Behind The Mask: Unmasking the Social Construction of Leadership Amongst Officer Cadets of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

by

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DOCTOR OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION

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Behind The Mask: A Qualitative Study to Unmask the Social Construction of Leadership Amongst Officer Cadets of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

by

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Abstract

This thesis explores Officer Cadets' social construction of leadership at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS). It addresses calls for more research into leadership behaviours.

Taking a social constructionist perspective, the thesis focuses on unmasking the social construction of Leadership amongst Officer Cadets. This study adopts a reflexive approach, acknowledging the centrality of the researcher in the co-construction of the data. The thesis develops interdisciplinary links between the theoretical areas of Dark Leadership to problematize and inform contemporary understandings of Officer Cadets' social construction of leadership through the emergent findings of the study.

This qualitative study employed a mono-method research design consisting of semi-structured interviews. Through these, participants shared their lived experiences and gave descriptions and understandings of their past leadership experiences before and current experiences within Sandhurst with a reflexive interview approach. The thesis utilises Reflexive Thematic analysis to interpret the data, with the results presented thematically.

The thesis uses reflexive thematic analysis to explore dark leadership through a social constructionist lens; the research has evidenced functional changes to practices within Sandhurst and developed a model of what dark leadership at Sandhurst is from an Officer Cadets view.

This approach highlights the importance of contextuality, the person and the situation through a holistic Leadership approach. The thesis proposes a holistic framework for leadership, which would advance toward de-coupling the dichotomies of leadership.
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Lastly, I would be remiss in not mentioning my family, especially my wife Emma. Whom has had to ‘take up the slack’ with our young family when I have been locked upstairs to conduct this research.

Fortune Favours The Brave
Authors Declaration

I declare that the work contained in this thesis has not been submitted for any other award and that it is all my own work. I also confirm that this work fully acknowledges opinions, ideas, and contributions from the work of others. The work was done in collaboration with the British Army.

Any ethical clearance for the research presented in this commentary has been granted.

Approval has been sought and granted through the Researcher's submission to Northumbria University's Ethics Online System, which was approved on 27/05/21. In addition, the Ministry of Defence Research and Ethics Committee gave the research ethical clearance on 9/11/21.

I declare that the Word Count of this Thesis is 59870 words.

Name: Jeffrey Roy Tibbett

Date: 27/09/2022
Chapter 1 - Introduction

This chapter will introduce the thesis, giving some background before providing demarcation for the research's scope, aims and objective.

1.1 Executive Summary

British Army leadership is world-renowned (Rennie, 2019b) as the gold standard of Military Leadership (Deakin, 2013). The attendance of numerous international Officer Cadets provides further evidence for this reputation as a World Class establishment (Deakin, 2013; Teller, 2014).

The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS) is the jewel in the crown of British Army Leadership – deemed the home of the British Army officer and the ‘global centre of excellence for leadership’ (Ministry of Defence, 2021). The Sandhurst motto ‘serve to lead’ (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005; Thomas, 1961) is synonymous with leadership worldwide.

Despite this high regard for British Army leadership, abhorrent actions resulting from leadership still occur. One British Army watershed moment, in particular, illustrates these leadership failures. Reported abuses in Iraq regarding Baha Musa led to an investigation into all communicated instances of abuses, which resulted in the publication of the Aitken Report (2008). Brigadier Aitken conducted the report at the behest of the Chief of the General Staff, now Lord Dannatt. This report was titled ‘An Investigation into Cases of Deliberate Abuse, and Unlawful Killing in Iraq in 2003 and 2004’, released in 2008. It was a troubling time for the British Army—pointing out many failures in leadership and directing that there needed to be “the production of new doctrine on leadership” (Aitken, 2008, p. 25).

The British Army, as a result, pushed to formalise and professionalise its leadership doctrine. The British Army started teaching ‘Values-Based Leadership’ at Sandhurst
as a direct reaction to the Aitkin Report, building on the doctrine already in place from ex-Sandhurst scholars such as John Adair (1979, 1983).

The British Army’s response to the Aitken report also later resulted in establishing the Centre of Army Leadership and the publication of the Army Leadership Code (British Army, 2016) and other doctrinal publications (British Army, 2014).

Sandhurst states that it teaches and practices Values-Based Leadership (VBL) (British Army, 2016; Yardley & Neal, 2007), but British Army Leadership has a definition that alludes to some elements of ‘dark leadership’, specifically it denoting that it requires the ‘projection of character; (Judge et al., 2009; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Dark leadership is a combination of three behaviours, namely Machiavellianism, Narcissism and Psychopathy, all registering at a sub-clinical level (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). This grouping, known as the dark triad, will be fully explored in Chapter 2.

