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COMMUNICATING PRAISE

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Praising is a communicative phenomenon. Or, at least, there is a *kind of praise* that is both integral to our responsibility practices and, in some important sense, communicative in nature. The claim that praise (or even *one kind of praise*) is communicative, however, may seem mysterious, or just flatly mistaken. For, in the case of blameworthy action, the wrongdoer can plausibly be understood to be *called to account* for his wrongdoing in being blamed. That is, the claim that blame is communicative – or that it involves “moral address” – finds intuitive articulation in the idea that to blame another is to ‘hold them accountable’ (or, to ‘hold them answerable’), often understood in terms of the blamer’s demanding that the wrongdoer properly acknowledge and ‘account for’ (or, ‘answer for’) their wrongdoing, by expressing guilt or remorse, apologizing, offering redress, etc. (Watson 1987; Darwall 2006; McKenna 2012; Shoemaker 2015; Helm 2017). The accountability-taking responses sought by blame are in this way *remedial* responses, presupposing a *previously disregarded* weighty normative consideration, one that perhaps persists in modified form after the wrongdoing (Gardner 2007: 33; Nelkin 2015: 363). But if blame’s communicativeness is intelligible as a way of calling the wrongdoer to account for their wrongdoing, a similar explanation will be lacking for praise.¹ For, there is nothing for which the praiseworthy agent owes the praiser an account – nothing to account, or answer, for. After all, the ‘rightdoer’ *already* properly regarded the relevant moral reasons *in having acted praiseworthily*; indeed, it is in virtue of their having properly regarded (and acted upon) the relevant reasons that they *are* praiseworthy.²

And yet, a number of theorists endorse the idea that praise is communicative *in the sense of being addressed to and seeking a response from* the rightdoer, i.e., the praiseworthy agent. Sometimes praise is construed as communicative in a far weaker sense than this response- or *uptake-seeking* sense of communicativeness. Consider the claim that “[p]raise communicates information about others’ evaluations – of specific performances, qualities of the self, or the entire person. It can be an important source of information about the self” (Crocker 2021: xvii), or that “praise conveys the message that one has the ability to succeed” (Delin & Baumeister 1994: 225; cf. Holroyd 2007: 268). Here, praise

communicates in the sense of conveying or implying certain information, without being essentially addressed to someone from whom a response is sought. Without denying that praise conveys information, e.g., that the praiser positively evaluates something ascribable to the agency of the praisee, I reserve talk of praise's communicativeness to the uptake-seeking sense of communication.

The aim of this chapter is to place on firmer ground the claim that our responsibility practices feature communicative praise, i.e., praise that is communicative in the uptake-seeking sense. I do so primarily by identifying and responding to three challenges to the idea of uptake-seeking praise: the descriptive adequacy objection; the normative objection; the redundancy objection. But first, in order to sufficiently distinguish between praise and nearby phenomena, like flattery and (mere) judgments of praiseworthiness, I provide an outline of praise.

1 An opinionated outline of praise

The sense of "praise" of interest to me is that associated with 'giving credit' to another for something, e.g., an action, and as such, of ascribing it to their agency.³ More substantively, I take it that to praise someone for some action is, at a minimum, to positively evaluate and take non-instrumental satisfaction in their performance of that action – where non-instrumental satisfaction consists in the subjective satisfaction of a non-instrumental desire⁴ – and, on that basis, to (be motivated to) communicate one's attitude to the target.⁵ We need not worry ourselves here in spelling out the precise content of praise's positive evaluation; at a minimum, it represents the action as a) particularly good so as to *merit* praise and b) ascribable to the agency of the praisee, e.g., an expression of the agent's good quality of will that exceeds what others' can demand of her. That the praisee is represented as *meriting* a positive response on the basis of some agential contribution distinguishes praise from its curry-favoring cousin, flattery.⁶

It is insufficient for praise that the agent merely positively evaluates an agent's action in the previously characterized way; a judgment (or belief) of praiseworthiness might do *this*. But, intuitively, one might judge that an agent acted praiseworthily (e.g., that they manifested a laudable degree of good quality of will) *without* praising them in the relevant sense. Perhaps the praiseworthy agent is a distant historical figure or one's enemy, in which case one's taking the agent *to be* praiseworthy might lack moral psychological import for one, and so, fail to translate into praise. Or imagine that the judgment of praiseworthiness is made by Satan or the amoralist, who, in thinking that some agent acted praiseworthily, is left indifferent or has the accompanying thought, 'what a sucker!'⁷ To *give credit*, as one does in the sense of praise of interest to me, in addition to positively evaluating the agent for their action, one must take non-instrumental satisfaction in their performance of that action (and be motivated to communicate this evaluation and satisfaction, in a sense to be further specified shortly). The satisfaction taken in the positively evaluated action must be of a *non-instrumental* kind. For, if the ground of one's satisfaction in another's performance of some generous deed, say, were solely that one placed a bet forecasting this kind of action, one's satisfaction (even if accompanied by the right kind of evaluation of the action) will not be of the right sort to constitute praise. Praise involves non-instrumental satisfaction in the positively evaluated action.

