Elio Antonucci
Thiemo Breyer
Marco Cavallaro (eds.)

Perspectives on the Philosophy of Culture

Husserl and Cassirer

Elio Antonucci, Thiemo Breyer, Marco Cavallaro (eds.)

Perspectives on the Philosophy of Culture

Schriften zur Phänomenologie und Anthropologie

Band 3

Herausgegeben von
Thiemo Breyer

Redaktion
Erik Norman Dzwiza-Ohlsen

Wissenschaftlicher Beirat
Sophie Loidolt, Matthias Schloßberger, Michela Summa,
Íngrid Vendrell Ferran, Maren Wehrle, Matthias Wunsch

Elio Antonucci, Thiemo Breyer, Marco Cavallaro (eds.)

Perspectives on the Philosophy of Culture

Husserl and Cassirer

Table of Contents

Husserl's and Cassirer's Naïve Historico-Cultural Progressivism as Viewed Through a Radical Reworking of Köhler's Value Theory

Panos Theodorou

Abstract: Husserl and Cassirer stand, according to their own self-understanding, as key 20th century figures in the cultivation of Enlightenment's principles and views on humanity, culture, and history. In a word, they both understand European culture and history as a story of progress (§ 1). As I see it, central in a culture and its dynamics is its system of values, and a grounded understanding of the issue of progress presupposes an adequate theory of the standing or constitution as well as of the givenness and transvaluation of values. Neither Husserl nor Cassirer, however, actually advanced any such theory. We are still in need of one in order to account for culture's formation and dynamics in history. Next, I briefly review Husserl's and Cassirer's available problematic views on values (§ 2). Then, in § 3, I examine some of the central problems in the traditional approaches to culture and to values. In § 4, I appeal to Köhler's very interesting Gestalt theoretical approach to values and pinpoint some of its problems. Next, in § 5, I suggest how we could start the research from below, from the level of the organism, which could eventually shed some new light on the problem of value constitution and givenness. Finally, in § 6, I attempt to sketch an explanation for how we can use this new approach to values in order to understand actual cultural formation and its historicity, in a way that goes further than the whiggish philosophy of history.

Keywords: Edmund Husserl, Ernst Cassirer, Wolfgang Köhler, Philosophy of Culture, Philosophy of History, Values, Meaning

"We shall perish by the very thing by which we fancy that we live."

Charles Baudelaire: *Fusées* (1851)[17]

1 Introduction: Husserl's and Cassirer's Understandings of Culture and History

The early 20th century was a complicated time. Humanity had witnessed the triumph of the natural sciences and efforts to render the human sciences as scientific as the natural ones. It was a period characterized by an intensification of the spread of naturalism and accompanying debates concerning the fate of normativity (theoretical and practical) in a solely natural reality. Meanwhile, an unexpected crisis had just emerged concerning the foundations of mathematics and physics after the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries and non-Newtonian physics. The intellectuals of the period found themselves faced with a difficult puzzle: how could anyone make sense of the cognitive and practical situation of (European) humanity as it appeared at that time? The transition from the ancient 'closed cosmos' to the modern 'open universe' was causing a gradual growth of nihilism with regard to the status of normative guidance, which confronted European humanity with an indifferent natural reality. Our painstakingly gained, and supposedly firm and permanent, truths were now appearing obscured.

Husserl and Cassirer stand as emblematic figures among the intellectuals that were, at the time, imbued with the incurably optimistic spirit of the modern era. Neo-Kantianism and phenomenology (together with positivism) were the last flares – or possibly dying flickers – of traditional philosophy's belief that all problems of the human condition could be solved in absolutely rational terms. Both Cassirer and Husserl, as children of the Enlightenment, made an effort to save European culture from the rising crisis and the specters of nihilism, relativism, and irrationalism.

Husserl called on us to make sense of science, the ultimate and highest achievement of the Enlightenment's theoretical rationality, as an intellectual accomplishment founded in our experience of the primordial lifeworld. He also tried to ground objective values and ethics in the non-theoretical but still rule-following

---

17 Quoted in Löwith (1949, 98).

intentional syntheses pertinent to an emotive rationality, which would then motivate correct moral praxis. If this grounding were to succeed, scientific truth, individual freedom, and responsibility, the ground and *telos* of European humanity, could again serve as normative examples for the future of humanity as a whole.

Meanwhile, Cassirer asked us to understand modern science and culture as the ultimate achievements of the symbolic-formative functions of transcendental consciousness or spirit. On the basis of symbolic formation, humanity advanced, through language, mythos, and religion, toward its highest attainment in the rationality of theoretical science. He also invited us to see the Enlightenment's ideals of individual freedom and responsibility as those on the basis of which humanity realizes its essence and can still organize itself in its development towards a glorious future.

Then, both Husserl and Cassirer undersign the Enlightenment's progressivist view of science, culture, and history,[18] taking the human capacity for reflective self-interpretation as a capability to arrive at ultimate truths about reality and the self.[19] Thus, they endorse a modern whiggish understanding of history, one already expressed emblematically by Kant, and emphasize the – supposedly self-evident – triumph of individual subjectivity: a subjectivity that may not *know*, but is *rationally justified in believing* that it has realized the ultimate purpose of nature's hidden *logos*. Thus, modern humanity's megalomaniac, secular eschatological meaning-attribution to its course through history still fueled Husserl's and Cassirer's thought.[20]

---

[18] For Husserl's case, see, e.g., Caygill (2005), Casement (1988), Kelkel (1979), and Theodorou (2016). For Cassirer's, see, e.g., Krois (1975), Luft (2011), and Wisner (1997).

[19] Inspired by both Husserl and Cassirer, Luft (2011, 356) considers Enlightenment culture as a "home" and "safe haven" for humanity, which should abide within it, "living life to its fullest" and staying safely away from all non- or contra-Enlightenment "subcultures." By contrast, I favor the outlook of Staiti (2012, 328), who pertinently observes the following: "[W]ho is in charge of deciding what counts as Culture with capital C and what counts as a mere niche, or a subculture which is, in Luft's words, 'the enemy of culture'? […] Around 200 AD Christianity was a niche, a persecuted subculture […]. The civil rights movement in the United States was perhaps less than a niche or a subculture in the 1950s. […] Some of the best, most authentic cultural developments in human history were and still are made possible by the silent activity of creative minorities."