The British Army Definition of leadership is:

*Effective Leadership in the British Army is characterised by the projection of personality and purpose onto people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding of circumstances. For this to be moral, just, and acceptable it must be underpinned by moral values and to be truly authentic, practiced by all ranks*

(British Army, 2014, p. 4)

The British Army, in its adoption of VBL in all training establishments (Arthur et al., 2010), has followed the course of many organisations in adopting a leadership model which in academic circles has been regarded as a Positive Organisational Behaviour (POB) (Harris & Jones, 2018; Luthans, 2002) or ‘Upbeat Leadership Studies’ (Alvesson, 2020) or as ‘Prozac Leadership’ (Collinson, 2012, 2020c). This ‘excessive positivity’ (Alvesson &
Einola, 2019; Collinson, 2020c) can force research into ‘tunnel vision’, to be trapped by its positivity (Eagly, 2016; Kurtulmuş, 2018) and moralistic positioning as ‘good’ Leadership (Padilla et al., 2007; Schyns et al., 2012). These positive leadership theories are criticised for possessing flaws, in their philosophical groundings (Alvesson & Einola, 2019), for lack of regard for the person (Ford & Harding, 2008), and for possessing dark leadership qualities (Tourish, 2013). In addition to these philosophical and methodological criticisms, these POB focussed academics are charged with designing a field of theories to feed the specific needs of the time (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2016) and were promoted to further the ‘leadership industry’ (Kellerman, 2012, p. 13).

The British Army has also had its share of scandals, exampled in its organisational reaction to both the abuses of Baha Mousa (Bennett, 2014; Gage, 2011; Kerr, 2015; Williams, 2012) and other examples of ‘poor leadership and strong group dynamics’ (Mackmin, 2007, p. 84).

These leadership journeys have led to a polarisation of leadership. This polarisation has led to the words ‘good’ and ‘bad’ entering the lexicon of leadership, with people denoted as good or bad Platoon Commanders, in place of other terms such as ‘effective’ or ‘appropriate’. By adopting this worldview of polarisation and thereby agreeing that we can all be good, ethical leaders all of the time, we are inauthentic (Ford & Harding, 2011; Gardner & Cogliser, 2008) and deceiving ourselves (Caldwell, 2009).

We must move beyond these simplistic dichotomies (Collinson, 2005, 2020a) to understand that leadership is situational, contextual (Johns, 2006; Porter & McLaughlin, 2006) and ever-changing (Kellerman, 2012; Tourish, 2013).

The thesis will now explore the research's background, focus and rationales. In addition, we will also signpost the structure and layout of the chapter.
1.2 Chapter Structure

Figure 1 Chapter Layout

Source: Produced for this research.

1.3 Background

This section will give the personal background and rationale to set the thesis scene, with an organisational background of Sandhurst held in Appendix C with a British Army Organisational review in Appendix A. In essence, and in the words of Simon Sinek and the title of his bestselling book, the thesis will ‘Start with Why’ (Sinek, 2011).
1.3.1 Personal Background

The researcher has served in the British Army for over 23 years, joining the Queens Lancashire Regiment in Omagh, Northern Ireland as a Private soldier in 1998. During this time, they have completed seven operational tours based in Northern Ireland (x2), Helmand Province (x3), and Iraq (x2) within the Infantry, personally observing inspirational and fearless leaders win Military Crosses on operations (Times, 2010; Williams, 2012).

The researcher has also seen first-hand the effect of what some may regard as a toxic leadership style (Lipman-Blumen, 2010; Pelletier, 2010) or dark leadership behaviours (Kurtulmuş, 2018; Tourish, 2013), terms which are rarely used in the British Army, despite its more regular use in the lexicon of our U.S. Counterparts (Johnson, 2019; Reed, 2015a; Steele, 2011; Van, 2019; Williams, 2005).

Queens Lancashire Regiment Commanding Officer, Col Jorge Mendonca DSO MBE, is an example of ineffective leadership; they created a poor leadership culture in Iraq in 2003 during Operation Telic (Bennett, 2014; Gage, 2011; Kerr, 2015; Williams, 2012). The researcher concurs with others due to their personal experience, believing that the Commanding Officer's leadership style directly led to an organisational culture that helped enable Mr Baha Mousa's death. Evidence of this culture was displayed by the “closing of ranks” (Williams, 2012, p. 262), which hindered the Coroner’s Inquest. Baha Mousa was a 26-year-old Iraqi civilian hotel receptionist who died in British Army custody at Basra, Iraq, in September 2003. Other academics have critiqued this abuse and explored this (Bennett, 2014; Kerr, 2015), so this incident will not be explored in detail, other than to say that Baha Mousa was arrested from the hotel and brought to army headquarters, where British soldiers brutally beat him, and he later died from his injuries. As a result of this abuse, Cpl Payne was the first British Army soldier to be convicted of a War Crime (Rasiah, 2009), namely ‘Inhumane Treatment of a Prisoner’, for his involvement in the death of Baha Mousa. Payne
is personally known by the researcher, as they served in the Queens Lancashire Regiment with Cpl Payne for ten years and was of the same rank as Payne during the incident.

