CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

METHODOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS IN THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF RUTH BENEDICT AND MARGARET MEAD

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I.

PREFACE

It is the vocation of philosophy to reflect on the activity of man, to come back upon his ongoing experience and explicate its meaning, its presuppositions, its conditions of possibility. Man's scientific activity has always been of interest to philosophers but the explosive development of the empirical sciences over the last few centuries has in particular drawn the close attention of every major philosopher since Descartes. Much of modern philosophy has been characterised by its dialogue with empirical science.

The natural sciences held the stage for hundreds of years and it is only in our own century that the human or social sciences have captured man's imagination and hope. Yet the attempt to turn the scientific apparatus towards its creator has led to a crisis in the conception not only of human science, but of all science. Natural science has been constituted precisely by the ideal of abstracting from all that is human; human science leads to the thematizing of this very ideal of objectivity itself and to its subsequent relativization.

Merleau-Ponty claims that phenomenology is precisely the expression in philosophy of this basic crisis. "Husserl's philosophical endeavour is basically directed towards the simultaneous solution of a crisis in philosophy, a crisis in the sciences of man, and a crisis in science as such which we have not yet passed through." (Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Human Sciences," p. 43) But Husserl's attempt to find an apodictic base for scientific objectivity led him to a radicalization of the Cartesian pure subject, a radicalization which ultimately led later phenomenology to reject no only the basis of absolute objectivity in a Transcendental Ego,
but to overthrow the very absoluteness of the Cartesian notion of objectivity itself. Mundane intersubjectivity can found only a more modest, incarnated objectivity. Yet it permits the development of a science which can investigate intersubjectivity itself.

Husserl's return to the things themselves reflected a general trend towards the reorganization of science around the things of the world as they are given. Attempts to reduce all phenomena to the categories of the already constituted sciences were suspended in favour of more descriptive approaches. Description gave rise to sciences designed to study global structures rather than atomic parts, and these sciences have developed new abstract objects constituted differently than the thing-like Cartesian substances that previously dominated science. Structures have become scientific.

The relativization of objectivity went hand in hand, then, with the relativization of the notion of object. Even the natural sciences themselves turned to new, structural modes of thought. But it was in human science that the change was especially evident, for the monopoly of the substantial mode of thought had been particularly crippling in this domain.

The global nature of patterns leads us to certain basic wholes in the human sciences. Cultural Anthropology's vocation to grasp the total world of a people makes it one of the structural sciences par excellence. The other important structural totality is the person. It is to be expected, then, that the field of Culture and Personality would be especially representative of the structural approach to human science. It must be admitted that some workers in this field have retained statistical and causal approaches and have avoided the turn to structure; these thinkers will not be discussed in this thesis. Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead,
however, have founded a school which explicitly adopts the structural approach.

Our aim in this thesis is to examine this school as initiated by Benedict and brought to its full development by Mead. We attempt to describe what they do, their methodology, what they presuppose concerning the nature of man and of science rather than try to make any judgement on the scientific nature of their work. No doubt, their work has been very influential, especially in the USA, not only within anthropology and the other human sciences, but also in popular opinion. But the judgement as to the scientific nature of our authors' influence must ultimately be made by their peers, the scientists themselves.

Before proceeding to any philosophical analysis of the foundations of the work of Benedict and Mead, we must present in some detail and depth the work itself. The first part of this thesis then is concerned with a completely naive exposition of their work. By naive, we mean that we attempt to refrain as much as possible in this part of the thesis from any philosophical interpretation and rather let our authors speak for themselves.

We start by introducing our authors and placing them in their historical and contextual position with respect to anthropology and allied sciences. Then we present, in chapter I, Benedict's fundamental inspiration, the need to find the pattern of behaviour of the culture as a whole. Chapter II presents Mead's elaboration of this approach in its more mature form. Neither Benedict nor Mead, however, are blind to questions concerning the nature of their work and in chapter III we present their own reflections on Culture and Personality as a science. Again in this chapter, we try to avoid interpreting their position in any philosophical way and rely
largely on citations from their own work as a mode of presentation. Recognizing, however, the need to give some content and substance to this discussion, and recognizing also that our authors' description of their science is not necessarily an exact account of what they do, we present, in chapter IV, three of Mead's most important studies as illustrations of the fertility of this approach. The introduction and first four chapters are intended to bring us to a close familiarity with Benedict's and Mead's work and this familiarity is presupposed by the rest of the thesis.

We then proceed to a philosophical analysis of this work. Chapter V is designed to be a preliminary analysis of the logic of the science with the intention of bringing out the specific questions to be answered. Fundamentally, a science is a theory about the world. The 'about the world' aspect is studied in chapter VI where we attempt to understand how Mead's and Benedict's approach permits an objectivity in the anthropologist's observation of a culture. The 'theoretical' aspect of their discipline is the subject-matter of chapters VII and VIII which are central to this thesis. These two chapters form a unity, but we have separated them, for the sake of clearer organization, into questions concerning the nature of the terms used and the nature of the fundamental systematic relationship. Both chapters are concerned with the very core of Culture and Personality, the notion of a science of the patterns of behaviour. In chapter IX we deal with some questions concerning human nature and the body, questions arising from the earlier chapters but left insuspense by them. In the concluding chapter we attempt to bring together and summarize some of the main points already discussed.

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V.

I thank those of the Institut Supérieur de Philosophie of Louvain who have helped and guided me in the preparation of this work, and indeed in all of my doctoral studies. To the professors of the Institute I am indebted for a basic philosophic formation. The width as well as the depth of their interests has been particularly inspiring. I am especially grateful for the philosophic depth, openness and good sense of professor Jean Ladriere and for his continual availability in advising me on this thesis. The critique, discussion and encouragement of Donald McDonell at every stage of the preparation of this work has contributed greatly to the final production. I wish also to thank Joseph Kaufmann, Michel Lagrange, Maurice Demers and all the others of the Institute whose suggestions and ideas have been so useful to me.

This work would not have been possible without the inspiration and loving support of many friends, to all of whom I am very grateful. In particular, my wife Madelaine was instrumental in bringing me to Louvain in the first place and her faithfulness has made life possible for me here since. Her many hours of deciphering and typing the early drafts of my ideas are greatly appreciated. It is to her that I am happy to dedicate this thesis.

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1. INTRODUCTION TO THE BACKGROUND AND WORK OF BENEDICT AND MEAD

1. Anthropology: Its Definition and Subdivisions

Anthropology is a comparative science which studies man, his activities and his nature. Such a comparative approach requires cultural contact with societies of men "other" than one's own. Since contact with other peoples has been an almost universal phenomenon the awareness that not all men are the same has been very widespread. Descriptions of other people's customs by our literate Western civilization were already present among the ancient Greeks e.g. Herodotus (Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man, p. 10) but it was not until the 15th century and onward, when explorers and travelers were returning from newly-discovered parts of the globe, and when printing was available, that any quantity of written descriptions became available. Reports of general interest came from traders, soldiers and missionaries and told of the exotic strangeness of other ways of life. Later, in the late 18th and 19th centuries, certain men of leisure took a more systematic interest in the subject for its own sake and collected and commissioned reports, even doing field trips themselves. Gradually anthropology developed into a recognized discipline. Because the founding "nineteenth-century anthropologists studied the things they did out of pure interest and not either to earn a living or to reform the world, a tradition of relative objectivity grew up." (Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man, p. 12) These accidents of its origin have, as we shall see, (p. 485) profoundly marked anthropology even to the present day.

As anthropology grew more technical it split into the two subdisciplines of physical and cultural (or social) anthropology. Physical anthropology studies the biological nature of man, the comparative anatomies of different "races"
and the relationship of such differences to the geographical, physical and biological environment. A major field of study during the latter half of the nineteenth century, under the impetus of Darwin's theories, was the evolution of the human animal.

Cultural Anthropology* studies the learned behaviour within a society, "the sum total of what an individual acquires from his society... which come to him not by his own creative activity, but as a legacy from the past, conveyed by formal or informal education." (Lowie, The History... p. 3) It too is divided into a number of problematics or subdisciplines. Just as for physical anthropology, one of the major original influences was evolutionism. The history of the development of culture and the relationship of this development to biological evolution are still studied today. Unfortunately, archeological and paleological finds can tell us much less about the cultural evolution of man than about his physical evolution. Discovery of tools, paintings, building and metal techniques and so on are useful, but the absence of a living culture, and especially our ignorance of early language, are serious impediments to the reconstruction of an ancient way of life. The study of social organization is restricted almost completely to living societies. Contemporary social typology attempts to categorize living societies by studying their kinship, marriage, exchange and other functioning systems. Human ecology attempts to correlate cultural behaviour with environment. Linguistics, seen as a branch of cultural anthropology, studies language within its full context of cultural life. One of the major interests of cultural anthropology is to examine the inner workings of a full culture including all its elements to try to see how the whole culture is lived. This is the search for what Boas calls the "inwardness" of the culture. Thus anthropology

* "Cultural Anthropology" is the American term. The British "Social Anthropology" is almost synonymous, although some authorities see it as narrower, referring only to studies of social organisation, ignoring, for example, linguistics or personality structure. (E.G. R.W. Firth, see note 7.)
is led to study the individual person and his experience and interpretation of his culture. Hence, personality, or character structure, is examined within a cultural context and an individual's emotional, intellectual and symbolic life are seen to influence, and be influenced by, his culture. A culture typifies the behaviour of the individuals in it not only in their modes of bodily action, but in their very modes of experiencing, of thinking, and of meaning. The study of the relationship of these personality traits to the cultural institutions involved is the problematic called Culture and Personality.

2. Anthropology and Sociology.

Cultural anthropology is distinguished from sociology (as an academic discipline) in a number of ways. Fundamentally, the distinction is due to historical causes. Sociology grew up in the academic world under stimulus from philosophy, law and economics, guided throughout by practical considerations, by the problems of Western society and by philosophic opinions as to the nature of science and the types of methods, abstractions and theories worthy of the title "scientific" to which it aspired.

The philosophers were shackled by the weighty history of their subject and by the vested interests of their profession. Auguste Comte, the founder of sociology, was a philosopher, but he tried to model sociology after the natural sciences. However, many of his followers, who were only slightly disguised philosophers of history, had a bias in favor of reasoning as opposed to observation. Many of the first American sociologists were Christian ministers, more eager to improve the world than to study it with detachment. (Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man, p. 12)

Anthropology, on the other hand, was founded on pure interest in how other men lived; such work originally felt little need to compete for objectivity and rigor with the "ideal models" of the scientific method, the natural sciences. Similarly, the almost contemplative nature of the original anthropologists and
their lack of interest in practical application or social reform, allowed
anthropology to maintain its interest in other cultures and not narrow itself,
as sociology did, to the immediate problems of the Western world. As a
result, the present "separation between social anthropology and sociology is
on two grounds -- of content and of technique." (Firth, "Social Anthropology",
p. 862) In content, anthropology has studied simple primitive and preliterate
societies, whereas sociology has limited itself to "advanced" Western society.
Within the last thirty years, however, this distinction has tended to disappear
as anthropology has started to study literate oriental society and small seg-
ments of Western culture, and because "social anthropology shares with and
helps to contribute to sociology a theoretical framework for the studies of
social life and social systems as a whole." (Firth, p. 862) In technique, anthro-
pologists normally live with the people to be studied and observe actual
behaviour, learn the language and get the "feel" of the life, whereas sociolo-
gists tend to rely on more objective methods based on quantitative surveys
and on statistics, often based on verbal and written responses rather than on
direct observation of the behaviour to be studied.
The interpretation of such surveys and methods, however, presupposes that
the investigator understands the culture already and simply wishes to clarify
a quantitative point. Benedict points out that "in trying to understand another
country, a systematic qualitative study of the habits and assumptions of its
people is essential before a [statistical] poll can serve to good advantage."
(Benedict, 1946a, p. 13) Otherwise the composition of the questions and the
interpretation of the responses would be impossible. Sociology attempts to
be objective by abstracting certain empirical concepts from the concrete
situation and finding laws and correlations between such abstracted objects.
It attempts to explain the social by the social and, when it cannot, looks to
economics of geography for the outside cause, seeing the individual human
being, if at all, more as a sort of minimum sample than as a singular entity
and so avoiding recourse to psychology. *

* "[La sociologie] ampute le social de son sens vécu ; elle le déshumanise en
se plaçant systématiquement pour le considérer à une échelle qui n'est
plus qu'un échantillon. Elle peut alors expliquer le social par le social et
non par le psychologique." (Dufrenne, Personalité de Base, p. 9).
Anthropology, however, tends to rely on the psychology of the individual as an explanatory principle, and it abstracts to standardized cultural patterns of individual behaviour. Whereas sociology usually tries to answer a particular precise problem within a culture, anthropology thinks the culture as a whole and it is this very attempt to reach the totality which, as we shall see, brings it back to the concrete singular person who incarnates, at least potentially, this totality. The anthropologist does not try to solve a specific problem within a culture, but, more usually, tries to grasp the whole of the culture which lies concretely before his eyes; it is this actual way of life which holds his interest. It is only within such a whole that specific problems can arise. This suggests that anthropology and sociology are really complementary to each other, and that it is more the result of historical accident, the difference in interests of the original founders of the two disciplines, than of essential nature that the two are presently separated.

Since anthropology approaches a particular human culture in its totality, it calls upon other, narrower human disciplines for specialized aspects of a society or of a problem. So, as well as sociology, anthropology maintains a close relationship with psychology, history, biology, genetics, botany, economics, human geography, demographics, medicine, nutrition and so on. Specific technical problems may also require the attention of specialists in metalurgy, radio-carbon dating, agriculture or even astronomy.

3. History of Theoretical Development.

By 1925, when Benedict and Mead were starting their work, anthropology, young as it was, had already passed through a number of stages of theoretical development. I will schematize these by calling them Evolutionism, Diffusionism and Functionalism.
(a) Evolutionism

While the idea of the progressive development of human culture was much older than Darwin, yet it was the latter's biological theories which ushered in the specific phase of Evolutionary Parallelism as an anthropological framework. Tylor wrote,

The institutions of man are as distinctly stratified as the earth on which he lives. They succeed each other in series substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what seem the comparatively superficial differences of race and language, but shaped by similar human nature through successively changing conditions in savage, barbaric, and civilized life. (Tylor, "On a method of investigating the Development of Institutions" JRAL, 18; 245-269, 1889. Cited by Lowie, A History . . ., p. 80)

This is an extreme phraseology that even Tylor himself would probably not wish to defend, but it illustrates the general mentality of the period which underlay the anthropological approach to certain cultural institutions such as marriage, religion, economics, politics, language, magic and science. It was assumed that present savage or barbaric societies were survivals from an earlier period of evolution and that the types of evolutionary stages through which modern civilization had passed could be seen and studied among contemporary primitive peoples. "The resemblance of modern savages to a primaeval ape-man" (Lowie, p. 25) was widely held. An historical museum of living cultural fossils lay before us to be studied. The basic evolutionary framework was an a priori to be filled by schemes of actual development of particular institutions, schemes based on institutionalized behaviour observed in individual contemporary cultures. The climax of this approach was found in Frazer's Golden Bough (1911-15), in which the evolution of politics, religion, magic, science and other institutions are illustrated voluminously with behaviour chosen, with little respect for context, from almost all the known cultures of the globe.
But, "as a matter of fact, biological evolution would not suggest parallelism", (Lowie, p. 29) but rather some theory of divergence. In any case, the whole doctrine was not verified by the empirical evidence then available. For archeological evidence was very slight and the study of "survivals" among contemporary primitives begs the question since there was no independent method of dating them, nor, therefore, any justification for labeling them "survivals". The assumption that a certain mode of magic among Melanesian savages is comparable with a pre-scientific stage of our own society is purely gratuitous. Nor is the presence of the same traits and institutions amongst different peoples, present or past, a proof of evolutionary parallelism, for it is exactly these facts that Diffusionism can explain in an alternate manner.

(b) Diffusionism

Diffusionism was the doctrine that "man is un inventive; hence culture was said to arise only in exceptionally favorable circumstances, practically never twice independently." (Lowie, p. 161) Hence the existence of the same institutionalized behaviour in two cultures of the globe was immediate evidence of diffusion of the institution from one to the other, or to both from a common source. "The irrelevancy of distance or continuity" (Lowie, p. 158) was also generally held. Clearly diffusion plays havoc with any universal law of sequence" (Lowie, p. 60) for the fact that, for example, both Hawaiians and Zulu classify certain relatives the same way is no longer evidence for parallelism, but evidence that "Polynesia and Kaffir must spring from the same stock" ! (Lowie, p. 60)

A most extreme form of Diffusionism was held by Elliot Smith as late as 1928. (In the Beginning : The Origin of Civilization) He held that Egypt was the sole origin of human culture and that diluted and impoverished portions of this culture have since spread over the globe. Hence, before
4000 BC, outside of Egypt, "human beings ... lived essentially like the anthropoid apes"! (Lowie, p. 161)

The German version of the theory had five Kulturkreise, complexes of cultural institutions which were developed independently of each other and then diffused over the globe, intermingling as they did so. It was a considerably more plausible version of the theory than that of Elliot Smith and gave rise to much important empirical research. But it suffered from a basic difficulty in that the institutions involved were now found only in the intermingled state and it was, in practice, impossible to re-separate the traits into the "original" complexes by any method which was not blatantly circular.

Diffusionism, however, suffered from the same basic problems as Evolutionism. Man's basic uninventiveness was no more an empirical datum than was evolutionary parallelism. Indeed it seems certain that both invention and diffusion have occurred in human history. It has been the genius of the German-American anthropologist Franz Boas to eschew dogmatic simplifications and work scientifically on particular culture areas to discover, in fact, which institutions or traits were invented and which had been diffused from a neighbouring culture. His insistence on rigor and on direct observation, his suspicion of grand speculative theories and his insistence on detailed observation and minute reporting on all the elements of a given culture, strongly influenced his many students, among them, Benedict and Mead. He insisted that a field worker should learn the native language when possible and record ceremonies and myths in the original language. He encouraged close living contact with the culture to be studied and, in his role as professor and director of field work, he expressly trained women anthropologists so as to allow access to the female half of primitive life. So it was that Mead's first field trip to Samoa was precisely to study the problems of adolescent girls.
Before Boas, few anthropologists actually held either of the two extreme and highly-simplified positions of Evolutionism and Diffusionism as I have described them above. Rather there had been a tendency to accept evolutionary parallelism as the explanation unless diffusion could be proved (or vice versa). But since proof in the required sense was very difficult, especially over wide areas and periods, the existence of all traits were, in practice explained by evolution (or diffusion, as per theory held). Boas admitted both the explanatory principles of invention and diffusion and applied them by the individual merits of the case within a carefully delimited and highly studied culture area where criteria such as distance in space and time and continuity over an area could be used to trace empirically the actual diffusion or invention of a specific trait.

(c) Particularism

More important for our interests, however, was Boas's particularism. For both evolutionism and diffusionism suffered from the same fault of treating of individual traits which could be identified cross-culturally. But identity of such traits is very difficult and their classification very dangerous. The institution called "agriculture" could no longer be considered a unity once the two very different traits of hoe-farming and plough-farming had been distinguished. The explanation by diffusion of two apparently "circular" forms of house-building is severely changed when it is learned that the builders of one conceive of it as a five-sided form with rounded corners. And a Parallelistic explanation for the institution known as "animal domestication" neglects the experiential difference between riding elephants and keeping bees. Boas, as early as 1887, objected to "synoptic museum exhibits, because if a specimen is isolated "we cannot understand its meaning". ... 'The art and characteristic style of a people can be understood only by studying its production as a whole"'. Of particular interest at the time (1916) was Boas's exposure of "Totemism ... as an artificial unit; the catchword
has been applied to diverse phenomena presenting superficial analogies. In reality, these several associations have neither a single psychological nor a single historical origin." (Lowie, p. 141) (This insistence on context for the understanding of a trait is central to the work of Benedict and Mead.) As we shall see later, (p. 21) it is, in effect, a new explanatory principle and involves the interpretation of each element of a culture from the total lived experience of those in it. Characteristically, it was Boas who suggested studying a culture through the eyes of a native informer in order to "interpret native life 'from within'". (Lowie, p. 132) And the study of "inwardness" is a constant theme in the writings of Benedict and Mead.

4. Culture and Personality.

The subdiscipline now called "Culture and Personality" or "Personality in Culture," was conceived in this anthropological atmosphere of the 1920's and came to birth with Benedict's Patterns of Culture in 1934. Fore-runners of the problematic, such as O. Spengler (The Decline of the West, 1926), had seen the uniformity of personality structure within certain particular cultures, but no widespread research had been stimulated by their work. The insistence on the unity of a culture, Boas's stimulation of research into the "inwardness" of a culture, the general climate of interest in personality structure in the 1920's, especially the interest in psychoanalysis, and finally, Benedict's personal sense of not being "at home" in her own culture that led to fertile research into the problem. The American experience of immigration, with its contrasting types of personality, the assimilation of such personalities into a unified American structure and the American emphasis on the importance of individual persons and on their personal inter-relationships, made the United States an ideal breeding ground for a science which would try to bring this malleability of human nature under scientific control. The United States, even today, seems to be the only
country to have contributed substantial research to the problem.

"Culture-and-Personality is an area of research where cultural and social anthropology relate to the psychology of personality." (Barnouw, Culture and Personality, p. 26) As such, it is interested not only in "the cultural and social determinants of personality" (Barnouw, p. 27), but also in the effects of personality on culture. Fundamentally, it wishes to understand cultures as wholes, on the basis of the individuals' living of the culture.

The subdiscipline has been developed by a number of vaguely distinct, but non-opposing, schools of thought. Malinowski was one of the first researchers and adopted a functionalist approach. The school of Linton, Kardiner and Dubois (herself a student of Benedict) is of strongly Freudian bent and uses the notion of "basic (or modal) personality structure" as the key tool of analysis. This approach has been discussed by Dufrenne (La Personnalité de Base) and will be ignored in this thesis.

Sapir, a close friend of Benedict's, also a student of Boas, had a "relativistic view which was similar to Benedict's view of culture" (Barnouw, p. 96) and was especially concerned with linguistic considerations. "Sapir, together with John Dellard, ... directed the first seminars on culture-and-personality at Yale in the early 1930's" (Barnouw, p. 95) and Mead acknowledges her debt to Dollard for basic theoretical insights. Sapir's important influence has continued, especially through Benjamin Lee Whorf, his major disciple.

The school founded on the work of Benedict and Mead has maintained a most surprising unity under their leadership over a period of three or four decades. Benedict, as student and assistant of Boas, trained Mead, her first student, to the latter's doctorate at Columbia University in the 1920's. Since then, the two have continually communicated theoretical and empirical material, worked and directed the same projects, cited each other's works
and written mutual eulogies. Mead, in effect, succeeded into Benedict's professional leadership position when the latter died in 1948 and later published a major book on Benedict's life and writings. Benedict relied considerably in her Patterns of Culture on field work done by Reo Fortune, Mead's first husband, and it was the manuscript for this book, sent to Mead and Fortune in 1933 which inspired much of the theoretical framework of Naven, the first major work of Gregory Bateson who had just been joined by Mead and Fortune in New Guinea. In 1936 Mead married Bateson and they worked together for many years. Mead specifically acknowledges the theoretical influence of Patterns of Culture in her report on this same field trip, Sex and Temperament. When Mead returned, in the threatening year of 1939, from another field trip to New Guinea, this time with Bateson, among the Bali and Iatmul, she and Benedict joined the Office for War Information, while Bateson joined the Office of Strategic Services, all in their roles as anthropologists. Benedict and Mead were joined by G. Gorer, a former student of theirs, and by C. Kluckhohn, who states that he "derived a major part of [his] theoretical development from her [Benedict]" (in Ruth Fulton Benedict a Memorial, p. 18); both were to be important scholars in the Culture and Personality field. The combined work of the school gave rise to the Study of National Character, an application, for wartime purposes, of the Culture and Personality approach to enemies, allies and the US itself. The postwar years saw more decentralization of the school as more workers with more varied backgrounds took an interest, but the influence of Benedict's and Mead's thought continued to be very important.

Not surprisingly, there is a basic unity of thought in our two authors (and among their co-workers). Often the very phraseology is similar. We will make little attempt to unravel the threads of their mutual influence, rather we will suppose their acceptance of the same theoretical and philosophic framework --- a supposition which will be confirmed as the first part of
this thesis unfolds. They were both primarily concerned with the relationship of culture and personality, and what other work they have done has been incidental; they were both concerned with the practical application of their findings in a humanistic way, and continually orientated their research towards contemporary social problems*; and both, accordingly, wrote popular books and popular articles in a myriad of mass-circulation magazines.

Benedict gave the basic inspiration to the movement but it was Mead who developed this inspiration in a more systematic and scientific manner. Mead also did more varied field work than Benedict and had more contact with the other human sciences. For these reasons, in the pages which follow we will concentrate more on Mead's work than on Benedict's.

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* Witness Benedict's Race: Science and Politics against Nazi-American racism of the 1930's and her study of Japanese culture during World War II, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword; Mead's study of adolescence (Coming of Age in Samoa) in the 1920's, Cooperation and Competition and the "feminist problem" (Sex and Temperament) in the 1930's; witness also their war studies, and, since 1950, Mead's interest in social change and development (New Lives for Old, Continuities in Cultural Evolution, and her work for UNESCO, Cultural patterns and Technical Change).
CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNINGS: BENEDICT'S INSPIRATIONS

Ruth Benedict was interested in understanding and controlling the social forms of human life. (Boas, Preface to Benedict, 1934a, p. vii) As an anthropologist, she turned to "primitive" peoples, cultures which are small, simple, and homogeneous, in the hope of finding the general principles which can later be applied to man's mastery of his culture. (Benedict, 1934a, p. 30) She had a profound respect for peoples other than her own and refused to follow the steps of many of her predecessors to a view of 'primitive' peoples as lower evolutionary steps towards our own culture. (Ibid., p. 20) Each culture, she believed, must be seen in its own light, from the point of view of its own members, and not as an agglomeration of elements suffering from a lack of (our) civilization. (Ibid., p. 33, 34) Many of the tools and concepts for such an understanding were given to her by her anthropological background, but a number of key inspirations were her own. It is with the latter that this chapter will be mainly concerned, for they formed the foundation for Mead's (and Benedict's own) later development.

1. The Whole

(a) Introduction

The debate between Evolutionism and Diffusionism centered on certain units called cultural traits, capable of being diffused from one culture to another, or, alternatively, invented independently. (Kluckhohn, Mirror for Man, p. 50) The use of the wheel, the notion of monotheism, the institution
of cross-cousin marriage, the performance of a particular ritual would be examples of such traits. The precise definition of the notion is difficult for its limitation depends on the particular context being discussed and can vary from the very narrow "use of a head scratcher" (Benedict, 1923b, p. 79) to "adoption of democracy". A trait is to be understood as "that which is diffused (or invented)" in the particular case. (Mead, 1938a, p. 158n2)

The area of diffusion of a complex of associated traits is called a **culture area**. Aboriginal North America, the Iberian Peninsula and Latin America, Catholicism would be examples of such culture areas with reference to specific complexes of traits. (Mead, 1946b, p. 480)

Any culture within a culture area can be presumed to have had access to all such traits so that we can assume the presence of a given trait in a culture within the area to be due to diffusion, its absence to be due to rejection, and the appearance of a trait not associated with the area as probably due to invention. (Mead, 1953a, p. 26) That is, all the occurrences of a trait within its associated culture area have an **historical unity**; this unity is absent from an isolated trait appearing in an area with which it is not associated. (Benedict, 1923b, p. 8)

Benedict, in her PhD thesis, (1923b) distinguishes the historical unity of a trait from its **psychological unity**; the latter appears to mean the psychological function of the trait within a particular culture. "The fact of historical connection has usually in theoretical discussions been regarded as involving a psychological unity of role. The two concepts, however, are by no means equivalent. Historical unity we can read from the face value of the facts of distribution; psychological unity or lack of unity, on the contrary, can be determined only by a critical analysis of its connotation, and of the roles which the concept plays in culture life." (Ibid., p. 9)
That is, the fact that two cultures accept the same trait does not mean they give it the same use, role, or function on the psychological level.

The function, then, of a trait, as opposed to its origin, can be discovered only by placing the trait within the cultural whole, to understand its function in the complete system. "In the psychological field, behavior is no longer given the same interpretation, say, for the cycloid and schizoid type. It is recognized that the organization of the total personality is crucial in the understanding or even in the mere description of individual behavior. If this is true in individual psychology where individual differentiation must be limited always by the cultural forms and by the short span of a human lifetime, it is even more imperative in social psychology where the limitations of time and of conformity are transcended. The degree of integration that may be obtained is, of course, incomparably greater than can ever be found in individual psychology. Cultures from this point of view are individual psychology thrown large upon the screen, given gigantic proportions and a long time span." (Benedict, M 32a, p. 23-24)

(b) Personality Writ Large

This statement, which is a summary of Benedict's theory of culture as "personality writ large", presents two theses: first it insist that any behavioural trait can only be interpreted by reference to the cultural whole; and it suggests the notion of personality as a model for conceptualizing this whole. I will treat these two points separately.

(i) Interpretation

Interpretation is one of the key notes throughout all the works of Benedict and Mead. They insist that every behavioural trait or institution
be studied not only as an element which has been diffused into (or invented by) a particular culture, but that the "inwardness" of the trait be found, that the anthropologist discover how the trait is "lived", "experienced", by a member of the culture.

Continually they search in the overt behaviour for its "emotional values" and "attitudes" (Mead 1938a; p. 164), the "ethological" dimension (Ibid., p. 163), the "intention" of the forms (Mead, 1947a, p. 176) the "symbolic meaning of phrases" and "meanings of acts" (Benedict, 1947a, p. 282), the "values" (Mead, 1956a, p. 410), the center of "integration" (Benedict, 1934a, p. 86), the "function" (Benedict, 1946a, p. 10), "emotional significance" (Benedict, 1932a, p. 7), the cultural institutions to which it "refers" (Benedict, 1934a, p. 206) and so on. For example: "Mundugamor laughing is bright, but not happy" (Mead, 1935a, p. 144); "the Kwakiutl gives [gifts] to shame his rival, the Dakota to honor someone else" (Mead, 1937a, p. 487) "when we identify ourselves with them we are emotionally poles apart though we put ourselves meticulously in the pattern of their behaviour" (Benedict, 1932a, p. 6); Catholics and Protestants both use the ritual of the Last Supper but the sense changes (Benedict, 1934c, p. 397); Yoga practises used in India for mystical and ascetical reasons, are used for non-ascetic self-discipline in Japan; (Benedict, 1946a, p. 166-169) depression and boredom are forms of self-agression; (Ibid., p. 116) whereas monogamy may be seen as difficult for male continence, polygamy is read as a resented drain on male potency (Mead, 1949b, p. 199); the "same sound" may occur in many languages, but its meaning may not be the same (Mead 1953a, p. 16). Such interpretations are not, of course, always conscious ones. The Balinese, for example, have a "vast body of ritual not understood by those who practice it" (Mead, 1961e, p. 1117).

Such interpretations of the meaning of behaviour must always be made by reference to the specific culture involved and Benedict continually rejects
any simple, absolute, cross-cultural interpretative system. The "Nature Symbolists" of the last century who read all rituals as reenactments of the cycles of nature, or the contemporary Freudian symbolists who interpret all cultural superstructures in terms of childhood pleasure experiences are rejected in so far as they are dogmatic universals (Benedict, 1931b, p. 289). Such interpretive schemes, however, are always possibilities, maybe even highly probable, but only if they have been accepted and elaborated within the individual cultural scheme. Each culture is a particular configuration which integrates behaviour into a unique whole (Benedict, 1934a, p. 196) and it is only in terms of this original pattern that the interpretation of parts of it is possible (Benedict, 1932a, p. 27).

(ii) Personality as Model

Benedict tries to describe each unique cultural whole by analogy with personality. Not only is a culture like a personality in that behaviours must be referred to it for interpretation, but also, psychological terms may be usefully employed in describing and analyzing the cultural configuration. The types of behaviour favoured within a particular culture are the same types favoured by particular personalities. They may therefore be labeled with categories originally applied to personality.

An Appolonian * culture emphasizes moderation and the Golden Mean (Benedict, 1934a, p. 101), places high value on social stability and on the real, matter of fact world, relies on precise communal ritual by communally ordained priests for their religion (ibid., p. 93), insists on formality, measure, and sobriety in all things (ibid., p. 120). Each member of such a culture should be average (ibid., p. 95) not a saint or a hero (ibid., p. 119), must "remain himself"("retain his civic name") in the dance (Benedict, 1928a, p. 249), and avoid all Dionysian excess and

* Terms taken originally from Nietzsche.
ecstasy (ibid., p. 258). A Dionysian culture emphasizes extreme behaviour and values extraordinary experience, it places very high value on the individual and his impulses (Benedict, 1934a, p. 895), its religion is highly individual and ecstatic, directed by prophets or shamans who have been "called" or "possessed" (ibid., p. 93), and it directs its members towards frenzy and orgiastic states (ibid., p. 79). In her Patterns of Culture Benedict studies in detail the Appolonian interpretations given by the Pueblo Indians of South Western North America to a set of traits which are interpreted as Dionysian over most of the rest of the North American continent. She also analyzes the Indians of the North West Coast as Dionysian with paranoid tendencies who, in great "potlatch" feasts make "war" on their enemies by insultingly giving them more gifts than the latter can repay. Here even natural events are read as megalomanical victories or as shameful insults leading to sulking or suicide (ibid., p. 156-196).

But each configuration must be "an empirical generalization" and not just a "type" in the sense of a fixed list of categories into which all cultures must fit. "Nothing could be more unfortunate than an effort to characterize all cultures as exponents of a limited number of fixed and selected types. Categories become a liability when they are taken as inevitable and applicable alike to all civilizations and events." (Ibid., p. 288) Rather the anthropologist must find the particular pattern of integration for each culture, for each culture is ultimately individual.

2. The Selection Theory

These cultural patterns are not organized around conscious purposes but are articulated "in accordance with unconscious canons of choice that develop within the culture" (Benedict, 1934a, p. 54). These canons are themselves selected.
"The cultural pattern of any civilization makes use of a certain segment of the great arc of potential human purposes and motivation, just as ... any culture makes use of certain selected material techniques or cultural traits. The great arc along which all the possible human behaviours are distributed is far too immense and too full of contradiction for any one culture to utilize even any considerable portion of it. Selection is the first requirement. Without selection no culture could ever achieve intelligibility, and the intentions it selects and makes its own are a much more important matter than the particular detail of technology or the marriage formality which it also selects in similar fashion." *(ibid., p. 207)*

For example, although our vocal systems can make a very large number of sounds, no language would be intelligible if it did not severely limit the sounds allowable in it. *(ibid., p. 35)* Once the mode of selection is established it becomes cumulative. "Every society, beginning with some slight inclination in one direction or another, carries its preferences farther and farther, integrating itself more and more completely upon its chosen basis, and discarding those types of behaviour that are uncongenial." *(Benedict, 1934b, Fried reprint p. 508)* Over generations, it can attain a very high degree of coherence and homogeneity.

Since a culture is largely dependent for the institutions its selects on the suggestions available to it, the idea of a 'culture area' *(see page 19)* takes on a special significance. The culture area contains the fund of traits from which a particular culture may draw and it therefore largely supplies the forms by which basic cultural attitudes may be expressed *(Benedict, 1946a, p. 6).* The area has, as it were, a set of traits in abstraction from their meaning within the individual cultures. This feature is of methodological importance, since by studying which traits from the area a culture accepts, rejects and modifies, the anthropologist can discover the criteria of selection by the culture without having to consider historical accident. *(Benedict, 1932a, p. 7)* This approach, as Mead points out, is a method of

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*For ease of reference I shall refer to this idea as the **SELECTION THEORY**, a term not used by Benedict.*
"holding history constant" (Mead, 1953a, p. 26), for since all the cultures within the area are presumed to have had the same historical background, the actual selection of traits made is a true reflection of the cultural choice. Thus the ways particular Eastern European cultures handle the institution of swaddling are excellent indices of their cultural orientations (Benedict, 1949a, reprint in Mead, 1959a, p. 450) whereas the absence of swaddling in an African culture only indicates that Africa is not in Eastern Europe.

This is not only a methodological point. The selected configuration is also selecting and as such is a principle of explanation in history. The way a society will react to any given historical situation is dependent on the configuration of its culture. Benedict explicitly denies any theory which gives precedence to technology as a principle which determines social order. (1943b, p. 212) In an article on "Two Patterns of Indian Acculturation" (1943b) she finds that the common factor among North and South American Indian tribes who accepted and worked with the white conquerors as opposed to those tribes who are still resisting acculturation is not a similarity in means of production, but a similarity of psychological configuration. Only in those areas where aboriginal slavery had developed a submissive, dependent attitude among subjugated tribes was there a configuration which allowed acculturation to a peonage system. "Free" Indian tribes were either exterminated or are still unacculturated. Similarly Mead shows in a study of thirteen cultures (1937a) that competitive, cooperative or individualistic organizations in society are not correlated with technological modes of subsistence nor with ease of subsistence, but with general cultural configuration, the cultural character.

So the notion of selected cultural configuration has a two-fold explanatory role as the principle for the integration of traits into one united cultural whole and therefore also as a principle governing change in cultural history.
The process of individuation of cultures by progressive selection of traits is paralleled by the individual personality's selection of behavioural patterns from the culture in which he develops. "His culture provides the raw materials of which the individual makes his life". (Benedict, 1934a, 218) A person is born with a particular temperament, a certain "original endowment" of "potentialities" (ibid., p. 221), a set of personality traits (ibid., p. 225), susceptibilities of one kind or another. (ibid., p. 229) He is, however, presented with patterns of behaviour already selected by his culture and these may or may not be from the same spectrum of behavioural possibilities. Due to "the enormous malleability of their original endowment ... the great mass of individuals take quite readily the form that is presented to them. They do not all, however, find it equally congenial, and those are favoured and fortunate whose potentialities most nearly coincide with the type of behaviour selected by the society." (ibid., p. 221) Some, however, may find the cultural stereotype so uncongenial that they must reject it to a greater or lesser extent. (Benedict, 1934b, reprint in Fried, p. 510) Such are the psychotics and neurotics, the misfits and deviants of a society; but such also are the revolutionaries and reformers, those whose influence may change the cultural configuration to select behavioural ideals more in accord with their own temperament. (Mead, 1953d, p. 434) The relationship between culture and personality is two-way.

3. Summary

Benedict, then, in trying to grasp cultural life as experienced is led to the study of the whole as a master pattern which gives meaning to each part. In studying such configurations, she draws on psychological models and she sees each culture as like a unique personality, capitalizing on certain temperaments and devaluing others. She conceives of culture and personality as mutually inseparable. "No individual can arrive even at
the threshold of his potentialities without a culture in which he participate. Conversely, no civilization has in it any element which in the last analysis is not the contribution of an individual." (Benedict, 1934a, p. 219)
CHAPTER II

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

It is characteristic of the close relationship between Benedict and Mead that the first publication of Benedict's selection theory was by Mead in 1930. (1930b) The theory was further exposed and applied in books and articles by both authors during the following seven years. The theory stimulated much criticism which influenced Mead's later development of the original inspiration. Despite Benedict's emphasis on deviants and her carefully nuanced argument that individuals were free to select or reject the traits presented in their cultural norm (Benedict, 1934a, p. 220), it was claimed she saw cultures as stereotyping each personality.

But anthropological experience [including Mead's own (Mead, 1928a, p. 172)] indicated there was often considerable variation in personality within a culture. Again, Benedict had claimed that the idea of a single theme integrating each culture into a whole was a methodological device, not a dogma, and always subject to the actual structure of the culture being studied. (Benedict, 1934a, p. 200) Further field work, however, showed that many cultures involved more than one basic theme, and might indeed have many.* This appeared to break the unity of each cultural whole.

1. Regularity

Against this background of criticism against stereotypy and homogeneity, Mead developed a theory based on more abstract concepts than Benedict's. (Mead, 1953a, p. 17)† Benedict's theory was organized around "certain

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† For instance, the penetrating criticisms of Benedict's approach by Aberle in 1957 ("The Influence of Linguistics on early Culture and Personality Theory"), are innoxious to Mead's formulations in, say, her important 1956 article, "The Cross-cultural Study of Personality."
selected types of behaviour... each ruling out the behaviour proper to its opposite." (Benedict, 1932a, p. 4) Mead refers to such "types of behaviour" as uniformities or similarities. These are cultural modes for, or cultural determinants of, personality and tend to be opposed to idiosyncracies in the individual. "So a tendency to speak volubly and with emotion will be referred to Italian culture, but the extent to which some individuals speak very little and others a great deal will be referred to 'individual differences'; [but this ignores] the fact that range and contrast, even sharp contradictions among the behaviour of individuals sharing the same culture are also 'regular' and referable to the culture." (Mead, 1946b, p. 478-479) A regularity, then, is any set of patterned behaviours which are systematically related to each other. It may include more than one uniformity or type of behaviour and it may itself be part of a higher order regularity.

The modes of systematic relationship of types of behaviour within a regularity have to be discovered in each case. The relationship may allow uniformities of behaviour to be distributed throughout the society to different individuals, or to the same individuals or groups over different periods and time, or to the same individuals involved in different activities, or to different levels of the same personality. Thus, there may be

"several possible expressions of the same basic emphasis, such as extreme prudery and institutionalized prostitution, fastidious personal cleanliness and great tolerance towards public lack of sanitation, or great public cleanliness and lack of personal hygiene, extreme brutality combined with an exquisite appreciation of aesthetic detail, a controlled unemotional religion combined with societies of intense witchcraft behaviour, etc." (Mead, 1946b, p. 477)

Reversals may occur as when the "emotionally charged" contact between growing yams and feminine sexuality is phrased as a mutual danger to each among the Arapesh, or as necessary for the growth of the yams among bordering tribes of the same culture area. (Mead, 1938a, p. 172) In Samoa,
exhibitionistic dancing compensates for repression of initiative in ordinary life. (Mead, 1928a, p. 97-101) In Bali, a horror of corpses is over-compensated for by the young men daringly plunging their arms into a decaying body to "feel the maggots." (Mead, 1942b, p. 46) In England, where parents are exhibitionistic, children play the complementary role of spectators; these roles are interchanged in the U.S.A. Relationships of ambiguity, as both horror and awe before the sacred, of dominance, as in authoritarian-submissive patterns, of combinations such as the sado-masochistic complex may all be subsumed under the notion of regularity.

The set of regularities learned in a given culture is its cultural character structure. This concept is defined as "the regularities in the inter-psychic organization of the cultural members of a given society that are to be attributed to these individuals having been reared within that culture." (Mead, 1953a, p. 33)

"It is important to recognize that cultural character, or the form of learned behavior embodied in the character structure of an individual which is found to be held in common by all members of a given culture is not a set of uniformities, but a set of regularities which may in fact appear to be extremely diverse or contradictory, but which nevertheless will be found upon examination to be systematically related to each other." (Mead, 1956b, p. 215)

That is, deviants from a cultural uniformity behave in a manner which is nonetheless culturally patterned as can be seen when we pass to the more abstract regularity.

"Thus the extreme emphasis upon personal bravery and warlike character among Dakota Indians, and the institution of the berdache under which young males who find the emphasis on bravery too great to bear, assume women's clothes and occupation, will be viewed together as data on an aspect of Dakota character which includes a demand for bravery and a possibility of refusing to meet the demand." (Mead, 1946b, p. 477)
Other cultures may institutionalize their deviants in other ways but the mode and extent of such institutionalization is itself, on a higher level, part of the cultural pattern of regularities, of the cultural character.

Another dichotomy depassed by the notion of regularity is that between the cultural ideal for behaviour and the actual pattern of behaviour. A verbalized ideal to which all pay lip service may, in practice, be continually violated by a recognized form of behaviour. (Mead, 1932a, p. xxiii) But the discrepancy itself, and the cultural mode of handling it, will be regular and will be an important aspect of the cultural character structure. So, for example, neither the Mundugomor nor the Manus follow their prescribed form of ideal marriage, but the Mundugomor acts in the conviction that he (and everyone else) is doing wrong and being wronged. (Mead, 1935a, p. 131) whereas in Manus, "although the system is rigid, every fiction is permitted in order to fit an individual into the proper category to arrange or contract a marriage" (Mead, 1930a, p. 224). Both attitudes are typical of the respective cultures.

The cultural character structure, then, is much more complex than a simple stereotype and includes patterns on many levels of regularity. It includes the pattern of deviancy from the norms, the interrelationship of real and ideal norms, and as we shall see later (p. 48-51), the sanctions which allow it to maintain its own structure.

It may be useful to mention briefly some of the ways in which the term cultural character may not be used. It is not modal character, neither a real nor an artificial type of summation of the most frequently occurring traits when such traits are measured on some standard scale.
Thus a real modal character for the United States might be an individual who chewed gum. A statement about cultural character, which would include gum-chewing and non-gum-chewing Americans would be a specification of the high degree of tolerance for material
which is taken in --- into the mouth, or through the eyes and the
ears into the mind, or through temporary hire or purchase into
one's life --- and as easily discarded. ... Still less is cultural
character a way of stating average behaviour. ... This average
American would be a construct from a large number of statistical sam-
plings on separate items, assembled into a synthesis which need not
be an exact description of any single American. Cultural character
statements, on the other hand, if made correctly, should be state-
ments about every single American, although any given individual
may illustrate the particular statement by reacting negatively or
positively, extensively or slightly, in the area being covered.

Nor is the statement of cultural character a statement of an ideal type.
The ideal American ... does not chew gum.... The gum-chewing
complex includes a knowledge that such behaviour is not ideal, and
this very knowledge contributes to the relaxation, the permitted
slouch, the covert disposal, and many other subsidiary aspects of
the gum-chewing habit. ... [Similarly] contrasts between
behaviours will in this way be related to the ideal, as both the kept
woman and the respectable married woman have an ideal of marriage
and respectibility, which is part of their shared set of values, to
which one conforms and the other does not. (Mead, 1956b, p. 218-
219).

The notion of regularity is rich enough to allow Mead to analyze
cultural character structure while avoiding the objections against stereotypy
and homogeneity. Different behavioural patterns may be taken up, for
example by men and women, but within the one regularity; or the behaviour
may be differentiated by trade, constitutional type, or accident of birth,
within the culture. Similarly the unity of the whole can always be preserved
by moving to a higher level of abstraction allowing heterogeneity on lower
levels. For example, a complex society like the U.S.A. has different types
of behaviour for men and women, for white and black people, for middle
and lower classes, for new immigrant stock and for long established families.
Yet this heterogeneity on one level can be subsumed under unifying regularities
of a higher level such as conformism, a common money-achievement
standard for all, the expectation that a newly-married man and wife will
have conflicting patterns for married behaviour and so on. (Mead, 1949b, p. 233)
In this way we arrive back at the whole. Mead's turn to "regularity" as an analytic tool does not lead her to a fragmentation of cultures into particular problems to be individually attacked as some of her critics would like. (e.g., Bennet, "Review of The Study of Culture") As late as 1956, Mead says:

"When we speak of relating the personality of each individual born within a culture to the "whole culture" we are referring to ... a patterned relationship. The peasant will not learn the habits of the nobleman, but the habits of each will include a recognition that they live in a society in which peasant and nobleman both participate....

So when we speak of the cross-cultural study of personality, the way in which the learning person learns one version of the whole culture --- whether this be the version suited to a genius or an imbecile, to prince, peasant, merchant, skilled mechanic, conservative landowner, or radical labor leader, a priest in the Catholic Church, a leader of a small Protestant sect, a modern obstetrician trained in a large medical school, or a local midwife skilled only in gathering herbs in the forest --- nevertheless, all will share in one cultural pattern and, if observations are full enough on any one of them, we should be able to abstract the main pattern of the whole." (Mead, 1956b, p. 207)

For this reason Mead prefers the term "version of culture" to "subculture" to emphasize the unique role of the unified culture as opposed to its parts or to the culture area in which it is to be found. (ibid., p. 208)

"A culture" is the learned behaviour of a complete society, of a cross-generational group in which all roles are represented and in which the total pattern is represented in all its forms as it impinges on the behaviour of the individual.

This impinging of the cultural pattern on the individual is not, of course, always accessible to the individual. (Mead, 1953a, p. 10) "Behaviour may be highly patterned and completely predictable, even though it is neither verbalized nor consciously taught and may not even be recognized as "behaviour". (Mead, 1964a, p. 46)
Whether we are considering the ways in which human beings relate themselves to their own bodies, to other human beings, to the physical world around them, or to the universe, we find that each and all of these are culturally modified and patterned. It is from the culture within which one is reared that one learns how to organize one’s emotions... [ and one’s interpersonal relationships. ] (Mead, 1956b, p. 204-205)

It is necessary to recognize that the growing child is systematically patterned in every detail, in posture as well as in gesture, in temperament as well as in speech, in his way of thinking as well as in the content of his thinking, in his capacity to feel as well as in the forms his feeling takes .... (Mead, 1946c, p. 669)

Even the "localization of blushing on the body" does not escape cultural patterning. (Mead, 1956b, p. 204) Psychosomatic research shows that body processes themselves are influenced by culture.

It is necessary to realize that every individual born into a society is from birth --- and in all probability from before birth --- subjected to a progressive molding by the culture, mediated through all of those with whom he comes in contact so that the cultural pattern is built into his whole personality in one process in which no dualism exists, so that the temper tantrum, the tautened muscles, the change in the manufacture of blood sugar, and the verbal insults hurled at an offending parent, all become patterned and integrated. (Mead, 1947d, p. 68)

It is ultimately to the psychosomatic totality of the individual personality that Benedict and Mead turn for the foundation of the regularity of learned behaviour. The coherence and regularity of culture "is inevitable, since these cultures are carried by men and women in their habituated bodies and minds". (Benedict, 1943a, Mead, 1959a Reprint, p. 441) The individual in the culture "is the same person performing the different roles, and they become in time systematically related to one another within the framework of the historical culture within which he acts." (Mead, 1955a, p. 11) This function of integrating cultures is explicitly referred to the body: "As the human body has systematic properties related to its anatomical structure, its
physiological state, and the ability to perceive movement, the recognition by members of a society of a few elements of a posture-gesture system serves to specify, without words, the rest of the pattern." (Mead, 1964a, p. 45-46) Not only kinesthetic patterns but all regularities of integrated behaviour are founded in the body although it is not clear if the foundation is to be found in the body as a whole, or, at times, only in the central nervous system. (Mead, 1953a, p. 12 note 4, cited from Bateson.)

... Learned [cultural] behaviour, when studied, has been found to be systematic, and this systematization can be referred to the uniformities in the structure and the functioning of the human beings who embody the culture. While the content of any particular culture is to be referred to a long series of historical events, many of them fortuitous from the standpoint of any given culture, the form in which this historically determined content will be expressed will -- given a sufficiently long period of time -- become systematic and, as such, will be comparable with the same formal aspects of other cultures. (Mead, 1953a, p. 22)

Mead, then, faces the objections to Benedict's (and her own early) theory by developing the more complex system of abstract regularities, learned from the culture, but based nonetheless on the individual. The relationship between these two terms, the pattern which is learned and the individual's systematizing integration, is fundamentally the problem of the relationship of culture and human nature. To understand the dynamics of this relationship, Mead turns to the process of enculturation of the individual.

2. Human Nature and Culture

A study of culture leads inevitably to human nature. Human nature is but a set of potentialities capable of being actualized by a culture. These potentialities are based on man's biological nature (Mead, 1953a, p. 18) and may be proper to (a) the species, (b) the society, or (c) the individual. (Mead, 1951a, p. 17)
(a) **As a race**, man is characterized as hot blooded, sexually differentiated and so on, as part of the class of mammalia, (Mead, 1949b, p. 17) and specifically as: of a certain general physiological form; having an essential need for learned culture for survival and the special cerebral capacities required for such learning; (Mead, 1964a, p. 38) subject to a delayed fertility which only allows reproduction six to ten years after the appearance of sexual impulses; (Mead, 1949, p. 18) and having, in the female, a period of sterility after a menopause. (ibid., p. 21) Conception, birth, nutrition, growth, sexual and reproductive activity and death are given ("hints") (Benedict, 1934a, p. 46) on the biological species level and must in some way be faced by all cultures. (Mead, 1949b, p. 144-158) Of special importance is the existence of a species-wide growth sequence in the human child which passes sequentially through a number of cycles of biologically governed growth in any culture.

(b) **On the societal level**, there are presumably potentialities due to heredity or biological (racial) stock, but none are known which influence the learning of culture. (Mead, 1964a, p. 27) That is, Mead assumes a "psychic unity of mankind", (Mead, 1946b, p. 477) that there is no comparative difference due to innate racial potentialities in the ability of any human group to learn and function in any culture. (Mead, 1956b, p. 224)

(c) **On the level of the individual**, there are "those qualities of mind and body whose form is determined at birth, either by the genes or by the prenatal, interuterine maternal environment." (ibid., p. 210) These are referred to as "constitution-temperament" where "constitution" refers to "those properties of the individual physique for which the ground plan is given by the genes," (ibid., p. 211) (i.e., "the inborn patterning of physical form," (ibid., p. 213) and "temperament" refers rather to the "inborn tendence to certain types of behaviour." (ibid., p. 213) Benedict had assumed a uniform distribution of
constitution-temperament types in all cultures. (Benedict, 1934a, p. 206) but Mead leaves this an open empirical question although her "hypothesis [ is ] that within each human group we will find in different proportions and possibly not always in all, representatives of the same constitutional types that we are beginning to distinguish in our own population." (Mead, 1949b, p. 137)

It is onto this biological base, this human nature, on the level of the species, the group or the individual, that culture is grafted. Such "original nature", of course, can only be studied in, for it only exists in, concrete cultural forms. (Mead, 1942d, p. 194 of Mead, 1964b, reprint) Biological human nature can never be ignored by the anthropologist, (Mead, 1951a, p. 16) for it is the very foundation for anthropological comparison between cultures. (Mead, 1955a, p. 7) "In the study of personality in culture we start with the recognition of the biologically given, of what all human beings have in common." (ibid., p. 6) But this is not enough; for man is not an instinctive creature but acts by learned behaviour. (Benedict, 1940a, p. 90) In fact, man is so far from a simple instinctive state that Mead even suggests that "it is quite credible that .... learned behaviours absolutely essential.... [ to reproduction ] ... should have replaced the biologically given ones." (Mead, 1949b, p. 204) As Benedict says, "it is these cultural patternings that turn out to be compulsive, rather than any original instincts with which we are born equipped. Even the basic emotions of fear and love and rage by the time they have been shaped over the different cultural lasts are well nigh unrecognizable. (Benedict, 1929a, p. 814 of Calverton reprint) Similarly, it seems that the frustration of biological urges are much less important to a man than the frustration of culturally induced needs. (Mead, 1939a, preface)

Learned culture, then, is essential to man. "We would not accord full humanity to an individual who had been reared without the intermediation
of other human beings whose behaviour was already culturally patterned." (Mead, 1946b, p. 483) Yet essential as it is, the capacity to learn is not enough to define man; it is man's ability to teach which characterizes him as cultural and this ability is much more distinctive, and presumably is a later evolutionary development, than learning. (Mead, 1964a, p. 43) Many species have the capacity for individuals to learn behaviour but not the ability to transmit their learning to the next generation. Hence Mead can refer to the social learning of "shame" by pigs (Mead, 1938a, p. 180) or to Boas's example of the "highly patterned behaviour of the pariah dogs of oriental towns", (Mead, 1964a, p. 42) without granting "humanity" to such animals, since it is only the continuing presence of the human environment which allows transmission of this learning from generation to generation. It is precisely man's ability to transmit patterns of learned behaviour to others which enables him to stay human, for it is learned behaviour which defines man as such. "Our humanity rests upon a series of learned behaviours, woven together into patterns that are infinitely fragile and never directly inherited." (Mead, 1949b, p. 178)

Here we must distinguish "a culture", defined as "the historically unique learned behaviour of a particular society", and "culture in general", i.e., "the process of man's species-wide culture-building behaviour." (Mead, 1964a, p. 36) The latter, although it defines humanity, is nevertheless an abstraction from particular cultures; there does not exist, at present, one world-wide culture.

There are, nonetheless, some species-wide characteristic of man which are not purely biological. "Types of behavior which we customarily regard as generically human, which include the use of language and the use of tools, already, of course, involve a cultural dimension." (Mead, 1946b, p. 483) Similarly, "the incest taboo in some form is always present for the protection of the sexually immature". (Mead, 1949b, p. 189-190) The
family is humanly universal and is characterized by a distinctive "learned
nurturing behaviour of man" not present in the males of the primates.
Although universal, this is learned behaviour and "we have no indication
that man the animal, man unpatterned by social learning, would do anything
of the sort." (ibid., p. 182) It is possible that the separation of the human
father from his children for a number of years after their birth is also
universal and may even be a condition for civilization, turning the male
creative drive from biological production to cultural things. (Mead, 1958b,
p. 33) So there is human behaviour which is species-wide and present in all
known human groups, which is nonetheless not instinctive, not a part of
human "nature".