[20] Löwith presented the progressivist mentality in the Enlightenment philosophy of history, marked by a belief in the movement towards a triumph of reason, freedom, and

As concerns culture and history, neither Husserl's nor Cassirer's analyses and argumentations were successful. On the one hand, their endeavors fall short of methodological completeness and effectiveness. Husserl does not show why or how intentional consciousness actually grounds theoretical and axiological normativity or safeguards universal rationality and progress. Nor does Cassirer demonstrate why or how symbolic formation unquestionably leads to transforming rational ideas into normative ideals (I will return to this in section 2 below). On the other hand, the very views they tried to justify are themselves disputable from various points of view, including those of Romanticism, the hermeneutics of suspicion (e.g., Marxian, Nietzschean, and Freudian views on culture and history), and post-colonialist discourse (or guilt, if you like). For example, those who wish to valorize the Enlightenment cannot simply circumvent Romanticism and its critique of rationalism's objectivism and universalism by dismissing it as reactionary caprice. Science and philosophy conceptualize and universalize truth, but why should this also be applied to concrete existence and praxis, which appear to be essentially partial and perspectival?

The presuppositions for a general critique of culture still evade us. Such an endeavor is only possible if we adopt an epoché *vis-à-vis* the Western ideology of the omnipotence and omniscience of reason and review the roots of cultural genesis in the most basic phenomena. For me, this means examining value constitution and value apprehension in our concrete and – more often than not – dolorous contact with a reality that resists us. If we are to understand our relation to culture and history, we have to examine the *sources* that constitute our views on what is possible and our existential-practical orientation toward this reality. The former is accomplished in our perceptual experiences and scientific theories. The latter needs to be examined in terms of value constitution and cultural self-understanding. And this leads us to three key questions: (A) Where exactly do values arise in our relatedness with natural reality? (B) How are they involved in cultural formation?

---

happiness, as the result of the secularization of the Judeo-Christian religious eschatology between the 17th and the 18th century (see, for instance, ch. 4 of Löwith 1949). Meanwhile, in 1962 and 1966, Blumenberg (1983) countered this notion with a defense of modernity's immanent, rationalist legitimacy in relation to its radical optimistic aspirations. For an attempt at a bio-existentialist interpretation of both religious and secular radical optimist readings of history, see Theodorou (2016).

(C) What gives rise to cultural diversity in its synchronic/spatial and diachronic/historical multifariousness?

With these questions in mind, in § 2, I will briefly review Husserl's and Cassirer's problematic or implicit views on values. Then, in § 3, I will examine some of the central problems in the traditional approaches to culture and to values. In § 4, I will appeal to Köhler's interesting Gestalt theoretical approach to values and pinpoint some of its problems. Next, in § 5, I will suggest how we could make progress with the problem of value constitution and givenness. And finally, in § 6, I will attempt to sketch an explanation for how we can use this new approach to values in order to understand cultural formation and its historicity.

2 Traces of Husserl's and Cassirer's Theories of Values

Both Husserl and Cassirer articulated interesting theories of science in its historicity, but neither succeeded in developing a working theory of value constitution and givenness (moral, aesthetic, or otherwise), let alone explaining how these are involved in the formation of culturality and how culture is exposed to radical diversity and change.

John Michael Krois offers a valuable account of what Cassirer would have said about values.[21] Humans, Cassirer says, are capable of giving symbolic form to experience. This means that they develop the capacity to "distinguish between actuality and possibility, between facts and ideals, and between what is and what ought to be. […] [And thus,] Cassirer's philosophy of symbolic forms can be seen to contain […] a philosophy of value" (Krois 1975, 65). The general view here is that the idea of humanity and its progress in history is a kind of symbolic formation projected on the facts of human life and their sequence in time. This idea becomes an ideal. But the way Cassirer understands this process, the passage from mythical taboos via religious commands to the Enlightenment's axiological

---

[21] As we may have expected, the Marburg neo-Kantian Cassirer does not have a distinct theory of values. Krois, an eminent Cassirer scholar, tried to reconstruct Cassirer's unwritten theory of values and their relation to culture. The meagre traces of such textual evidence are presented in Krois (1975, esp., 65, 76f., 102–106, 131–170).

normativity shows that humans only fully realize their essence in the final phase. Here, they become individuals capable of freedom, autonomy, and self-responsibility, thus earning their dignity. For Cassirer, there is no value proper without a subject-object dichotomy or the symbolic formation of the self-given rule of an ideal 'ought.' That is, mythic (mimetic of the supranatural) and religious (analogical to the supranatural) experiences of reality do not yet count as humanly proper valuative views of reality. According to this approach, such a view is achieved only in the purely symbolic or theoretical-abstract representation of the supranatural, which, moreover, has become non-transcendent and commensurate with a self-conscious, autonomous conception of the normative 'ought' conceived as an a priori constitutive and regulative ideal. Unsurprisingly, this is basically a repetition of Kant's view on the matter. Be that as it may, this is difficult to apply in the case of non-moral values. Kant had to devise a painful, prolonged method to attempt to make such a connection between the aesthetic and the moral, but Cassirer does not seem to appeal to this or create one of his own. To be sure, there are some elements (not strictly related to the preceding concerns) of Cassirer's work (see Cassirer 2013, esp. chs. 2, 5, 7, 9) where, however, beauty is not classed as a value; only 'style' is mentioned, in this respect, as a form of symbolic meaning formation.[22]

Cassirer showed intense interest in the development of Gestalt theory and Goldstein's empirical neuro-psychological findings. He assimilated the spirit of its part-whole and foreground-background theory (i.e., the structuring or meaning of the 'animating' function of gestalts).[23] He did not see in it, however, the potential for a theory of values. This was Köhler's achievement (see § 4 below).

As regards Husserl, we know that he tried to become a philosopher of values and spent quite some time on the problem. He toyed with the view that values are a kind of 'coloring' with which perceptual objects are 'invested' and that are

---

[22] On the problems and limitations of these views, see, e.g., Alloa (2015) and Bundgaard (2011).

[23] See, for instance, Parszutowicz (2015) and Katsur (2018). Cassirer, we can guess, may also have drawn inspiration for his concept of symbolic formation from Husserl's analysis regarding intentional constitution in the meaning-giving acts of consciousness, even though he read it inadequately and unfairly. Regarding this unfairness, I have in mind his criticism of Husserl's content-form or hyle-meaning schema (see Cassirer 1957, 197ff.).

given to us in emotions as 'value-ceptions' (*Wertnehmungen*). He was led to an impasse, though, when he had to explicate the specific intentional constitution that we would expect to take place in acts that have values as their elusive, *sui generis* objects.[24] Strictly for the purposes of the present discussion, I will provocatively claim that Köhler's Gestalt theoretical analysis of values would have been an interesting escape route from Husserl's impasse. When we reach § 4 below, Husserlian readers will find, I hope, some justification for this claim. And in order to intensify this provocation, I will also claim that, as soon as we reach sections 3.3 and 3.4, the reader will hopefully also realize that Heidegger had developed elements of a theory of meaning or significance akin to Köhler's, but he refused to place them in a value-theoretical context.[25]

3 Problems with Traditional Philosophies of Value

In section 3.1 and later in more detail in § 6, we will see why the lack of a working theory of values eliminates the possibility of building a solid critique of cultural formation and the historical evolution of culture. In Western thought, this results in ideological self-praise of the sort we saw above in Husserl and Cassirer. The lack of such a theory, though, is not a fault of these two thinkers, who offer here a chance for discussion. As we will see, values have proven an enigmatic topic for all philosophy. In the remainder of this section, then, we will review some reasons for this. And, naturally, we will see how their enigmatic status still blurs our understanding of culture and history.

