Internalism, (Super)fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy

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Internalism, (Super)fragile Reasons, and the Conditional Fallacy

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Abstract: David Sobel (2001) objects to Bernard Williams’s internalism, the view that an agent has a reason to perform an action only if she has some motive that will be served by performing that action. Sobel is an unusual challenger in that he endorses neo-Humean subjectivism, ‘the view that it is the agent’s subjective motivational set that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to φ’ (219). Sobel’s objection in fact arises from this very commitment. Internalism, he says, is incompatible with the best subjectivist accounts of reasons for action—accounts that suggest that there are what he calls fragile reasons and perhaps also superfragile ones, both of which allegedly provide for counterexamples to internalism. I argue that such reasons do not in fact threaten internalism. I then briefly explore whether internalism is vulnerable to a related charge—that it commits the conditional fallacy.

1 Introduction

I can think of no claim associated with contemporary metaethics that is more visible to the general philosophical reader than Bernard Williams’s (1980/1981) claim of internalism about reasons for action—roughly, the view that an agent has a reason to perform a certain action only if she has some motive that will be served or furthered by performing that action. To bring out the contrast between internalism and externalism, Williams has us consider the case of Owen Wingrave, a man who, although he comes from a long line of soldiers, has no motivation to join the army and whose every desire leads in another direction. In such a case, the internalist claims that Owen has no reason to join the army. An externalist, by contrast, might claim that considerations of family honor give Owen a reason to join up (even when such considerations mean absolutely nothing to Owen himself).

The flavor of Williams’s claim is decidedly subjectivist, comporting as it does with the thought that it is the agent’s subjective motivational set
that makes it the case that an agent does or does not have a reason to act.\footnote{Sobel says that internalism is, strictly speaking, compatible with either objectivism or subjectivism, since it may be that the relationship between motivations and reasons is merely one of ‘tracking’ and not one of ‘truth-making’ (233-234). However Sobel and I are in agreement with each other and with the general philosophical public that the spirit of Williams’s discussion is subjectivist. I take my statement of the claim of subjectivism from Sobel (219).} It seems natural that the view should face challenges from the objectivist camp. Thus a recent objection raised by David Sobel (2001) comes as something of a surprise: Sobel objects to Williams’s claim on the ground that it is incompatible with the best subjectivist accounts of reasons for action (226).

According to Sobel, the best subjectivist accounts of reasons for action are what he calls ideal advisor accounts. He explains the general idea behind such accounts of reasons for action by means of an analogy he sees with accounts of well-being. Consider first Sidgwick’s full information account of well-being.

[A] man’s future good on the whole is what he would now desire and seek on the whole if all the consequences of all the different lines of conduct open to him were accurately foreseen and adequately realized in imagination at the present point in time (Sidgwick 1981: 111-112).

Sobel tells us that Sidgwick’s formulation—which he apparently understands as saying that an individual’s future good is what a fully informed version of that individual would on the whole desire—runs into trouble.

For example, consider that even though our fully informed self would never want more information for itself, we are firmly convinced that sometimes it can be intrinsically in our interest to gain information. The fact that the fully informed agent lacks a desire for information clearly does not threaten the thought that it would be good for a noninformed agent to get information (Sobel 2001: 227).

But, Sobel says, this trouble can be avoided by modifying the account—for example in the way that Railton does.

An individual’s good consists in what he would want himself to want, or to
pursue, were he to contemplate his present situation from a standpoint fully and vividly informed about himself and his circumstances, and entirely free of cognitive error or lapses of instrumental rationality (Railton 1986: 16).

