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ON RORTY AND HEIDEGGER

In many of his recent publications Richard Rorty pays tribute to Heidegger. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, and elsewhere, he presents Heidegger as one of the most important philosophers of our century. (PMN, p.5) He rarely discusses Heidegger's work, explicitly or in detail, but from the general direction of his writings two sources of the praise are discernible. One is his respect for Heidegger's work on the history of philosophy, work that Rorty relies upon in his own critique. The other is his sense that, in general, Heidegger's philosophy supports the range of views and direction that Rorty wants to propose. These are pragmatism, philosophy as conversation, philosophy as edification, and so on.

A number of other philosophers come in for similar praise, particularly Wittgenstein and Dewey, and to a lesser extent, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Sartre, Nietzsche, Derrida, etc. For the purposes of this paper I leave aside the issue of whether Rorty's claims do justice to the thought of these philosophers. And I leave to others the task of debating the force of his detailed criticisms of realism in general and contemporary analytic philosophy in particular. My concern is with his relationship with Heidegger.

Heidegger, together with Wittgenstein and Dewey, Rorty says in the Introduction to *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, "are in agreement that the notion of knowledge as accurate representation, made possible by special mental processes, and intelligible through a general theory of representation, needs to be abandoned". They set aside not just a view of foundations of knowledge, but metaphysics and epistemology entirely, and in doing so bring us to a period of revolutionary philosophy that is therapeutic rather than constructive, and edifying rather than systematic. (PMN, pp. 5 - 6)

In this paper I want to show three things. First, that despite some similarities in their analyses of the history of philosophy there are substantial differences in the point or moral that Rorty and Heidegger want to draw. Secondly, that this difference derives from substantial differences, again despite some similarities, in their understanding of what it is to be human and in their conception of what philosophy is. Thirdly, as a consequence of these differences Heidegger should not be understood as supporting Rorty's proposals for the future of philosophy; and moreover, that from a Heideggerian perspective on philosophy we should be deeply suspicious of Rorty's pragmatism.

The substantive issue of the paper is, roughly, whether the critique of epistemologically centred philosophy should lead us to adopt a Rorty type pragmatism. I say roughly because, as will emerge in the discussion, it is not completely clear how much Rorty wants to include under 'epistemologically centred philosophy'; minimally it includes any philosophy seeking foundations of knowledge based on a correspondence theory of truth and supported by mirroring images of the mind's relation to reality. Nor is it clear whether Rorty thinks we ought to abandon epistemology, or that, if we do, we are logically
required to adopt pragmatism. Nor is it entirely clear what his pragmatism, and related proposals amount to. But I will deal with these problems as I come to them.

But first some preliminary remarks are in order.

First, before proceeding it is important to note one exception and one qualification to Rorty's general praise of Heidegger. The qualification is that Rorty makes a distinction between the early and the late Heidegger. It is the latter he aligns himself with, the former he rejects as still involved with fundamental ontology. The exception is in Rorty's 1974 paper 'Overcoming the Tradition: Heidegger and Dewey' where he criticises Heidegger's "attachment to the notion of 'philosophy' - the pathetic notion that even after metaphysics goes, something called 'Thought' might remain - [as] simply the sign of Heidegger's own fatal attachment to the tradition: the last infirmity of the greatest of the German professors". (CP, p. 52) However in the 1982 Preface to Consequences of Pragmatism, where he reprints this paper, he says that he thinks that his view of Heidegger then was "unduly unsympathetic". (CP, p.ix)

Secondly, I am not especially interested in arguing that Rorty does not understand Heidegger and giving an exegetical defence of such a claim. Nor in suggesting that one philosopher should not make use of another for their own purposes. Rather, by diagnosing the source of the conflict I want to defend the view that a more robust sense of truth can be maintained, even if we relinquish mirroring metaphors, so that there is more for philosophers to do than conversing, creating new vocabularies, and so on.