This single incident was instrumental in changing the British Army and Sandhurst to instil Values-Base Leadership (VBL). Indeed, the current Chief of the Defence Staff at the time stated directly after the Court-Martial of Cpl Payne, “everyone inside and outside the Army should recognise the harm that is caused to our hard-earned reputation and, potentially, to our operational effectiveness when anyone commits serious breaches of our values” (Kelly, 2011, p. 50).

The researcher moved to Sandhurst to conduct their research because Sandhurst is viewed as the bastion of Army leadership. The researcher felt the leadership culture at Sandhurst did not feel like it was the centre of leadership for the British Army; the researcher became aware of incidents, with the most serious of these widely reported in the media. The first examples in this thesis are historical examples set in the crucible of combat. Sandhurst was surely different; it is a training organisation that deems itself a global leadership centre of excellence but has had some shameful acts occur in recent times. Incidences in the last three years alone include numerous sexual assaults (Brown, 2018; Corke, 2019; Gordon, 2020; Robinson, 2021), physical assaults (Nicholls, 2018; Wynn-davies, 2022), Racism (Etienne, 2020), large scale and repeated non-compliance with COVID rules (BBC, 2021; Nichol, 2020) and the suicide of Miss Olivia Perks (BBC, 2019). Of course, these are substantial incidents within the public domain; the internal service discipline system deals with most discipline issues; only the most severe are open to public scrutiny.

The researcher could regard these as isolated incidents that have no linkage, but then reread the following paragraph:

*The public condemnation of those ‘bad apples’ occasionally exposed as culpable has never quite hidden a culture of contempt and indifference permeating the army and government hierarchies.*
The above statement could easily be attributed to any atrocious behaviours displayed in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Sandhurst. That realisation focussed the researcher's position and reflected the indifference the researcher felt amongst permanent staff regarding the incidents at Sandhurst.

1.3.2 Initial Reflections

How did these repugnant incidents occur if the Armed Forces are indeed bastions of leadership excellence? Particularly at Sandhurst, where they would be enacted by leaders selected for their leadership skills and conferred command (A. King, 2019) by their rank, but these incidents seemingly occurred within an organisational setting whose culture enabled them to conduct these acts with relative comfort. Surely the Sandhurst setting would not be as permissive? Many of these combat incidents occurred in the direct view of more than ten other individuals. Could this be due to the presence of ‘dark leadership’ tendencies, or was it the fault of the 2 per cent of service people previously identified in research as having ‘aggressive psychopathic personalities’ (Swank & Marchand, 1946, p. 244) in British Army combat environments?

The researcher concluded that Sandhurst had leadership issues and thought this should be acknowledged, but it has not. Sandhurst instead released a book in which an “Army General reveals how we can ALL adopt the self-discipline taught at Sandhurst” (Nanson, 2020). This book proclaimed that Sandhurst's behaviours are key to unlocking leadership (Nanson, 2019). This perplexed the researcher as an ‘insider’. Is Sandhurst's hierarchy so blinkered that they cannot see the areas of weakness in the leadership culture? Recently, because of the unpublished Service Inquiry into Miss Perks death, both the Commanding Officer (Lieutenant-Colonel) and Commander (Brigadier) were suspended and moved on
before the potentially embarrassing outcome of the Coroner’s Inquest. So, Sandhurst must have realised that their leaders were not working in line with their current leadership model or that the model was broken. Sandhurst continues to believe its Leadership is excellent, with the Centre of Army Leadership's recent book promising to “distil into one peerlessly authoritative work the essence of leading and leadership from one of the world’s most revered institutions” (Audible; Sharp, 2021). Whilst the researcher is biased, as the British Army has provided the researcher income and education for over 20 years. The researcher felt these incidents warranted more investigation and organisational reflection and were unacceptable.