Similarly, Sobel thinks, we should look to an idealized version of $A$ (call him ‘$A+$’) in order to determine $A$’s reasons for action, but we must be careful in doing this ‘lest $A$’s reasons that are present because he is a nonidealized agent get lost or altered’ (229). In order to determine $A$’s reasons for action, we should look to what an ideal advisor, $A+$, would advise $A$ to do instead of looking to what $A+$ is himself motivated to do. It seems then that according to ideal advisor accounts, $A$ has reason to $\phi$ if and only if $A+$ would recommend $\phi$-ing to $A$.\footnote{Sobel explicitly gives the ‘if’ part of this claim (230). Given that what the ideal advisor advises is supposed to be determinative of the agent’s reasons, the ‘only if’ seems intended.}

In effect, Sobel is pointing out that the best subjectivist accounts of reasons for action must avoid the ‘conditional fallacy’.\footnote{Shope (1978) identifies this sort of problem in a wide variety of contexts. He does not explicitly discuss subjectivism about reasons for action (and of course, given the dates, he does not discuss Williams’s internalism).} The fallacy involves overlooking, in one way or another, tensions between the analysandum and the antecedent and consequent of the conditional in the analysans. Consider a view that I will call naïve subjectivism, according to which $A$ has reason to $\phi$ if and only if $A+$ would be motivated to $\phi$. Putting this view into a form that makes the relevance of the conditional fallacy apparent, we might say that naïve subjectivism holds that $A$ has reason to $\phi$ if and only if the following conditional holds: if $A$ were fully informed and fully rational, she would be motivated to $\phi$. Consider the case of the agent who intuitively has reason to gather certain information. Here naïve subjectivism commits the conditional fallacy by overlooking the fact that $A$’s being fully informed and fully rational is incompatible with her being motivated to gather any information. Thus the agent who intuitively has reason to gather certain information is said by the analysis offered by naïve subjectivism not to have a reason. Ideal advisor accounts seek to avoid such a mistake.
It is at this point that Sobel begins his case against Williams’s internalism. He says, ‘If we are persuaded by these sorts of considerations to [adopt some form of an ideal advisor account], then Williams’s … internalism [is] threatened’ (230).

Ideal advisor accounts of reasons for action allow for the existence of what Sobel terms fragile reasons—reasons that ‘break’ (and thus cease to be reasons to φ) in the process of an agent’s becoming ideally informed. In Sobel’s succinct formulation, ‘A’s reason to φ is fragile if and only if A has it but A+ lacks it’ (231). He asks us to consider an example: suppose that there is a food with ‘singular taste’—something such that once one has tasted it, one is glad to have done so, but never wants to taste again. Assuming that A has never tasted this food, it seems that he has reason to taste it, whereas A+—who, Sobel imagines, as the ideal advisor, has tasted this food—does not have reason to do so, and thus that A’s reason to taste the food is fragile.

In addition, Sobel thinks that the example of the singular taste ‘might’ also be an example of a superfragile reason—a reason ‘so fragile that the only vantage points from which one could appreciate the way in which φ-ing furthers something in the actual agent’s subjective motivational set are vantage points in which one lacks a reason to φ’ (231). More definitively, he says, ‘Superfragile reasons are reasons that one cannot have and be motivated by simultaneously’ (231).

It is Sobel’s explicit contention that the (at least possible) existence of fragile reasons gives us reason to reject Williams’s internalism. Moreover Sobel also suggests that the (at least possible) existence of superfragile reasons does likewise. So, after a brief examination to clarify just what it is that internalism claims (§2), I will argue first that fragile reasons do not support counterexamples to that view (§3), and then that superfragile

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4 Sobel writes, ‘Fragile reasons are the key to my rejection of … internalism. Superfragile reasons are the key to my rejection of Explanation II [which is a different thesis]’ (231). However when he explains (233) just what the problem with internalism is supposed to be, the consideration he gives appeals to features of superfragile reasons that are not features of mere fragile reasons.
reasons also do not (§4). Finally (in §5), I will briefly consider a question that seems to me closely related to Sobel’s concerns: Does Williams’s internalism commit the conditional fallacy?