The interplay between biology and culture which occurs on the species-
wide level occurs also on the group and individual levels. The Cultural
Character Structure of a group, is, of course, limited and conditioned by the
biological potentialities of its carriers. Inbreeding, as a result of cultural
factors such as marriage laws, may change the proportion and intensity of
innate constitution-temperament. (Mead, 1956b, p. 212) Clearly the cultural
character structure selected by a culture must be selected from the spectrum
of human potentialities, as Benedict also points out, and Mead admits that
a particular culture is likely to favour certain constitution-temperaments
over others. Sometimes, as among the Arapesh, Mead sees the same scale
of variation of personality as among Americans, but with the whole scale
moved down towards the passive end. (Mead, 1935a, p. 106) Speaking of
three cultures, she says, "we found in each case the spectrum, differentially
overlaid in each case by the monotone which covers it. This spectrum is the
range of individual differences which lies back of the so much more conspicuous
cultural emphasis." (Mead, 1935a, p. 193) Later research suggests that
the situation, however, is more complex, for temperaments are not constants
which vary only in proportion or in role in each society. Rather, the natures
of the temperaments themselves change so that Mead expresses a need for
more abstract cross-cultural categories to handle the variation. (Mead, 1942f, p. 55)

A culture, however, like humanity, is an abstraction which 'acts' only through its members." (Mead, 1956a, p. 143) The dynamic interplay of nature (biology) and learned culture on the three levels we have discussed finally come to concrete reality in the living experience of the cultural carrier, the individual personality. It is with the study of "Culture and Personality," then, that the whole relationship between nature and culture is brought to observable reality. The title of "Culture and Personality" sometimes leads to confusion for it suggests the interaction of two separate entities, each outside of the other. But biology and culture intermingle on every level and we cannot analyze a personality in terms of a dichotomy between cultural factors and biological factors as if culture were an entity external to the individual biological organism. Dr Angyal used this dichotomy for his analysis (Foundations for a Science of Personality) and in criticizing him Mead says:

From the anthropological point of view, the individual organism develops within the culture from the moment of birth, and, in all probability (although the material to document this statement is not yet available), from the beginning of gestation. The culture of those individuals who form his social environment is built into his body, into its tempo and its rhythms, into its sensitivities and its insensitivities. The reality of culture permeates the organism, and at no time can a human being, bred in a group of human beings, be said to stand outside culture, or to have personal experiences that are not culturally shaped. Such a statement as "hunger becomes appetite" is only relatively true, for even the hunger of the three-day old baby is already patterned by the feeding habits of its culture: whether a newly delivered mother gives her baby the breast; whether a child is fed intermittently but also continuously; whether it is starved for three days, etc. Dr Angyal uses the phrasing "cultural determinations are superimposed also on primary physical functions such as sex, food intake and excretory functions" (p. 187), but, as none of these physical functions are ever manifested by a human being who has not been at least prenatally moulded by contacts with other human beings, who themselves
embody regularly patterned forms of behaviour, we cannot speak of
culture being superimposed upon, but must speak rather of physical
functions which develop in a culturally patterned way. A human
being developing without contact with other human beings (if, for
instance, it were possible for him to be reared by another mammal)
would provide valuable data on original nature. But it is untenable to
consider any human being, who have [sic] been reared among human
beings, as having at any point in his life-history, or in any layer of
his personality, or in any segment of his soma, some area somehow
unpatterned and set vis-a-vis culture. (Mead, 1944a, p. 96)

3. Enculturation

The study of how "physical functions ... develop in a culturally
patterned way" is the study of the enculturation of a child into a culture.
Mead spends much of her effort on such enculturation studies, not so much
for their own sake, but as a means to the understanding of the general relation-
ship of personality and culture. Her studies are based on the notion of
patterns of regularity integrated into cultural wholes, the points we have
discussed above.

Students of the cultural dimension of personality can work from quite
different angles and arrive at internally consistent results because of
the complexities and internal consistencies of the material with
which they deal. The concept of culture rests upon the finding that
items of behaviour of many different orders, a gesture, a relationship
between parents and child, a method of addressing the deity, a
convention for the composition of poetry and a system of mortgaging
property may all be seen as systematic. As an analysis of any series
of these details -- as the whole range of interpersonal relations, art
forms, religious beliefs, or the methods of commercial behaviour,
is designed primarily to be a way of studying the whole, of defining
either the whole culture or the culturally regular character of a
carrier of that culture, a valid analysis of any one series makes it
possible to derive the whole from it. So it is that approaching a study
of a culture from the standpoint of the body and outlining the ways in
which different parts of the body, particularly orifices and limbs and
eyes are treated in a developing child, if carefully pursued will
produce the same type of generalization as may be obtained from a
study of the developmental history of children or from an analysis of
the pattern of interpersonal relations.... (Mead, 1946b, p. 482)
While Mead also studies the adult pattern, her forte is the study of enculturation, the enquiry into the way a child's learning of his culture is based on his biological development.

Before studying the details of her approach to enculturation, it is important to understand clearly the function of such study in Mead's work, for it is often misunderstood. To begin with, the study of enculturation is not a study of "why" this cultural character is as it is. (Mead, 1942a, p. 80) It is not a claim "that the child-rearing practices are the sole and sufficient determinants of an historical event." (Mead, 1964a, p. 171) The culture must pre-exist before we can study enculturation into it, and to understand its formation we must turn to historical, ecological, biological, economic or other factors. In studying enculturation "a description is given of the means by which children in each generation acquire the (pre-existing) character structure." (ibid., p. 171)

A second misunderstanding is also common. In studying enculturation, Mead is "making no claim for the adult pattern of behaviour, characteristic of the society, having been developed as a projection of the child's experience." *(Mead, 1949d, p. 51 of Mead, 1964b, reprint) Rather she is looking for the pattern which is equally present in both. She says, "I expect that when we get to the point of being able to specify the pattern by which the individual learns the culture and the pattern which is represented cross-sectionally in the adult you would recognize them as highly identical patterns." (Mead, 1956e, p. 201) The only difference between the learning pattern and the cross-sectional pattern is that the latter gives a "flat or static picture" while the study of enculturation, of the genesis, gives the "dynamics" of the interpsychic pattern. (Mead, 1942a, p. 80) But it is

* Thus she rejects the essence of A. Kardiner's position. This whole point will be discussed in chapter three, on the foundations of the theory, when we consider the problem of causality and explanation,
the same pattern of regularities which is searched for in the two cases, not some relationship of cause and effect between the two periods of the individual's life-history.

So, in discussing American character Mead distinguishes three questions: (a) "What are Americans?", the demand for the static pattern; (b) "How does one become an American? and the answer... will give us a picture of the changing and growing individual. ... We get a glimpse of the dynamics of the American character"; (c) "Why are Americans as they are? --- a question which looks towards a few historical causes [ e.g., ] ... immigration... wide frontier, unpatterned landscape...". (ibid., p. 80-81)

Enculturation studies answer the second question only.

The study of enculturation is at the core of Mead's approach to Culture and Personality. It is here that methods and theories of anthropology and of psychology meet in a mutually profitable enterprise. From the anthropologist's point of view, which we will adopt here, this enterprise can be seen as the assimilation of certain key concepts, approaches and findings of psychology, and their application in the cultural field. I will discuss six of the more important themes from Mead's work, more as illustrations than as an (impossible) attempt at a summary.

(a) The notion of Personality itself comes from psychology, but is adapted to the culturologist's approach. (b) Learning Theories are at the very core of the process of enculturation. (c) The Gessel-Plg approach comes from the study of child development; (d) Prefiguration and (e) Identification come from Freudian and Neo-Freudian theories. Finally, I will touch on the (f) Sanctions, which, formed in childhood, control adult behaviour.

(a) Personality

"By personality I [Mead] shall mean the total pattern of an individual's behaviour which may be referred to his constitution-temperament,
the culture or cultures in which he has been reared and has lived, and his particular series of life experiences." (Mead, 1956b, p. 209)

"The word character is used to refer to those aspects of personality which an individual with a given constitution-temperament exposed to an idiosyncratic series of situations within a given culture, develops in the course of his interactions with other individuals who make up his environment. Each human individual develops a unique character, a large component of which can be referred to the cultures within which he is reared --- this shared set of regularities I shall call cultural character." (ibid., p. 215) (as we have already seen above p. 26).

It would be a mistake, however, to suggest that some components of character are completely independent of culture and are purely individual, for the area and range of individuality and of individual experience are themselves, on a more abstract level, culturally patterned. (Mead, 1944a, p. 97)

Perhaps the simplest illustration may be found in the way in which men and women do their hair in present day [1946] America, the men with a high degree of uniformity, the women with greater emphasis on conformity to rapidly changing fashions and distinctiveness within the fashion. Looking at a mixed group, the men's appearance is much more uniform than the women's. Each type of behavior is to be referred to the culture, but in the case of the women the culture has institutionalized a degree of individuality. (Mead, 1946b, p. 479)

Once this all-embracing aspect of culture is understood, we can avoid the tendency to see the cultural norm as "natural" to man, a tendency due to the interest of therapists in tracing only abnormalities to the previous life-history negative" this means that the patient's life-history has followed the cultural norm, certainly not that his history has had no influence on his personality! (Mead, 1947d, p. 67) Positive attempts to improve the mental health of a culture require that this ethnocentric view be depassed so that improvements may be made in the norm itself. (Mead, 1953d, p. 432-440)
(b) Learning Theory

Early attempts to understand how the individual accepted the cultural norm simply spoke of "imitation"; the mechanism of such learning was not studied. Even in 1964, Mead cannot discuss the direct learning of patterns or gestalts for lack of research data, (Mead, 1964a, p. xvii) although it may be one of the most important forms of cultural learning. (ibid., p. 137) In practice, anthropology relies on analysis of specific behavioural interactions. "From learning theory comes the emphasis on detail, on stimulus-response sequences, on types of reinforcement, so that the whole process of embodying a culture is dissected into interactive sequences in which cues are exchanged between the growing child and others in his society." (Mead, 1953a, p. 38) Such theories, however, must be integrated into both the child's structural development for which psychoanalysis provides the framework, and into the pattern of the culture itself. Thus reflex and conditioned learning, learning by reward and punishment, passive learning (cf. Bali, see below p. 113) (Mead, 1964a, p. 69) and freudian introjection (identification) learning (Mead, 1953a, p. 38) are all admitted as possibly useful conceptual devices but only if they are replaced in the pattern of the cultural whole to allow for correct interpretation, for such types of learning are themselves subject to institutionalization. (Mead, 1964a, p. 54) Thus, in Bali, the exposure of the children to a series of broken emotional climaxes (see below p. 123) cannot be analyzed out of the Balinese context. The child is not "taught" to avoid climaxes by operant conditioning. "Its is more accurate to say that from these sequences in which mothers repeat the games of which they were once the victims and which they have seen a thousand times the children learn what the mothers already know; at no point is there any teaching or disciplining in which punishing or rewarding sequences are purposefully introduced." (Mead, 1964a, p. 127) That is, learning behaviour, like all behaviour, is part of the cultural configuration and cannot be treated
as a separable trait having a meaning within itself.

(c) The Gesell-IIg Approach

In the same way, Mead takes the findings of child development students and adapts them to the cross-cultural context. Gesell and IIg, working with American children developed a theory of "spiral development" from which Mead accepts three concepts:

"A rhythm of growth with a definite sequence which can be distorted or bypassed, but not hurried; a concept of growth as proceeding from periods of consolidation to periods of expansion to new consolidation, so that different points on the spiral will have a different quality (in ability to adjust, vulnerability to external pressures, accidents, etc.); and a concept of patterned individual differences expressed in differing emphasis on different phases of the growth process." (Mead, 1947e, p. 57 of Mead, 1964b, reprint)

Cultures, in a fashion reminiscent of the Selection Theory, emphasize certain periods of the spiral and bypass others. So, the Balinese almost eliminate the creeping phase and encourage the child to walk early resulting in "frequent experience of overextension and loss of balance; and loss of balance is a preoccupation of Balinese throughout their lives..." (ibid., p. 58) That is, the maturational sequence occurs in any case but effect on personality is different if, in teaching a child a new skill, say, it is done when he is trying to consolidate or when he is in an extension stage. "... The degree of discrepancy or of correspondence will be registered at a deutero level and become a factor in later development." (ibid., p. 58) Mead considers this approach to personality development more systematic (and complicated) than any "tabula rasa" theory which ignores the "natural" maturational sequence of the organism. (ibid., p. 58)
(d) Prefiguration in the Body

"The child learns to relate itself to other people and to the world around him through the use of its body, in a successive series of adaptations appropriate for different stages of growth." (Mead, 1953a, p. 37) Freud's zonal analysis of development is supplemented by Erickson who adds "modes" such as inception, retention, production, which, although each is primarily linked with a particular zone, are applicable to all zones to some extent. (Mead, 1956b, p. 226. Cf. Erickson, *Childhood and Society*) (Mead's work in Bali suggests that limbs, skin, and total body movement must be added to the oral, anal, genital, zonal structure; this is an example of feedback from anthropology into the psychological theory as a result of attempts to adapt it to cross-cultural work. (Mead, 1951a, p. 197) These stages are, of course, patterned and selected for emphasis by each culture. The childhood experiences which result are the "prototype" (Mead, 1949d, p. 50 of Mead, 1964b, reprint) or "prefigurations" (Mead, 1949c, p. 68 of Mead, 1964b, reprint) of adult experiences into which they must be "transformed". "Civilization depends on such an orderly transformation of the primary experiences of childhood into the disciplined symbolism of adult life ...". (Mead, 1949b, p. 73)

For example, the mode of elimination has a reciprocal structure in which the food given to a child is repaid in defecation. Emphasis on elimination, then, is likely to correlate with an adult emphasis on the exchange of commodities, of physical objects, of finances, and even personal relationships will be interpreted in such terms. (ibid., p. 78) American and Manus cultures show such a pattern. Among the Manus, all of life, even friendship, is read as "exchange" (kawas) (Mead, 1930a, p. 66) and is characterized by "prudery, the equation of the sex act with excretion, the close tie between women and property, the pivoting of all economic arrangements on marriage so that adultery is always a threat
against the economic system...." (Mead, 1949b, p. 101)

Emphasis on the feeding nurturing role of the parent before the
helplessness of the child, however, is complementary. The Arapesh have
such a strong oral emphasis, often playing with their mouths and lips
and the culture places little emphasis on elimination training. Handling
is assimilated to the grasping possibilities of the mouth, i.e., to receptivity
rather than initiative. Eyes are passive rather than probing; (ibid.,
p. 150) Arapesh have low curiosity and practically no control over the
world of objects. (ibid., p. 150) Hunting is read as waiting for game
to appear. Sex is seen as passive and receptive nurturing and maternal,
a model easy for the woman to adopt, but difficult for the men. (ibid., p.
79) A special taboo against oral-genital association is needed to maintain
the transformation of such a strong oral complementary pattern into an
adult sex life. (Mead, 1935a, p. 62)

Again, this must not be interpreted in terms of one way sequences.

"The simple act or special treatment accorded the child at one
period - at teething, weening, or learning sphincter control -
does not stand alone to dramatize or provide some lifelong
obsessional pattern. Adult and older children, within whose
personality the culturally distinctive learning sequence has been
integrated, are able to impart simultaneously the place of the
present bit of learning in a longer sequence, that which the child
has already experienced and the part which is to come.... As
soon as the child is able to assimilate the behavior of those around
him, he sees older children living out the next steps in his own
emerging life pattern, sees the dying and the dead completing it.
On the other hand, he sees the child at the mother's breast
suckled, soothed, or scolded in the same words which were so
recently used to him... This simultaneity of impact is carried
out not only by the behavior of each individual with whom the
child comes in contact, but is also mediated by ritual, drama,
and the arts. The shape of a pot, the design on a temple door,
the pattern of the courtyard, the form of the bed, the graveposts
or the funeral urn, the dancer's headdress and the clown's mask,
are again reinforcements and whole statements of the same pattern which the child himself is experiencing serially." (Mead, 1947c, Fried reprint pp. 516-517)

A personality lives in a cultural pattern throughout his whole life continually exposed to all the other aspects and versions of the culture, reenacting his own earlier and later roles vicariously and reinforcing others. Again the whole culture is emphasized and Mead insists that "the model situation on which the anthropological concept of culture is based is that of the total learned, shared behavior of a functionally autonomous society that has maintained its existence through a sufficient number of generations so that each stage of the life span of an individual is included within the system." (Mead, 1953a, p. 22)

In a homogeneous society, then, whatever conflicts may be generated in the early life of the child will be provided with a cultural mode of symbolic expression in adulthood as the same patterns are repeated unendingly in many different ways. Thus, although Balinese childhood is very conflictual so that adult Balinese are indistinguishable on tests from Western schizophrenics, (Mead, 1956d, p. 177) yet due to the mass of extremely rich symbolic art forms available to him the individual Balinese seems quite happy and the society functions well. (ibid., p. 177)

Mead speaks of a "veil" which limits access to original childhood experiences allowing a transformation which permits adult experience to retain its real as well as symbolic value. "Those who have not succeeded in making these transformations go mad..." (Mead, 1949b, p. 73)

(e) Identification

Identification, says Mead is "the way in which one individual identifies himself so strongly with another personality, ... that he makes
the choices, the attitudes of that personality his own." (Mead, 1930a, p. 174) Identification may be with an individual, real or imagined or with a group stereotype. It appears to be a learning device which enables the subject to acquire a relatively complete pattern of preintegrated behaviour en bloc.

A child must primarily identify himself with a human being. (Mead, 1958b, p. 20) Since, as we have seen, humanity is fundamentally cultural, this primary identification is mixed with identification with a culture. Identification with one's cultural group, the adoption of certain of their symbolic identifying behaviours (dress, language, special foods, particular religion) is a universal phenomenon often accompanied by an exclusion of those who act otherwise as non-human. (Benedict, 1940a, p. 100) Those not of the tribe may be treated as animals. (Benedict, 1939b, p. 372 of Mead, 1959a, reprint) subject to being headhunted, raped or eaten. For example, Manus law and morality are good only within the culture and have no effect and no sanctions outside the community*. (Mead, 1956a, p. 319) hence, despite a strongly puritanical sex ethic within the tribe, captured women might be raped to death. "Their spirits forbade lovemaking directed towards Manus girls, but like most gods, they were not interested in the women of the enemy." (Mead, 1930a, p. 147) Evolutionary advances, however, include "man's developing ability to include in his own group ever more people living at a greater distance." (Mead, 1964a, p. 322)

Within a culture, a person may identify with a particular caste, group, or age level with accompanying learning of the relevant version of the culture. Sex group identification is usually the most important. (Mead, 1949b, p. 139) This occurs in many ways. In Bali, the child becomes aware of his sex by having his genitals continually handled by adults remarking explicitly on his sex - and this from a very early age. (see below p.121) Simple invectives to "act as a boy" or "as a girl", a taboo separating boys and girls and in Samoa and elsewhere, even the terms of address in the

* Surprisingly, "Manus natives abroad preserve a strong respect for property...". (Mead, 1933a, p. 14)
language and the modes of dress imposed all contribute to such identification. It is through this identification that the regularities of behavior distributed by the culture to its men and women are learned. Occasionally, where sex group membership is identified rigidly with certain behavior types, those whose sex groups and temperaments do not match as culturally dictated, may misidentify with the wrong sex and become homosexuals (or at least doubt their maleness or femaleness) although there may be no evidence of biological inversion. Thus in American society where, for historical reasons, an artistic temperament has been associated with women, a boy, if artistically inclined, may come to doubt his maleness and adopt those sexual behavioural patterns culturally associated with his temperament instead of with his biological sex. (Mead, 1935a, p. 206)

In our culture, as Freud discovered, identification with sex group is primarily a result of the resolution of the Oedipus situation. He believed this pattern to be universal and biologically given. Mead does grant that children, "experimenting with their budding sexuality... reach a crisis in their relations with adults... this is the period of development in which children who are capable of intense feeling and capacity for pleasure, but without the degree of maturity necessary for adult procreative relations, must come to terms both with their parents and with their own immaturity." (Mead, 1949b, p. 114) However this is still but a biological "hint", and the actual structure of the Oedipus development cannot be taken out of the cultural context. Whether the resolution is easy or tragic and traumatic (e.g., the European pattern [Mead, 1955a, p. 44] depends on its institutionalization. (Mead, 1949b, p. 124) "Differences in family structure will give exceedingly different forms to the ways in which small children learn to deal with their springing sexual attachments to the adults of both sexes with whom they are reared." (Mead, 1953d, p. 410) So, for example, the growing boy is both male and small. Sex distinctions may be minimized and the culture may emphasize the difference in size between child and his parents, seeing the child as inferior or equal in strength, being the promise of the future or a
threat to adults and so on. (Mead, 1949b, p. 87) Or the size differential may be ignored and sex complementarity emphasized as in traditional Japan where even a three-year-old male is superior to any female, even his mother. (Benedict, 1946a, p. 184) Similarly, the Oedipus situation can be read as one of sex rivalry, of authority contestation, or, as in America, as one of fraternity between father and son, a fraternity without rivalry. (Mead, 1942a, p. 110) The Oedipus situation then, can only be interpreted within the cultural whole for it is not just a biological step, but a stage of enculturation, a stage which itself is formed in turn by the culture.

(f) Sanctions

The patterns of behaviour learned in childhood are maintained in force by sanctions. Sanctions are "mechanisms by which conformity is obtained, by which desired behavior is induced and undesired behavior prevented." (Mead, 1937a, p. 493) Again, sanctions cannot be seen apart from their culture for sensitivity to a given sanction is itself cultural rather than natural. "The development in the growing child of a responsiveness to the peculiar sanctions of his society is the essence of character formation." (ibid., p. 493) The sanctions used by any culture are part of the cultural character structure and so must not be seen just as modes of maintaining social order; they maintain modes of behaviour within the psyche of the individual as well as between individuals. The simplest of such mechanisms is the use of force by the society on each individual who does not conform: some societies rely on such sanctions, e.g. the Iatmul of New Guinea. (ibid., p. 493; cf, Mead, 1948b) The Mundugomor rely on institutionalized hostility but this is an "uncertain ground... on which to base an ordered society. There is no genuine community, no nucleus of related males around which the society can permanently crystalize." (Mead, 1935a, p. 130) Most societies rely on some form of internal sanction. Some may rely on an internalized fear of strange ways, e.g., the Balinese, to
whom the loss of the familiar leads to sleep or sickness. (Mead, 1955a, p. 50, see below p.116) The most common sanctions, however, are shame and guilt.

Shame is fundamentally a control by the disapproval of the group. Normally it is the fear before the act of being shamed by the group which controls behaviour rather than actual disapproval afterwards. Usually, the disapproval and, therefore, the standards of the group are internalized so that the fear of shame operates even in the absence of any other member of the group. (Mead, 1948b, p. 58) Shame must somehow be wiped out, usually in institutionalized ways. (Benedict, 1934a, p. 190) Note that confession can never be used since it increases the shame instead of reducing it. (Benedict, 1946a, p. 156) Shame is particularly used among the North American Indians, (the Kwatiutl, for example,) who use the distribution or destruction of property, headhunting, or even suicide as ways of cleansing themselves. (Mead, 1950a, p. 205 of reprint in Mead, 1964b) It is also used in traditional Japan where, again, suicide may be resorted to. (Benedict, 1946a, p. 156) Pride and honor are more positive variations of shame common especially in Polynesia where they are associated with detailed etiquette and special respect language associated with status. (Mead, 1948b, p. 60)

Guilt is defined as "an internalization, or expectation of sanction under which the individual feels either anticipatively or retroactively the type of punishment which he once experienced, in which, in fact, the individual is able to inflict upon himself the suffering once inflicted by parent or parent surrogate." (ibid., p. 57) Guilt, once established, in no way requires the presence of the parent or any other member of society and may even sanction the individual behaving against the norms of the society. It is not just fear of punishment. "Guilt differs from fear in that it represents a disordered state within the psyche which can be righted only by atonement." (Mead, 1937a, p. 494)
Usually confession in some form is used to alleviate the guilt from a wrong action whether public or private, (Benedict, 1946a, p. 156) and penances are often used. Thus the Manus insist on public confession of sins to avoid the illnesses sent by the gods as punishment on the sinner's skin. (Mead, 1930a, p. 128)

We can distinguish four important factors in the development of sanctions.

(a). The extent to which the parents or emotionally close, highly identified individuals interpret a sanction to a child, whether that be the guilt-producing sanction of "I, the parent, will punish you, or reward you," or the "people will applaud or admire you" of pride, and this participation of parent or parent surrogate seems to determine the degree to which the internalization occurs, a limited number of figures with whom one has close ties appearing to provide the conditions for incorporation; ["focusing"]
(b). the type of behavior expected, e.g., whether it is predominantly approval, praise, and reward or disapproval, blame, or punishment;
(c) the individual or group to whom principal reference is made, parents, age mates, specific levels, or the whole of society, or their various supernatural or symbolic surrogates, God, angels, the spirits, the village;
and (d). the type of valuation placed on the individual or group to which behavior is referred, as superior, inferior, loved, feared, etc.,
(Mead, 1950a, p. 206-207 of reprint in Mead, 1964b)

Note, for factor (b), that although our language distinguishes negative "shame" from positive "pride", we lack a positive word for "good guilt" and so often see the guilt type sanction as all negative. In the case of guilt development, a final factor may be added in that so far as the parents emphasized the form of obedience, such training leaves the individual open to an authoritarian influence (e.g., "Prussian character"); where they emphasize the matter, the particular behaviour, as wrong, the child develops an individualistic "democratic" character and will do what he believes is absolutely right in itself regardless of authority, (Mead, 1948b, p. 57-64) (19th century
American Puritanism).

In fact, of course, most cultures combine guilt, shame, and other sanctions within their systems of social control. So police may be used to control those in a guilt culture whose internal sanctions are deficient; or in Japan, guilt itself may be used to sanction shame since the parents may reject children who shame the family, (ibid., p. 61 and Benedict, 1946a, p. 192); again, the elimination of guilt by confession may be hindered by shame, as in Manus (Mead, 1930a, p. 143) The relationship and articulation of the many possible sanctions as well as the very attitude and interpretation of them and their means of development vary, of course, with each culture and there is no question of a constant "experience" called guilt which occurs in each of the guilt-cultures. For example, where the Westerner feels guilt in his body as dirtiness or soilage, the Arapesh feels it as having "eaten something bad" (Mead, 1947a, p. 362) and his response is bloodletting to let out the poison (Mead, 1940a, p. 419) rather than an attempt at cleansing. The cultural control can never be ignored.

Summary

So we see that in analyzing the relationship between culture and personality, especially the dynamics of the cultural character structure, Mead turns to the study of enculturation, using as tools a number of different psychological approaches. Psychological concepts, however, cannot be applied in a simply objective manner, but must always be treated as subject to interpretation, elaboration or attempted suppression within the cultural whole. The anthropological orientation is not neglected.
4. Abstraction

The use of psychological theory in the study of enculturation is based largely on that prototype of anthropological research, the simple, homogeneous, very slowly changing culture. The Second World War led both Benedict and Mead to apply their theories to the study of "national character" with a view to practical applications in the hot and, later, cold war. This led to the study of modern, complex, heterogeneous and rapidly changing cultures. We have seen how, faced with heterogeneous cultures, the notion of abstract regularity was developed to avoid breaking the unified integration of the whole culture. The study of cultural change, however, also contributed to a more abstract notion of pattern, as we will now see.

Cultural change by diffusion or borrowing requires that a trait be separated from one cultural pattern to allow its inheritance in another. Otherwise, individuals in the borrowing culture would have to accept the total pattern of the culture from which the trait was diffused and so loose their own culture. As an extreme example, the Siriano of Eastern Bolivia appear to have great difficulty in separating traits from their cultural whole and feel acquired to take flight physically from all contact with European culture in order to preserve their self-identification. (Mead, 1964a, p. 52)

More usually, however, specific behaviour patterns are "separated", "detached" or "abstracted" from the full range of cultural behaviour and may be given or sold to, borrowed or stolen by another culture, without the complete collapse of either cultural system. "Without some degree of abstraction, through the separation of the behaviour form from identifiable human actors, the behaviour cannot be consciously transmitted." (Mead, 1964a, p. 49) Thus the diffusion of a "trait" such as a dance, a language, a technique, or even a physical artifact requires a fragmentation of this trait from the global cultural configuration. Unlike the situation among the Siriano, we find among the tribes of the Sepik River in New Guinea a
veritable economy built on the buying and selling of cultural traits ranging from dress fashions to rituals and skills to marriage organizations. (Mead, 1938a) Similarly, conscious teaching requires that the behaviour taught be separable from its integration into the personality of the teacher so that the learner may adopt behaviour without becoming the teacher, i.e., without identifying with his whole personality. This separation appears linked with the process of conceptualization or becoming aware or conscious of the trait, but the relationship is left obscure. (Mead, 1964a, p. 128) In the case of a country with multi-cultural immigrants such as the United States, this separation or fragmentation of traits from patterns is taken to an extreme. Each cultural group has a set of behaviour patterns incomprehensible to the others and to allow communication, explicit behaviour sequences, e.g., speech, must be taken out of the cultural whole from which they came. The result is an extreme simplification of behavioural patterns, a result which is also found among domesticated animals when compared with their wild analogues (Mead, 1956e, p. 227). Since the actual behaviours adopted come from different patterns, "virtually all coherence vanishes" (Mead, 1949c, p. 74 of reprint in Mead 1964b) and the growing child must learn to see "each situation as a single unit", rather than to expect the same pattern in every life situation as in an homogeneous culture. That is, he develops a "situational character". (ibid., p. 75) Mead also refers to this fragmentation as "compartimentalization", "rationalization", (Mead, 1964a, p. 132-133) or "atomization". (Mead, 1947c, p. 76 of reprint)

Since this process separates each adult act from the total cultural and personal background, it makes each behaviour more realistic and less symbolic. Thus, after discussing the role of cultural symbolism in nutritional research, Mead can compare "the symbolic importance of food during early childhood and the advisability of looking forward to a rationalization of consumption..." (Mead, 1950b, p. 190 of reprint in Mead 1964b) The loss of symbolic values, however, may lead to the elimination of forms needed
by certain individuals, groups, or the whole society for the resolution and control of conflict originating in early childhood. (Mead, 1953c, p. 216 of reprint in Mead, 1964b)
The result may be an increase in neuroses, psychoses and violence as the conflict is acted out in reality (or in the body, by psychosomatic complaints (Mead, 1947d, p. 72) instead of symbolically.)

"From this point of view it is not necessary to assume that a participant in a lynching or a pogrom has more murderous impulses than members of religious groups have whose closest approach to ritual killing is participation in a ceremonial blood meal in which the blood is not blood but some surrogate. The only difference may be that in one society the rituals for the symbolic expression of the regularly engendered conflicts are present, and in the other they are not." (Mead, 1950a, p. 202 of reprint in Mead, 1964b)

Since it is the pattern which gives meaning to a behavioural trait, this fragmentation also leads to lack of meaning:

the perception of the outer world becomes atomized, as the growing child is no longer presented with a coherent set of culturally interrelated experiences to guide his perception. Relationships disappear and experience is broken down into small, discrete bits which may be given temporary meaning in any one of a thousand patterns but lack coherent relationship to any one pattern. It is as if a child were taught to perceive a human skeleton, not as a single system of functionally relevant, articulated, non-interchangeable units, but instead as composed of two hundred-odd irregular and comparably meaningless bits - as if, in fact, a picture of a skeleton had been reduced to a jigsaw puzzle, each bit of which might also fit into a hundred other designs.

Such an atomization of external reality is, of course, not in itself incompatible with an integrated culture, provided the character formation of the individuals is such that there is a genuine relationship between the series of temporary patterns imposed upon the aggregation of bits, [as, for example, in Bali]. (Mead, 1949c, p. 76 of reprint in Mead, 1964b)
So just as for regularity, the wholeness of the pattern can continue to exist, as a higher order pattern, after its apparent fragmentation into bits; a more abstract regularity is called upon to integrate the pieces broken from the lower order pattern. Wholeness is to be achieved by going forward not backwards. If, as I suggested above, (see above p. 53) fragmentation is linked with the process of becoming more conscious of specific traits in a realistic way, we can see ratiomization as dating back to the rise of science.

Our contention is that man has already lost the particular form of innocence that was possible in a pre-scientific age, and that now, his innocence shattered, he must go forward still further or accept the penalties of either an ostrich-like sentimentality or cynicism in which power and immediate satisfaction are alternate solutions. We believe that it is possible to attain innocence, that is, a new wholeness in which Christ’s admonition, "Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth" can again mean wholeness and integration, but on another level. (Mead, 1949b, p. 376)
CHAPTER III

ANTHROPOLOGY: ITS NATURE AND METHOD

Introduction

We have seen, in very brief form, the results of the anthropological fieldwork of Benedict and Mead and the conceptualization of their results within the theoretical framework of Culture and Personality*. But our two authors not only do anthropology, they also think about it. Normally such a metastudy is integrated with their actual work and theory, but for the purposes of this thesis, we will separate this more reflective level of their thought from the rest of their writing. This chapter is concerned, then, with Benedict’s and Mead’s ideas on (1) the nature of anthropology as a science, (2) its methods of research, and on (3) three foundational problems: (A) causality; (B) the impartiality of the observer; (C) the abstracting of the pattern.

1. The Nature of Anthropology as a Science

When an anthropologist enters the village of a primitive people "he wants only to understand them and by understanding them to add to our knowledge of the limitations and the potentialities of human beings... He does not want to improve them, convert them, govern them, trade with them, recruit them or heal them... [but only] to observe and understand individuals as revealing their culture." (Mead, 1949b, p. 57) That is, anthropology

* It should be noted that Benedict and Mead usually use the term "Anthropology" as if it were synonymous with their version of the "Culture and Personality" sub-discipline. I have been using, and will continue to use, both terms as interchangeable unless otherwise noted.
claims a place in the Western tradition of theoria, of "contemplation", of the disinterested seeking of knowledge for its own sake.

Within this tradition, anthropology insists on a certain autonomy, a right not to be "reduced" to another science. Benedict claims, "biology does not deny chemistry, though chemistry is inadequate to explain biological phenomenon. Nor is biology obliged to work according to chemical formulae because it recognizes that the laws of chemistry underlie the facts it analyzes." (1934a, p. 206) So, in the same way, anthropology neither denies, nor is reduceable to, biology, physiology, neurology or even psychology.

Despite the traditional disinterestedness and autonomy of the western sciences, scientists have invariably been interested in the practical application of their results once discovered. Mead discusses both the efficacy and the ethics of such application. Since the results of social science research are themselves elements of the cultural tradition and will be accepted, rejected or reinterpreted in terms of that tradition, the social scientist must take as much account of the culture to which he presents his results, as of the objective results themselves, if he wishes them to be accepted and effective. (Mead, 1951a, chapter 1) Mead gives many examples of how results from anthropology, psychology, education research and especially child development, over the last 50 years, have been fragmented, taken out of context, accepted as panaceas ("scientific magic" (Mead, 1964a, p. 270) or rejected as un congenial by clinicians, pediatricians, teachers, and parents, often with much more harm than good. She considers that because these results are presented as rules rather than as new artifacts or as new inventions in social organization, the social sciences have so far had little good effect on human society. (Mead, 1964a, p. 293) What is needed is an institutionalized method of allowing scientific findings to enter the cultural life. Such an institution would have to take account of the ethical problem of not presenting to a society those unconscious, disallowed traits which could not be handled
by the cultural defences. (Mead, 1949b, p. 389) Mead herself, therefore, tries to phrase her insights in terms acceptable to the members of the cultures involved, both for ethical reasons and for efficacy. (Mead, 1959a, p. xx)

As a science, anthropology must maintain a strict impartiality with respect to the relative values of different cultures, especially the anthropologist's own. "Any scientific study requires that there be no preferential weighing of one or another of the items in the series it selects for its consideration." (Benedict, 1934a, p. 18) Since according to the selection theory (see above page 19) each culture actualizes only a part of the human spectrum of potentialities, Benedict preaches this cultural relativity not only as an indispensable methodological position for anthropologists, but as a humanistic approach for all. Cultures "are traveling along different roads in pursuit of different ends, and these ends and these means in one society cannot be judged in terms of those of another society, because essentially they are incommeasurable". (ibid., p. 196)

But such relativity, she claims, "carries with it its own values, which need not be those of the absolutist philosopher." (ibid., p. 239) She does not hesitate to judge cultures as to the price in human happiness and in the development of human potentialities which they involve and indeed conceives her life work as aiding man in the control of his own society for his own betterment.

"Beyond relativity ... a major goal of social science is to discover the ways and means of social cohesion - the scientific study of aspects of society which do correlate with social cohesion and so with minimizing individual aggression and frustration. (Benedict, 1941a, p. 385 of reprint in Mead, 1959a) This often remarked clash (see, for example, Williams, "Anthropology for the Common Man" or Nadel, "Typological Approach to Culture", especially p. 272) between an absolute relativity and a practical pragmatism reappears in Mead's work where the conflict is resolved as follows.

Each particular trait of a culture must be morally judged only after interpretation
within the total configuration of the culture and so there are no particular moral absolutes outside of a cultural context. (Mead, 1942e, p. 93 of reprint in Mead, 1964b) However, the culture as a whole may be judged on some other, pragmatic, basis, such as its fitness or adaptiveness to evolutionary development. (Mead, 1949b, p. 215)

2. Method

Benedict's and Mead's theoretical emphasis on the unique individuality of each culture ("particularism" as M. Harris calls it (The Rise of Anthropological Theory, chapters 9 and 11) is paralleled by their field method. Their research is oriented structurally rather than quantitatively, (Mead, 1955c, p. 7) and tries to uncover the basic patterns of regularity rather than the statistical distribution of traits. "After such a [structural] study had been made, carefully controlled statistical samples of the incidence of certain attitudes, as well as an analysis of the patterns of behaviour in their different structural positions would be necessary." (Mead, 1954a, p. viii) But, "in trying to understand another country, systematic qualitative study of the habits and assumptions of its people is essential before a poll can serve to good advantage." (Benedict, 1946a, p. 13) Statistics cannot even be interpreted until the patterns involved are understood, and sociology's reliance on such statistics in Western cultures is only possible because the researchers, sharing the cultures, already work within the pattern. Particular problems of a sociological, economic, political, or even a psychological nature may be usefully phrased statistically only after the basic inquiry; "without these basic studies, however, the precise investigations are meaningless." (Mead, 1946c, p. 676) In fact, Mead never proceeds to the second, quantitative, phase of this research but is satisfied to uncover the basic patterns by reliance on informants and direct observation.
Anthropology, then, is not a statistical science but a clinical science; (Mead, 1932a, p. xix) that is, it is "based on an intensive analysis of large numbers of observations on limited numbers of persons, documents or events, in which the exact temporal, spatial and social position of each person, document, or event [is] carefully specified." (Mead, 1955a, p. 15) (In this point it is like history where one good document may authenticate an event and statistical correlations of large numbers of documents are usually secondary. (Mead, 1951f, p. 157 of reprint in Mead, 1964b) Three points of this characterization should be noted:

(a) Unlike experimental sciences, a clinical science is based on observation rather than control.

The study of culture is primarily an observational science which relies upon the necessary conditions having already been created by history. Students take the trouble to journey to a strange society, learn the language, and study the culture in detail in order to benefit from the natural situations which occur there because cultures have been historically differentiated. Experiments tend to force our frame of reference upon the individuals of these other cultures, ... just as maze experiments force our theories of learning on the rat. There is an essential contradiction between the experiment which relies upon the competence with which the experimenter imposes his conditions and the method of observation in which the observer finds his answer the more completely he leaves the conditions unaltered." (Mead, 1946b, p. 484)

(b) Yet a different kind of control is present. Mead admits that the particular selection of informants and interpreters and of particular observations made are due mostly to chance, but nonetheless, the anthropologist "controls -

While this position is constant in Mead's works, her phraseology is not and she often assimilates anthropological observation to experimentation. "In the human sciences, ... experimentation is very difficult, so that we have to allow history to provide us with experiments [and] we progress by locating the natural experiments, studying them, and from the understanding so learned, construct the theory..." (Mead, 1956a, p. 105; cf.: Benedict, 1934a, p. 29; Mead, 1928a, p. 157; 1930a, p. 211; 1942a, p. 237-239.
by knowledge instead of by initial specification - the role which age, sex, temperament, I. Q. and past experience play." (Mead, 1955c, p. 4) He cannot control by action the condition of his experiment, nor the randomness of his sample, but by knowledge of the exact position of the informant in his culture and of his personality, the anthropologist can correct the idiosyncratic version of the culture he has obtained and allow for its limitations. This approach presupposes, of course, that every member of a culture is "representative" (Honnigmann, Personality in Culture, p. 98) of his culture, that the main pattern of the whole culture can be abstracted from the study of any personality in it. (Mead, 1956b, p. 207)

(c) Finally, Mead refers to an "intensive" analysis (page 60 above). Informants are studied not as sources of information about cultural custom (which could be more efficiently discovered otherwise) but rather as examples of functioning models of the culture in which the dynamic psychic interrelationships of the pattern may be found. Hence an informant is studied for his character structure rather than to obtain information, (Mead, 1953a, p. 45-48) which again differentiates the anthropological from the statistical approach. Since, in this type of study, chains of association, exact phraseology and even tone of voice and exact gesture are important - as they are for the clinician - Mead considers verbatim recording by electric and photographic means as very important and has pioneered its use. Such non-interpreted recording captures the data on which future theorists or contemporaries with different theoretical frameworks than the original field worker may build or with which they may cross-check their hypothesis, a possibility not open in experimental work where data considered extraneous by the current theory is specifically eliminated. (Mead, 1932a, p. xii) Her own records of her sessions with a single Arapesh informants, Unabelin, published as an example, run to 105 pages of small print. (Mead, 1949a) (Such material, like the results of projection tests, are very useful for interdisciplinary communication for Mead considers that two theoretical approaches can learn most from
each other if they study together the same shared concrete material.)

Detailed field work is the foundation of any Culture and Personality study. An anthropologist enters a culture not just as a tourist but to suffer a type of self-enculturation, (Mead, 1953a, p. 19) "to put on" the native culture. (Mead, 1949b, p. 47 & 61) His case is somewhat akin to that of the enculturation of a child or an adult immigrant, except that the anthropologist must maintain, as we have seen (above, page 60), his observational "distance", his orientation towards understanding. (Mead, 1949b, p. 46) Mead's method is to try and observe and record everything until she spots a regularity. Once the regularity is established, she records and investigates only apparent exceptions to it. (Mead, 1940a, p. 329; and Mead, 1949b, p. 392) The result is a knowledge of the articulation and variation of the regularities of the culture but is definitely not a knowledge of the statistical distribution of the regularities. (Mead, 1961b, p. 332 of reprint in Mead, 1964a)

Nor is such a result in any way an inductive "proof" of any hypothesis, since it is precisely the vast mass of positive data which is not recorded. The anthropologist can suggest hypotheses which may later be "tested in the laboratory under more controlled conditions"; (Mead, 1940a, p. 329) he can criticize theories developed in the laboratories of a particular culture as to their cross-cultural validity and their generalized interpretation; (Mead, 1930a, p. 212-215) but he does not prove theories. (Mead, 1942d, p. 195 of reprint in Mead, 1964b)

As the physician and the psychiatrist have found it necessary to describe each case separately and to use their cases as illumination of their thesis rather than as irrefutable proof such as it is possible to adduce in the physical sciences, so the student of the more intangible and psychological aspects of human behaviour is forced to illuminate rather than demonstrate a thesis. (Mead, 1928a, p. 207 of Appendix 2, on Method)
3. Foundations

Since the physical or natural sciences have been for centuries the prototypes for positive empirical science, "social science", as a late arrival, cannot avoid defining itself in reference to these prototypes. Some social scientists attempt to make the social sciences "scientific" by rigidly imposing onto them those structures which have been so successful for natural science. Others, such as Mead, consider that the social sciences must find their own way, in obedience to their special subject matter, (Mead, 1942a, p. 182) while still maintaining a "scientific" status."

"Human scientists have destroyed the delicacy and intricacy of their subject matter is coarse-grained attempts to imitate the experimental methods of Newtonian physics instead of developing new methods of including unanalyzable components in situations or in developing new methods of validating the analysis of unique and complex historical events." (Mead, 1965c, p. 139)

Such new methods must ultimately come to grips with certain basic concepts which differentiate social or human science from physical, natural sciences. I will organize our authors' thoughts on this differentiation around three complexes of problems: firstly, the notion of causality, to which explanation, prediction, control, determinism and so on are attached; secondly, the type of impartiality or objectivity demanded of the anthropologist; finally, the foundation for the order the anthropologist finds, the problem of how a pattern is abstracted and justified.

(a) Causality

(i) Particularism and Nomology

Anthropology began as the science of history. Inspired by the triumphs of the scientific methods in the physical and organic domains, nineteenth
century anthropologists believed that sociocultural phenomena were
governed by discoverable lawful principles... [In the twentieth
century and on into the 1940's, especially in the United States,]
delighting in diversity of patterns, anthropologists sought out divergent
and incomparable events. They stressed the inner, subjective mean-
ing of experience to the exclusion of objective effects and relations.
They denied historical determinism in general. ... Anthropology
came to increasingly concern itself with idiographic phenomena, that
is the study of the unique and the non-repetitive aspects of history.
(Harris, Rise of Anthropological Theory, p. 1-2)

Anthropologists turned to "particularism" rather than to "nomology".
Theorists with a Functionalist bent tend to see each trait as a part of a
synchronic pattern and ignore questions of historical diachronic causes.
Causal explanation, however, presupposes the possibility of the isolation
or fragmentation from the whole of specific causal factors which are deter-
ministic in their effect, that is, which can be generalized for application to
other comparable situations by their formulation into laws. Where do
Benedict and Mead stand with respect to this option between particularism
and nomology?

In the nomological approach,

a series of "cultures" may be analyzed into an abstraction which may
conveniently applied to any one of them. When, however, a culture
is regarded as a unique whole, ... then it may be analyzed into
units which are primarily relevant to that particular whole, and are
not cross-cultural abstractions, but specific cultural holistic units.
This approach is best represented by the work of Ruth Benedict, and
some of Dorothy Lee's papers. My own [Mead's] work ... falls
somewhat between the two approaches, using cross-cultural abstrac-
tions based upon the development process, but also invoking a number
of holistic units specifically referred to the particular culture under
description, or ... to the cultural area under discussion. (Mead,
1944a, p. 93-94)
Mead never seems to choose between these two approaches. She differentiates between, on the one hand,

"Some anthropologists [ who ] have preferred to work on the assumption that there are a limited number of variables which ... will one day underlie a body of theory about human behaviour as a developing science of human behaviour makes it increasingly possible to refer patterns of culture to regularity in human growth and development and to the functioning of the human nervous system"

and on the other hand,

"other anthropologists, like Ruth Benedict and Alfred Kroeber, [ who ] have been struck by the great variety of cultural forms and are inclined to impute a kind of open-ended regularity that would never result in an analog of the periodic table." (Mead, 1953a, p. 15)

Mead seems to decide against the first option when she claims that "natural scientists have elaborated their hierarchial views of 'true' science into an inability to understand the nature of the sciences of human behaviour, welcoming studies of fragmented aspects of human behaviour, or an inappropriate reduction in the number of variables." (Mead, 1965c, p. 138)

Less dogmatically she says that "cross-cultural studies can be used to isolate universals, but such isolation is not the aim of studies of natural character; they are more appropriately pursued under less complex conditions [ which probably means in the laboratory ]." (Mead, 1954b, p. 400) Yet, as late as 1968, closing a symposium on personality, she says:

I think all the way through this discussion I have sensed a tension that has been recurrent between those who want to do justice to the unique, whether it is the unique human person or the unique culture, and those who want to generalize and universalize in a variety of ways. Perhaps this attention to uniqueness, which is important, is one reason why thinking in the social sciences... goes round and round, and is, on the whole, so extraordinarily non-cumulative. (Mead, 1968a, p. 378)
In an attempt to clarify this approach let us see what Mead actually
does in the case of three particular problems: A. enculturation, B. predic-
tion and C. correlation.

A. Enculturation, as we have seen in some detail, (above page 39-51)
is not a simple acceptance of the whole culture, but a detailed interaction
of the child and the rest of society which can be analyzed in terms of precise
psychological, generalizable, laws. Yet in each case we saw that the cultural
factor was very important so that even simple reinforcement by reward
required that the culture read the event as a reward and that it emphasize, or
at least accept, this type of learning. (see above p. 41)

B. Prediction is required for the application of anthropological results.
Mead considers that prediction from patterns of regularities is possible for
groups, though not for individuals (Mead, 1953a, p. 397) and is best for
larger groups, for as the groups get smaller, we arrive at a "cut-off" level
of effective prediction." (Mead, 1964a, p. 195) Some prediction of one part
of a pattern from another part which has been found is possible, (Mead, 1950b,
p. 179 of reprint in Mead, 1964b) but specific events are more difficult. "The
sciences of human behaviour must take into account the complexity which
results from historical accident, and recognize that while they can predict the range
within which human beings will respond, they cannot predict the particular
responses." (Mead, 1955b, p. 271) "The success or failure, the shape of any
one of man's ventures within time, is subject always to such combinations of
sequences, each of which is only partially known and partially predictable." (Mead, 1956a, p. 105) So, from the character of the Manus in 1929 Mead
saw that they were predisposed to the American way or life, but their
acculturation toward this way of life by 1953 was dependent on the passage
of one million Americans through Manus in World War II. (ibid., p. 212)
This was an "accident" and could not have been predicted from the regularities
of Manus life.
Perhaps the important point here is that prediction is attempted not on the basis of general laws, but on the basis of culturally particular laws, of the specific regularity of the pattern. Cultures could then be seen as individual functioning systems which relate input to output in unique ways so that no general law can give the effect of a given cause. We would expect, however, a higher order of laws which would explain the functioning of such systems in general.

C. Correlations are used within the causal approach when two or more elements are found to be associated casually but the exact nature of the link is unknown or unfindable. In Cooperation And Competition Mead attempts to discover what cultural elements correlate with competition and cooperation by a survey of thirteen cultures. While accepting the possibility of such generalized correlations, Mead, in the introduction, criticizes those who correlate traits taken out of context. Her suggestion seems to be that generalization is possible but only after the traits concerned have been understood and interpreted in their full cultural significance.

We can tentatively conclude, then, that Mead is, as she herself implies, both a particularist and a nomologist. She accepts the possibility of cross-cultural generalization but only if the complete cultural context is allowed for, only if the abstraction is made from a sequence whose interpretation and significance for the culture is first understood. "To be significant a cross-cultural survey must compare systems of character organization, not aggregation of items of behaviour..." (Mead, 1946c, p. 675) Similarly such laws may be used in analyzing cultures but only if treated as "hints" or foundations which may be culturally elaborated in various ways.

(ii) Circular causality

Mead, then, does not analyze a culture by the simple application of general causes and laws to the particular situation, as a physicist, for
example, would. What does she do? We have seen already (above page 25) that she discovers patterns of behaviour which are the same, or systematically related, in every aspect of the cultural life. (Mead, 1946b, p. 482) Is this simply descriptive or is it explanatory? When she says "without some... reference to childhood learning the statement about ... [adult] behavior remain descriptive and static," (Mead, 1956b, p. 217) the suggestion is that when the adult pattern is "referred to" the childhood experience, the analysis is not only dynamic but that it is more than simply descriptive.

Whatever "more than simply descriptive" may mean, there is no doubt that Mead rejects the reference to childhood experience as a citation of cause for the adult behaviour as effect. In her work, "culture is never derived from childrearing practice!" (Mead, 1961f, p. 136) From her oft repeated denials of childhood determinism, we will quote one from her article on Psychological Weaning. (Mead, 1949, p. 51 of reprint in Mead 1964b)

In describing these sets of regularities, I am making no claim for the adult pattern of behaviour, characteristic of the society, having been developed as a projection of the child's experiences. Rather, I am attempting to demonstrate the order of interrelationship which can be found between learning patterns of children and adult patterns of sex behaviour, in which the treatment of the child not only teaches the child, but reinforces in the adult, a style of human intercommunication which permeates the whole cultural pattern. The selection of weaning experiences was made because it provides a point upon which it is easy to focus observation, not because weaning is given any crucial significance in a theory of cultural learning. (Mead, 1949d, p. 51 of reprint in Mead 1964b)

We have already discussed this notion of a completely circular system of prefiguration, reinforcement and postfiguration (above page 45). Mead expressed hope that the notion of "feedback" borrowed from cybernetics, would be useful for the analysis of such systems.

Until the development of cybernetics, we thought of the child as the
end product of a linear assembly line. The child was born and adults did things to each other until finally it became an adult who did things to other people. It was really the whole set of circular conceptions that came in with cybernetics, that made us realize that the child, shaped by its culture, is also a vivid component in the perpetuation of society in societies that are changing slowly and of change itself in societies that are changing rapidly. (Mead, 1968a, p. 373-374)

Ironically, she is here using "new physical science models" to combat "the persistence among social scientists of outmoded models of cause and effect." (Mead, 1953a, p. 39)

"By using these models, especially the models drawn from the field of communication engineering and computation machines, it has been possible to emphasize analyses of behaviour in which the focus is not on the amount or the source of the energy, but upon the nature of the network with which that energy is utilized, and possible by studies of interactive systems to institute analyses in which effects feed back as causes. In the study of culture, this means that attention is focused upon the entire network of human relationships among human beings in different stages of maturation, the properties of the network being doubly defined by the historically determined culture and by the biological nature of the human species. The child's behaviour is then seen not only as shaped and molded by what its parents do to it, but also as a self-providing stimulus to the next parental act. Thus we are given tools for analyzing cultural change, for identifying how any change in such an interactive system ... will be reflected in minute, specific, eventually discriminable changes throughout the behaviour of other members of the society." (Mead, 1953a, p. 40)

So Mead tries to find models which do not imply childhood determinism. Nonetheless, she discusses why those theories which explain particular human behaviours from childhood experiences seem so plausible. The plausibility comes from their use by psychiatrists and other therapists in analyzing sick individuals within a culture. A therapist looks to an antecedent event in the previous life of his patient to explain his abnormality, ignoring both adult

* I doubt if Mead herself ever held this position.
behaviours and childhood experiences which are normal for his culture. (Mead, 1947d, p. 71) Such a theorist fails to see that the specific cause-effect correlations he so establishes are culturally limited and that the same childhood experiences in other cultures may not lead to the same adult effect, because the regularities of the culture may be different. Thus, the witnessing of a post-mortem Caesarian operation performed on a Samoan woman's dead body in a shallow open grave to remove the partially developed foetus which would otherwise be born as an avenging ghost, seemed "to leave no bad effects on the children's emotional make-up", (Mead, 1928a, p. 111) although it would presumably be a "cause" of neurotic behaviour in a Western culture. But the therapist, working in a single culture, can afford to ignore the relativity of his results and claim that childhood events are determinative of personality rather than as just mediative, as an anthropologist must maintain. (Mead, 1953d, p. 406) So the causalist error is introduced by the necessities of therapy and the attempt to transfer the findings of therapy to educational practices. Thus the therapist, finding in his individual patient the record of an unhappy childhood, will regard that childhood experience as the antecedent cause of his patient's state, and recommend that changes be made in the upbringing of all children to obviate similar sufferings in other individuals. But the student of cultural character recognizes rather a circular system within which the newborn child or adult immigrant receives, perpetuates and stimulates behavior in others in terms of the entire cultural tradition, so that the method of child rearing, the presence of a particular literary tradition, the nature of the domestic and public architecture, the religious beliefs, the political system are all conditions within which a given kind of personality develops." (Mead, 1951d, p. 74)

So the existence of a cultural behaviour, such as "fraternal jealousy, can never be ascribed solely to the behaviour of the mother to the child. However much the mother may live a secluded life, her relationship with other human beings is always present, in the tone of her voice and in the whole way in which she tends the child. For this reason, it can be said that the cause of adult jealousy lies in the whole society, and in everybody's past." (Mead, 1956c, p. 168)
It is for this reason that Mead insists on the autonomy of the cultural order and refuses Freudian-type reductions to psychology. She distinguishes the psychological origin of a trait from its present function in a culture. (Mead, 1950a, p. 198 of reprint in Mead 1964b) Thus, although the institution or conception of witchcraft may have originated as an adult resolution by some individual (or individuals) of a severe psychic childhood conflict involving the mother image, its present function in a culture in another area and different era, to which the trait has been diffused, need not be the resolution of the same conflict. Indeed, the childhood experience of the originator and of any later perpetrator of the trait will always be significantly different since the concept will be present during the later's childhood. Hence, except in the very rare case of origination or invention, a cultural trait is not a neurotic behaviour, but is of a different order, subject to and propagated by different laws. (Mead, 1935b, p. 87-89) Hence, in general, cultures cannot be seen as simple projections resulting from childhood conflict. "Unless we could assume, as we have no basis for doing, that the whole culture had been evolved on the spot ... the childhood experience would never explain the whole content of the culture..." (Mead, 1953d, p. 415)

Mead rejects, then, a simple linear causal model for cultural phenomena and refuses to see specific modes of adult behavior as effects of specific antecedent causes in his experiences. Rather she suggests the model of an electronic network whose functioning is governed by many parameters, both built-in and learned, so that any new stimulus or input must be "totalized", i.e., be related to all the other parameters and to the basic laws of the network, (the regularities,) before any output can be considered. Each network is unique in its laws and parameters so that the same new input into one may have an entirely different effect than if fed into another. Only after the full dynamics of each network is understood and is allowed for is it meaningful to abstract an isolated correlation and attempt to generalize it.
(iii) Comparison

For Mead, anthropology is not a simple inductive science generating and proving hypotheses on the basis of the observation of a large number of cross-cultural similarities. Rather it is the intensive, comparative study of unique cultures and emphasizes differences as well as similarities. "Differences among human beings are the very stuff on which human awareness feeds." (Mead, 1953b, p. xxi) We cannot become aware of any pattern of behaviour unless we see it contrasted with some other pattern. "It is hard to be conscious of the eyes through which one looks.

More than any other social scientist [the anthropologist] has professionally used differences as an asset rather than a liability. There is nothing that has made him pay such sharp attention to institutions and peoples as the fact that they were phenomenally strange. There was nothing he could take for granted in his tribe's way of living and it made him look not just at a few selected traits, but at everything. In studies of Western nations one who is untrained in studies of comparative cultures overlooks whole areas of behaviour. He takes so much for granted that he does not explore the range of trivial habits in daily living... (Benedict, 1946a, p. 7)

Mead insists that the comparison on which this new awareness is based presupposes a psychic unity of mankind. (Mead, 1951a, p. 189) "It is, of course, essential to this comparative method to assume that all human beings share in a basic humanity that varies from individual to individual, but, for those aspects which are relevant, it is in no way related to those physical differences upon which we base racial classifications." (Mead, 1951d, p. 73) The ability to learn a culture, any culture, is species-characteristic of mankind. It is a new awareness of what is learned, of the specificity of individual cultures, which the anthropologist gains in his field work, and which is the basis of his science. "With the awareness, then, that has come from being exposed so thoroughly to another way of life, the anthropologist goes on to
think these contrasting details from many cultures." (Mead, 1949b, p. 48)
The major results of field work would seem to be this new level of awareness on the part of the anthropologist himself rather than any specific correlation or causal hypotheses which he may find.