---

[24] For a presentation and critique of this impasse, see Theodorou (2012; 2014).

[25] After all, Köhler himself repeatedly calls his theory 'phenomenological' and explicitly mentions Husserl's philosophy as a source of inspiration (he only distances himself from the method of 'the' – supposedly one, i.e., the transcendental – phenomenological reduction). Interestingly, he also remarks that he does not follow phenomenologists who have entered a path of sterile, vague, and aberrant theories in phenomenology (which might be aimed at Heidegger's developments; see, e.g., Köhler 1939, 47, 52f., 68, 409). Incidentally, it is notable that Heidegger does not refer to Köhler's ground-breaking conclusions from *Intelligenzprüfungen an Anthropoiden* (1917) in either his analysis of equipment in *Being and Time* (1927) or in similar analyses within his courses prior to this. For more on this subject, see Wise (2019).

3.1 Values and Culture: Which Is the Source of Which?

It is true that, in the relevant literature, values and culture are intimately connected, but it cannot really be said that their relation has been sufficiently spelled out. It seems instead to be considered self-evident. Krois' (1975, 109) own reconstruction of Cassirer's view on the relation between values and culture gives us a hint to this: "Cassirer's approach to the problem of value is to conceive it as a problem of culture. On this view, values have their origin in culture." He further states that "[t]he philosophy of symbolic forms […] [shows that] values originate in culture […] as a semiotic order" (ibid., 149). Later in the same text, he continues to say that "Cassirer's semiotic foundation and cultural approach to axiological questions provides a kind of logical basis for values" (ibid., 150). And finally, he concludes, "[t]he philosophy of symbolic forms […] verifies the eighteenth-century view that culture is the source of values" (ibid., 158).[26] The idea here, then, is that culture gives birth to values, that it builds and forms them. This, however, appears to be a mistake. To view the matter in this way is a sign of the absence of a theory of values. After our analysis in section 6, we will see that it is not culture that creates values but rather the other way around.

3.2 What Do We Mean by 'Values'?

Many suggestions have been made for what values are. As concerns their nature, values (at least goodness, the ἀγαθόν) are said to be exceptional ideas more far-reaching than the standard ones (ἐπέκεινα της οὐσίας); rational ideals, meanings or significances; 'nothing but' feelings like pleasure and pain; points of view for the preservation or growth of life; styles according to which will-to-power builds and rebuilds reality; senses, meanings or significances projected in some interpretation of reality; ways of organizing parts in a whole; colorations with which natural things or the environments in which they exist are 'invested'; sources of satisfaction; gestalts or gestalt qualities; necessities, requirednesses, or

---

26   The confusion behind this scheme is shown by the directly contradictory sentence following immediately: "Insofar as men engage themselves in the activities of human culture they are committed to certain values" (Krois 1975, 158).

affordances, etc. As concerns their givenness, values have been seen as objects of feelings, desires, emotions, interests, insights, reason, cognitive and practical attitudes, etc. And concerning their mode of being, values have been compared with facts: facts stand for what is, values stand for what ought to be; facts exist or stand, values hold or are valid; facts fall under concepts, values fall under ideals; facts require description and explanation, values prescribe and require understanding; facts develop causally in time, values indicate a course to be followed toward a purpose or end; facts follow laws, values stand as norms; facts are characterized by facticity, values are characterized by normativity, etc.

It is easy to see here that values have been one of the most puzzling and irritatingly obscure topics in philosophy. Among the various issues that these views pose for us, I think two are central: (A) that values involve a normative 'ought;' and (B) that values are seen as meanings.

3.3 Normativity and Values

The transition from the 'closed cosmos' to the 'open universe' immediately created the problem of values as we know it. Values clearly appeared as such under bright light, only to quickly withdraw and shroud themselves in dark mystery. This left us without grounding as concerns our need for normative organization and orientation in life and action. The fundamental idea adhered to by many thinkers since at least Hume and Kant has been that values are the antipode of facts conceived as the research object of the natural sciences. This is why, after the fall of absolute idealism in the middle of the 19th century, Windelband found in values the research object that could sustain philosophy despite the imperialist tendency of the natural sciences to conquer all areas of knowledge. More specifically, Windelband identified the (critical) valuing of *truth* in knowledge, of *goodness* in morality, and of *beauty* in aesthetics. Thus, a *normative* (in contradistinction to a *psychological*) understanding of Kant's transcendental philosophy appeared possible with regard to epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics. Philosophy investigates value, which characterizes the content of our objective (universally valid) cognitive, moral, and aesthetic judgments from the point of view of whether they (i.e., their truth, goodness, and beauty) comply with norms, normative conditions of possibility, synthetic a priori rules, and ideals, which do not have being, but are themselves

valid, hold good (i.e., 'as they should').[27] All Kantian constitutive and regulative conditions of possibility could be seen as non-facts/non-causes that are presupposed (a priori) in our experience of, in this context, our judgments about facts, motivations for actions, and the givenness of the basic forms of objects.[28] This is an outline of the one way (the explicit or official one, if you like) in which values connect to norms. At the same time, however, a certain shift appears to have surreptitiously taken place in the discussion of the object and method of philosophy (as opposed to the object and method of science). Truth, goodness, and beauty are *themselves* seen as values. Thus, it is not only the a priori presuppositions that stand as valid; the possibilities they open (i.e., the truth of the facts, the goodness of motivations/actions, and the beauty of the forms of objects) are also valid as values. Here, values, as the antipodes of facts, are not what necessarily holds as valid or normative *presuppositions*, but truthfulness, goodness, and beauty themselves are conceived as realities that *ought* to be realized.[29] Of course, on such an account the same could be said of all other values.