The researcher pondered on Plato’s brother Glaucon’s philosophical position. Are these actions a presentation of the inherent ‘evil’ within all people waiting for an opportunity such as with the Ring of Gyges (Plato et al., 2007)? Did the combat setting and context of war create a personal ‘Ring of Gyges’ for Payne? Did they emplace trust that a single incident in the plethora of conflict would provide anonymity and, therefore, invisibility? Do the bystanders from within the organisation believe they sat within the anonymisation of groupthink, furthermore does Sandhurst replicate conditions similar to that of Payne and Blackman, little external involvement with small teams where interference was rare?

Whatever the British Army is currently doing to combat poor leadership practice is still not working. Their leadership style still leaves the British Army exposed due to repeated unacceptable behaviours (Wigston, 2019); a recent damning report declares that the issue with unacceptable behaviour in the British Army “is about the leadership at every level in the organisation” (Wigston, 2019, p. 4).

Maybe this is an institutional failure of the British Army – have they allowed persons with a more malleable character to stare for too long into the ‘abyss’? Many major incidents were
conducted on Combat Operations; for Payne, this was not their first deployment, with it being the fourth for Payne.

*He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.*

Source: (Nietzsche, p. 20863)

A Lieutenant-General once remarked to the researcher (Personal communication, 2018) about another general’s leadership effectiveness, that they lacked the ‘ruthlessness’ needed to be promoted. Furthermore, he states that the British Army selects its senior officers based on war footings – it chooses the leader who can ultimately order his men to make the ‘ultimate sacrifice’. Ruthlessness was re-enforced during a chat with Lord Dannatt, who explained that his Colour Sergeant at Sandhurst told him he did not have the ruthlessness to be a general – so Lord Dannatt worked to develop this ruthlessness (Dannatt 2021, Personal Communication, 11 January). Do these unwritten and unspoken cultural connotations drive leadership selection, development, and mentorship? Ruthlessness is undoubtedly not one of the core values (British Army, 2018) of the British Army – so if it is essential, why are they not discussed?

There is clear divarication between these abhorrent acts and the British Army’s internal (Centre of Army Leadership, 2020) and external perception of Sandhurst as a bastion of Leadership (Rennie, 2019a), further complicated by this organisational culture of socially constructed perceptions of leadership outside of the doctrine.

The researcher sought to focus on the intangible, ever evolving, and seemingly ineffable concept: British Army leadership. They pondered who decides what effective Leadership is and how it is constructed. Whether effective Leadership can be genuinely
ethical or due to the role that leading in combat can never be genuinely ethical or truly authentic.

Was Cpl Payne simply an evil individual (Talbert & Wolfendale, 2019; Waller, 2007; Zimbardo, 2008) or was it not “a question of a good man doing evil things, but a good man doing what he thought was right” (Sharrock, 2010, p. 48). Could they have underlying ‘dark’ leadership qualities that may make them more susceptible to poor decision-making and ‘bad’ leadership? Or are we selecting and developing leaders incorrectly as an organisation, specifically at Sandhurst?

_We’re fishing for tuna by using shark bait, and we wonder why we keep getting sharks._

Source: (Campbell & Crist, 2020, p. 204)

### 1.3.3 Positional Statement

This thesis will now explore the very building block of British Army Leadership - the start-point from which all should flow, its construction. Evidence and rigorous exploration of the social construction of leadership at Sandhurst could provide the building blocks for leadership doctrine and further research.

Therefore, the researcher’s position is that eminent military leaders of the 21st Century do not come to the fore solely due to the leadership lessons at Sandhurst. Leadership is socially constructed through experiential learning (Kolb, 2014), simulation exercises (Kowalski & Prescott, 2019; Menaker et al., 2006) and combat (Allen & Kayes, 2012). It is these aspects combined that drive cognisant development of Leadership amongst cadets at Sandhurst.

Sandhurst itself is a Leadership Development Programme which, like other research into similar programmes and as such, possesses “complex and sometimes paradoxical processes through which dynamics of power and identity are enacted and reproduced”
(Gagnon & Collinson, 2014, p. 646) we will explore in particular the tensions between the taught leadership of Sandhurst and these “paradoxical processes”.

Experiential learning in the Armed Forces is already subject to limited academic research (Rhodes & Martin, 2015). A growing number of academics believe that VBL is too outdated for the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous organisational environments (VUCA) in which the British Army operates (Anderson et al., 2017; Bennis, 2013; Latham, 2014; Paparone et al., 2008; Rodriguez & Rodriguez, 2015).

Does leadership philosophy even matter? “Leadership has been considered a critical factor in military successes since records have been kept” (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 12; Danielsen, 2017), but conversely the extent to which military failures have been directly affected by leadership has not been subject to significant research and is therefore not fully understood.