(b) Objectivity of the Observer

The change from a linear causality to a circular dynamic feedback system brings us to the second major foundational problem, that of the objectivity of the observer. For the observer and his awareness of the cultural system are themselves elements of the system. Two difficulties arise.

First, the anthropologist by participating in the culture and observing it from within cannot but influence its members; "the observer is part of the system he observes." (Mead, 1953a, p. 40) In Manus, for example, Mead and her team set up a medical clinic, not only for humanitarian reasons, but also to have an "in" into the functioning culture, to "become integral parts of the community with definite functions assigned to us." (Mead, 1956a, p. 497)

Actually, the anthropologist who lives in a native community does become part of it, but in so doing he changes the form of the community, providing new employment, new sources of material objects; his house may become a sort of club - "somewhere to go" - and his role as dispenser of simple medical remedies or recorder of economic transactions may be fitted into the existing structure . . . . Here one learns to understand the culture not only as it is embodied in individuals, but in the society that functions through the cultural forms. (Mead, 1953a, p. 48)

But the conspicuousness of the anthropologist also has disadvantages for aspects of the culture may become hidden to him. Thus, the mystic elements
in the Paliau movement in Manus were not discussed with Mead since it was assumed, rightly, that she would not be in sympathy with them. (Mead, 1956a, p. 231 & 499) So it cannot be assumed that that which is observed has been left unchanged by the process of observation, an ideal assumed by pre-twentieth century natural science.

A more important difficulty is that of the impartiality of the observer-anthropologist himself. "To what extent is the research worker so bound by the premises of his own culture that he will ask only certain questions and make only certain observations?" (Mead, 1951a, p. 8) We must "recognize... that the cultural and personal preoccupations of the observer determine what it is that he observes...", (ibid., p. 7) "So that we would not expect that an American, Spanish, and a Chinese anthropologist, respectively, would ever perceive the same things..." (Mead, 1956b, p. 206) For example, up until 1940, Western anthropologists saw the problem of cultural contact and change as involving a forced, unwanted, change in one culture. They were blind to the idea that the receiving culture might want to change. (Mead, 1956a, p. 440) Somehow the social scientist must find ways to free himself from his own ethnocentrism; (Mead, 1942a, p. 181) The specific cultural resistances of the researcher must be combatted. (Mead, 1953a, p. 22) Two solutions are suggested by Mead: First, the anthropologist in being trained must be taught to see the regularities of his own culture so that he can counteract their biases, just as a psychiatrist must understand the reactions of his own psyche. (Mead, 1952b, p. 345) What biases do remain should then be constant for all cultures or individuals studied by that one observer and so his work can be studied for inner consistency. (Mead, 1928a, p. 207 & 1939a, p. vi) A second suggestion is the use of teams of anthropologists whose members come from different cultures so that they are not all blind to the same patterns, (Mead, 1942a, p. 262) and can thus arrive at some level of objectivity. (Mead, 1956b, p. 222)
But even if we use observers from other than Western cultures, they must first be trained as anthropologists. That is, they must be partially acculturated into a culture where research itself, and particularly anthropological research, is an institutionalized element of the society. (Mead, 1953a, p. 7-8) For "research on human behaviour is viable only when there is a climate of opinion within which its methods and implications are known." (Mead, 1951a, p. 189) For example, one clear condition for the existence of scientific research is that the base culture insist on the moral obligation to present factual truth; many primitive peoples on the other hand "believe that courtesy demands telling a questioner what he wants to hear." (Mead, 1961c, p. 1435) Even the anthropological language used, be it Mead's usual literary style or more strictly scientific terms, is inevitably ethnocentric. (Mead, 1942b, p. xi) The very concepts used in analysis are taken from Western culture. (Mead, 1953a, p. 31 note 1) Each culture is in itself a closed circle of generations, but to study enculturation "... we may ... break the circle... and, for purposes of a type of scientific analysis born of our Western conceptions of time, space, and causality, ..." (Mead, 1955a, p. 46) ask certain analytic questions. That is, the very project of anthropology itself carries with it a background of Western culture.

Apart from the biases carried by all anthropologists as such, and by each anthropologist as a representative of a particular culture, there are the biases carried by the particular individual conducting the research. The theories an anthropologist holds affect his observations just as one's

* "Lowe found among the Crow Indians of the plains a man of exceptional knowledge of his cultural forms. He was interested in considering these objectively and in correlating different facets ... [i.e., he was a "anthropologist"] ... Among the Crow... by the general opinion constantly reiterated, he was regarded as irresponsible and incompetent." (Benedict, 1934a, p. 224-225)
culture influences perception. (Mead, 1951c, p. 14) It might seem best, therefore, to send the observer into the field with as little specific theory as possible, (Mead, 1949b, p. 49), leaving him to create his theory by surrendering to his concrete material and letting it shape his categories. (ibid., pp. 61-62) But yet, some of the most useful, if not the least biased, data is collected under the stimulus of proving or disproving a particular hypothesis. (Mead, 1949a, p. 297) Besides, it would be impossible to approach even the description of a culture without some way of ordering the infinity of data. ("One or two observers cannot possibly get full records of everything that happens in a native community." (Mead, 1951a, p.189)

Field work itself is highly selective and the selection must be done in terms of well-understood categories, (Mead, 1930a, p. 212) categories chosen for their cross-cultural utility, (Mead, 1951a, p. 189) and for the anthropological experience there-in stored. The anthropologist must set about "ordering his material in already recognized categories," (ibid., p. 192) without missing the possibility of a new category appearing from his research. (ibid., p. 192) Despite this, Mead says, as late as 1961, that anthropology

"involves a willingness to suspend judgment---not until a hypothesis is verified, but before we make any hypothesis at all. It involves a willingness to expect that which cannot even be formulated, to wait upon the material and to surrender to what it tells us as we encounter it. Rigid cross-cultural frames of reference, tight taxonomic systems, and incipient analogues of periodic tables all cramp and distort the necessary uncommittedness of our approach." (Mead, 1961a, p. 477)

Even if we distinguish, as we must, between the use of theory in collecting the data and in analyzing it, (Mead, 1942d, p. 197 of reprint in Mead 1964b) there still remains a certain ambivalence in Mead's attitude towards the usefulness of theory in field work.

But while there is a real danger that some of the rewards of months of painstaking field work... may be lost if the material is observed
too rigorously from a predetermined point of view, there is also
the danger that without theoretical tools, the field anthropologist
may not see enough and may not sense the significance of what he
does see." (Mead, 1947e, p. 54 of reprint in Mead, 1964b)

Any report from a field worker makes reference not only to explicit
theories, but to areas of comparison (see above page 72). Since we
are blind without comparison, any pattern noticed is noticed with reference
to another pattern. (Mead, 1953a, p. 28)

Even the simplest, apparently factual statement - e.g., 'there were
25 houses in the Hamlet of X' - is made in a context that makes this
number larger or smaller than in other hamlets within the country
or the tribe or the period. It is not the sort of result that is obtained
automatically by ticking off the occurrence or non-occurrence of a 'house'
in spaces on an IBM card." (Ibid., p. 30-31)

"Every single statement that an anthropologist makes is a comparative
statement". (Mead, 1955a, p. 9) Only by remarking the implicit area of
comparison, e.g., Arapesh, Melanesia, nineteenth century Europe, all
of Mead's field work, etc., can any anthropological item be cited away
from its context. Each item has as organically a place in the comparative
whole, as a trait has in a cultural whole. (Mead, 1953a, p. 30)

So, both the research worker himself and any future users of his
data must allow for the original theoretical and comparative biases,
otherwise such data is useless. (Mead, 1932a, p. xii) This is one of the
reasons why Mead has such a preference for recording permanently the most
basic data possible e.g., films, recordings, and verbatim reports. (Mead,
1939a, p. vii)

Finally, any observation is biased by the observer's personality
and temperament. When the object of study is personality and culture and
the method is akin to self-enculturation (see above page 62 ), clearly the
congeniality of the observer's personality to the cultural forms is an important
factor in his observations. Provided, however, that this factor is recognized,
Mead turns it to advantage. Just as the social functioning of a society cannot
be understood without taking a clearly defined part in it (see above page  ),
so the interpsychic structure of the culture must be seen from within, and
from a definite point of view. Any "unbiased report... [ would be ] ... no
report at all; it is comparable to a colour-blind man reporting on a sunset." (Mead, 1949a, p. 299) Unbiasedness would leave the behaviour meaningless.
"Actually, in the matter of ethos [ i.e., emotional structure of the culture ],
the surest and most perfect instrument of understanding is our own emotional
response, provided that we can make disciplined use of it." (ibid., p. 300)
Just as the psychiatrist must learn to be self-conscious about his own response
to any behaviour in order to be able to interpret it, so must the anthropologist.
The anthropologist, knowing his own temperament, should try to find an
informant with the same temperament with whom he can identify. Mead's
Arapesh informant, Unabelin, was such a man, who although not a "typical"
Arapesh, gave Mead the chance to sympathize with the culture, even if
from a slightly deviant point of view. (ibid., p. 300) This method of
identification gives the anthropologist the point of view into the culture which
is required by his own temperament, and if he allows for his own personality,
permits him to be objective in a way not otherwise possible. (ibid., p. 300)
The anthropologist uses himself as an instrument.

But any observation made by an instrument is in some way tied to
and defined by that instrument. "In the social sciences, long experience
is the analogue of the rigorous formulations essential in the natural sciences";
(Mead, 1956a, p. 14 ; cf. Mead, 1953a, p. 12) that is, the results are not
completely separable from the researcher's personality. "The individual
style of the research worker ... must always be taken into account in under-
standing his or her work." (Mead, 1953a, p. 10) "In the social sciences...
the human observer is an essential part of the observation and..., at least in... anthropology, observers from different cultural backgrounds will necessarily arrive at different hypotheses, using different methods." (Mead, 1944c, p. 49) This is inevitable since the anthropologist "must always use [his own culture] to interpret other cultures, in the end translating other languages into his own, empathizing the postures, gestures, and body images of others with his own body, grasping the patterned perceptions of others because he himself learned to perceive the world around him in a patterned way." (Mead, 1956b, p. 206)

The possibility of an anthropological science which would itself be cross-cultural is not, however, thereby denied. In a way reminiscent of her solution to the problem of cross-cultural nomological generalizations, Mead claims that "by comparative means and the accumulation of observations made from different cultural approaches[ to culture ] it is hoped in time to establish a science which will be comparably usable in different cultures. But this approach does not hope to arrive at scientifically valid results by excluding the investigator nor by holding the investigator constant." (Mead, 1946b, p. 484)

While in the physical sciences, it is possible to work directly to hypotheses which, when verified, may be used, at either the theoretical or applied level, by members of other cultures than that in which the original work was done, the question of borrowing scientific hypotheses in the human sciences becomes much more complicated. It is probable that only after we have developed a series of culturally limited and culturally rich hypotheses in a number of cultural settings will we have enough material actually to build a system which is genuinely cross-cultural and includes, or constructively excludes, the many different cultural frameworks now present in the world. (Mead, 1944a, p. 99)

[There is] one essential difference between social science and natural science. In the natural sciences, progress has been made by the systematic exclusion of the observer, his errors, his biases, and human fallability, from any experimental observation which was
made. In the social sciences every effort to repeat this performance has met with sterility, producing a pseudo-social science hollowly imitating the natural sciences.

Advance in the social sciences depends upon the systematic inclusion of the human experimenter within the experiment, in terms of his constitution, culture, idiosyncratic life-history, and the constellational significance which he has for his subject. Instead of attempting to rule these out, in which case we are confronted with a vacuum, the position of the experimenter in various respects becomes the point of reference from which we define a field of observation, and only as his position is known can the field be known. (Mead, 1942e, pp. 101-102)

Summary

So Mead insists that "in the human science, the observer must be included as part of any set of observations, not so that his individuality may be discounted, but so that it may be accurately included in any later interpretation." (Mead, 1951e, p. 108)

Our present tendency to regard only those activities as 'scientific' which can be performed with equal skill by any individual with an I.Q. of over 130, and as 'an art' any activity in which one individual with an I.Q. of over 130 excels another - this tendency is a peculiar by-product of an age that has become intoxicated with the rewards of measurement, intoxicated to the point of extreme danger. For while man's humanity is enhanced by the quantifying methods of the natural sciences, his humanity is denigrated when human beings are treated as interchangeable cyphers in monolythic schemes in which, in human affairs, the distinctiveness of the individual human being, of each human culture, each period of history, - and each scientist - is ignored or denied." (Mead, 1953a, p. 17-18)

(c) The Abstraction of the Pattern

We have seen Mead's position on two major characteristics of the social sciences, especially of anthropology, viz., a particular concept of causality and the impossibility of excluding the observer. To conclude, I
will now present; (i). her position on the abstract nature of the concepts used in anthropology, particularly "culture", "personality" and "pattern of regularity"; (ii). her ways of abstracting, and justifying the abstraction of these concepts; (iii) the status of the concept of "pattern of regularity"; and finally (iv). the notion of "understanding" and the problem of whether anthropology is a science or a humanity.

(i) Abstractions

All formulations which seek to class phenomenon, or facts, as 'cultural', 'psychological', 'individual', 'idiosyncratic', 'somatic', fail to recognize that all of these categories are categories of observations, points of view taken by science, and that all phenomena of human behaviour may be looked at from each of these points of view. There are no 'cultural facts'; there are merely orders of data which those who are interested in studying the cultural aspects of behaviour, have found it most convenient to analyse. (Mead, 1946b, p. 479)

In other words, "the abstraction 'culture' and the abstraction 'cultural character [and, presumably, 'personality'] are different ways of organizing material about the same human beings." (Mead, 1954b, p. 396) These abstractions are, of course, founded on the concrete; "culture is an abstraction in the mind of the social scientist, but each person for whom he makes this abstraction behave in certain ways, are certain kinds of people, were reared in a given fashion, and have a given character." (Mead, 1942a, p. 21) As an empirical science, anthropology must base itself on the foundation of data; "a disciplined science of human relations...is built by drawing out from very detailed, concrete materials,...the relevant abstractions..." (Mead, 1942b, xvi)

But it may be asked "what are these 'concrete materials' from which anthropology abstracts its concepts?" Mead makes two conflicting claims: in one article she says,
The units of both [early historical and early anthropological] research were items of behaviour, [traits] * performed at an identified time and at an identified place by an identified individual; from them, patterns of 'feudalism' or of 'age societies' could be derived. In neither procedure was it possible to study living societies in which the units for analysis were not items of behaviour, [traits] * but instead individuals and groups of individuals. (Mead, 1951f, p. 152 of reprint in Mead, 1964b).

In a different article, but published in the same year, she claims that

Whatever the size of the universe within which the anthropologist works, he works with the same type of unit - items of behaviour [singular acts], acts identified in time and space, and the social position of those who perform them. (Mead, 1951d, p. 72-73)

I suggest the following resolution of this ambiguity: Anthropologists used to study "items of behaviour" in the sense of traits, such as gum-chewing, (usually from the memory of an old informant from a dead culture) but they now base their analyses on the observation of specific singular actions, "items of behaviour", such as Joe Doe's chewing of gum here yesterday. "Traits" are abstractions, whereas the singular acts of concrete individuals would seem to be the base from which abstractions are made. In culture and personality studies, "the unit of research is the identified individual, within a known cultural setting, and within a reasonably closed social group." (Mead, 1939b, p. 22 of reprint in Mead 1964b) "The recent psychological movement when interpreted at its broadest is a further, more systematic phrasing of the essential unity of the individual in a culture and the need for insisting upon a recognition of this unity, while his behaviour is studied from a variety of points of view." (Mead, 1946b, p. 440) This interpretation is also in accord with the terms, cited above (page 81), describing the ground from which the abstraction is made, viz., "phenomena of human behaviour", (ibid., p. 479) "human behaviour" (Mead, 1954b, p. 396) and "the people [who] ... behave in certain ways,". (Mead, 1942a, p. 21)

* The bracketed terms are our attempt to interpret the ambiguity.
Note that it does not appear to matter whether the behaviour referred
to as base for abstraction be that of an individual or a group of individuals.
(compare page 82; ref. to Mead, 1951f) The reason seems to be that

In all studies of human behaviour, the units are human beings, members
of one species. . . . But as long as we take a group of human beings
as our unit, even though groups may differ in size, . . . we may change
our focus in order to investigate in greater detail the more finely
specified properties of a group without thereby shifting the level of
analysis. For here a change in focus does not involve the invocation
of qualitatively different units [as reference to 'gene pool', 'aggression',
etc., would]. (Mead, 1964a, p. 172; my underlining)

That is, the behaviour of an individual, a group or a nation are on the same
level, the level of "phenomena of human behaviour", from which abstractions
such as "traits", "personality", "a culture", "cultural character", and
"Culture" (man's general cultural-building ability) (ibid., p. 36) may be made.

(ii) The Process and Justification of Abstraction

Unfortunately, the important notion of "the singular behaviours of
concrete individuals" does not seem to be thematized in the work of either
Benedict or Mead. We turn then, to the perception of patterns in this
behaviour, to the abstraction of order. "The anthropologist is trained to see
form where other people see concrete details." (Mead, 1942a, p. 526)
Thus he must learn to interpret the behavior (see above page 17) and needs
"training in the recognition of pattern [ ; this ] is absolutely essential if
the student [ anthropologist ] is to give a coherent account of any culture
and [ it ] becomes doubly necessary if his work is to include any treatment of
cultural psychodynamics." (Mead, 1952b, p. 344) The anthropologist must
"habitually use multiple clues, filing subliminal impressions, holding in
memory partially perceived behavioural sequences that became meaningful
only after some later act." (Mead, 1953a, p. 12) "Only so, by fitting together
separate sets of clues or traces into a reconstructed living whole can the parts be made meaningful." (ibid., p. 11)

The research worker's own perception is used as a searching device to pick out from the mass of behaviour being analyzed, - written or spoken words, gesture systems, ritual idiom, kinship usage, figures of speech, arrangements of space in architecture or design, dance patterns, cosmologies - systematic relationships that give clues to the way in which individuals, or members of an artistic school, or the representatives of a period in literary history, or the members of a whole culture, organize their experience." (ibid., p. 10)

Such a spotting of pattern should not be branded as "intuitive" or "unsystematic" or "having no methods!" (ibid., p. 12) Mead points out that linguistics also depends upon the individual researcher's gift for spotting pattern, but this does not make linguistics any less a science. (ibid., p. 16)

Mead's own work is especially subject to this charge of being unscientific because she writes in a literary style, often avoiding "as much as possible the use of technical terms". (Mead, 1930a, p. 219) This she justifies as an attempt to give data as primitive as possible and as little influenced as possible by any particular theory so that her field work can be used by anyone. (ibid., p. 219) During her later interest in interdisciplinary communication, she emphasizes the need for non-technical language to allow for mutual understanding between representatives of different theoretical orientations. But most of all, she uses literary language to try and capture the "inwardness", the way existence is experienced, that is, the pattern, for the pattern is not analytic, but the foundation of analyses. She claims that in presenting such a total pattern, we must not fear that "we may be regarded as unscientific by those who limit science to the task of testing hypotheses someone else has developed." (Mead, 1953b, pp xix-xx)

Those who use pattern spotting in social science are to be distinguished
from those who work on "the assumption that there are a limited number of variables, which, though still unknown, will one day underlie a body of theory about human behaviour." (Mead, 1953a, p. 15) So Mead compares thinking with patterns to the functioning of analog computers as opposed to digital computers which use discrete units, stages and sequences. (ibid., p. 12) But this does not deny analysis of the pattern into parts, indeed "the formal pattern is ... derived from a comparison and analysis of a large number of statements about cultural forms, the herb used, the rite employed, the taboo enjoined." (Mead, 1940a, p. 335) That is, the pattern can be founded and justified objectively. A reviewer of Mead's The Study of Culture (1953a) says that the book

Should make plain to even the most hardened objectivists that what is first perceived (and perhaps solely perceived) 'intuitively' can, once it is identified, located, and described, become as objective and reliable a datum as the dimensions of a potsherd or the course of a ritual. Probably not all research workers have an 'ear' or an 'eye' for characterological research; but those who do can demonstrate the existence of the empirical patterns they perceive. (Wallace, Review of..., p. 1143)

(iii) Status of Pattern

We have seen that the integration of behaviour into a pattern of regularities is due to the individual's habituated bodily system, and that specific patterns may be spotted and justified. But the status in anthropological theory of this notion of regularity of pattern itself is less clear. Sometimes it is said that culturally learned behavior "has been found to be systematic". (Mead, 1953a, p. 22; cf. Mead, 1942e, p. 100 of reprint in Mead 1964b) But if this is a simple empirical discovery, it seems contradicted by the facts for "certain unintegrated cultures exist...," (Mead, 1937a, p. 461; cf. Benedict, 1934a, p. 196) although such may be temporary stages due to contradictory historical influence. (Benedict, 1934a, p. 197-198) Rather
we might insist that there is a drive to consistency due to a tendency in each
person to maintain "order." (Mead, 1955b, 279) Thus human nature would
have a hypothetical drive to systematization, (ibid., p. 13) a drive evident by
the "stress" present when consistency is lacking. (Benedict, 1946a, p. 9)

All cultural behavior is mediated by human beings who not only hear
and speak and communicate through words, but also use all the senses,
in ways that are equally systematic, to see and to project what they
see in concrete forms - in design, costume, and architecture - and
to communicate through the mutual perception of visual images;
to taste and smell and to pattern their capacities to taste and smell,
so that the traditional cuisine of a people can be as distinctive and
as organized as a language." (Mead, 1953a, p. 16)

The systematization of behaviour would then be a project, a dynamism
towards consistency, rather than an already accomplished fact. In either
case "the assumption is that these regularities are imposed by regularities
in the biological nature of man and functioning of the human nervous system
and are not merely designs read into a mass of material by a human being,
himself capable of perceiving pattern where no pattern is." (Mead, 1954b,
p. 401)

Nevertheless, Mead also says that "We assume that culture is
systematic, however diverse the historical elements which form its content
may be .... This does not mean that all parts of a culture are in harmony
with each other. Some parts may be strikingly discrepant, but the way the
discrepancies are handled can be referred to the whole." (ibid., p. 401)
The change from Benedict's simple attempt to find an immediate homogeneous
cultural unity to Mead's theory of regularities of varying levels of abstraction
changes Benedict's conceivably empirical claim of unity to a methodological
presupposition. For the presence of a heterogeneity on one level of regularity
never permits us to declare the culture disintegrated, but simply urges us
on to find a higher level regularity which will unified the heterogeneous elements.
(iv) Understanding and the Humanities

Mead never seems to clearly decide between these two options as to the status of pattern within her theory. We can at least say, however, that each individual pattern is anterior to and takes its meaning from the larger configuration which is the whole culture. So any analysis of particular problems presupposes a grasp of the whole. (Mead, 1953a, p. 30)

But this whole can only be grasped by "understanding", for the "whole" is an attempt to delineate the experience of the culture, the way it is lived. The possibility of studying the whole of a lived experience was precisely the inspiration which originally led Boas to send Benedict and Mead into the field to study the science which became Culture and Personality. (Mead, 1959a, p. 14) The anthropologist

is willing to forsake the amenities of civilized life and subject himself for months at a time to the inconveniences and unpleasantness of life among people whose manner, methods of sanitation, and ways of thoughts, [sic] are completely alien to him. He is willing to learn their language, to immerse himself in their manners, get their culture sufficiently by heart to feel their repugnances and sympathize with their triumphs. In Manus, for instance, it was necessary to learn a very real horror of the meeting of two taboo relatives, to guard one's tongue against ever uttering a taboo word and feel embarrassed contrition if one had made a slip: to learn to greet every news of illness or misfortune with a question of what spirit was involved. (Mead, 1930a, p. 213)

Only in terms of this global understanding of the culture can the explanation of any item be attempted.

This tension between understanding-sympathy tendencies usually associated with the humanities and explanatory tendencies usually associated with science runs through the whole of the work of our two authors. It was thematized by Benedict in one of her last talks given the year she died,
Anthropology and the Humanities (1948a) In it she insists that anthropology is a science for "it has phrased the problems to be investigated and has adopted conceptual schemes, according to patterns which belong to the scientific tradition... it has attempted to arrive at objective, generalized descriptions of reality."

(1948a, p. 585) Yet in its object and its subject matter it is often closer to the humanities. In the cross-cultural experience it gives the perspective and compassions which permit an understanding of one's own way of life, the humanities had for centuries led the way. Yet anthropology was born in the hayday of science and "the excitement of phrasing the study of man in terms of scientific generalizations instead of in humanistic terms was basic to the whole discipline of anthropology." (ibid., p. 587)

Yet it lost something in doing so, even though it gained a level of generalization not present in the humanities. "My conviction is simply that today the scientific and humanistic traditions are not opposites nor mutually exclusive. They are supplementary, and modern anthropology handicaps itself in method and insight by neglecting the work of the great humanists." (ibid., p. 587)

As soon as the study of the subjective elements of culture were admitted into anthropology, the laws it searches for became dependent on man's creativity and liberty. But man's free creativity has been traditionally the domain of the humanities. So Benedict calls for an anthropology which can consciously combine both the comparative generalizations of a science and the insights of a humanity.

I would suggest, however, that from its conception, the discipline of Culture and Personality has always been such a combination of science and humanity, of explanation and understanding. It is not surprising that Mead, when she came to publish a collection of her articles, should entitle it, "Anthropology - A Human Science."
CHAPTER IV

ILLUSTRATIONS OF MEAD'S WORK

Before passing to a philosophical analysis of the science developed by Benedict and Mead, it will be useful to look in some detail at three examples of her field work. These illustrations will enable us to see what Mead actually does and may be compared with her own account of her science as presented above.

The three examples are chosen because they are among the studies to which Mead most frequently refers and on which she has published much material. They are also selected because of their particular richness of contrast with each other and with our own Western culture. Finally, they cover well the period of Mead's field work: Manus was her second field trip and was revisited as late as 1953; Arapesh was visited in 1931 and 1932; Bali was studied just before the second World War.
1. The Manus

(a) Introduction

The Manus of the Admiralty Islands (near New Guinea) are a small energetic tribe of fishermen and traders who build their houses on piles in the salt lagoons. Tall, brown-skinned, lean and active, with nothing but their wits, their skill, and ethics which say that the ghosts of the dead will penalize the unindustrious, they have built a high standard of living, which they maintain by continuous hard work. Puritan to the core, they are committed to effort and work, disallowing love and the pleasures of the senses.

Economic Treadmill

"Manus culture is singularly integrated. Every institution is bent to the single emphasis of the attainment of personal success through the manipulation of property." (1937a, p. 230) "Their economic system [is] one of the most elaborate of primitive systems for which we have any record. They had real money. Dogs teeth and shell beads, as handled by them met all the requirements of a modern definition of money." (1956a, p. 53)

Their exchange system is nominally based on the events of the life-cycle but, in a characteristic manner, they allow enterprising 'big men' to invest, singly, in the life cycles of others so that they could develop a high-powered, individualistic, economy based on personal initiative, rather than an exchange system limited by natural events. The big men are allowed no rest for the system allows no stopping point, no place for resting on one's laurels, and they literally work themselves to death at an early age.

* Since all references in this chapter are to Mead's books and articles, only the year-code and page reference will be given.
Religion and Motivation

Behind (and below) this ideal lies the sanction of the supernatural world. The ghosts insist upon the kind of efficiency which results from the manipulation of material things, upon good houses, good exchanges, good economic planning. There is practically no art. Objects of art are bought and sold, but they have no other attribute than their value as economic counters in the system of exchanges. Their religious life is completely integrated with the economic. Its main elements are magical charms and ancestral blessings which make individuals successful in handling property and ensure that they will not disrupt the peaceful exchange of valuables by sexual offences. (1937a, p. 230)

Each Manus household is governed by a ghost of a recently dead male relative. ... The skull of the ghost is kept in the house and presides over the moral and economic life of the household. He punishes sex offences, scandalmongering, obscenity, failure to pay debts, failure to help relatives, and failure to keep one's house in repair. For dereliction in these duties, he sends illness and misfortune (which must be alleviated by public confession of the sin). ... The ghost is expected to protect his ward from the malice of the ghosts of other households. Therefore if a male ward dies, his Sir Ghost is conceived as having failed in his duty; he is evicted and the ghost of the newly dead takes his place. (1937a, p. 230)

The Manus, then, do not work from a desire for wealth or success, but are driven by the fear of sanctions against them.

Animism

The Manus are very practical and industrious, have a clear conception of objective 'truth' and place high value on the 'facts'. Their legends are very poorly developed; they do not attempt to tell them to the children because they are so dull that the children would have no interest in them! Their religion is singularly unimaginative and they abstain from almost all animism or anthropomorphism with respect to nature. This naturalism is even more obvious among the children than among the adults: "In thirty thousand (children's) drawings, not one case of personalizing natural
phenomena of inanimate objects occurred" (1930a, p. 104 note 1)

"The intensely crowded life of any Manus generation existed between two voids." (1956a, p. 67) Past and future are the same and the present floats in a featureless time sequence just as their village floats in the "open sea, which surrounds them in every direction, stretching up to an indefinite horizon, unbounded, unnamed." (1956a, p. 67) The individual starts at copulation, and, after death, may exist a few years as a skull-ghost until demoted, when he slowly dissipates into nothing.

(b) Character Dynamics

**Autonomy**

At birth, when the Manus baby starts to cry, "the nurse ... begins to sing a lullaby in time with the baby's birth wail. As the baby wails ... the nurse's voice rises into a crescendo and the new baby becomes part of the rhythm of the world around it." (1956a, p. 345)

Whenever it cries, there is the lullaby echoing its cry in exact rising cadence, interspersed with the words, "Some day you'll be a fisherman, you'll sail the seas, you'll catch fish," if the baby is a boy, and with, "You'll grow big, you'll bear children," if a girl. The new baby is not fed until it "cries for food," which may be several hours after birth, when it is given milk by the woman who has given birth most recently. Thus the Manus baby's introduction to the world, its first contact, is not an oral one, but is muscular and auditory, as its nurse moves and ... lulls it, taking her time cues from its voice. Instead of initially communicating with the world through a nipple from which comes food and comfort, it moves with a world that moves with it. And the cue that the child gives is a real cue, not an imputed one, a real cry which the adult imitates. It has begun a life of autonomy in which others will respond to its strength, its initiative, its will to move, to make sounds, to grasp food.

So from the moment that a Manus baby is born, it is caught into a system which emphasizes the active rhythmic reciprocity with
the world about it, de-emphasizes differences in size and strength and sex, and stresses its existence as an independent organism. (1956a, p. 346)

By the age of three the young Manus has learned all the physical skills needed for his life. He can walk and swim, punt a miniature and a full-sized canoe and maintain complete control over his own body. Teaching is exacting, but involves only the rewarding of success, the ignoring of clumsiness (for which there is no word) and the discrete protection from traumatic mistakes. On this "basis of motor skill is laid a superstructure of complete self-confidence." (1930a, p. 43)

**Puritanism**

The social life of the Manus, however, is quite otherwise. Sphincter control is emphasized and is accompanied by severe shame surrounding all excretionary activity. "Children must learn privacy in excretion almost by the time they can walk; must get by heart the conventional attitudes of shame and embarrassment.... The parents' horror, physical shrinking, and repugnance are communicated to the careless child." (1930a, 42) This prudery lasts through life and is never sacrificed for convenience, even on sea voyages many hours long.

This privacy of the body, despite a minimum of clothing, reaches into many areas of Manus life. The slightest bodily contact between individuals not in special relationships is sedulously avoided. What body contact does occur is highly stylized. Communal eating is rare and always embarrassing. "The house [a body symbol] in Manus is a sort of sanctuary... one adult will not enter another man's house without due and grave cause." (1934a, p. 240) "The gesture of defiance is not the clenched fist, as with us, but the spear hand thrown back... Physical encounters are usually avoided
except when the contestants are armed with spears." (1934a, p. 242)

"As the Manus are shy of sleeping, eating and exposing themselves in the presence of others, so they are equally shy of personalities in speech. One must handle the private life, the body, the affairs of another as circum spectly in speech as one must the actual body in practice. Conversation, except in the specially recognized grooves, is impersonal, formal, and never stoops to personalities except in anger." (1934a, p. 242)

Puritanism would also seem to be linked to scrupulosity about private property. "In Manus, where property is sacred and one wails for lost property as for the dead, respect for property is taught children from their earliest years. Before they walk they are rebuked and chastised for touching anything which does not belong to them." (1930a, p. 31) Trade, the exchange of property, is, of course, the overruling category of all Manus life.

The whole of life, his most intimate relation to people, his conception of places, his evaluation of his guarding spirits, all fall under the heading of Kawas 'exchange'. He has no other word for friend; ... Pregnancy, birth, puberty, betrothed, marriage, death, are thought of in terms of dogs' teeth and shell money, pigs and oil." (1930a, p. 66)

The category of exchange is present even in the nursing relationship right after birth.

The complementary relationship in which the strong, large mother with milk gives her breast to the small, passive, hungry baby is converted by the Manus into a kind of reciprocal exchange in which the breast is treated more like a connecting piece of tubing between mother and child than as a part of the mother. From the earliest suckling the mother handles her breast in this detached way, and the child soon learns to treat it in the same way, pulling, dragging, stretching the breast about to suit its needs, (1956a, p. 346-347)
Stylized Relationships

Puritanism and exchange can also be found in the Manus patterning of the jesting and avoidance relationships. In all Manus "avoidance relationships, a man or woman is always ashamed because the relationship itself is based upon an explicit recognition that a female relative of one is engaged in an actual sex relationship with a male relative of the other." (1934a, p. 255) After betrothal (as early as 6 years old, always financially motivated), the young girl has the onus for avoiding her future husband and his male relatives by hiding under a cloak or on the bottom of a canoe and so on. She must never use (or hear) their names, or those same words occurring elsewhere in the language. Her husband she must never even think of. After marriage, she and her father-in-law will live in the same house but must continue this strict avoidance behaviour, despite the extreme inconvenience, until old age makes the body less dangerous.

The jesting relationship is limited to certain cross-cousins. It permits lack of respect, play, jesting and lying and practical jokes. Between men, rough body play, obscene references and various non-sexual liberties are allowed. "In jesting with a woman, the body handling is definitely sexual, a man will play with a woman's breasts, or even venture to touch her pubes." (1934a, p. 248) Such intimacy is only possible in public for, as throughout the Manus culture, the private situation is considered much more dangerous and so needs more strict restraint. "The climax of cross-cousin jesting has been institutionalized in a ceremony which nominally involves cross-cousins, but often involves men who are in very different and even avoidance relationships to each other. This is the athletic phallic dance performed by the chief men of each party to an important official exchange." (1934a, p. 25) The men decorate the phallus and dance in threatening, insulting postures and use insulting words to defy the financial partners to carry through with their obligations.
A man maintains, even after marriage, a very close economic and personal relationship with his sister, often looking after her welfare to the exclusion of his wife's. To his sister the man may pour out his soul.

The result of the Manus' stylized modes of behaviour is that an individual's personal relationships are highly fragmented. For example, since personal intimacy is allowed only with his sister, sexual play and enjoyment only with his cross-cousin, and for his wife these two modes being excluded, he can only relate to her by shameful, private intercourse.

Anger

Surprisingly, the children, except for motor, property, and excretion training are left to themselves. They are taught no respect for age, or any obedience, no social discipline, no interest in the economic or religious affairs of their elders. Their very spoilt, defiant, independent attitude, their love for autonomy, is used, at the time of their marriage, to force them into the cultural system. At marriage, the young man incurs a vast debt and is ashamed to enjoy a wife he has not paid for. Resentful and angered, he has to work his hardest until his debts are paid off, about ten years, by which time he has started to take the ghosts and the economic system seriously, and any slackening of activity will lead to being stricken with illness. Anger is the Manus keynote of work, and from the nurses response to the baby's angry birth cry onwards, one's autonomy is expressed in anger. In sexual intercourse, in financial dealings, in mourning, even in a child's asking for food, angry aggression followed by the submission of the "environment" is the expected mode of behaviour.
(c) Change

The passage of one million American soldiers through Manus in 1945 showed the Manus a model of life for which they were admirably fit in a cultural way. Their realism, industriousness, trading and economic approach to life combined with their conscious dislike of their own culture and their belief, already shown in 1928, that cultural modes are relative and can be changed, led to a giant step into the modern world. The war delayed a generation of young defiant men from being placed under the yoke of debt and they forced their elders to adopt the New Way, a semi-religious (their idea of Christianity), semi-political (their idea of the U.S.A.) movement which led to the removal of the village to land, the wearing of clothes, the building of schools, and the seeds of an organized independence movement for the whole area.

The continuation or systematic change of the culture was studied in detail by Mead in 1953. Only one part will concern us here, that of the moral sanctions.

Soul and Moral Sanctions

The old Manus moral system "might be summarized as a set of external sanctions --- Sir-Ghost enforced and illness-validated---against words, acts and lapses antithetical to the code." (1956a, p. 321) The sins were defined externally. "A Sir-Ghost was interested in a failure to make economic plans and a failure to pay debts, sins of omission but not sins of the heart or spirit.

There was in fact no real conception of a soul or a mind, that could sin by thought as well as by word or deed. Thought under the old conception of man took place in the neck-throat; to remember was to 'neck-throat to it'. The verb to forget also involved the same part of the body, and to change someone's mind was expressed by the phrase
to "twist his neck-throat". Sorrow dwelt in the eyes, anger in the belly, and fear in the buttocks... There was a definite lack of any sense of a spiritual core of a human being..." (1956a, p. 319-320)

Informed by Christian missionaries, however, of the unity of the soul and its relationship to God, the Manus developed a dichotomy between external crime and internal sin which seems to have been based on a curious interpretation of the Biblical phrase "Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's."

Man has a mind-soul-the distinction between that which thinks and that which goes up to God at death is very unclear, and for most purposes this mind-soul is thought of as one. Sin consists in thinking the wrong thoughts, while all overt offences of word and deed are considered to be civil offences punishable in terms of fines and imprisonment by the civil authorities, local village, or district administration. To lust after another man's wife is a sin but to have sex relations with her is a civil offence; to steal is a civil offence but to think about a theft before or after the theft is a sin. A sin is something which disturbs a man's relationship to God by "fastening" his thought, by keeping it from running clearly and freely. In this respect, a sin is strictly analogous to the Manus view about any injury to the body which "fastens" the blood—a bruise or swelling which keeps the blood in one place, prevents it free life-giving flow. In the same way, man's mind-soul should be able to move, aware of his relationship to God, relating all that he does to God, free from undue obsession of any sort. So too much desire for a woman, too great a desire to obtain some material object, to make a journey or hold a position, may "fasten" one's thought. Confession is enjoined as a way of getting past crimes off one's mind. If a man steals from another man's tree and is not detected and punished and does not confess, then "Every time he passes that tree his thought will be fast to his theft and he will not be able to think of anything else."

So, in the development of a spiritual theory of human nature, the Manus model has stressed the importance of freedom of movement, a prime essential in the relationship of children and adults to the physical world and to one another, the importance of control over the body, which must ever be free to act, the importance of freedom of thought and of control over one's thinking. [What we have called autonomy]

As any impediment in freedom of the blood to move is felt as an injury or a sickness, so also any impediment to the smooth flow of thought
is also a spiritual sickness. Physical sickness is still a punishment
sent from God because one's mind-soul is in the wrong, as it was
once a punishment sent by Sir Ghost because one's body had done the
wrong thing or failed to do the right thing. (1956a, p. 322-323)

2. The Mountain Arapesh

(a) Introduction

The mountain Arapesh are a mild undernourished people who live in
the steep unproductive Torricelli Mountains of New Guinea. The word
"Arapesh" means simply "human being" and refers to a number of related tribes
in the area against whom the mountain Arapesh define their self-identity
in a negative manner. Poor themselves, they are always struggling to save
enough to buy songs and dance-steps and new fashions from the trading people
of the sea-coast, and to buy off the sorcerers among the fiercer people of the
interior plains.

The living are felt to belong to the land rather than to be its owners
and their duty is the cooperative upkeep of this ancestral land. Their greatest
fear is that each generation will reach maturity shorter in stature than their
forebears, until finally there will be no people left to look after the land.
While each individual belongs to a particular garden, all work is done in
cooperative groups. As a result, an individual spends most of his time
responding to other's requests and only a small proportion of the time is
he the 'host' of a party for his own purposes. In fact, this 'helpful', group
approach is, given their type of cultivation, much less efficient than an
individual approach would be.

"The fundamental premises of Arapesh culture are organized on an

* In future I will refer to the mountain Arapesh simply as "Arapesh".
affective, rather than upon a cognitive basis." (1940a, p. 339) They have many myths, but "these cannot be said to be a structure upon which they base their view of the universe, but rather to be ways in which their basic emotional values are symbolically expressed." (1940a, p. 340) They lack any will or capacity to master the world by knowledge or by technique.

(b) Basic Dichotomies

To an Arapesh, the real order of the universe lies within human beings themselves and in the contrasts between the physiological natures and functions of men and women. This is the basic dichotomy which controls life. On the one hand, stand men, with right hands which plant yams and kill game to feed children, with blood which is essentially nourishing and life-giving, but also with dangerous masculinity on the other side, stand women, with a reproductive life-giving system which, in its menstrual aspect, is antithetical to the growth of yams and children. A rigorous watchfulness over their own highly charged reproductivity is demanded of the women; an equal watchfulness and a ritual guarding of their maleness by the ceremonies of the tamberran cult is required of the men. (1940a, p. 344)

This is really a double dichotomy, for apart from the male-female pair of elements there is an opposition between active sexuality in either sex and the nurturing, growing role. Sexuality is dangerous for the growth of yams, pigs, one's children, one's elders, or even oneself. The Arapesh have a particular fear of precocious sexuality in children.

These dichotomies are well expressed in certain taboos. A menstruating or pregnant woman must avoid contaminating the yam gardens or the pigs. A man must not enter his yam garden immediately after intercourse. A man who sees a marsalai (a spirit symbolic of extreme lustful maleness) must turn to a menstruating woman, the opposite extreme, to be neutralized
or he may die or loose his powers to grow things. During later pregnancy
and until the child is able to walk, the father must abstain from all sexual
activity, even with a second wife, if he wants his child to develop. A young
married couple must ritually protect their aging parents from the dangers of
their young sexuality.

It is typical of the Arapesh that the power inherent in sexual activity
or in aggression, or in magic, is as dangerous to the owner as to others.
The young girl at first menstruation is taught to put stinging nettles into
her vagina, if she is to continue growing. Similarly, the boy is taught to
cut his penis and let out his bad blood whenever he has "eaten badly", i.e.,
when he feels guilty about his budding sexual impulses.

(c) Womb Envy

Another "basic Arapesh conception is the superiority of the maternal
role and that the male consistently imitates the female in his efforts to take
over this role." (1940a, p. 350) In other words, where western culture
patterns the man as aggressively sexual and the woman as nurturing, and
prohibits the interchange of these functions, Arapesh culture patterns both
men and women as nurturing and rejects aggressive sexuality for either of
them.

The maternal, nurturing role for the father can be seen in the case of
reproduction. After conception, the father must "work", by frequent inter-
course, to nourish the child with semen until it is "fastened", a period of
about two months. "For the child is not the product of a moment’s passion,
but is made by father and mother, carefully, over time." (1935a, p. 33)
After birth, both father and mother sleep with the child and even the father
is said to be "in bed having a baby!" (1935a, p. 34) Indeed the same verb
is used for both mother and father to say "bear" a baby. One even comments
on how handsome a man was "before he had all those children." (1935a, p. 39) The soul of the child, is present at birth; the name however, is not given until the child's first laugh. The soul may come from either parent, and its origin in each case can be determined from the facial features. Many rituals, mostly centered on food, are also needed to promote the child's growth and are performed by the father as well as the mother.

All later links between parents and child are based on the fact that the parents grew the child; they fed it and kept the ritual food and sex taboos. All love and affection, among the Arapesh, are related to this nurturing kind of relationship. Even the relationship of husband and wife is seen as one of cultivation rather than of sex. A man "grows" his wife. She is given to him, while he is yet a boy, as a younger sister whom he must feed and grow and care for until he brings her to maturity. Specifically, this means he must avoid all precocious sexual experience with her until after puberty. The later stability of marriage is based not on sexual attraction but on the nurturing relationship between the two.

(d) Tamberan Cult

In much of the surrounding area, the Tamberan cult is used to terrify women and children and keep them subordinated to the men. Among the Arapesh, the nurturing and womb-envying patterns are, predictably, predominant. The initiates are separated in a group and well-fed, perhaps for the only time in their lives. It is revealed to them that the feared Tamberan, which must not be seen by the women or children for it would endanger their growth and reproduction, is really non-existent and is just a set of flutes played by men. A ritual meal of blood (symbol of growth) from the arms of the older men gives the initiate power, the power to grow himself and others, not sexual potency. A divinatory ceremony reveals who has experimented with sex, and he is punished by a ritual breaking of the
oral genital taboo.

At no point is rivalry between the older men and the youths expressed. The initiation is not the hazing, degrading or subordination of the upspringing sexuality of the youths by the threatening older men, as in many initiations. Rather, it is the last step in the nurturing concern of the fathers. The father has already found a wife for his son, he has protected his growing son from his adult sexuality and now is only too happy to step down from the sexual cycle of his life into safe old age. The son, now and after marriage, in turn protects his father from the budding sexuality of himself and his young wife, the wife he and his father "grew" cooperatively. *(1935a, p. 64)*

(e) Oral Emphasis

It is not surprising that such a nurturing culture would have a strong oral emphasis. The child is nursed until it is three or four years old. It "is permitted to suckle all day, and as it grows older and the mother has to leave it behind when she goes on short trips, she makes up for her absence by suckling it for hours. Nevertheless, these increasing absences of the mother... leave the child desolate and rebellious and seem to lay a basis for the child's later temper tantrums when food is refused it, and later still, tantrums when anything is refused it." *(1937a, p. 44)* Older children have hundreds of stylized ways of playing with their lips and such play has come to be regarded as a symbol of childhood for the Arapesh.

Food taboos become extremely important in later childhood and adulthood---again to protect one's growing powers. Foods are divided into two groups, those for sexually active adults and those for children and the old. Guilt is experienced as "having eaten carelessly." *(1940a, p. 347)*

* Mead seems to imply here that the oedipal sex rivalry found in western culture is absent among the Arapesh.
Food and sex are very closely linked in Arapesh symbolism, congruently with the tremendous development of orality, and the relationship in which the husband provides food for his betrothed wife, but does not eat food for his betrothed wife, but does not eat food which she has cooked until the marriage is consummated. Food is also the most potent carrier of power, so that food is exceedingly dangerous when it has come into contact with the tambaran, with magic, or with sorcery, on the one hand, or, on the other, when it has been cooked on a fire beside which there has been sex intercourse, or which has in any way come in contact with menstruation. The Arapesh have a very vivid sense of the contribution which food makes to the body and of its intimate connection with the body. The fact that this is a living connection is evidenced by the sorcery usages. A part of a piece of food, half a yam, or the butt of a sugar cane stalk, the other half of which the victim has eaten, is suitable material for sorcery because it is tied to the victim by a living bond. (1940a, p. 346 347)

The distribution of food forms one of the strongest bonds of adult society. The products of a man's labour, the catches of his traps, the pigs he kills must be distributed to others. A surplus of yams by any individual is the occasion for a "feast" in which all his yams are piled up and distributed to others as seed yams. Economic individualism is not allowed and is indeed assimilated to incest.

The incest formula which describes how a man should behave about his mother and sisters, runs: -

Other people's mothers
Other people's sisters
Other people's pigs
Other people's yams which have been piled up
You may eat.
Your own mother
Your own sister
Your own pigs
Your own yams which have been piled up
You may not eat.

In feeling, pigs one has grown, one's yam surplus, game one has killed, sago one has planted, are all included in the incest taboo,
from which sex and aggression are outlawed. Greediness and grabbing, aggressive individualism in sex and in regard to food are alike interdicted. (1940a, p. 352-353)

(f) Aggression

The economic system is then based on the oral-receptive-personal categories rather than the anal-reciprocal-thinglike categories as is most common, as, for example, among the Manus. As a result, the society depends for its functioning on the maintenance of good emotional relationships between the participants. Hence any aggression, violence or anger towards others in the tribe must be excluded and any disagreements must be expressed in oblique symbolic form. The foundation for this configuration in the individual is in the reaction of the child to food. We already saw that he expected to be passively fed and reacted to the absence of food with temper tantrums rather than extroverted aggression or effective action. Throughout childhood the child meets the same cultural form.

Little children are only allowed to play with each other as long as they do not quarrel. The minute there is the slightest altercation the adult steps in. The agressor ... is dragged off the scene of battle and held firmly. The angry child is allowed to kick and scream, to roll in the mud, to throw stones or firewood about on the ground, but he is not allowed to touch the other child. This habit of venting one's rage at others upon one's surroundings persists into adult life. An angry man will spend an hour banging on a slit gong, or hacking with an ax at one of his own palm-trees. (1935a, p. 45)

A number of masochistic practices and the inhibition of sexual passion are also closely related. The only anger or violence which is allowed is that in the defence of the rights of others and this "is again a maternal phrasing." (1935a, p. 103)

What little external sanctions the Arapesh do have against the really aggressive man who has not been successfully encultured are characteristically
inefficacious. When blood is spilt, the injured party must pay a fine to his mother's brother -- to whom his blood belongs.

(g) Sorcery

Another device to control aggression within the tribe is also related to the oral tendencies of the Arapesh culture. The group of relatives who will never refuse him food are opposed to the evil men of the Plains who practice sorcery. Again (see p. 103) the sorcery involves food and other exuviae, especially sexual exuviae and is based on the food-growth-sex complex. A fellow tribesman, "out of his right mind," will in compulsive but temporary anger pass some exuviae of his victim to a sorcerer among the Plains people who may use it to cause illness or keep it for blackmail later. By the time this aggression takes effect, the sorcerer, an outsider, can be held responsible and all hate is deflected from fellow tribesmen. All death is explained by such sorcery as are most illnesses, except those due to "careless eating."

The violence of the men of the Plains is matched by the highly sexed nature of their women. Together they form the very antithesis of mountain Arapesh culture and allow all aggressive and sexual drives as well as illness and death to be projected outside the tribe.

(h) Kin Classes

Within the tribe itself, the sex dichotomy leads to peculiar kin distinctions. The distinction of marriage and blood relationships is of little importance to the Arapesh, rather they articulate their society in terms of relationships through kin of one's own sex (class one) and through kin of the opposite sex (class two). As a secondary principle, they take the husband and wife as one unit. Thus Class One relationship includes not only brother and father's brother, but also wife's sister, her "sibling-of-the-same-sex,"


and Class Two includes sister, mother's brother and wife's brother, i.e. brother-in-law. Within Class One, the relationships are largely complementary and ordered in terms of age. Class Two, however, are mostly symmetrical and it is with Class Two relatives that a man will visit and talk, exchange, hunt and form cooperative work teams.

In actual content, it may almost be said that these two classes of relatives correspond in Arapesh feeling to the self and the non-self, and that Class One has as its base a combination of incestuous and homosexual implications in which the wife * is identified with the trusted brother, as one of the same sex siblings who remains at home, while Class Two contains all that the Arapesh know of a heterosexual, non-incestuous tie. The fact that the homosexual attitude is attached to a member of the opposite sex and the heterosexual attitude to a member of the same sex does not invalidate this assumption about the psychic attitudes involved. In this connection it may be remembered that no overt homosexuality occurs among the Arapesh, and that all heterosexual expression which is outside the warm, domestic tie with the long-acclimated wife is felt as exceedingly dangerous and is much feared. The own sister becomes very early the stranger woman, who lives at a distance, with whom there is a tie, but no longer continuous reassuring domesticity. Her husband, the brother-in-law, shares in this exciting, dangerous tie. (1947a, p. 199)

Every Arapesh community is continually oscillating between marrying their daughters abroad and establishing new and exciting ties but running the risk of sorcery, and marrying them at home and becoming ingrown, turned in upon itself, and lacking in excitement. (1947a, p. 199)

* Remember he has "grown" his wife since she was six or seven in his own home, and his own sister left at the same age for another household.
The extreme of security would be to marry one's own sister, and this is the incest which is associated with eating one's own yams or pigs. In fact, such incest is very rare for the aim of marriage is to get new brother-in-laws, to establish more communal ties, and such incest would short-circuit this aim. But in the sense that the Arapesh marries a girl he has "grown" himself and has lived with since childhood, and towards whom he has learned to control all sexual passion so as not to stunt her growth, all Arapesh marriages are of an incestuous tone.

The extreme of excitement would be, of course, to enter into a sexual relationship with a highly sexed Plains woman, but that way leads to sorcery and to death.

(i) The Arapesh Ideal

The mountain Arapesh are then a highly "oral" people who structure their life about dichotomies of male and female, growth and sexuality, close, friendly kin group and evil outsiders. They select as the ideal for all personalities in their culture, man and woman, the same ideal we in the west have adopted for woman only. Some temperamentally aggressive and sexual types of both sexes were born into the culture, but were maladapted to it. Nyelahai, for instance, "was the one who approached most strongly to a western-European ideal of the male, well built, with a handsome face with fine lines, a well-integrated body, violent, possessive, arbitrary, dictatorial, positive and aggressively sexed. Among the Arapesh, he was a pathetic figure." (1935a, p. 109)

Unfortunately, this ideal of nonviolent, unaggressive behaviour based on emotional rather than on objective technical control over the world, is most unsuited, says Mead, for survival. They manage to struggle along
in the mountains and to continue their meager standard of living only because
the land is so poor that no one else wants it! (1949b, p. 125 & 129)

(j) Summary

We have then the picture of human beings who view themselves as
living in a universe which they have not attempted to rationalize and deal
with cognitively, about which they have built up no cosmology, within which
they have established no rigid order. Instead, their whole attention has
centered upon an internalized struggle between man and his human nature,
which is conceived as dual, one part symbolized as "bad blood," the aggressive
sexuality leading to death, death of children, failure of crops, lack of
success in hunting, and death of self; the other symbolized by "good blood,"
the parental use of sexuality which renders it, in a sense, asexual and
entirely unaggressive and cherishing, which leads to the birth and health of
children, the growth of crops and pigs, the finding of game. It is not possible
to say that there is a dichotomy between sex activity on the one hand and
parenthood on the other. This is too simple. Rather one must say that two
aspects of the sexuality of each individual, woman as well as man, are recog-
ized. One leads to life, the other to death, whether it be the fate of a child
in the womb, or of yams which are planted in the ground. Even sex activity
with one's own trusted wife is dangerous, unless husband and wife are on
very good terms and completely willing; otherwise the note of aggression, of
personal selfishness and, therefore, of danger, enters. On the other hand, with
a long-known, domesticated, trusted wife, within the circle of the home group
where all are trusted and loved, sex is spoken of gently as "play" and is a
safe and good activity. (1940a, p. 357-358)
3. The Balinese

(a) General Orientation

Bali is a small Indonesian island with a population of about one million, formerly under Dutch rule. It has received successive waves of cultural influence from Buddhist and Hindu sources, with a less important Chinese impact and a very slight Mohammedan influence. Immigrant high-caste Javanese form the central authority structure of kingdoms ruled by rajas, but each village maintained local control over its own affairs. This system was basically continued by the Dutch.

Margaret Mead and George Bateson arrived in 1936 and studied the Balinese for two years. The results were published in two largely photographic books and a number of articles.

Contending that the Balinese had a basic cultural stock of its own onto which the various layers of cultural accretion had been grafted, Mead and Bateson chose a small, relatively primitive village, Bajoeng Gede, where exterior cultural influences were presumably at a minimum, and the culture could be studied in its simplest state. They maintain that though the forms vary somewhat throughout Bali, the basic ethos remains constant.

(b) Continuity and Circularity

The Balinese ethos is characterized by Continuity and Circularity. A Westerner sees life as starting at birth, developing linearly by a series of conflicts, of traumas, and of climaxes of love and hate, as self-fulfillment in a real goal-orientated world, and as terminated by the final and ultimate unknown, death.

The Balinese will have none of this. Their universe is a rigidly organized
continuity of cycles, unpunctuated by climaxes, and in which even death itself
is never really final. Each individual's place is clearly and securely defined
on the great three-generation cycle which takes him from the sacred world
of the gods to birth, through the profane world of marriage until, with old
age, he again approaches the sacred, visiting the world of the gods again
at death, only to be reincarnated in his great-grandchild.
(A great-grandfather must give a penny to his great-grandchild if he meets
him, as an atonement for the impropriety of their double existence.) There
is no self to be developed at birth, for he has seen it all before; there is no
dangerous finality in death.

The cycle stretches to the future too, but no contingency or insecurity
lurks in the shadowy world of becoming.

In reply to questions about future events... the Balinese will reply
'doeroengterang'—'it is not clear'—a phrase which implies that
the future is fixed, but that, like the latent image on an exposed
photographic plate, it has not yet developed." (1942b, p. 5)

Similarly, questions like "what would have happened if ...?" make no
sense to him, for such did not occur, and so could not have occurred.