3.4 Meaning and/or Value

In the dialogue surrounding values, another serious and interesting confusion arose. As we saw in section 3.2, values ended up being treated as meanings. But

---

[27] For examples of this passing from the one to the other, see Beiser (2014, 499ff., 503) or also Heidegger (2000, 121ff.).

[28] In his mature thought, Heinrich Rickert proposed a combined view: values are transcendent ideal-logical (a priori) presuppositions, necessary laws, or norms that are only known in their actual "functionalization" in ongoing cognitive acts (see, for instance, Beiser 2009, esp. 22). Philosophy could, then, be the a priori science of the (a priori) presuppositions or necessary laws behind all normative and empirical sciences. In the broadest conception of this schema, philosophy could become a science of culture in its historical evolution. Husserl's phenomenology moved along a very similar path. Neo-Kantianism and traditional phenomenology, however, reached their apex and experienced their fall without having found a convincing analysis of what value is and how it connects with the sciences and with culture.

[29] Heidegger (2000, 38f.) and Schnädelbach (1984, 164) appear to believe that the values that are possible to hold in the reality we experience are distinguishable from presupposed norms (in the neo-Kantian conception) on the basis that they are simply valid *without* also being connected with an ought. The way I present the matter here shows, however, that the supposed clear distinction does not hold.

meaningfulness and value are not typically adequately differentiated. This was clearly the case, for instance, in Nietzsche's many interchangeable uses of those terms,[30] and it also seems to have been a problem on Heidegger's mind ever since his first experiments, in his *Kriegsnotsemester* course of 1919, with treating the problem of meaning as a problem of values, taking the lead from the neo-Kantian approach of Rickert. Later, too, in *Being and Time*, we read: "In interpreting [i.e., in comprehending something *as* something], we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' [*Bedeutung*] over some naked thing, which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it" (Heidegger 1962, 190). As far as Heidegger was concerned, the very topic of 'value' should be abandoned and replaced throughout by the concept of meaning. In a – I think – fatal move, Heidegger rejected all talk about values, validity, and normativity, turning the discussion toward meaning and authenticity.

Also in Cassirer's writings, meaningfulness and values were not adequately distinguished. Symbolic formation is projection of meanings, a meaning-giving process and phenomenon. Thus, in his treatment of myth, for instance, he did not properly distinguish between meaning and value. What should be understood in terms of value (e.g., a taboo or a totem, or the sacred and the profane) are just projected meanings.[31] In the next paragraph, I will continue examining this problem.

4 Value Emergence and Givenness in Köhler's Analysis

Adherents of Gestalt psychology, and in particular Köhler, who apparently wrote the longest explicit Gestalt theoretical analysis on the topic, conceive values in the

---

[30] For example, he says that "[t]he supreme values in whose service man should live […] were erected over man […] as if they were commands of God […]. Now that the shabby origin of these values is becoming clear, the universe seems to have lost value, seems 'meaningless.' […] The logic of […] nihilism: what is at work in it? The idea of valuelessness, meaninglessness" (Nietzsche 1968, 10f.). He also claims that "the more superficially and coarsely it is conceived, the more valuable, definite, beautiful, and significant the world appears. The deeper one looks, the more our valuations disappear – meaninglessness approaches!" (Ibid., 326)

[31] See also Krois (1975, 131, 169).

context of a more appropriate 'topology' and generally manage to advance the topic in a way and to a degree inaccessible to Husserl and Cassirer. Moreover, if we no longer view humans Platonically as beings in the likeness of God (i.e., as rational souls or rational *beings*), but rather consider them in an Aristotelian manner as rational *animals*, then the fact that Köhler advanced his theory of values against the backdrop of his ground-breaking research on the intelligence of chimpanzees acquires additional importance. This approach found fruitful continuation and expansion in Gibson's ecological psychology. We can, therefore, base our new effort to build a naturalized theory of mind, capable of accommodating intentionality, values, and normativity, upon the general spirit of such approaches, which take the living organism as a starting point. Of course, this goes against Cassirer's emphatically anthropocentric views regarding mind, value, and normativity, as well as Husserl's militant anti-naturalism. But that is another story.

4.1 The Basic Idea

The model situation that Köhler has in mind for his analysis of the rise and appearance of value qualities is listening to a melody. Melodies are gestalt entities that are not reducible to the mere co-existence or sum of the tones from which they are composed. This can be demonstrated by the fact that we can recognize the same melody in a different key. When we start listening to a melody, we experience one tone following another in a way that is somehow 'imposed' by the sequence of the preceding tones and those that we somehow expect to follow. A melody is, then, a gestalt in the sense of an objective formation within reality, which dictates what seems to be required to fit in a context of relevant co-givenness. Replacing a tone in a melody with another tone that does not fit provokes a negative stance in the listener. This positive or negative *requiredness* is perceived: We have 'insight into' its being exerted by the gestalt and directed toward us.[32] Due to this, Köhler, and

---

[32] It is no surprise that Köhler (1939, 49–52) cites Husserl's notions of *Einsicht* and *Evidenz* as a source of inspiration, at least on this point. These are notions that Husserl conceived in an effort to de-psychologize and render objective our relatedness to essential necessity as regards the holding or non-holding of a relationship or truth, the standing or non-standing of a state of affairs, etc.

Wertheimer before him, gave requiredness the status of a *vector*.[33] Requiredness, then, is not reducible to mere facts, but it is still a part of objective reality. And this suggests that normativity is possible in reality as a natural complement to the world of facts.[34]

In a questionable move, however, Köhler (1939, 31) quickly equates all talk about value with that of requiredness or the 'ought' character involved in such cases, saying, "[l]et us […] give the name value to this common trait of intrinsic requiredness." By this, he means "that some things 'ought to be' and others not" (ibid., 35). He further claims that "a theory of value does not necessarily consist in the reduction of requiredness to something else […] [otherwise] a definition of value would be impossible" (ibid., 83). Elsewhere, he remarks that "value is not adequately described unless we mention what may be called a demand character that belongs to its very nature" (Köhler 1944, 206).[35] Köhler also declares that value is *essentially connected* with requiredness, since between them "there is more than a factual connection, as though the demand merely accompanied the value characteristic" and because "the attraction (or the negative vector) which issues from the object is felt to spring from the very nature of that value attribute" (ibid., 207).

Nonetheless, the phrasing of this point creates some doubt as to whether values are 'nothing but' – to use here reversely Köhler's often-repeated phrase against the reductionist spirit – requiredness or just issue requiredness. The situation gets even more complicated when we come across thoughts that leave open the possibility that what actually issues the vector of requiredness *may* be the relation between a gestalt and the subject: "A datum, an entity or an act is required within a context of other data, entities or acts. […] [T]he structural nature of all requiredness

---

[33] The original discussion of this element of Gestalt theory used the terms *Forderung* and *Aufforderung*, which were first translated into English as 'requiredness' and 'claim' or 'demand,' though they were later made famous and combined under the single term 'affordance' by Gibson (see, e.g., Dreyfus 1996; 2007). De Monticelli (2013) recently brought this thematic and Köhler's work to the attention of phenomenologists working in the field of emotions and values.