In other contexts, reports cite leadership as at least a contributing factor in several U.K. scandals such as the Hutton Inquiry (Coates, 2004), LIBOR Scandal (Knights & McCabe, 2015), Political Leadership (Grint, 2016) and U.K. Coronavirus response (Grint, 2020; Tourish, 2020). Leadership is of importance both in terms of success and failures.

The Centre of Army Leadership states that in the British Army, “successes are underpinned by exceptional Leadership, Leadership of, and by, our people. It is in our DNA” (Centre of Army Leadership, 2020, p. 4).

Leadership is personal, contextual, and situational. People respond to differing behaviours in different environments and different situations. Leaders must work to select a style dependent on these variables to maximise leadership effectiveness. Leader effectiveness is exceptionally subjective in an environment like the British Army. It is more concerned with a person's view than any positivist metric.
1.4 Research Focus

This research focuses on the dark aspects of the social construction of leadership by Officer Cadets attending Sandhurst; however, this study will have similarities across the British Army, Defence, and broader public sector organisations. Sandhurst has, as mentioned, stated that it uses Values-Based Leadership (VBL) due to issues around values and standards, highlighted by abuses in Iraq (Gage, 2011). VBL is not a single type of Leadership and is placed by some academics in up to eleven separate styles under a broad umbrella (Copeland, 2014).

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Values-Based Leadership Theories</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Servant Leadership</td>
<td>(Greenleaf, 1977; Parolini et al., 2009; Patterson, 2003)</td>
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<td>Stewardship</td>
<td>(Block, 1993)</td>
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<td>Connective Leadership</td>
<td>(Lipman-Bluman, 1996)</td>
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<td>Self-sacrificial Leadership</td>
<td>(Choi &amp; Mai-Dalton, 1999)</td>
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<td>Authentic Transformational</td>
<td>(Bass &amp; Steidlmeier, 1999b)</td>
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<td>Complex Leadership</td>
<td>(Knowles, 2001, 2002; Marion &amp; Uhl-Bien, 2001; Regine &amp; Lewin, 2000)</td>
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<td>Shared Leadership</td>
<td>(Pearce &amp; Conger, 2003)</td>
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<td>Spiritual Leadership</td>
<td>(Fry, 2003)</td>
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<td>Authentic Leadership</td>
<td>(Avolio &amp; Gardner, 2005; Avolio et al., 2004; Avolio &amp; Luthans, 2003a, 2003b; Avolio &amp; Wernsing, 2008; Bass &amp; Gardner, 2003; Gardner et al., 2005; George, 2003; Walumbwa et al., 2008a; Walumbwa et al., 2008b)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ethical Leadership</td>
<td>(Brown &amp; Trevino, 2006; Brown et al., 2005; De Hoogh &amp; Den Hartog, 2008; Den Hartog, 2015)</td>
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Table 1: Emerging Constructs in Response to Ethical and Moral Deficiencies in Leaders (In chronological order based on the first occurrence)

Adapted From: (Copeland, 2014, p. 7)

This sweeping generalisation is rejected by other academics who categorise leadership theory differently (Wren, 2006), placing Value-Based theories with other ‘Normative’ styles such as Ethical and Servant Leadership, a position which has similarities to that of Copeland, but with the addition of Transformational styles and change theory as critical differences.

Also, previous studies (Tibbett, 2018) believe that the British Army does something more akin to a situational style of Leadership, with similarities to Contingency Theory (Fiedler, 1964) or Cognitive Resource Theory (Fielder & Garcia, 1987).
1964; Fielder & Garcia, 1987) indicated that leaders selected their leadership style depending on the situation. This emergent exploratory research indicates discordance between British Army leadership theory and leadership practice and its very definition. This discordance between teaching and practical application is inefficient. The British Army should, in common with combat forces worldwide, ‘train as they fight’ (Danielsen, 2017, p. 93), or in this case, lead.

This research explores if ‘dark’ leadership behaviours are a factor in the social construction of leadership at Sandhurst.

1.4.1 Critique of Military Leadership

At least in an academic context, the British Army Leadership doctrine is a nascent beast, only being formalised in the last decade (British Army, 2014). British Army leadership doctrine and theory have tried too much, selecting leadership theories and practices as one may select nourishment from a buffet. It has no ‘worldview’, philosophical groundings or ‘golden thread’ – it is incoherent. The British Army must row back and start producing academically researched and rigorous leadership building blocks. Also, there is a counter-narrative with others viewing Leadership and the Military as less comfortable bedfellows than Sandhurst would socialise (Reed, 2015a), “From a general study of leadership, it seems there is much in military organizations to invite incompetence” (Dixon, 2016, p. 251). The British Army must select and evidenced, rigorous leadership style from which to build from. A style which accepts the fluid changes in leadership style required for different context, situations and environments, but also one that is comfortable with accommodating a transactional style, when engaged in Combat Operations.
1.5 Research Value

The researcher understands the need to have actual value in social science research (Alvesson et al., 2017). The value of a Doctorate in Business Administration (DBA) must lie in the progression of knowledge and its application to professional practice to solve a real-world problem (Bourner et al., 2000). This DBA will seek to further academic research into the social construction of leadership and produce a practical outcome to develop understanding and leadership practice at Sandhurst.