Even in the fictitious world of the theatre to which the Balinese are
ritually devoted, there is no breach with the continuity of daily life. Theatrical
themes are just the same themes as in daily life, with the same problems and
solutions, but lived out in a more intense manner. And by identifying with
actor instead of with character acted, treating all as professional players
and allowing the audience to participate fully in the drama, even the usual
aesthetic break between life and ritual or art is eliminated. There is no gap
between performance and rehearsal, professional and amateur, stage and
audience, or real life and fantasy. The actor and farmer are one and the
same man. "The absence of sequence even in the life-span of the individual
and the absence of discontinuity between ritual role and everyday role seem crucial." (1955a, p. 47)

(c) Spatial Orientation and Levels

Just as the temporal cycle is organized into a continuum of the sacred (birth, death) and profane (middle age) parts, but with no clear breaks, so the spatial framework of Balinese life is divided into sacred and profane directions: east is superior to west, and inland (towards the central mountain of the gods) is superior to seawards. Temples and shrines are built in the inland-east quadrant of the village or house, whereas kitchens, cemeteries and latrines are placed at the opposite end. "The words for the cardinal points are among the first that the child learns and are used even for the geography of the body. A Balinese will tell you that you have a fly on the 'west' side of your face." (1942b, p. 6)

Of lesser importance—-it is more conscious and subject to joking and playful violation—-is the notion of "elevation". The castes are arranged hierarchically. A Brahmin high priest must always sit on the higher chair; food (a god) must be raised off the ground level on which the people sit; offerings must be made in high shrines; young children, still close to the sacred, must never touch the ground; "respect" language must be used to those higher than the speaker; dancers (possessed by gods) may dance on one's shoulders; middle-aged women (profane) must never be carried; humans (especially children) must never crawl, like an animal or a lower demon; dogs crawl on the ground scavenging and eating feces. The head is the highest part of the body, nothing must be placed above it, and flowers which may have fallen down from the head to the ground cannot be replaced. An incestuous couple must crawl on the ground with yokes on their necks and eat from a trough like animals. Even at 18 months, a baby "will
shriek and rage if another child is held over his head". (1942b, p. 12)

This system is subject to theatrical caricature where the elevations or statues are confused or inverted.

"The very tone of the laughter is a further index of what the caricature does, for it has the unmistakable character of laughter at a pornographic joke. ... In Bali ... the restrictions surrounding personal relationships in terms of seniority, caste, and directions and levels seem to have the same quality as the restrictions which, in many cultures, surround sex; and the skits upon status, although rooted in interpersonal relationships, have some of their most satisfying expressions in inversions of the human body---dances in which people stand on their heads with feet doing duty as hands and with masks set on their pubes; carvings in which the head is set on a neck so elongated that it can be twisted around to fit between the legs." (1942b, p. 12)

It would seem that the Balinese sense of elevation is connected with their experience of the body.

(d) Learning

The Balinese experience of his body seems different than a Westerner's. Learning, for example, is primarily kinesthetic. From birth, and "all through babyhood, the child is fitted into a frame of behaviour of imputed speech and imputed thought and complex gesture far beyond his skill and maturity" (1942b, p. 13) --- for, after all, he has gone through all this many times before in previous incarnations. So the words are said for him, his body is passively moved to perform the right gesture many times before he responds actively. Learning to walk, to play musical instruments and learning to dance all follow the same pattern of continual passive movement of the body, with a minimum of verbal direction. This is learning by rote muscular behaviour.
Under such a system of learning, one can only learn if one is completely relaxed and if will and consciousness as we understand those terms are almost in abeyance. (1942b, p. 15)

As a result of such a system, "Where human beings in most cultures have limitations placed upon their behaviour so that the older they grow, the narrower the limits within which their posture varies, the Balinese retain the flexibility that is characteristically seen in the human foetus moving with a fluidity that suggests suspension in amniotic fluid rather than a consistent outer sustained demeanour in an organized world." (1951a, p. 124)

Carried in a sling against the body of another, even the disciplined conflict of impulse with material object is mediated by the cultural pattern. To grasp with the left hand is impolite, so babies are carried on the left hip to leave the carrier's right hand free. It is then the baby's left, impolite hand which spontaneously reaches for objects. This behaviour is disallowed and the mother pulls out the baby's right hand from behind her and makes the baby grasp in the acceptable manner. In later life, "there is a very profound difference between left and right. The left hand should be used for unclean things—the genitals, feces, etc. --- while the right hand should be used for eating and for giving and receiving gifts." (1942b, p. 100) The left hand of the artist drawing with his right, takes up independent series of expressive postures, (1942b, p. 100) and in the spear dance, the spear, a phallic symbol, is held by the left hand. (1942b, p. 135) Spontaneous sensory or explanatory functions are lefthanded.

Spontaneous impulses, then, are not so much disciplined as ignored, while behaviour is kept continually flexible to receive cultural forms which are independent of one's spontaneity. Hence the continued extreme flexibility combined with rote muscular learning independent of the will.
In such learning, verbalization is kept minimal.
"The Balinese learn virtually nothing from verbal instruction and most Balinese adults are incapable of following out the three consecutive orders that we regard as a sign of a normal three-year-old intelligence. ... Only by ... laborious assimilation of words into word gestures made by oneself, do words come to have any meaning for action." (1942b, p. 15) Similarly, Balinese story-telling is dialectic and proceeds by question and answer.
"A thread, even a simple verbal thread, in which one's body plays no role, has no continuous meaning." (1942b, p. 15) "The Balinese talk continually while working, but the talk has no relationship to the muscular work done." (1942b, p. 12) The language itself "is extraordinarily rich in specific words and poor in general-purpose words." (1951a, p. 190) Indeed, this seems to be one reason for Mead's photographic presentation of the culture, for "there is a very great difference among cultures in their susceptibility to verbal report." (1953a, p. 49) "Some cultures rely more on non-verbal cues in their communicating .... The Balinese are such a culture." (1955a, p. 38)

(c) The Body

(i) "Rame", Noisy Crowdedness

The Balinese may be said to place much more emphasis on the body than we do.

A Balinese baby does not live in an organized world of objects, of toys and furniture, of beds and baby carriages, of floors, streets and walls, as a Western baby does. Its "chief physical environment is the arms or the hip of another human being who is lightly conscious of its presence." (1951a, p. 41) It cannot even touch the ground until at its 105th day birthday some of its sacredness has worn off. And even then it is usually carried to avoid
it crawling like an animal. No clothes separate it from its carrier, rather a sling binds them together. When a child is lost, he doesn't seek his "home", but his mother, He faces the world in continual contact with another's skin, a passive participant to another's dance or work or fear. In later life "the human environment is definitive" and the Balinese love close bodily contact, sleep together, pressed tight in a theater audience, touch each other in processions. "A Balinese crowd will pack almost solid without any of those spaces which we try to preserve around ourselves." (1942b, p. 64) This is "Rame", crowds and noise, many orchestras playing different pieces within earshot of each other, hustle and noise. A Balinese will put bells on his oxen to make his lonely field seem a little more "Rame". Yet such crowds are impersonal and at any given time many of the so physically present individuals may be "away", absent psychically, with a vacant distant look on their faces, completely ignoring the laughter or activity of the group.

In such proximity, the Balinese are happy and confident; they can face their Rajah or the terrors of a strange temple in another village, or travel to dance in Paris or New York. "But one Balinese, isolated from those he knows and taken to a strange place, wilts and sickens; people say that is because he is paling -- disorientated -- the word used for trances, insanity, for being confused or lost." (1955a, p. 50)

(ii) Integration and Disintegration of the Body

Besides the terror of disorientation, the Balinese also have a deep anxiety about the disintegration of the body, especially of a rotting corpse. The animated puppet symbolizes this fear, for "This body, which moves only in parts and without volition, hardly seems like a unit at all, and may well be composed of a series of separate units, each with a life of its own. (1942b, p. 18) In dance, the dancers often go exaggeratedly limp, like a puppet, or they are possessed, in trance, by a god who makes them act without
volition. Shadow-play puppets of graveyard spirits represent isolated arms or legs, or headless bodies all with their own independent animation.

We have seen how head and pubes may be interchanged and how the left and right hands are differentiated. Balinese baby's toes are also more differentiated than American baby's toes. The greatest development of independence of parts is in the hands and fingers. "Balinese hands at rest rarely lie with the fingers in seriated regular flexion as our hands do..." and "The fingers of Balinese children.... fall into the most complicated and seemingly discrepant, though often graceful attitudes." (1951a, p. 154) Individual fingers may "wander off." A five-minute series of photographs shows one child's hand left forgotten without movement while the rest of the body performed many activities. (1951a, p. 172) Some performances may put or leave only the hand in trance. Watching a cock fight, one hand may identify with each cock and follow the independent fortunes of their models. The painter's nonworking hand often adopts the most interesting postures. This disassociation appears as much in sleep as in work.

When performing some activity, only those limbs and muscles actually necessary are used. "The more coordinated and disciplined the motion of the body becomes, the smaller the muscle groups with which the Balinese operates. Where an American or a New Guinea native will involve almost every muscle in his body to pick up a pin, the Balinese merely uses the muscles immediately relevant to the act, leaving the rest of the body undisturbed." (1951a, p. 17)

Similarly, in the use of the hand, the sensory ends of the fingers are preferred to the palm of the hand for most activities. The Balinese will prefer to grasp objects between the tips of the fingers and the heel of the hand. "Thumb opposition, grasping between thumb and forefinger, is very much less developed in the Balinese children than in the New Haven [American]
children." (1951a, p. 52) Also inprehension, Balinese children do not anticipate the grasp with their fingers as American children do. Such traits, and others such as general bodily outward rotation (and hyperextension of parts) "could... be related to the lack of goal orientation in Bali". (1951a, p. 203)

Associated with this is the "autocosmic" tendency (see below p. 120) to treat objects as extensions of bodily parts. Children themselves, are often treated in their sling "as if they were parts of own body to which one is temporarily not attending..." (1951a, p. 144)

None of this, however, leads to any lack of coordination, for Balinese balance, for instance, is excellent, although it is achieved by "rearranging themselves where they are" rather than by moving as American children would. Just as some god-puppets represent disassociated parts, others represent extreme, even suffocating corporal integration. And the Balinese himself remains flexible as a part of the social group, "the whole moving in such a way that any casual group of Balinese seem to compose themselves like a ballet." (1951a, p. 50)

"The Balinese have their fantasies of bodily disintegration, but as one watches an adult Balinese, one is impressed with the sense of the whole body, with the way in which the tip of the finger is an integrated part of the whole. Watching a member of our own culture, one receives quite a different impression; the body appears as a trunk and the arms and legs as appendages which are never quite in unison with it." (1942b, p. 19)

(iii) Orifices of the Body

Children meet the world by a series of orifices, and their primary interpretation of such experience persists into later life. In Bali, this
experience is sharply dichotomized. The Balinese child is carried in a sling close to his mother's breast to which he has free access whenever he wishes. His unusually high position means that he draws milk up into his mouth. For solid food, however, he is lain on his back, with a pile of mashed, pre-chewed food placed on his mouth and forced into it. "The infant splutters and chokes, helpless and almost always resistant to the mountain of mush which is being forced on it." (1942b, p. 20) Later, the eating of food is generally something unpleasant, to be done as quickly and privately as possible and in an irritable mood. (Food is premashed and stuffed downwards into the mouth; a young child may place the whole bowl over his face.) As might be expected, however, the inverse behaviour also occurs and food is treated as a god, offered to the gods, and requires elaborate preparation. Defecation is assimilated to food and also involves privacy. Food dropped on the ground is assimilated to feces and cannot be eaten. Dogs eat feces and are assimilated to the lower demons who eat food offerings laid on the ground. Any similarity of human beings to animals, e.g. by crawling, or by bestiality, is shunned except on ritual occasions, e.g. as punishment for incest (animal-like), during funerals (where men are assimilated to dogs in scavenging the unclean), or during other necessary contacts with the unclean where the riotous scrambling of the dogs is taken as model.
A human being stands upright, never crawls, is embarrassed by eating, keeps his right hand for his food.

Adult Balinese have a fear of oral aggression and are sensitive to open mouths in themselves and in others, often covering the mouth with cloth or a hand, or stuffing it up for hours with a huge wad of tobacco. Ritual and painful filing of the teeth causes tension not only in the initiated, but in all the spectators as well, who on other occasions try to avoid identification with pain.

On the other hand, urination is assimilated to the suckling experience,
is casual and free, requiring no privacy even in adulthood. Similarly, snacks and tidbits that are taken freely during the day and bitten into, not premashed like real food, are pleasant and are eaten on a level or upwards. Drink naturally follows the same model. The mouth is washed with water before and after eating.

(iv) Auto-Cosmic Play

Many genital symbols appear to be universal or natural and as such tell us little about specific cultural structures. Rather "we need to know what sort of things are symbolic in this sense, so that we may know what psychological role the genital organs themselves play in the character," (1942b, p. 131) e.g. extensions of self, or independent powers. "Balinese genital symbolism is almost entirely of the autocosmic type; i.e., some object in the outside world is identified as an extension of the own body." (1942b, p. 131) (This category is opposed to "microcosmic" where a drama is enacted in miniature such as with toys and "macrocosmic" where the drama is enacted symbolically in real life.) Most Balinese symbols "combine autonomous movement with responsiveness," (1942b, p. 135) in line with their fantasies of independently animated parts of the body.

Babies are among the most important genital symbols. They are treated both as unattended-to parts of the body and as toys and puppets, but these two behaviours are in no way conflicting since Balinese treat toys and other objects as extensions of the body. Babies are passed from hand to hand and enjoyed as objects which can be stimulated and expected to respond, a behaviour, as we shall see, that only lasts a couple of years and cannot be found in adult Balinese. Babies may be flicked under the chin, or have fingers or penis flipped or tugged, made to laugh or cry, teased and passed to someone else.
But babies are ambiguous, for they share both the attraction and repulsion characteristic of the sacred. They respond as the adult himself must never allow himself to do. They are called "mouse", "caterpillar", "grub" until their 105th day birthday when they are named; they must not be approached by holy persons. Grubs eat corpses and sterile women must suckle grubs in hell as punishment.

Men usually prefer cocks to babies, and such fighting is a very important sport—a sport which the maladjusted may "take to" as a man might "take to drink" in our society. A man's cock is bathed and preened, ruffled and smoothed, stimulated with red pepper on its beak or anus, made to fight by tieing spurs under its feet. Where babies are separate from the carriers and may be passed about, cocks tend rather to remain in one place, a newcomer slipping in behind the cock and the original owner moving aside.

Children often play with small animate objects, birds or insects, on the end of a string. The child in no way identifies with the live toy by pity or care, but, rather, is interested in its responses when he pulls the string. "The sense of a body-part symbol which is attached by a thread, and which has a life and wilfulness of its own becomes strongly developed." (1942b, p. 25) In the shadow-play, obviously phallic spears become completely detachable.

The interest of the child in its own body parts as toys is reinforced by the handling he receives. A girl is patted in the vulva with the exclamation "pretty female"; a boy's penis is flicked and pulled to the accompaniment of "handsome male"—the native terms being specific to each sex. "The child's body becomes a stage and his body parts the actors on that stage." (1942b, p. 26) People play on his body as on a musical instrument and continually turn the child's attention back at himself.
The real stage where drama and dance are performed is a hollow square of human bodies, against which the beautiful hand and finger movement are almost invisible "so that only kinesthetic identification with the movement itself makes it possible to realize it." (1942b, p. 28) For the shadow play, the audience sits on both sides of the screen and is more interested in the technique of puppeteering than in the shadow results. The puppets are accordingly painted elaborately on both sides--quite unnecessary if only the shadows were important. We have already noted the identification of the audience with the acting rather than the character. There are no curtain for the off-scene actors who sit among the audience, the latter in turn, feeling free to join the actors at any moment. The dramas themselves are but the intense and exaggerated representations of the common emotions of daily life. "The members of the audience, playing out the scenes with their own bodies, are drawn into the play, audience and actor alike preoccupied with their own bodies." (1942b, p. 28)

(f) Parents and Children

In Bali, the gods are thought of as the children of the people, not as august paternal figures. Speaking through the lips of those in trance, the gods address the villagers as "papa" and "mama" and the people are said to spoil and indulge their gods, the same term being used as that which is used when spoiling or indulging a child or a monarch." (1942b, p. 29) We have already noted the sacred character of the child, based on the reincarnation doctrine. The entranced dancer, possessed by a god, acts as a child. "Tranced, relaxed, puppet-like, sacred and yet completely under control, compliant and yet willful, the sangiang dancer is the ideal object for Balinese parental attitudes...." (1942b, p. 29-30) At the end of the dance the god is exhorted to return to heaven, but if he does not, the little girl is summarily dispossessed by a special ritual---in spite of herself, and becomes again a very ordinary girl of the village.
(1) Mother

Parents, however, have more specific relationships to their offspring. The mother's close bodily contact with her child allows in a fearful situation for the contagion of inner panic from her to the child, even when she herself doesn't show fear. The screaming child is then told not to act afraid, but "no one ever attempts to furnish enough reassurance so that the child's internal fear may be dispelled." (1942b, p. 31) Fear is also used to control the child's behaviour and the straying child hears the fear-laden cry of "Argh!" followed by a scare symbol such as "Fire", "Snake!" "Feces !", "White man!". Such words are chosen at random with no concern for their relevance to the situation. This technique is used to keep the child within a "safe" framework of life. Note that fear is aroused in the child by contagion with the mother's body or simulated verbal panic and is a fear with, as part of, the mother and not a fear of her. "This practice lays the groundwork for the continuation of fear as a major sanction and stimulus in Balinese life," (1942a, p. 31) and we have seen how a Balinese reacts with "paling" when alienated from his secure environment.

Since the fearful child runs back to its mother's waiting, comforting arms, to safety, an ambivalent attitude to fear is developed, and this emotion is actually cultivated by the Balinese. This ambivalence is all the stranger because this "startled" reaction of the mother is one of the very few emotional responses she makes to the child.

This fear of emotional response is seen in the mother's relationship to the child who, from 5 or 6 months onwards is subjected to a "series of broken sequences, of unreached climaxes. The mother continually stimulates the child to show emotion--love or desire, jealousy or anger--only to turn away, to break the thread, as the child, in rising passion, makes a demand for some emotional response on her part." (1942b, p. 32) She stimulat
him playfully to suckle, but looks away uninterested when he takes the
nipple; she threatens to leave him but picks him up and talks to someone
else when he bursts into tears. Even from birth, he was held limply with
unattentive hands or hung unattended to in his sling. Weaning is accomplished
by borrowing another baby who is playfully held over his head (Balinese
insult) or put to the breast in place of him, but before his enraged jealousy
can reach a climax, the borrowed baby is handed to him as a toy, cutting
his emotion in two, as it were. The child, at first, reacts to this gradually
increasing frustration by periods of sulking or by tantrums--depending on
his temperament--but normal children learn by the age of three of four to
withdraw from all responsiveness to refuse to be baited. "And once
established, his unresponsiveness will last through live." (1942b, p. 33)

During this period, the child attends the theatre where the standardized
plot is essentially the same throughout Bali. A Witch, dressed as an old
hag, becomes in the thick of the plot, "a masked supernatural being whose
tongue is studded with flame, whose nails are many inches long, whose
breasts are abhorrently hairy and pendulous, and whose teeth are tusks...
Followers of the Dragon [a kindly father symbol], armed with Krisses
[daggers], enter and approach the Witch ready to attack her. But she
waves her magic cloth--the cloth baby sling--and after each attack they
crouch down before her, magically cowed. Finally, they rush upon her in
pairs, stabbing ineffectually at the witch who has become a half-limp
bundle in their arms. She is uninvolved and offers no resistance, but one
by one they fall to the ground in deep trance, some limp, some rigid. From
this trance they are aroused by the Dragon who clasps his jaws over them....
Now able to move again, but not yet returned to normal consciousness, they
move about in a somnambulistic state, turning their daggers which were
powerless against the Witch, against their own breasts, fixing them upon
a spot which is said to itch unbearably. Thus symbolically they complete

Contrast the sense of bodily dirtiness symbolizing guilt in our culture.
the cycle of the childhood trauma—the approach to the mother, the rejection of self and the turn-in-upon themself." (1942b, p. 35)
The Witch is never killed, and the performers are never hurt, but safely revived from trance by the supporting Dragon—the same Dragon who, before the play, marked out the circle of the "stage", establishing the limits of safety for the onlookers.
The Witch in the performance shows postures of "startle"; she is not only a fear-inspiring figure, but..... is Fear". She is not menacing, but induces fear by contagion, by being afraid. The similarity to the mother-experience is clear.

Courtship, symbolized by the institutionalized djoget dancer, a beautiful young girl who dances and flirts tantalizingly with the men of the village, but who may at any time adopt the mask and postures of the Witch. In the theatre, there is a frequent plot, "that of the prince who attempts to abduct a beautiful girl, but through accident gets instead her ugly sister, the "Beast" princess, who is always dressed in the distinctive costume worn by mothers and mothers-in-law." (1932b, p. 32) In each generation, parents try to marry their children to close cousins, while the youth tries to marry glamorous romantic outsiders. Usually the youth succeeds, only to find that the romantic excitement quickly dies as the bride adopts the only pattern of personal relationship she knows, the very pattern he tried to escape from in his mother. "Generation after generation, men continue to dream of the princess and find themselves married to the Witch. (1942b, p. 37)

(ii) Father

The Balinese father, however, is "gentle, playful, satisfying". (1942b, p. 38) The child squirms against the father, usually with his back against him, engages in rough play with him, makes symbolic attempt to "get inside him" by putting his head under his shirt or putting offerings of food in his mouth, and with him "the child may relax with a feeling of utter
relief, away from the strain of either responding to his mother's teasing or refusing to respond at all." (1942b, p. 37) All these postures and actions are performed again with the friendly protective Dragon, a two-man mask in which the carriers are completely inside and who, by enveloping an actor may revive him from trance.

Lying securely with his back against his father, a Balinese child goes quietly to sleep. Faced with tension from his mother or child nurse, or, in adulthood, from fear or anxiety of any kind, the Balinese will slip off into a deep sleep, the sleep of security, the very opposite of the trance state. The very times when an American would be most wakeful, e.g., during a court trial, when he has failed in an assignment, or during a birth (when witches, who feed on new born babies abound) the Balinese will slip off into a deep sleep, the sleep of security, the very opposite of the trance state. The very times when an American would be most wakeful, e.g., during a court trial, when he has failed in an assignment, or during a birth (when witches, who feed on new born babies, abound) the Balinese will lapse into "Takoet, poeles," "in a fright, asleep." (1942b, p. 39)

(g) Stages of Child Development

The Balinese child develops in stages significantly different from an American child. We have already noted the prevalence of human bodies over objects in the child's early life, the way in which his spontaneity is ignored and a pattern of passive learning is substituted, (resulting in a prolonging of his early flexibility), the inattentive relationship of his carrier to him, and the restrictions against his playing on the ground. Balinese children have a low tonal organization, which although perhaps based on some genetical or nutritional factor is organized and patterned by the adults' inattentive and passive approach. This pattern of passivity
and meandering tonus is related to catatonic schizophrenia in our culture. Where American children learn to creep, then stand, then squat, Balinese squat before standing and almost completely avoid the creeping phase. Being carried on the hip and the taboo against "animal-like" creeping may account for their distinction in development. Here Mead assumes the Gesell theory of natural spiral developmental stages in the child, and suggests that Balinese neglect certain possibilities (e.g. creeping), and reinforce others (squatting), thus selecting from the biological potentialities a certain set of possibilities. (Selection Theory) The persistence in Bali of such behaviour as flexibility, low tonus, cupped hands and hyperextension suggests that these are potential biological behaviours which we have not capitalized upon.

Psychological development is also different. Where the American drama is between a "new baby" and the displaced child, the Balinese have a threefold classification. The suckling baby is weaned by a process of teasing and insulting with a borrowed baby (not with the new younger sibling) and as a second-place child, a "knee" baby, he responds with sulks or tantrums, slipping back to the breast when he can, pulling at the mother's sling, anxiously feeling their genitals if boys, or adopting "pregnant" postures, if girls. Adults play with and remarks about the child's genitals (see p. 121) seem to have clearly identified the child with his sex group by this time. With the arrival of a third baby, however, the "knee" baby is displaced and "almost all physical contact with the parent ceases." (1942b, p. 40) This is the stage of unresponsiveness and avoidance of stimulation which is established by about the age of four, and continues until the period of latency when a girl becomes a child nurse and the boys start work in the fields. Deviation from these patterns occur, but are recognized as such.
During latency, the children slowly become more active in the ceremonial and artistic life of the community, at which they have always been present. Puberty is passed over lightly and at about twenty the Balinese will settle down, forming a household and becoming an adult citizen of the village. Marriage is not associated with adulthood and occasionally a Balinese of either sex may fail to marry.

(h) Rites de Passage

The lack of expectation of conflict or change leads to few climaxes in the continual ceremonial life of Bali. Each Balinese is "stuck with" one personality and situation for the whole of this incarnation and it may be better or worse than the past or the next reincarnation. "People say philosophically, 'I am having bad luck this incarnation'" (1942b, p. 45) Only death is a problem, but not for subjective reasons, for immortality is certain. "The sense of personal uniqueness in Bali is slight and people are shy at mentioning their own names or the names of others, but each has an impersonal individuality which is completely tough and incontrovertible." (1942b, p. 45)

The problem with death is the body; "the body cannot finally be separated from the soul, nor can they finally be united." (1942b, p. 46) Integration and disintegration are acted out and re-acted out in many steps of burial, exhumation, reintegration with the soul by various symbolic modes, cremation, throwing the ashes in the sea, and the recreation of the body and soul as replicas at stated periods thereafter. Such scenes are accompanied by the rowdiness and hysterical gaiety which seems to be a Balinese overcompensation for their horror of the unclean (cf role of animality p. 112).
(i) Theatre and Arts

But in a sense the whole of life may considered a rite for Balinese culture selects the temperament of actor and dancer as a model for personality. These roles require spectators and any Balinese can slip easily from audience to stage or vice versa. No professionalism cuts the audience from identification with the art or the actor. There is no separation of drama from life and the function of theatre and of the arts seems to be very important in Bali. In the Western world we develop by individual traumas, administered by individual parents and leading possibly to individual genius, to prophets, artists, or revolutionaries, or to an adulthood of mental maladjustment which, in later life, despite the help of psychiatrists, must ultimately be "solved alone by the traumatized individual." (1955a, p. 44) In Bali, however, the traumas are more standardized and the new cultural needs substituted for the original spontaneous ones have institutionalized models ready for their expression. The refusal of conflict, of jealousy, of spontaneity and of emotional response are all compensated for by the projection of these into the drama in which all participate—but safely, for it is theatre, not reality. Indeed, it is only in exaggerated dramatized events of real life, or in the theatre proper that the Balinese feel at ease with emotional responsiveness. Mead's attempts to communicate with the mother and their children by a normal affection which had held her in such good stead on her previous field trips, failed in Bali and communication was only established after she "learned to exaggerate and caricature [her] friendly attitudes until the Balinese could safely accept them as theatrical rather than real." (1942b, p. 32) "The tendency in Bali [is] to counterpoint the theatre to real life." (1951a, p. 203) On the stage, the whole body is integrated into full attentiveness and involvement, even the eyes, whose lateral movement is normally less than in America, are free to take on all
extremes which may be needed for the integrated expression of the dance.

(j) Conclusion

Balinese culture is in many ways less like our own than any other which has yet been recorded. It is also a culture in which the ordinary adjustment of the individual approximates in form the sort of maladjustment which, in our cultural setting, we call schizoid. (1942b, p. xvi) *

The Balinese character is a character based upon fear which, because it is learned in the mother's arms is a value as well as a threat. It is a character curiously cut off from interpersonal relationships, existing in a state of dreamy-relaxed disassociation, with occasional intervals of non-personal concentration—in trance, in gambling, and in the practice of the arts. The Balinese carries the memory of his mother's intense theatrical exclamation, "Aroh!" to deter him from ever venturing on an untrodden path; but he carries the equally strong memory of his father's protective arm as long as he stays on a trodden one... He is vulnerable, but deft and gay, and usually content. Always a little frightened of some undefined unknown, always driven to fill the hours, so empty of interpersonal relationships, with a rhythmic unattended industriousness, he follows the routines laid down by calendars and revelations of those in trance, relaxed at the center of any world of which he knows the outlines. No appeal has ever been made to him to validate his humanity, for it is taken as given.... If a man follows the prescribed forms he may expect safety—and if that safety is still meager there will be a different turn to come in another incarnation. Life is without climax and not the ultimate goal, but rather the first impact of experience the initial ping of startle, is the only stimulus that has real power to arouse one's interest. And there is always the danger that one may not be aroused at all. Between the Death which is symbolized by the Witch's claws and the graveyard orgies, and the death which is sleep into which one retires when frightened, life is a rhythmic patterned unreality of pleasant, significant movement centered in one's own body to which all emotion long since withdrew."

(1942b, 47-48)

* This was one of Mead's original reasons for choosing Bali for this study.
CHAPTER V

EMPIRICAL MODES OF ANALYSIS

Introduction

In the last four chapters we have given a brief exposition and some illustrations of the discipline of Culture and Personality as Benedict and Mead have developed it. We are now in a position to start a more philosophical analysis of their work.

Since our authors clearly conceive of their work as empirical science, we will begin our discussion by presenting certain forms of analysis which seem basic to any empirical science. This treatment will reveal certain fundamental questions which will enable us to structure the rest of our philosophical analysis. (See below, especially p. 137)

Empirical science aims at making events intelligible in terms of order. The order appealed to must ultimately be accepted as a given, as a kind of final contingency, at least within the domain of science. Different kinds and levels of order may be distinguished and some orders may be reduced to more fundamental ones, but any attempt to "complete" the intelligibility of an empirical science slips invariably into metaphysics.

In this chapter we will discuss the kinds of order to which Mead appeals in her cultural analyses. The Hempelian deductive-nomological scheme of explanation will be taken as base and it will be shown that Mead's system meets the requirements of this scheme if we are allowed to interpret it in a non-causal manner. The scheme of configurational
explanation which so results will be related to causal analysis in terms of reduction and of pragmatic interests. Ultimately, two areas of causal analysis will be distinguished.

1. The Deductive-Nomological Scheme

Hempel argues that scientific explanation involves the deduction of the explanandum from a set of specific conditions and some general laws. "For example, the explanation of the lengthening of a given iron bar as having been caused by an increase in its temperature... includes (a) statements specifying the initial length of the bar and indicating that the bar is made of iron and that its temperature was raised, (b) a law pertaining to the increase in the length of any iron bar with rising temperature." (Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation, p. 301)

"The general laws or theoretical principles that serve to account for empirical generalizations may in turn be deductively subsumable under even more comprehensive principles." (ibid., p. 300) Note that this is a logical characterization of explanation, and is not sufficient to guarantee that the explanation is empirical. From the purely logical viewpoint,

The general form of such an explanation is given by the following schema:

\[
\begin{array}{c}
L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_m \\
C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \\
E \\
\end{array}
\]

Explanans
Explanandum

Here, \( L_1, L_2, \ldots, L_m \) are general laws and \( C_1, C_2, \ldots, C_n \) are statements of particular fact: the horizontal line separating the conclusion \( E \) from the premises indicates that the former follows from the latter." (ibid., p. 299)
In attempting to fit Benedict's and Mead's work into this schema, two levels present themselves, the general or cross-cultural level, and the particularistic level.

(a) Cross-cultural Level

On the cross-cultural level, a science of culture would attempt to deduce a full cultural pattern, a particular cultural regularity or a specific behaviour from a set of cross-culturally valid laws of human behaviour together with certain factual (boundary, limit, initial, etc.) conditions. The general laws would be the laws of human nature as empirically discovered. Consider the following suggested cultural law: "Under conditions of economic scarcity, competitive individualism occurs." (L₁) If we add, as a factual condition that the Arapesh live under conditions of economic scarcity, (C₁) we can conclude by formal deduction that (E₁) the Arapesh will have a regime of competitive individualism.

\[
\begin{array}{c}
L₁ \\
C₁ \\
\hline
E₁
\end{array}
\]

In fact, the Arapesh have a cooperative, helpful life (E₁) and so, assuming C₁ is correct, we may deduce that L₁ is incorrect, as Mead, on wider evidence, in fact, does.*

This example seems to fit very well the nomological-deductive scheme of explanation, and the falsification proves the empirical content of the

* "Whether a group has a minimum or a plentiful subsistence level is not directly relevant to the question of how cooperative or competitive a culture will be." (Mead, 1937a, p. 511)
law. The general law appealed to, of course, is of a very low level and one can hope for a higher level of theory which would in turn explain these generalizations. The substitution of a psychological law in place of the cultural law cited above would change nothing in this discussion, and Mead attempts, on occasion, to establish or, more often, to refute such general psychological laws.

Some difficulties in establishing the intersubjective sense of such terms as "economic scarcity", "economic individualism", "frustration", and so on will be examined in detail in later chapters (VI, VII, and VIII). More important here is the fact that cross-cultural explanations such as the above are not characteristic of Benedict's and Mead's work, especially of their work in Culture and Personality. For although such explanations may explain a full cultural pattern as a hodge-podge of isolated regularities due to ecological, economic, psychological, or historical or other factors, they appear incapable of explaining the integration of the culture as such. Indeed, Benedict maintains that general laws or even general categories are out of place in anthropology, claiming that each cultural pattern is unique.

(b) Particularism

The particular cultural pattern or configuration plays a unique role in the work of both Benedict and Mead. On no occasion do either attempt to explain a complete pattern on the basis of general cross-cultural laws. Rather they consider the anthropologist's job, at least in Culture and Personality, to be the discovery of cultural patterns and the explanation of the cultural regularities and individual behaviours in terms of these patterns. Let us see to what extent this explanation is nomological-deductive.
Take the following event \((E_2)\) in Manus. "Three year old Alupw defiantly refuses to return home with her mother." (Mead, 1930a, p. 19) We may explain this behaviour by deduction from the law \((L_2)\) "The child in Manus is unchecked by any reverence or respect for his elders." (ibid., p. 43-44) and from the obvious factual conditions \((C_2)\), Alupw is a Manus child, etc. This is nomological-deductive.

Let us now take \(L_2\) as the explanandum and attempt to explain the Manus child's lack of respect for his elders as explained by the Manus regularity "autonomy", of which it is a case. Clearly we cannot deduce directly from \((L_3)\) "Manus behaviour is autonomous" that children lack respect for elders. \((L_2)\)

But perhaps this is not deductive explanation. Dray suggests that "explaining what a thing is, i.e., how it should be regarded, is just not the same enterprise at all as explaining why it (whatever it may have been) happened...." (Dray, "Explaining what...", p. 345) "Indeed, explaining what a thing is, where this means explain it as a so-and-so, might be characterized in a preliminary way as explanation by means of a general concept rather than a general law. For the explanation is given by finding a satisfactory classification of what seems to require explanation." (ibid., p. 344) Dray is willing to admit that some such explanation-by-concept is due to hypotheses hidden in the concept, but insists that these are special cases and that in the general case such hypotheses are not involved.

Hempel responds, however, that not all subsumption under a concept is explanatory and that indeed the only explanatory concepts are those which are linked to general hypotheses (Hempel, Aspects of scientific Explanation, p. 453-457) For instance, "To interpret a set of complaints as manifestations of the measles is surely to claim that they fit into a
certain pattern of regularities...; and such an account accords with the covering-law conception of explanation." (ibid., p. 455)

Since Mead calls categories such as autonomy, "regularities", we would expect some general hypotheses to be associated with them. For instance, we might claim that autonomy means i.e., that it includes as a hidden hypothesis, that autonomous children lack respect for their elders. Then we have

\[ L_4 \text{ Children with autonomous behaviour lack respect for elders} \]
\[ C_4 \text{ All Manus (including children) have autonomous behaviour} \]
\[ E_4 \text{ Manus children lack respect for their elders} \]

Here the logical form is filled, yet the explanation suffers from the fatal defect that \( L_4 \) is not an empirical law for lack of respect for elders is included in the very meaning of autonomy. Indeed the term itself seems to be defined ad hoc so that the "explanation" reduces to a pure description.

It is important that we clearly distinguish description and explanation. Feigl points out that the law in an explanation is always in principle universal, and covers more than the particular event being explained. (Feigl, "Some Remarks...".) This is a formal, not a factual point; the connotation of the explanatory law must not be limited to any singular situation even if it happens that in fact only one situation is denoted. A description, however, need not cover any more than the situation or regularity being described.

Similarly, * if "autonomy" is defined as "the lack of respect of

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* This paragraph is based on Hempel's treatment of dispositional concepts such as "magnetic". (Hempel, "Aspects of...", p. 457-463) Compare Feigl's treatment of the operational definition for temperature. (Feigl, "Some Remarks...".)
children towards their elders", then any explanation based on this definition, such as that above, is non-empirical and non-explanatory, for $C_4$ and $E_4$ are logically equivalent. If, however, we elaborate $L_4$ to say that $(L_4)$ "those who show autonomous behaviour (a) show, if children, lack of respect for their elders, and (b) avoid personal body contact and (c) resent any subordinate status, and so on," then we have a statement which is no longer a definition or a tautology. It has non-tautological content for it says that those who exhibit behaviour (a) also exhibit behaviour (b) and also (c), and this statement is not tautological.

Since a statement such as $L_4$ is precisely a statement of the cultural pattern (or a part of it) we have arrived at a formal deductive scheme explaining a behavioural institution (or an individual behaviour) on the basis of the cultural pattern.

$L'_4$ Autonomy involves lack of respect for elders, avoidance of body contact, etc.

$C_4$ All Manus (including children) have autonomous behaviour

$E_4$ Manus children lack respect for their elders.

For such a deductive scheme to qualify as an empirical explanation in Hempel's sense it would be necessary (1) to give intersubjective rules for the applicability of terms such as "lack of respect", "body contact", "avoidance", and so ultimately "autonomy" and (2) to show that the non-tautologous $L'_4$ is an empirical law. Problem (1) will concern us in chapter VI and some of chapter VII whereas problem (2), which we shall call the problem of the nature of "systematization", concerns the very nature of culture itself and will concern us throughout the rest of this thesis, but especially in chapter VIII.
2. Configurational and Causal Analyses

So far we have limited the discussion to the basic logical form of deductive explanation. We must now distinguish within this form two subspecies of explanation, synchronic and diachronic.

Diachronic, causal or process analysis involves the explanation of the effect, i.e., an event, state or situation, in terms of an antecedent known as the cause.* The general law appealed to usually links uniquely a set of prior initial conditions to the posterior situation which is to be explained. In general, we require only that the two events linked be temporally separated, the order of the two events being important only from the standpoint of human intervention. If we think of the universe as cut into time-slices of simultaneous events called "states", a process analysis links a part or the whole of any one state to the parts or the whole of any other by universal laws. Clearly such an analysis presupposes determinism, i.e., that every state of the system or universe in question is univocally linked to every other state.

Synchronic or configurational analysis, however, does not involve the linking of two states of a system, but rather a description of the relationships which the parts of a system bear to each other and to the system as a whole. Explanation in this case involves showing how a part "fits" into the whole rather than the citing of a cause.

All the relationships in this case are simultaneous and there is not question of any causal, temporal priority of any event over another.

Note that these two forms of explanation take their intelligibility from the deductive order whose form they both follow. Yet since the birth of modern science and especially, in philosophy, since Descartes,

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* Statistical liaisons do not seriously change this causal scheme and are ignored for simplicity.
the appeal to the mechanistically conceived anterior cause as an acting "substance" has held a certain priority. Substances have been held to be the only real beings and relations were generally considered to be ideal or epiphenomenal or at least suspect in their reality. Speaking of psychology, Merleau-Ponty claims, "The return to description, ... prohibits us in principle from treating configurations as lesser or derived realities and from maintaining the privileged position given by scientism to linear processes, to isolatable sequences." ("Le Métaphysique dans l'homme", pp. 148-149) Structure or form is "an irreducible ingredient of being." (ibid., p. 150)

Configurational analyses, since they are about reality, presuppose that relations, configurations, or structures are as real, as intersubjective as "things", though, of course, entities of a different order. "Social structures, says Radcliffe-Brown, are just as real as are individual organisms." (Structure and Function... p. 190) Appeal to configurations for explanation is no more mysterious than appeal to a "particle" as a cause----provided we do not confuse the two and think of configurations as "things". Both configurational and causal explanation appeal to an order which is ultimately an empirical find and the temporal form of the causal order gives it no priority over the atemporal form of the configurational order.

Both modes of explanation can be found already in the physical sciences: The system of Newtonian mechanics links deterministically every state of nature to all earlier and later states; equilibrium laws such as Boyle's law, for example, express a functional configuration between the various factors (e.g. pressure, temperature, and volume) regardless of previous or future states of this equilibrium. In the human sciences, too, examples are easily found. Diachronic linguistics relates particular parts of a language to antecedent events in other languages
(etymology) whereas synchronic studies rather lay bare the interrelationships of the parts of a single language without reference to the historical causes.

Benedict's insistence on the individuality of each culture and the necessity for interpreting the institutions of the culture in terms of the whole is an attempt at a configuration analysis rather than a process explanation. In fact, she explicitly rejects the purely historical approach of giving causes, since the effect which the cause has is not independent of the configuration of the culture in which this effect occurs.

Benedict also avoided reifying culture as another "thing", an approach which would misunderstand a configurational explanation as a causal explanation in which the "configuration" is the antecedent cause. She claims, "the controversy over whether or not society is an organism... is largely a verbal quarrel. ... The argument between those who have thought it necessary to conceive of the group as more than the sum of its individuals and those who have not has been largely between students handling different kinds of data." (1934a, p. 202) "It is quite justifiable to call it [ culture ] an organic whole. It is a necessary consequence of the animism embedded in our language that we speak of such a group as choosing its ends and having specific purposes; it should not be held against the student as an evidence of a mystic philosophy." (ibid., p. 203) This supports the view that cultural configurations are "real", but in their own way, i.e. with reference to a certain mode of study, but that a culture does not have the reality of a "thing", as if it were a hidden substantial soul which animates the individual.

The point is well brought out by Mead when she rejects the position that an autonomously developing human organism comes up against a culture as a set of forces imposed upon it. (Mead, 1944a, p. 95-98) This makes no more sense than to say of a mass of gas that it is
manipulated, or forced into shape by Boyle's law. Boyle's law is not a thing among other things, but a form, a structure, a configuration which these things take. Similarly, a culture is the configuration that behaviour takes and not a force or an efficient cause among others.

The point can be illustrated from language. A child learning English cannot be said to have English imposed upon him against his natural tendencies as if some other, innate patterning of linguistic behaviour would otherwise occur. At no point, either, does an English-speaker say anything which is not related to the norms of English, although the relation may be one of deviance. Yet we cannot consider English as one cause among others, along with a natural instinct for language, for example; rather it is the form that his speaking behaviour takes.

The autonomy of the configurational mode of explanation is here in question. Clearly those who believe that all explanation must be explanation in terms of causal processes will deny any autonomy to configurational explanation, insisting either that the configuration referred to for explanation is a thing-like cause in a process explanation or that the configurational explanation as such is incomplete and not really an explanation until it can be reduced to the underlying process laws. This is very similar to the old question of vitalism versus mechanism in biology. The problem arises from the assumption that the only explanatory order is the causal order. But the point of appealing to configurations is that the configurational order is itself intelligible in its own right for a synchronic order or a diachronic order may both be reduced to the operative intelligibility of the deductive scheme.

Hence the question of the priority of these two modes of analysis is not a logical one which can be decided generally once and for all.
Rather in each case we must examine how each particular configurational analysis relates to each particular process analysis. Which type of analysis is 'absolute' cannot be predicted in advance.

3. Reduction and Interaction

Are we then led to pose two independent modes of explanation for the same phenomena? Is an individual's behaviour to be explained simultaneously from the cultural pattern and from, say, psychological laws of development? Or can we say that the intelligibility of the cultural configuration, although real, is provisional and ultimately reducible to process laws, such as those of psychology?

Both Benedict and Mead hold that the cultural pattern is irreducible to psychological or other (e.g. economic) laws. Mead insists on a certain autonomy of social phenomena and the necessity of distinguishing synchronous configurational functioning from psychological origin. (see above p. 71) Benedict claims that anthropology neither denies nor is reducible to other sciences. (see above p. 56)

Benedict had already made the point that "the difficulty with naive interpretations of culture in terms of individual behaviour is not that these interpretations are those of psychology, but that they ignore history and the historical process of acceptance and rejection of traits." (1934a, p. 203) The historical acceptance or rejection being, of course, in her view subject to the cultural configuration, we have here the point of interaction of psychology and Culture and Personality. That is, a culture is a configuration which controls its own elements, allowing itself to be affected by psychological phenomena only in so far as these are granted a place in the pattern.
Mead's analogy from cybernetics is here very useful. A computer circuit can be seen as a configuration which controls its own inputs, for it is programmed to limit its reception of data and to interpret it in certain ways. Thus, fluctuations in the mains power supply are excluded as input and even on an input line the circuit may respond only to the presence or absence of a pulse at a given moment, and ignore its level, intensity or form. Then, the computer may be programmed to read this input as an operating instruction, or a number to be added to a preceding number, or as noise to be ignored. Yet all these operations are performed by electronic circuits governed by well-known process laws. These process laws are the condition of possibility for the existence of any configuration on the circuit level and explain the actual operation of any configuration. What then is left to be explained by the configuration explanation? In effect, everything. For the existence of each process and its links to other processes are explained in terms either of the physiology of the circuit or the programmed instructions, neither of which are themselves governed by the laws of electronics. The choice of the configuration which the circuits take is determined by extraneous factors, such as the laws of logic and mathematics, the intentions of the designer, the function of the computer, the program, and so on.

This analogy allows us to distinguish the material operation from the formal operation. The distinction is, of course, relative, for we may consider as material the electronic operation of the diodes and resistors and as formal their physical arrangement into add-circuits and so on, or we may take the addition and other elementary operations as the 'material' level which is patterned by the program, this latter now giving the formal operation. Other distinctions can also be made here, such as that between the physically-fixed configurations, often quite complex, of the addition (etc.) operation of the computer and the capacity of this fixed configuration to take on a variable program — its 'plasticity.'
In a sense, the formal operation at any level has a certain independence from the material, for it could conceivably be 'incarnated' in some other material substrate — though some material substrate is presumably necessary. So addition as a formal operation may be performed on an abacus as well as with diodes and resistors. We require, of course, that the substrate be rich enough to carry the particular formal operation or configuration desired.

Analogously, we may treat the psychological laws governing individual psychology as playing the same role as the elementary operations, such as addition, in the computer. On the one hand, they are based on a more material substrate, the body and its nervous system as studied by physiology and biology, just as addition is based on elements studied by electronics; on the other hand, the psychological level of operation is itself a material substrate for the cultural configuration, just as the elementary operations of a computer may be programmed into a higher order operation. The psychological processes (and also the physiological and the biological) must be rich enough to subsume the cultural configurations —— lunar orbits cannot be calculated on an abacus. But this does not mean that the cultural configuration can be reduced to the underlying laws of psychology.

But what precisely do we mean by "reduction"? There is a strong sense which means simply that all the laws and hence the theorems deducible in the reduced explanatory system are deducible in the system to which it is reduced, this latter system also being capable of other deductions. Mead maintains with excellent evidence that present psychological or other non-cultural logical theories are incapable of reducing her science of Culture and Personality in this manner. Similarly, cybernetic configurations cannot be deduced from electronic and elementary operation laws but are dependent on the design and programming of the computer.

A weaker sense of reduction, however, covers the possibility of
deducing the reduced system from the more general system if special conditions or hypotheses are added. Thus the laws of electronics can explain a computer configuration if we add the factual conditions to which the circuits are submitted. Discussing the explanation of such configurations as "the solar system, a carbon atom, or a calcium fluoride crystal" by the simple "addition" of the laws governing the component parts, Nagel comments, "current explanations of such systems in terms of theories about their constituent parts cannot avoid supplementing these theories with statements about the special circumstances under which the constituents occur as elements of the system." ("Wholes, Sums and Organic Unity", p. 50)

A startling example of such a 'weak' reduction is cited by Edward Purcell. ("Parts and Wholes in Physics", p. 18-21). A computer is programmed to stimulate the behaviour of thirty-two 'billiard ball' molecules constrained within a theoretical 'box'. Large numbers of imaginary impact sequences are calculated and the 'history' of the 'particles' is presented on a special display. Only the mechanical laws of the particles and the boundary conditions are given to the computer. Yet, under certain conditions, the 'particles' will 'freeze' into a 'crystal lattice,' presenting the type of configuration found in crystalline substances.

Here we have an extremely weak case of reduction where we can know that the particle laws and the boundary conditions are enough to guarantee the new configuration without us being able to deduce the laws of this configuration from the particle laws and conditions, for the configurational laws of crystals are not deducible from mechanics. Yet we programmed the computer, so we know that no other principles are involved. Here is an apparent case of 'emergence' of a new form simply as a result of the interaction situations of the elementary parts.

If, by analogy with the above, we consider psychological laws as those
governing the component parts of a society, then cultural phenomena may be
born as a result of the interaction of these parts without appeal to any 'new'
principles other than the conditions of interaction themselves. That such is
the case has not, of course, been proved and appear to be an open empirical
question.

In a sense, Mead's study of enculturation is an attempt to show how
individuals, with nothing but their 'isolated' laws of functioning, e.g., the
laws of learning or of bodily development, come to follow the cultural pattern
simply by interaction with their culture. No new principle such as a cultural
drive, a set of innate ideas, or a collective unconscious (in the psychic, non-
cultural sense) is appealed to. Mead is careful to point out, however, that
what is here explained is the enculturation of the individual and not the
existence or nature of the cultural pattern itself which here functions as the
boundary conditions for the laws governing the individual.

Whether any reduction of cultural phenomena to noncultural laws is
possible must ultimately remain an empirical question and so cannot concern
us here. The important point is that a configurational explanation does not
require reduction but is acceptable as an explanation in its own right. As a
methodological rule, of course, we must expect science to attempt to reduce
any explanatory system to more elementary laws, if only to show to what extent
such reduction is impossible. (Beck, "The Natural Science Ideal, . . .", p. 87)
Mead certainly accepts this program, even if Benedict appears to have had hesitations.

Before leaving the question of reduction, it is well to clearly differ-
entiate the question of the reduction of cultural phenomena to its non-cultural
"parts", e.g. to the laws governing individuals, or governing economy, and
the question of the use of theoretical terms in the study of culture. Theoretical
terms may refer to theoretical entities which put together form a culture
and in this sense are "parts" of the whole; but they are cultural parts and no reduction of cultural phenomena is implied in this case.

4. The Pragmatic Nature of Causality

We have cited Benedict's remark (see above, p. 140) that the disagreement between those who would treat cultures as wholes and those who would reduce them to the behaviour of individuals is a dispute "largely between students handling different kinds of data." (1934a, p. 202) There is a pragmatic difference involved here which corresponds to the use to which the results of the study are to be put. We can see this point clearly when we consider the notion of "cause".

Schutz claims, "The causal relations of the objective world are subjectively experienced as means and ends, as hindrances or aids, of the spontaneous activity of thought or action [of the experiencing subject]," (Schutz, Collected Papers, vol. III, p. 122) that is, they are subject to a system of relevances! Dray, citing Collingwood, refers to this as "the principle of the relativity of causes. This may be stated: 'for any given person, the cause... of a given thing is that one of its conditions which he is able to produce or prevent!... If this is so, we must say that causal judgements are not just, in general, relative to human concerns--they are in each case relative to one or other of many possible specific 'standpoints'." (Dray, Philosophy of History, p. 45)

Nagel goes so far as to try and distinguish holistic from atomistic analysis on this basis.

Many who claim that there is a fundamental difference between functional and non-functional (or 'summative') wholes tacitly admit that the distinction is based on practical decisions concerning what causal influences may be ignored for certain purposes. Thus Koehler cites
as an example of a 'summative' whole a system of three stones, one each in Africa, Australia, and the United States. The system is held to be a summative grouping of its parts, because displacement of one stone has no effect on the others or on their mutual relations. However, if current theories of physics are accepted, such a displacement is not without some effect on the other stone, even if the effects are so minute that they cannot be detected with present experimental technique and can therefore be practically ignored." ("Wholes, Sums and Organic Unities", pp. 148-149. His underlining)

Hence the analysis of behaviour in terms of cause or in terms of configuration depends on one's practical interests. Mead's practical interests involve the control of whole cultures, such as the elimination of racism, and her later studies of cultural change are concerned not with changing the behaviour of specific individuals but with changing the overall cultural configurations. It is in this perspective that we must see her disagreement with childhood determinism.

Mead has largely defined her position by opposition with Kardiner and other causalists. She has, nonetheless, as we have seen (see p. 69), attempted to show why the explanation of adult behaviour in terms of childhood condition seems so plausible. The causal approach comes particularly from psychiatric and other clinical approaches to abnormal behaviour. Given that neurosis is caused by childhood trauma, psychiatrists suggest changes in child rearing practices, which changed practices should, analogously to traumas, "cause" more normal adult behaviour. It is but a short step from this to the causalists claim that culture is caused by upbringing. This step Mead refuses.

The application of our distinction in modes of explanation as modeled on the computer analogy may allow us to clarify and bring out the pragmatic interest behind Mead's point. We find an asymmetry in the way that normal and faulty operations of a computer are explained. The pertinent explanation for normal operation of the computer is, as we have seen, by appeal to
the configuration, for the material explanation is irrelevant. But faulty
operation is explained by reference to a breakdown in the circuitry, that is,
to the process laws governing the substrate. Of course, the configuration
cannot here be ignored, for it enters in two ways: only by taking the
configuration as the norm can the operation in question be declared to be
faulty; and the configuration present in the machine explains why this
particular faulty operation and not another occurs from the given breakdown.

For example, a particular normal operation of a computer may be
explained in terms of the mathematical configuration $1 + 1 = 2$ in a way
in which the antecedent causes such as power supply, electronics and so
on are irrelevant. Grant now a breakdown in a diode of the add circuit so
that the computer performs the operation $1 + 1 = 1$. This operation is to
be explained in terms of the diode failure. Nevertheless, it is only a fault
because $1 + 1 = 2$, as we see from mathematics; and besides, the fact that
the diode failure led to $1 + 1 = 1$ and not to, say, $1 + 1 = 6$ is because the
circuit configuration is an add circuit. The technician, called to repair
the fault, is unlikely to discuss the relative merits of $1 + 1 = 1$ and $1 + 1 = 2$,
but will proceed directly to the location and replacement of the diode.

In exactly parallel fashion, a psychiatrist will attempt to repair the
results of a psychological trauma or may propose means for the avoidance
of such traumas in the future. He does not normally consider the cultural
configuration because he assumes it, as surely as the electronic technician
assumes the mathematical configuration. Nonetheless, it is in terms of
the cultural configuration that his patient’s behaviour is abnormal and it
is because of the cultural configuration that the particular causal-trauma
has this neurotic effect. But for the psychiatrist to attempt to generalize
and say that all adult behaviour is caused by childhood experience is as
much a mistake as for the electronic technician to claim that $1 + 1 = 2$ is
caused by electronic antecedents. In one sense, the material one, both
claims are, of course, correct, but quite trivial. In the formal and pertinent sense, they are both wrong.

The point here is that our causal intervention in the case of abnormal behaviour in the individual occurs indeed at childhood for the configuration is, for causal, pragmatic reasons, unimportant because presumed. If, however, we wish to intervene and change a cultural configuration, we cannot simply change the educational system alone, leaving the rest of the culture unchanged.

Since any configuration is a dynamic whole, any causal intervention on a part will result in a redistribution of the whole and the redistribution will affect in turn the part upon which we intervened. The resulting reaction of the configuration is sometimes described as a form of circular causality and Mead's reference to cybernetic "feedback" seems to involve this approach. This, however, would seem to involve a confusion between our two modes of explanation. For we can either treat a configurational system as a black box within a process system, the input and output of the box itself in configurational terms. Only in the first case do we really have cause-effects relationships. If now, we try to analyze both the configuration and its input and output together we will naturally tend to continue to call "cause" that change in the configuration which, seen in black box terms, is the input. We will then be forced to describe the holistic response of the configuration, which alters the "cause" itself, in terms of feedback of the effect to the cause, and so in terms of "circular causality". But such vocabulary is misleading. For causality is really extraneous to the configuration as such, and our use of the word cause has reference only to our manipulation, to our point of leverage on the configuration. Since logically, and often in practice, we can attain the same configurational equilibrium in many different ways, this analysis by causality is subject to the particular mode of manipulation chosen and lacks a desired level
of universality.

In other words, the configuration, as a dynamic interacting system, takes on a certain orientation, a focusing around the point of intervention, any point of intervention. But this is not to say that that point has a priority with respect to the other parts of the configuration as such. Rather it is only with respect to a particular change in the configuration that a focal point develops as a cause.

A similar priority for configurational over causal analysis is to be seen in Mead's discussion of prediction. (see above p. 66) Mead is usually vague about the possibilities of the human sciences predicting an event from antecedent conditions, calling to mind the extreme complexity of the antecedent conditions, the difficulties in closing the predicative system and so on. But once she drops the diachronic question and discusses synchronic "prediction" of behavioural regularities on the basis of the previously discovered regularities within a pattern, the ambivalence vanishes and she even recommends the use of such prediction as a method of validating hypotheses. (Mead, 1953a, p. 7) The term "prediction" is somewhat out of place here as would be "postdiction" for the pre-or postdictive aspects of science refer to the interrelation between states of affairs i.e., to that which is non-simultaneous and so is part of causal analysis. But Mead’s synchronous "prediction" refers to the simultaneous copresence of systematically related regularities within the one state, within the one pattern, and the only temporal element is heuristic, referring to the relative order of our discovery.

5. Pre- and Post-Configurational Analysis

This discussion leads us to distinguish two different relationships of configurational and causal analysis. Causal analyses of the clinical
type which *presuppose* the cultural configuration in either an implicit or explicit way we will call post-configurational analysis.

Schutz considers that many social sciences (such as economics) develop conceptual schemes which abstract from subjective elements. If we read "cultural" or "configurational" for "subjective" we have an exact analogy with post-configurational analysis. *"Closer investigation... reveals that this abstract conceptual scheme is nothing else than a kind of intellectual shorthand and that the underlying subjective [read "cultural"] elements of human actions involved are either taken for granted or deemed to be irrelevant with respect to the scientific purpose at hand—the problem under scrutiny—and are, therefore, disregarded."* (Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Vol. I, p. 35) Culturally-limited psychological studies and much of statistical sociology fit in this class. Schutz' example is from economy which presupposes a cultural regularity of rational (economic) action. These analyses are often causal, but this is a causality which is dependent on the configurational scheme.