2 Williams’s internalism
Williams formulates internalism ‘very roughly’ (1980/1981: 101) as the view that A has a reason to φ only if A has some motive that will be served or furthered by his φ-ing. In an effort to clarify his view, he later formulates it as this: ‘A has a reason to φ only if he could reach the conclusion to φ by a sound deliberative route from the motivations he already has’ (Williams 1989/1995: 35). This second formulation of the claim then has the form, ‘P ⊃ □Q’.5 Sobel takes the central idea here to be that ‘if consideration C provides A a reason to φ, then it must be the case that A could φ because C motivated him to φ’ (230). Provided we understand Sobel’s ‘A φs because C motivates him to φ’ implicitly to retain the idealizing element that is explicit in ‘A reaches the conclusion to φ by a sound deliberative route from the motivations he already has’, this seems a reasonable representation of Williams’s claim. (Sobel’s claim contains another modal operator—‘then it must be the case that A could ... ’—but I take it that this is supposed to have the force of saying that the entire conditional claim is necessary, rather than saying that the consequent is necessarily possible. I agree with Sobel that Williams intends his claim to be a necessary one; hence Sobel’s attempt to use merely possible cases as counterexamples seems entirely appropriate to me.6) So, keeping with Sobel’s wording, we can spell out Williams’s claim, using the often helpful idiom of quantification over worlds and times, as this: If, on the actual world at a given time, C gives A a reason to φ, then there is a possible world and time at which A φs because C motivates him to φ. (Here it is to be understood that there is an implicit restriction to worlds and times at which A deliberates soundly from his actual

5 To see this let ‘P’ be ‘A has a reason to φ’ and ‘Q’ be ‘A reaches the conclusion to φ by a sound deliberative route from A’s actual motivations’.

6 I thank an anonymous referee for highlighting the need to make this explicit.
motivational set. Otherwise it is not plausible to retain Sobel’s wording.) Thus, the form that a counterexample to Williams’s claim should take is clear: it should present a case in which the antecedent of Williams’s conditional claim is true—that is, it should present a case in which $C$ gives $A$ a reason to $\phi$ (at a given time)—but in which the consequent is false—that is, the case should also be one in which there is no possible world (relative to the world of the case) and time at which $A$ $\phi$s because $C$ motivates him to $\phi$.

3 Fragile reasons

Do cases of fragile reasons provide such counterexamples? It seems to me that they do not—certainly not generally. Consider again a case in which the fact that $A$ is ignorant of some particular information gives him a reason to go to the library. Even if we grant that $A$’s ideal advisor does not share $A$’s ignorance\(^7\)—and thus grant that $A$’s reason to go to the library is fragile, since $A$ has the ignorance and (thus) the reason while $A+$ lacks the ignorance and (thus) the reason—we do not seem to have a counterexample to internalism. Williams’s antecedent is satisfied, but so is its consequent: the fact that $A$ is ignorant in a certain way does (actually) give him a reason to go to the library (at a given time); and there is indeed a possible world and time (for example, a world and time at which $A$ is aware of his ignorance) in which $A$ goes to the library because his ignorance motivates him to do so. Thus, we see that it is not true—at least as a universal claim—that where there are fragile reasons there are counterexamples to internalism.

But perhaps, even if fragile reasons do not universally provide for counterexamples to internalism, some particular case of a fragile reason does provide a counterexample. This would still tell against Williams’s claim. Whatever his thoughts about the counterexample-producing

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\(^7\) It is not entirely clear to me why Sobel assumes that an ideal advisor must be fully informed, rather than simply relevantly informed. It may be enough for an advisor to be ideal in this case that he recognizes (that is, that he is ‘informed’) that the agent is ignorant in some way. It seems to me that the ideal advisor may in some cases be able to recognize the agent’s ignorance while also sharing it.
abilities of fragile reasons in general, Sobel apparently intends the case of the ‘singular taste’ to provide a particular counterexample to internalism. He writes, ‘After one has tasted it, one would recommend to versions of oneself that have not tasted it to try it’, thus indicating that $A$ has reason to taste the food, but, he continues, ‘considering the taste itself could never motivate one, whether informed or not, to try it’, thus indicating that it is impossible that ‘considering the taste itself’ motivates $A$ (or $A^+$) to try the food.

