannot consider them properly other than as
instances of the mode of thinking. The concept of reason, for example,
has a long history. We cannot easily - or properly - isolate it from
its philosophical and ideological context, and this includes its exclusion
of emotion, experience, the bodily and so on, and attempt to open up its
boundaries, expand its meaning, alter its relationships. To attempt this,
by itself, would be to fail to recognise that the concept of reason is
embedded in conceptual system constituted by oppositions, and associations
between the oppositions, and the values implicit in this - that is meaning
has been determined by what it excludes and what it is associated with.
It is this whole system and the mode of thinking that needs to be called

into question, and this means undermining the mode of thinking, not just altering the relationships between the concepts or applying them differently. Consider, for example, the feminine-masculine dichotomous distinction. What we need to be concerned with is not the question whether only females are feminine or whether both males and females have or can have feminine and masculine characteristics, but the sort of thinking that conceives of characteristics as exclusively feminine or masculine : passive or active, soft or hard, emotional or rational, and so on. The same sort of thinking is involved in both answers, that only females are feminine, or that females have both feminine and masculine qualities, and it is also involved in arguments about which characteristics are properly feminine and which properly masculine. Rather than answering the question, we need to question the thinking in which the question is proposed and answered.

However we cannot attempt this questioning of the questions without employing these concepts, such that, for instance, when we write inside-while-outside we are to some extent implicated in the system of concepts and the history and ideology in which inside and outside appear as a dichotomy. And we cannot just adopt a different mode of thinking which does not have this implication, for the language carries these implications, this history. We need a different way of using the language, a different style and a different relationship to the words and concepts we use. For this purpose some of Derrida's techniques might prove suggestive. [5] We can, for instance, use one concept to displace another, and then another one to displace the displacing concept. The concept of intentionality displaces that of the mind as an empty cabinet, and the concept of structure, and of the sign can be used to displace the concept of the subject implicit in the theory of intentionality. Derrida then uses the concept of a 'system' without a centre, a 'system', a game perhaps, of free-play to displace the centred structure. But when we do this, the

displacing concept should not be accorded an ontological value, as if it were closer to 'the truth'; it should be used as a methodological device of disrupture, breaking open what is taken for granted in dichotomous thinking while not allowing that which achieves the break to become taken for granted in its turn. This means that the displacing concept, or whatever effects the rupture, can never become a privileged sign, it will be used, as it were, in suspension, in brackets perhaps, or in Heidegger's style, crossed out. The crossed out concept, as well as displacing another concept, implies a double movement. ~~Reason~~ , for instance, will refer to the traditional concept as that which is crossed out, but it will also point away from this to a new, non-dichotomous usage. We cannot disrupt the old concept without referring to it but we want to avoid simply repeating it. Because of this reference to the tradition, and because the new, displacing, concept must resist moves to transform it either back into the old concept or to take its place in the system of dichotomies, the displacing and the crossing out must be an ongoing process, it must be constantly repeated and renewed. In this way, no concept will be able to close in upon itself and become the sort of self-referential unity which can exclude what it would come to consider as its 'other'; it will, in differing from itself not be able to re-instate a dichotomy. Our concern will thereby be with the way in which concepts are used; rather than using them naively and straight-forwardly in the serious, unreflectingly-assuming-to-be-the-truth, manner of dichotomous thinking, concepts will be deployed in the style of a parody and an irony. And this will mean that we will be concerned with the rhetoric, the style and the contexts in which statements, judgements and descriptions are made rather than with the apparent truth value of those statements.

Adopting this strategy will enable us to avoid the tendency to propose an alterative theory which would take on the same status as that

which it is opposing, and it will enable us to work with the fact that we are never fully conscious and in control of our thoughts and to resist the temptation to desire the fulfillment of consciousness. If we play this game, and play it seriously, we will have to accept and exploit the paradoxes and the paradoxical situations in which we find ourselves. We can never step outside dichotomous thinking, we can only, in perpetually effecting a rupture within it, displace what it takes for granted and what it strives to impose on us, until it no longer commands a place in thinking.

Notes

1. Derrida, Jacques, "The Ends of Man" in <u>Philosophy and Phenomenological Research</u> , Sept 1969, p.56.

2. Derrida, Jacques, "Differance" in <u>Speech and Phenomena</u>, translated and edited by David B. Allsion. Evanston; Northwestern University Press, p. 130. Later in this essay Derrida writes of not wanting to overcome the oppositions on which philosophy is constructed, " but to see the emergence of a necessity such that one of the terms appears as the difference of the other, the other as 'differed' within the systematic ordering of the same", p. 148.

