

Erin C. Tarver

---

### Abstract

Some provisions of the UN's Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are clearly important from the perspective of business ethics, particularly those calling for equal rights for women to employment and financial security. Some other provisions of CEDAW are equally as important for ethical business practices and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), but are frequently overlooked because of the presumption that they are not strictly business concerns: the rights of women to participation in public life, marriage, and family rights; the rights of rural women to adequate living conditions; and general rights to equality. This chapter will discuss the conceptual commitments that underlie the assumption of a clear demarcation between work and life concerns, and examine the criticisms of this assumption made by feminism. It will, in particular, be interested in:

- The public/private distinction
- The meaning of "work" or "labor"
- The relationship between CSR and care ethics
- Fostering a broader understanding of the family or familial relations
- Examining the connection between fair wages and work/life integration

These discussions suggest that the ability for businesses worldwide to uphold the tenets of CEDAW is dependent upon a reconsideration of the character of the Ideal Worker and a nuanced understanding of the effects of workplace policies on the wider communities in which businesses operate. In particular, though work/life integration is not strictly speaking a "women's issue," the ethical and policy considerations addressed herein currently have disproportionately negative effects for women; thus, addressing them is crucial for achieving the aims of gender equality.

---

E.C. Tarver

Department of Philosophy, Georgetown College, 400 East College Street, Georgetown, KY, USA  
e-mail: [erin\\_tarver@georgetowncollege.edu](mailto:erin_tarver@georgetowncollege.edu)

## Introduction

When taking the provisions of the United Nations' Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) as a guideline for approaching gender issues in business ethics, it is clear that some provisions – such the declaration that women have equal rights to employment, and should not be discriminated against on the basis of marital status or maternity, and the claim that women have equal rights to full participation in economic life – are of obvious concern for anyone interested in ethical business practices. Indeed, employment law in many countries reflects a concern with the prohibition of such discrimination, and public discussion of sexism in business practices tends to focus exclusively on this form of discrimination, particularly in hiring practices. One might be left with the impression, then, that as long as barriers to women's employment are eliminated, one's business practices can be assured to be fully ethical. However, it is important to notice that CEDAW provisions with implications for business ethics extend beyond prohibitions against employment discrimination. In fact, other provisions of CEDAW – including the right to full participation in public life, equal rights within marriage and family life, and rights to adequate rural living conditions – have significant implications for ethical business practices. Because workers, whatever their genders, are always also members of families and communities, there are important connections between concerns that we have often understood as strictly divided between one's "work" life and one's "private" life. Moreover, workplace policies not sufficiently attuned to these connections have disproportionately negative impacts on the lives of women workers.

Though attending to concerns about work/life integration is fairly new in the business world, the insight that work life and private life cannot be thoroughly disentangled is not a new one for feminists. If this is so, why have discussions of ethical business practice so infrequently included policy changes supporting better work/life integration, or practices fostering gender equality beyond employment discrimination? Feminist philosophers have pointed out that there are important conceptual commitments underlying our collective failure to notice the many respects in which our approaches to business ethics and workplace policy have strongly gendered effects. This chapter will discuss the conceptual commitments that underlie the assumption of a clear demarcation between work and life concerns, and examine the criticisms of this assumption made by feminism. It will, specifically, address the public/private distinction, the meaning of the notion of "work" and women's work, particularly in an age of globalization, the relationship between care ethics and the idea of Corporate Social Responsibility, the concept of "family," and the implications of the idea of a fair wage. Throughout, its aim will be to shed light on the various aspects of business practice that must be considered when taking CEDAW as a central feature of business ethics, particularly when taking seriously the insights of feminist philosophy.