This is important to the British Army as understanding the mechanics of the ‘how’ of Leadership within the context of RMAS helps the British Army to understand the ‘why’. Leadership is oft cited as a critical battle winning component in combat, particularly as we have a war in Europe looming.

1.6 Scope of the Study

This section will establish the study's boundaries, central concepts, and motivations.

1.6.1 Scope of the Study

This study will explore through ‘problematization’ (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2014; Butler et al., 2015; Tourish, 2013) Sandhurst's Officer Cadets’ sensemaking (Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick, 1995) of Leadership through a social constructionist lens (Cisneros Puebla & Faux, 2008; Gergen, 2001b, 2009; Hacking & Hacking, 1999; McNamee, 2012; Searle & Willis, 1995; Stam, 2001). Sense-making means that Officer Cadets “convert a world of experience into an intelligible world” (Weick, 2001, p. 9). This world is framed within Sandhurst's context-specific (Blair & Hunt, 1986) institution.

“‘Problematization’ is ‘to challenge its fundamental premises in a significant way
and scrutinise its contradictions” (Tourish, 2013, p. 199). The fundamental premise is that all Officer Cadets are ‘good’ officers and adhere to Army Values and Standards. The selected contradiction is that these ‘good’ people can then ruthlessly destroy the enemy without any dark leadership behaviours or tendencies when called upon to do so.

The thesis will problematise by examining Officer Cadets' social construction of Leadership. Analysing if the presence of ‘dark’ leadership traits within their social constructions is a real, although unacknowledged, element of their Sandhurst lived experience.

The study focuses from a wide angle of the academically unpopular in North America (Baert et al., 2011) post-modernist position (Rosenau et al., 1992) of Social Constructionism to narrow to the specific flavour espoused by Gergen (Gergen, 1985, 2001b, 2009), particularly the less adversarial, softer stance, he later expressed (Cisneros Puebla & Faux, 2008; Yang & Gergen, 2012). This will be explored in detail in Chapter Three (3.2.).

The selected cynosure of this philosophy is critical relational constructionism (Hosking, 2005, 2008; Hosking & Pluut, 2010; McNamee, 2012), indeed “Ken’s [Gergen] constructionism is best described as relational construction” (Hosking, 2011; McNamee, 2012, p. 152), this position within the thesis determines that Leadership is a relational construct. This position presumes that reality is continuously being (re)constructed as a process (Hosking & Morley, 2004; Hosking, 2011). Within Leadership, this would mean that its meaning and measure are perennially socially constructed by accepted social and cultural norms (Hosking & Morley, 1991; Wilson, 2016).

The relational view of leadership places the relationship at the centre with the leadership/people as the output of the relation (Alvesson, 2016; Hosking, 2007; McNamee, 2012); put simply, the researcher's position is that people are not bequeathed as leaders or followers. They are instead people that enact leading or following behaviours, sometimes
concurrently to varying levels of effectiveness; this is an appropriate view for the organisational context of this thesis. Organisational members lead and follow concurrently, as formalised by the rank structure, in addition to myriad informal relationships.

The Sword of Honour

The Sword of Honour is the ultimate representation of status at Sandhurst. It is given to the best Officer Cadet. Status has recently been subject to a surge in research in wider academia (Anderson & Cowan, 2014; Blader et al., 2016) but none have approached from a military viewpoint. This research however considers status “the degree of respect, esteem, and prestige that an individual holds in the eyes of others” (Blader et al., 2016, p. 725). Few would argue against the esteem of being recognised the best Officer Cadet in a field of over three hundred Officer Cadets from countries worldwide would fulfil this definition.

This search for status has been subject to research on the sub-clinical narcissistic tendencies of those seeking this status (Zeigler-Hill et al., 2021).

In addition, the sword is presented by the 2* General, whom they view as the ‘best’ Officer Cadet. The Officer Cadets' interactions with the 2* are generally fleeting and more in interview-like settings, of limited duration. Research shows this type of engagement benefits those with narcissistic tendencies (Hogan & Kaiser, 2005).