But how exactly is all this supposed to provide for a counterexample to Williams’s claim? Sobel has, it seems, only provided a case in which some $C$ or other, which is not explicitly stated, gives $A$ a reason to try the food, but in which a particular $C$, which is explicitly stated (namely, ‘considering the taste itself’), fails at every possible world and time to motivate the agent (idealized or not) to try the food. But to generate a counterexample to Williams’s claim Sobel needs to provide a case in which the very $C$ that gives the agent a reason to do something also fails at every possible world and time to motivate him to do that thing. It seems to me that he has not done this.

It is clear that ‘considering the taste itself’ is not what gives $A$ a reason to try the food: there is, after all, no such (actual) thing as $A$’s consideration of the taste itself (at the appropriate time), since $A$ does not actually consider the taste itself (at the appropriate time). This means then that with $C$ as ‘considering the taste itself’ we do not have a counterexample to Williams’s conditional, since then its antecedent is not even satisfied. And thus it seems to me that Sobel does not make clear how the example of the singular taste is supposed to provide for a counterexample to internalism.

One might complain that I am taking Sobel too literally. Perhaps instead of ‘considering the taste itself could never motivate …’ he meant the consideration, the taste itself, could never motivate … so that the intended $C$ is not consideration of the taste itself but instead the taste itself. Does this give a counterexample to internalism? Does the taste itself give $A$ a reason to try the food and does the taste itself fail at every
possible world and time to motivate $A$ (idealized or not) to try the food? To my ear these questions do not really make sense taken literally: oh, I can imagine seeing an ad for a sports drink that says, ‘The taste alone is reason enough to drink it’, which I would understand to mean that the fact that I will enjoy the taste gives me a reason to drink the stuff. Similarly, I take it that it is the fact, which is unbeknownst to the agent, that the agent will be glad to have tasted the singular-tasting food that gives him a reason to try the food. But surely there is a possible world and time (for example, a world and time at which $A$ is aware of the fact that he will be glad to have tasted the singular-tasting food) at which this fact motivates him to try the food. And thus there is no counterexample to Williams’s claim.

But perhaps this is just a fault of Sobel’s exposition; perhaps the example does, after all, provide a counterexample. The first step in exploring this possibility is to figure out just what it is in the singular taste case that gives the agent a reason to try the food. It seems to me that the agent has a reason to try the food because the food has a singular taste that the agent has never experienced. This should be congenial to Sobel, since it does clearly provide a case of a fragile reason: $A$, with his virgin palate, has the reason while $A+$, with his experienced palate, lacks it. However, taking as $C$ the (conjunctive) fact that the agent has never tried the food and that the food has a singular taste, does not yield a counterexample to internalism. The conditional’s antecedent is satisfied but so is its consequent. The (conjunctive) fact that $A$ has never tried the food and that the food has a singular taste (actually) gives $A$ a reason to try the food (at a given time); and there is indeed a possible world and time (for example, a world and time at which $A$ is aware of the conjunctive fact) in which $A$ tries the food because the (conjunctive) fact that he has never tried the food and that the food has a singular taste motivates him to do so.

But perhaps all this is only so much misunderstanding of Sobel’s thought. Aside from giving the example of the singular taste, he explains what the problem with internalism is supposed to be. He writes that the
problem ‘is that there need not be, at least according to ideal advisor views, a single version of $A$ who both (1) has a reason to $\phi$, and (2) is himself motivated to $\phi$ or would conclude that he ought to $\phi$ after sound deliberation’ (233). Here then Sobel apparently appeals to features of superfragile reasons in particular (and not just to features of fragile reasons) to show what is wrong with internalism: it is superfragile reasons, after all, that Sobel says are the ones that one cannot have and be motivated by simultaneously.

4 Superfragile reasons

Sobel expresses some hesitation to say that the example of the singular taste is an example of a superfragile reason. What he says is that it ‘might be’ an example of such a reason (231). It seems to me Sobel’s hesitation is appropriate, since, as I see it, the singular taste case does not give an example of a superfragile reason. After all, in that case, there is a vantage point—namely one in which $A$ is aware that the food has a singular taste and that he has not tasted it—from which $A$ appreciates the way in which trying the food furthers something in his subjective motivational set and in which $A$ has the reason to try the food. But one might wonder whether Sobel’s example can be modified a bit, so that it says that the only way that $A$ could be aware that the taste is a singular taste is by tasting it. It seems to me that one cannot simply stipulate what is and is not possible, so I do not think Sobel’s example can usefully be modified in this way.  