## The Public/Private Distinction

The vast majority of thinking about ethics, whether in philosophy, or in policy discussions, focuses its attention on what we typically understand as public life. In, for example, classical contract theory, the question of right living is the question of the citizen's obligations to other citizens and to the State, and concomitantly, the citizen's rights with respect to each of these. Similarly, in contemporary thought about global justice, the question of ethics is the question of how universal human rights are to be reconciled with our obligations to others the world over, regardless of citizenship status. In each case, the subjects of ethical concern are neutral and interchangeable (insofar as their social status is understood to be ethically irrelevant), and thus as fundamentally non-private. The so-called private sphere – that of the home, the family, the marriage, and so on – might perhaps become an object of moral order (if, for example, we choose to stipulate what forms of marriage relationship or treatment of children are ethical), but this is typically thought of as a separate realm of inquiry, and certainly not the one of paramount importance for ethics. The secondary status of the “private sphere” in this public/private distinction is implicit, as feminists have pointed out, in its omission from the majority of philosophical discussions of “justice,” as well as in the comparatively recent development of laws prohibiting violence within the home or marriage. Only by presuming a sharp division between the public life of the neutral citizen, and the private life of the family, does the standard approach to ethics become intelligible.

This public/private distinction is implicit, moreover, not only in standard approaches to business ethics, but also in typical workplace policies. In many cases, for example, workplace policies (and employment law) depend upon the assumption that the employer-employee relationship may be considered in isolation or abstraction. On this view, policies regarding absenteeism, tardiness, or benefits may (or must) be determined solely with reference to the workplace relationship. Thus, each employee functions as an analog to the neutral citizen of standard contract theory: as an autonomous agent to be treated as equal under the rules of the workplace – or, minimally, as bound by the same rules as others of her or his status – and whose life beyond that workplace is irrelevant to those rules.

It is in view of this implicit distinction that work/life integration becomes a problem to be dealt with, as it is at the root of what Joan Williams ([18], p. 2) calls the “Ideal Worker norm.” The Ideal Worker is the figure assumed by many workplace polices, the employee who “works at least 40 h a week year-round,” who does not need time off for caring for sick children, maternity leave, or taking aged parents to doctor's appointments. The Ideal Worker, in short, is the worker whose “private” life outside of the workplace makes no encroachment or demands upon the “public” life within the workplace.

It is important to ask, however, whether a clear public/private distinction is truly viable from the perspective of business ethics. For, while it is certainly true that a business full of Ideal Workers might make for greater profits, feminists and feminism offer many reasons to question the viability of the public/private distinction

and the Ideal Worker norm. Indeed, whether coming from liberal democratic, critical theory/Marxist or transnational critical perspectives, feminists have important criticisms of the public/private distinction to consider.

Writing from a feminist perspective on liberalism, Susan Moller Okin argues [10] that the public/private distinction is unsustainable for several reasons. First, Okin suggests, the family itself is necessarily a political space insofar as it is shot through with differential distributions in power – which are themselves reinforced by women’s legal and economic vulnerabilities, and thus hardly contained within the “private” realm. Moreover, Okin points out, “the domestic sphere is itself created by political decisions” ([10], p. 127), both through phenomena like the legal recognition of particular domestic relationships via marriage, and through extra-legal policy decisions (as we will see in later sections). Thus, even if we subscribe to the liberal view that de jure regulation of family relations is unacceptable, social realities entail that the family, and the rest of the private realm, will necessarily be significantly shaped by public life, political and policy decisions.

Feminists working from within the tradition of Critical Theory (which has roots in Marxism) also question the strict demarcation between public and private spheres, but at the same time raise doubts about the standard liberal feminist view. Nancy Fraser, for example, points out that the notion that there is just one public sphere – everything that is not the private home – and that women have been wrongly excluded from it, “turns out to be ideological; it rests on a class- and gender-biased notion of publicity, one which accepts at face value the bourgeois public’s claim to be *the* public” ([2], p. 116). On the contrary, there have always been multiple publics, according to Fraser; it is simply that the public of the dominant ruling class purports to be the most important one, and thus becomes the one that feminists become concerned with integrating. Thus, while Fraser would agree that “private” relations of gender pervade our public interactions, she would suggest that it is mistaken to assume that this means we all are, or ought to be, part of a singular public, our claims to privacy notwithstanding.