Some evidence for thinking that we're on the right track comes from reflection on the fact that expressions of *admiration* (and similar attitudes) are naturally understood as

expressions of praise, at least when agent-directed.⁸ When I admire, say, my peer's (A's) going out of her way to make a visitor feel welcome, I am, *inter alia*, positively evaluating and taking non-instrumental satisfaction in A's (kind, fair-minded, considerate, super-erogatory, generous) action. Consider what else I am doing in expressing my admiration to A, in, e.g., saying 'it was very considerate of you to host a dinner to welcome B to the department'. I am framing A's praiseworthy action in a particular way salient to me, i.e., as considerate. I am, further, inviting A to respond to my way of admiring A's action. As my admiration involves *crediting* A for her treatment of B, in inviting A to respond to my admiration of her, I am inviting A to accept credit from me. (Perhaps A will judge me poorly positioned to evaluate her action, in which case she might reject *my praise* without denying that she acted praiseworthily, that she is the fitting target of praise.) Of course, B himself might respond to A's praiseworthy action, e.g., in expressing *gratitude* to A for her action, perhaps saying 'thank you for your kindness and friendliness in welcoming me to the department'. Gratitude too, at least gratitude directed to agents for their benevolent actions, involves positively evaluating some action in which one takes non-instrumental satisfaction. Here too, perhaps more vividly, B's grateful response frames A's action in terms salient to B and invites A to take credit for the action so framed.

While it might be possible to praise an agent in the above sense without therein feeling a positive emotion toward that agent for that action, I take it to be no accident that, following Strawson (1962), interpersonal emotions (or "reactive attitudes") like admiration and gratitude are often identified as vehicles of praise. While gratitude involves positively evaluating and taking satisfaction in another's acting well *toward oneself* (or toward another with whom one identifies, e.g., one's child), admiration involves positively evaluating and taking satisfaction in another's acting well *toward another* (with whom one does not identify). Without treating responses like admiration and gratitude as necessary for praise, I proceed under the assumption that praise is paradigmatically instantiated in attitudes like these. These are attitudes in which one values an agent's action non-instrumentally. That is, assuming that thus valuing is a way of taking non-instrumental satisfaction in an agent's positively evaluated action, which, what's more, seeks uptake from its target, we can see why admiration and gratitude emerge as paradigmatic vehicles of praise in the communicative sense. The Strawsonian approach coheres with my treating praise as a communicative phenomenon, for, following Gary Watson (1996), a large cluster of Strawsonians understand the reactive attitudes as communicative phenomena, or forms of 'moral address'.⁹

In saying that praise *invites* a response, I am claiming that praise is communicative in more than the information-implying sense. After all, invitations – in addition to informing their recipients of various matters (e.g., that some event will (or may) take place at some time) – *seek a response* of a particular sort. They call for uptake. What kind of communicative response makes an invitation successful? It is *acceptance* of the invitation. The uptake sought by praise, accordingly, is acceptance of the invitation issued by praise. Consider my admiration and B's gratitude of A for A's action. Despite their differences, both aim for A to value her own action, as framed by the praiser, *with the praiser*. That is, they are invitations to co-value the praiseworthy agent's action. As the valuing of A's action that is involved in my admiration and B's gratitude is valuing that construes B's action as worthy of, or meriting, a positive response, the valuing sought in turn will be valuing wherein one *accepts* credit from the praiser. If discursive expression of admiration and gratitude is the paradigmatic way in which we recognize and value others' praiseworthy actions, it is

natural that it is via discursive expression of positive *self-reactive* attitudes, like self-approbation and pride, that praisees paradigmatically recognize and value their own actions *in response* to the praise of others.¹⁰ On the invitational view, then, praise issues an invitation to accept credit in discursively co-valuing the praiseworthy agent's action in terms salient to the praiser.