Given all this, it seems wise to turn away from the example, and look instead to Sobel’s thought about how superfragile reasons—on the assumption that there are such reasons—would provide for

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8 There are though tempting examples of this kind of thing. I seem to remember that Harry Frankfurt once suggested to me that perhaps the only way to see that raising a child is a valuable experience is by raising a child. In this connection, he shared with me a quotation from Leon Bloy: ‘Man has places in his heart that do not yet exist, and into them enters suffering in order that they may have existence.’ The suggestion seemed to be that the value of the kind of suffering that accompanies raising a child—and the value associated with the resulting impact on who one is—is something that can be recognized only after the fact. Sympathetic as I am to this thought, it seems to me that, strictly—and perhaps overly dryly philosophically—speaking, this is not true.
counterexamples to internalism. We have just seen in the passage quoted at the end of the last section that Sobel thinks that when there is not a single version of A who both has a reason to ϕ and is motivated to ϕ, then there is some kind of problem for internalism. But again he does not say exactly what this problem supposed to be.

Sobel suggests that the fact—if it is a fact—that there are Cs such that there is no possible world and time at which C both gives A a reason to ϕ and motivates him to ϕ tells against internalism. But it seems to me that this thought turns on a misunderstanding of the modal structure of the claims involved. The fact that Sobel appeals to has roughly the form of ‘∼□ (P & Q)’. Internalism, as we have seen, has roughly the form of ‘P ⊨ □Q’. But the truth of ‘∼□ (P & Q)’ says nothing to threaten the truth of ‘P ⊨ □Q’, as an example easily shows. Some philosophers hold that a material object such as a table or a lectern could have had a slightly different material origin from the one it actually had: a carpenter might, for example, have picked up and used one different nail from one that she actually used in constructing the object, and the result would have been the very same object.⁹ This sort of claim is sometimes put thus: If a given table—call it ‘Albert’—originated from a hunk of matter h, then Albert could have originated from hunk of matter h₁ (where h₁ differs from h by a single molecule). Now, it is of course impossible that Albert originated from h and also originated from h₁, since there is no possible world in which Albert has two material origins. This latter claim though does nothing of course to falsify the claim that Albert might have had a slightly different material origin from the one that it actually had.

Similarly, and in a little more detail, Williams claims that if on the actual world at a given time, C gives A a reason to ϕ, then there is a possible world and time at which A ϕs because C motivates him to ϕ. (Compare: if on the actual world at a given time Albert originates from hunk of matter h, then there is a possible world and time at which Albert originates from hunk of matter h₁.) Sobel counters that when C is a superfragile reason,

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⁹ I am merely stating a view that some hold. (See, for example, Forbes 1986 and Salmon 1989.) I am not endorsing the view.
there is no world and time at which C gives A a reason to φ and A φ’s because C motivates him to φ. (Compare: there is no world and time at which Albert originates from hunk of matter h and in which Albert originates from hunk of matter h1.) Sobel’s claim, even granting its truth, does nothing to falsify Williams’s claim: it simply does not have the right modal structure to do so.

5 Internalism and the conditional fallacy
It seems clear to me that Sobel has not presented a counterexample to Williams’s internalism, but I also think that in light of the fact that Williams at least sometimes presents his view as providing a necessary condition for A’s having a reason to φ in terms of an implicit conditional, it is well worth exploring the possibility that his view is subject to a version of the conditional fallacy.

First, I will state the obvious: Williams’s internalism is not the ‘only-if half’ of naïve subjectivism. The ‘only-if half’ of naïve subjectivism says

A has reason to φ only if the following conditional holds: if A were fully informed and fully rational, she would be motivated to φ

whereas Williams’s internalism (in its 1989/1995 formulation) says

A has a reason to φ only if he could reach the conclusion to φ by a sound deliberative route from the motivations he already has.