In order to come to the substantive issue I will begin by giving a broad characterisation of Rorty's position, based on a number of his texts. I will start with a brief sketch of one of Rorty's main themes. Rorty states that thoughts, mental images, sentences, pictures and the like are representational or intentional in being about something, (or, if you like, in referring to something). But this, he says, is not some intrinsic property or function of these items, but rather a function of their use as circumscribed by convention, or history, or a form of life. What something means is dependent on its relation to other things - for example words or pictures, and people and contexts - and whether it is true depends on whether it is accepted by those people, in that context, as fitting in with the other sentences they accept, and not by its corresponding with what it refers to. For it does not 'correspond' independently of those conventions and practices, and we could not know if it did anyway. Much less could we give an account of such correspondence independently of the practices of acceptance. (PMN, passim)

What this amounts to I will consider in more detail later, but we can sum it up as the claim that there is nothing in the notion of reference or correspondence other than what agreements underlie people's practices. Rorty wants to show that the idea that there is something more results from metaphors of knowledge as picturing, and from a set of distinctions that generate an idea of the World as absolutely independent of human experience and knowledge. I will now present Rorty's story about these origins.

The first story is Rorty's claim that the idea of a foundation of knowledge is the product of a choice of perceptual metaphors. The dominant metaphor is that of the mind as a mirror of
nature, a mirror that reflects and represents what it 'sees'. This metaphor derives from an identification of the reality of a thing with its presence before us, and it encourages a conception of belief as a representation of the object of the belief. Justification of beliefs is then thought of in terms of causes, not reasons, and knowledge is modelled on the forced character of visual perception. If some beliefs can be shown to be determined by their objects such that their accuracy as representations cannot be doubted then these privileged representations will form the foundations of knowledge. Rorty claims that it makes no difference to this picture of knowledge whether we think of the representations as ideas or as linguistic entities such as descriptions. (PMN, pp.159 - 163)

The second story is that, within this perceptual model of knowledge, once we distinguish between the given and the imposed, between receptivity and spontaneity, objective and subjective, necessary and contingent, we will generate an idea of the World so independent of our knowledge that everything we have thought might be false. This is the idea of a world as thing in itself, and the notion of truth that it generates is that of an accurate representation which is unmediated by theory, which is, as Rorty puts it, a representation of 'Natures Own Vocabulary'. (CP, 'The World Well Lost!')

In the essay 'Is there a Problem about Fictional Discourse?' Rorty traces both of these conceptions back to Parmenides. Here he says that "Parmenides' fear of the poetic, playful, arbitrary aspects of language was so great as to make him distrust predicative discourse itself. This distrust came from the conviction that only being seized, compelled, gripped by the real could produce Knowledge rather than Opinion". (CP, p.130) Predicative sentences, being able to say a multiplicity of things, depend on conventions of representation, and so can only express opinion. So Parmenides, and philosophers following him from Plato to Russell and Kripke and Donnellan, have sought for a nonconventional relation of words to the world. In the Introduction to Consequences of Pragmatism Rorty describes the two paths this search has taken as crystallising in the nineteenth century in the forms of Platonism and positivism. Both of these he sees as concerned with Truth as correspondence to Reality, their task being to determine the conditions which guarantee such truth. Both make a distinction between first rate truths, or genuine knowledge, and second rate truths, or mere opinion. The difference between them is that the Platonists go transcendental and find some extra-worldly Reality that governs Truth that the first rate truths must correspond to, whereas the positivists turn to empirical science as telling us what Reality really is, such that sentences about spatio-temporal events are candidates for first rate truths, and the rest are reducible to these or dismissed as, for example, 'expressions of emotion'. (CP, pp.xv - xvi)

In contrast to such views Rorty proposes that we adopt pragmatism, which he characterises as the view that "there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones" - that is, no constraints derived from the nature of objects, of the mind, or of language, "but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow inquirers". (CP, p.165)

The pragmatist, says Rorty, sees Platonism and positivism as just the reverse sides of the same coin, and recommends abandoning their common presuppositions. Instead, he suggests, we should see
philosophy as Sellars proposed, as "an attempt to see how things, understood in the broadest possible sense of the term, hang together, in the broadest possible sense of the term" (CP, p. xiv). To be a pragmatist, or an epistemological behaviourist is, Rorty says, to see normal scientific discourse bifocally. That is, "to see it as patterns adopted for various historical reasons, and as the achievement of objective truth, where 'objective truth' is no more and no less than the best idea we currently have about how to explain what is going on". More generally, inquiry is made possible by the adoption of practices of justification - and these have alternatives. These practices are "just the facts about what a given society, or profession,... takes to be good grounds for assertions of a certain sort", and these grounds are a "combination of common sense practical imperatives (e.g. tribal taboos or Mill's Methods) with the standard current theory about the subject". (PMN, p.385) To say that something is true is, for Rorty, just to say that we are warranted in asserting it, and all this means is that our peers will, ceteris paribus, let us get away with saying it. (PMN, p.176) To say that something is objective is just to say that it conforms to the norms of justification we find about us. (PMN, p.361) So the application of honorifics such as 'objective' is "never anything more than an expression of the pregeence of, or hope for, agreement amongst inquirers". (PMN, p. 335)