This researcher would de-link the best leader and the Sword of Honour winner. One does not necessarily infer the other – narcissistic leaders are more likely to attain the Sword of Honour (Rosenthal, 2006). However, if the Sword of Honour is truly an award for the best leader, then it is not an accurate measure. Leadership position, attainment and performance are not always linked.

There are no standards laid down or characteristics that must be attained to present this award, making this an extremely subjective award. The Commandant has little to no
interaction with Officer Cadets, so it depends on the recommendations of the Platoon Staff with Officer Cadet peers not involved. Therefore, Officer Cadets are very clear that to have a chance of being selected, they must be deemed the best by their staff; peers’ opinions matter little to them.

The researcher surmises that this subjectiveness, combined with a highly competitive environment, presents an important context to understand how leadership is constructed and the extent to which dark leadership behaviours may result.

1.6.2 Central Concepts of the Study

The thesis will now briefly explore several central concepts that underpin the researcher's philosophy and, therefore, the thesis.

Leadership as Social Construction

_We may never know what the true essence of a leader or the situation actually is and must often base our actions and beliefs on the accounts of others from whom we can (re)constitute our version of events._

(Grint, 1997, p. 6).

This statement encapsulates the researcher's view of Leadership – that Leadership is a socially constructed notion, although we may measure it against positivist/quantitative organisational outcomes.

We can all recount episodes of ‘good leaders’ with bad organisational outcomes and vice-versa. The researcher would also concede that organisational outcomes contribute to the socially constructed notion of an aptitude to lead. The researcher also acknowledges that all contributors to the socially constructed identification of Leadership are not equal (Grint, 1997; Harding, 2004) – particularly in a hierarchical structure such as the British Army.
The researcher’s position is that of joining the growing host of academia (Collinson, 2006; Crevani et al., 2010; Endres & Weibler, 2017; Fairhurst & Grant, 2010; Grint, 2005, 2019; Gronn, 2002; Harding, 2004; Hosking, 2011; Meindl, 1995; Morris, 2014; Ropo et al., 2013; Sutherland et al., 2020) in recognising Leadership as a social construct and that “language, discourse and narratives play a central role” (Sutherland et al., 2020, p. 134). Within Sandhurst, we must accept that “Leadership is in the eyes of the beholder” (Popper Druyan 2001 p552) or, in Sandhurst’s case, the Permanent Staff when awarding the Sword of Honour.

We must explore how the Permanent Staff and Officer Cadets create this social construction and sensemaking of leadership. The researcher concurs with Popper and Druyan (2001) that culture impacts leadership perceptions. Dickson further expands this position (2006), who state, “Leadership is a dynamic social process and an emergent property of the interactions among leaders and followers…that occurs within the context of a particular social setting” (p.502) with the social setting for this thesis being particularly focussed due to the lockdowns imposed around COVID19. The researcher acknowledges that this environment may have created a particularly polarised culture, with Officer Cadets unable to go home and relieve the pressures of this constant competition.

The British Army as a social structure

This thesis regards the British Army as a social structure, although academia is still unclear about the meaning and “find it nearly impossible to define it adequately” (Sewell Jr, 1992, p. 1). This sits within the researcher’s views as a Social Constructionist (Cisneros Puebla & Faux, 2008; Gergen, 2009; Lazzaro-Salazar, 2013), although as a relational constructionist (Hosking, 2011; Hosking & Pluut, 2010) The researcher places more relevance on the micro rather than the macro (Cunliffe, 2008).
The researcher’s position agrees with other academics (Alvesson, 2011; Jackson & Parry, 2011; Tourish, 2019) in that too many previous studies have used a reductionist approach to explore Leadership in isolation of its cultural position. This social and cultural context abstraction loses the bigger picture (Alvesson, 2011).

One cannot grasp the British Army or pick it up – neither can it be directly replicated along with its intricate social norms and culture; this thesis regards the ‘British Army’ as an intangible entity. The British Army has been held up as an example of a ‘social structure by other academics (Martin, 2009).

Indeed, the British Army alludes to itself as a social structure, “People are the Army, not just in the Army” (Defence, 2019a, p. 3); this sits within some academic's view of social structures, with people at their base (Harré, 2002). The Army has specific and possibly unique circumstances as a social structure, particularly regarding facets such as authority and the social contract (Arrow, 1974, pp. 63-64).

Although the Army has significantly changed since Arrow declared its position unique (1974), the ‘Total Institution’ described by Goffman (1961) could be argued as no longer in existence as organisational changes have eroded many cornerstones of the ‘Total Institution’.