In her book *Feminism Without Borders*, Chandra Talpade Mohanty offers further reasons to question the public/private distinction, particularly within the age of globalization, which has seen a “massive incorporation of Third World women into a multinational labor force and into domestic service” ([8], p. 71). Mohanty, like other scholars of globalization, points out that Third World women play a hugely significant role in the global economy, through employment in “world market factories, sweatshops and home work” ([8], p. 74). However, unlike some economists who might be inclined to see this fact as purely innocuous, Mohanty argues that the overwhelmingly female demographics of such business ventures is telling, as multinational corporations deliberately recruit Third World women in an effort to avoid paying fair wages or having to document employees for tax purposes. In doing so, Mohanty suggests, such corporations both exploit *and* contribute to a sexist and racist stereotype of Third World women as passive or controllable, as well as a strictly gendered division of labor – which are then blamed on the “backward” customs of the Third World country. Thus, in both transnational and local cases,

we see public and business policies as both drawing on and contributing to supposedly private gender arrangements.

With these criticisms of the public/private distinction in mind, the notion of the Ideal Worker, whose work life is clearly distinct from his private life, is increasingly untenable. The Ideal Worker is therefore, as Williams points out, not a neutral concept at all, but “framed around the traditional life patterns of men,” and “excludes most women of childbearing age” ([18], p. 2). The notion of the Ideal Worker – along with the dominant notion of “professionalism,” which demands “a way of life devoted to work perceived as one’s calling” ([11], p. 79) – thus depends upon and reinforces the assumption that work in the public sphere is done by men unencumbered by responsibilities in the private or “home” sphere (which must, on this logic, be attended to by someone else, usually a woman).

This is not to say that any use of a public/private distinction is illicit, nor that we may not, for certain purposes, distinguish between our private lives and our public or professional ones. It is, however, to insist that we take seriously the connections between the two, particularly where business ethics and policy are concerned – taking care, for example, to avoid practices that presume Ideal Workers whose lives in the workplace are abstracted or isolatable from their lives outside of it.

---

## Domestic Labor and the Value of Women’s Work

Closely connected to the assumption of a clear demarcation between public life and private life is, as the previous section implies, the presumption that domestic labor, or labor done within the home, is not “work” as such. Indeed, the assumption that “the workplace” is fundamentally opposed to “the home” is rooted in the notion that labor done in the home is not labor at all. Typical domestic labor – such as cooking, cleaning, washing, caring for children – is still disproportionately done by women, even when both partners in a heterosexual relationship hold jobs outside the home ([9], p. 1134). As feminists have pointed out, while this situation results in a kind of “second shift” for many women, this work is not understood to be work, but instead simply “what moms (or wives) do.” This means both that women are disproportionately affected by changes to work/life integration policies, and also that women’s work is frequently assumed not to be as important, or as valuable, simply because it is done by or associated with women.

The gendered division of labor that results in (particular forms of) domestic work being reserved for women has additional effects in work outside the home. As Marina Prieto-Carrón points out, paid work outside the home often reflects gender divisions and hierarchies of “private” life, as “men occupy virtually all managerial positions in manufacturing, and the principle of gender divisions established in families is reproduced on the factory floor,” such that women are directed to lower-paying positions, based on “the belief that women are more suited to jobs that are similar to domestic skills at home” ([12], p. 6). This gendered division of labor in nondomestic work has significant consequences both for women’s career advancement and for their

earning potential: Once particular jobs become feminized or associated with women (i.e., secretarial work), they lose status, leading to lower wages ([16], p. 18).

There thus appears to be a kind of chicken-or-egg problem for women's work and domestic labor: Is women's work or domestic labor devalued because women are the ones doing it, or are women pushed into domestic labor and/or feminized jobs because these jobs are less valuable or lucrative? The answer to such a question is likely not straightforward. Further complicating this picture, moreover, is the fact that women of color do (and have done, for some time) a disproportionate amount of the world's domestic work, particularly in the industrialized first world. Because domestic workers – especially in the United States and Europe – are and historically have been overwhelmingly women of color [1], it is crucial to take seriously the extent to which particular forms of work are devalued or discounted in part because of the influence of racist and sexist oppression. Moreover, this oppression is so thoroughly pervasive that even well-meaning persons may remain ignorant of it without constant vigilance – as is evident in the too-frequent presumption that “working women” or “mothers working outside the home” is a new phenomenon. Women of color, as Angela Davis points out [1], have been working outside their homes (often caring for the homes of others) for hundreds of years, only to be ignored by mainstream feminist efforts to bring about better workplace policies on family leave. It is thus crucial to remember that the problem of work/life integration is not a new problem; nor is it a problem reserved for “professional” women.