Goldstein, however, suggests another relationship between configurational analysis and causality. He claims that what he calls "the phenomenological and the naturalistic approaches to the social are simply different undertakings for the purpose of acquiring different kinds of knowledge." ("The Phenomenological and Naturalistic Approaches...", p. 99)

For the purpose of the distinction I want to make, 'the phenomenological approach' will mean one that is primarily orientated towards description not theory formation, and in which the vantage point of subjectivity... is of first importance. By the naturalistic approach, I shall mean

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* The assimilation of "subjective" to "cultural" will be considered in detail in Chapter VIII when intersubjective constitution will be discussed.
any concern with the social not from the standpoint of subjectivity. Naturalistic social science seeks to explain how sociocultural phenomena came to be as they are, how they develop and change." (ibid., p. 98)

While "naturalistic social science" presumably covers also what I have called post-configurational analysis, Goldstein emphasizes rather its pre-configurational aspects.

No one wants to assert that the social world in which we now find ourselves always was, and so we must recognize that any account of our social world or Lebenswelt is an account of something which is but the latest stage of a series which cannot be constituted in the same way that this latest stage itself can. And this is only another way of saying that what is constructed by the phenomenological approach to the study of the social cannot be said to stand by itself in the sense that it had no antecedents but simply came into the world fullblown the way it is. It clearly presupposes what can only be known through the naturalistic approach." (ibid., p. 104)

Such pre-configurational science is presumably causal, and so in this case the configurational analysis presupposes a causal analysis. Natural factors such as are studied in ecology and factors from human nature such as are studied in biology, psychoanalysis, learning theory and child development theory would be examples of such pre-configurational science. The exact borderline between pre- and post-configurational analyses, however, seldom coincides with the borderlines between the established sciences so that some parts of economics, for example, are pre-configurational. Similarly, we can see in Mead's use of psychoanalysis, that the Freudian theory includes some post-configurational factors. Mead tends to presuppose in her work only the general theoretical scheme of psycho-analysis (pre-configurational) and she rejects as culturally limited many of the structures (post-configurational) which Freud discovered empirically in his own culture.
Remember that, as we have seen above, the fact that configurational analysis presupposes certain causal laws does not mean that it is reducible, in the sense of simply deductible from these pre-configurational laws. Similarly, post-configurational laws may not be deductible from the configuration. Economics, for instance, cannot be deduced from a configurational analysis for it involves idealizations from, and limitations on, general cultural behaviour.

6. Conclusions

In the light of these considerations, we can elaborate somewhat on the logical form of explanation as we left it at p. 137 viz.: 

\[ L_4^{1} \text{ Autonomy involves lack of respect for elders, avoidance of body contact, etc.} \]

\[ C_4 \text{ All Manus (including children) have autonomous behaviour} \]

\[ E_4 \text{ Manus children lack respect for elders.} \]

We now see that although \( C_4 \) is the statement of fact, empirically determined, this fact must itself be explained in terms of general pre-configurational laws. Say, for instance, that we had the following empirically determined ecological law, \( L_5 \), the following explanation would hold:

\[ L_5 \text{ All peoples who live on the sea must trade to survive and all traders behave autonomously} \]

\[ C_5 \text{ The Manus live on the sea} \]

\[ E_5 = C_4 \text{ All Manus have autonomous behaviour} \]

In fact, of course, we have no such laws and their very existence seems unlikely. The most we could expect would be of the following type:
L₆ All people who live on the sea must be physically fit
C₆ The Manus live on the sea

E₆ All Manus are physically fit.

Now being physically fit is part of the Manus pattern of autonomy but it is not all of it and there is no way of deducing lack of respect for elders directly from this feature. If a certain number of such traits could be explained in this manner we might be able to "jump to the conclusion" that Manus behaviour is autonomous but it seems nonetheless that the pattern of "autonomy" always involves more than this simple summation of traits. This is Benedict's point that a culture is not a hodge-podge of chance elements, but an integrated systematic pattern. Such systematization will be discussed, as already mentioned, in Chapter VIII.

To conclude, let us say that Mead can certainly construe her system in a manner which will fulfill the form of deductive explanation, though usually of the configurational (as on p. 137) rather than causal type. We have shown that the configurational laws referred to (e.g., L₄) are non-tautological, but their exact empirical nature is still left in suspense. We have yet to decide whether the statements of empirical fact (e.g., C₄) are intersubjectively observable, a problem which will be discussed in a more general context in Chapter VI.
CHAPTER VI

EMPIRICAL CONTENT: THE PROBLEM OF OBSERVATIONAL
OBJECTIVITY

1. Introduction

We have discussed in chapter V the general forms of explanation used by Mead. If her science of Culture and Personality is to qualify as an empirical science, however, it must also meet other non-formal criteria. In particular, it must be objectively true and universally accessible. It is the ideal of empirical science to fulfill these requirements of objectivity, truth and universality by basing scientific statements on experience open to all.

But, in a sense, experience is always the lived experience of an individual and as such inaccessible to others. This conflict between the subjectivism of individual experience and the universal truth of science has troubled western thought from the time of the Greeks to the present day, and the general problem cannot be touched here. Indisputably, empirical natural science does overcome the conflict. In this chapter we must ask whether Mead's Culture and Personality has or can overcome this antinomy and if so how.

2. Objectivity in Natural and Human Science

In empirical natural science the subjectivism of the observer is eliminated by excluding from the science any statement essentially linked to a subject.
But this anti-subjectivism actually covers two separate points. Not only is any reference to the individuality of the observer-subject eliminated from the concepts and observations used (the requirement of intersubjective universality), but also the concepts and observation themselves are limited in a manner to avoid any reference to subjects as such, even as objects of study. All observation reports must be phrased in terms which are 'objective' in the sense of applying equally to things and persons and any reporting in terms of intent, purpose, or meaning is excluded as non-objective and "anthropomorphic".

When this same approach is applied to social science it is called physicalism and it claims to eliminate any metaphysical presuppositions concerning essential differences between men and things. If there are any such differences they must appear only at the end of the scientific endeavour. The position implies a belief in a unified method of science.

A modified form of objectivism is proposed by Granger for the social sciences and before discussing what Mead actually does we will summarize Granger's position.

(a) Granger's Position

Granger claims that science is a new language which permits us not only to communicate among ourselves but to operate on and control phenomena; (Granger, *Pensée Formelle et Sciences de l’Homme*, p. 22) it mediates between consciousness and objects as well as carrying information between consciousnesses. As a new language, science opposes itself to the old language of myth, of ordinary language, which not only suffers from lack of empirical testing, but, because of uncontroled, multiple meanings, is radically unclear and incapable of a progressive control over the phenomena. It is not in ordinary mythical language that we can found
objective, scientific concepts. "The objectivity of a notion is no longer
founder in the givenness of the lived event, but rather in a progressively
more conscious and more accurate process in which language and practice
are controlled and dominated." (ibid., p. 64)

Ordinary, mythical language offers a set of terms which are linked
(over-linked, thinks Granger) into a system which cuts out the phenomena
and gives an intuitive understanding of them. This is the ordinary cultural
interpretation of human life in terms of meanings. Due, however, to its
equivocal and intuitive nature such a cutting out of the phenomena lacks the
objectivity and efficacy desired by all science and already achieved by
the natural sciences Yet we must somehow preserve the level of meaning.

The double temptation of the [ student of the human sciences ] is,
then, either to remain on the level of the lived experience or to make
an inappropriate effort to attain to the positivity of the natural sciences
by eliminating all meaning, thus taking physical phenomena as the
model for the reduction of human reality. The problem which is
constitutive of human science can be described, then, as the trans-
mutation of lived meanings into a universe of objective meanings.
(ibid., p. 66)

I will call this position "soft objectivism" to distinguish it on the one hand
from the "hard objectivism" of physicalism which refuses to use any mean-
ing concepts whatsoever and, on the other hand, from a simple phenomeno-
logical explicitation of lived experience, or from the obvious intuitions of
common sense.

The replacement of the lived meaning for the phenomena by an
objective, theoretical meaning requires, says Granger, that the 'obvious'
order of the phenomena, given as part of the lived meaning be suspended,
so that the phenomena can be seen as disordered. The brute, disordered
phenomena can then be structured by a theoretical scheme which does not
rely on the culturally obvious for its intelligibility. Axiomatization, believes Granger, is the only way of effectuating this new intelligibility.

Axiomatization offers to rational thought the only means of escaping the enticements of the lived fact. In the domain of man, the immediate meanings which make up the natural mode of presentation of the phenomena, run the danger of masking completely the positive structures, the only possible determinations of an object of science. (ibid., p. 178-179)

The objection that the complexity and richness of the lived experience would thus be lost is answered by noting that all scientific facts are partial, but that they are in principle perfectible by a rational reconstruction of the original complexity. Another objection, that the structure of the lived experience would be deformed, is handled by pointing out that the role of science is not to simply conceptualize the experience as lived, but to restructure the phenomena from scratch. "The cutting out of the fact, in the human sciences, then, involves a spectacular metamorphosis of the perceptual givens."

In other words, Granger seems to be saying that everyday terms carry with them hidden hypotheses, complex sets of presuppositions which are implicitly invoked whenever the terms are used. "Simpler" scientific terms, on the other hand, have fewer and more coherent hypotheses attached to each term and these hypotheses are, ideally, explicitated in a formal analytic conceptual scheme. In effect, the original complex presuppositions are neither clearly analytic nor clearly empirical and the passage to science involves a fixing of a limited analytic scheme, explicitly leaving all other relationships empirical. These explicit empirical relations are then testable. Granger is suggesting that in the human sciences,

"Le découpage du fait dans les sciences de l'homme comporte donc une métamorphose spectaculaire de donné perçu." (ibid., p. 72)
the conceptual analytic scheme should be clearly explicated from the start by axiomatization.

(b) *From Everyday to Scientific Concepts*

It is clear that Mead does not use an axiomatic system to define her terms, as Granger would prefer. The key terms she uses come from three sources: from psychology (e.g., 'schizophrenic'), from everyday English (e.g., 'autonomy'), and from the culture studied (e.g., 'kawas'). In general, the psychological terms used have a fairly clear definition from psychology which Mead just accepts. Terms taken from the culture studied are only rarely used, and in these cases their sense remains unchanged; they usually designate low level regularities.

A large proportion, however, of Mead's terms are taken from ordinary English and precised in certain ways. Thus the term "autonomy" comes from everyday English but its dictionary definition is quite inadequate to Mead's use of the term in describing the Manus. Similarly, the "maternalism" of the Arapesh or their interest in "growing things", are terms taken from English but with their original sense extended in various ways and made more exact. Yet no definitions or explicit rules for the use of these terms are given.

Rudner says, "Should neither a necessary nor correlated condition be given in the theory for some relative primitive, we would still not be forced to construe it as a 'meaningless' term, for the term may well have some other ('ordinary-usage') clarity wholly antecedent to its occurrence in the theory." (Philosophy of Social Science, p. 51) Rudner also points out that the presence of nonindigenous terms in a theory "usually indicates that some portion (large or small) of the results of some other discipline or area of knowledge is being presupposed in the theory." (Ibid., p. 48) In
our case, this implies that despite Mead's precising of the sense of the key terms used, they bring in with them many presuppositions from common-sense, i.e., from English language culture. That is, not only are ordinary language terms used, but some of those beliefs that Granger designates as mythical, i.e., not scientifically verified, are admitted.

In discussing the meaning of terms we must distinguish that to which they refer, i.e., their denotation, from their connotation or connection with other terms. A science, especially in its early stages, tends to take everyday terms and redefine them, i.e., change their connotation, while maintaining their denotation approximately constant. In physics, terms like "force", "mass", "heat" and so on are purified versions of notions already present in daily life. The overdetermination which Granger combats is reduced to univocity within the scientific language. This change in connotation cannot be achieved without some change in the denotation, but this change in reference is usually not radical but rather involves a continuity in which the same central class of phenomena are denoted although the fringes may vary. (This point will be discussed in more detail in chapter VII).

Continuity of change of denotation is necessary if we are to have a science which treats of the same "things" which we handle in the life-world. After all, the aim of science is to understand, explain, and control a world which is prescientifically given. Any sudden discontinuity such as Granger imagines, which would change not only the connotation of terms but their very denotation ("une métamorphose spectaculaire de donné perçu") would leave us with a science about a world we could never enter. Only if the perceptual lived world itself could be changed overnight at the same time as the new scientific découpage took effect could we maintain contact with the new world. But this would require that man's everyday cultural life could suddenly become scientific, which would be "une métamorphose spectaculaire"
indeed! If this is what Granger's phrase is suggesting, he himself gives the response:

The scientific world, it is true, penetrates into our life, but not as scientific, for it enters rather by renewing these (everyday) meanings and myths than by suppressing them. It seems that scientific knowledge and efficacious concepts, the instruments of a controlled praxis, cannot be assimilated into an individual's life except by being changed and changed even to the point of taking on the very characteristics of naive notions. (Granger, *Pensée Formelle...*, p. 67)

We should rather expect then the kind of approach which Mead actually uses rather than that which Granger proposes. That is, starting from commonly understood concepts, progressively stricter attempts at the definition of their connotation in theoretical terms will lead to a slow change in their denotations---a slow change which will maintain the continuity with the life-world which we need in order to know what the science is about. Axiomatization is the limit point of such a progression and can only occur when the meaning of the term has been almost completely recuperated by its scientific connotation and appeal to denotive intuition is at a minimum.

Such progression can indeed be seen in Mead's work. The early term 'kawas', or 'exchange', used for the Manus, gives place in her later writing to the more technical and precise term 'reciprocity', a change which we will see in Chapter VII. (see below, p. 195) is very significant. Similarly, the technical term "autonomy" is not present in Mead's 1930 study of "spoilt character", egocentricity" and so on were used instead. Of course, this is still very far from axiomatization.

From Granger, then, we can accept the necessity of a break with the everyday connotation of terms if objectivity is to be achieved, but for an adequate analysis of how this can be done while still speaking of the
same phenomena, we must turn to a phenomenologist. We will now present Strasser's notion of objectivity as intersubjectivity.

(c) Strasser's Position on Objectivity

Strasser first points out that there is objectivity in everyday life, as well as in science. (cf. Strasser, Phenomenology and the Human Sciences, p. 69) All human life, in so far as it has meaning is in some way intersubjective. For instance, there is never any such thing as a pure, i.e., meaningless perception; all perceiving is "perceiving as" something and this meaning is in principle open to others. Once we admit that the subjectivity which founds meaning is an intersubjectivity this position follows naturally.

In everyday cultural life we speak to other persons about things. The thing is that of which we speak to others, but which itself does not speak. It is in the intersubjective situation, therefore, that things are constituted as the objects and tools of our praxis and as the "same" to which others also refer but from another perspective. This objectification requires that the phenomenal field be broken up so that the "thing" becomes isolated from the rest and can be seen to retain an identity throughout many actions and many perspectives. Naming is here of fundamental importance, for it constitutes the symbolic identity of the thing in many different functions. "By means of this objectification man removes the opposition between the individual and the universal, between the variable and the permanent, between the "I" and the 'we'". (ibid., p. 80)

It is clear that some objectivity or truth does occur on the cultural level for the members of a culture do communicate and act together. Strasser refers to this as "First Objectivity". Objectivity is to be seen as
the process of being normalized by what is not oneself. Man indeed poses the questions but the answers must come from Being if they come at all. The result of the collaboration is the "thing", the phenomenon as unveiled by our language, but unveiled as already there.

This objectification, as all objectification, is an abstraction, for the richness of the phenomena is not captured by the constituted thing. On the cultural level, this objectification is based on common practice and on ordinary language, and is uncritical, naive, not conscious of itself. Nothing, except the thing, is explicit. "Words and concepts are present here in a simple ready fashion, without becoming an occasion of reflection and especially of critical reflection," (ibid., p. 86) That is, the concepts and words have not themselves become objectified and so subordinated to a critical control.

Contact with other cultures, with other systems of evidence results in the relativization of each of the systems so that "the evident character of the world ceases to be evident". (ibid., p. 98) The resulting attempt to devise a universal system good for all cultures results in the development of "second objectivity". This is the "scientific illumination" which Strasser considers as starting with the birth of Western culture. "The traditional doxa, the unproved 'opinion' of the everyday world, is replaced by a scientific epistême, the demonstrable intellectual view, which claims to be based on intellectual grounds and therefore to be valid for all," (ibid., p. 101) Science aims at "a universally valid theory and a praxis which is effective anywhere in the world". (ibid., p. 103)

The logos differs from myth in that it knows itself. It is aware of itself as concept or as language and so can maintain a certain control over itself, i.e., it can be methodic. Logos can take a distance from what is intended.
The relationship between first and second objectivity may be interpreted as an evolutionary development. Popper suggests a conceptual scheme useful here. (in *Of Clouds and Clocks*, SECTs. XIV-XVI) In an evolutionary context of problem solving, he claims that humans have developed hierarchies of language with which to control behaviour. Each layer functions as a plastic control over the layer below. Thus the argumentative function of language uses the criteria of validity to control the descriptive level which is guided by truth. The advantage of using language as a mode of evolution is that errors may be eliminated without eliminating the species.

In an analogous way we may see cultures as evolutionary trials which use certain mythical, unselfconscious languages and patterns of behaviour as modes of preserving evolutionary experience and teaching it to each new generation. But the only evolutionary control over the language and over the overall cultural pattern is by the survival or elimination of that cultural pattern as a whole. Some cultures are good ways of dealing with the world, others less good. The only criticism involved is that of life itself.

The birth of science and of second objectivity led to a new level of control. The thoughts, concepts and propositions accepted as true are first criticized by rationality. In this way errors may be eliminated without the extinction of the society concerned, a system which leads to much faster and more efficient accumulation of experience in dealing with the world.

Strasser's position, then, is that scientific objectivity is the intersubjective development of a wider perspective when the interaction of a number of narrower perspectives show each of them to be inadequate. This development, I suggest, following Popper, may be seen as an evolutionary survival technique.
3. Intuition in Human Science

(a) Science as Behaviour

From the point of view we have been exposing science maintains a certain continuity with ordinary culture. Science is a process of expanding the intersubjective community which is the foundation of objectivity—although such expansion may be limited to specific domains. How does this scheme fit Mead’s approach?

I have already discussed at some length Mead’s opinions on the objectivity involved in anthropology. (see above, pp. 73-80) Briefly, she holds that an investigator’s observations are influenced by his culture, his theory, and his personality and so different anthropologists from different cultures will see different things and may even develop different theories. A converging of such theories and observations can be hoped for in the future, but any premature attempts to borrow hypotheses from one culture’s anthropology to another’s must be prevented. Let us try and see, then, how an objectively valid anthropology may be elaborated.

Granger’s position that science is a new language is fundamentally correct, but it would be better to say that science is a new pattern of behaviour. Linguistic behaviour is certainly a very important aspect of science for it brings the explicitness and critical analysis which distinguishes scientific behaviour from other behaviour, but it is not the only scientific behaviour. Observational intuition is also a behaviour and is scientific.

Can we then say that science is just a new culture? In effect, Strasser suggests (Phenomenology..., pp. 88-97) that Western culture,
since the "scientific illumination", is a scientific culture, but this is simply not true. If one were to possess only the behaviours patterned by science and perceive only in the explicit limited form so prescribed, one's culture would be very poor indeed! Rather, even the most ardent scientist lives mostly in the everyday cultural world and performs strictly scientific linguistic or observational behaviour for a very small proportion of the time. His scientific behaviour occurs within his everyday life. It may be that not all cultures have a spot in their pattern which permits the subpattern which is science. That is to say, only certain cultures may be able to nurture our scientific tradition, as Mead has remarked. (see above, p.75
The scientific pattern of behaviour must be a meaningful part of the scientist's culture; it must be institutionalized within the culture as a possibility.

Science may even, as a subpattern, have different meanings in different cultures. We have already remarked on the possibility of separable subpatterns of a culture which may be diffused to another culture as relatively autonomous wholes and then reintegrated into the new culture, probably with a different meaning. Tools and artifacts, dances and rites, and full linguistic systems were presented as examples. (see above, pp. 80-87)
We can view science as one such diffused subpattern. That it receives different meanings in different cultures is innocuous; certainly the meanings given by American, European and Chinese cultures to the scientific enterprise are not the same, but this is no more harm than permitting into the realm of science scientists who are differently motivated, e.g., by prestige, by money or by the pure pursuit of knowledge. As long as the explicit rules are followed, science can remain as innocent of these factors and as cross-cultural as, say, chess.

Schutz's notion of "relevance" will help us to distinguish the specificity of scientific behaviour. Elaborating Husserl, Schutz points out
that "the prepredicative experience of the life world is fundamentally
duplicated according to types.... This typification takes place according to
particular structures of relevancy." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. III,
p. 125) The scientific attitude of the disinterested observer "consists in
the abandoning of the system of relevancies which prevails within the
practical sphere of the natural attitude." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I,
p. 246) "The scientific problem, once established, determines alone the
in Mead's terms, this is to say that the scientist leaves his cultural pattern
of behaviour and adopts a new scientific pattern.

But Schutz adds:

In his daily life the social scientist remains a human being, a man
living among his fellow-men, with whom he is interrelated in many
ways. And, surely, scientific activity itself occurs within the tradition
of socially derived knowledge, is based upon cooperation with other
scientists, requires mutual corroboration and criticism and can only
be communicated by social interaction. But insofar as scientific
activity is socially founded, it is one among all the other activities
occurring within the social world. Dealing with science and
scientific matters within the social world is one thing, the specific
scientific attitude which the scientist has to adopt towards his object
is another. (ibid., p. 37)

This distinction is difficult to maintain for Schutz is almost suggesting
that the scientist as such does not remain a human being. The difficulty
cannot be solved by stating in a footnote "We intentionally disregard the
problems of the so-called sociology of knowledge here involved! (ibid.,
p. 39 note 51) Certainly we can accept a certain change of relevances
and we can accept the distinction between the auxiliary activities of a
scientist and the doing of science itself, but if science is done by anyone,
then it is a behaviour performed by an enculturated human being and as such
has a meaning within the cultural context. Not only is the preexistence of
culture a condition for science, but the preexistence of specific kinds of
cultures is needed. "Research on human behaviour is viable only when there
is a climate of opinion within which its methods and implications are known." (Mead, 1951a, p. 189; see above, p. 75)

Strictly speaking, as a pure observer of the social world, the social
scientist does not act. In so far as he 'acts scientifically' (publishing
papers, discussing problems with others, teaching), his activity is
performed within the social world: he acts as man among other men,
dealing with science, but he no longer has, then, the specific attitude
of a scientific observer. (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 16)

Schutz must here deny that observation is an action, a denial that would
seem to contradict his own notion of action. Certainly such observation is
a behaviour in Mead's sense and although it may be governed by scientific
relevances, as Mead admits (see above, p. 56), the behaviour is nonetheless
cultural. Anthropologists from some cultures are blind to this or to that,
others have resistances to admitting the existence of certain regularities,
and so on. Mead's own interest in childhood enculturation, for instance, is
almost certainly due to American culture.

(b) The Necessity for Intuition

The difficulty is above all in observation. Purely linguistic aspects of
science are much easier to criticize and control, than the experiential
foundations in intuition. We have remarked on the need for the relative
continuity of the denotation of terms between the life-world and science.
The denoted referent of a term is what is perceived and this perception is
an encultured human being is always accompanied by an intuitive inter-
pretation, not as a separate act, but as a part of the unified "perceiving
as...". A science whose terms have no denotation, that is, a science
which involved no intuition, no matter how well it is criticized and controlled
rationally is never an empirical science. All empirical science must be based on experience.

However, experiences which depend on the nature of a particular everyday world and on the ways in which this nature is 'seen' in them, do not qualify, for they cannot be compared with experiences obtained in a different everyday world. A universally valid empirical science can be constructed only when it is possible to identify certain experiences or kinds of experiences. This identification requires that the experiences can be selected and channelized by means of an intersubjectively determined 'scientific apparatus'. (Strasser, *Phenomenology...*, p. 107)

In physical science the experience is reduced to the simplest possible observation, the ideal being the reading of a pointer on a scale. In any case, only purely objective observation on "primary qualities" are permitted and any reference to human being is eliminated. For that which is to be studied and observed is that realm of the life world which remains when all references to the human is abstracted, i.e., the realm of Nature.

Every investigation is the investigation of something. Prior to scientific knowledge, this "something" consists necessarily of data known only through intuition. As we have shown above, this assertion applies also to the physical sciences. The only disputed point is whether or not the human sciences must begin with the same "something" as their starting point. Do they have to take into consideration only those phenomena which appear in the "universe of discourse" of the physical sciences (including biology and physiology) or is there also something else that exists for them? The specific task of human science is the investigation of the typically human aspect of man. But the human element is human only because it can be understood or misunderstood by human beings. Accordingly, anyone who wants to abstract completely from "Verstehen" simply deprive human science of its object and changes it into physical science. (Strasser, *Phenomenology...*, pp. 168-169)

By Verstehen here, Strasser refers to what I have called "Intuitive interpretation". His point here is that social science, if it is to be about
the social, must use terms which denote social reality and so must refer to some experiential contact with such reality. If the only observation allowed is that of physical science then cultural phenomena will be invisible and the "something" denoted will not be what we wish to study. "In other words, we cannot talk about man by changing the subject." (Brodbeck, Readings..., p. 6)

Schutz, too, refers to empirical observation in social science and claims that we must "not restrict this term to sensory perceptions of objects and events in the outer world but include the experiential form, by which common-sense thinking in everyday life understands human actions and their outcome in terms of their underlying motives and goals." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 65)

The difficulty is that the experience of the cultural world does not have the universality of the experience of Nature on which natural science is based. Husserl claims, "Everyone, as a matter of a priori necessity, lives in the same..." (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 133) However, when we turn to the objectivity or accessibility of the surrounding world of culture, "there are essential constitutional reasons why this accessibility is not unconditional. In this respect it is manifestly different from that absolutely unconditional accessibility which belongs essentially to the constitutive sense of Nature." (ibid., p. 132)

Whether there is an a priori necessity for essential constitutional reasons or whether it is a simple empirical fact, Husserl seems to be correct in stating that whereas the kind of sensory perception on which natural science is based is universal, the kind of interpretive intuition on which social science is based is culturally limited. That is, not only is social reality a cultural invention, but the ability to perceive that reality is also a culturally inculcated faculty. Any attempt, because of its non-
universality, to eliminate this intuitive interpretation, which is cultural perception, will also eliminate our ability to maintain empirical contact with the social subject we wish to study.

The way to intersubjectivity in cultural studies, then, cannot be by hard objectivity, by attempting to abstract from all culturally patterned perceptions. Rather, the observer's culturally patterned perceptions must be purified and placed under some form of scientific control. Mead says that the anthropologist is only capable of "grasping the patterned perceptions of others because he himself learned to perceive the world around him in a patterned way." (Mead, 1956b, p.206)

(c) Problems of Intuition

The use of interpretive intuition, however, is subject to certain difficulties. Here we will discuss three.

(i) The intersubjective controllability or verifiability of such intuition requires all the observers in the research community to have had the same cultural patterning. Unfortunately, since most cultural patterning is very complex, and as Granger points out, often overdetermined, this is seldom the case. Accordingly, the social scientist must attempt to break his global intuition into parts which are common to all in the research community.

Among the Yaka of Africa, for instance, economic riches are distributed in inverse proportion to work. (E. Roosens, "Monde Yaka") To a Yaka then, the European global intuition of "wages-received-for-work" would not be an intuitive observable, but "wages", "work", and "receiving" would, and so, with these new terms, a science could be developed which would be understandable to Yaka and European alike.
That is, the scientist must start with his own culture's "obvious" intuition and, in communication with others to whom it is not obvious, discover or construct simpler, less global intuitions controllable by both parties. Clearly in most cases the two parties concerned are the anthropologist with his culture and science and the native culture, but Mead also comments on the fecundity of cooperation with other anthropologists foreign to both these cultures.

In this way, by slow gradual steps, a set of observationally relevant terms can be developed which meet both the criteria for culturally patterned intuition and for intersubjectively controllability within a given anthropological research community at a given time.

(ii) The self-interpretation of the anthropologist and his culture is here implied. The anthropologist's "wages-received-for-work" intuition must be put into question in its obviousness if he is ever to understand the Yaka system. The thematization of the anthropologist's own pattern and its "disarming" is necessary if the new pattern is to be discovered.

"As a matter of course, the stranger starts to interpret his new social environment in terms of his thinking as usual. Within the scheme of reference brought from his home group, however, he finds a ready-made idea of the pattern supposedly valid within the approached group--an idea which necessarily will soon prove inadequate." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. II, p. 97) Consider, for instance, a Westerner's first impressions of Japan. "The Japanese are, in the highest degree, both aggressive and unaggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways." (Benedict, 1946a, p. 2) At this point we may simply claim that since
Japanese are both loyal and treacherous their behaviour is incoherent and unsystematic, i.e., meaningless. But if we adopt as a methodological rule to try to find a system in any and all cultures we will reflect further. We will notice that loyalty and treachery in our culture are contradictory; the place they occupy in our pattern of behaviour is such that no one person can be both loyal and treacherous. Already we may have learned something, for we may never before have reflected on this aspect of the meanings of loyalty and treachery in our own culture.

Now we realise that our naive interpretation of the two Japanese behaviours as "loyalty" and "treachery" was due to certain relations between these two behaviours and other behaviours of the Japanese culture, relations which were similar to those of loyalty and treachery in our own culture. But we are now in a position to see how they differ from our behaviours of the same name. A certain sophistication of analysis is here necessary, for as long as we persist in seeing only loyalty and treachery by themselves, as units, without distinguishing the many links with other behaviours which go to constitute their patterns, which give them a place in the system, then we cannot distinguish the ways in which Japanese loyalty differs from ours, nor can we see how it fits into the Japanese system. For instance, we can come to see that Japanese loyalty is to support a person because one has a debt to him, a debt which may vanish overnight or be superseded by a more important debt; and we might analyse western loyalty into the support of a person because of an "intrinsic worth" in that person which cannot therefore vanish overnight. The link of "loyalty" to "support" is common in both cases, which is why we designate the Japanese behaviour as "loyalty", but the other links are different, that is, the pattern of behaviour of the two cultures is in this region, partially, but only partially, the same and so allows a kind of superficial translation. The more accurate translation, e.g., the interpretation which removes the
strangeness, requires an analysis not only of the Japanese behaviour into parts, but also a similar analysis of the western behaviours. That is, the interpretive intuition used must not remain naive, but must continually break down its own global obviousness in the face of the strange.

(iii) A gradual breakdown of cultural obviousness rather than a Grangerian global suspension is needed. This is required, as we have mentioned, if we are to continue to speak of the same phenomena. This breakdown must be gradual because any global suspension of cultural intuition will destroy our ability to perceive our object, social reality. Rather each cultural assumption on the part of the anthropologist must be thematized individually and then suspended if necessary. And as Mead insists, such thematization of one’s own cultural pattern comes chiefly from comparison with other patterns. The case of loyalty discussed above will also serve here to exemplify the particular and piecemeal thematization and suspension needed.

If we ask at what point the progressive process of thematization and suspension stops, the answer is that the level is always provisional and is determined by the history of the contacts which the particular anthropological research community has had with different cultures, i.e., with both the cultures of the anthropologists involved and with the cultures studied. Our piecemeal approach implies that each intuition thematized and purified is backed by a mass of unthematized, generally accepted intuitions. If agreement is not presupposed on a fundamental base then the work of thematization cannot start off as cross-cultural or universal but rather aims at a cross-cultural science as the convergence point of many culturally limited anthropologies.
(d) Comparison with Intuition in Natural Science

In a certain way we have already seen this same development in the
natural sciences. With the birth of modern science, physics put into
question the ordinary "obvious" (Aristotelian) laws governing moving bodies,
and a new set of regularities was suggested. But, simultaneity, for
example, another common sense pattern, was not then questioned but served
as a common base for discussion. In this case, the scientists were all
from western culture and shared basic cultural intuitions and myths (about
Nature).

In natural science, however, once the cultural intuition has been
suspended it may be replaced by a precise set of simple sensory observation
based on instruments.

Observation in the natural sciences differs widely from that of
everyday life. Most observations in natural science are instrumental
results, usually observations of pointer readings. The major part
of natural science work is not the taking of observations, but deciding
what to observe and constructing instruments to make the observation.
The observations of the natural scientist, therefore, are never the
raw data or brute facts of common sense; they come to him already
conceptually transformed and instrumentally abstracted from irrel-
evantages. They are what Loewenberg has aptly called "post-analytic
data". In getting these postanalytical data, the scientific instrument
reduces the subjective contribution of the observer almost to zero..."
(Beck, "The Natural Science Ideal...", p. 82)

Beck continues, "As the social studies became scientific, they did so in
part by the use of instruments. Usually these were not "brass instruments",
but conceptual devices that served comparable purposes..." (ibid., p. 83)
But such "conceptual instruments" are not really comparable for they
involve the training of observers to see only certain things. Training of
this nature requires that the observer learn to suspend his cultural evidences
and it must be repeated for each new anthropologist. That is, the
anthropologist himself is the only instrument we have so far discovered which is capable of registering cultural data. Mead criticizes those who think that the use of photography in anthropology or of recordings in linguistics makes these fields any more "scientific", i.e., instrumental (Mead, 1953a, p. 16); all they do is delay the intervention of the crucial human instrument.

The cumulative effect of natural science which is due to the freezing into an instrument once and for all of a particular suspension of everyday intuition is not yet possible in human science. Some accumulation is possible since the skill of one generation may be passed partially to the next, but nonetheless, each new generation of anthropologists must start from the beginning in learning to suspend their own patterns of culture and to recognize others.

(e) Discovery and Justification

It is often suggested that the use of interpretive intuition is heuristic and should be confined to the context of discovery rather than the context of justification. (Abel, "The Operation called 'Verstehen'", p. 44)

Clearly this is not the case, for in the above example of Japanese loyalty, intuition is being used to falsify or verify an hypothesis. Not only is the discovery of an hypothetical regularity based on the anthropologist's own cultural pattern, but the justification of this regularity brings into play other complex intuitive unities from the home culture.

It should be mentioned that this distinction between discovery and justification is often misused. Popper, despite the title of his book, claims that, "The initial stage, the act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to call for logical analysis nor to be susceptible to it." (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 31) and relegates is to psychology.
By means of this distinction the context of discovery is often rejected from consideration by the philosophy of science. But Mead's work is almost entirely in the context of discovery, which is probably not surprising for a new science. Her manual on the study of culture "is primarily concerned with Stage I [ of four stages ], with the development of a first set of hypotheses about a culture which has never been explored..." (Mead, 1953a, p. 7) Mead also claims that anthropologists must reject the fear that "we may be regarded as unscientific by those who limit science to the task of testing hypotheses someone else has developed." (Mead, 1953b, p. xix-xx)

Sciences, even the natural sciences, cannot be limited to the confirmation of theories developed arbitrarily, by chance, or because of 'purely psychological' factors. Theories and hypotheses are developed by scientists for particular reasons. Mead does not proceed by selecting hypothetical patterns for her cultures and then confirming or falsifying them. Rather, given the observational data, she searches for a regularity which will unify them. The regularities so discovered become in turn the data to be unified by a higher order regularity, and so on. Once the regularity or pattern has been discovered that problem is solved, the question asked has been answered, and Mead no longer attends to that regularity or that culture. She admits the possibility of later stages of research, notably a 'stage two', in which the hypotheses developed are confirmed --- but the admission is purely academic, for in fact she seldom if ever spends time on confirmation. Her problem is to unify, to systematize the observed behaviour into a pattern; once the pattern has been found, her problem as been found, her problem has been solved and she can go home.

One justification for this procedure may be found in our notion of the anthropologist as an instrument. To say that the hypotheses developed by a trained anthropologist in the face of observational data are merely
psychological 'discoveries' or 'intuitions' which have no prima facie value until subjected to confirmation is to consider his training in pattern-spotting as useless. A mechanical instrument is never treated by the natural scientist as a generator of hypothetical readings to be subjected to confirmation; he has designed and built the instrument so that, in the absence of contrary evidence, its readings may be presumed correct. Similarly, a trained anthropologist has been designed, 'programmed', to read out correct patterns from observational data. Better, his behaviour, especially his perceptive behaviour, has been patterned in accordance with intersubjective anthropological norms. As long as it can be assumed that the 'instrument' is functioning correctly, the 'discoveries' it makes are postanalytic readings and so justified before confirmation. Confirmation would be necessary in the case of challenge or doubt, such as in the case of anthropological incompetence, poor training and so on, --- and even then the only check is by the use of another similar instrument, another anthropologist whose skill inspires us with more respect. But this is exactly parallel to the doubting of a mechanical instrument in physics, when it too must be checked against one we are sure of. Under conditions of proper functioning the patterns discovered by the anthropologist are, by the very nature of the case, already largely justified.

A more fundamental approach to Mead's procedure, however, is to question its supposed non-orthodoxy. Is it true that science normally begins when we try to confirm a hypothesis whose source is irrelevant? Hanson argues that in a research science, in "frontier thinking", (Patterns of Discovery, p. 118) the process of discovery itself has a logic and a justification --- even in the prototype which is physics.

Philosophers sometimes regard physics as a kind of mathematical photography and its laws as formal pictures of regularities. But the physicist often seeks not a general description of what he observes, but a general pattern of phenomena within which what he observes will
appear intelligible. It is thus that observations come to cohere systematically. We ought not to expect the same coherence and intelligibility of the fundamental formulae which so order observations. That they order the observations is their raison d'etre; (ibid., p. 109)

Thus we must distinguish the development of a theory within which an object may be studied, and the "almanac" work (ibid., p. 118) in which new laws or regularities are found within the theoretical framework. "What is it to supply a theory? It is to offer an intelligible, systematic, conceptual pattern for the observed data." (ibid., p. 121) Once a theory has been developed, there is room for the hypothesis-confirmation approach --- the quantificational level of cultural science which Mead refers to as 'stage three' and which corresponds to statistical sociology within a culture. (Mead, 1953a, p. 7) But the initial development of a theory in the first place occurs when one has a set of data to be unified, to be rendered intelligible. Hanson, following Peirce, refers to this process as "retroduction", (ibid., p. 85) and contrasts this procedure with deduction.

[Hypothetico-Deductive] accounts all agree that physical laws explain data, "but they obscure the initial connexion between data and laws; indeed, they suggest that the fundamental inference is from higher-order hypotheses to observation statements. This may be a way of setting out one's reasons for accepting an hypothesis after it is got, or for making a prediction, but it is not a way of setting out reasons for proposing or for trying an hypothesis in the first place. Yet the initial suggestion of an hypothesis is very often a reasonable affair. It is not so often affected by intuition, insight, hunches, or other imponderables as biographers or scientists suggest. Disciples of the H-D account often dismiss the dawning of an hypothesis as being of psychological interest only, or else claim it to be the province solely of genius and not of logic. They are wrong. If establishing an hypothesis through its predictions has a logic, so has the conceiving of an hypothesis. (ibid., p. 71)

Hanson goes on to argue that retroduction is empirical, for it patterns the data given. "If the detail [data] statements are empirical,
the pattern statements which give them sense are also empirical --- though not in the same way." (ibid., p. 88) He also claims that deduction and confirmation after the discovery are secondary. Galileo knew he had succeeded when the constant acceleration hypothesis patterned the diverse phenomena he had encountered for thirty years. His reasoned advance from insight to insight culminated in an ultimate physical explicans. Further deductions were merely confirmatory; he could have left them to any of his students.... (ibid., p. 89)

Physical theories provide patterns within which data appear intelligible. They constitute a 'conceptual Gestalt'. A theory is not pieced together from observed phenomena; it is rather what makes it possible to observe phenomena as being of a certain sort, and as related to other phenomena. Theories put phenomena into systems. They are built up 'in reverse' - retroductively. From the observed properties of phenomena the physicist reasons his way towards a keystone idea from which the properties are explicable as a matter of course. (ibid., p. 90)

This is not the place to try to justify Hanson's position for science in general. His account however, of a research science (as opposed to a textbook science) is an exact description of Mead's actual procedure. She seeks an ordering of the cultural behaviour which will unite it into an intelligible pattern and once such a pattern is found, the work is basically over; deduction and confirmation can be left to others, to those who lack either the gift or training for pattern-spotting. "Only those who habitually use multiple clues, filing subliminal impressions, holding in memory partially perceived behavior sequences that become meaningful only after some later act..." (Mead, 1953a, p. 12) can spot patterns. In a sense the 'facts' to be explained are not even perceived as unities until the pattern has been discovered, until the anthropologist has learned to pattern his perception in the required cultural way. Until that point, the 'data' are seen either as meaningless (a kind of non-seeing) or as if they belonged to
the anthropologist's own cultural pattern, i.e., incorrectly. Retroduction involves learning to see the behaviour the way it must be seen if it is to be intelligible. The "Eureka! experience", as Hanson calls it, of a conceptual or perceptual Gestalt is fundamental in Mead's work.

So we can conclude that the distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification is of little use in the analysis of Mead's work and may even prove misleading. The process of discovering the cultural pattern is itself 'scientific' even if based on interpretative intuition and we can in no way isolate a later stage of justification independent, as it were, from the discovery.

(f) Intuition is Empirical

The appeal to the intuition of the anthropologist does not, of course, make anthropology non-empirical. Any intuitive postulate is subject to empirical test. Thus if Mead postulates after observation that the Manus are "puritanical" this hypothesis may be falsified by her discovery that the Manus value art objects, for an aesthetic sense would appear to be non-puritanical. In fact she finds that such art objects are never made by the Manus, are used by them only for trade and valued by them only for their exchange value, and so this possible falsification is disarmed. Such a procedure is empirical and may be performed by her or any other anthropologist adequately trained. But, it should be noted that the empirical study proceeds by criticizing one interpretive intuition in terms of other interpretive intuitions. Interpretive intuition, of course, is fallible, but cannot be corrected by anything but more intuition. This feature, however, applies equally to sensory observation in natural science and is a constitutive feature of empirical science as such.

The criticism is sometimes made that Mead's intuition of a regularity
is protected by falsification by her procedure of referring all irregularities to "deviancy". This criticism misunderstands the notion of regularity, for ultimately no behaviour in a culture can be irregular under Mead's conception. Deviants are always deviant in a culturally regular way, but in terms of a regularity of a higher order.

(g) Summary so far

Let us summarize the argument of this chapter so far. The problem is to discover how Mead achieves objectivity and empirical content in Culture and Personality. We suggest that everyday terms and the intuitions associated with them are gradually purified and changed into scientific terms and intuitions. If we are to study cultural phenomena then we must start not from sensory observation, but from the interpretive intuition in which these phenomena are given in everyday life. The purification of this intuition must maintain a basic denotative continuity with everyday life and must preserve the interpretive nature of the intuition.

In studying other cultures, Mead approaches them with the global obviousnesses which come from our cultural pattern and in contact with the native cultural pattern breaks down this global intuition into parts which are capable of analyzing the native culture while maintaining some obviousness from our own culture. The process involves treating the scientific activity of the anthropologist as itself a behaviour which must receive a subpattern based on scientific relevances. In this sense, the trained anthropologist is himself a scientific instrument and his psychological discoveries, in so far as they follow the scientific subpattern, give rise to postanalytical data, i.e., "justified" hypotheses.
4. Truth as an Ideal

The position we have so far outlined places much emphasis on the perceptual aspects of science and accordingly, on the denotative side of the terms used. If an empirical science were simply a conceptual or linguistic system, it could be formalized and axiomatized independently of any perceptual elements. But since an empirical science does ultimately rely on perception, then it must appeal to subjects, for perception is always individual, and hence cultural. The natural sciences have developed a large, but not complete independence from perceptual intuition, a development possible because of the peculiar nature of their subject-matter and the relatively long history they have undergone. The human sciences, however, are younger and closer to everyday life and since their subject-matter is itself human, they have so far been unable to eliminate human, interpretive intuition.

The highly developed state of the natural sciences may easily mislead one into thinking that science may start off with a minimum of perception. Practically all the truth in physics is captured in explicit theories, definitions and conceptual schemes and very little is left to intuition or individual familiarity with physical things. But while the truth is now in the connotation of the terms and the explicit theories, this is only due to a long evolution during which the intuitive familiarity associated with the denotative aspects of the terms and their intuitive links has gradually been thematized and crystallized into an intersubjectively accessible conceptual system. This evolution is only starting in anthropology.

The difficulty here is the notion of truth or objectivity itself. For some, of a Platonic tendency, truth exists in isolation from concrete subjects in particular situations. For them, truth is obtainable once
and for all and is an absolute above and beyond any man or any cultural system. The phenomenal, perceptual world is but a set of shadows cast by this sunlight.

Let us rather start with the phenomenal world as given—"the night when all the cows are black"—and consider man as cutting up this world into "parts" by praxis and language. This cutting out is already an intersubjective process and involves what Strasser calls first objectivity. Truth is then an ideal construct, a "joint perspective" of a community of subjects. Truth is an ideal referred to by any individual within the community without, however, this individual ever attaining to that ideal, for to do so would be precisely to cease to be an individual.

Cross-cultural truth may be similarly treated as an ideal, as the aim of the intention on the part of subjects from different cultures to place themselves in a common perspective on the phenomena. It is a construct being built up by the mutual broadening of different perspectives on the same phenomena, i.e., within the one world. It is an intersubjective task, never a completed achievement.
CHAPTER VII

THEORETICAL STRUCTURE: THE TERMS USED

Introduction

Intersubjective truth develops by the progressive objectification of the life-world. A certain region is delimited by abstracting an aspect or part of the life-world and this region is defined by sets of categories and relationships. In this chapter we will attempt to discover the region and associated categories used by Mead in her study of Culture and Personality, leaving the relationships involved for chapter VIII.

First it will be necessary to elaborate somewhat on the need for a theoretical perspective in the passage from everyday intuition to simple scientific definitions which we have discussed in chapter VI. The actual perspective used by Mead to cut out the region or formal object of her study will then be discussed. We will show that "behaviour" is not action and that the discovery of a pattern of behaviour cannot be assimilated to the interpretation of meaning in the sense of finding the purpose behind an action.

The essential nature of the native patterning of behaviour will then be argued and the scientific methods Mead uses to preserve these essential patterns will be explicated.
2. The Importance of Methodological Orientation

The everyday world of perception from which science starts is extremely complex. It is ordered in a mythical way by terms whose perceptual denotation is fairly precise but whose connotation is complex, overdetermined, and confused. Science proceeded by suggesting alternative conceptual schemes or sets of terms which are simpler and more rational. Such conceptual schemes are developed from a basic orientation, a methodological idea, a project which aims at analyzing the phenomena in a certain way. A methodological idea may or may not be linked to or give rise to a theory in the strict sense of postulating unobservables, but it is not itself a theory for it is never falsifiable. Since a methodological idea is a project it is not the kind of thing which could be false, but must rather be judged by other criteria, such as by the fecundity of the analyses which flow from it.

The methodological idea, if properly designed, cuts up the phenomena of the life world into intersubjectively verifiable "facts".

By means of the methodic idea the fact is demonstrable. It can withstand critical reflection because it can be made manifest in a certain way. For this reason it is an "evident fact" for all who are willing to adopt the methodic idea in question. And because the methodic principle presents itself as a universally open road to truth, every "fact" lays claim to being universally true. Or more accurately expressed, the fact is unqualifiedly true for all who are able and willing to make use of the methodic idea; it is verifiable by all who are willing to acquire the experiences demanded by the methodic principles. (Strasser, Phenomenology..., p. 126)

We will call the set of such facts for a given methodological scheme, the formal object of the science. The role of the science which treats of such an object is to order and explain these facts.
The methodological idea gives rise to facts which are relative to a particular perspective or point of view. They are governed by the system of relevances of the science involved, by the questions relative to a particular problem. The set of rules which constitute the science as intersubjective forms the basis for the appearance of the object as such and dictates in an a priori manner the schemes of anticipation which the object must fulfill in one way or another. That is, the methodological apparatus determines the inner and outer horizons of the object. As Schutz says:

We have now to characterize briefly the system of relevances prevailing within the province of scientific contemplation. This system originates in a voluntary act of the scientist by which he selects the object of his further inquiry, in other words, by the stating of the problem at hand. Therewith the more or less emptily anticipated solution of this problem becomes the supreme goal of the scientific activity. On the other hand, by the mere stating of the problem the sections or elements of the world which actually are or potentially may become related to it as relevant, as bearing upon the matter in hand, are at once defined. Henceforth, this circumscription of the relevant field will guide the process of inquiry... The stating of the problem at once reveals its open horizons, the outer horizon of connected problems which will have to be stated afterwards, as well as the inner horizon of all the implications hidden within the problem itself which have to be made visible and explicated in order to solve it. (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 249-250)

Note that the dependence of an inquiry and the facts it establishes on a set of questions which are often pragmatically or culturally determined does not make the inquiry non-objective. "The traits selected for study, with a view to discovering their conditions and consequences, may indeed be dependent on the fact that the investigator is a 'cultural being'; but there is no reason whatever for believing that the validity of his conclusions is dependent on that fact in the same way." (Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory, Formation..." p. 197) Rather, scientific objectivity demands that there be an explicit perspective in which all can participate.
Strasser defines objectivity as "free man's recognition of his orientation to, and being normalized by something which is not himself... In other words, nothing is objective for us without us. On the other hand, we may not neglect the correlated truth that nothing is objective through us, we do not make anything objective, for whatever has been unveiled by us or will ever be unveiled by us was already there." (Strasser, Phenomenology..., p. 85; his emphases) That is, intersubjective knowledge requires not only a common perspective or problem on the part of the community of subjects concerned, but also, within this context, "response" on the part of the phenomena. The resultant fact is dependent on both the conceptual scheme adopted and the way the world is.

The cutting up of the phenomena into facts which are intersubjective requires abstractive criteria of classification. Science must classify or conceptualize entities or events in terms of abstract aspects which are the "same" in all the members of the class. "A concept names what is the same in different individuals---that is, a character they all exemplify." (Brodbeck, Readings..., p. 7) Dray's says that "Even if historical events really are in themselves unique... they cannot be described as such; for historical description, like scientific or any other, must use general concepts; and these... necessarily classify what is being talked about..... What an historian explains...must be specifiable in general terms." (Dray, Philosophy of History, p. 9) Laws can only contain terms which refer to specific but abstract and so repeatable aspects of situations if such laws are to be general. Laws can never link complete, concrete situations. "A generalization is such by virtue of its form, stating that all things having a certain character also have another, or whenever we have the first then we also have the second." (Brodbeck, Readings..., p. 7) In other words, a law connecting two classes of events can never be general and scientific if the classes are defined only by their denotation, i.e.,
by listing the concrete entities which are members of them. Only if the abstract aspects of these concrete entities on the basis of which their memberships are accepted or rejected can be exhibited do the classes become determinable in a general way. That is, rules must be given which will allow intersubjective decision on any new candidate for the class if the class-concept is to be a term in a general law. This abstraction or conceptualization is, of course, guided by the methodological idea or perspective adopted, from which the criteria for identity or sameness are developed.

We must now proceed to an examination of Mead's science in the light of this analysis. We must ask what her methodological idea is and how she defines her object. What region of the life-world is objectified and with what set of concepts does she classify it? If culture and personality are, as she claims, abstractions, how and from what do they abstract? What does she mean by a pattern of behaviour?

3. The Categories of Behaviour

(a) Behaviour as Objectified

The region of the life world which Mead objectifies is called behaviour. Culture and personality are both parts of this more fundamental domain. We will examine to what extent the behaviour Mead studies is objectified.

Early anthropologists used native informants to discover how members of a culture behaved. It was soon discovered that the verbal reports of the informant on what natives did and thought are obviously inaccurate and that cultural behaviour has to be observed directly. The verbal reports themselves, however, are very valuable if treated as data
rather than as reports of data. That is, the anthropologist does not accept the native informant's report as if the informant were himself an observer-colleague, but considers the reporting as one more behaviour by a member of the culture. The informant's verbal account is admitted only in objectified form (see above p. 61 ). This approach accords well with an objectivist maxim cited (without approval) by Strasser: "The subject who organizes the (scientific) experience cannot be at the same time the object of this experience. The reason is that experience has to pass through the filter of the scientific apparatus if it wants to qualify as scientific experience." (Strasser, Phenomenology..., p. 11)

Mead's notion of behaviour is in no way limited to overt behaviour. Thoughts, feelings, wishes and other such psychic data are also treated as behaviour in so far as they are accessible. We will see later the importance of this move; for the moment let us remark simply on the fact that in treating such "internal" acts as behaviour, Mead is objectifying these acts. Unlike Brodbeck, who claims that "a mental act is not, of course, an action...." (Brodbeck, Meaning and Action", p. 60) Mead proceeds precisely by treating it as a behaviour and so subject to the cultural pattern. This is not a simple extension of the notion of behaviour, it involves a reversal of priorities. It has often been thought that mental acts have a priority over overt behaviour on the assumption that overt behaviours get their meaning or patterning from these acts. But under Mead's conceptualization, a mental act is as equally behaviour as is an overt behaviour and so must get its patterning or meaning from elsewhere. Such a psychic act is itself patterned rather than pattern-giving.

The region which Mead objectifies as behaviour, then, includes both overt and internal behaviour and is not restricted to any "behaviouristic" notion of overt movement.
(b) The Linguistic Analogy for Objectivation

Aberle has shown that Benedict's original conceptualization of cultural behaviour is closely analogous to the objectification which linguistics has performed of language behaviour. (Aberle, "The Influence of Linguistics...") The selection theory, the idea of patterning, the uniqueness and implicit nature of configuration, the tendency to systematization, the relativity of systems and the idea that there are linguistic or behavioural patterns, shared by all the natives in a group are all to be found both in Benedict's cultural analysis and in Sapir's linguistics. (ibid., p. 305-310) Sapir's own "essays are increasingly concerned with grasping the organization of the individual private world. Sapir points out, for example, that two individuals of ostensibly similar social position may live in quite different perceived worlds." (ibid., p. 312) The resemblance to Benedict's approach is striking.

Aberle points out, however, that the only viable analogy between culture and language is that between the cultural pattern and the Communications Network. The linguistic structure is but a part of the Communications Network for the latter includes the problem of distribution of roles. As we have mentioned, (see above p. 24) this critique of Benedict's position is depassed by Mead's notion of regularity which applies to all in the culture but is participated in regularly different ways by different people.

The analogy, then, between Mead's developed theory and linguistic structure is limited.

(c) Behaviour as Form and as Content

Nevertheless, the linguistic analogy will help us to bring out an important distinction. Linguistic structure is an objectification not of what
is said in a language, but of the way of saying it. Abstraction is made from the "content" and only the "form" is studied. On occasion, the same thing may be said in two languages but the saying may be structured differently in the two cases. On the other hand, the same structure may conceivably be used to say different things. That is, from the phenomenon of speech we may objectify "that which is said" by certain criteria for identity, but by adopting a different criteria for sameness we may objectify another object, the linguistic object, in which the self-identical entities are structures which are repeatable in many different sayings. The linguistic structure has a certain independence from what is said. Let us apply this distinction of form and content to Benedict's work.

Benedict claimed in 1923, "It is, as far as we can see, an ultimate fact of human nature that man builds up his culture out of disparate elements, combining and recombining them; and until we have abandoned the superstition that the result is an organism functionally interrelated, we shall be unable to see our cultural life objectively, or to control its manifestations." (1923a, p. 84) Radcliffe-Brown refers to this position as the 'shreds and patches' theory. (Structure and Function..., p. 186) It might seem at first sight incompatible with her position ten years later that all cultures form a whole.

Yet Aberle points out that "Benedict's two earliest publications "The Vision in Plains Culture" (1922) and "The Concept of the Guardian Spirit in North America" (1923) are concerned with showing the non-organic quality of various religious traits complexes: the lack of necessary connection among the traits. After the fact we can see that she is also showing how each particular exemplification of the vision or guardian spirit is related to some general feature of the culture in question." (Aberle, "The Influence of Linguistics...," p. 314) This is the distinction of historical unity and psychological unity. (see above p. 15) By 1928 the distinction was clear:
these cultures though... made up of disparate elements fortuitously assembled from all directions by diffusion, are none the less over and over again in different tribes integrated according to very different and individual patterns. ... The order is due to the circumstances that in these societies a principle has been set up according to which the assembled cultural material is made over into consistent patterns in accordance with certain inner necessities that have developed within the group. (Benedict, 1928a, p. 580)

In effect, then, Benedict (and later Mead) never gives up the "shreds and patches" theory, but continues to maintain the disparate nature of the elements despite the cultural unity. The classification or conceptualization is based on different criteria for identity in the case of historical (diffusional) and "psychological" unity. From one point of view a culture is an integrated whole; but from the point of view of its "raw materials" (Benedict, 1934a, p. 218) or of "the formal elements" (Benedict, 1928a, p. 253 of reprint in Mead, 1959a) there is only the chaos of historical accident. We are presently trying to discover the point of view from which a culture is a whole, and what kinds of parts this whole is composed of.

Kluckhohn claims that "In his description of 'parts' the anthropologist pays as careful attention to form as to content." ("Parts and Wholes,...," p. 116) Here "content" refers to Benedict's "formal elements", but nonetheless the use of these ambiguous terms is necessary. The sense of a "content" classification of behaviour is best given by examples. Behaviour such as eating, sleeping, walking, speaking, painting, marrying, reproducing, nursing, governing, building, praying, and sexual or economic activity are all classifications based on "content". Behaviour which is appolonian, autonomous, schizophrenic, anal, symmetrical, maternal, authoritarian and so on are "formal" conceptualizations. The distinction is roughly between "what is done" and "how it is done".
The distinction can be seen in the development of the notion of kawas in Manus. The term is translated at first as "exchange" and covers economic activity as a content area. As soon, however, as Mead starts to interpret friendships, marriage, sexuality and so on as governed by the regularity of "exchange" or "kawas", she is speaking of the form of such behaviour and the term has an entirely different sense, referring as it does to a different conceptual scheme. The confusion comes from the fact that among the Manus, economic activity is "exchange" in both senses. The confusion is clarified when Mead later adopts the term "reciprocal" for the regularity pattern. The link between economic activity and reciprocity is contingent, although it occurs in both Manus and Western cultures; among the Arapesh, for instance, exchange is performed "receptively" (as gift giving and receiving) rather than "reciprocally".