[34] Furthermore, with his notions of positive and negative requiredness, Köhler, more effectively than in neo-Kantianism, analyzes the 'ought' or normative dimension in the context of values.

[35] We also read that "[t]he plus and the minus signs which are characteristic of all values […] also mean 'to be accepted, reached, maintained, supported' and 'to be avoided, eliminated, changed in the positive direction'" (Köhler 1944, 206).

is implied in this word, but not in the term 'value'" (Köhler 1939, 336). He also argues that "requiredness means that vectors issuing in parts of certain contexts extend beyond these parts and refer to other parts with a quality of acceptance or rejection" (ibid., 98), and that "[r]equiredness differs strikingly from other forms of reference by its demanding character" (ibid., 337). The gestalt involved in experiences of requiredness seems to comprise at least part of the nature of the object we confront in such cases or incorporate qualities or characteristics of the object. We see this in quotes such as "the percept […] has qualities which make it valuable. But […] no such quality alone constitutes actual value" (Köhler 1944, 210) – only their gestalt or the requiredness that this supposedly issues do this. Similarly, he writes that when one says that requiredness that issued by an object of value is "felt to spring from the nature of those objects and their values" what is meant is that "we are attracted by objects which have certain characteristics, and that we are disgusted [*sic*] by others" (ibid., 207). No clue, however, is offered as to what these properties, qualities, or characteristics may be and how they actually relate to the gestalt and to requiredness. Instead, he simply notes that "[t]hese qualities as such we have decided not to discuss" (ibid., 210).

Moreover, in his objectivist theory of values, Köhler (1939, 78) insists that, in our contact with realities and situations in the phenomenal field, value as requiredness is issued – clearly – from them due to what resides within them: "Everywhere value-qualities are found residing in such objects as characteristics of them. […] Just as objects are round or tall, events slow or sudden, so some have charm, some are ugly by themselves, independently". For example, while playing a melody, a note played after another note will either fit or not fit the context. On this, Köhler says that when a context (i.e., a gestalt) forms, a vector develops in it "and definite objects are either accepted or rejected as completions" (ibid., 96). It can thus "hardly be doubted that […] these terms refer, phenomenally, to something in the tones [i.e., among the parts of the whole], not in ourselves." Elsewhere, Köhler (1944, 206) asserts that in actual experience it is first of all value in an *object* which goes with a demand," which means that "*the vector issues from the object* qua valuable. The dangerous object threatens, the cool drink is tempting, the problematic situation invites closer inspection, and so forth" (second emphasis added).

Finally, Köhler does not clearly distinguish values from meanings. On this point, he contends that "there are always the same remarks about the necessity of distinguishing between questions of solid fact […] and problems of value, of

meaning" (Köhler 1939, 3). In his 1944 paper, he adds that he understands this vector of requiredness as a "rational or understandable relationship […] experienced within actual mental situations" (Köhler 1944, 207) and that "the factual datum to which the value characteristic of a situation refers tends to be a structural or relational trait of this situation" (ibid., 206). Values are thus 'structural or relational traits' of objects or situations. In other words, they are gestalts or meanings (i.e., forms or patterns of unification of parts in the relevant wholes), which have a demanding character or exert requiredness on us and call us to take this or that stance or action toward them (e.g., flee from or pursue them). This understanding of gestalts in terms of meaning is generally well documented in Gestalt theory as a whole. Köhler (1992, 69), for instance, notes that "among the genuine sensory data there can be nothing like objects. Objects exist for us only when sensory experience has become thoroughly imbued with meaning." In the same vein, Pillsbury (1933, 484ff.) writes that "[t]he figure of the square is one meaning of the group of four lines […]. It is what they mean for us over and above the bare four lines themselves" and that "[e]xactly what a gestalt is has never been clearly stated. […] Ehrenfels suggested that it was […] the meaning that four dots assumed when they were approximately at the corners of a square".

Also, those inspired by Köhler's Gestalt theoretical analysis of values discuss values and requiredness in terms of meaning. Fuller (1990, 91), for instance, suggests that "[a] gestalt not only always and already has meaning, it always and already is meaning, immediately what it is as the organization of its sensible members," and that "[v]alue […] is meaning in its external requiredness, a whole of meaning positively or negatively required in its place within a context of significance. […] [A] gestalt is value itself" (ibid., 138). Gibson (2015, 129), on the other hand, posits this relation as follows:

> The Gestalt psychologists recognized that the meaning or the value of a thing seems to be perceived just as immediately as its color. The value is clear *on the face of it*, as we say, and thus it has a physiognomic quality […]. Each thing says what it is.

As an example of this, he explains: "a fruit says 'Eat me'; water says 'Drink me'; thunder says 'Fear me'; and a woman says 'Love me'" (ibid.), to which he immediately adds that "Koffka did not believe that a meaning of this sort could be

explained as a pale context of memory images or an unconscious set of response tendencies" (ibid., 130).

4.2 Critical Points

The passages above yield the impression that Köhler has touched upon something very interesting. However, what he is doing constantly slips from his hands and only confusing fragments of it actually find their way into the text. In fact, Gestalt theory claims that there is a first 'vectoral' dimension or event that exerts demands *within* the context of the parts of the gestalt whole, which then, somehow, also happens to exert a second vectoral demand (clearly *upon us* this time). The first-level vector of requiredness can be recognized as concerning the well-formedness or *Prägnanz* of the structured whole as gestalt or meaning. That is, it has to do with what is known as laws of the good gestalt. On one level, requiredness functions on the parts of the gestalt in its structuredness. The pertinent fitting of this part with the rest of the parts in the gestalt issues a positive requiredness. To whom? Supposedly, it is objective and concerns the parts themselves (however, I would say that, ultimately, it somehow depends on us experiencing the actual or potential satiation of that requiredness). On another level, the gestalt exerts a second positive or negative requiredness on us. Concerning what? The available descriptions do not make this explicit. Köhler does not clearly state how these two levels of exerted requiredness are differentiated: recognition of a gestalt in its well-formedness, on the one hand, and 'issuing' or exertion of a requiredness by which we accept or deny the gestalt, on the other. It is as if Köhler trusts that the analysis of the well- or not-well-structured gestalt formation in the given perceived thing (e.g., a human face) that exerts the supposed positive or negative requiredness on the subject can somehow *by itself* solve the problem of what the second requiredness may involve (i.e., of what value is). But I believe we have reasons to doubt this.