Another important consideration, when approaching the question of women's work and work done in the home, is that labor done within the home is not limited to labor done for the family or domicile. Indeed, many rural and Third World women participate in global supply chains through work based in their homes [12], especially for the textile industry. While such arrangements for home-based work might have the appearance of fostering a well-integrated work/life relation, however, this is not necessarily the case. In practice, such arrangements can mean less safe working conditions and less job security for women who engage in it, since such arrangements are often excluded from the same Corporate Codes of Conduct adopted for factory-based work. This results in greater instability of income and even physical danger to many rural and Third World women, thus failing “to deal with deeply embedded structures of inequality, such as low wages and the segmentation of women into the lowest paid and more insecure jobs” ([12], p. 13). It is, then, important to stress that, if we are to adopt business practices in line with the goals of CEDAW, it is not enough to merely allow workplace arrangements that permit women to spend more time at home. Rather, the devaluation of women's work and the presumed public/private distinction must be addressed in more fundamental ways.

---

## **Corporate Social Responsibility and Care Ethics**

Another important concern for a feminist approach to business ethics, which itself depends upon a troubling of the public/private distinction and a revaluation of labor typically thought of as “women's work,” is the ethical approach known as care

ethics. Care ethics is an approach to ethical philosophy pioneered by feminists, which is centrally concerned with rethinking the autonomous, isolated subject at the center of most theorizing about morality. Such abstracted figures are, according to feminist care ethics, at the heart of the majority of ethical and moral theory, and (at least in part) account for the centrality of the value of “justice” in these accounts. In contrast, advocates of care ethics suggest that this exclusive focus on justice as *the* virtue par excellence distracts from the development of the moral value of caring. Human beings, according to care ethicists such as Virginia Held, are fundamentally relational creatures, dependent upon others: “Every human being has been cared for as a child or would not be alive” ([5], p. 3). For this reason, ethical approaches that presume isolated, autonomous subjects as the agents of ethical living are unable to provide a rich picture of the good life, insofar as they cannot account for the “moral value and importance of relations of family and friendship,” or “the value of caring relations in such contexts as these” ([5], p. 12) and how those values can be encouraged or developed. Because persons only become ethical agents insofar as they have been cared for – as infants, as children, as students, and as dependent upon communities for their sustained existence – any ethical approach that does not recognize “care” as an indispensable human value is seriously remiss.

This insight of care ethics is important to take seriously from a business ethics perspective, particularly in light of the recently renewed interest in Corporate Social Responsibility. Because the outlook of CSR is interested not merely in compliance with the law, but also frequently in “address(ing) important social and economic issues” ([21], p. 458), CSR would, from a feminist perspective, involve instituting policies and practices that foster the virtue of caring in the community – or, minimally, do not inhibit the cultivation of this virtue by its members.

Unfortunately, however, many workplace policies inhibit the cultivation of care as a value in the way that care ethics would suggest. Indeed, as our discussion of the public/private distinction indicates, the Ideal Worker norm presupposed by many workplaces severely curtails the abilities of many people to engage in the kind of caring many feminists would advocate – and the cultural devaluation of caring leads care-related jobs to be among the lowest paying ([5], p. 109). Moreover, the negative implications of this fact are not limited to its effects on women, or care workers. As Joan Williams points out, dominant workplace policies, combined with a persistently gendered division of labor, result in a situation in which men are actually harmed by being deprived of the opportunity to cultivate this important aspect of their characters [20]. Though business practices are, of course, not the singular cause of this deprivation of men – the wider cultural intransigence of strictly delimited gender roles is surely at work – official policies can and do play a part. Williams points to a particularly dramatic example of this in “Knussman v. Maryland, in which a Maryland state trooper was told that he could not take parental leave after the birth of his child ‘unless [his] wife [was] in a coma or dead’” [19]. The widely held presumption that only one partner must be responsible for child care is, through such policies, enforced – with the result that conventional social arrangements, even those that may not be desirable, are rendered effectively obligatory.