The word "behaviour", then, refers to two quite different formal objects, and is simply equivocal. The unit of behavior, "a behaviour", is identified by criteria of sameness which are radically different in the two cases. In a sense we can say that the original area of the phenomenal world is somehow the same in both approaches, but the objectified region, as defined by the conceptual perspective adopted, is altogether different. The material object is similar but the formal objects are different. The object studied by diffusionist-evolutionist anthropology is composed of identical "traits" which are the same in many cultures; the object of Culture and Personality is composed of identical regularities which are repeated in the many different traits. That both are called "behaviour" is simply unfortunate. To call each kind of behaviour "cultural" is also unfortunate, since from one point of view a culture is an integrated systematic whole while from the other it is a simple hodge-podge of collected items with little or no unity.
(d) Emics and Etics

The distinction which we are trying to clarify with Kluckhohn’s terms, "form and content", is analyzed by Harris with the terms "emic and etic". "The terms themselves were coined by the missionary linguist Kenneth Pike* on analogy with the "emic" in phonemic and the "etic" in phonetic." (Harris, Anthropological Theory, p. 569) Harris proposes the following definitions:

Emic statements refer to logical empirical systems whose phenomenal distinctions or 'things' are built up out of contrasts and discriminations significant, meaningful, real, accurate, or in some other fashion regarded as appropriate by the actors themselves. An emic statement can be falsified if it can be shown that it contradicts the cognitive calculus by which relevant actors judge that entities are similar or different, real, meaningful, significant, or in some other sense 'appropriate' or 'acceptable'. (ibid., p. 571)

Etic statements depend upon phenomenal distinctions judged appropriate by the community of scientific observers. Etic statements cannot be falsified if they do not conform to the actor's notion of what is significant, real, meaningful or appropriate. Etic statements are verified when independent observers using similar operations agree that a given event has occurred." (ibid., p. 575)

To avoid confusion, Harris clearly distinguishes the dichotomy between actual and ideally expected behavior in a culture from the emic/etic dichotomy. "The entire weight of the latter dichotomy rests upon the epistemological significance of describing cultural things through categories and relations which are necessarily isomorphic with those appropriate or meaningful to the actors, as opposed to categories and relations which arise independently in the ethnographer's data language." (ibid., p. 580)

Harris' emic/etic distinction is, of course, very close to the subjective/objective distinction of Weber or Goldstein's between the phenomenological and naturalistic approaches. Harris correctly places Boas and all the

Culture and Personality investigators within the emic approach, although he himself is advocating development of the etic approach.

Harris claims that "an emic ethnography may be neither more nor less empirical, scientific or intersubjective than an etic ethnography." (ibid., p. 576) Informants may be used in either approach but "when an informant is used etically, he joins the community of observers." (ibid., p. 576) In our terms, the form of his behaviour is not objectified. Harris claims that both etics and emics may give rise to cross-cultural studies for "what is involved is the setting of intersubjective standards of similarity and difference." (ibid., p. 579) That is, emic terms used cross-culturally do not by that fact become etic. On the other hand, "From an etic point of view, the universe of meaning, purposes, goals, motivations, etc., is ... unapproachable." (ibid., p. 579) Psychoanalysis, in accepting hidden meanings, i.e., meaning not accessible to the actor, fundamentally defeats the emic/etic distinction and "suffers a penalty in the form of a low standard of verifiability and a dubious empirical status. This penalty is always suffered by those who indiscriminately shift back and forth from emic to etic strategies." (ibid., p. 575)

(e) Closure of the Emic Region; Prediction

Ideally, a methodological scheme would allow closure of the region it defines. Mead, however, no less than psychoanalysts, often shifts back and forth from emic to etic categories. She allows etic factors to influence emics; e.g., the Balinese suffer from hypothyroidism due to diet and the resultant passiveness is patterned by and becomes part of the culture, i.e., the emic structure. (cf. Mead, 1951a, p. 184) Clearly too, both Benedict and Mead believe that etic factors influence etic phenomena such as economics. (see, for example, p. 21)
The same lack of closure can be found in Mead's treatment of prediction. Any predictions a science can make must, of course, be restricted to predictions of the phenomena as described and objectified by that science.

However deterministic celestial mechanics (that paradigm of 'deterministic theories') may be with respect to the locations and moments of the constituents of the solar system, it is clearly not deterministic at all with respect to such characteristics as, say, their magnetic fields, or their color or the level of intelligence of their inhabitants. (Rudner, Philosophy of Social Science, p. 91)

Thus it would be a mistake to insist that Mead's emic approach be capable of predictions of a non-emic character. She can not predict the events in Manus which followed the wartime American influence, but she can predict that the Manus will approach any such events in a realistic, hard-working and autonomous fashion. Since, however, the way events are approached by a people will influence subsequent events in their content as well as form, happenings described by means of emic categories effect events as etically conceptualized. Benedict's Selection Theory, which is a step beyond the shreds and patches theory as quoted on p. 193 above, implies that the emic configuration of a culture will effect the selection it makes of diffusible traits, i.e., of behavioural institutions in their very content. The conclusion is that the objectification of the formal aspects of behaviour by means of emic concepts leads only to a relatively isolated region and not one which achieves full closure.

This lack of closure should not be considered as too serious. Nagel criticizes "the tacit assumption that celestial mechanics is the paradigm of any science worthy of the name":

It needs little argument to show that the circumstances which permit long-range predictions in astronomy do not prevail in other branches of natural sciences, and that in this respect celestial mechanics is
not a typical physical science. Such predictions are possible because for all practical purposes the solar system is an isolated system which will remain isolated, so there is reason to believe, during an indefinitely long future. In most other domains of physical inquiry, however, this condition is not in general satisfied... It is clear, therefore, that inability to forecast the indefinite future is not unique to the study of human affairs." (Nagel, "Problems of Concept and Theory Formation,,", p. 207-208)

Schutz claims that natural science achieves conceptual closure at least from human spontaneity.

The concept of Nature, for instance, with which the natural sciences have to deal is, as Husserl has shown, an idealizing abstraction from the Lebenswelt, an abstraction which, on principle and, of course, legitimately, excludes persons with their personal life and all objects of culture which originate as such in practical human activity." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 58)

But I would suggest that such closure is only partially due to the abstractive conceptualization. Rather, when the physical sciences do achieve predictive closure, they do so not only by conceptual means, but by an experimental, active operation. The experimenter must physically protect his equipment from any effects of human spontaneity if he is to keep his region of Nature closed. Similarly, Mead's emic conceptual scheme could only be predictively closed from etic or other influences, if she could in actual practice set up a situation in which all etic factors could be actively controlled.

(f) Summary

In summary, we can say that Mead has objectified a certain aspect of the life-world which we can call the "form" of behaviour. This objectification is achieved by abstracting from the "content", following the analogous procedure in linguistics. Benedict's postulate of systematization is restricted to the "formal" description of behaviour, i.e., its
conceptualization in that type of classification which Harris calls "emic". This emic region is relatively isolated but not absolutely closed; complete closure can ultimately be attained only in mathematics for in any conceptualization of the world, one perspective on the things can never be completely isolated from other perspectives.

We must now discuss the nature of this objectified, semi-closed region of patterned behaviour, the emic domain.

4. Behaviour: Meaningful or Patterned?

(a) Mentalism

Harris associates emic categories with appeal to psychic states.

In ethnography, an emic approach to purposes, goals, motivations, attitudes, etc., is premised on the assumption that between the actor and the observer, it is the actor who is better able to know his own inner state. Furthermore, it is assumed that access to information concerning the actor's inner state is essential for an understanding of his behavior and for a proper description of the behavior-stream events in which he participates." (Harris, Anthropological Theory, p. 574)

There is an obvious, maybe primary, sense in which to interpret a behaviour is to give the conscious, verbalizable purpose which the subject gives to it, i.e., the "reason" for his action. Behaviour in this case, it is claimed, takes its meaning from a prior idea which itself is transparent to consciousness, at least to the actor's consciousness. Nagel claims that the method of Verstehen "consists in supplying interpretations and explanations of social action by imputing to social agents 'subjective states of mind', 'motivational attitudes', and 'intended meanings'." (Nagel, "On the Method of Verstehen...,", p. 263) Let us call this the mentalist notion of the
interpretation of behaviour.

The mentalist tendency is present in many advocates of subjective interpretation. "Nadel, in particular, was concerned to stress the pervasiveness of purpose: thus 'behaviour is sociologically relevant only if it is aim-controlled or enters into aim-controlled action patterns'; and 'there must be, somewhere in the task pattern, consciousness, and somewhere in its activation, purpose. Without these two factors there can be no social understanding; more precisely, there can be no material susceptible of such understanding.'" (Cited by Beattie, in "Understanding and Explanation...", p. 123 note 7, no reference given) Weber claims that sociology must discover the subjective motivations of the actor, but faces the difficulty that, on occasion,

"...the 'conscious motives' may well, even to the actor himself, conceal the various 'motives' and 'repressions' which constitute the real driving force of his action... Then it is the task of the sociologist to be aware of this motivational situation and to describe and analyze it, even though it has not actually been concretely part of the conscious 'intention' of the actor; possibly not at all, at least not fully. This is a borderline case of the interpretation of meaning. (Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, p. 97)

But with Mead's interpretation of behaviour this is not at all a borderline case, but completely normal. Mead wishes to interpret behaviour in a quite other sense than finding the subjective motives or purposes---she wants to find the pattern of objectified behaviour. (This is not a judgment on subjective interpretation as such.) The aim of this section is to distinguish clearly between these two projects.

The mentalist position is based on a certain rationalist ideal that every behaviour should be an action with a conscious purpose. But, as Goldstein says:
there is no reason for thinking that every... human action is done with an end in view....
Much of human action is not purposive in this way yet, nevertheless, cannot be made intelligible without the kind of understanding that is simply not to be had if one limits one's apprehension of it to accord with the prescriptions of behaviorism [i.e., physicalism]. What must be understood to make sense of such action is the mode of social existence which makes this sort of behavior the thing to expect or the thing to do. To think that the kind of understanding called for is of "subjective state of mind" (Nagel) is simply to miss the point, for it seems to suggest that its advocates treat all social action as if it were the purposive behavior of rational agents, and this is surely not the case." ("The Phenomenological and Naturalistic Approaches...", p. 101)

Even, however, when it is recognized that not all human behaviour is purposeful, there is a tendency to think of purposeful behaviour as the paradigm and to construe other behaviours as special or limit cases of purposeful action in which the project shrinks to nothing or becomes purely formal. Consider this citation from Weber:

For a science which is concerned with the subjective meaning of action, explanation requires a grasp of the complex of meaning in which an actual course of understandable action thus interpreted belongs. In all such cases, even where the processes are largely affectual, the subjective meaning of the action, including that also of the relevant meaning complexes, would be called the 'intended' meaning. This involves a departure from ordinary usage, which speaks of intention in this sense only in the case of rationally purposive action." (Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, pp. 95-96)

The suggestion here seems to be that we can develop a more general notion of "intended" meaning valuable for all behaviour, by extending the notion of the intention behind purposive action.

But Mead has a quite different notion of what it is for a behaviour to have a meaning. She will not even accept that purposeful rational
behaviour takes its meaning from a preconceived project, for the preconceived project is itself a behaviour. There is simply no question of understanding "interpretation" on the basis of "reading the purpose" as model for any kind of behaviour, not even for purposeful action.

To say, for instance, that a behaviour is autonomous or maternal is not to give the subjective purpose for which it is done, for these descriptions cover not only both purposeful and non-purposeful behaviours, but also, for the former, they describe as much the purpose as the overt behaviour. If an Arapesh behaves purposefully, the very projecting of the purpose ("pri源头" to the overt behaviour) will itself be a maternal behaviour and the purpose too will be maternal.

It is, of course, possible that Western rational culture possesses as a regularity the ideal that all behaviour should be conscious action. If so, such a regularity may be usefully presumed by a sociologist working in Western societies. But this ideal must itself be thematized as a part of the cultural pattern by an anthropologist who must interpret this very ideal of rational action.

In this analysis, of course, we are not claiming that interpretation in terms of subjective meaning is never possible; but it is clear that any attempt to do so gives rise to a science and to a notion of behaviour which are different from Mead's.

(b) Empathy and Identification

The difficulty is that the notion of meaning appears to lead back to consciousness and consciousness involves subjects. To say that a behaviour is meaningful seems to imply that it is the behaviour of a subject who gave it meaning by doing it for a purpose. The mentalist aim of interpretation is
by inference, or, more usually, by empathy, to grasp this psychic idea behind
the behaviour. Hence arises the notion of putting oneself in the place of
another, or reliving the behaviour vicariously. (see, for instance, Abel,
"The Operation called Verstehen."

Mead uses a field method called identification (see above, p. 78)
which is very close to empathy but must be carefully distinguished from it.
The difference is in what we have called objectification. The emotional
responses of the observer are considered by the believer in empathy to be,
at least hypothetically, the same motivations which exist in the psyche of the
subject of the observed behaviour. (Such motivations may exist in the
observer's psyche only in an imaginary form.) But in Mead's method of
identification, the observer's motivational or emotional response is another
piece of data, another fact to add to the collection. It is not an answer to the
question of what the behaviour means. It is a behaviour and as much a datum
as the original behaviour of the observed native. The observer's emotional
response is the indication of a carefully controlled instrument and as such is
valuable as long as the functioning of the instrument is understood.

The important element in this distinction is the objectified nature
of behaviour in Mead's work. We have seen that she and other anthropologists
do not accept an informant's statement of the motives and purposes of a
behaviour as the correct interpretation of that behaviour. It is not only that
the informant may be incapable of thematizing his motivations, or that some
motivations may be positively repressed; for an anthropologist may arrive
at a motivation for a behaviour even in the face of explicit denial of this
motivation by the native, if such denial is itself explainable. Rather the
point is that even when one can find the motivation, purpose or thought behind
a behaviour, this psychic factor is itself objectified as a behaviour.

If we then wish to maintain that all behaviour takes its meaning from
a psychic act "behind" it, we cannot objectify that act without entering an infinite regress. For once objectified, the mental act is itself a behaviour and so has a meaning and we must look to an 'earlier' or "further back" mental act which gives meaning to the first. But under Mead's method, this mental act must in turn be objectified as behaviour having a meaning, and so on. Brodbeck, a mentalist, prevents such a regress only by refusing to allow that mental acts are behaviours, (see above p. 191 ) i.e., by refusing Mead's objectification.

The difficulty here is twofold. Not only is there fear of an infinite regress in the giving of meaning, but, in fact, an objectified mental behaviour, even if it had a meaning, cannot give meaning to the overt behaviour. If a motivation is an objectified behaviour it cannot be the meaning of the behaviour motivated. Behaviours are just not the kinds of things which function as meanings for other behaviours. Once, however, emotional responses and other psychic data are themselves objectified as "behaviour", which Mead has done, then they cannot be meaning-giving and both the original behaviour and the mental behaviour must get their meaning from elsewhere. Hence any empathic discovery of such mental states, even if possible, would not advance us towards the problem of interpreting behaviour but would lay bare other behaviours which would have to be interpreted.

The common set of presuppositions in the positions we have been discussing in these last few pages are that the individual psychological subject performs mental acts which give meaning to behaviours and so to interpret these behaviours involves the grasping of these prior "ideas" by empathy or otherwise. But this approach involves a kind of psychologism quite foreign to Mead's emphasis on the cultural pattern of behaviour. Her work must be understood in a different way.

To discover this difference, I will present Schutz's notion of subjective
interpretation as the finding of a reflective meaning and show what modifications must be made to this scheme if it is to be used in analyzing Mead's science.

(c) Schutz: Notion of Subjective Meaning

Schutz, following Husserl, claims that subjective meaning is always reflective. My on-going lived experience is pre-phenomenal and it is only when I step out of duration and direct my gaze at the elapsed part of the experience that that experience ceases to be continuous and is broken up into discrete behaviours each with a meaning. "Meaning is a certain way of directing one's gaze at an item of experience." (Schutz, The Phenomenology of the Social World, p. 42) The very unity of meaning which defines the behaviour as a behaviour originates in reflection.

Meaning... is not a quality inherent in certain experiences emerging within our stream of consciousness but the result of an interpretation of a past experience looked at from the present NOW with a reflective attitude. As long as I live in my acts, directed towards the objects of these acts, the acts do not have any meaning, they become meaningful if I grasp them as well-circumscribed experiences of the past and, therefore, in retrospection. Only experiences which can be recollected beyond their actuality and which can be questioned about their constitution are, therefore, meaningful." (ibid., p. 210)

Schutz, however, distinguishes conduct from action. "Conduct" corresponds to Mead's notion of behaviour and means any spontaneous activity whose meaning may be retrospectively grasped. Action, however, requires also the pre-existence of a project, and corresponds to Mead's purposeful behaviour. As an indirect result of the existence of a project, action has an ongoing meaning. In so far as action is concerned, then, Schutz claims that "the intended meaning of an action is always on principle subjective and accessible only to the actor." (ibid., p. 115)
On the other hand, Schutz discusses " 'expressive movements' ... without any explicit intention," (ibid., p. 116) which the subject has not reflected upon and which are therefore subjectively meaningless.

The expressive movement does, then, enter into a meaning-context, but only for the observer, for whom it is an indication of the lived experiences of the person he is observing. The latter is barred from giving meaning to his own expressive movements as they occur by the mere fact that he has not yet noticed them; they are, in our terminology, prephenomenal. Expressive movements, then, have meaning only for the observer, not for the person observed." (ibid., p. 117)

Schutz is presenting us with a concept of meaning which is not based on purpose as a paradigm. Conduct, expression and action all are meaningful. Nonetheless, action does not take its ongoing meaning directly from the prior purpose but rather from the act performed viewed in the future perfect tense. Conduct has no ongoing meaning but only a reflective meaning for the subject. Expression has no reflective meaning for the subject, but may be meaningful to another, observing subject.

We will find in the rest of this chapter and in chapter VIII that this notion of meaning is fundamentally correct, but we must first break its direct relationship to individual subjects.

(d) Behaviour as Configuration

Although Schutz is closer to Mead's position than the mentalists are, one important difference remains. For Schutz the meaning discovered in his own conduct by the reflection of the subject is constitutive of the meaning of that conduct. For Mead, however, the meaning is primarily cultural. That is, the continuity of experience is cut up into discrete meanings or behaviours not by the subject in an act of reflection but by the culture as
a whole. In other words, Schutz's notion of expressive movement which takes
its meaning primarily from the viewpoint of the observer is our best model
for behaviour as interpreted by Mead. The members of a culture form a
community of observers who intersubjectively cut up any individual's behaviour.

We can find some philosophic support for this approach in Winch, who
claims, in effect, that the cutting up of behaviour into self-identical,
discrete units with meanings requires the use of rules. Wittgenstein is
right, claims Winch, when he insists that the idea of following a rule im-
plicates the individual who does so with other people. To follow a rule
implies the possibility of making a mistake, it implies a norm against which
the actor's behaviour can be judged. The rule which an individual follows
must in principle be accessible to others for if not the actor can do what he
likes and invent a rule to cover his actions post factum. If we allow this,
then all behaviour involves "following a rule" and the notion becomes vacuous.
It must be possible for others to judge his conduct:

Otherwise there is no foothold in his behaviour in which the notion
of a rule can take a grip; there is then no sense in describing his
behaviour in that way, since everything he does is as good as anything
else he might do, whereas the point of the concept of a rule is that
it should enable us to evaluate what is being done." (Winch, Idea
of a Social Science, p. 32)

In other words "establishing a standard is not an activity which it makes
sense to ascribe to any individual in complete isolation from other indivi-
duals." (ibid., p. 32) He continues:

A qualification must be here to avert a possible misunderstanding.
It is, of course, possible, within a human society as we know it,
with its established language, and institutions, for an individual to
adhere to a private rule of conduct. What Wittgenstein insists on,
however, is, first, that it must be in principle possible for other
people to grasp that rule and judge when it is being correctly followed;
secondly, that it makes no sense to suppose anyone capable of establishing a purely personal standard of behaviour if he had never had any experience of human society with its socially established rules. In this part of philosophy one is concerned with the general concept of following a rule; that being so, one is not at liberty, in explaining what is involved in that concept, to take for granted a situation in which that concept is already presupposed. (ibid., pp. 32-33)

Winch then goes on to discuss language as a set of accepted rules, such as naming rules. To give the one name, (the one meaning) to two situations is to claim that these two situations are the same; but to treat two situations as the same, regularly, is to follow a rule and this involves a norm which goes beyond the individual. Hence, language, meanings, and norms are all intersubjective.

The rules Winch is referring to are not, of course, rules of conduct in the sense of explicit moral, social, or legal laws, for such must be about behaviours already constituted. The rules are rather of a transcendental nature in the sense that they govern the constitution of the discrete unities which may then be called behaviours. They are somewhat equivalent to the passage in the individual consciousness from pre-phenomenal to phenomenal experience in Schutz's approach. Here, however, the rules are governing the cultural, intersubjective constitution of the phenomena rather than constitution in individual experience. "As Husserl stated in his last years, the last subjectivity, philosophical, ultimate, radical subjectivity, which philosophers call transcendental, is an intersubjectivity." (Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man", p. 51)

It would seem then that there is some philosophical support for the primacy Mead gives to intersubjective meaning. Cultural meaning is prior to individual-subjective meaning, and indeed the presence of any individual meaning is possible only if the cultural meaning has place for it. Individuality
is itself patterned as a possibility. The cultural pattern is always there before the individual and indeed it is always found to be in the individual before he notices it, if he ever does. In Merleau-Ponty's oft-cited words, "before having conceptualized our class or our milieu, we are that class or that milieu." (Structure of Behaviour, p. 222) A particular behaviour is fully patterned whether or not the individual reflects upon it as lived to give it a "subjective", i.e., individual, meaning. Further, each particular behaviour is unified as a discrete entity before the consciousness of the individual turns towards it.

When Balinese behaviour is classified as "autocosmic" (see above, p. 120) Mead is not claiming that each Balinese has reflected on his ongoing lived experience and picked out discrete "autocosmic" behaviours. To interpret behaviour as autocosmic is not to grasp the reflected subjective meaning, nor any approximation to it. Seldom if ever is Mead interested in the subjective meaning the individual gives to his acts; indeed insofar as she studies cultural behaviour she explicitly abstracts from any such idiosyncracy.

The form which behaviour takes does not originate in the subject, but in the intersubjective region of culture. To interpret a behaviour is to find the overall pattern in which all participate and not to use a mystical insight into the psyche of the individual. As Gadamer says, speaking of the interpretation of historical documents:

When we understand a text we do not put ourselves in the place of another and it is not a question of penetrating into the spiritual activity of the author; it is simply a question of grasping the sense, the meaning, the aim of what is transmitted to us. ... We find ourselves suddenly within the perspective, already comprehensible in itself without any need to glance at the subjectivity of the partner. The point of hermeneutic research is to reveal the miracle of comprehension and not the mysterious communication of souls. Comprehension is the participation in a common perspective. (à la visée commune.) (Gadamer, La Conscience Historique, p. 68.)
The *visée commune* is, of course, the cultural approach to life, the way in which all behaviour is formed. It depasses and is prior to the individual subject.

In rejecting this psychologistic reference to the individual subject for the source of meaning, Mead is, in effect, rejecting a Cartesian conception of behaviour. Cartesian dualism sees man as a composite of mental and physical substances. Within this tradition it is natural to conceive of human behaviour as a set of mechanistic movements whose only redeeming factor is their original initiation by a clear, self-conscious idea. In rejecting the principle that the "idea" is the meaning which infuses the movement, Mead is accepting a distinctly different concept of behaviour.

As long as reality was conceived to be limited to thing-like substance, the Cartesian approach led to two extreme alternatives; we could accept either a (caricatured) concept of "behaviourism" which eliminated all psychic "things" and treated all behaviour as physical movement; or we could insist on the importance of the pure idea as a giver of meaning, the "idealist" position. Once we admit, however, that configurations, patterns, relations and so on are also real, without thereby being things, we can admit meaningful behaviour which is neither pure movement, nor movement linked to a clear idea. If we accept that a behaviour is essentially constituted by the inter-subjective pattern, then its "meaning" is its pattern and its place in the larger pattern.

This is evidently Mead's notion of behaviour. For Mead, to interpret a behaviour is to see it as a regularity which is part of the overall pattern. To understand the pattern of the behaviour is to understand its "meaning", to have interpreted it. Indeed, Mead seldom speaks of the meaning of behaviour at all and consistently prefers the terms "regularity", "configuration"
and "pattern". She also explicitly avoids any misunderstanding of this pattern as an ideal scientific construction. "[Patterns] are not merely designs read into a mass of material by a human being, himself capable of perceiving pattern where no pattern is." (Mead, 1954b, p. 401; cf above p. 86.)

This relational-reality status of the pattern of behaviour is not extra-ordinary in contemporary science. The following statement by Merleau-Ponty would apply as well to the cultural as to the linguistic form. The behavioural pattern is neither idea nor thing, and is real in the sense of being already present in cultural life.

This universal genius, which everyone constitutes together by their common life, is, indeed, the equivalent on the linguistic plain of the psychological form. It is an intention already deposited in the received system of the language; yet it is preconscious, for the speaking subject espouses it before he remarks it and brings it to the level of consciousness. Nonetheless, it does not exist except in so far as it is assumed or taken up again by speaking subjects and it lives by their wish to communicate. The objective existence of a natural process is as foreign to this genius or form as is the mental existence of an idea. (Merleau-Ponty, "Le Métaphysique dans l'Homme", p. 154)

5. Pattern as Essential

(a) Introduction

We have seen that Mead's concept of behaviour involves the objectification of the form of cultural conduct and that as form it is neither thing nor idea. We have also examined the kinds of concepts Mead uses to classify those forms and to investigate their configuration. So far, however, we have concentrated on the methodological a priori which, although important, is only half of the final scientific object. The other half comes from the phenomena themselves. The pattern, we have said, is not just ideal, but
real; we must now see how this is so.

Benedict and Mead maintain great respect for the cultural pattern itself, and continually fight against its deformation. Benedict insists that any behaviour is only meaningful in its cultural context and that it cannot be treated without reference to the whole. Mead claims that the anthropologist must "wait upon the material and surrender to what it tells us," (above, p. 76 ) Nonetheless, Mead is fully aware that any investigation is impossible without conceptual tools. But if any investigation proceeds from a certain methodological viewpoint, does it not necessarily violate the integrity of the culture?

Our aim in this section is the examination of the "integrity of a culture." We will argue that since cultural things are constituted by the culture itself, the study of these things requires that we not violate the cultural "definition" which constitutes them. To do so would be to study something else.

We will proceed by opposing the positions of Schutz and Winch on this matter against that of Granger. The results of this confrontation must then be reexpressed in terms of Mead's approach. We will also insist on an important distinction between the cultural pattern itself and the culture's own interpretation of this pattern.

(b) Confrontation of Two Alternatives

(i) **Granger**

Consider Granger's position. He claims that science must overthrow the ordinary cultural ordering of the phenomena and replace this order by a rational scientific order. This position presupposes that the phenomena
are amenable to such restructuration. It implies that the ordinary cultural interpretation of the phenomena is but a layer of meaning placed upon them but in principle separable from them. When he says that the perceptual givens are spectacularly changed, he does not mean that men learn to act differently or restructure their society, he means that science reads the phenomena differently. That such a rereading is possible presupposes that the phenomena are not essentially linked to their patterning within the culture. He presumes that the meanings given by a culture or an individual to a behaviour do not form the essence of that behaviour.

Mead and Benedict, however, are claiming rather that the individual behaviour has a pattern which constitutes the very meaning of the behaviour, and this before the arrival of the concept. This would appear to distinguish the "individual" in natural science and in human science, and Schutz insists on this distinction.

(ii) Schutz

This state of affairs is founded on the fact that there is an essential difference in the structure of the thought objects or mental constructs formed by the social sciences and those formed by the natural sciences. It is up to the natural scientist and to him alone to define, in accordance with the procedural rules of his science, his observational field, and to determine the facts, data, and events within it which are relevant for his problem or scientific purpose at hand. Neither are those facts and events pre-selected, nor is the observational field pre-interpreted. The world of nature, as explored by the natural scientist, does not "mean" anything to molecules, atoms, and electrons. But the observational field of the social scientist-social reality has a specific meaning and relevance structure for the human beings living, acting, and thinking within it. By a series of common-sense constructs they have pre-selected and pre-interpreted this world which they experience as the reality of their daily lives. It is these thought objects of theirs which determine their behavior by motivating it. The thought objects constructed by the social scientist, in order to grasp this social reality, have to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the common-sense thinking of men, living their daily
life within their social world. Thus, the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, that is, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the social scientist has to observe and to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science. (Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Vol. I., pp. 58-59)

(iii) Winch

Winch makes much the same point by developing Wittgenstein's position that rules are never essentially private. Rules play a fundamentally constitutive role in human activity, both in science and within cultural life. For instance, empirical science can be seen as requiring intersubjective rules if it is to investigate uniformities.

In effect, the scientific rules are what we have called the methodological idea which constitutes the object. Can a rule-governed science also be used to study social phenomena?

But here we run into a difficulty; for whereas in the case of the natural scientist we have to deal with only one set of rules, namely those governing the scientist's investigation itself, here what the sociologist is studying, as well as his study of it, is a human activity and is therefore carried on according to rules and it is these rules rather than those which govern the sociologist's investigation, which specify what is to be counted as 'doing the same kind of thing' in relation to that kind of activity. (Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science*, p. 87)

Hence, the social scientist must learn rules of activity, of identity and of meaning-giving rather than apply rules to the discovery of new facts. "His understanding of social phenomena is more like the engineer's understanding of his colleague's activities than it is like the engineer's understanding of the mechanical systems which he studies." (ibid., p. 88) It is like being able to speak and understand a language rather than knowing, say, the
statistical distribution of the words in the language.

As a result of this position, Winch defends the principle that "the social relations between men and the ideas which men's actions embody are really the same thing considered from different points of view." (ibid., p. 121) This has some similarity to Mead's position that the intrapsychic structure of the personality is isomorphic with the interpsychic structure of that personality's relationships with others within his culture. Winch maintains that:

To give an account of the meaning of a word is to describe how it is used; and to describe how it is used is to describe the social intercourse into which it enters.

If social relations between men exist only in and through their ideas, then, since the relations between ideas are internal relations, social relations must be a species of internal relation too. (ibid., p. 123)

Social relations are then more like logical relations than like empirical relations for they are essentially connected.

"An act of obedience itself contains, as an essential element, a recognition of what went before as an order." (ibid., 125) Similarly, to understand belligerent behaviour in terms of "war", is not to apply a theoretical construct derived from the rules of investigation of sociology, but is an essential understanding.

The concept of war belongs essentially to my behaviour.
But the concept of gravity does not belong essentially to the behaviour of a falling apple in the same way: it belongs rather to the physicist's explanation of the apple's behaviour. (ibid., p. 128)

Both Schutz and Winch, then are maintaining that social reality is different from natural reality in that it is already structured by a meaningful pre-interpretation or a set of rules. That is, the phenomena to be studied are such phenomena only if we accept the cultural defining of them. We
cannot speak of the "same" phenomena in two cultures if their meaning is different in the two cultures regardless of how similar the phenomena may be in exterior appearance.

Take the experience known in our culture as "Romantic Love", and which Mead claims does not exist in Samoa. ("Romantic love as it occurs in our civilization, inextricably bound up with ideas of monogamy, exclusiveness, jealousy and undeviating fidelity, does not occur in Samoa." (Mead, 1928a, p. 88) Such behaviour is recognised by our society, it is a regularity of our cultural pattern so that a norm has been established and anyone in our society who behaves in this way can be said to be following our rule. It is the rule which makes this experience to be an experience of "Romantic Love" which gives it its meaning, and a Samoan, even if he should perform, by some objective standard, the same movements, could not be said to be "Romantically in Love", for there is no Samoan norm, no rule for Romantic love.

(c) The Cultural Interpretation is not the Pattern

The notions of pre-interpretation, of rules or of recognition are ambiguous. We must again avoid the psychologicist error. Brodbeck limits the notion of "rule" to those regularities of behaviour which involve "the presence in society of certain standards or norms," all other regularities are idiosyncratic and merely "habitual". "Norms don't exist by themselves; they ultimately involve mental acts. They may be explicated as say, certain definite and durable expectations that people in a society have about each other's behaviour." (Brodbeck, "Meaning and Action", p. 73) Although Brodbeck attempts to define expectation in dispositional terms, we must still be wary of this statement. It suggests a certain level of reflective consciousness, a certain rationalism which is simply not present in Mead.
Mead claims that "behavior may be very highly patterned and completely predictable, even though it is neither verbalized nor consciously taught may not even be recognized as behavior." (Mead, 1964a, p. 46; my underlining.) Even Benedict said that the tendency to speak of patterning as purposeful is due to animism in our language and a poor, if necessary, way of speaking. No mental acts of individual consciousness are needed for the existence of a pattern of behaviour and the fact that a behaviour is patterned is not at all an indication that it has entered the awareness of any subject.

Of course, cultures do often notice their behavioural traits and offer interpretations of them on an explicit level. Such interpretation, however, has no guarantee of correctness and may indeed be systematically incorrect. The interpretation is itself a behaviour and must be treated as real, for even if it is incorrect it may still influence the pattern. It may give rise to new essential unities, but always within the basic pattern to which, as behaviour, it belongs. The extent to which such explicit interpretation occurs varies with each culture; we have remarked, for instance, the low level of such verbalization among the Balinese. (see above, p. 115)

But in no way is such explicit interpretation necessary for the existence of a cultural pattern.

The primordial nature of patterning is analogous to that of typification in subjective experience. "Husserl has shown that, from the outset, the prepredicative experience of the life-world is fundamentally articulated according to types." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. III, p. 125) Schutz adds, "all typifications of common-sense thinking are themselves integral elements of the concrete historical sociocultural Lebenswelt within which they prevail as taken for granted and as socially approved." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 149)
Schutz explicitly distinguishes typification from interpretation. (Schutz, *Collected Papers*, Vol. III, p. 129) The important point here is that types are prepredictative and are not thematized by reflective thought. If new reflective thought comes back over these types it constructs general concepts on the basis of such types. It may also attempt to describe the structure of the typification itself and is capable of error in this attempt, but such error may itself be typical and belong to the subject's system of typification.

Dropping the reference to subjective experience, we can see that, in an analogous way, explicit interpretation is not the only or primordial base for picking out particular behaviours and patterning them. For instance, the Balinese lack of use of the opposing thumb in the grasping of objects is not an "interpretation" of grasping, as if grasping was an object for which they set out to find a meaning. The Balinese have, probably, never thematized this behaviour, and if they were to try they are likely to misinterpret it. Neither the absence of interpretation, nor the existence of a wrong interpretation, are likely to prevent or change the existence of this behaviour as a unity within a larger pattern.

(d) Essential Nature of the Cultural Pattern

A culture "behaviour", then, is not a continuity in time and space but is broken up into a set of discrete "behaviours" by the cultural pattern. This implies not only that the behaviour forms a limited individual unity cut out from the world around it, but also that the behaviour is classified as the "same" as other numerically different behaviours. The Balinese regularity of fear of bodily disintegration cuts out an aspect of a funeral procession from, say, the carrying of the corpse and so on, but it also identifies this behaviour, part of the funeral procession with the same fear
as part of other events, e.g., separated limbs in the shadow play. That is, the pattern gives both self-identity (numerical identity) and species identity (i.e., the essence) to each behaviour. The phenomena are what they are because of an essence given them by the pattern. We cannot say that there exist first certain behaviours which are then to be given a place or meaning in the pattern. "A behaviour" is not an entity until it is cut out by the pattern and given a place or meaning.

Essential to the cultural pattern are not only its cutting out of behavioural units, but also the relationship between these units. To use Winch's example, the cultural pattern cuts out a behaviour as an act of "obedience", but also it links this act to a former act of command. Any second order construct must preserve not only the unities, but also the interrelations which are essential to these unities. Ultimately, it must preserve the whole pattern. The difficulty comes from thinking of individual essences such as "obedience"; if we speak rather of obedience as regularity then its essential links to other regularities in the global configuration are less easily ignored. If we must speak of essences we should refer to the total cultural configuration as one big essence.

In effect, then, Granger's rejection of essences as intermediary between the concept and the individual is only half right. Rather we should say that the pattern is constitutive of the individual and as such cannot be ignored. This is true whether one is speaking of individual behaviours or global cultural patterns. Whatever the "size" of the pattern, it is the pattern itself which cuts out the unities to be studied. There is no already cut out or preconstituted "X" to which a meaning is given by integrating it into a culture. For instance, there is no "meaningless" act, to which the meaning "obedience" is added. The behaviour is a behaviour only because it has been isolated from "other behaviours" by the pattern as an act of obedience.
If then, it is these cultural behaviours which one wishes to study, one cannot re-order the phenomena as Granger would like to do. To reorder the phenomena would be to study something else. If Granger were but to drop the culture's interpretation of its own pattern, he would be doing no more than Mead or any other anthropologist when they refuse to take the informant's words at face value. Such interpretation must, of course, be suspended, or rather, objectified and itself treated as a behaviour. But this would not at all imply that etic categories are being adopted, for we can still accept the cultural pattern's criteria for identity and sameness which define our particular object for us.

Of course, the cultural patterns do not exist in isolation from other objects which may be constituted by other cultural or scientific activity. The object's constituted by biology, psychology, and so on are also abstractions from much the same general region of the life-world and we can expect interaction. Similarly, the objects cut out by cultural diffusion are related to the cultural patterns involved. In other words, as we have already remarked, the region of Culture and Personality does not achieve conceptual closure. Much of Mead's work is precisely a study of these complex interrelationships.

To summarize this section, we can say that, as Winch and Schutz point out in their own ways, cultural reality is constituted by the cultural pattern and this in an essential way. Winch's "rules" are not rules relating pre-existing objects, but rather "transcendental" rules governing the constitution of these objects. Similarly, the cultural pattern which Mead studies is constitutive of the very identity of every part of it, i.e., of every individual behaviour. This patterning is prior to any cultural interpretation of it which may, on occasion, occur. To say, then, as Mead does, that the culture must be given the last word does not mean that we must accept the culture's own interpretation of its pattern. Rather it is
simply to study the "things themselves" as they are, for cultural things are, by their very nature, constituted by the culture.

6. Pattern and Science

(a) Introduction : The Question

Let us accept then that Mead wishes to study the cultural pattern, that is, the interrelated set of essences already constructed by the culture. We must now ask how and in what sense she tries to "save" these patterns within an objective, scientific analysis.

Schutz claims:

The most serious question which the methodology of the social sciences has to answer is: How is it possible to form objective concepts and an objectively verifiable theory of subjective [read "cultural"] meaning-structures? The basic insight that the constructs formed by the social scientist are constructs of the constructs formed in common-sense thinking by the actors on the social scene offers an answer. The scientific constructs formed on the second level, in accordance with the procedural rules valid for all empirical sciences, are objective ideal typical constructs and, as such, of a different kind from those developed on the first level of common-sense thinking which they have to supersede. They are theoretical systems embodying testable general hypotheses. (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol I, p. 63)

Hence Schutz can present the following test for adequacy:

Each term in a scientific model of human action must be constructed in such a way that a human act performed within the life-world by an individual actor in the way indicated by the typical construct would be understandable for the actor himself as well as for his fellow-men in term of common-sense interpretation of everyday life. (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 44)
Schutz' question is exactly to the point, but his response slips again into the position we have called mentalism, for he identifies the first level of constructs with 'common-sense thinking', or 'common-sense interpretation.' But the thinking or the interpretation of the native has nothing to do with the pattern—except that it is a part of it. The 'first level' is the level of the pattern of behaviour and is indeed constituted by the culture, but it is not a construct in the sense of a concept. Hence the scientific constructs are not a second layer of concepts, for the first level is not in general composed of concepts, but of behaviour patterns.

The question, then, still remains: How can scientific concepts, governed by a methodological a priori grasp the cultural pattern without distorting it? How can the scientific concepts be governed by two sets of rules? What must remain untouched, 'sacred', if the theory is to be true to the culture?

(b) Descriptive Adequacy

It might be suggested that we can distinguish a level of description which would be theory-free from the explanatory, theoretical level of science. Feyerabend claims that in many radical empiricist accounts, it is taken for granted that observational results can be stated and verified independently, at least independently of the theories investigated. This is nothing but an expression, in the formal mode of speech, of the common belief that experience contains of factual core that is independent of theories. Such a core must exist or else we cannot be sure that our ideas have any relation to fact. (Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism," p. 151)

If this is so, then any theory explaining the facts must leave the meaning of the terms describing these facts invariant and any two theories which overlap must be consistent in the overlapping domain. The
description of the observed facts must be independent of theoretical development. Mead seems to support this view when she claims, "where human behaviour is concerned, a precise description stands forever as a unique record of a given people. ... Once the description is set down, materials exist for later analysis as new theoretical developments provide new concepts and new tools and methods. ... (Mead, 1932a, p. xii).

But can we claim that any theory of Culture and Personality must leave invariant the meaning given to behaviour by the culture itself? That is, can we consider that the culture is a theory or description of behaviour and so any later explanatory theories must explain the facts already cut out by the culture?

Again this would be to misunderstand the pattern of behaviour in a mentalist way, as if the patterning resulted from an interpretation by the culture. Any description or theory possessed by a culture is evidence to the anthropologist in his search for the pattern; it is not the solution to his problem. The description or theory is itself part of the pattern, secondary to it, and it will always be incomplete, often systematically incorrect.

So it is not the 'facts' as cut out by the culture's own description or theory which must be preserved in any scientific account. This was to be expected, for, as Feyerabend points out in the above-referenced article and as we have already seen (p. 187), the 'fact' is linked to a methodological perspective. The difficulty with this whole account is that the 'fact' is an intersubjective observation statement and such a statement uses general terms. Hence it is relative to the linguistic system used and to the theory which gives the general terms their meaning.

Given the same world, it might have been construed differently.
We might have spoken of it, thought of it, perceived it differently. Perhaps facts are somehow moulded by the logical forms of the fact-stating language. Perhaps these provide a 'mould' in terms of which the world coagulates for us in definite ways. (Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, p. 36)

Feyerabend's response to the discovery that facts are relative to the methodology used is to insist on the need for multiple theories each with their own set of confirming facts. He rejects the need for meaning invariance and subordinates facts completely to the theory which generates them. A theory should have no qualms about denying the facts, the facts, that is, as generated by other theories. In effect, facts can never directly decide between rival theories for they take their meaning directly from their respective theories. "It needs thought to determine meanings, and thought is present neither in our sensations, nor in our behaviour, nor in our language." (Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism", p. 208) There is no meaning in sensation so any meaningful fact must come from a theory. "The meaning of an observational term and the phenomena leading to its application are two entirely different things. Phenomena cannot determine meanings." (ibid., p. 206)

Feyerabend's response smacks of idealism and is an overreaction to the insistence of empiricism on the independence of facts. The dispute is about the origin of meanings: Is meaning presented to us in the world or does it come from thought? We have already opted for a position which tries to depass this dilemma by reading the objective fact as due to the contributions of both the phenomena and the subject's perspective. (See above, p. 164) Let us see how this position fits Mead's approach.

Mead clearly states that the cultural pattern is real and not an invention on the part of the investigator, although each particular investigator may vary in the description he gives. Yet its real presence in the culture
is not a presence as a meaning in the sense of thought or idea. All meanings, thoughts and ideas in the culture are part of the pattern and secondary to it. We have said that the pattern of behaviour is neither idea nor thing; that is, it is neither a meaning nor a set of isolated, meaningless, atomic entities. Rather it is a pattern.

We see then, the danger of referring to the discovery of the pattern as an interpretation of meaning, for the immediate tendency is to understand meaning as idea, hence either the idea of the native or of the anthropologist The need to give the last word to the culture is then understood as a requirement of meaning invariance, as if some meaning in the culture had to be held constant in any theory of that culture. Feyerabend and others have shown that such meanings are not held constant in theoretical development; hence any theoretical study of culture would have to replace the original cultural meaning. But this is contrary to Mead's fundamental project. Therefore we must not understand it in this way.

(c) The Conceptualization of Perception

We must return to the notions of connotation and denotation. By connotation we understand the meaning a term takes from its place in the linguistic system, its reference to other terms and so on. Denotation is rather what is referred to by the term, its extension. We have already remarked the link of denotation to intuition and perception and have claimed that in any theoretical development, no matter how the connotation of a term is changed, its denotation must change gradually and maintain a certain continuity in this change if we are to know what we are talking about. (See above p 161).

Can we claim that in cultural science, although the connotations of
terms may change with the theory, the denotation must remain constant if it is to remain faithful to the culture? In Winch's example (see above p. 216) belligerent behaviour is essentially linked to the actor's notion of war and so it would seem that even if we change the connotative meaning of war, its denotation must remain constant if we are not to violate the essence of the behaviour.

Feyerabend uses a similar notion, that of constancy of causal context. "According to this theory, 'this is red' is an observation sentence, because a well-conditioned individual who is prompted in the appropriate manner in front of an object that has certain physical properties will respond without hesitation with 'this is red'; and this response will occur independently of the interpretation he may connect with the statement." (Feyerabend, "Problems of Empiricism," p. 198) Can we insist that in cultural science the 'causal' context of the terms, or their denotation must be held constant?

No, we cannot. For one thing there is no term to be held constant. Much cultural behaviour is not verbalized, and where verbalization does occur it must be objectified and treated as behaviour. Hence there is no question of maintaining the denotation or the causal context of a term constant.

Usually, when asked for the denotation of a term, such as 'mammal', one will reply "dogs, humans, whales, and so on." That is, the denotation is expressed by means of descriptive words. All such descriptive words are general and so abstractive, that is, they are linked to a linguistic or theoretical perspective. Feyerabend is right that if we change our theory the facts of descriptions, and so the denotations of terms, will change. Mead, too, clearly believes that anthropologists from different cultures will describe the phenomena differently. Hence there is no constancy of denotation.
But is there not another sense of denotation which does not refer
to descriptions but to perception and intuition? When we say that the denotation
of a term is that to which it refers we are not obliged to explicate this by
means of another linguistic description. We may be referring to the original
phenomena themselves as given in perception.

We wish to maintain that it is these phenomena that the anthropologist
studies and which must remain constant despite changes in the description
or in the theory.

Now if we maintain, as Feyerabend would seem to, that all structure
comes from thought, then any notion of constancy of the phenomena is
nonsense. Our position requires that the phenomena already have certain
structures or essences which are nonetheless not meanings, for they can
become meanings or facts only when they have been conceptualized from
some specific perspective, i.e., when they are spoken, when thought is
applied to them. Granger, of course, rejects any such essences:
"Essences, in the philosophies of consciousness, appear precisely as
mediating between the individual and the concept. But this is a mythical
mediation, for it mixes up together the dialectical nature of the concept
and consciousness by making them turn around a fixed point which is
illusionary." (Granger, Pensée Formelle..., p. 82) It is only because
of this rejection that Granger can permit science to ignore the culture's
pattern and "reorder" the phenomena. He is in effect denying that any order
is essentially given with the phenomena.

Mead, however, is insisting on precisely this point. Perception itself
is patterned by the culture before the anthropologist or even the native
attempts to interpret it. The given is not a set of atomic entities but a
configuration and it cannot be a configuration unless it is in some way
ordered. The ordering is not, of course, an explicit ordering such as the
ordering of thought; the pattern is intelligible in potency, not in act. It
is certainly not a uniform unstructured mess.

Given to the anthropologist in perception is a pattern which has
been constituted by the intersubjective intentionality of the culture. This
is what the anthropologist wishes to study, so he must accept it as given,
i.e., as patterned. The constellation and interrelationship of the parts to
the whole is what must be preserved. Any modification of this given is no
longer a study of the cultural reality, hence this perceptual given must be
constant.

Two points are involved here. First, the unity of the particular
behaviours as they are cut out by the cultural pattern must be maintained
in any conceptualization whatsoever. Secondly, the links of these unities
of behaviour to other behaviours in the pattern must be held constant. This
is really but one requirement, for the individual unity of each behaviour is
constituted by the global pattern; there is no question of pre-unified behaviours
externally linked into a pattern. It is not as if the pattern were a secondary
set of relations placed by a culture over pre-existing behaviours and our
problem is not whether we should retain these relations or reorganise the
elements of the relations, i.e., the behaviours, from scratch. The pattern
is primary and there are no isolated behaviours which have an identity in-
dependent of the pattern. Hence there is no possibility of reorganizing the
relationships. It is the constellation itself which is the culture we wish
to study.

But nor is the pattern an idea. It is not a way of thinking about pre-
given behaviours. It is not a theory or a way of speaking. It is not a mean-
ing in any way, so we do not need any principle of meaning-invariance. In
particular, to interpret a behaviour (in Mead's work) is to place it in its
pattern, it is not to discover a meaning in it, overt or hidden. The behaviour does not mean anything in the sense of a sign referring to a signified. Mead's interpretation is not the discovery of what is symbolized by a behaviour, 'what it is trying to say'. Behaviour doesn't say anything; it doesn't speak. Cultural linguistic behaviour is behaviour precisely in its form, in how it says something, not in what is said. A culture is a way of patterning behaviour, not a way of referring to it or speaking about it. The culture patterns childbirth; this does not mean that it talks about it, refers to it or that it uses childbirth to symbolize or signify something else. If in a culture one does speak about childbirth or use it as a sign of something else, this doing is a behaviour which must be examined for its pattern.

Our requirement for any cultural science, then, is that it remain true to what is given in perception. Nothing stronger can be allowed; there is no invariant layer of descriptive facts or interpretations. But nor is anything weaker allowed; one must accept the perception as given, that is, as patterned, and one cannot break it into parts. The anthropologist must learn to see things as the native sees them, adopt his perceptual pattern towards the world and then express this lived experience in words. These words are always abstractive and depend on the theory and culture of the observer, but they are still descriptions of or perspectives on the constantly given pattern.

7. Summary

We have argued that every science cuts out a certain area of the life-world for objectification by means of a priori, methodological conceptual schemes. The explicitness of this conceptualization is the basis for the objectivity of the science by permitting an intersubjectively standard access to the phenomena. The conceptual scheme is abstract and its terms are fundamentally defined by their connotation but these definitions must
be such that the phenomena denoted can somehow be accessible to perception in the life-world.

The science of Culture and Personality objectifies a region called behaviour. Benedict, following the linguistic approach, distinguished clearly between behaviour as conceptualized in terms of diffusion unities, and behaviour as conceptualized by its meaning in the culture, by the way it is performed, i.e., by its form. Mead developed this conceptualization by expanding the sense of psychological, native and ordinary English terms into a complete approach which is labelled by Harris as emic. The concepts have the distinctive feature of being somehow linked to cultural experience as opposed to purely scientific definition. We saw that the abstract region defined by Mead in this way is only partially closed and so complete control, prediction or explanation within this system is not possible.

Since Mead speaks of the meaning of behaviour we found it necessary to clarify this term. We showed that Mead's notion could not be assimilated to the mentalistic "idea" behind an action, i.e., to the behaviour's purpose. Behaviour as objectified by Mead is not the kind of thing which is purposeful and even goal-orientated behaviour does not take its meaning from its goal. Therefore, interpretation is not based on empathy understood as a recapturing of these meaning-giving pure ideas in the psyche behind the action. Schutz's theory of reflective meaning allows us to go a step beyond purposeful action but his emphasis on subjective meaning is ultimately inadequate to Mead's notion of cultural pattern. It is better to drop the ambiguous term meaning and refer, as Mead usually does, to a pattern of behaviour. The subjectivist notion of meaning as a pure idea is thereby passed, but without falling into a simple physicalism, for the behavioural configuration is no more a thing than an idea.
The nature of the necessary reference to cultural constructs in social science was discussed. The very field we wish to study only exists insofar as it is defined by cultural interaction; to abstract from social reality renders invisible that which we wish to study. The cultural pattern, or set of rules as Winch calls them, give the essences which synthesize and identify behavioural unities. This constitution of units of behaviour is not to be construed mentalistically as if the conscious reflective interpretation of the culture were the generator of the pattern. Rather, the pattern and its "essences" precede and govern any such interpretation. The cultural interpretation may itself be contradicted by the anthropological interpretation, but the cultural pattern must be maintained. It is not a question of the culture having the last "word"; rather, the culture's "word" may itself be wrong, and Culture and Personality must reach the things themselves as the culture has created them.

Finally we discussed in what way these cultural relationships must be preserved within a scientific frame of reference. The meaning of terms may come in part from their theory, but they must nevertheless be grounded in perception. Since the object of the cultural science is a pattern the conceptual scheme must conceptualize this pattern and not just its parts. The relationship between the science and the culture is a relationship of concept to percept and not a relationship based on two connotations or even two denotations. A culture is not a theory, for the pattern itself is not spoken; anything spoken by a culture is spoken within its pattern. The behaviour does not signify or symbolize anything; to interpret it is not to find its 'meaning', or the idea behind it. Rather the anthropologist must conceptualize the pattern, the phenomenon, as given in perception.

How Mead does this must now be examined.
CHAPTER VIII

THEORETICAL STRUCTURE: THE "SYSTEMATIC" RELATIONSHIP

1. Introduction

In chapter V, Mead's work was analyzed in terms of some of the basic formal requirements of scientific analysis. A science involves a set of terms embedded in propositions connected by a logic and linked to an empirical, observational region. The linking of Mead's approach to observational reality was treated in chapter VI and the nature of the terms used was preliminarily studied in chapter VII. We must now complete the analysis of the theoretical structure of Mead's science by replacing those terms into their conceptual context.

To understand the problematic of this chapter we must return to our discussion in chapter V of Deductive-Nomological explanation. (see above p. 137) We were discussing the following conceptual scheme:

\[ \begin{align*}
L_4 & \text{ Autonomy involves lack of respect for elders, avoidance of body contact, etc.} \\
C_4 & \text{ All Manus (including children) have autonomous behaviour} \\
E_4 & \text{ Manus children lack respect for their elders}
\end{align*} \]

We discovered that \( L'_4 \) was not a tautology but its non-tautological nature was left unexplicated. The explanatory power of this explanation, however, depends not only on the deductive scheme, but also on the nature of the law \( L'_4 \). If, for instance, \( L'_4 \) is false, the explanation is valueless. If \( L'_4 \) is a tautology, the scheme may indeed be an "explanation", but a purely
logical "explanation", not an explanation such as one would find in an empirical science.

Can we divide propositions in science on the one hand, into those which are analytic or tautological, relatively arbitrary definitions which determine how we use terms, and on the other hand, propositions which are empirical in the sense that they express purely contingent relations discovered in fact to be the case? That is, can we clearly and distinctly define each term in a science by means of other terms and then inductively search for uniformities and law of constant occurrence, or for functional interrelations between these terms?

For instance, in Newtonian physics it might be argued that 'f=ma' is analytic in that it is a definition of, say, 'f', but that the gravitational law, 'F=GMm/r^2' expresses an inductively developed relationship which is a 'matter of fact', in no way necessary. For the terms of the gravitational law are independently definable and so there is not good reason for the law other than inductive empirical evidence. There is nothing in the meanings of the terms which lead us to see why the gravitational law is as it is. But 'f=ma' is formally necessary, logically tautologous.

We will refer to this position as the 'inductivist' account. It is simplistic and has been criticized for at least two centuries. Its specific aim is to reject the idea of an a priori truth. The position in this extreme form has probably never been held by anyone, but we will use it as a foil to bring out the synthetic a priori which Mead's work presupposes. Culture and Personality cannot be analyzed into analytically defined terms externally related by contingent, inductively discovered laws.

A major difficulty of the inductivist account is that its notion of necessity is too restricted, even for natural science. The non-analytic propositions
of an empirical science are not all statements of observed facts. Some are law-like generalizations and these carry with them a certain necessity. Popper says, "compared with logical tautologies, laws of nature have a contingent, accidental character. ... And the singular facts seem highly contingent compared with the natural laws. But the natural laws, though necessary as compared with singular facts, are contingent as compared with logical tautologies." (The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 431–432) He refers to the necessity of natural laws as 'natural or physical necessity.' This necessity cannot be handled by the inductivist.

The problems of the foundations for such natural necessity is difficult and we will not approach it here. Let it suffice to draw the parallel with Mead's work: The parts of a cultural pattern are interrelated in essential, systematic ways, that is, with a certain necessity, but not a logical necessity. To continue with the example of 'autonomy,' the systematically related parts are: lack of respect for elders, avoidance of body contact, etc. Aesthetic tendencies, on the other hand, are excluded. But these inclusions and exclusions are certainly not empirical, in the inductive sense. Mead does not proceed by inductively testing the constancy of co-occurrence of separately definable 'autonomous behaviour' and 'lack of respect for elders'. Indeed she only investigates one case of an autonomous culture. When aesthetic taste is declared incompatible with autonomous behaviour the exclusion is not based on the fact that so far we have never found a culture in which the two occur together. Rather, it is a necessary, essential exclusion. The systematic nature of such relationships is certainly not a conclusion from simple inductive enumeration.

Yet neither is their necessity analytic. In chapter V already we have shown that autonomy is not defined as, or logically equivalent to, lack of respect for elders, for avoidance of body contact and other such traits are also implicated by the term autonomy. But these traits are not
logically equivalent, and so the law which links them is non-tautologous.

The intelligibility, then, appealed to in Mead's explanations involves not only the intelligibility of the deductive scheme, but in a more important way, the systematic relationship which exists between the regularities of a cultural pattern. We must grasp the nature of systematization if we are to understand Mead's science.

In this chapter we will try to explicate this relationship by reference to Husserl's notion of genetic constitution. Constitution will be used to elucidate two distinct but related structures, the logical interrelationship of the terms in Mead's science and the real relationship between the regularities of a cultural pattern, i.e., the pattern itself as real.

We will show that genetic constitution involves both an a priori necessity and a certain facticity. Complex synthetic concepts such as Mead uses unite both aspects into the object conceptualized so that the logical structure of her theory is a material logic, in the sense of relating concepts not only formally but also by their content. The resultant logic is of the nature of a regional ontology of cultural behaviour. In effect, it is an exposition of the essence called "cultural behaviour", that is, of those structures which are essential to it.

The study of enculturation can then be seen as a genetic history of constitution rather than a causal analysis based on a dogma of childhood determinism. Yet any study of genetic constitution is as thoroughly experiential as it is a priori and we will attempt to lay bare the interrelation of the two elements in Mead's work. Cultural constitution is based on a fundamental Nature common to all and we suggest that Husserl's concept of Nature is more adequate to the task at hand than Mead's notion of a
biologically based "psychic unity of mankind."