For example, given the gestalt of a melody, it is one thing to experience its well-formedness, but another to experience some aesthetic value in it. Or consider the gestalt of a person's face. *When* or *under which* circumstances or *on which* presuppositions is it recognizable as being (a) a face of a person, (b) a long or short, a fat or thin face, etc., (c) a face that is sad, angry, tired, young, sick, healthy, etc., or even (d) a face that is harmonious or disharmonious, charming, beautiful, etc.?

Someone who would like to save Köhler's analysis could argue that an angry face has a specific grimace or 'style:' e.g., brows raised with a certain angle, lips tightened, eyes open, etc. Of course, this would move beyond Köhler's analysis. But let us suppose that we amend the analysis thusly. We should reply that this is a specific style in a general facial gestalt, but it at most makes the face look 'angry.' However, 'being angry' is not yet a *value* experienced in a face. Nor would we experience such a value even if we were to recognize a 'threatening' or 'fearsome' character in the facial expression. To be threatening is to display or express threat. To be fearsome is to display or express fearsomeness. *By themselves*, these characteristics are still facts, or factual characteristics, which will from now on be understood as *meanings* (see section 5 below). In the case of melodies, characteristics on the same level would include those of, say, harmony, complexity, dynamism, robustness, or even melancholy, joyfulness, etc. We *would* have recognized a value in the proper sense only if we were, somehow, to experience, in the case of the face, for instance, 'dangerousness' or (potential) '*harmfulness*' in it. In the case of a melody, values proper would include elegance, charm, beauty, or even sublimity. For this new level of experience to settle on the corresponding gestalts, objects, or states of affairs, *another* level of comprehension is required.

Meanwhile, the situation could become even worse, and this is decisive. For instance, if (potential) harmfulness is comprehended on a face with an 'angry' or 'threatening' grimace, then what common structural or relational characteristic *within* the gestalt can we ever find among this grimace gestalt and a host of other (potentially) *harmful* things, situations, ideas, or whatever else (e.g., a gun, an avalanche, smoking, totalitarianism)? As we will see, the willingness to address this ultimate challenge may also harbor a way out of the current predicament.

In order to prepare this move, though, we should stress that, in sum, Köhler does not offer a solution to the issue. For example, a musical note demands that it be followed by such and such possible notes in, say, an A-minor melody. Thus, the melody itself raises a demand that it be accepted as having one or another positive or negative value. On the first level, requiredness is raised by one part of a gestalt in the name of fittingness *vis-à-vis* its place in a recognized context. We are not given any clue, however, as to *in the name of what* and *vis-à-vis which context* the second-level demand is raised as a positive or negative requiredness (*qua* value) that is exerted on us by the gestalt. This is understandable in Köhler, since he thinks that the 'secret' abides within the gestalt *itself*. All these ideas certainly need further

analysis.[36] And, given that we do not yet have such an analysis, it seems urgent that we begin with one as soon as possible.

5   Disentangling Values from Meanings, Gestalts, and Requiredness

5.1   Retrieving the Thread

In his *De Anima*, Avicenna posits this problem: how does an animal (e.g., a sheep) become aware of a potential harm (e.g., a wolf) and respond accordingly (e.g., flees) when one appears? In his analysis, he claims that apart from the Aristotelian *sensus communis*, which is capable of recognizing common sensibles (e.g., a wolf's overall shape or form – a gestalt!), there must also be a capacity by which the animal gains awareness of what he notoriously calls (in its Latin translation) "*intentio*" (*ma 'nâ*) or "*intentions* of the sensibles" (*ma 'ânî al-mahsâsât*), i.e., "properties which are not essentially material, but which nonetheless adhere or attach to sensible forms and can be perceived through them" (Black 1993, 220). Avicenna's idea, then, is that, given its function, this special inner sense should bear the name *vis aestimativa* or *aestimatio* (*wahm*). In his canonical texts, his favorite examples are "the sheep's perception of hostility or harmfulness [*sic*] in the wolf,[37] or its perception of its offspring as an object of love" (Black 1993, 220). Avicenna clearly implies that perception of the form or shape/gestalt of an object and estimative apprehension of 'intentional properties' of the thus-formed objects are two different things. In the first conception of this idea, however, the newly discovered element shines forth only in order to sink back again in confusion. Harmfulness and friendliness – not beneficialness – but also pleasantness, painfulness, lovableness, etc., are mentioned. From the point of view set out in

---

[36]   Nor do the analyses that Köhler (1939, 336f.) develops later in the book concerning the four laws of requiredness offer any further guidance on this.

[37]   It is interesting that, in a very similar context and clearly inspired by Avicenna, Thomas Aquinas (1952, q. 78, art. 4) refers to "*intentio*" as that which a bird recognizes in the straws that it collects in order to build its nest. This brings us very close to Gibson's affordances.

section 4, then, Avicenna's analysis suffers from confusing factual characteristics or meanings with *values* proper.[38] It remains, however, a delicate discussion of our problem.

5.2 Outline of an Alternative Approach

In a nutshell, the way in which I believe we can make better sense of the above-mentioned problems and move toward some solution is the following. First of all, we need to reach the *core* phenomena in which meaning and value are involved: that is, the elementary level of relevant life functions, on top of which the more complex meaning and value phenomena of concrete individual and collective life are built. I think that this core should be sought in the simplest vital relations between organisms and their environments. For reasons of simplicity, I will restrict myself here to cases in which we see the emergence of conscious feelings and emotive responses. As a core example, let us consider a sharp object that is quickly approaching an organism capable of visual perception. The object has the potential to destroy at least the outer tissue of the organism and is for this reason harmful. What happens then? And what can we say about it? A recent neuroscientific finding shows that, in humans, appearance of fear and preparation for fleeing from harm take place on a level of neurological connectivity that does *not* yet involve cortical regions in the brain (i.e., conscious perceptual experience of objects; see, e.g., Le-Doux 1995; 2014). Perceptual (visual) 'stimuli' that have only reached perceptually relevant, intra-thalamic sub-structures can trigger the amygdala and give rise to the conscious emotion of fear. On this level of an organism's *pre-conscious* sensory contact with its natural surroundings, elements of these surroundings can already give rise to conscious emotions. I take it that such emotions arise *vis-à-vis* beings and situations that are somehow recognized as potentially harmful for a living

---

[38] This is also reflected in the relevant discussion of Avicenna's core idea (see, e.g., Hasse 2000). Also apparent in this literature is the aforementioned conflation of Avicenna's "intentional properties" with *meaning*: "[intention is] an indicator pointing to the significance or meaning of an image with which this indicator is connected. In the example of the wolf, the sheep perceives the form or outer appearance 'wolf' plus the 'intention' 'bad' or 'disagreeing' or 'harmful' or 'hostile', then forms a judgement about it and flees" (ibid., 131).

agent in general. And I interpret this as implying that meaning and values are also involved – even if in a nascent manner – in mere animality.