3. Althusser, Louis and Balibar, Etienne, <u>Reading Capital</u>, translated by Ben Brewster. London; New Left Books, 1970. p.53.

4. Wilden, Anthony, <u>System and Structure</u>. London; Tavistock, 1972. pp..xxvii-xxviii.

5. See for instance, Derrida, Jacques, "Structure, Sign and Play" in Macksey, Richard and Donato, Eugenio (ed), <u>The Structuralist Controversy</u>. Baltimore; The John Hopkins University Press, 1970. pp.247-265; and Derrida, <u>Of Grammatology</u>, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore; The John Hopkins University Press, 1974. Esp. Part I.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ALLISON, David B. (ed)   The New Nietzsche
New York; Delta, 1977.

ALTHUSSER, Louis and   Reading Capital
BALIBAR, Etienne.   translated by Ben Brewster.
London; New Left Books, 1975.

ARCHER, Richard   "Personal Autonomy and Historical Materialism."
Radical Philosophy 15, Autumn 1976, pp. 8-14.

BARTHES, Roland.   Elements of Semiology
translated by Annette Lavers and
Colin Smith.
London; Jonathon Cape, 1967.

BARTHES, Roland.   Mythologies
translated by Annette Lavers.
Great Britain; Paladin, 1973.

BENJAMIN, Andrew.   "A theory of Reading with Respect
to Freud and Lacan".
Working Papers in Sex, Science and Culture
Vol. 1, No. 1, (1976), 55-67.

BIEMEL, Walter.   Martin Heidegger
translated by J. L. Mehta.
London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.

BINSWANGER, Ludwig.   Being in the World
translated by Jacob Needleman.
London; Souvenir Press, 1975.

BRENNAN, Teresa, CAMPIONI, Mia   "One Step Forward, Two Steps Back."
and JACKA, Elizabeth.   Working Papers in Sex, Science and Culture
Vol. 1, No. 1, (1976), 15-45.

BROWN, Norman O.   Life against Death
London; Sphere Books, 1968.

BURNHAM, Jack.   The Structure of Art
New York; George Braziller, 1971.

BURNHAM, Jack.   "Unveiling the Consort."
Artforum   March 1971, 55-60.
April 1971, 42-51.

CAIRNS, Dorian.   Conversations with Husserl and Fink
The Hague; Martinus-Nijhoff, 1976.

CARR, David.   "Husserl's Problematic Concept of the
Life-World."
American Philosophical Quarterly 7, No. 4,
(1970), 331-339

CARR, David.   Phenomenology and the Problem of History
                                Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1974.

CARR, David.   "The "Fifth Meditation" and Husserl's
                                Cartesianism."
                                Philosphy and Phenomenological Research 34
                                (1977), 14-35.

CHARBONNIER, G.   Conversations with Claude Levi-Strauss
                                translated by John and Doreen Weightman.
                                London; Jonathon Cape, 1969.

CULLER, Jonathon.   Saussure
                                Glascow; Fontana, 1976.

D'AMICO, Robert.   "The Coutours and Coupures of Structuralist
                                Theory."
                                Telos 17, (1973), 70-97.

DEELY, John N.   The Tradition via Heidegger
                                The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1971.

DERRIDA, Jacques.   "Freud and The Scene of Writing"
                                translated by Jeffrey Mehlman.
                                Yale French Studies no. 48, 1972.

DERRIDA, Jacques.   Of Grammatology
                                translated by G. C. Spivak.
                                Baltimore; The John Hopkins University
                                Press, 1976.

DERRIDA, Jacques.   " ' Οὐσία and Γραμμή '
                                A Note to a Footnote in Being and Time"
                                In SMITH, F. J. (ed).
                                Phenomenology in Perspective
                                The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

DERRIDA, Jacques.   Speech and Phenomena
                                translated by David B. Allison.
                                Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1973.

DERRIDA, Jacques.   "Structure, Sign and Play in The Discourse of
                                The Human Sciences"
                                In MACKSEY, Richard and DONATO, Eugenio (ed).
                                The Structuralist Controversy
                                Baltimore; John Hopkins University Press, 1972.