We will start by presenting Husserl's notion of constitution.

2. Genetic Constitution

(a) Husserl's Concept of Genetic Constitution

Husserl discovered early (in the Prolegomena, 1900) that "insight into the essence of the concepts... is only attainable by the intuitive representation of the essence in adequate ideation; or in the case of complicated concepts, by the knowledge of the essential nature of the elementary concepts inherent in them and of the concepts of their form of connection." (Farber, The Foundation of Phenomenology, p. 143) To understand a concept we must bring it to fulfillment, that is, intuit the essence directly, examine it "in person". A meaning exists as a unity because it has been constituted according to certain laws: "All possible meanings are subject to a firm type of categorical structures, worked out a priori in the general idea of meaning, and... an a priori structure of law reigns in the domain of meaning according to which all possible cases of concrete formations are systematically dependent upon a small number of primitive forms laid down through existential laws, from which they can therefore be derived through pure construction." (ibid., p. 328) To understand an essence involves going back to its origin, undoing its sedimentation, and actually performing the reconstitution.

In his later works, Husserl modified the notion of constitution in a genetic or historical direction. Meaning is developed in the subject by a dialogue with reality during which the object (and subject) is built up.
The development followed by a given genesis is teleological. Judgement and encounter work alternatively to build a sense. Furthermore, the growth of such a sense is not a chance occurrence conditioned only by certain historical conditions. It is necessary; transcendental subjectivity must develop along the lines uncovered by genetical analysis. Husserl's theory of genetic constitution keeps the characteristics of a necessary, apriori science. However, the necessity in question is not something that is deducible from subjectivity as such. It is a necessity that comes from our perception of reality, and as such supposes a certain facticity or givenness on the part of objectivity. Within this facticity and our encounter of it, there are certain apriori interconnections of sense which govern the development of the content of knowledge. (Sokolowski, The Formation of Husserl's Concept of Constitution, p. 171)

Sokolowski points out that such essential constitutional development occurs also in the pre-predicative sphere in what is called "passive genesis". "With good reason it is said that in infancy we had to learn to see physical things, and that such modes of consciousness of them had to precede all others genetically." (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 79) We have already cited Schutz' position that active explicit interpretation is quite distinct from passive prepredicative typification. (see above p. 219)

We can, the mediating ego can, penetrate into the intentional constituents of experiential phenomena themselves—thing-experiencing phenomena and all others, --- and thus find intentional references leading back to a 'history' and accordingly making these phenomena knowable as formations subsequent to other, essentially antecedent formations... There, however, we soon encounter eidetic laws governing a passive forming of perpetually new syntheses (a forming that, in part, lies prior to all activity and, in part, takes in all activity itself); we encounter a passive genesis of the manifold apperceptions, as products that persist in a habituality relating specifically to them." (ibid., p. 79)

Of course, the history involved is constitutional, not real history. Studying the question of the origin of geometry, for instance, Husserl says,
The question here ... must not be taken as the philologico-historical question, nor, therefore, is it a study of the researches of the first geometers. ... Rather, our preoccupation must be directed towards a return upon that most original sense within which geometry was once born. ... There is a way to go back over the original, submerged beginnings of geometry, such as they must necessarily have been, in so far as they were 'proto-foundational.' (Husserl, Die Krisis..., Beilage III on the origin of geometry, p. 365-366)

Similarly, the laws referred to in this history of meaning are laws of meaning. "Unlike the common conception of law ... Husserl's conception never implies causality; rather, an observable constancy of operation makes possible an intuition of an a priori necessity in operation---since the operation is intentional and not physical, causality is simply meaningless." (Lauer, Phenomenology, p. 146; cf. Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 75)

The important point for us in this discussion is that genetic constitution is governed by eidetic laws which alone make such constitution understandable, and which are based on the very meaning of the concepts constituted.

It is phenomenologically evident, but strange to the tradition-bound, that association is not a title for a conformity to empirical laws on the part of complexes of data compressed in a 'psyche'---according to the old figure, something like an intrapsychic gravitation---but a title... for a conformity to eidetic laws on the part of the constitution of the pure ego. It designates a realm of the 'innate' Apriori without which an ego as such is unthinkable. (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, pp. 80-81)

This innate a priori governs the development of any constituted sense, i.e., of any genetic history. Speaking of the studies of such a priori Husserl says,

Followed in a systematic manner, they will give us nothing more nor less than the universal a priori of history in its most rich ingredients. ... All history-of-the-facts remains unintelligible ... because it has
not investigated its own powerful structural a priori. (Husserl, Die Krisis..., p. 380)

It is very important for our analysis of Mead that this apriori not be taken in a purely formal sense. Husserl distinguishes empirical and eidetic sciences, but the eidetic sciences include not only formal science, but also sciences of the material essence.

In analyzing the constitution of a certain type of objects or a certain region of being, Husserl gives us a "material logic" appropriate to it. He shows what sort of encounter is necessary for a certain object and what types of reasoning can be built up concerning it. In doing so, he supplements purely formal logic with a material logic which is absolutely necessary if we are to account for the structure of discursive reasoning as it takes place concretely in our life. A material logic, based on analysis of how certain objects are constituted in consciousness, must be elaborated if we are to see why we can use certain arguments in respect of one type of reality and not in respect to another. It is also necessary to show what sort of perception we must try to carry out in order to deepen our knowledge of a given object. We cannot use any type of argument or any type of scientific experiment, which is simply controlled perception, in each and every context of research. Constitutional analysis... can provide a standard of criticism for our methodology. (Sokolowski, Concept of Constitution, p. 212; cf., Husserl, Ideas I, Section 149, p. 411)

In other words, Mead's concept of behaviour must be governed not only by formal logic and the conditions sufficient for it to be a scientific empirical object, but also by certain essential a priori laws which define behaviour as such, that is, which define it as different from, say, a physical thing.

But we must not think that Husserl leaves no room for non-a priori elements. The essential a priori laws which govern genetic constitution whether it be in the active, conceptual domain, or in the passive,
prepredicative domain of typification, are not completely determinative. The stages of constitution are governed by laws which give the necessary conditions for the possibility of the genetic emergence of sense and objects. But these conditions are not sufficient and we require encounter with reality at each stage. The development of a science cannot be determined a priori without returning to what is given. The a priori "prescribes rules for the manifolds of appearances", (Husserl, Ideas, I, p. 417) it does not create them.

[ Husserl ] shows how one sense is presupposed, as a sine qua non, by another sense which follows. For example, Euclidean geometry can be considered as a necessary condition for a geometry of more than three dimensions, and the lived consciousness of space is a necessary condition for both of these. Newtonian mechanics is a necessary prior step before quantum theory, and the lived awareness of causality is a necessary condition for both again. A primitive moral code based on selfish motives is a prior condition for more sophisticated morality based on justice. ... If the prior sense were not achieved, then the ulterior one could not emerge, could not be constituted. However, a prior sense is never claimed by Husserl to be sufficient cause for what follows it. (Sokolowski, Concept of Constitution, p. 192)

To summarize Husserl's position, eidetic science involves the grasping of essences by retracing their constitution. To understand such essences is to see how they have been generated either passively or actively in accordance with a priori laws. These laws are not only purely formal, but are also material; they leave room for influence from historical encounter with reality.

(b) The Passage to Mundane Intersubjectivity

In chapter VII we found that the concept of meaning as used by Husserl and Schutz had to be modified before it could be applied to Mead's analyses. Let us finish this section by transforming the notion of genetic constitution
in a parallel manner by turning from the emphasis on subjectivity towards
an intersubjective or cultural interpretation.

Husserl himself, near the end of his work, opened the way for such a
transformation. "Each science is referred to an open chain of generations
of investigators, known and unknown, working with each other and for each
other, in so far as they constitute the productive subjectivity for the totality of
the living science." (Husserl, Die Krisis..., p. 368) Lauer says,
"it is now possible to recognize a personality of a higher order, a social
unity, having as its correspondent a "community" world, which Husserl
calls the Kulturwelt. In this then is discovered an intersubjective a priori... 
Husserl himself is convinced that this intersubjective a priori excludes any
arbitrariness in constitution, making it resemble a 'discovery' for more
than a 'creation'.... (Lauer, Phenomenology, pp. 157-158; cf. Husserl,
Cartesian Meditations, pp. 131-136, Fifth Meditation, Section 58)

For Husserl, of course, any analysis of this intersubjective a priori
must take place in the reduced consciousness of the Transcendental Ego.
Schutz, however, suggests that the reduction is not necessary.

One can always reanimate the process which has built up the sediments
of meaning, and one can explain the intentionalities of the perspectives
of relevance and the horizons of interest. Then all these phenomena
of meaning..., might be in principle exactly described and analyzed
even within the general thesis. To accomplish this on the level of
mundane intersubjectivity is the task of the mundane cultural sciences,
and to clarify their specific methods is precisely a part of that
constitutive phenomenology of the natural attitude of which we have
been speaking. Whether one will call this science Intentional
Psychology or, better, General Sociology, since it must always be
referred back to mundane intersubjectivity, is a quite secondary question,
(Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I, pp. 136-137)
This statement permits us to rephrase the purpose of this chapter. We wish to show that Mead’s study of enculturation is a science of the intersubjective constitution of the cultural pattern. And secondly, we wish to "clarify her specific methods" by studying the constitution of the complex concepts to which her science appeals for its intelligibility.

3. Cultural Constitution

(a) Introduction

Objectified behaviour is the subject matter of the work of Mead and Benedict. Accordingly they have no interest in the private, subjective constitution of meaning as studied by Husserl. Intersubjective constitution, however, although lived through by the native may be thematised and objectified by the anthropologist as a pattern of behaviour.

We have seen (see above, pp. 37-39) that the pattern of behaviour may be studied in various ways but that Mead chooses to discover the configuration by studying enculturation because this gives us the "dynamics" of the interpsychic pattern instead of a "flat or static picture". The point of this operation remained obscure above and our only clear conclusion was that it was not a study of childhood causal determinism. (see above, p. 38) We suggest now that enculturation studies are analogous to studies of genetic constitution.

When Benedict insists on studying "inwardness", that is, the cultural institutions as lived, as experienced by the culture, (see above, p. 17 is she not trying to grasp the pattern as constituted by the culture? She is right in rejecting psychology here, for the study of the intersubjective constitution of a culture is not a psychological study. When she speaks
of a culture as a Personality-writ-large, she is always clear that this is a metaphor and that she is in no way positing a supersubject or even a transcendental Ego. Rather, she is pointing out, in effect, that a culture has the ability to constitute behavioural patterns and that these patterns must be studied as constituted.

(b) Cultural Constitution

What does it mean to say that a culture constitutes a behavioural pattern?

Benedict's Selection Theory (see above, pp 19-22) claims that the cultural pattern is the result of a particular selection of traits from the material available in the culture area. The pattern is also the principle of this selection. Mead places more emphasis on the biological and natural "hints" open to elaboration in various ways, rather than on the culture area. Both, however, insist that each culture selects a set of systematic institutions from the arc or spectrum of behavioural possibilities. Not all such behavioural potentials are co-possibilities. It is our authors' major inspiration that, whatever the institutions selected they are arranged in a pattern in such a manner that they are co-possible. From this point of view, the simple presence or absence of an institution in the culture is less important than the role or place it is granted in the total selection. Thus we saw that the presence of aesthetic objects among the Manus appeared as an unintegrated feature until it was found that the place assigned to them by the pattern was that of valuable commercial objects. As such they are co-possible with Manus puritanism; but as aesthetic objects, they would have been out of place.

The term co-possible is too weak for there is also an element of necessity involved. Thus once we see that Manus marriage is governed
by reciprocity, we see that it is necessary, at least \textit{prima facie}, that their economic activity also be reciprocal. Similarly, the link between the receptivity of Arapesh sexual life and their view of all exchange as gift-giving involves not only co-possibility, but necessity. The necessity, however, is of a peculiar kind, as we will see later.

The similarity to the notion of constitution is striking. The attempt to understand a cultural configuration involves a similar process to that of Husserl's attempt to understand essences by studying their constitution. In each case, the pattern breaks down into subpatterns which "fit" together to form the whole. The "fit" appears in both cases to be governed by basic a priori laws.

Consider, for instance, Schutz' study of the constitution of subjective meaning in terms of reflective attention.

The fact that I become aware of the meaning of an experience presupposes that I notice it and 'select it out' from all my other experiences.... If I call one of these experiences meaningful, it is only because, in taking heed of it, I have 'selected it out' of and distinguished it from the abundance of experiences coexisting with it, preceding it, and following it. Let us call an experience that has been 'selected out' in this way a 'discrete' experience and say that we 'attach a meaning to it'. We have now defined the first and most primitive sense of the word 'meaning'. (Schutz, \textit{Phenomenology of the Social World}, pp. 41-42)

Schutz goes on to point out that the selection is not really the attaching of a meaning to a preexisting entity; rather it is the selection and the meaning which create the unity of the discrete experience.

Benedict speaks as if a Personality-writ-large similarly selected out for special attention and patterning certain possibilities of human behaviour while 'discarding', (Benedict, 1934a, p. 53)'ruling out! (ibid., p. 203)
'disregarding' (ibid., p. 222) or not capitalizing on (ibid., p. 223) the other possibilities. The possibilities not selected are simply ignored although they are usually "present" to the culture in some way, either as actually existing among neighbouring peoples or as potentials in individual natives who have temperaments "eschewed" by the culture. In Schutz, subjective meanings are not isolated unities but are linked by synthetic acts to other meanings within the total life-meaning of the subject. Similarly, the elements selected for attention in a culture are selected into a particular context. Thus anger among the Manus is selected within an everyday context which patterns it as the motive force for work, whereas among the Arapesh, anger is selected only in a context of defending the rights of others and at other times, even if spontaneous anger occurs, it is ignored, left unintegrated, either as completely unnoticed or as "meaningless" behaviour.

Of course, Personality-writ-large is a metaphor, and it is the cultural configuration itself which "selects" and patterns. We are not positing a "transcendental Ego" for each culture; but we are pointing to a constitutional "region" which is as governed by a priori laws of co-possibility and necessity as is Husserl's region of subjectivity. A cultural configuration is not an "idea" thought by, and so constituted by, a cultural consciousness. But nor is it just a collection of naturally given and preconstituted elements linked together by historical or other accident.

If, then, we turn from the subjective constitution of essences to the intersubjective or cultural generation of configurations, we find some parallels in that the cultural configuration "selects out" certain discrete features, which take their unity from the selection, and which are then integrated into a synthesized pattern subject to basic laws. If this is so, we would expect that, as in the subjective case, any attempt to understand the overall pattern would involve a study of the "origin" of the pattern,
in the sense of "reactivating" its "constitution". We will now show that Mead's studies of enculturation may be interpreted in this sense.

(c) Enculturation

Mead claims that enculturation studies show us the "dynamics" of the cultural pattern, but do not reveal the "cause" of the pattern. Yet she certainly considers that her studies of child enculturation explain or at least lead us to understand the static, "adult" configuration. It is a "constitutional" rather than causal explanation and seeks to lay bare the genetic sedimentation of the overall pattern. That is, it shows how the pattern is articulated by putting us in the presence of the actual articulating. The historic development of the individual, as Mead so often insists, is not the point of these studies, rather she is showing why these subpatterns fit together. We see how they fit together by seeing them being fitted together, by seeing, in the life of the generalized individual native how certain biological or other "hints" are ignored or selected, and selected in a certain way.

For instance, we saw how among the Manus the reciprocal possibilities inherent in childbirth, in nursing, in defecation, and in early education are singled out by the praxis and the language of the culture. (see above p. 43 and 92-93) We see how the shame surrounding excretionary activity becomes generalized into a prudery about the whole body and how later this shame spreads to sex and so leads to the economic puritanism of the young husband whose sexual activity has not yet been paid for. This is only incidentally a personal history. Its point is to show how the static configuration can unite as necessary co-possibilities bodily prudery, sexual puritanism and an economic drive for autonomy. We have been brought to understand what the cultural configuration is by examining its genetic constitution.
Cultural constitution proceeds by stages or layers in accordance with a priori laws of cultural development. But, as we have seen (above p. 238 and 241) such constitutional genesis allows and even demands repeated encounter with reality so that a particular "necessary" development is only necessary in the specific situation. "Situation" here means the whole set of non-cultural factors which influence a culture, especially natural factors of a physical, biological or psychological nature ("hints") and those traits which are diffused from the culture area. Each layer of constitution is necessary before the subsequent can occur and the subsequent stage refers back to the antecedent stage from which it developed.

For instance, take the Manus encounter with marriage. The newly-wed has already developed the regularities of autonomy, sullen anger, and sexual puritanism and shame, but has no interest in work. The sexual activity involved in marriage combines with the economic system of bride payments to make the transfer of autonomy and puritanism into the economic life of the young husband a necessity. This analysis is constitutional, not psychological, historical, or causal, for the young boy growing up within a marriage already sees how young married men behave and knows he will do the same; his life has been filled with avoidance taboos which refer continually to his future marriage and the shame therein involved; he has no other model for adult life. That is, the event of marriage operates rather as a symbolic trigger for the individual rather than a really efficacious cause. Conceivably an individual who received his wife free of bride price and also abstained from all sexual relations with her would still fall into the pattern. (As in our culture a child whose father has died may still structure his personality in terms of the oedipal triangle although the father-pole is present only symbolically, as part of the cultural pattern, as implied by his mother's relationship to him, etc.) In fact, Manus marriage as a "in" which the culture elaborates is always present and is a dynamic element
in the constituted culture. The enculturation studies show how this always present element is selected into certain complexes which refer to both "earlier" and "later" constitutional stages.

This, in effect, is Mead's argument that enculturation studies are not causal, for the culture was there before the individual and so the individual cannot be the cause of it. But nor is such a study causal in the cultural-historical sense, for how could sexual puritanism "precede" marriage in the history of the Manus people? We have no evidence even that bodily prudery historically preceded economic individualism. Both these points are synthesized in Mead's distinction of present role of an institution (e.g. belief in witches) from the origin of this institution as an historical event, possibly of an individual psychological nature, (e.g. the story-teller who spontaneously created the notion of witch because he had been traumatized by a woman).

Thus between the various age-levels of a culture Mead refers to a process of transformation of a childhood experience into the adult pattern which is assimilated to this experience. That is, the parts of a culture refer by prefiguration or postfiguration to the other parts. (see above Ch. II, pp. 45-46 ) These are, in effect, relationships of constitutional sedimentation.

We can then see why "earlier" childhood constitutional factors seem to play a more important role than later ones, as they determine the original orientation of the constitution in the individual. In effect, of course, the whole cultural pattern is present to the individual at each age and his acceptance of the place in the pattern suitable to his age implicates him already in the later developments. The relations of pre- and post-figuration are but special cases of the overall systematic relation between all the parts of the culture.
As always, we must avoid any mentalist interpretation of this scheme. The constitutional stages do not involve any explicit reflective thought on the part of any mind. Husserl distinguishes passive and active constitution. "Passivity as such is the domain of associative links and fusions in all of which the sense which springs forth is that of a passive together-formation (Zusammenbildung)." (Husserl, Die Krisis..., p. 372) He claims, "anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything built actively, we run into constitution by passive genesis." (Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, p. 78) Thus a passively constituted thing may be present to our consciousness without us grasping its essence by an active constitution. This passive constitution may simply refer back to a memory of when the object was actively constituted. "There belongs to the passivity of that which is first obscurely awakened and which eventually emerges to an ever greater clarity, the possible activity of a remembering in which the past experience is lived through again, anew and actively". (Husserl, Die Krisis..., p. 370) But Husserl proceeds to say that, especially with written language, a constituted object may be remembered and reactivated by a subject other than the one who performed the original active constitution.

Husserl himself, then, admits that what is constituted may be passed from subject to subject in a passive way without reactivation. This would seem to be the foundation for the common typification of the life-world to which we have already referred. (see above, p. 218) The same structure is studied in detail by Heidegger. He finds that the world of Dasein is organized into common pragmatic equipment, the ready-to-hand (Zuhanden), and this in a purely passive way, before there is any active interpretation by the individual Dasein. The Zuhanden are ordered by a network of references so that the pen refers to the paper and both to the writing for which they exist. (Heidegger, Being and Time, paragraphs 15-18)
Mead then lays bare the genetic constitution of this passively received network of references and typifications. The constitution is both passive in the sense of being prepredicative and prior to all active reflection or interpretation, and non-subjective (or intersubjective) in that it is a cultural pattern rather than a set of subjective meanings. Indeed whenever any particular individual comes to reflect on and interpret what he is living, he finds the cultural pattern already there, pregiven. What he has learned has been learned unconsciously, preconsciously in the sense that he already finds his behaviour patterned when he comes to consciousness. Indeed, reflective consciousness itself may be seen as just one learned pattern of behaviour, and a secondary one at that. Perhaps we can say that the most fundamental thing a child learns is how to constitute in the particular cultural manner.

What we have done in this section is transform Husserl's notion of genetic constitution of meaning by a Transcendental Ego into the notion of a genetic constitution of a cultural pattern within the intersubjective area which may perhaps be seen as transcendental,* but certainly not as egological. We are suggesting that Benedict's Selection Theory and Mead's Enculturation studies are ultimately analyses of this genetic constitution. The cultural whole is a behavioural pattern which has a structure somewhat like the constituted structure of an idea or essence in an individual consciousness. That is, the configuration is patterned essentially in a complex but necessary manner which can be understood only if we go back to its "origin" and participate in its constitution. The cultural pattern, however, is not an idea. (see above, pp 207-211) And the reality-encounters involved in its constitution are somewhat different. Nonetheless, despite the pattern's continual encounter with contingent facticity, its genetic

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* 'Transcendental' in the sense of being prior to, and giving the conditions for, objects and subjects. (cf. Granger, Pensee Formelle,..., p. 10)
constitution follows certain a priori laws which make the final product a set of "necessary" relations and so intelligible.

We have, then, as promised, applied Husserl's notion of genetic constitution to the constitution of the cultural pattern. Our second task in this chapter is to apply the same notion to Mead's science and show how her theoretical structure is constituted in a manner which enables us to understand cultures.

4. The Constitution of Mead's Conceptual Scheme

(a) Eidetic Science

The foregoing has been mostly a preliminary to the central point of this chapter—the "systematic" relationship. Until, however, we see culture as a configuration which is a constituted unity we cannot understand the fundamental conceptual scheme Mead adopts in the study of it. The methodology to be used must be related to the way of being of the object.

It is very important that we clearly distinguish on the one hand the real object referred to by the science i.e., the configuration which is neither thing nor idea but is nonetheless "constituted", and on the other hand the conceptual scheme in which this object is grasped. The concept "autonomy", for instance, which we use to analyze Manus culture is an intersubjective idea used by anthropologists. But is it used to study the Manus pattern which is not a concept but a really existing entity of a particular kind, a configuration. The anthropologist's conceptual scheme may be seen as a garment which must be carefully tailored and continually adjusted until it fits the reality as closely as possible. (The metaphor is Husserl's cf. Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol. I, p. 130) The anthropologist
must construct a conceptual scheme which mirrors the pattern as constituted by the culture itself.

In general, scientific conceptual schemes are composed of formal propositional logic, usually of mathematics, and of a regional ontology. The regional ontology is not empirically inductive, but is eidetically or essentially necessary, for it is based on the very constitution of the object. For instance, some claim that Nature is constituted as a set of things: "The thing is res materialis, it is substantial unity, and as such the unity of causal connexions,..." (Husserl, Ideas I, Section 149, p. 415) Thus the causal analysis of nature, its study in terms of purely external relationships between isolated atomic entities, would follow as an essential necessity from the very constitution of the object.

Our question, then, must be what original ontology or material logic follows from the notion of behaviour as Mead has defined it? The unities of behaviour cut out are clearly not constituted as atomic, isolated things so there is no immediate reason to adopt as methodology the search for laws governing the external empirical regularities, (or causal laws) between these entities. Rather, the behavioural unities are patterns embedded in larger patterns. These are not isolated "puritanical sexual acts" among the Manus which might be empirically found to be uniformly correlated with "prudish excretionary acts", for these acts are not given in isolation as "puritanical" or "prudish", but to be seen as such they must be replaced in the context of the overall Manus pattern. Puritanical acts are puritanical only because they are subpatterns of the Manus configuration and the same physical movement by a native of another culture might be given an entirely different interpretation. The character of the individual acts is based on its essential (i.e., culturally constituted) relationship to other acts within the pattern. The pattern determines the unity and nature of the particular
behaviours. A particular physical thing, under the above conception, however, is quite different, for it is constituted as self-identical throughout many different physical arrangements and in no way takes its unity or nature from its context.

Thus whereas physical things are constituted as atomic, causally related unities, at least under the inductivist account, behaviours (as defined by Mead) are constituted as configurationally linked to other behaviours. Accordingly where the science of physics would have to look for empirical laws governing the external relationships between atomic things, the laws which Mead searches for are not inductive causal laws, but laws governing interrelationships between the parts of a pattern. The relationships between the concepts of Mead's theory must approximate to the laws governing the culture's constitution of its pattern. Schutz claims that, "[apparent cultural inconsistencies] and similar problems would have to be explored by a logic of everyday thinking, postulated but not attained by all the great logicians from Leibniz to Husserl and Dewey. Up to now the science of logic has primarily dealt with the logic of science." (Schutz, Collected Papers, Vol II, p. 95) He does not mean, of course, that formal logic must be dropped, for formal logic is a condition of any discourse. Rather the heritage of material logic based on the contingent, causal connection which is an essential aspect of the very constitution of Nature, must be replaced by two material logic of a cultural pattern of behaviour", and based on the constitution of that object.

In other words, the methodology of Mead's study is governed by an eidetic science of the object of that study. The eidetic science determines the inner and outer horizons of the object, the kind of links possible between behavioural unities, and whether any of these relations are empirical and if so which. Clearly, we can distinguish between an eidetic science of cultural patterns in general, and an eidetic science of a particular cultural
pattern. For instance, that any interpretive reflection of a native on his own culture is governed by the cultural pattern and "distorted" accordingly would seem to be general and a priori for all cultures, under Mead's conception. But whether hair styles for men and women are completely determined by the culture or not would seem to depend on the a priori of the particular culture; so some cultures determine that all women's hairstyles are identical, others, such as Western culture permit a certain individualism which must then be studied inductively. That is, when and where inductive studies are methodologically required is subject to the a priori of the cultural object in general and the specific configuration in particular.

(b) Synthetic Concepts

Mead explains cultural behaviour by subsuming it under global concepts which are syntheses of many regularities related according to a special logic proper to cultural behaviour. The regularities are related "systematically", they fit together according to a certain evidence. It is obvious to us that bodily prudery, sexual puritanism, economic drive and individualism go together and that an interest in aesthetics is out of place. It is obvious that Balinese lack of goal-directedness goes with absence of opposing thumb behaviour and with difficulty in following verbal commands. Similarly, Arapesh maternalism, temper tantrums and penis cutting evidently go together. These sets of regularities are systematic and once we see how they are related we see both the copossibility and the necessity of the relations.

It is this obviousness or intuitiveness that Mead ultimately appeals to in making cultural behaviour understandable. Attempts to explain behaviour under the Nomological-Deductive scheme lead back immediately to "laws" which explicate and take their validity from this obviousness. Seldom does Mead try to give inductive empirical evidence for such laws. Nonetheless,
the laws are non-analytic, as we have shown. (see above p. 137)

The "laws" appealed to, then, are neither analytic nor inductive, but are a laying out of the implications of the concept under which the behaviour is assumed. (e.g. autonomy) These implications are involved in the concept because of the way the concept is constituted. Once we understand the concept (intuit its essence) we see why the behaviour is systematic. Attempts to claim that anything "implicated" in a concept is simply an analytic part of that concept reduces all constitution to definition.

We can say, then, that in view of the way cultural behaviour is in the first place, Mead's method is justifiable. The simple analytic concepts used to grasp nature must give way to global synthetic concepts when the object to be grasped is a complex, interrelated pattern.

We must now examine the origin of these global concepts.

(c) The Comparative Study of Culture

If we maintain, then, that culture is not to be studied by empirical, inductive laws because the parts of the pattern are internally related, are we not forced into a position such as that defended by Winch (Idea of a Social Science...) that the study of society is like the study of ideas and so is philosophical, not scientific? Is Mead not wasting her time and energy on difficult field work when she could simply sit in her armchair and think?

In claiming that behavioural patterns are not things and so cannot be studied by purely empirical laws of external relations, we are not maintaining, as an inductivist might think, that behaviour patterns are ideas and so must be studied by the laws which connect ideas, i.e., by logical analyses. For
we have been insisting that configurations are neither things nor ideas and so logical analyses will be no more sufficient for understanding culture than are purely inductivist analyses. What, then, do we do?

Mead proceeds, as we have seen, by comparison; (see above p. 72) her interpretation of a culture is also self-interpretation. (see above pp. 173-175) Her first interpretation of a behaviour is to see it as if it belonged to her own culture, i.e., to subsume it under a concept which fits into a pattern from her own culture. In effect, this is a postulation that the global pattern taken from her own culture is also the pattern of the studied culture. Further research shows inconsistencies in this assumption and leads, as we saw, to a breakdown of the evidence of the anthropologists own pattern in some specific way. More correctly, the evidence of the global concept by which the anthropologist classifies his own concrete pattern is put into question at some point of its constitution so that a new concept may be constituted, differing in this point. We saw how this occurs in the application of the western concept of "loyalty" to Japanese culture ( p. 174) The result is a new global concept which has a constitution different from the original Western concept at one thematized point. Since this new point has been seen in its new constitution and since the rest of the pattern remains unchanged and retains its constitutional evidence, the new global concept remains "obvious" in its configuration. (The obviousness therefore comes partially from the anthropologist's own unthematized pattern and partially from the activity of constitution. (see section 6) ) This procedure is repeated many times and the result is a new synthetic concept whose constitution is understood, and a new awareness about the constitution of the pattern of one's own culture.

This process of coming to understand a configuration by comparison with other configurations is similar to Husserl's intuition of essences.
Husserl claims that one may intuit an essence by a free variation of particular facts. The phenomenologist always starts from a given concrete situation, a particular event. In his imagination he then changes features of this event in various ways to discover what is essential to the event, what is a necessary part of its meaning. Thus he arrives at the essence. (see, for example, Husserl, Ideas I, section 149, pp. 411-412)

Merleau-Ponty criticizes Husserl's scheme and points out two fundamental limitations of this approach: first "I can never be sure that my vision of an essence is anything more than a prejudice rooted in language;" (Merleau-Ponty, "Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man," p. 90) and second, "the 'facts' go beyond what we imagine." (ibid., p. 90) As a result, Merleau-Ponty concludes that "contact with historical or ethnological facts is not only suggestive but even indispensable to a true apprehension of the possible," (ibid., p. 90) and hence of the essence.

But this is precisely Mead's approach, for she says that we are blind to our own pattern until we have actual experience of another. Awareness and thematization occurs largely by contrast and comparison. We tend to consider our own system as the natural one, the only possible one until we have seen and experienced others. Mead and Benedict show not the slightest confidence in our imaginary free variations on the nature of man or of culture. The possibilities inherent in the essence of man are to be found by experiential study; our imagination is quite incapable of exhausting them.

One of phenomenology's chief contentions is that an essence cannot be predicted a priori, but must be intuited in the concrete fact, "In the last analysis the essence is just as contingent as the fact." (ibid., p. 72) That is, while we may dictate a priori conditions for the appearance of the object called cultural behaviour, any particular cultural pattern cannot
be simply predicted from these conditions. We can certainly insist that the cultural pattern be constituted in accordance with certain laws, but these constitutive laws allow place for essential encounters with reality which determines how these laws will be actually incarnated. Only by experience of the concrete individual culture and by comparing it with other cultures can its essence or pattern be discovered.

Since the "internal" relationships of a pattern are not the formal analytic relationships of a pure idea, they can only be discovered by concrete experience, i.e., by an empirical science, provided "empirical" is not restricted to inductive generalizations from objective observations, but covers the phenomenological sense of finding an essence in an experience. Husserl claims of phenomenologists, "it is we who are the genuine positivists." (Ideas I, section 20, p. 86)

We must beware of any unscientific interpretations of this procedure, Mead has no mystic flashes of insight into a culture's pattern, but must proceed by the hard work of comparison, within a general theory. A general theory is needed, however, for awareness by comparison can hardly develop without a basic framework or ground within which the comparison can take place. As Granger says, "Quality is essentially grasped as limitation, and more precisely, as difference. ... Difference has no sense except in a system of oppositions and correlations which bring us from an immediate and apparently isolated being-there to a structure." (Granger, Pensée Formelle..., p. 109) As well as having something to compare we must have some way to compare it. It is the conceptualization of the objectified cultural behaviour as Mead has performed it, which allows the spotting of differences in patterns and so the grasping of particular configurations by the comparative method.
Mead, however, does not rely only on the theoretical scheme as the ground for awareness by comparison. This, indeed, would be to remain on the conceptual level of the pattern as idea constituted by the anthropological community. But we saw also that this pattern is only a tight-fitting conceptual garment around the real pattern as it exists in the culture. As the real foundation for comparison Mead speaks of the "Psychic Unity of Mankind," of our "Common Human Nature". Before terminating this chapter with a treatment of this Human Nature, let us clarify and summarize the argument so far.

5. Scientific Studies Concerning Culture

(a) Experiential Science of Culture

Mead has developed a methodic idea and a set of categories which enable her to objectify a region of the Life-world and submit it to a scientific study. This formal object, which is called cultural behaviour, is a configuration of regularities, a pattern, and not a set of isolated individual unities. To understand these patterns is to understand the interrelations of the composing regularities.

Real Cultures are neither ideas nor things, but configurations of behaviour which are constituted in a way analogous to Husserl's essences. Such constitutions follow a priori, necessary laws of co-possibility, but also include essential encounters with reality, with facticity and these encounters are as determinative as the laws for the final "product". Such complex patterns are understood if one can grasp the necessary articulation of the parts.

The grasping of this articulation requires a process of comparison
of different patterns which permits Mead to recognize and undo some of the "obvious" links which come from her own pattern so she can spot the new links. These new links also have a certain evidence, which is the evidence which comes from their constitution. Hence to grasp not only how the studied pattern is different from Mead's, i.e., to discover the static pattern, but also why this pattern holds together, i.e., its dynamics, she must study the genetic constitution of the new pattern. Mead does this by studying the enculturation of the child.

On the conceptual level of theory, a cultural pattern must be grasped by means of global synthetic concepts which can be understood in terms of their constitution rather than because they are simple. Simple, explicitly defined terms enter into analytic or empirical relationships and since cultures are neither things nor ideas, such conceptual schemes are inadequate. Rather Mead must use terms such as "maternal" or "autonomous" and by comparison with our own culture and by showing the constitutional genesis of the pattern so conceptualized lead us to grasp these terms as unified ideas.

Once the key concepts are understood by this kind of intuition based on constitutional studies, our understanding may be expressed in statements or laws which relate various regularities in the culture. These laws express systematic relationships which are neither analytic in the sense of formal linguistic tautologies, nor simple inductively based laws of constant co-occurrence, but represent relationships essential or internal to the pattern. These laws may be used to explain behaviours under the Deductive-Nomological scheme, but only if we are clear that the laws appealed to are of this special nature. The primary intelligibility appealed to in such explanations is the intuition which results from the constitutional study of the genesis of the concept under which the behaviour is subsumed; the making explicit of
a part of this intuition by a law is secondary.

We are now able to distinguish the various phases of this study. The development of a particular conceptual framework (e.g., autonomy--puritanism--prudery) for a particular culture, although it depends on a methodological a priori which defines cultural patterns as such, requires active field work in the culture concerned. This study is then empirical or experiential even though it is largely eidetic for the essence can only be discovered in the concrete situation.

(b) Intracultural Science

Quite apart from this constitutional, but nonetheless, experiential study, we can distinguish a purely inductive science of behaviour. After the global concepts have been constituted, that is, after the configuration of the culture has been discovered, there may be place for a post-constitutional, intra-cultural science. Mead distinguishes four stages in the study of a culture: a first exploratory stage, in which a set of hypotheses is developed; a second confirmatory stage when these are tested; a third quantificational stage; and a fourth stage of experimental verification in which change experiments are performed. (cf., Mead, 1953a, p. 7) Most of Mead's work is restricted to stage one. The third, quantificational, stage involves the analysis of a society using statistical methods in the current sociological manner.

Of what does such an analysis treat? It treats of statistical correlations and laws linking regularities or entities which have already been laid bare by a constitutional analysis. That is, it accepts as given a set of global synthetic concepts and the essential links between them and attempts to find purely inductive laws. This is only possible when the cultural pattern can
be presupposed which usually occurs only after the anthropological investigation. In the sociologist's own culture, however, the sociologist can often proceed directly to the statistical study since he knows intuitively his own pattern.

Thus a sociologist may investigate what percentage of a population practices religion, is only nominally religious, or is non-religious. But this is only possible because all three behaviours are already known to the investigator as being culturally patterned. Such an investigation would be impossible in many cultures when the possibility of being non-religious doesn't exist, there is no room for it in the pattern. Similarly, to study what proportion of the time a Balinese is in an "away" state assumes that the pattern has been constituted as a part of the culture. (see above, p. 116) Any sociologist who tried in Western culture to investigate the causes of the Balinese Rame condition of noisy crowdedness (see above, pp. 115-116) would draw a complete blank. An inductive study of the relationship between co-wives is not possible in a monogamous culture where a second wife (as opposed to a mistress) is an impossibility.

But an intra-cultural inductive study requires not only that the regularities being investigated exist in the culture but also that the configuration be such that the connecting links may be studied inductively. That is, some regularities must be patterned as indeterminate in a constitutional sense. The configuration must anticipate some possibilities in such a manner that an inductive study is a propos.

For instance, in a culture which patterns sado-masochistic behaviour, these behaviours are constituted by the cultural configuration. The configuration also determines the distribution of the two complementary regularities of sadism and masochism by person and period. One possibility for such distribution is to pattern all men as sadists and all women as
masochists. But another possibility is that the configuration determine that the distribution be left "open" to nonconfigurational factors, which may or may not be specified. In this case only may we perform an inductive study to discover the who, when, where and even why (if we have a theory) of the distribution of sadism and masochism.

Similarly, some cultures determine exactly what clothes or hairstyles shall be worn by whom; others institutionalize such elements as dependent on the taste of the individual, thereby authorizing an inductive study.

Thus there is room for inductive sciences such as intra-cultural psychology, sociology, economics, and so on. Since, however, such sciences are about objects and relations constituted in a given culture, there is no reason for the laws discovered to be valid outside the particular configuration; indeed, the laws may even be meaningless elsewhere.

(c) Cross-cultural Science

These postconstitutional, intra-cultural sciences must be clearly distinguished from cross-cultural sciences, even those bearing the same name. Cross-cultural sciences must use etic terms which make no reference to culturally constituted patterns, but rely on objects constituted only by the scientific community in abstraction from any cultural pattern. These sciences do not rely on cultural constitution for their concepts and objects and may indeed be able to explain, causally, how particular constituted patterns come to be. It is doubtful, but not impossible that cultural constitutional could ultimately be reduced to such a cross-cultural science; only the future can tell. (see above, ch. V)

Mead uses cross-cultural sciences such as biology, psychology learning
theory, psychoanalysis and child development theory to explicate the
notion of human Nature upon which culture is built. But the interrelation-
ships between cross-cultural and constitutional science are many and
obscure. They are based on quite different methodic ideas and perspectives,
abstracting out different aspects of the life-world. The relation between
two such separate conceptual systems is always complex and leads us back
ultimately to the unity of the life-world itself. Probably we can not
adequately discover how they relate until they are both superseded by a
new science uniting both perspectives. In fact, we can never even be sure
when both sciences are speaking about the same things.

Yet Mead does appear to implicate these sciences when she refers
to the laws of human Nature. How does she do so? Are we sure that
"Nature" is not ambiguous coming as it does from two contexts? It is
to these questions that we must now turn.

6. Nature and Culture

(a) Introduction

Two major difficulties which have been present throughout much of our
study can be put off no longer. Both may be called the relationship of
culture to nature but in different ways.

The first question is the status of the human nature on which culture
is based. Mead continually refers to those sciences of behaviour which we
have called cross-cultural, biology, psychology and so on, as describing the
natural "hints" which culture elaborates. What is this nature and how is
it related to culture? We will suggest that Mead is mistaken when she
conceives of this nature as the object of the cross-cultural sciences; rather
the nature which enters into culture is nature as experienced and lived by
the culture, i.e., phenomenological nature.

Secondly, in interpreting the systematic relationship as based on genetic constitution, we have only postponed the real question, what is the nature of the a priori laws of constitution on which the obviousness and intelligibility of Mead's work ultimately rests? Are they ultimately laws of nature to be elaborated by a natural science—as Mead herself suggests at times, or should we adopt a Husserlian interpretation which would eschew any such naturalism as ultimately circular?

(b) Nature

We have presented above (pp. 31-36) Mead's position that human nature is a set of potentialities capable of being actualized by culture. These potentialities may be species-wide, may be due to heredity on the society or group level, or may be purely individual in which case they are known as "temperament". We cite as examples the species-wide age gap between the appearance of sexual impulses and reproductive maturity, the hypothyroidism of the Balinese (see above, p. 126) the unusually aggressive temperament of the Arapesh, Nyelahi. (see above, p. 108) Such potentialities are hints which a culture may elaborate in various directions but which will not permit just any elaboration. The "force" behind such hints also varies so that, for instance, all cultures must somehow institutionalize sexual activity in marriage, protect the immature by incest taboos and so on, whereas "convulsive vomiting (such as in early pregnancy) is a capacity of every human organism, which can be elaborated, neglected, or to a large degree disallowed." (Mead, 1949b, p. 208) First menstruation and puberty are excellent examples of biological hints which are elaborated in radically different ways in different cultures.
How, basically, do such hints fit into the cultural configuration?

Husserl, too, refers to Nature in his constitution studies. He claims that, the cultural world "is given orientedly on the underlying basis of the Nature common to all and on the basis of the spatio-temporal form that gives access to Nature and must function also in making the multiplicity of cultural formations and cultures accessible." (Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, 5th Meditation, Section 58, p. 134) Again:

The following is... included in the sphere of unconditional universality which is the correlate of the essential form of world constitution: Everyone, as a matter of apriori necessity, lives in the same Nature, a Nature moreover that, with the necessary communalization of his life and the lives of others, he has fashioned into a cultural world in his individual and communalized living and doing—a world having human significances... (ibid., p. 133)

Husserl goes so far as to apply this idea to Personality.

Far-reaching problems of static and genetic constitution make themselves keenly felt. Those of genetic constitution as part of the problem of all-embracing genesis, which presents so many enigmas. For example: regarding personality, not only the problem of the static constitution of a unity of personal character, over against the multiplicity of instituted and subsequently annulled habitualities, but also the genetic problem, which leads back to enigmas concerning 'innate' character. (ibid., pp. 135-136)

In effect, Husserl is claiming that human culture as intersubjectively constituted must always be based on that which is common to all subjects—the world of Nature. If Nature were not uniformly constituted by all, not only would anthropological understanding of other cultures be unable to get a foothold, but intersubjective culture could never itself be constituted in the first place. That is, ultimately we can come to understand the surrounding world of another subject or of another culture by working back down
through their constituted world until we come to a Nature which we have both constituted identically. For instance, an anthropologist can always unravel a kinship system no matter how complex for as long as it is a kinship system it is based on the relationships of sexual reproduction and this relationship is natural and the same for all. Interpretation is ultimately possible because there is a level of primordial experience common to all in which culture builds. Merleau-Ponty adds, "We call this level of experience 'primordial'---not to assert that everything else derives from it by transformation and evolution...but rather that it reveals to us the permanent data of the problem which culture attempts to resolve." (Merleau-Ponty, Primacy of Perception, p. 25)

Now Mead certainly seems to explain a culture by displaying its articulation upon the permanent, common problems and hints of nature. Her static and genetic constitutional studies even lead her back to the "enigmas concerning 'innate' character." But is she speaking of the same Nature as Husserl?

The Nature Mead appeals to is the Nature constituted and studied by the cross-cultural etic sciences such as biology, psychology, learning theory, and so on. But this is not the Nature which is constituted in the same way for us all, rather it is proper to those sciences and is not constituted by nonscientists, or at least not by members of "unscientific" cultures. It is an abstraction from the life-world and an abstraction not made in the same way by other cultures. No non-Western non-biologist sees the "body" as a biologist does.

Rather the Nature to which Husserl appeals is a certain order of constitution in the everyday life-world, nature as lived and experienced by everyone. The "childbirth" which may be taken and used for cultural
elaboration is childbirth as experienced or witnessed by the mother, child, 
and other natives, not parturition as viewed by a biologist or obstetrician.

An element can only enter into a constitutional genesis when this 
element has been constituted already. But scientific Nature is not 
universally constituted in every culture Therefore, the common Nature 
to which all constitutional studies ultimately appeal is lived, not scientific 
nature. (Of course, in a "scientific" culture, scientific nature is constitu-
ted and so may enter into a constitutional genesis, but usually at a high 
level. In any case, it cannot serve as the foundation.)

The difficulties of relating cross-cultural and constitutional sciences 
are further aggravated by this ambiguity. The natural objects of the cross-
cultural sciences are not the elements which enter into a cultural constitu-
tion. But nor are they entirely different, for the cross-cultural sciences 
are still related to and founded upon nature as constituted by all. Hence, 
as Mead points out, learning, psycho-analytic, or child development theories 
may be useful, but only if "replaced" into the cultural context. (cf. 
above p. 67)

If this is true, then Mead's studies of cultural constitution should be 
based on a phenomenology of Nature as universally experienced. For 
instance, when a particular regularity, such as Manus puritanism, is based 
on the body, such as on prudery in excretion, then she should turn to a 
study not of biology of the body or of excretion, nor even a psychology, 
but to a phenomenology of the lived body. We will return to this question 
in detail in chapter IX.

A difficulty still remains. Why is nature as lived constituted uniformly 
by all? This is just a particular aspect of the more general question of 
the origin of constitutional laws and a prioris and it is to this question that 
we must now turn.
(c) Constitutional Laws

We have been maintaining that the systematic relationship to which Mead appeals in explaining cultural configurations is based on genetic constitution. We spoke also of a priori laws which govern the possibility and necessity of this constitution. What is the nature of these laws?

Mead and Benedict clearly state that the ground for systematization is to be found in individual human beings. Mead goes so far as to say "the assumption is that these regularities are imposed by regularities in the biological nature of man and the functioning of the human nervous system..." (Mead, 1954b p. 401) Presumably, she would want to maintain that the laws of genetic constitution would be of a similar natural origin. She certainly interprets the Psychic Unity of Mankind as a similarity of biological potential such that any child can, in principle, be encultured into any culture.

(i) Husserl

This position is, of course, radically opposed to that of Husserl who spent much of his life combatting naturalism, and especially psychologism. The study of how meanings are constituted must take place in the pure evidence of the reduced Ego and any appeal to natural science is impossible. Natural science itself is constituted as a meaning as are its terms and the logic governing them, hence to turn to such science for the study of meaning would be viciously circular. Rather, Husserl appeals to the immediate evidence which is involved in the reactivation of a constitution. Inductively discovered factual regularities are completely out of place here for they presuppose the eidetic investigation.
For Husserl, ultimate intelligibility is to be found by studying the things themselves as constituted. Constitutional rules are not rules of psychology, of how we must think, but are founded on the essence of the object, on what it is. We have the power to see and understand this essence by bringing it to fulfillment, to the pure evidence of constitution. The laws of constitutive connection are simply the laws of what the intended object is in itself.

In general, all connections are submitted to pure laws and it is particularly so for all material connections limited to one domain the unity of which is defined by its object; in such cases, that which results of the connection must belong to the same domain as the elements connected. This is in contrast to formal ("analytical") connections which, like collective ones, do not depend on the material particularities of one domain and are not governed by the material essences of the elements of the connection. In no domain are we able to unify any singularity whatsoever by any form, rather, the domain of the singularities limits a priori the number of possible forms and determines the laws of their filling up. The universality of this fact, however, does not dispense from the obligation to demonstrate it in each domain and from discovering the precise laws according to which it develops. (Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, II/1, p. 317)

In other words, any constitution which does not follow the a priori laws for behaviour-constitution is simply not a behaviour. It is excluded by the very meaning of 'behaviour'; its essence is different. The a priori laws of constitution appealed to, then, are those laws which when followed lead to the constitution of the meaning-unity 'behaviour'. Similarly, the particular constitutional laws of a specific culture, within the general region, are such that if not followed the result is not a behaviour of this culture.

But where are these "laws"? Never are they exhibited. Rather they remain implicit in all of Mead's work; all her appeals to intuitive
obviousness presuppose that our intuition is guided by these laws. Let us see how.

(ii) Intuition Again

Chomsky has developed a theory of generative grammar to explain the phenomena of language. He contrasts such an explanatory theory with traditional grammar:

Traditional grammars make an essential appeal to the intelligence of the reader. They do not actually formulate the rules of the grammar, but rather give examples and hints that enable the intelligent reader to determine the grammar, in some way that is not at all understood. They do not provide an analysis of the 'faculté de langage' that makes this achievement possible. ... A generative grammar ... is an explicit grammar that makes no appeal to the reader's 'faculté de langage' but rather attempts to incorporate the mechanism of this faculty.... (Chomsky, Topics in the Theory of Generative Grammar, pp. 11-12)

Mead's work is very similar to traditional grammar. With examples and hints she leads us to understand a culture, but only by appealing to our own intuition of behavioural patterns. Ultimately the observer is capable of "grasping the patterned perceptions of others because he himself learned to perceive the world around him in a patterned way." (see above, p. 79) This is analogous to an appeal to a "faculté de langage".

When Mead gives us examples and hints which lead us to understand how a configuration is constituted she relies upon the laws of constitution in the minds of her readers. The anthropologist and the reader undergo some kind of pseudo-enculturation. Since the native, the anthropologist and the reader are governed by the same laws of constitution-learning, these laws can be presumed and the observers simply have to come to see the native pattern as having fulfilled these implicit laws to see it as evident, as possible and necessary, as systematic.
An analogy from logic may help. The rules of formal logic, once understood, are evident to all. But few, if any, understand why they are evident. Some, such as Husserl, say they are evident because of a transcendental logic, because of the constitution of the terms and propositions in accordance with a priori laws. Others claim the evidence is purely psychological, or that the laws are innate, or that they are ultimate pragmatic rules which have been found to work. But despite this dispute, there has been practically no disagreement in 2500 years about the content of formal logic or the fact of its evidence. We all appear to have the same faculty of logic although the mechanisms and justification of this faculty remain obscure.

In a similar way, Mead appeals to an intuitive obviousness in cultural patterns which allows us to judge them as indeed systematic. Since this obviousness is greatly increased by the study of enculturation we would seem to be dealing with a constitutional intelligibility but the constitutional laws remain implicit. Besides, as we saw, the final understanding is constitutional only is so far as we have thematized and so reactivated a constitution. But this occurs only for constitutional developments which differ from those of our own culture. That which is common is included in the constitutional development as obvious because familiar, not because the constitution is understood.

More precisely, a cultural pattern is understood by the anthropologist because of constitution but in two quite different ways. There is first the active or at least reactivatable constitution on the conceptual level of his science. Secondly, there is the "constitution" of his own cultural configuration which is essentially passive and unthematized and which he carries in his encultured personality. This latter gives him the perceptual and interpretive perception which permits him to observe and grasp patterns in the first place. When the anthropologist performs the active, scientific constitution, he must
also base the complex constitution on simpler "elements" which are the intuitions given him by his encultured perception, and these are passively constituted. Originally the anthropologists whole cultural pattern is given to him in the passive constitution of enculturation; his training and field work expose him to other patterns and by the process of comparison and awareness he is forced to thematize certain patterns of his own culture and to actively reconstitute them. This permits him to actively constitute, on the conceptual level, other cultures from this point on. But the great mass of unthematized patterns common to both cultures remain passively constituted.

To give an example, the Arapesh pattern of maternal behaviour is constituted of a careful attitude to plants, a non-aggressive kind of hunting, a non-climactic approach to sexual activity, a suppression of social aggression and many similar elements. Material behaviour is understood by us if (a) we see how these elements are related and (b) if we understand each of the elements. I suggest that we understand "suppression of social aggression" because such a regularity has been passively constituted in us by our enculturation, hence we can intuitively observe such a regularity. Perhaps we have difficulty with "non aggressive hunting", for Western hunting may seem always aggressive; so Mead breaks it down in turn to "walking around hoping to find game", invoking our intuition of what it is to "walk around hoping to find...", a regularity which does exist in our culture and is evident to us.

Now look at the constituting. It proceeds indeed by a priori laws of constitution, but these laws are not explicitly known to us. We see only their evidence of application. Thus we can see suppression of social aggression linked to nonaggressive hunting as exhibiting an intuitive necessity and copossibility and we can see this pattern is quite different from suppression of social aggression linked to aggressive hunting which would involve a quite
different compensatory pattern with its own intuitive necessity and co-possibility. I suggest that these intuitions of the form of constitution are just as dependent on the enculturated personality of the observer as are the intuitions of the elementary parts discussed in the last paragraph.

What is new and what constitutes the intersubjective science of anthropology is the explicit and public putting together of just these facts within this form. Both the parts and the form must first be held in common by the intuition of the member of the anthropological community—hence such a community may be limited to the members of one or a group of cultures. As the intuited "parts" are more and more broken down and as the forms become thematized and explicit, the science becomes open to personality types who have undergone more varied enculturations, and so anthropology can become more widely cross-cultural or "objective". As long, however, as we wish to study patterns of behaviour and as long as the only instrument capable of such patterns in the encultured individual, such intuition can never be eliminated.

7 Conclusion

We have faced in this chapter Mead's notion of systematization. We saw that its role is fundamental to her science, for the intelligibility to which Mead ultimately appeals is the configurational intelligibility of the system.

We have argued that this intelligibility depends on an a priori, but on a material, synthetic a priori, not a formal, analytic one.

The a priori is based fundamentally on that essence called 'behaviour' as it is given to us. More particularly, the systematization of each culture is intelligible in so far as we understand that culture as given, as an essence. This essence is but another name for the cultural pattern. It has a specific
mode of being; it is a kind of Gestalt, a whole in which the parts exist only in a secondary manner, taking their meaning from the whole. Thus it is not constituted as a material thing, composed of other material things partes extra partes, externally, spatially and causally related. Rather it is a pattern genetically constituted in accordance with a priori laws by successive layers of contact with nature.

In this development, the constitutional a priori and facticity enter in many and various ways into the pattern, so that successive layers of lower order regularities, as it were, become in turn the 'matter' for a higher order regularity, a further synthesis. As a result, we cannot separate en bloc all the a priori from all the facticity. Rather, each successive development must be followed to see how the a priori enters at each level. We cannot propose, as it were, a separation of all the a priori into an axiomatic, formal system, free of facticity. Intelligibility is rather to be attained by a study of the genesis of the constitution --- and this Mead does in her enculturation studies. She admits the possibility that we could grasp the pattern in a static study of its constitution, but for a full understanding of its dynamics, to see why the parts interrelate as they do, we must turn to a study of its genetic constitution. This study is neither causal nor historical.

The possibility of such causal or historical studies within the same general domain was discussed, but the exact relationship of these pre- or post-constitutional sciences to the study of culture remains obscure. The cultural pattern globalizes all these influences, accepting, modifying or rejecting them according to how they fit into the pattern.

We remarked that the basic difficulty in the foundation of Culture and Personality has only been pushed further back by this analysis. Two foundations for constitutional intelligibility were noted; The 'material'
foundation in nature, which as we will see in chapter IX is not as 'material' as it might at first appear; and the a priori laws of constitution which guide the genesis of the pattern in its contacts with nature.

These a priori laws are peculiar and we can hardly be said to have finally resolved their nature. We have never in fact exhibited any such laws, yet we presume their existence in order to explain why constitutional studies make cultures intelligible to us. We can see intuitively how each step follows another in the given situation--we understand it because, in a way, we would do the same. We follow the cultural constitution vicariously, as it were, by constituting synthetic concepts in a parallel manner.

We face here a parallelism between the concepts we constitute and the patterns the observed peoples constitute in their praxis and perception, in their behaviour. The a prioris of our understanding seem linked to the a prioris of the development of the object understood, the pattern. One could remark here the correlation of the subject and the object, as Husserl would, and place the foundation of this correlation in the transcendental arena. Or, we could point out, as Mead would, that both observer and observed are human beings and share in the Psychic Unity of Mankind. Hence, in their very nature both are governed by the same potentialities. That is, since the understanding of the observer is a behaviour, it is governed by the same a prioris, the same systematization tendencies as the observed are in their behaviour.

The difficulty here is to choose between, on the one hand, an epistemological a priori, a transcendental a priori, prior to all knowledge and to the constitution of the subject and the object, and, on the other hand, a common nature in the observer and the observed so that any behavioural possibility
on the part of the observed is also a behavioural possibility — in the sense that science and thought are behaviours — in the observer. Is this the choice between a pre-objective transcendentalism and a naturalism which treats knowledge as a property of an object? Perhaps the dichotomy is false, for Mead's 'object' is pattern - a pattern which is the condition for the appearance of behavioural 'objects' — and so is, in a sense, transcendental. In other words, Mead's naturalism is based on a Nature which is itself not a thing but a structure. Perhaps we should call her a transcendental Naturalist!

Human cultures are not logical systems: they are not built in accordance with the laws of nature that can be elaborated on the basis of a careful observation of the external world. Rather, they are mediating systems by which human beings are able to combine ways of thought and feeling modeled upon looking inwards with ways of thought and acting modeled on looking outward, at the external world. As mediating systems, cultures are also infused with the logic of inner and outer worlds. (Mead, 1951a, p. 18)

Without pretending to have resolved this ultimate epistemological question, we must now turn to a brief study of the concept of nature as Mead uses it, in particular to that privileged domain of nature, the body.
CHAPTER IX

THE BODY

1. Introduction

We promised above (p. 269) to return to the notion of the lived body as the foundation for culture. Both Husserl and Mead consider that all culture must be based on a Nature which is common to all but whereas for Mead this Nature is understood as that which is treated of in the natural sciences, Husserl looks rather to that Nature which is constituted in an identical manner by all human beings. For both, however, the body holds a preeminent place in Nature.