With this in mind, let us return to our example and make it more specific. Suppose that a needle approaches our skin. Applied here, the neurological theory above suggests that, even if I do not consciously recognize the needle as such, I will feel fear. Needles are pointed things that can prick the skin and give rise to pain.[39] On an organismal level, this is the *meaning* of the needle approaching my skin. Generally, then, meaning is the way in which elements of reality are first (tactually, visually, etc.) registered in the organism according to what they sensorially are to it and what they physiologically or feelingly do to it. Organisms are equipped with specific mechanisms that are sensitive to a series of effects that elements of reality can have on them. Meaning on this level is the series of these effects on the organism, given its specific constitution, function, and capacity for interacting with the environment. Furthermore, damage to tissue can cause bleeding, inflammation, sickness, or other serious dysfunctions and, generally, poses a threat to the organism's well-being or survival. On an organismal level, this is the 'meaning' of the aforementioned meaning. And this is what I suggest we call *value* in the fullest and most accurate sense of the term. Generally, then, value is the way in which the above-mentioned meanings matter or weigh for the organism. And this mattering or weighing acquires its sense only given the *instrumental or telic prospects* of the organism, which, in the longer term, also define the organism's life and fate.[40] In our example, what induces or can induce pain is potentially *harmful* for the organism's tissues and its physiological and functional well-being.

Higher-level organisms, specifically human beings as *reflecting mammals*, may also feel fear in response to a needle that is perceptually recognized as such, upon seeing a bear in the woods, when one is a passenger on a bus with broken brakes, or when one thinks of or imagines being found guilty of fraud at trial, etc. Suitably adapted, the distinction we introduced applies here, too. In the most general terms, meaning is what an element of reality is or does *to* me; value is the way in

---

[39] Empirical research will help us to reasonably hypothesize whether the pricking of the tissue of an organism is, all the way down to the simplest organism, phenomenally lived-through or not: i.e., if phenomenal experience of pain arises in all organisms or only in organisms of a certain complexity.

[40] Elsewhere, I have already called this a 'salvational' plan or project (see Theodorou 2016).

which this meaning matters *for* me. The subtly different expressions '*to* me' and '*for* me' can be used to distinguish between meanings and values on the level of description. The first expresses a fact, whereas the second expresses the way (positive or negative) something factual matters *vis-à-vis* the perspective of an agent's bio-functional (for simple organisms) or bio-existential (for humans) prospects.[41]

I will end this section by noting that I, too, approach values in terms of a *vectoral* analysis.[42] The way I do this, however, is totally different from that of the Gestalt theorists. As I see it, the value vector is not issued by the gestalt (object) toward the subject. Rather, (a) it is constituted on behalf of (not always *by*) the subject, (b) it originates in the factual relatedness or meaning that connects an object or state of affairs (or some elements of it) to the organism that confronts it, and (c) it is directed to the subject's future state, its bio-organismal and praxio-existential possibilities. In addition, we can now recognize requiredness as an *orectic* state involved in the emergence or experience of values and as another vector within such experience. It is not, however, a pull emanating from a state of affairs, dragging the subject toward it, but a push that arises (unconsciously or consciously) within the organism and motivates it to act in a way that brings it closer to or further away from a future state or possibility.

6 Values, Culture, and History

Now that we have an outline of a new theory of values, we can finally return to the issues of culture and meaning in history and understand – 'suspiciously' this time – the complicated processes by which we acquire patterns of ways to recognize, estimate, and act in the becoming world (i.e., ways to historically confront reality from within a culture). Values provide the flesh to the skeleton of perceptual

---

41 The space that separates these levels of meaning- and value-constitution, from the elementary level up to the self-aware subject and concrete person in its various forms and frames of co-existence with others, cannot be presented here.

42 I reached this idea sometime in March 2014 when, disappointed by traditional phenomenological views and with a background in physics, I tried to approach the phenomena of value anew. I only became acquainted with the above-presented Gestalt theoretical notion of vectoral analysis in October 2018. However, my perspective on vectoral analysis differs from those of Köhler and Lewin.

or otherwise interpreted reality as well as ways to cope with it, which will be most relevant to the variously formed collectives of co-existing humans (e.g., families, clans, etc.), but also, at least to some degree, to other primates.[43] And, since relatively similar 'skeletons' can be fleshed out – appropriately or otherwise – with different values, culture in the strict sense is actually this very system of values. To recall Nietzsche here, values are generally seen as replies to the question *What for?* regarding our preferences and choices in life. The organized hierarchical pattern of our answers, then, which is formed in the process of addressing this question in all aspects of human affairs, constitutes the system of values that fundamentally defines a culture. It is the roadmap that guides humans across the rough terrain of the concrete situations they confront, individually and collectively, while they project a salvational plan for themselves. As such, a system of values or a culture presupposes one major or *dominant value*, the one that determines the final (telic) for-the-sake-of-which (οὗ ἕνεκα) that ultimately determines living and acting, individually and collectively.

Primordially, values are not something that we conceive and understand, but the normative patterns that guide our estimations of what is positive and negative relative to a life's (unreflected or reflected) bio-organismic and praxio-existential prospects. Now, given that (a) what we confront as reality changes through experience and knowledge, (b) we never typically know in advance what the long-term effects of valuing some element of reality will be, (c) we are never clear on our knowledge of what our ends are and why they are our ends, and (d) we can never fully predict the effects that our valuings will have on us, cultural formation and change are never a linear process, but rather an unstable one with clear *evolutionary* characteristics. In evolutionary phenomena, however, absolute teleology has no meaning at all, let alone a *progressive* meaning. We cannot take for granted or advocate in an absolutely convincing way any particular character for the course

---

43 Studies show that chimpanzees may very well be capable not only of tool use, but also of gestural communication, teaching, strategic group hunting, folk physics, simple mathematical thinking, self-awareness, theory of mind, symbolic thinking, proto-religious apprehension of reality in the sense of "non-natural intentional causality (e.g., theism, luck, fate, immanent justice, deontic code, etc.) of naturally occurring events" (Bering 2001, 126). This includes perception of "self-relevant natural events, such as the death of their offspring, or the fortuitous discovery of [beneficial circumstances]" (ibid., 129), which possibly indicates that cultural formation is not an exclusively human privilege.

of cultural change in history. No induction based on the past and no predictive model for the future can be advocated in a fully rational way. As salvational projects, systems of values are not measurable or comparable on the basis of an *absolute* scale of good and bad, better and worse, etc. Of course, this does not change the fact that we are allowed, nay forced, to choose or even be proud of the culture we like most and reject other cultures as possible choices. I understand this in a manner similar to Kuhn's evolutionary view regarding paradigm change in the history of science.