In contrasting his pragmatism or epistemological behaviourism to ontological or foundational epistemology (Cf. PMN, pp.175 - 176) Rorty insists that he is not giving either a new criterion of truth or any attempt to say what makes certain sentences true. What is not so clear is what his attitude to foundational epistemology is. Sometimes he claims that so far no one has had anything interesting to say about truth (CP, p.xiii), that no interesting sense has been made of the notion of correspondence, either of thought to things or words to things, (CP, p.xvii) so it would be better or more interesting if we simply changed the subject. But since he regards correspondence accounts as requiring a physicalist theory of reference, (CP, pp.xxiii - iv) and takes himself to have shown that there are no grounds for retaining an extra-theoretic notion of truth, (CP, pp.xxv - xcv) it appears that his claim must be stronger than lack of interest or unsuccessful attempts. If we ask why we should foreclose this conversation Rorty is inclined to answer: because the notion of the World is vacuous; because knowledge cannot be grounded; because the picture picture of knowledge is absurd; or because any reasonable view of truth as correspondence to reality is an uncontroversial triviality. Rorty allows that we have intuitions such as 'truth is more than assertibility', but claims that these are just the result of our education in a tradition built on such claims, that we are familiar with that particular language game, and that our appeals to such intuitions are always an appeal to linguistic habits entrenched in the language by our predecessors. (CP, pp.xxxix - xxx; PMN, pp.34, 56) What he recommends is that we try to understand why, historically, we have such intuitions so that we can stop having them. (CP, p.xxxi)

But despite these claims there seems to be an equivocation in Rorty's view, for, in other papers and in some sections of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, he claims that we need the tradition in order for modernists to be ironic towards it (CP, p.136); that deconstructors needs constructors (CP, p.108); that 'Existentialism' is essentially
reactive, and that the possibility of hermeneutics is parasitic on the possibility and perhaps even the actuality of epistemology (PMN, pp.365 - 366).

On the basis of this exposition of Rorty's views, and in order to draw out the contrast with Heidegger's, I want to make some general remarks about the structure of Rorty's thought. Rorty operates with an overarching dichotomy expressed in different ways as that between correspondence theories and pragmatism, or foundationalist accounts of knowledge and pragmatism, or epistemologically based philosophy and edifying, conversational philosophy. It is important to be clear, in justice to Rorty, where the division lies. Rorty goes to some length to insist that the choice is not between truth/ reason/ knowledge/ objectivity/ morality, on the one hand, and relativism, scepticism, irrationalism, historicism, and nihilism on the other. He is not relinquishing, at least in his better moments, notions like truth. He is rejecting certain theories of them, and he is redescribing them, though he wants to insist that he is not offering an alternative theory or answer to the old problems, for example, not a new criterion of truth, nor a new analysis of the meaning of 'true' or 'good' that would provide a new foundation.

In his review of Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature Richard Bernstein clarifies these points in the following way. Rorty is an historicist if this is having a healthy sense of how language games arise, become entrenched, and pass away, but not if historicism is thought of in terms of making history a foundational discipline. Rorty is sceptical in being suspicious of attempts to escape history, to discover foundations and delineate a permanent neutral framework for evaluating knowledge claims, but not sceptical in the sense of thinking that we can never get behind the 'veil of ideas' or that we can never 'really' justify knowledge. He is relativist in adopting epistemological behaviourism, that is, the view that the only standards and justifications are by appeal to social practices within which we distinguish the true from the false. But he is not relativist in the sense of claiming that there is no truth, objectivity or standards for judging. He is nihilist in the sense of not having an illusion that there is something we can appeal to which ought to command universal assent and in believing that there is no escape from human freedom and responsibility. But not nihilistic in the sense of believing that anything is as good or true as anything else. The general point is that the senses in which Rorty is not historicist, relativist, sceptical and nihilistic are the reverse sides or opposites of an assumption about foundations. Rorty, Bernstein claims, wants to liberate us from this either/or.