DERRIDA, Jacques.   "The Ends of Man"
                                Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
                                30, (1969), 31-57.

DESCARTES, Rene.   Philosophical Works
                                translated by E. S. Haldene and G. R. T. Ross.
                                Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1968.

DOUGLAS, Mary.   Purity and Danger
                                  Middlesex; Pelican, 1970.

ELDERS, Fons (ed).   Reflexive Waters
                                  London; Souvenir Press, 1974.

ELVERTON, R. O. (ed).   The Phenomenology of Husserl
                                  Chicago; Quadrangle, 1970.

EMBREE, Lester (ed).   Life-World and Consciousness
                                  Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1972.

FELL, Joseph P.   "Heidegger's Notion of Two Beginnings"
                                  Review of Metaphysics XXV, No. 2, (Dec. 1971),
                                  213-237.

FIRTH, Raymond.   Symbols : Public and Private
                                  New York; Cornell University Press, 1973.

FOUCAULT, Michel.   "Orders of Discourse"
                                  Social Science Information 10, (1971), 7-30.

FOUCAULT, Michel.   The Archeology of Knowledge
                                  translated by A. M. Sheridan Smith.
                                  London; Tavistock, 1972.

FOUCAULT, Michel.   The Order of Things
                                  London; Tavistock, 1970.

FREUD, Sigmund.   The Interpretation of Dreams
                                  translated by James Strachey.
                                  Middlesex; Penguin, 1976.

FRINGS, Manfred S. (ed).   Heidegger and the Quest for Truth
                                  Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 1968.

FRITSCH, Wilma.   Left and Right in Science and Life
                                  London; Barne and Rocklitt, 1968.

FUCHS, Wolfgang Walter.   Phenomenology and the Metaphysics of Presence
                                  The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1976.

GERAS, N. M.   "Levi-Strauss and Philosophy"
                                  Journal of the British Society of Phenomenology
                                  Vol. I, No. 3, October 1970, 50-60.

GOOCH, Stan.   Total Man
                                  London; Allen Lane the Penguin Press, 1972.

HACKING, Ian.   Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?
                                  Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1975.

HEGEL, G. W. F.   The Phenomenology of Mind

translated by Sir James Baillie.
London; George Allen and Unwin, 1971.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   An Introduction to Metaphysics

translated by Ralph Manheim.
New York; Anchor Books, 1961.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   Basic Writings

edited by D. F. Krell.
London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   Being and Time

translated by John Macquarie and Edward
Robinson.
Oxford; Basil Blackwell, 1967.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   Discourse on Thinking

translated by John M. Anderson and E. Hans
Freund.
New York; Harper Colophon Books, 1968.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   Hegel's Concept of Experience

New York; Harper and Row, 1970.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   Identity and Difference

translated by Joan Stambaugh.
New York; Harper and Row, 1969.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   "Letter on Humanism"

In BARRETT, W. and AITKIN, H. (ed).
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century, Vol. II,
New York; Random House, 1962.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   "On the Essence of Truth"

translated by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick.
in BROCK, Werner (ed).
Existence and Being
Chicago; Gateway, 1970.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   Poetry, Language, Thought

translated by Albert Hofstadter.
New York, Harper Colophon Books, 1975.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   The End of Philosophy

translated by Joan Stambaugh.
London; Condor Books, 1975.

HEIDEGGER, Martin.   "The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics"

in BARRETT, W. and AITKIN, H. (ed).
Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Vol. II,
New York, Random House, 1962.

HEIDEGGER, Martin. What is Called Thinking?

translated by F. D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray.
New York; Harper and Row, 1968.

HEIDEGGER, Martin. "What is Metaphysics?"

translated by R.F.C. Hull and Alan Crick.
in BROCK, Werner (ed).
Existence and Being
Chicago; Gateway, 1970.

HEIDEGGER, Martin. "Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?"

translated by Bernd Magnus.
in ALLISON, David B. (ed).
The New Nietzsche
New York; Delta, 1977.

HILLMAN, James. "First Adam, Then Eve : Fantasies of Female
Inferiority in Changing Consciousness."

Art International XIV, no. 7, (1970), 30-43.

HINDESS, Barry. "Models and Masks : Empiricist Conceptions
of the Conditions of Scientific Knowledge"

Economy and Society 2, (1973), 233-254.