Although Williams’s talk of ‘sound deliberative routes’ indicates some idealizing of the agent, there is no indication that the idealized agent Williams is concerned with is in all respects fully informed or even in all respects fully rational. There is of course an indication that the idealized

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10 Actually, this may not be so obvious. In a thought-provoking article, Johnson (1999) seems to equate such a view with Williams’s internalism. But what is obvious is that the “only-if half” of naïve subjectivism is not the view that Sobel has in mind when he discusses Williams’s internalism: if it were, then it would be entirely unclear what Sobel means his talk of fragile and superfragile reasons to be adding to the discussion, since it is already abundantly apparent from his advocacy of ideal advisor accounts of reasons for action that he thinks that the ‘only-if half’ of naïve subjectivism falls to the conditional fallacy.
agent is informed and rational as far as the deliberative route from his motivations to the particular action in question is concerned. The example of the agent who has a reason to gather certain information nicely brings out the differences between the ‘only-if half’ of naïve subjectivism and Williams’s internalism.\footnote{Van Roojen (2000) gives a number of similar examples—examples that although they tell against something like the ‘only-if half’ of naïve subjectivism do not tell against a less idealized account.} What Williams is saying is that it is a necessary condition of A’s having a reason to \( \phi \) that some version of \( A \), who is apprised of the relevant facts (for example, that failure to gather certain information will lead to such and such undesirable consequences) and who reasons well from her actual motivational set, would be motivated to \( \phi \). If we bring out the conditional in the ‘analytical’ explicitly, we have

\[ A \text{ has a reason to } \phi \text{ only if the following conditional holds: if } A \text{ were relevantly informed and rational she could reach the conclusion to } \phi \text{ from the motivations she already has.} \]

If we are to look for a problem with Williams’s formulation of internalism, the schema for the conditional fallacy tells us where to look: we want a case in which intuitively an agent has a reason to perform a certain action, but in which even this relatively modest idealizing of the agent is in tension with the modestly idealized agent’s having a motivation to perform the relevant action. A contrived case comes to mind. Suppose that Emma has a brain configuration that makes her unable to engage in any sound deliberation, but that there is a pill available with the following properties: if it is taken by one who has this particular brain problem, then the pill corrects the problem; but if it is taken by one who is able to deliberate soundly in even a single case, then the pill causes extreme and eternal pain. Intuition says that Emma \textit{does} have a reason to take the pill, but according to Williams’s conditional ‘analysis’, Emma does not have such a reason, since a version of Emma
who is a sound deliberator (even only about this one issue) would not be motivated to take the pill.\textsuperscript{12}

On the face of it, we have here a case in which \( A \) has reason to take the pill but in which there is no possible world in which \( A \) (deliberates soundly from her actual motivations and) is motivated to take the pill.\textsuperscript{13} Thus we have what Sobel searched for in fragile and superfragile reasons—a \textit{prima facie} counterexample to Williams’s later formulation of internalism.\textsuperscript{14}

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\section*{References}


\textsuperscript{12} This example arguably fits Sobel's characterization of a superfragile reason, but it is not the fact that it fits this characterization that is doing the work. Notice that what is important about the example is not that the there is no version of Emma who both has the reason and the motivation (even though this seems true). What is important is simply that the appropriately idealized version of Emma lacks the motivation. The issue of whether she has the reason is simply irrelevant.

\textsuperscript{13} It seems to me worth exploring whether looks are deceiving here. At this point I cannot see my way clear to a definitive answer.

\textsuperscript{14} I offer thanks to Steven Arkonovich, Ben Eggleston, Mark van Roojen, and David Sobel for discussion. More importantly I want to acknowledge that I am more than usually grateful to each of them for offering so much encouragement as I ventured into an area of philosophy that is so far from my areas of expertise. I thank also an anonymous referee for comments that helped me see much better the lay of the land here.