The objection from descriptive adequacy

One might wonder whether the invitational view of praise captures what we're doing when engaging in praise. That it is descriptively inadequate is not an automatic disqualifier for a view of praise, for one could be engaged in a revisionary, prescriptive, project, one that aims to characterize how we *should* praise (where this prescription gets its normative force from, e.g., considerations of justice, fairness, or utility). But while the invitational view of praise might offer local prescriptions about how to praise in order to secure praise's sought-after response, it is meant to capture what we are doing, at least in paradigmatic cases, in praising others. That is, continuous with the Strawsonian methodology of aiming to elucidate the nature of moral responsibility by attending to the subtleties of our responsibility practices, as we find them, the invitational view (at least that under consideration here) purports to be descriptively adequate.

To see why one might doubt the descriptive adequacy of the invitational view, consider the oddness of the following exchange:

- D: 'It was really considerate of you to help F with that problem of hers.'
- E: 'I recognize your valuing of my action, and I value my action (with you) in response'.

Not only do rightdoers characteristically *not* respond to praise as E does, rightdoers seem to regularly deflect or reject praise, by saying things like 'it was nothing', 'don't mention it', etc. These are intuitively responses of the opposite sort than those predicted by the invitational view. They do not look like self-valuing responses.

In reply, norms of modesty presumably temper the way in which praise is received and, by extension, the ways in which pride felt in response to praise is expressed (Leech 1983).¹¹ Given the association of certain facets of pride with vices like arrogance (Tracy & Robins 2007, 2014; Tracy et al. 2009), it should not be surprising that we have internalized strategies to express pride in ways that do not signal conceit. In this context, responses like 'don't mention it' or 'it was nothing' *are* conventional ways of discursively giving praise uptake. Elinor Mason makes this kind of point in outlining a view on which praise's acceptance similarly generates a kind of joint valuing:

Imagine that my friend decides to donate 10 per cent of her income to charity. . . . When I praise her, I am entering into a communication: I am telling her that I recognize the moral value of her act, and the effort she has put into it. I want her to accept my praise. Verbally she may brush it off, but that is compatible with her accepting it. *We tend to say things like, 'oh, you know, it's not much'. But that can be a way of accepting praise.* In accepting my praise, my friend does her part of the praise conversation, accepts my assessment, quietly takes pleasure in it, and we jointly affirm our shared values.

(Mason 2019: 108, italics added)

There is a big difference between the seemingly tepid response, ‘it was nothing’, and one that conventionally *rejects* praise, e.g., ‘I did not do that’ or ‘I regret doing that; it conflicts with my values.’ Furthermore, on the assumption that the rightdoer responded, *ex ante*, to the value of the intended action for which they are praiseworthy – without which they would not be praiseworthy – it is difficult to see how, *ex post*, the rightdoer would not be disposed to value what they have done. What’s more, in being praised, the rightdoer is receiving feedback that confirms their earlier assessment of the value of their action. While it is surely possible for the rightdoer to have valued their action *ex ante* but not *ex post* – perhaps they underwent a shift in values in the interim – normally (or at least, in the absence of misjudgment or other error), their positive attitudes toward the action as *to be done* will translate into positive attitudes toward the action as *done*. Further, insofar as the valuable action is viewed as done *by them* – i.e., as *one’s own doing* – it will presumably be valued as such. So, while norms of modesty may mediate our responses to praise such that we downplay our praiseworthy actions, downplaying one’s praiseworthy action is compatible with valuing it in the mode of pride.

Additionally, although the pride in question is a species of *agential-pride* – pride that targets an expression of one’s agency – the pride sought by praise is not simply pride in ‘having done the right thing’, but pride in, as it were, having *righted* another. That is, it is patient-focused; it is a way of valuing one’s own action *as significant for another* (Telech 2021: 164). After all, assuming the praiseworthy agent is morally praiseworthy (for some other-regarding action), she will not simply have done the right thing, but have done the right thing from other-regarding motives, i.e., in a patient-focused way. It is thus no surprise that we often respond to praise in ways that make reference to our original reasons for action, e.g., ‘I’m am happy to have been able to help’.

The normative objection

Next, one might object to the uptake-seeking conception of communicative praise on the following grounds: it seems unjust, unfair, or some such, that, having acted praiseworthy, the rightdoer should now owe a response to the praiser upon being praised. On what basis can the praiser legitimately expect the kind of uptake that, according to the invitational view, praise calls for? While *blamers* (perhaps especially, victims of wrongdoing) are intuitively licensed to put normative pressure on wrongdoers in blaming them, whence comes the *praiser’s* entitlement to the rightdoer’s response? Surely, the praiseworthy agent does not owe the praiser a response, much less the kind of reparative response associated with the entitlement to seek uptake in blame.