Still, the reasons for many men's failure to cultivate the sort of characters that care ethics would encourage are complex. Ironically, as Katharine Silbaugh points out, "nothing has disserved men more than employment and educational discrimination in their favor (!)" [15]. A long history of wage discrimination, through which men have consistently been paid higher salaries for doing comparable work to women, even when men had fewer educational credentials, has given rise to a situation in which men are now more concerned with taking time off or changing jobs to accommodate the needs of their families. That is, sexist discrimination has meant that men have more to lose in altering their current careers, both in terms of wages, and in terms of job security – insofar as women now are statistically outpacing them in terms of education [15], and efforts to mitigate the effects of discrimination are now becoming more widespread. The point here is not to suggest that men are unfairly oppressed by being the beneficiaries of sexism, but instead to claim that our complex sets of social and business practices have wider-ranging effects than we may initially suspect, and to offer reasons for rethinking their value.

In short, if we take seriously the notion that Corporate Social Responsibility involves the imperative to implement business practices that are sustainable within the community, and minimally, do not harm a great number of its members, it is necessary to take seriously the claims of care ethics. As Gregory Guitián puts it, "CSR...should include work/family conciliation policies as a normal component of the social sustainability or social responsibility policy of the firm, in as much as they constitute a clear contribution to 'human ecology' of society in both short term and long term" ([4], p. 518).

---

## **Expanding the Notion of Family/Kinship**

Much of the discussion of work/life integration policy, including (to a certain extent) this chapter, assumes a particular model of family life: a nuclear family headed by two parents – typically, a couple in a heterosexual marriage – with children. While this model is the overwhelmingly dominant one in many parts of the world (particularly for the privileged classes of the United States), assuming it when discussing work/life policy or the ethics of those policies can be extremely problematic. It is problematic both because many people in the world do not operate within such a strictly delimited nuclear family setup (living, instead, with some assortment of extended family members, several of whom may be responsible for tasks like child care and domestic labor), and because many other people live in families or kinship arrangements that are not structured by heterosexual marriage. Ignoring the existence of these non-normative living arrangements is a problem, moreover, not only because the ethical theorizing or policy making that results remains unable to deal with a significant segment of the human population, but also because this exclusion perpetuates the privileging of those in the dominant arrangement at the expense of persons in non-normative ones.



The reason for this (perhaps unintended) consequence is similar to one we encountered in the previous section – policies may often have the effect of sanctioning dominant social arrangements, thereby implicitly reinforcing their legitimacy over against the (tacit) illegitimacy of others. That is, should we understand the ethical problem of work/life integration to be primarily about providing parents time off to care for their children, and institute policies providing for this specifically, we “promote and encourage child rearing provided primarily by parents” ([13], p. 727). And while this may in fact be a good thing (though it is unclear that it is necessarily better than, say, the promotion of childcare by extended kinship networks, or the promotion of government-sponsored childcare by professionals), it also often has the additional consequence of lending legitimacy to the nuclear, heterosexual family model while leaving workers with other life models in the lurch. As Gowri Ramachandran rightly points out, if the right to take advantage of family leave policies applies “only to those workers who conform to traditional gender and family-structure norms – those whose obligations are to their children and spouses, as opposed to their siblings, grandchildren, close friends, domestic partners, or some broader group in need – then we will have transferred wealth from social nonconformists to social conformists” ([13], p. 728). Thus, it may not be enough, from a feminist viewpoint, to simply allow workers flexible schedules to care for their families, particularly when the dominant social model of “family” disadvantages so many people.