HINDESS, Barry "Transcendentalism and History : The problem
of the history of philosophy and the sciences
in the later philosophy of Husserl."

Economy and Society 2, (1973), 309-342.

HJELMSLEV, Louis. Language : an Introduction

translated by Francis J. Whitfield.
Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1970.

HJELMSLEV, Louis. Prolegomena to a Theory of Language

translated by Francis J. Whitfield.
Madison; University of Wisconsin Press, 1961.

HUSSERL, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations

translated by Dorian Cairns.
The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

HUSSERL, Edmund Formal and Transcendental Logic

translated by Dorian Cairns.
The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1969.

HUSSERL, Edmund. Ideas

translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson.
London, George Allen and Unwin, 1931.

HUSSERL, Edmund. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy

translated by Quentin Lauer.
New York; Harper Torchbooks, 1965.

HUSSERL, Edmund.   The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy

translated by D. Carr.
Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1970.

HUSSERL, Edmund.   The Idea of Phenomenology

translated by W. P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian.
The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1964.

IRIGARAY, Luce.   "That Sex Which is Not One"

translated by Paul Foss.
in FOSS, Paul and MORRIS, Meaghan (ed).
Language, Sexuality and Subversion
Darlington (N.S.W.); Feral Publications, 1978.

JASPERS, Karl.   The Great Philosophers

translated by Ralph Manheim.
London; Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962.

KOCKELMANS, Joseph, J. (ed). On Heidegger and Language

Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1972.

KOLAKOWSKI, Leszek.   Husserl and the Search for Certitude

New Haven; Yale University Press, 1975.

KOSOK, Michael.   "The Dialectical Matrix : Towards Phenomenolog as a Science."

Telos 5, pp. 115-159.

LACAN, Jacques.   The Language of The Self

translated and commentary by Anthony Wilden.
New York; Delta, 1968.

LANDGREBE, Ludwig.   "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism"

In ELVERTON, R.O. (ed).
The Phenomenology of Husserl
Chicago; Quadrangle, 1970.

LANDGREBE, Ludwig.   "The Phenomenological Concept of Experience"

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34
(1973), 1-13.

LANDGREBE, Ludwig.   "The Problem of the Beginning of Philosophy in Husserl's Phenomenology"

translated by J. Huertas-Jourda.
in EMBREE, Lester (ed).
Life-World and Consciousness
Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1972.

LANDGREBE, Ludwig.   "The World as a Phenomenological Problem"

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1,
(1940), 38-58.

LANE, Michael (ed).   Structuralism

London, Jonathon Cape, 1970.

LANGAN, Thomas.   Merleau Ponty's Critique of Reason
            New Haven; Yale University Press, 1966.

LAUER, Quentin.   "The Subjectivity of Objectivity"
            In Edmund Husserl 1859-1959
            La Haye; Martinus Nijhoff, 1959.

LAVERS, Annette.   "Man, Meaning and Subject, A Current
            Re-appraisal."
            Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
            I, no. 3, (1970), 44-49.

LEACH, Edmund.   Genesis as Myth
            London; Jonathon Cape, 1969.

LEACH, Edmund.   Levi-Strauss
            London; Fontana, 1970.

LEACH, Edmund.   Rethinking Anthropology
            London; The Athlone Press, 1966.

LECOURT, Dominique.   Marxism and Epistemology
            translated by Ben Brewster.
            London; New Left Books. 1975.

LEVIN, David M.   Reason and Evidence in Husserl's Phenomenology
            Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1970.

LEVI-STRAUSS, Claude. Structural Anthropology
            translated by Claire Jacobson and Brooke
            Grundfest Schoepf.
            Middlesex; Penguin Books, 1968.

LEVI-STRAUSS, Claude. The Elementary Structures of Kinship
            translated by J. H. Bell, J. R. von Sturner,
            and Rodney Needham.
            London,; Social Science Paperbacks, 1970.

LEVI-STRAUSS, Claude. The Raw and the Cooked
            translated by John and Doreen Weightman.
            London; Jonathon Cape, 1969.

LEVI-STRAUSS, Claude. The Savage Mind
            London; Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1966.

LLOYD, G.   "Man of Reason."
            (forthcoming in Metaphilosophy)

LLOYD, G. E. R.   Polarity and Analogy
            Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1966.