In reply, it should be granted that praise does not communicate a normative expectation of (or demand for) uptake. One might worry, however, that once it is denied that praise comes with an expectation of response – or that there is normative pressure on the praisee to respond in the previously characterized way – the idea that praise is communicative *in more than the information-implying sense* is rendered opaque. We can put the normative objection in terms of the following dilemma: either a) praise communicates that the praisee *should* (or is expected to, or owes it to the praiser that they) give praise uptake or b) it does not. If a), communicative praise is inappropriate, for the praiseworthy agent does not owe the praiser an account of their rightdoing (and to treat them as if they do is to treat them unjustly). If b), communicative praise is normatively impotent; it is not clear how praise

is uptake-seeking rather than merely information-providing. Robert Wallace (2022: 468) presses a version of the second horn of this dilemma:

The recipient of blame *should feel* (or know that they should feel) *guilt*; if otherwise, they must correct the blamer's assessment of what happened in an accounting. The recipient of gratitude need not accept it as praise, or justify their actions, or offer an excuse. They can even downplay what happened. It is hard to see how these responses indicate that a person is being held to account as a feature of our moral practices, even if these responses indicate something communicative and interpersonal has happened, namely, an internal sense of uptake. How is this sense of recognition as internal uptake anything more than recognizing in yourself, merely attributing to yourself, a beneficent will?

The normative objection can be defused. First, it is true that the invitational view understands praise to put normative pressure on the praisee. So, the invitational view denies b), specifically the implication that praise is normatively impotent. Nevertheless, praise does not communicate an *expectation* of uptake. The praisee is under no *requirement* to give praise uptake, as the blamee arguably is with respect to blame. That is, the invitational view also denies a). To see how both a) and b) can be rejected, let us turn to the distinctive features of invitation.

Valid invitations provide their addressees with reason to accept the invitation because invited. That is, like demands and requests, invitations are *directives*. The directive here is *discretionary* in that the reason provided, like that of request and unlike that of command, is non-obligatory, i.e., not a conclusive reason. Invitations seek acceptance, rather than compliance. Whether to do as invited is up to the invitee's discretion. *And yet*, invitations put normative pressure on the addressee to accept, for this is what invitations seek. As Martin (2021: 75) notes, invitations 'carry with them a certain legitimate pressure to accept, where the invitee needs a good reason to refuse (beyond say "I don't feel like it")'. In this respect, invitations contrast with offers. Both seek *some* reply, but speech act theorists understand offers as neutral between acceptance and rejection, while "invitations prefer acceptances and disprefer rejections" (Walker 2013: 456). Evidence for this is found in the normative remainder generated by declining a valid invitation, namely the appropriateness of an expression of regret, e.g., 'I'm sorry I can't make it'.¹² Thus, even if we deny that praise possesses the normative force of demand – imperatival force – it may nonetheless be, as the invitational view maintains, that praise puts normative pressure on the praisee to give praise uptake.

The objection from redundancy

Finally, one might worry that any view on which the praisee is called to recognise the value of their action must be redundant. For, the praiseworthy agent typically *already knows* they acted praiseworthy (assuming she acted from recognition of the relevant moral reasons), and so, will have apprehended the value of their action. After all, it's in light of this value that the praiseworthy agent acted in the first place. So, the idea that praise seeks uptake in the praisee's seeing herself as having done something valuable in pride is implausible; praise that sought this would be redundant.

Cheshire Calhoun (2021: 24–25) raises a version of this objection:

Why does sending the gratitude message matter? Is it really to get people to self-approvingly see themselves as the grateful see them? Those who do us favors, live up to normative expectations when most others wouldn't, contribute to collective projects, engage in heroic rescues, and so on do so intentionally for just the right reasons – or at least, if they deserve to be appreciated or thanked, they do. Any message whose gist is “You did a good thing” simply affirms what the appreciative or grateful person must assume the target already knows. Thus, the target already has grounds for feeling self-approbation (along with noticing her good qualities, interpreting her actions in the best possible light, patting herself on the back, and doing something nice for herself). Thus, sending appreciation and gratitude messages seems pointless.