Particularly pressing, from a feminist perspective, are policies that explicitly restrict the familial or kinship relations eligible to receive benefits to those structured by heterosexual marriage or common-law relations. Because homosexual workers are not afforded the same legal protections as heterosexual workers in the vast majority of the world (insofar as only a handful of countries offer the legal benefits of marriage to homosexual persons, and firing, harassing, and sometimes even killing people on the basis of homosexuality remains legal in many locations), a feminist perspective on business ethics would demand that, at a minimum, benefits for fostering better work/life integration not exclude same-sex domestic partners. This could be accomplished, moreover, in ways that are in line with CEDAW’s directive to respect and value cultural differences: As Ramachandran points out, “a more universal type of benefit would help to remake the workplace” by including “a right to refuse overtime shifts, not only for child-care reasons, but for *any* reason; timeoff options that are available whether the person uses that time for family-related reasons or other reasons. . .” ([13], p. 731). While such a shift in policy would likely result in some increase in expenses, it is important to keep in mind that its benefits are crucial from a CSR perspective, insofar as it would contribute to greater inclusivity, as well as providing a way to work toward greater involvement in care by men.

---

## The Importance of Fair Wages

A final consideration when approaching business ethics from a feminist perspective is the indispensability of fair wages for workers. As CEDAW suggests, full human

flourishing requires financial stability. Unfortunately, all too often, women's work is devalued – this is the case both in the lower valuation of labor typically done by women, and in a persistent wage gap, through which women are consistently paid less than their male counterparts for doing the same jobs [17]. As Susan Moller Okin [10] has pointed out, this financial disadvantage makes women uniquely vulnerable in multiple respects, insofar as it often makes them dependent upon men, and may even make it more difficult for them to leave abusive relationships. If a woman in such a relationship is unable to support herself or her children alone as a result of low wages, her options in the face of abuse (or even unhappy marriage) are quite few. Moreover, women who do not earn a sustainable living wage are at a significant disadvantage when it comes to their abilities to maintain good living conditions and to participate fully in public life, each of which CEDAW suggests are crucial to promote in order to achieve gender equality and women's human rights. Beyond the benefits that most saliently benefit women, however, fair wages promote better work/life integration for all workers, insofar as they improve living conditions and make workers' employment situations less precarious – thus addressing some of the care-related issues from our previous sections.

Of course, what constitutes a fair wage is an open question, and indeed a point of significant disagreement among feminists and business ethicists. On the one hand, theorists working from a Marxist perspective would suggest that no wage paid under a capitalist system is fair, insofar as capitalism requires, for its sustained existence, that workers are paid less than the value of the goods or services they produce. Because the capitalist's aim is to make a profit, he or she necessarily pays workers as little as possible, while charging as much as possible for the products resulting from their labor. And, because the capitalist owns the materials necessary for that production, workers who want to survive are faced with no choice but to work for whatever wage the capitalist(s) will pay –thus effectively consigned to the position of wage slavery [6]. On the other hand, theorists working in the liberal democratic tradition would suggest that there is nothing inherently unfair about differences in income or wage-dependence – though the majority of today's liberals would suggest that this does not mean that *every* distribution of wealth is equally fair. Following John Rawls' influential account, most liberals today would likely suggest that, for an income distribution to be fair in the moral sense, it would have to be of the sort that provides some minimum standard of living for those least well off, such that anyone who did not know her actual place in society could agree to its income distribution, bearing in mind the notion that she might in fact be among the least well off [14]. Because the vast majority of income disparity depends upon factors that are accidental and thus not morally relevant (we are not in control of many such factors, i.e., our intelligence, physical abilities, etc.), moral fairness of income distribution requires that anyone, regardless of situation, be able to agree to it. While this notion of fair wage is rather different than the one currently in place in most parts of the world today, it is also quite distinct from the Marxian notion of fairness.

Whatever our answer to the question of fair wages, it is crucial, from a feminist perspective, that policy changes aimed at making work/life integration more feasible must *not* be understood as a substitute for fair wages. That is, whether we believe that

fairness would require strictly equitable distribution or merely distribution to which we could all agree, even if not equitable, the fact remains that some minimum wage that provides from a sustainable living is necessary for upholding the tenets of CEDAW. Indeed, as Domenec Melé points out, “paying unjustly low wages is another way of violating family independence. . . If real pay is insufficient to bring up a family, then a basic right is trampled under foot which, to a large extent, conditions all the rest” ([7], p. 653).