LOCKE, John.   An Essay Concerning Human Understanding
            Abridged and Edited by A. D. Woozley.
            London; Collins, 1964.

MAGNUS, Bernd. Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy :
                Amor Fati, Being and Truth
                The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

MALL, R. A. Experience and Reason
              The Hague; Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.

MARX, Werner. Heidegger and the Tradition
                translated by Theodore Kisiel and
                Murray Greene.
                Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1971.

McCANN, Christopher. "Jacque Derrida's Theory of Writing and
                       the Concept of Trace."
                       Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
                       3, no. 2, (1972), 197-200.

MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice. "The Philosopher and His Shadow"
                          In Signs
                          translated by Richard C. McCleary.
                          Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1964.

MOHANTY, J. N. "Husserl's Concept of Intentionality"
                 In Tymieniecka, A.D. (ed) Analecta Husserliana I
                 Holland; Reidel, 1971.

MUNZ, Peter. When the Golden Bough Breaks
               London; Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973.

NEEDHAM, Rodney. Belief, Language and Experience
                   Oxford; Blackwell, 1972.

NEEDHAM, Rodney. (ed). Right and Left
                         Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1973.

NIETZSCHE, Friedrich. Twilight of the Idols
                        translated by R. J. Hollingdale.
                        Middlesex; Penguin, 1968.

PAZ, Octavio. Claude Levi-Strauss : An Introduction
                translated by J. S. Berstein and Maxine
                Berstein.
                London; Jonathon Cape, 1971.

PETTIT, Philip. The Concept of Structuralism
                  Dublin; Gill and Macmillan, 1975.

POOLE, Ross. "Freedom and Alienation"
               Radical Philosophy, Winter 1975, 11-17.

RICHARDSON, William J. Heidegger : Through Phenomenology to Thought
                         The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1963.

RICOEUR, Paul.

Freud and Philosophy

translated by D. Savage.
New Haven; Yale University Press, 1970.

RICOEUR, Paul.

Husserl : An Analysis of his Phenomenology

translated by E. G. Ballard and L. E. Embree.
Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1967.

RICOEUR, Paul.

"The Critique of Subjectivity and Cogito in
  the Philosophy of Heidegger."

In FRINGS, Manfred S. (ed).
Heidegger and the Quest for Truth
Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 1968.

ROBEY, David (ed).

Structuralism

Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1973.

ROSSI, Ino (ed).

The Unconscious in Culture

New York; Dutton, 1974.

RYLE, Gilbert.

The Concept of Mind

Middlesex; Penguin, 1963.

SADLER, Ted.

"Aspects of Althusser's Epistemology"

Working Papers in Sex, Science and Culture
Vol. 1, no. 2, (1976), 61-72.

SARTRE, Jean-Paul.

Being and Nothingness

translated by Hazel E. Barnes.
New York; The Citadel Press, 1968.

SAUSSURE, Ferdinand de

Course in General Linguistics

translated by Wade Baskin.
New York; McGraw Hill, 1966.

SOKOLOWSKI, Robert.

"Husserl's Protreptic."

In EMBREE, Lester (ed).
Life-World and Consciousness
Evanston; Northwestern University Press, 1972.

SOKOLOWSKI, Robert.

The Formation of Husserl's Concept of
Constitution

The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

SPIEGELBERG, Herbert.

"Is the Reduction Necessary for Phenomenology?
  Husserl's and Pfänder's Replies."

Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology
4, no. 1, (1973), 3-15.

STEINER, George.

Heidegger
Glascow; Fontana, 1978.

THEVENAZ, Pierre.

What is Phenomenology? and other essays
translated by James M. Edie.
edited by James M. Edie.
Chicago; Quadrangle Books, 1962.

TYMIENIECKA, Anna-Teresa.

Phenomenology and Science in Contemporary
European Thought
New York; Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1962.

VAN BAAL, J.

Symbols for Communication
Assen; Van Gorcum, 1971.

WILDEN, Anthony.

System and Structure
London; Tavistock Publications, 1977.

WILLIAMS, Karel.

"Unproblematic Archeology"
Economy and Society 3, (1974), 41-68.

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig.

Philosophical Investigations
translated by G. E. M. Anscombe.
Oxford; Blackwells, 1968.

ZANER, R.M.

"Passivity and Activity of Consciousness
in Husserl."
Analecta - Husserliana III, 1974, pp. 199-226