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The redundancy objection is useful in illustrating the shortcomings of the *information-conveying* view of praise's communicativeness. If the information conveyed by praised is information about the act's rightness (/right-making features), on the assumption that an agent's being praiseworthy for acting rightly presupposes her being *aware of and guided by* the act's rightness (/right-making features) (D'Arcy 1963: 160; Arpaly 2003: 79, 84; Zimmerman 1988: 50; Haji 1998: 175), praise will indeed be redundant. As Calhoun (2021: 25, n.28) elaborates, “the appreciative or grateful person must assume that the target intended to do something of positive moral import *because* of its positive moral import in order to be justified in thinking that appreciation or gratitude was the appropriate response.” The information ‘conveyed’ ex post will be information the praisee already possessed – indeed, *was guided by* – ex ante. And what's more, the praiser will normally *know* this, assuming their praise is justified.

In reply, first, praise does not simply tell the praisee that what they did was praiseworthy (/had positive moral import). It does this *in terms salient to the praiser*. Praiseworthy actions are replete with value that can be described in myriad ways reflective of the praiser's particular concerns, their relative weightings of the normative considerations, their history, etc. One and the same action may, for example, be generous, compassionate, and courageous, and so on. Different praisers might fittingly praise the action in distinct but non-competing ways, one for its generosity, one for its compassionateness, and so on. Even if the praiseworthy agent must have been guided by the act's rightness, she need not have conceived of her action under the description salient to third parties, much less by the particular third party doing the praising.

Secondly, and more importantly, according to the invitational view of praise, the uptake sought by praise is not for the praisee simply to recognize the value of their action. Its point is not exhausted by its content (including its content as informed by the aspects of the action salient to the praiser). This content comes in cordial *form* – that of invitation – as praise is itself an *expression of good will* (Wallace 2022: 476). This is reflected in the fact that other things being equal, we appreciate, feel gratified by, etc., others' praise. Without collapsing the distinction between praise and reward (where the latter but not the former includes an *intention* to benefit), praise is *reward-like* in the following sense: it tends to promote the interests of, or benefit, its recipient. This should not be surprising given that praise is a way of valuing some agent for her praiseworthy action. In addition to verbally expressing gratitude and admiration – which can be meaningful to the praisee over and

above the meaning of its content – we ‘show’ our thanks and admiration in various ways meant to express the value, to us, of the praiseworthy agent’s action.

The invitational view of praise captures the intuition that praise paradigmatically benefits the praisee. For, invitations represent it to be in the invitee’s *interest* to accept the invitation. This is one important dimension along which requests are distinguished from invitations. As Drew and Couper-Kuhlen (2014: 6) write, “[w]hen A requests B to do something, A is the beneficiary; but when A invites B to (do) something, then B becomes at least a co-beneficiary.” In the case of praise, the addressee’s being a co-beneficiary of the praising interaction will be a matter of her accepting praise in co-*valuing* her action in terms salient to, and presented by, the praiser.

Thus, even when the praiseworthy agent knows that they are praiseworthy and also that the would-be praiser judges them praiseworthy in some particular way, communicative praise has a point. In praising another, we are inviting the praiseworthy agent to accept credit in valuing their praiseworthy action as valued by us. If accepted, the praiser and the praiseworthy agent will co-value the latter’s action in a manner hosted by (because initiated by and framed in terms salient to) the praiser. While the praiseworthy agent will have *valued* the action *ex ante*, she could not have jointly valued the significance of that action for the praiser. Thus, praise that seeks uptake in the praiseworthy agent’s valuing of her action need not be redundant.

Conclusion

This chapter presented and defended a view of praise as a communicative phenomenon, distinguishing communicativeness in the (mere) information-conveying sense and communicativeness in the uptake-seeking sense. On the view outlined, praise is communicative in that it invites the praiseworthy agent to accept praise by co-valuing their action in the evaluative terms supplied by the praiser. Praise is invitational in that it i) provides the praisee with a (discretionary) directive reason to accept praise; ii) seeks to host the addressee in co-valuing her action; and iii) characteristically benefits the praisee. Thus, although it is not a response that calls the praisee ‘to account’ in a remedial sense, this is no challenge to the proposal that praise is a communicative phenomenon.¹³