At a fairly general level Rorty's map of philosophical positions could be presented as a set of dichotomies. Platonism is opposed to positivism within the domain of foundationalist epistemologies. The kind of scepticism and relativism Rorty rejects is that constructed by dichotomy in contrast to foundationalism. As the opposite of foundationalism it is still caught up in the epistemological project structured by mirroring metaphors. Rorty asks us to abandon that project in favour of pragmatism. But is his pragmatism constructed dichotomously in contrast to epistemology, such that from another perspective it can be seen as itself caught up in epistemology? I want to suggest that this is the case, and that it can
be seen to be so from a Heideggarian perspective. And the interesting point here is that Heidegger's position is not constructed dichotomously in relation to the epistemology/pragmatism contrast. Rather, it has a depth dimension. Heidegger's thought is not a contrast at the same level as epistemology/pragmatism, but is to be understood as related in terms of original and derivative.

In order to understand this we need to see the difference between Heidegger's and Rorty's approaches to the history of philosophy. The basis for Heidegger's approach lies in his analysis of what it is to be in a world, and the consequence of this is that Heidegger has a very different attitude from Rorty's towards philosophy and its future. (Here I am implicitly rejecting Rorty's sharp contrast between the early and the late Heidegger.)

If we reduce Rorty's history and critique of philosophy to a set of propositions then it would appear that there is a considerable overlap between his and Heidegger's views. For example, both would agree that philosophy has been dominated by ocular metaphors, that correspondence theories derive from a representational account of thought and language, and that this is caught up in understanding the relationship between human beings and the world as a relationship between a subject and an object, and perhaps also that the 'subject' is conceived of in terms derived from a conception of the object. Both agree that human beings, and hence philosophy, are unavoidably historical. So both agree that we need to understand historically how we have been formed by the tradition so that we need to 'step back' from what the Platonists and the positivists have in common in order to understand the origin of our tradition. But, once we move on from the shared propositions to what each philosopher understands as the basis and the force of those propositions the stories that emerge are markedly different.

We can see this by examining what Rorty and Heidegger make of the 'step back' behind Platonism and positivism, that is how they understand Parmenides. Rorty, as we saw, presents Parmenides as distrusting (fearing) poetry, the distrust being based on the "conviction that only being... compelled by the real could produce Knowledge rather than Opinion". (CP, p.130) On Rorty's understanding it is as if, because of an unfortunate bias, Parmenides erected a false distinction between first and second rate truths and this set in train, via Plato, the whole mirroring image, where the true mirror is supposed to coincide with Natures Own Vocabulary. Whereas for Rorty there is no such Vocabulary that the mind can mirror, only people proposing propositions in conversation with other people. In contrast, Heidegger's discussion of Parmenides is aimed at showing that thought does belong to being, in primordial and derivative modes, or true and misleading ways. And this is due to the 'nature' of 'Being' itself. What Heidegger means by this is that when a being emerges, or is present to us, it appears. But appearance is essentially ambiguous - it can be an appearance of the thing as it is, or it can be a semblance. A semblance is also a way in which a thing appears so it is derivative from appearance, and as derivative it belongs to the being of appearing. Thought can accord with, or correspond to, the genuine appearing or it can be taken in by the mere semblance. It is important for Heidegger that a semblance is a way something appears such that being taken in by the semblance is not simply a matter of making a
wrong judgement, for such a judgement can still be in accord with something true of the thing - that is, that it can so appear. It is not just a matter of human fallibility. And further, that we can be so taken in shows us something about what it is to be in a world. I will come back to this later.

When Heidegger writes about truth the problem has two facets. One is his concern with the question: how is it possible for us to be in accord with the thing, and correlative to be out of accord? That is, what makes truth as agreement with things possible? At this level he is not rejecting the conception of truth as agreement or correspondence. His question is not concerned with providing a criterion of truth but rather with uncovering the essence of truth, or, as we might say, the ontological conditions of truth. This is an ontological problem, and Heidegger's answer is located in his account of being in the world.