But is such historicity necessary for a culture? It seems that whatever raises an organism above its merely natural (mechanical, chemotactic, etc.) interaction with reality can count as culture. Organisms that are conscious in a way that allows for meaningful and 'valueful' confrontations with reality *vis-à-vis* some future conception of themselves, combined with the possibility of habitual adaptation to these confrontations and transmission of such habits to subsequent generations, may be recognized as capable of some culturality. Culture is a matter of meaning and value mediation in an organism's gives-and-takes with reality around it in ways that lead to the transformation of this reality into a living environment or, perhaps, even a world. Elementarily, this may be achieved on the basis of instinctual or quasi-conceptual knowledge of materials and their properties, the use of tools, transmissible acquired habits for dealing with the environment (as minimal worldviews), etc. At the limit, then, historicity is not a necessary condition for culturality.

At least in the case of humans, though, cultures may also have an evolutionary historicity. On the basis of all the above, we can assume that this is due to possible changes on the levels of meaning and value. What is changeable on the level of meaning? As we suggested earlier, change here depends on what human beings are and what elements of reality they encounter or interact with. On this level, change may not only depend on the elements of reality that appear on or disappear from the face of Earth, but also on the reflective or theoretical views we have of reality. Whence, however, the changes in systems of values? If values can indeed be accounted for in terms of the way factual meanings affect or determine the bio-existential prospect of humans, then any change in the way we comprehend our praxio-existential orientedness in space and time brings about a change in the system of values (i.e., in culture). Broadly speaking, if – either in relation to changes in reality or independently in its application – our being and acting in accordance

with a system of values leads us, individually or collectively, to perdition instead of salvation, then a re-evaluation of our values is urgent! Of course, the future is uncertain and a person or people may abandon an imperfect but functioning system of values for one that appears to offer more hope of salvation but will turn out to be disastrous. Systems of values are finally judged by the degree to which the members of the societies that hold them actually conform to them and by the degree to which the systems of values actually safeguard the possibility of such a society to reach or attain its projected end.

We can see an emblematic example of a change in a system of values and, thus, in the identity of a culture due to change in situation in the case of late 19th century Japan, when the country came into contact with the advanced technology (e.g., firearms) of Western civilization. Within a few decades, a culture of honor and shame was redirected toward a culture based on work and guilt. Yukio Mishima is also a clear case of this – imperfect and not without remainders and hidden niches of the older order – cultural *metabasis*. Similar stories can be told for the transition from the Homeric to the Hesiodean world in ancient Greece, from the Roman imperium to the Christian *oikumene*, from the feudal to the bourgeois world, etc. Were all these changes made for a deterministically expectable ultimate good? Having abandoned both overt and covert dogmatic theodicies and historiodicies, the tacit presuppositions of naïve historico-cultural progressivism, we can only say one thing: μηδένα προ του τέλους μακάριζε (consider no one blessed before the end)! And if we are to take seriously post-Husserlian and post-Cassirerian analyses for our transition from the Enlightenment to the metamodern era, like those of Horkheimer and Adorno, or of Bauman, then it seems that our developing system of values has now long stopped fulfilling its salvational purpose.

References

Aquinas, T. (1952). *Summa theologiae*. Ed. by P. Caramello. Turin/Rome: Marietti.

Alloa, E. (2015). Could Perspective Ever Be a Symbolic Form? *Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology* 2, 51–71.

Beiser, F. (2009). Normativity in Neo-Kantianism: Its Rise and Fall. *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 17, 9–27.

——— (2014). *The Genesis of Neo-Kantianism: 1796–1880*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bering, J. (2001). Are Chimpanzees "Mere" Existentialists? A Phylogenetic Approach to Religious Origins. *Evolution and Cognition* 7, 126–133.

Blumenberg, H. (1983). *The Legitimacy of the Modern Age*. Trans. by R. Wallace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Bundgaard, P. (2011). The Grammar of Aesthetic Intuition: On Ernst Cassirer's Concept of Symbolic Form in the Visual Arts. *Synthese* 179, 43–57.

Casement, W. (1988). Husserl and the Philosophy of History. *History and Theory* 27, 229–240.

Cassirer, E. (1957). *The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*, *Vol. 3 : The Phenomenology of Knowledge.* New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

——— (2013). *The Warburg Years (1919–1933): Essays on Language, Art, Myth, and Technology.* Trans. and introduced by S. Lofts & A. Calcagno. New Haven/London: Yale University Press.

Caygill, H. (2005). Crisis and Renewal: Husserl's Kaizo Articles of 1923–24. In: G. Banham (Ed.), *Husserl and the Logic of Experience*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 184–201.

De Monticelli, R. (2016). Requiredness: An Argument for Value-Realism. *Phenomenology and Mind* 5, 84–97.

Dreyfus, H. (1996). The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Embodiment. *The Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 4, 1–20.

——— (2007). Why Heideggerian AI Failed and How Fixing It Would Require Making It More Heideggerian. *Philosophical Psychology* 20, 247–268.

Fuller, A. 1990. *Insight Into Value: An Exploration of the Premises of a Phenomenological Psychology.* Albany: State University of New York Press.

Gibson, J. (2015). *The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception*. New York/London: Psychology Press & Routledge Classic Editions.

Hasse, D. (2000). *Avicenna's* De Anima *in the Latin West: The Formation of a Peripatetic Philosophy of the Soul 1160–1300*. London: The Warburg Institute.

Heidegger, M. (1962). *Being and Time*. Trans. by J. Macquarie & E. Robinson. New York: Harper & Row.

——— (2000). *Towards the Definition of Philosophy: The Idea of Philosophy and the Problem of Worldview and Phenomenology and Transcendental Philosophy Value.* Trans. by T. Sadler. London/New Jersey: The Athlone Press.

Katsur, I. (2018). Gestalt Psychology as a Missing Link in Ernst Cassirer's Mythical Symbolic Form. *Human Studies* 41, 41–57.

Kelkel, A. (1979), History as Teleology and Eschatology: Husserl and Heidegger. *Analecta Husserliana* 9, 381–411.