Notes

- 1 For elaboration, see King (2014); Macnamara (2013a, 2013b); Eshleman (2014); Telech (2020).
- 2 What’s more, even if it is possible to be praiseworthy for some unwitting rightdoing (such that the praiseworthy agent is not aware she did the right thing, under the relevant description), praise of the unwitting rightdoer would not intuitively amount to a form of holding *to account*.
- 3 I speak of praise as targeting (agents for their) *actions* for simplicity’s sake. Other candidates for proper objects of praise include virtues of character, and non-volitional attitudes like desires, beliefs, and emotions. One’s response to the question, ‘what are the proper objects of praise?’ will be determined by one’s account of *praiseworthiness*; a traditional assumption is that moral responsibility generally (and by extension, *praiseworthiness*) presupposes voluntary control, thus ruling out responsibility for the non-voluntary. But see Adams (1985), Scanlon (1998), and Smith (2005, 2008).
- 4 To desire X non-instrumentally is to desire X *at least in part* for its own sake. On non-instrumental (or, ‘intrinsic’) desires, see Arpaly and Schroeder (2014).
- 5 An account of praise’s communicative aim is well served by focusing on praise in its paradigmatic form, i.e., praise that is *in fact* communicated (cf. Fricker 2016; McKenna 2012). While

the motivation to address the praisee might fail to find communicative expression (much less, its sought-after uptake), I limit my scope to communicated praise.

- 6 On flattery, see Eylon and Heyd (2008).
- 7 See Arpaly and Schroeder (2014: 160–161) on this point.
- 8 For skepticism about there being a tight connection between positive emotion and praise, see Stout (2020: 217). Stout, however, treats *congratulations* (including, for non-moral achievements, e.g., a student's acquiring 17,000 Instagram followers) as expressions of praise, but many cases of congratulations won't involve taking non-instrumental satisfaction in some exercise of agency, either because the congratulator does not have a non-instrumental desire that is satisfied by the act (true of me in relation to someone's gaining many social media followers, assuming the latter qualifies as an action), or because one is congratulated for something non-agential (e.g., winning the lottery). On other objections (and responses) to the view that positive emotion is essential to praise, see Telech (2022: 5–6).
- 9 Darwall (2006); McKenna (2012); Macnamara (2013a); Shoemaker (2015); Telech (2021).
- 10 See Telech (2021). See also Lippert-Rasmussen (2022), though he denies that praise is *essentially* invitational; sometimes it issues demands. See also Mason (2019: 108–109). See also Macnamara (2013a: 908), who, though not taking praise to be invitational, writes, 'moral agents receptively recognize themselves as having done something morally good with self-approbation'. Of gratitude, which he takes to be the positive analogue of resentment, Shoemaker (2013: 117) writes, 'the aim is fundamentally communicative, to get the heighter [i.e., the praiseworthy agent] to robustly acknowledge what he has done and how he has made the heighted feel from the heighted's perspective'.
- 11 Leech's (1983: 136) *Politeness Principle* contains among its maxims, 'The modesty maxim: Minimize the expression of praise of self; maximize the expression of dispraise of self'. Within the modern Chinese context, see Yuegou's (1990: 246) *Self-denigration maxim*: '(a) denigrate self and (b) elevate other'.
- 12 Not all invitation *attempts* will generate valid (i.e., directive-providing) invitations, just as not all command or request attempts will generate valid commands and requests.
- 13 The ideas in this chapter benefited from presentations at the University of Oxford and Tilburg University. For helpful comments and questions, I thank Rachel Achs, Mark Alfano, Cheshire Calhoun, Jules Holroyd, Max Kiener, Matt King, Elinor Mason, Leo Menges, Thaddeus Metz, and Andrea Westlund.

Further reading

Macnamara, C. (2013). "‘Screw You!’ & ‘Thank You!’,” *Philosophical Studies*, 165(3), 893–914, develops an influential communicative account of expressions of the positive and negative reactive attitudes as “recognitives,” speech acts expressing emotional recognition that seek acknowledgement in expression of self-reactive attitudes from their targets. Martin, A. (2014). *How We Hope: A Moral Psychology*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, chapter 5, develops an account of “normative hope,” an agent-directed stance wherein one upholds norms as aspirational and from which positive reactive attitudes (vehicles of praise, for the Strawsonian) are proposed to be intelligible. Telech, D. (2022) “Praise,” *Philosophy Compass*, 17(10), 1–19, provides a survey of possible views of praise's nature (e.g., the judgment view, the action view, the emotion view, the conative-alteration view) and outlines several norms (a norm of merit/fittingness/desert, an epistemic norm, a norm of standing, a fairness norm) that may govern praise. Telech, D. (2021). “Praise as Moral Address,” *Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility*, 7, 154–181, introduces the invitational view of praise on which this chapter builds.

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