Apart from its role as the foundation of culture, the body in Mead's work fulfills a second function. It is because of our common human nature that anthropology is possible, --- more, it is only an anthropologist whose own body has been patterned by a culture who, for essential reasons, can understand other cultures. We have written above of how the anthropologist uses his own trained body as an instrument for the spotting of patterns. Much of Mead's work relies for its intelligibility on appeal to certain evidences carried by the bodies of the anthropologist and of his reader.

In this chapter we will thematize Mead's use of the notion of body and compare it with the psychoanalytic notion of the body image and with the descriptions of the lived body developed by those who followed Husserl. We will claim that the body which Mead needs as a base for culture is not only the body as conceptualized by biological and medical science, but also the lived body as experienced by the culture-member. We will describe briefly
the kind of unity to be found in the lived body and show how this unity is correlated
to the systematic unity of the world in which the body lives. The body and
its culture are related as the mode of access to a world and that world itself.
Any attempts to separate the human being into body and soul must take account
of this correlation. Finally, the difficult question of the relationship of the
body as so described and the body as conceptualized in the natural sciences
will be discussed.

2. Illustrations from Mead

To start, let us review the importance of the body in Mead's work
by illustrating her actual use of the notion in some of her studies.

The Manus body experience immediately before and after birth is of
a whole body rhythm in which others respond to the natural spontaneity of
the delivering mother and of the newborn baby. In infancy the Manus builds
up a high level of motor coordination and resulting physical self-confidence.
The reciprocal approach to nursing emphasizes this independence and autonomy
of the own body and founds all later reciprocal ('exchange') behaviour.
Toilet training again emphasizes both bodily autonomy and reciprocal,
thing-like relationships, but adds a level of privacy and shame. Later, except
in stylized relationships the body and possessions of the others are
untouchable. The houses and even names of others must be treated with
a respectful distance and to those who are particularly tainted by bodily,
sexual relations rigid avoidance behaviour is necessary. After betrothal,
even the thought of the betrothed is forbidden to the future bride.

The Arapesh cultural pattern involves a fundamental dichotomy based
on the bodily functions of males and females. Their character is oral and
they emphasize the receptive elements in nursing; the adults pattern their
economics in terms of gift giving and receiving, i.e., as maternal-receptive. Their great fear is of sorcery performed with their bodily exuviae which never really become separate from them. Guilt is experiences as having eaten badly and requires blood letting to let out the 'bad blood.' All aggression towards others, either bodily or by word, is repressed and is turned against the self in a masochistic fashion, e.g., by temper tantrums or chopping down one's own trees, etc.

The Balinese also have some oral tendencies, but Mead resists here any dogmatic zonal analysis. Rather she claims that the Balinese body experience is not primarily zonal but involves an awareness of the whole body, especially of the skin surface. The Balinese worry much about both the over-integration of the body and its disintegration into parts (or at least the separate animation of the parts.) In fact their body parts often do act in relative independence of each other --- yet this plasticity also permits them the control over the individual parts needed for the complex patterns of the dance. They see the world in autocosmic terms reading all objects as body extensions and seeing the body itself as just part of the world scene on which dramas may be acted out.

In these examples we see that not only is body patterning one of the earliest and most important experience in the life of the individual, but that in a certain way this reference to the body is never depassed. Adult body experience looms large in Mead's descriptions and presumably also in cultural life. The examples also suggest that all of a cultural pattern is in some way to be referred to the body.

3. The Psychoanalytic Body Image

Psychoanalysis has developed a rich doctrine concerning the influence of the body on personality. Vergote claims that all truth and value find in
the body their model and their symbolic matrix.

There is no concept which can express cultural, ethical or religious values without falling into metaphors based on the lived body. ... Psychoanalysis unveils the body as the guardian of our existential metaphors .... This bundle of behavioural schemes which is called character, is in the end a sedimentation of the lived body, very ancient but always active ...." (Huber, Piron et Vergote, La Psychanalyse....., pp. 170-171)

In psychoanalytic theory the body image * is an unconscious imaginary structure which develops as the body is progressively endowed by the libido. This image carried with it the structural history of the individual and is determinant for his personality. (Lacan.) It develops hand in hand with the body schema, the physiological body, since, for example, the nervous system must be developed before an awareness of any body part can occur. Normally as each zone is pleasurably endowed by the libido it is integrated into the body image. If fixation is not to occur, the unboundness of the primitive desire must be limited and partially renounced, a process called 'castration'. This permits advancement to the next structural stage. If for one reason or another a particular body organ is not libidinally endowed, then that organ is never integrated into the body image --- with consequent behavioural abnormalities.

Let us illustrate this notion by an example. Dolto, explains certain cases of vomiting during pregnancy as due to too early and rigid sphincter training. "The anal interdiction which took effect before anal endowment in certain girls forced the image of the anal body back up to the preceding sphincter, the pylorus. This occurs in a completely unconscious manner but provokes hysterical vomiting whenever feminine fantasm occupy the imagination." (Interview printed in above Memoire, p. 129) That is, in

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* For references and discussion see Anne-Marie Decuypere, L'Image du corps. The following is an interpreted resumé of her presentation.
so far as the erotic structure of the body is concerned, the pylorus has taken the normal place of the anal sphincter which is simply absent.

Two characteristics of the body image should be noticed. First it is "imaginary", that is, it is separate from the real body schema itself, and need not accord with it. It would seem to be a type of representation, but it must nonetheless be distinguished from the specifically symbolic order. Yet it is unconscious and so can never be directly encountered but only inferred from behaviour.

Second, the body image is the erotically endowed body only, and is directly connected with the notion of libido. It concerns the affective and emotional structure of the body and is centered on the erotic zones, so it has a certain independence from, say, the body as available for praxis, where the limbs, eyes, and so on loom larger.

Lacan considers that the sphere of imagination supplies the subject with the first fundamental representation of his own unity. "If we accept that the subject's search for affective unity gives rise to forms in which he represents to himself his identity, the most intuitive form is given, at this stage, by the mirror image." (Lacan, "La Famille", 8-40, p. 10) In effect, these forms spread to the whole perceptive world: Since man is born "prematurely",

There results an affective and mental stage based on a proprioceptivity which gives the body as fragmented. In this stage, on the one hand, psychic interest is transferred to the tendency to stick the own body back together; on the other hand, reality, originally subject to a perceptual fragmentation, ... is ordered as if it were a reflection of the forms of the body, which give a sort of model for all these objects. (ibid., 8-40, p. 10)
This stage of the mirror image is, of course, but one structuring complex and leads to later developmental structuring situations. The final result of these stages of structuration of the libido is the organisation of the adult personality. This structuration is expressed in the notion of body image. Is this kind of structuring development not very similar to Mead's approach?

A major difficulty here is the term 'image'. One sense of the word 'image' is that of a little picture, a copy, and, in a sense, at the mirror stage the image concerned is indeed a reflection, a picture, in the mirror. If we took 'body image' to mean the 'picture' one forms of one's own body then, obviously, the notion is useless for Mead's work. Such a picture would be a mentalistic interpretation of how one's body is; it could be incorrect, and whether it is or not it must be treated by the anthropologist as another behaviour whose pattern is to be found. It is not the kind of thing which could itself be the pattern.

But, of course, we are told that the psychoanalytic body image is unconscious. Now if our idea of the unconscious is that of a realm like consciousness, having ideas, images, motives and so on, but separated from consciousness in a split off and inaccessible area, then the body image is again an interpretation of how the body looks and will be an interesting factor for the Culturologist, --- but again only as one other behaviour, not as a source of behavioural structuration.

The possession of an image may at times be causally explanatory. Thus if I have an image of my son which pictures him as having unrealistically small feet, I may buy him shoes which are too small. The image is then part of the antecedent condition from which one would explain the behaviour. An unconscious image, say of my father, would presumably influence my behaviour in a similar manner. The danger is that we would consider the
body image in this way -- as an antecedent cause of certain behaviours.

But this notion of body image, and so of the unconscious, must be rejected. Lacan is clearly referring to the body image as a configurational explanation of behaviour, a way behaviour is structured. * The unconscious, then, is not a receptacle for images and motives, but a way of existence of a structure; it can never be experienced or directly expressed by the subject, although it may be referred to by science.

Understood in this way, the similarities of the psychoanalytic body image with Mead's use of the notion of body are striking. Both are related to a certain structuring of behaviour. In particular, let us retain our advancement from the notion of the body as biological. At any structural stage the body which enters into a Lacanian complex is not the body as a biologist would describe it, but the body as already 'imagined', as already structured in its libidinal aspects. The body as composed of cells and fluids and nervous systems has little to do with the body as libidinally structured.

We will retain this notion of a body which is a structure, as opposed to a purely biological body, in our analysis of Mead's notion in section 5 below. Yet we must reject the psychoanalytic body image itself as a base for cultural patterning.

The basis for this rejection is the difficulty that the Freudian notion is so closely linked to the theory of the libido. But although Mead accepts a certain role for pleasure-seeking and even a development of pleasurable, * If this is so, would it not be better to drop the term 'body image' which may prove misleading and speak directly of a structure of bodily behaviour instead, as Mead does?
erotic zones, she always interprets them in either a biological or cultural manner and never adopts the specifically Freudian idea of the libido as a working hypothesis. She accepts that the culture patterns the affective, emotional and sexual aspects of man --- but she treats these as just certain factors among others. The body to which she refers includes the erotic body image, but is by no means limited to it. The hypothyroidism of the Balinese, the special haircuts of the Arapesh, the physical coordination of the Manus, refer to aspects of the body which can be related only indirectly to the erotic body image if at all. Thus the use of the libidinal body image is subordinated to the cultural pattern and is just one of the many bodily 'hints' to which the pattern may refer; it cannot be considered as the only base for the pattern.

4. The Unity of the Lived Body

The psychoanalytic notion of the body image then, is inadequate as a foundation for cultural pattern although some aspects of it can be retained. Recent phenomenology, also has placed great emphasis on the body and some of this research will be useful for analyzing Mead's work. Like psychoanalysis, phenomenology also finds the purely biological body inadequate for its purposes and so it turns to the body as it is lived. Let us approach this concept of the lived body by means of a brief history.

Husserl sets out to justify science by tracing back its constitution to an apodictic level. Apodicticity he finds in the reduced transcendental field given in intuition to the Transcendental Ego. This position led him to a transcendental Idealism for phenomenology ultimately became an Egology, albeit transcendental. Later in Husserl's career problems arose concerning intersubjectivity, for an intermonadal world is difficult to conceptualize when all the monads are transcendental.
Starting with Heidegger, most post-Husserlian phenomenologists attempted to resolve the difficulty by starting from the intersubjective world as given. They point out that at the fundamental level of constitution we do not find a monadal Ego, but rather a non-reflective perceptual world present to all. The perceptual level is structured before the advent of the subject, at least of the knowing subject, and both the subject and object are generated from the pre-objective (and pre-subjective) primordial structure.

For Heidegger, the World is a structure of Dasein which permits Being to appear as beings. He remarks Dasein's essential facticity and thrownness. Merleau-Ponty interprets these structures in terms of the body. The body is the facticity and thrownness which permits being-in-the-world, while necessarily limiting it to one perspective. Both authors emphasize that this structure comes before knowledge and is non-reflective or pre-comprehensive. Heidegger emphasizes the role of mood (Stimmung) as fundamental to Dasein.

Merleau-Ponty, however, concentrates on the body as expression. He grants the psychological hypothesis that the child starts out its life in a symbiotic relationship with his mother — and indeed with the whole world. As such, he participates in a certain style which dominates his perception and other behaviours:

The different sensory domains (sight, touch, and the sense of movement in the joints) which are involved in the perception of my body do not present themselves to me as so many absolutely distinct regions. Even if, in the child's first and second years, the translation of one into the language of others is imprecise and incomplete, they all have in common a certain style of action, a certain gestural meaning that makes of the collection an already organized totality. Understood in this way, the experience that I have of my own body could be transferred to another... giving rise to what Wallon calls a 'postural impregnation' of my own body by the conducts I witness. .... Psychogenesis begins in a state where the child is unaware of
himself and the other as different beings. ... There is initially a state 'of pre-communication' (Max Scheler), wherein the other's intentions somehow play across my body while my intentions play across his. (Merleau-Ponty, "The Child's Relations with Others", pp. 118-119)

The ability of the child to take on the style presented to him assumes that the body in its motor responses imitates that which is seen. "It is this fundamental correspondence between perception and motility... which would be the function of mimesis, or mimicry, in its most fundamental and irreducible form." (Idem., p. 146)

That which is perceived must be the kind of thing which is transferable to motor behaviour. It cannot therefore be an atomic sensation: "All sensation necessarily involves a structure, relations, in short, a meaning, and thus appears as entirely the opposite of a pure atomic impression." (De Waelhens, "Phenomenology of the Body", p. 156) This is simply Husserl's doctrine of intentionality, for to say that a subject's experiences are intentional is to say that they transcend the subject himself and are united in an object. The subject is present in a world and is not just a flux of psychic sensations. The body is not a 'thing' which has properties, but a mode of access to things.

The unity of things, however, requires the unity of sensation, perception and action in the body, and Merleau-Ponty, as we saw above, describes this as the unity of a style:

What unites 'tactile sensations' in the hand and links them to visual perceptions of the same hand, and to perceptions of other bodily areas, is a certain style informing my manual gestures and implying in turn a certain style of finger movements, and contributing, in the last resort, to a certain bodily bearing. (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 150)
A human body, then, is united in its perception and behaviour by a style; it responds to styles as presented to it in the human and natural order and not to atomic sensations. That this requirement is necessary is already shown by Merleau-Ponty in The Structure of Behaviour (p. 158-171) when he explains that communication presupposes that intentions are actually present in objects, language and so on and are not just shadows behind, or causes before, them.

The consciousness of the child, who sees human objects used and begins to use them in his turn, is capable of discovering immediately in these acts and in these objects the intention of which they are the visible testimony. To use a human object is always more or less to embrace and assume for oneself the meaning of the work which produced it. (Structure of Behaviour, p. 170)

In other words Merleau-Ponty is claiming that the body lives on the level of style. It perceives styles in the world around it, and it is these very styles which unite its various perceptions and relates them to other behaviour. Behaviour is a form, a structure, and not a series of isolated atomic sequences.

The unity of the lived body comes, then, not from any physical or physiological (i.e., spatial) unity of isolatable organs, partes extra partes, but is the unity of interrelation of perceptions and behaviours, the unity of a style.

Our body is comparable to a work of art. It is a focal point of living meanings, not the function of a certain number of mutually variable terms. A certain experience of touch felt in the upper arm signifies a certain feeling in the forearm and shoulder along with a certain appearance of the same arm, not because the various tactile perceptions among themselves, or the tactile and visual ones, are all involved in one intelligible arm, as the different facets of a cube are related to the idea of a cube, but because the arm seen and the arm touched, like the different segments of the arm, together
perform one and the same action. (Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 151)

"We have seen in the body a unity distinct from that of the scientific object." (Idem, p. 174)

Let us now see to what extent this notion of the body as a unity of style reflects the actual use of the term body in the work of Mead and Benedict.

5. The Body in Mead's Work

Benedict with her tendency to idealism, largely ignored the role of the body and of individual psychology. Mead's more systematic and scientific approach, however, led her to found all culture in the body, explicating cultural configurations on the basis of a uniform body-nature pre-given to each culture. It is significant that she phrases her doctrine of the Psychic Unity of Mankind as the hypothesis that a child born from any culture may be encultured in another, if he is placed in it early enough. That is, there is a body which is independent from culture in the sense that it can be changed from one pattern to another. This is the body which is governed by biological and psychological laws and which is the basis for culture.

However, the isolation of the culture-independent body becomes more and more difficult. The process of birth itself brings with it an important layer of cultural patterning --- and Mead suggests the high probability that the foetus in the womb already undergoes a cultural influence. The pre-cultural body, therefore becomes a pure abstraction for it can never be found in reality.

Nonetheless, Mead considers that we can distinguish influences due to biological heredity, for example, from those influences due to culture.
But these must not be conceived as independent forces, for all bodily development, even when explainable on the basis of genetics, takes place within a culture from the very beginning.

Fundamentally, the doctrine of the Psychic Unity of Mankind is needed to give a foundation to anthropological studies. A comparative study of culture presupposes that something is the same throughout on which we can base our comparison. The anthropologist can come to understand another culture only because it is another human culture; he can understand the patterns their bodies carry because he too has a body which carries patterns, even if different patterns. What body is it which is the same?

We have listed above (p. 32) some of the factors which Mead considers as natural, as part of the body. For example, humans come in two sexes, yet all are born from one of these; any human who does not eat will die. She assumes, too, that humans have certain important capacities for learning, probably more developed than other animals. More specifically, however, humans rely on learned behaviour for survival. That is, each human body is not naturally determined to a set of fixed instincts and behaviours, but has a plasticity which varies from faculty to faculty.

Biological and psychological plasticity, then, is an essential feature of human corporeity; each body has, or rather, is, a set of potentials open to many different actualizations, and not a set of finished abilities. Thus the potential to speak one of many languages is given, but no one of these languages is innate; the ability to walk in one of many ways is given, but no one of these is determined.

Plasticity, however, is not enough. The body must not only have the capacity to learn --- but the capacity to learn patterns. Mead refers to this
property as the **systematic** nature of the human body.

As the human body has systematic properties related to its anatomical structure, its physiological state, and the ability to perceive movement, the recognition by members of a society of a few elements of a posture-gesture system serves to specify, without words, the rest of the pattern. (Mead, 1964a, p. 45)

The body, then, must have the capacity to generalise a pattern learned in one situation so that it can be used in other situations. The pattern initially present in one part of the body must reappear in all the other parts. More correctly, we need not the reappearance or repetition of the same behaviour which is systematically related to the first, united to it by what Merleau-Ponty calls a "style." The smile on the face must be generalised over the body so that the muscles of the arm, for instance, are relaxed; but we certainly do not want the muscles of the arm to try and form themselves into a smile!

Merleau-Ponty refers to this property of the body as 'body unity'. More correctly, the body is unified in the first place by a style; the body is that entity which related its behaviours in a systematic way. If it did not do so, enculturation would be impossible. In particular, a child could not be enculturated if the patterns given to him in perception could not be reproduced in his motility. Since perception itself is a behaviour,* this process is but a particular case of the more general inter-systematization of body behaviour. Body unity, in this sense of systematization, then is a precondition for any culture.

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* Merleau-Ponty claims, "Perception is a conduct by which the child commits himself to a real interchange with the things." (Résumé des Cours, p. 194)
We are claiming that human perception is of patterns, not of atomic sensations. The systematic body unity present in all behaviour enables the native to perceive his own culture's patterns in the behaviour of others or in the artifacts of his culture. Even when the child learns to see 'things', he is always co-learning the context within which the things occur and which ultimately constitutes them. The body not only learns to recognise the breast and to suck from it, but to perceive simultaneously the attitude with which the breast is given to it, the pattern of behaviour involved in the way he is held, the faces and sounds, the frequency of feeding, whether the breast is treated as a thing or not, and so on. The context or background is not only perceived but is learned, and when this perception is generalized to the body's own motor behaviour (or the other perceptive behaviour), it is to this overall pattern or style that it is referring and not to the specific object.

The child perceives, responds to and learns the form of behaviour along with the contents; his perception always occurs within a 'world', an horizon. We have shown that it is the pattern of form within which a behaviour occurs which constitutes its unity and nature reaction within the same pattern. What is more, the behaviour perceived in another's body, or implied in an artifact, is the 'same' behaviour. That pattern of behaviour which Mead has called 'maternal' is present in the behaviours perceived by the Arapesh child, but it is also present as the pattern of his perceiving and will reappear in any responsive behaviour.

The fundamental unity here required stretches beyond the bounds of the individual (biological) body for it includes the behaviour of others, indeed ultimately it coincides with the whole culture. And in a sense we can say that the fundamental unity of a body is the unity of a world. The world is a configuration within which all behaviour, one's own or other's, is
given and which is co-given and presupposed by any such behaviour. In Heidegger's phraseology, the World is a structure of Dasein.

The unity of the body and the systematic whole of the culture are then the same phenomenon. If the body is a unity of style and the style is the cultural pattern then culture and body are synonomous. Body experience and cultural experience are one and the same thing and indeed, Merleau-Ponty, referring to Mead, claims that,

As important finding of the culturalists is that the psychological and the institutional are to be considered as but two aspects of the same structure and that the psychic must not be made into an individual experience ("vécu individuel") a sentimental relationship of self to self, but a generalized intersubjective experience ("vécu intersubjectif généralisé"). (Merleau-Ponty, Résumé des Cours, p. 225)

We can no longer claim, therefore, that body unity is a precondition for culture, for it is as much an effect as a condition; they are both the same unity. The body is unified within a pattern, and according to it --- as we can see so well in the case of the Balinese. The Balinese take little care to pattern as a unity the individual, 'biological' body, but leave the parts in a relatively fragmented state. Hence in learning the hand-dance, the teacher moves the limbs of the learner whose body parts remain separate from his own consciousness, from his own unity, and are subject to the will of the teacher. (see above, p. 114) It is precisely because the Balinese pattern does not give to each body a fixed unity (as our culture does for instance, at the stage of the mirror image) that their body remains free ('flexible') to be united by artistic styles in the dance, the theatre and so on. Mead remarks that any casual group of Balinese seem to compose themselves like a ballet, (see above, p. 118) as if they could lend their bodies to the service of a unity of style which depasses the limitations of the individual biological body.
We can say too that any culture is but an extension of the body, but only of the body as united by the culture. The Arapesh culture is but an extension of the Arapesh body but the body as united primarily in the oral mode --- so that both the body and the culture are patterned like one big receptive mouth!

In our culture the importance of the mirror image for the unity of the body has been emphasized, by Lacan and others, and the implicit suggestion is often that this structure is not cultural and so is universal. But there is evidence that an important feature of this experience is the approbation by the parents of the child's discovery of his own body image. (see Decuyper, *L'image du Corps*, p. 57-58) If this is so, then clearly this experience of unity is cultural and may be patterned as joyous or threatening, to be spoken of or repressed. It is even conceivable that the mirror experience would not be integrated into the cultural pattern, would not be selected --- and so would have negligible effect on the personality.

So it would seem that the libidinal structuration of the body as a psychoanalytic body image, although of a similar nature to the body as used by Mead, is itself but one of the sets of plastic possibilities open to culture. The body image is never biological, but is always already libidinal structure just as the body that culture is based upon is always already a cultural structure. But the libidinal structuration is never determinate in itself, but is in potential to many different developments and the actual structure that the libidinal body does in fact take on in any concrete case is determined ultimately by the culture.

So ultimately, we cannot even say that the body required by Mead's theory is a pre-cultural body which perceive patterns and behave systematically. For the unity of the body which permits these operations is itself already cultural. In no way can we consider man as a biological animal.
with a certain superimposed cultural structure. "Mind is not a specific
difference which would be added to vital or psychological being in order to
constitute a man. Man is not a rational animal. The appearance of reason
and mind does not leave intact a sphere of self-enclosed instincts in man."
(Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behaviour, p. 181)

Of course, we cannot here assimilate the culture to mind or reason
--- that would be to fall back into dualism. We are speaking rather of a
new level of patterning in which, "reorganized in new wholes, vital
behaviour as such disappears." (ibid., p. 181) "The milieu of development,
then, is neither the body, ... nor consciousness. It is a third element:
the total structure of behaviour." (Merleau-Ponty, Résumé des Cours,
p. 221)

6. Conclusions.

Must we then altogether reject the biological and psychological body
in cultural studies? Clearly not, for Mead continually refers to biology
and psychology. Merleau-Ponty claims:

The advent of higher orders, to the extent that they are accomplished,
eliminate the autonomy of the lower orders and give a new signification
to the steps which constitute them. ... The so frequent distinction
of the mental and the somatic has its place in pathology but cannot
serve for the knowledge of normal man, that is, of integrated man,
since in him the somatic processes do not unfold in isolation but
are integrated into a cycle of more extensive action. It is not a
question of two de facto orders external to each other, but of two
types of relations, the second of which integrates the first. (Merleau-

This description of the relation of human and vital orders fits well
the way in which Mead actually relates the cultural, the psychological and
the biological. Just as the biochemical and biological forces are united into the human structure studied by psychology, (especially as Merleau-Ponty conceives this later science), so the psychological and all the lower orders are integrated by the cultural configuration into a new level of unity which in no way negates the lower structures. We have already discussed the relationship between a configuration and its substrate in chapter V. There we noted, as Merleau-Ponty does here, that appeal to the underlying configurations or causes occurs especially in the case of breakdown of the integrated order, but that in the normal course of events no such appeal is made.

What we have tried to show in this chapter is that the body as conceived in biology or psychology is not enough. These sciences inform us about the material substrate which is a necessary condition for human culture and which may indeed give us useful information for understanding the cultural configuration. But except in the case of pathology, all biological and psychological processes are subordinated or rather ordered, by the culture which determines when and in what way particular processes will be used. Never, however, can these processes be considered sufficient for they are built into an organism which is essentially plastic, so that the biological and psychological processes are not determinate, they cannot choose which potential to adopt, unless they are completed by the culture.

The fundamental and sufficient basis for the culture itself, we saw, is then not the biological or psychological factor and not even the plasticity, of the total body. Rather it is the fact that human beings have worlds, their bodies are ways of being in the world. From conception, and indeed in an anticipative way, from before conception, the body lives in a world --- and although the structure of this being-in-the-world may develop especially during childhood, there is never a time when the child is not in some way within the cultural pattern, that is, the pattern is as
much temporal as spatial so that the age-position occupied by the child implies as much the whole pattern as does any other 'position' (e.g., adult male) in the pattern. Merleau-Ponty has already remarked on this point:

To say that a phenomenon is one of 'form' (Gestalt) is in no way to say that it is innate in its different aspects or even in a single one of its aspects. Rather it is to say that it develops according to a law of internal equilibrium, as if by auto-organisation. Gestalt theorists have by no means limited the use of the notion of 'form' to the instant or the present. They have, on the contrary, insisted on the phenomenon of form in time (melody), [for example] I said that the perception of one's own body comes earlier than perception of the other... This does not prevent the two phenomena from being internally linked. (Merleau-Ponty, "Child's Relations with Others," p. 121)

To say that human beings are within a cultural pattern at all times is simply to say that to be human is to have a world. The very capacity to have a world is called by phenomenologists 'the body', for the body is our access to the world. That human beings have access to things through a body, that they have a world, that they are cultural and that their behaviour (both perceptive and motor) is patterned, are ultimately synonymous expressions.

Hence Mead's reference to the body as the foundation for culture is ultimately ambiguous for she is referring not only to the biological material substrate and the psychological body (the body 'image' and so on, that is, the body as the carrier of fixed laws) but also to the specifically cultural foundation, the body as lived, as united, as systematic, as patterned --- and this new level of configuration does not seem exhaustively reducible to the others.
By granting to the cultural configuration the 'last word', even on occasion over which psychological laws will apply in a particular case, Mead of course accepts this autonomy of culture. When she says that ultimately cultures are systematic because they are carried by human bodies she must mean the body in the sense of the lived body which is already a body with a world, a body within a cultural pattern. But because of the ambiguity of the term body she seems to be suggesting that the systematization of a culture could ultimately be explained by biological, psychological or neurological laws. But the point of plasticity is that by themselves these laws are not determinate and cannot become determinate except within a culture.

The body unity, then, on which cultural systematization is based, and which itself is equally based on the culture, is a new level of unity, of system, and is sui generis. We have suggested that these configurations can be understood if treated on the analogy of Husserlian constitution, but they cannot be exhaustively explained or reduced to non-cultural factors. The first, universally constituted, level of Nature to which such constitutional levels refer is indeed the body, but the unified lived body, not the biological body, nor the psychoanalytic body 'image', and this body must be studied not be psychology or biology, but by Mead's approach of developing awareness by comparison with other patterns.
CHAPTER X

CONCLUSIONS: ACHIEVEMENTS AND HOPES IN CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

1. Summary of Thesis

Before attempting to draw out of this thesis certain points of interest concerning the nature of sciences and the nature of man, we will loosely summarize our study.

We saw that Benedict and Boas revolutionized the anthropology of their day. Particularism and an emphasis on the culture as a whole replaced the fragmentation of cultures produced by the Evolutionist-Diffusionist debate. Benedict wanted to understand how other people lived and she hoped to find ways of conceptualizing this understanding in a scientific manner so that man could control his own life.

Benedict's model for the integrated unity of a culture is that of Personality. She thinks of a culture as a 'Personality-writ-large', and just as all of an individual's behaviours must be referred to his personality if they are to be understood, the interpretation of cultural behaviour must also be referred to the culture as a whole. She originates the idea of cultural pattern, of a configuration of behaviour which is to be discovered in every behaviour of the culture. She emphasizes, too, the dynamic nature of such configurations, for the configurations themselves select the contents of the culture, the set of traits which can be integrated into an harmonious whole. In this way the particular traits themselves take their meaning from the whole.
Mead developed Benedict's approach by turning more directly to problems concerning the interrelations of culture and personality. A personality is related systematically to its culture, but this is not a relation of stereotypy. Rather each personality must take on its culture in its own way, and so the culture is distributed among its members by sex, class, role, temperament and so on. Each of these subgroups takes on a regularity of behaviour, and these regularities are ordered into a hierarchy by systematic relationships which lead up ultimately to the global cultural pattern.

A personality is the result of the interaction of the culture and the individual, and it is this encounter with the individual which leads Mead to study human nature. In particular, she studies the process of enculturation in which a concrete specimen of human nature learns to take on the cultural pattern. In this study she can appeal to other behavioral sciences, such as learning and development theories, personality theories and especially psychoanalysis.

We studied in some detail Mead's conception of her study as a science. She claims it is not an experimental, but an observational or clinical science. As such it is centered more on the individual culture than on cross cultural uniformities; it is particularist rather than nomological, rather than search for isolated deterministic laws valid in all cultures, she compares the patterns of the cultures she studies in order to increase our awareness of those configurations which are present before us. This leads her to a study of the interrelationship of the parts of the pattern, and hence to a rejection of any simple causalist scheme based, for instance, on childhood determinism.

Mead insists continually on the essential involvement of the investigator in that which he investigates. She rejects any simple objectivist position carried over from natural science and claims that any report tells as much
about the reporter as about the people reported upon. Only if this fact is realised can allowance be made for it and a certain kind of objectivity achieved.

The observer's objectivity is particularly put in question by the fact that patterns can only be investigated by those whose body is already patterned, who carry a culture. Although the pattern is real, and not just an invention of this observer, it can only be grasped by another human being who is capable of understanding and intuition.

After this philosophically naive exposition of Benedict's and Mead's own work, we came back over their science from a philosophical viewpoint in the second part of the thesis.

We started our philosophical analysis by discussing logical forms of explanation. This permitted us to preliminarily structure Mead's science along the lines of the empirical, nomological-deductive scheme. We discovered that Mead's work is compatible with an analysis of this type, provided the nomological structure is configurational rather than causal. The logical autonomy of configurational analysis from reference to causality was stressed, and this autonomy stood us in good stead for the rest of the thesis. The possibility of reducing one configurational scheme of analysis to another, lower, configurational or causal scheme was discussed and the importance of the interaction condition stressed.

This preliminary approach permitted us to organize the following chapters as responses arising from the attempted application of the nomological-deductive scheme to Mead's work. How does Mead give this scheme empirical content in a manner which is objective, or at least intersubjectively valid? (Chapter VI) What methodological viewpoint and what
categories and concepts does her specific objectification use? (Chapter VII) What is the nature of and foundation for the systematic relationship on which, in Mead's case, the nomological-deductive scheme is dependent? (Chapter VIII)

The question on objective empirical content led us directly back to perception and intuition. Science is itself a behaviour, and has its patterning of both linguistic and observational conduct. We saw that for the observation of cultural patterning the only instrument presently available is the human instrument — the anthropologist who has been enculturated and trained. Cultural patterns can only be perceived by enculturated perception. Hence, if our object of study is to be the pattern, then we cannot dispense with that type of global, synthetic perception we call interpretive intuition.

The difficulty is that an individual's intuition is linked to the patterns of his own culture. Hence the attempt to observe a foreign culture involves the observer in a gradual thematicization and breakdown of the obviousnesses of his own culture's evidences in a process of comparison with other cultural patterns. He cannot interpret his own culture without a self-interpretation.

In discussing the objectivity of this perception, we refused to limit science to the inductive-predictive confirmation of hypotheses discovered for purely 'psychological' reasons. The process of discovery is itself scientific for the anthropologist is a trained instrument capable of giving post-analytic data. The problem to be answered in any particular case is, "how does this data fit together?" Once the regularity or pattern has been retroduced, it shows how they do fit together and the problem is solved. The separation of the contexts of discovery and justification does not reflect Mead's work.
Turning to the question of the methodological viewpoint we found that Mead cuts out from the life-world a specific region called behaviour which is defined by its categories and concepts. In particular we saw that cultural behaviour refers to a form of conduct rather than to its contents. Hence the term 'behaviour' is fundamentally ambiguous for it refers equally to that object studied as a set of unrelated traits such as would interest a diffusionist and also to Mead's specific object, patterned behaviour in which the parts are systematically related.

In attempting to explicate this concept of behavioural meaning we contrasted it with the 'mentalist' concept of purpose for an action and with Schutz' idea of reflective, subjective meaning. We rejected any such attempts to assimilate the unity of behaviour to the mental unity of an idea. For this reason, too, we preferred not to speak of the culture's interpretation of life, for this term suggests a mentalistic finality of purpose behind behaviour. Rather we should speak only of the cultural patternning of behaviour. The pattern has a primacy over its parts and determines their cutting out into unities and their interrelations. There are no prior behavioural units, self-identical entities or traits which are interconnected externally into a pattern, rather the pattern gives them their self-identity --- and their internal linkage to each other.

As a result, we concluded that any science of culture must preserve this configurational Gestalt as it is given to the anthropologist. It is not enough to design theories which will leave atomic facts, 'observed behaviours', invariant --- indeed such would be impossible. It is the pattern itself as given in perception which must be conceptualized.

The systematic relationship, then, is in no way a framework superimposed upon a set of atomic facts, but is the very core of the pattern
approach. In chapter VIII we attacked this relationship by means of Husserl's notion of constitution, in particular of genetic constitution.

We spoke of an intersubjective, or, better, a cultural constitution of the behavioural pattern. The present pattern of a culture may be seen as having genetically developed through many sedimented layers of a priori and facticity. The a priori in the development is due to constitutional laws and the facticity enters at each layer from the non-cultural influence on the configuration. This genesis is not, of course, historical or causal, but constitutional. To understand the final pattern, we must reactivate this constitution, following the development at each stage. We claimed that Mead's study of enculturation is precisely such a genetic-constitutional study.

Because of the complex interrelationship of a priori and facticity in this scheme, the conceptual system needed to grasp it cannot be a formal, a priori, axiomatic scheme adjoined to a set of inductively determined laws. The a priori cannot be immediately separated out as a whole. Rather we must build up complex synthetic concepts, also by means of a genetic constitution, which mirror the structure of the constitutional genesis of the concrete culture. That is, the eidetic science which gives the definition of the cultural object and which founds any cultural science is a material eidetic science.

The origin of the material element in this eidetic scheme seems two-fold. First there is the nature upon which culture is based, and we suggested that his is not nature as objectified by natural science but rather a constitutional layer common to all men, as Husserl suggests. Secondly, we cited the a priori laws of cultural constitution as a material a priori. We compared Husserl's transcendental approach to the origin of those laws
with Mead's naturalist approach based on a common intuition in all human beings, on the Psychic Unity of Mankind. There is a common a priori in the behaviour of all mankind and the anthropologist must base himself on this a priori --- which he is capable of doing because he is human. Ultimately, however, we found it impossible to decide whether this a priori is an empirical a priori in mankind or a transcendental, epistemological a priori which gives the conditions of possibility for all knowledge. The dichotomy seemed finally too absolute, and we suggested that the answer may lie in a transcendental conception of nature as itself a configuration.

Mead's notion of nature, in particular, of the body, was then discussed in chapter IX. We examined the psychoanalytic notion of the libidinal body image and found useful its liberation from the biological notion of the body; the body image is always already a libidinal structure. A similar conclusion was reached by approaching the problem from the viewpoint of the lived body as studied by phenomenology; here we found, too, that the body as lived is not biological, but is a prescientific unity, the unity of a style.

Attempting to base the systematization of culture on this fundamental and prior unity of the body, we discovered that this could not be done. For the unity of the lived body is itself already cultural, already a configuration. At no constitutional level does the biological body, as an externally related set of atomic, spatially organized parts, enter. The lowest level of cultural patterning, even if we call it 'nature', is always already a pattern, and indeed a specific cultural pattern.

Hence the body must be seen as itself non-determinate. It is a limited plasticity capable of being actualized in many possible directions by a culture, but in itself incapable of any such actualization. The human
'body' is a set of pure potentials.

2. Science

We must now ask if this analysis of Mead's science of Culture and Personality leads us to any general conclusions about the human sciences, or indeed about science as such.

(a) Objectivity

One important point is the notion of objectivity. Natural science has been constituted over the centuries as a realm in which the observer is completely impartial and may be ignored. As a result, the truth such science discovers has been considered as absolutely objective and independent of human beings and cultures. It is clear that Mead and Benedict's science is not of this nature. At no point can the culture or personality of the investigator be left aside. Cultural science cannot proceed by analyzing all cultures but one's own; the observer's own culture must also be thematized. We see, then, a fundamental relativity in the extent to which cultural science depends upon encultured intuition, and indeed, on encultured thought. Knowledge of culture is always by a personality within a culture.

This reflection of cultural science upon the subject of the science, with the resultant failure of absolute objectivity, is not unique to Mead's approach. The same structure is to be found in other human sciences, in psychoanalysis for example. Piron says, "Freud warned us that every attempt to understand psychoanalysis comes up against the same resistances and the same blindnesses as the psychoanalytic cure itself," (Piron et al., *La Psychanalyse...*, p. 12) That is, psychoanalysis cannot be
seen to be objective except in so far as it applies its own findings to the investigator.

The notion of an absolute scientific objectivity in the human sciences must then be dropped in favour of a progressive development towards an ideal. Objectivity is seen to be relative to a given scientific community, a community which sets up inter-subjective standards and a common methodology. This community may expand, even until all men are included in it, but the resultant objectivity will never cease to be an inter-subjective construct.

The sciences of man (not to speak of the others) made us see that all knowledge of man by man is inevitably not pure contemplation, but a taking up again by each one -- in so far as he is able -- of the acts of others, reactivating on the basis of ambiguous signs an experience which is not his own, appropriating by it a structure an a priori of the species, a sublinguistic scheme or the genius of a civilization. (Merleau-Ponty, "Le Métaphysique dans l'Homme," p. 162)

Truth itself must then be seen as relative to encultured human beings, for there is no truth until there is a common perspective guaranteed by an intersubjective methodology. There is not Truth-in-itself which precedes man and into which he would enter, rather he is the creator of truth, the lumen naturale, without whom all the cows are black. Of course this truth is objective in the sense that it reflects the phenomena, but nonetheless the phenomena become objective beings only when objectified from a certain perspective.

The possibility of different perspectives on the same phenomenal region is therefore open. Adopting different methodological a prioris, coming perhaps from different cultures, various intersubjective communities may generate different scientific systems, each of which is
nonetheless objective in the sense of being a genuine intersubjective access to the phenomena. Such a diversity of approaches is not possible with a Platonic idea of absolute objective truth.

From the Greeks on, western civilization has faced at least two options on the nature of science. Platonic science is based on the One; truth is one, is independent of man and his cultures and personalities; it as absolute. In the Aristotelian tradition, science is not primarily based on the One but on Being, on the phenomena, and so its unity is secondary. We are suggesting even that this Aristotelian unity is an unattainable ideal, and in any case unnecessary. All science is unified in the phenomena, not in the methodology, in the idea, in the object, or in the Truth. Hence separate methodologies, objectivities, and even truths are possible while still remaining within science. Perspectivism is possible if the truth is based on the phenomena as given in perception and not on the coherent unity of the thought object.

Once we accept this intersubjective analysis of scientific truth, there is no need to restrict it to the human sciences. Once the ideal of a Platonic, Unified Science is dropped, we can see no objection to a multiple-theory approach in the natural sciences. It seems likely, though it cannot be proven here, that the apparent absolute objectivity, unity and coherence of natural science is due to historical accident. For one reason natural science developed in a culture which believed in such a unity, for another, since it is non-reflective upon the investigator and was developed within the limits of one culture, the relativity involved passed unnoticed.

Scientific objectivity and Truth, then, are intersubjectively constituted activities and can only exist as incarnated in some culture or other. They are not absolutes.
(b) A Priori and Facticity

Another conclusion we have drawn concerns the relationship between a priori and facticity. The highly developed nature of formal logic and mathematics often leads to a false separation of the formal from the material or of thought from perception. Formal theories, axiomatic systems, conceptual schemes are often thought of as if they were elaborated a priori and in a vacuum and only later applied to reality. The other, complementary, extreme is the equally simplistic notion that all our science is ultimately inductive. We have seen that Mead's science is much more complex than either of these analyses.

In fact every concept and theory is developed in a given historical context, in the face of reality and of a specific problem. A simple statement such as \( f^2 = ma \), even if construed as an a priori definition of, say, \( f \), presupposes centuries of development of thought and experience all of which is somehow included in the simple formula. The formula is neither a simple methodological a priori whose 'psychological' foundation is of no importance, nor is it the simple result of inductive experience. It is the end product of a history and of a constitutional genesis in which both factors have played various roles.

This we discovered in trying to understand Mead's actual procedures. Each conceptual advance she makes is made in a particular situation, in the face of a set of incomprensibles. Each layer of regularities is presupposed by the next and the conceptualization of the final pattern is in no sense an a priori form placed over the observed matter, the facts. Rather, at each level the observed 'matter' is already largely patterned by lower-level regularities and is in no way a pure 'matter'. 
Hence, we have the logical structure of retrodiction in which the 'confirming' perceptions are given before the concept which will organize them. The new pattern discovered then becomes itself part of another set of perceptions in search of a higher patterning. In effect, we have relativized the distinction of concept and percept, for the grasping of the new Gestalt is a learning to see the things in a new, coherent way. The concept orders the perception, without changing its perceptual status. A perceptual structure is then but a sedimental conceptual one. At no time can we separate out a 'purely perceptual' layer independent of concepts, but nor do we ever have concepts which are not, or were not, the conceptualizations of perceptual givens, or based on them.

Nonetheless we can ask about the lowest level of the constitutional structure --- must there not be some level of synthesis based on elements which are purely material, non-constituted? The question may be posed not only for the anthropologist's science, but also for the cultural constitution itself --- is there not some layer which is pre-cultural? Is a pattern not somehow composed of what is not pattern?

Careful distinctions must be made here. Clearly one can study the material conditions necessary for any cultural pattern. But this will not give us the first constitutional layer, for constitutional studies always treat of behaviours, i.e., of configurations, and even 'lowest' constitutional level, the body, as we saw in chapter IX, is already a pattern. (This question must be clearly distinguished from the historical question of how culture first started at a given moment of evolution, under certain interaction conditions. Such an historical study, is not a constitutional study and the interaction conditions so discovered are not necessarily the present necessary material conditions, and they are certainly not the 'first' or 'lowest' present constitutional level.
Similarly, attempts to trace back the anthropologist's perception to a level which is no longer cultural, i.e., no longer interpretative-intuitive, is impossible, for any 'first' level of cultural perception of cultural pattern is already a culturally patterned perception. But this is no difficulty if we do not seek absolute truth and knowledge. Cultural science has as an aim to lead encultured human beings to an understanding of culture -- it has no obligation to lead non-encultured beings to such an understanding. And encultured human beings always already have a cultural perception. An anthropologist coming from our culture and wishing to study another culture must fragment his own global cultural perceptions and push back what is obvious to lower constitutional levels, -- but only until he reaches a level which he has in common with the studied culture. Never will his final reduced perception be an unpatterned perception -- this is the force of the doctrine of the Psychic Unity of Mankind. If all we want is knowledge and understanding of culture by other encultured human beings, for what more absolute foundation need we ask?

We must start from where we are. We live and think on the level of pattern and the knowledge and science we seek is for us, so there is no need to try and get below pattern.

(c) Natural and Human Science

Is this notion of science radically different from that of natural science? On a number of occasions throughout the thesis we have written as if there were a fundamental dichotomy between natural science and the human sciences, especially Culture and Personality. But the ideas that truth is developed by the intersubjective activity of a scientific community, that there is a logic of retroduction, or that patterns are important, may all be used to interpret natural science as well. The two branches of science
are not fundamentally different; rather in a study of human science it is
easier to thematize certain structures which although present in natural
science tend to stay hidden. Hanson has argued rather persuasively that
introduction is the normal mode for important research in physics. Also,
although we have suggested, as a foil, a model of natural science as a set
of isolated atomic structures, things, externally, causally related, it
may well be asked if this model fits natural science as it is today, or indeed
as it ever was. Are not causal laws between entities not rather minor find-
ings within a fundamental pattern which is the condition of possibility for
such entities and laws in the first place? Only detailed research into such
questions can give us answers.

So we suggest that maybe the human sciences are not opposed or funda-
mentally different to natural science, but rather both are but subsections of
the overall field called science. We need no longer take natural science as
the paradigm for all later science. Rather we may expect that our notion of
science would be restricted by our overconcentration on the natural area,
and that studies in human science can lead us to see many features we would
otherwise be blind to. Since only human science permits us to reflect on
the behaviour of the scientist himself in his very knowing, we may see human
science as a privileged area for the discovery of characteristics common to
all science.

It should be noted, that throughout this thesis we have carefully avoided
the question of whether Culture and Personality is a science or not. In
effect this question must be answered by science itself in accordance with
its own criteria; it is no more a question for the philosophy of science than
the question of whether a particular work of art is a painting or a sculpture
belongs to the philosophy of aesthetics. Rather we have tried to lay bare
the basic structures of Mead's researchs and once this has been done the
question of whether to call the discipline 'science' or not is of little theoretical consequence.

3. Indications for Philosophical Anthropology

All human science is finally about man. We must ask what new conceptions of, or findings about, man Mead's science gives us.

Mead's most important point is the notion of a patterning of behaviour which is different from, and prior to, individual subjectivity. In this she converges with other movements in the twentieth century, such as psychoanalysis and Marxism. Culture precedes the individual and the individual's subjectivity is possible only because the culture leads him to this possibility.

Mead stresses not only the primacy of culture over subjectivity, but also its autonomy. An individual's creative activity may certainly change a culture, but this influence, like all others, must first be accepted by the cultural pattern and on its terms; if it is not accepted, no change will be forthcoming. Once any such influence is accepted, by the culture, it becomes itself cultural, it takes a place in the pattern. Hence if we wish to understand it, we must turn not to its particular, historical origin in the individual but rather to its constitutional place in the present functioning culture. This is Mead's distinction of origin and function.

Throughout this thesis, as in Mead's work, culture and its influence on personality have been emphasized at the expense of personality. Yet Mead acknowledges that cultures are subject to influence from individuals and events and, in recent years, directing her science as always towards important world problems, she has studied cultural change and in particular the role of individuals and small groups in the evolutionary advance of
cultures and Culture. This work is still in its infancy and we have not
touched on it in this thesis. Fundamentally, she suggests that the effective
unity of evolutionary culture change is neither the individual genius nor the
culture as a whole, but rather small 'clusters' within a culture. Such
clusters are usually centered around a leader and result in a kind of model
in miniature for the culture change. Although this conclusion follows
especially from her studies of the spectacular changes in Manus, it should
be noted that her suggestion that we use miniature culture groupes as
tools of change was first made as early as 1930. (Mead, 1930a, p. 207)

Man's ability to change and control his own culture was, of course,
one of Benedict's original aims. At first sight, we may think that these
hopes have not led to many results, for no clear techniques of control
have been revealed. Yet some success in control and prediction was
achieved near the end of World War II when our two authors cooperated
with the military machinery of the day.

We must remember, however, not to phrase this question in a manner
foreign to Mead's approach. Given the notions of science, objectivity
and causality exposed in this work, we can no longer ask for a simple set
of causal techniques which may be used to gain solated ends in an impersonal
objective manner, without considering the personalitites and cultures of
the users. Rather we must expect that any change will be a global change
and will be initiated by encultured human beings who must 'pull themselves
up by their bootstraps.' Mead says we must recognize "that it is not only
the price, but also the glory, of our humanity that civilization must be
built by human beings." (Mead, 1949b, p. 344) Science must always be
incarnated as a behaviour of human beings and so is always in one way
subject to culture. What is required for change is that human beings become
aware of their own culture by comparing it with the patterns of other
peoples and that they learn to accept the basic relativity of their own way of life. (This acceptance of relativity was one crucial factor in the Manus advance; see above p. 97) That is, there is no way of going beyond one's culture, but one may nonetheless modify the culture in the way it is held. By becoming aware of cultural differences the individual can come to see new potentials for himself and for his culture, he can see that human nature cannot be identified with his culture. This not only gives him the intellectual possibility for change, but it also allows him to accept change without being overly threatened for he will realize that it is not his very humanity which is at stake, --- only his particular culture. (Contrast the Siriano case; see above, p. 52) But this new way of holding to one's own culture is itself a part of the cultural pattern, and so any such new awareness and relativization is itself a very important cultural change. (Merleau-Ponty would go so far as to call this relativization 'metaphysics'. "There is metaphysics from the moment when ceasing to live within the obviousnesses of the object ... we remark the radical subjectivity of all our experience and, indissolubly, its value as truth." ('"Le Metaphysique dans l'Homme,"' p. 163)

To this relativization Benedict and Mead have certainly contributed. Benedict's Patterns of Culture has sold well over a million copies and the majority of Mead's thirty-five odd major books have been best-selling, popular expositions; Mead's popular articles are innumerable. The influence of this work on American culture is inestimable; it is certainly comparable to that of Freud's. Their popular relativization of culture, especially in America has certainly been one major factor in the cultural changes in the United States over the last 25 years.

Hence we can say that Culture and Personality is capable of effectuating cultural changes and with a certain measure of control. This type of control however, is no more comparable with traditional scientific control than is
anthropological objectivity with the traditional notion of objectivity.

The main difficulty in speaking of control in Mead's system is that control refers to the manipulation of the future by means of key, isolated 'causes.' But Mead has largely rejected the whole traditional notion of causality. One might say that she has achieved this only by limiting all her studies, at least during the period of her work that we have examined, to synchronous time slices of stable or very slowly changing societies. With time eliminated, causality and its problems could also be neglected. Conceivably her new interest in culture change may lead Mead and her followers to a new consideration of causality.

One possible direction here is the extension of the notion of pattern. The first use of the notion of pattern by Benedict applies to a synchronous time slice across adult behaviour. Mead's later enculturation studies imply a kind of time, but by studying only stable cultures Mead could avoid this question, relating only age positions in the pattern, rather than different times. That is, she relates a present adult behaviour to a present childhood behaviour, clearly in a different personality, since no personality is both child and adult at the same time. In this way any reference to a time sequence is bypassed. But could we not say that there is no essential limitation of patterns to what is synchronous? Is not the adult behaviour of a personality systematically related to his own childhood? That is, can we not unite under one pattern behaviours which are years apart? And is this relationship not just as explanatory as in the synchronous case?

If we admit that such a pattern-connection may make intelligible the relationship between two behaviours occurring at different times, we can now extend this notion to longer time spans. Not only can we unite the behaviours throughout the life span of an individual by means of a pattern,
but we can unite the behaviours of a culture throughout the history of that culture --- and even if that culture is not stable, but changing. For we see clearly in Benedict's early work, and Mead applies the same principle to the analysis of Manus in 1956, that outside influences on a culture are controlled by the culture's configuration. Hence even different time slices of a changing culture are systematically linked.

So we have a possible application of the notion of pattern to history, for we can now interpret the whole history of a culture as one large pattern, 'distributed' over different time positions but still systematically related. Conceivably the history of all mankind could ultimately be systematically united in this way. Mead has not so far developed this mode of historical explanation, but once the pattern mode of intelligibility is permitted, there would seem to be no objection to such an approach.

Another contribution of Mead to our conception of Man is the importance of the body. Her science is based on behaviour, and in a fundamental sense it is the body which behaves. All behaviour is in some way incarnated in the body and even the most abstract thoughts and feelings are patterned in a manner which relates them to the body. The body is what is first patterned, and in the end is the only thing patterned. There is no behaviour which is not bodily. It has been one of Mead's greatest contributions to have shown in detail how this is so.

But from another point of view, all of man is cultural, is informed by learned patterns. The body itself is cultural even in its most fundamental biological functioning.

Mead rejects the dichotomy of man into body and spirit because it presents the body as limitation, when we must stress rather its potentialities. (Mead, 1949b, p. 41) As we saw in chapter IX, the body as a set of
potentialities is itself a pure abstraction and the only real living human body is the body already within the cultural pattern, that is, a body which already behaves in a patterned way.

Hence we may say that 'behaviour' is the most fundamental notion in Mead's concept of man. Behaviour, that is, in the sense of a pattern, certainly not behaviour as it is often understood by behaviourism. It is a unity, a system, which is present in the culture and in the individual; it is seen by perception and also governs the perceiving, and it is present in thought. That is, the pattern of behaviour is the structure of the World, as Heidegger understands this term. The body is of importance only because it is the most fundamental level of this pattern; it is never outside the pattern.

In 1942 Merleau-Ponty laid bare philosophically the need to study behaviour as a structure rather than as a set of atomic sequences. Although in The Structure of Behaviour there is not a single reference to either Benedict or Mead, we suggest that their work fulfills in practice the requirements laid down in Merleau-Ponty's work. That fundamental region of man which is neither physical, biological, nor psychological, but which is not yet subjectivity, and which is nevertheless the condition for such subjectivity, is a pattern of behaviour.

4. The Future

The mid-twenties to the mid-fifties were the most important years for the development of our school of Culture and Personality. Now, more than a decade later, can we see any future trends or developments appearing?

The greatest hopes for the future would seem to lie in interdisciplinary research. In effect, anthropology as a whole, and Culture and Personality
in particular have for decades led the way in breaking down the walls between the human sciences. Even without further basic research such communication may be very fruitful in bringing out convergences in the behavioural science. Mead, as late as 1968, commenting on the statement that "We need a science of behaviour, not a bunch of behavioural sciences," says

I think the only way we can hope to have this is to have shared materials to work on with our variety of conceptual schemes and methods of analysis. ... We have everything we need. ... If we could now take all the different kinds of relevant data which have been accumulated in this general field under a variety of rubrics and really begin to submit them to some kind of analysis so that we could work out congruences and convergences, we might very well take another step forward. ... I am laying stress on shared materials rather than on a shared conceptual scheme, and on the possibility that if we have enough shared materials it will be possible for us to work out more better, more shareable conceptual schemes. (Mead, 1968a, p. 377-378)

In this light our new freedom from the need for a monolithic truth and a unified science is very important for it permits the various contemporary approaches to cooperate rather than compete. The shared material Mead refers to, is, of course, not conceptual, indeed not even descriptive, but is rather composed of films and recordings of actual life. The new advances in such techniques combined with new advances in information storage, processing and retrieval show great promise for the future.

The use of computer techniques should allow us to handle much more complex theories and models for behaviour using many more variable and having access to much wider information sources. This latter is of special importance in an observational or clinical science where access to the right observational recording at the crucial moment in a theoretical development replaces experimentation. Attempts at computerization, of course, involve a mathematization of the human sciences. So far most
attempts at mathematization have involved brute force statistical methods, quite inadequate to a structural science. Presumably we must use structural rather than quantitative systems of mathematics in analyzing the basic patterns and recent developments in mathematics seem hopeful in this respect. Levy-Strauss appears to be developing the pattern approach to human science in a mathematical direction. Mead herself, has suggested mathematical models based on multidimensional property spaces --- the dimensions represent, in effect, human potentials and surfaces of lesser dimensionality represent quantified and interrelated cultural or personal actualizations of these. By adding a further, time dimension evolutionary development can also be followed. (Mead, 1961b)

Recent developments in genetics may also prove useful. Since it now appears that genes control global, structural features in the organism rather than particular isolated characteristics, we can hope for mathematical models to be developed in this field which we may be able to transfer to Culture and Personality. Apart from the analogy, however, there is the possibility of immediate interaction between the two fields, since many aspects of the genetic structures must be precisely personality, or at least temperament, structures. The extent to which personality is based on hereditary rather than enculturation would then be easier to assess. Zsondi, in particular, appears to be proposing a theory of heredity structure which is close enough to Mead’s approach to be a direct challenge.

From linguistics, too, we can hope for both analogical and direct influences. Chomsky’s approach appeals to innate ideas, a priori laws of transformation. Any actual language is composed of a surface structure developed by the transformation of deep structures of thought in accordance with these laws. Since linguistics is already highly formalized, present and future techniques from this field may also be transferable. More directly,
Chomsky considers that these innate structures are structures of the mind and so would be fundamental to all behaviour. If developed, such an approach might be able to supply us with an answer to our problem concerning the nature of the a priori constitutional laws of behavioural pattern formation.

Any such formalization or mathematization would have to be very complex for we saw in this thesis to what extent a priori and facticity are intermingled in the constitutional development. Conceivably we could build computers capable of mirroring certain human constitutional developments, although it is not clear if any computer less complex than a human being would be capable of this. And if we built a machine capable of such constitution, would it not be human? And would it not also suffer the 'defects' of being limited to a particular historical culture? Even man's ability to enculture a computer, to give it his own soul, cannot release him from his incarnated fate.
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THROIS THESES ANNEXES

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1. On ne peut pas défendre rationnellement l'opinion que toute action humaine est déterminée.

2. L'usage spinoziste du terme 'substance' est fondamentalement équivoque.

3. La réflexion philosophique est antithétique au mythe vécu de la religion.

Louvain, 1970