The importance of fair wages suggests that some businesses’ methods of dealing with economic difficulties may be problematic from an ethical perspective. Specifically, some businesses have begun using flextime as a new feature of “total rewards” to compensate for stagnating wages during the economic downturn [3]. While the use of flextime is in a certain sense welcome, from a feminist perspective on work/life integration, there are legitimate reasons to be concerned about this practice. Most pressingly, if the feminist approach to business ethics and CSR is correct, such accommodations as flextime should not be understood as “special” benefits that would offset lower wages, but normative features of ethical business practice that should be available to all workers.

---

### Conclusion

Ethical business practice and CSR in the case of work/life integration requires, from a feminist viewpoint, rethinking some major animating business concepts and changing our practices accordingly. They demand, specifically, a reimagining of the Ideal Worker and a willingness to recognize the linkages between public and private life, a recognition of the value of caring in the wider community and the importance of fostering such care, and a willingness to expand the dominant, restrictive notion of family life. They require, moreover, the change of corporate policies while still paying the kind of fair wages that allow for the life of flourishing that CEDAW recognizes as crucial for upholding women’s human rights.

---

### Cross-References

- ▶ [Feminist Care Ethics and Business Ethics](#)
- ▶ [Framing Global Gender Issues: Cross-Cultural Theory and Analysis](#)
- ▶ [Poverty as a Lack of Freedom: A Short History of the Capability Approach](#)
- ▶ [The Classic Social Contract Tradition](#)
- ▶ [Women’s Work: Global Trends and Demographics of Wealth and Employment](#)

---

### References

1. Davis AY (1983) *Women, race and class*. Vintage, New York
2. Fraser N (1992) Rethinking the public sphere: a contribution to the critique of actually existing democracy. In: Calhoun C (ed) *Habermas and the Public*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp 109–142

3. Gross S, Johnson R (2001) The ongoing integration of total rewards. *Employ Relat Today*, Winter
4. Guitián G (2009) Conciliating work and family: a catholic social teaching perspective. *J Bus Ethics* 88(3):513–524
5. Held V (2007) *The ethics of care: personal, political and global*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
6. Marx K (1992) *Capital*, vol 1., (trans: Fowkes B). Penguin Classics, New York
7. Melé D (1989) Organization of work in the company and family rights of employees. *J Bus Ethics* 8:8
8. Mohanty CT (2003) *Feminism without borders*. Duke, Durham
9. Noonan M (2001) The impact of domestic work on men's and women's wages. *J Marriage Fam* 63(November):1134–1145
10. Okin SM (1989) *Justice, gender and the family*. Basic Books, New York
11. Parkan B (2008) Professionalism: a virtue or estrangement from self-activity? *J Bus Ethics* 78:77–85
12. Prieto-Carrón M (2008) Women workers, industrialization, global supply chains and corporate codes of conduct. *J Bus Ethics* 53:5–17
13. Ramachandran G (2011) Confronting difference and finding common ground. *Seattle U L Rev* 34(3):725
14. Rawls J (2005) *A theory of justice*. Belknap/Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
15. Silbaugh K (2011) Deliverable male. *Seattle U L Rev* 34(3):733
16. Sklar H, Stallard K (1999) *Poverty in the American dream: women and children first*. INC Pamphlet, New York
17. United States EEOC (2011) Gender –based wage gap persists, experts agree at EEOC forum. Press Release, 28 Apr 2011
18. Williams JC (2000) *Unbending gender: why work and family conflict and what to do about it*. Oxford University Press, Oxford
19. Williams JC (2004) Hitting the maternal wall. *Academe* 90(6):16–20
20. Williams JC (2010) *Reshaping the work-family debate: why men and class matter*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA
21. Williams CA, Aguilera RV (2008) Corporate social responsibility in a comparative perspective. In: *Oxford handbook of corporate social responsibility*. Oxford University Press, Oxford