The second facet of his concern is with the historical question of how it came about that being in accord with the thing came to be understood in terms of a correspondence between a mental or linguistic representation and the thing of which it is a representation. And this question itself has two facets. The first, and relatively superficial, is just the tracing of the history of ideas. But for Heidegger this has an ontological dimension, for he does not see the history of ideas as just the story of what one person said in response to what someone else said, but rather he sees a philosophical 'position' as a response to and articulation of what Being means in a given epoch. So unlike Rorty he cannot simply criticise a philosopher for having produced some bad arguments or for being entangled in a set of unfortunate metaphors, nor can he understand the point of reading a philosopher in terms of coming to understand how we got into some bad intellectual habits. For Heidegger, to understand a philosopher is not a matter of working out the degree of consistency of the set of their assertions but rather uncovering what understanding of being, (that is, what it means to be), made what they said possible and intelligible. That is, what is the underlying and operative ontology, and how is this possible. So for example, Descartes' discussion of corporeal and incorporeal substances is traced back to the mathematization of nature, and traced forward to the cogito, as that which is constantly present at hand, from out of which all being is determined. Being present at hand is what it means for something to be for Descartes, and this is one of the ways being can be, can give itself, and hence be understood. To see that this is so is partly to understand the meaning of being, that it is historical, and partly to understand in what way this understanding of being is a misunderstanding in treating being as a-historical. To understand this is to understand something about human being, that is, that we have the capacity to misconstrue what it is to be human, for example, to model our understanding of ourselves on our understanding of nature, and to eternalise this understanding.

In Being and Time Heidegger shows what it is about human being that enables these misunderstandings, that is, how they are possible; and in his later writings on the history of philosophy he shows what these have been. And insofar as the possibility of misunderstanding derives from our 'essence' such misunderstanding will nevertheless still reflect something 'true'. It would be a trivialisation to say that for Heidegger the correspondence theory of
truth and its associated mirror metaphors are false, that is, that he rejects them. What Heidegger does is to show how they are derived from, or are modifications of, a more primordial notion of truth as being in accord with, or open to, things.

In order to come at the question of what it means to be in a world for Heidegger, at least so far as my remarks on Rorty are concerned, I want to first discuss the other points I mentioned as common to Rorty and Heidegger. Both agree that human beings are unavoidably historical. By this I mean that we are always in a world in the sense that we cannot transcend our world and view things from an absolute and a-historical perspective. In this respect we are always in time. And both agree that being in a world is something like being in intricate contexts of meaning or manifold meaningful relationships with things and other people. But for Heidegger this has several consequences, the implications of which, at least, I think are implicitly denied by Rorty. This is despite the fact that Rorty fully recognises our formation by the tradition, our situatedness within it, but to some extent, insofar as he think we can just step out of the tradition by creating new vocabularies, it seems that he does not fully understand the import of such situatedness for what is involved in understanding ourselves. The import of these consequences gives Heidegger a perspective from which to be critical of Rorty's pragmatism, and leaves open, or compels, a task for philosophy other than conversation. It also shows the sense in which Rorty's pragmatism remains within the epistemological tradition, perhaps as its reverse side.

Heidegger understands our being in time in terms of the three temporal modes of past, present, and future, each of which has 'existential' implications. We find ourselves 'thrown' into a world - a tradition, a culture, a language - over which we had no control. This is the dimension of the past. We live in terms of projects and plans for the future - there is a future orientatedness of our activities. But we find ourselves in the present - and we mostly get caught up in the issues and affairs of the moment. What is in the present, how we find things, is, in fact, made meaningful for us by the past, and we project our future in terms of this understanding. Heidegger claims that mostly we are so absorbed in the present, with things in the world, that we tend to understand ourselves in terms of the world and to think of time as a linear sequence of the present such that we do not understand the way in which the past and the future are embedded in the present. In a sense we tend to eternalise the present, that is, we tend to interpret the future and the past in terms of the present, and ourselves in terms of what is present, that is, things.

For Heidegger, the world in which we find ourselves - the contexts of meanings, the language in which we experience things and in which things are present to us - is always and already full with ontological implications. Our activity within the world presupposes an understanding of what it means to be that is brought down to us through the tradition and from the way the world is now. So if we are to properly understand ourselves and our world, which would involve making explicit this presupposed but unthought ontology, we must come to terms with the past, with the tradition. We cannot do this by stepping outside or transcending the world since what it means to be human is essentially to be in a world. Such understanding must be a stepping
back, an uncovering of what is already there, operative but concealed. And this is why philosophical understanding for Heidegger is essentially a matter of interpretation, of hermeneutics.

The task for philosophers, as Heidegger sees it, is thus twofold. To interrogate the tradition, to uncover the operative but unspoken, or indirectly spoken, understanding of what it means to be, so that we can better question and understand what it means to be now. In contrast Rorty tends to level matters out in ways that are precisely what Heidegger describes as inauthentic, as our ensnarement in the present. I will try to spell this out a bit.

For Heidegger one of the ways the tradition has understood what it means to be has been in terms of what we can know. What is, since at the least the time of Descartes, has been determined by what is knowable. Ontology became subordinated to epistemology. But for Heidegger this insistence on epistemology is itself, or presupposes, an ontology. On this point it might appear that the paths of Rorty and Heidegger cross, but they go in different directions. For Heidegger wants to turn to a deeper understanding of ontology, whereas Rorty insists that there is nothing but epistemology - what he recommends is that we adopt an epistemology without foundations, that we settle knowledge claims by reference to our accepted social practices or current norms of justification. And this is just the respect in which I want to claim that, despite appearances to the contrary, Rorty remains within the epistemological tradition that he criticises. For that tradition is, in part, constituted by its denial of ontology and its refusal to acknowledge its own ontological presuppositions. Rorty's criticism of traditional epistemology is that it does have ontological commitments. If anything, from a Heideggerian perspective, Rorty's position is worse than that which he criticises, since he explicitly proposes that we reject ontological questions. For Rorty there are no foundations and no possibility of transcendence, just the one dimension of language games and social practices.

I want to conclude by considering Rorty's understanding of these last two notions, for they are both anti-thetical to Heidegger's thought and that of which we should be most critical or questioning. For Rorty, language, conversations, vocabularies are means for doing what we want. Representational language he says has not got us anywhere so he suggests adopting a new vocabulary, a multiplicity of vocabularies, the better to serve our purposes. For Heidegger language is that in which things presence, it is not fundamentally a tool or instrument for achieving things. And further, Heidegger's understanding of what it means to be in the current age - which he calls the age of technology - is to be an instrument. For example, the earth is thought in terms of resources - coal mines, fishing grounds, timber sources, and people are thought in terms of populations, work forces, etc, that is, in instrumental terms. And so is language. For Rorty to propose such an understanding is, in effect, to reflect the meaning of being in our times, but in a totally unreflective, uncritical way. And Rorty's adoption, and interpretation, of Derrida's notorious phrase 'there is nothing outside of the text', and his insistence that we think of the multiplicity of discourses - the sciences, philosophy, poetry, etc. - as simply diverse but equal genres is antithetical to Heidegger's understanding of language. For Heidegger all discourses presuppose an understanding of being, they have ontological commitments, so we must
care for what we say, and those discourses which are most attentive to the presencing of beings are the most fundamental, that is, philosophy and poetry. The scientific discourses equally operate with an understanding of being but it is not their concern to reflect on this. But conversation for the sake of keeping the conversation going, albeit with those who have read the great philosophers, would be, for Heidegger, not much more than idle chatter, the most derivative of discourses.

Finally Rorty's idea that notions like 'objectivity' and 'rational' are simply honorifics awarded for saying something that other inquirers accept, and that truth is determined by our current norms of justification worked out in our social practices, is something that Heidegger might agree with, but with a twist. He might agree, for example, that the history of philosophy reflects, to some extent, what you can get away with saying, but in the sense of what captured the imagination of the time, what reflected the then current understanding of what it meant to be. For Heidegger the ability of a philosopher to articulate this, to bring to language the meaning of being, would be a mark of their greatness. But what we need to understand, to bring to light, is what constituted the times - both then and now. For a philosopher to propose that we accept as true 'what we can get away with', what conforms to our social practices, would be the greatest irresponsibility. If Rorty is right that pragmatism is the philosophy of our times then it is precisely that which we most need to question.

NOTES

1. Rorty's works are cited in the text by page numbers following abbreviated titles, as follows:
   PMN Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,
   CP Consequences of Pragmatism,

2. It is important to note that this discussion refers to inquiry, or normal discourse, and needs to be contrasted with what we might hope for from edifying or revolutionary discourse in which we try to introduce a new vocabulary perhaps in the hope of its enabling us to do something or see things in a new way.


5. While I agree that Heidegger's thought takes a turning after Being and Time I do not believe that he rejected many of the specific theses developed there, on the structure of understanding and interpretation for instance. He also retained a concern with what it means to be, and developed the suggestion that it is in language that things come to presence and that certain modes of language are more primordial.