The researcher acknowledges that “there continues to be a certain blurriness in the way we speak of social structure” (Fleetwood, 2008; Porpora, 2007, p. 195) and that “the term social structure is used by social scientists in a number of different ways” (Martin, 2009, p. 5). We will now clarify the position of the researcher and this thesis.

The researcher must first acknowledge Sandhurst's “collective intentionality” (Searle, 2010; Searle & Willis, 1995, p. 37) in training Officer Cadets in Leadership.

An easy leap would be to the social structures espoused by Bhaskar (Bhaskar, 1979; 2016) within the philosophy of critical realism. Structuration theory in its original (Giddens,
1984) and revised form (Stones, 2005) has some elements that synergise with the British Army's social structure and the researcher's philosophical position. However, the theory is complex and all-encompassing.

Although the researcher agrees that the social structure could be perceived as transcendental, the position of this thesis is more akin to that of Berger and Luckman (1967), who regard the social structure as a virtuous cycle – with social structures creating individuals who, in turn, create the social structure.

Also, the British Army has all four concepts of a social structure (1989), as theorised by sociologist Porpora. Porpora’s position develops the Marxian understanding of Social Structures (Porpora, 2007; Porpora, 1989).

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<th>Four Concepts of Social Structure</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Patterns of aggregate behavior that are stable over time.</td>
<td>1. The British Army has many behaviours, such as morning muster parades which use the reductionist approach, which are micro-situational examples.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Lawlike regularities that govern the behavior of social facts.</td>
<td>2. Military Law and discipline.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Four Concepts of Social Structure

Adapted From: (Porpora, 1989)

The British Army, as a social structure, creates culture, passes information, provides its hierarchical establishment and enables command, among a myriad of other items (Martin, 2009). The view of this thesis is beyond the dualistic ontology, that of structure and agency, which many Critical Theorists argue for (Giddens, Habermas, Bhaskar, Foucault).

Many academics, particularly more recently, have concurred with this rejection (Archer & Archer, 2003; King, 2004b) which is particularly wanting when applied to the Military (King, 2004a);

*Sociology cannot understand the development of European defence collaboration, the development of new military strategies or new forms of terrorism by reference to Structure*
and Agency. The dualistic ontology cannot explain the fluid and dynamic processes of transformation which are currently occurring.

(King, 2004a, p. 236)

The researcher's position is that a social structure is a socially constructed phenomenon – indeed, the British Army could never be argued as naturally occurring. The many elements of the British Army are socially constructed – to loop back to a quote mentioned in the introduction, ‘People are the [British] Army’ (Defence, 2019a).

**Dark Leadership**

Dark leadership behaviours are a recent area of study. The researcher's position is that British Army leaders may need some aspects of ‘dark’ leadership (Judge et al., 2009), ‘social dominance, Machiavellianism and hubris’ would be a few that could be viewed as positive behaviours for specific context/situations within military settings. Hubris is a behaviour which has come to the fore in the leadership arena relatively recently (Picone et al., 2021; Sadler-Smith & Tourish, 2021). Dark leadership will be fully explored in Chapter Two.

**The Critic**

This research has a naturally critical discourse. This position would be called Critical Relational Constructionism (Hosking, 2005, 2006, 2008), which enables a critical discourse whilst maintaining the relational constructionist position (Toledano & Anderson, 2020). This position also accommodates reflexivity and focus (Toledano & Anderson, 2020). This is separate from other critical positions in management (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000) in that Critical Relational Constructionism is critical of claims to know what is best for others (Hosking, 2008, p. 671).
1.7 Research Aims, Objectives and Contribution

The research aims to gain knowledge and examples of personal experiences, to examine the social construction of Leadership. The research will also explore and rigorously critique British Army Leadership at Sandhurst through problematization (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013).

1.7.1 Primary Research Aims

- To explore the potential presence of dark leadership behaviours in the social construction of Leadership amongst Officer Cadets.

1.7.2 Research Objectives

- Critically review the Dark Leadership and Dark Triad theory bases to conceptualise key terms and identify gaps in current knowledge.
- To develop an appropriate methodological approach and design a data collection process, to gain rich insights into participants' experiences of leading.
- To make an original methodological and empirical contribution to the Leadership field through the use of digital MP3s embedded into the thesis, enhancing reflective capabilities and depth of insight into participants’ experiences of Leadership.
- Make a practical contribution to leadership practice in a workplace setting by recommending changes and alterations to help positively develop Officer Cadet leadership effectiveness.

1.7.3 Contributions

There are several areas to which this research can potentially contribute.
Progress of Social Constructionist knowledge of Leadership

This thesis can expand the theoretical understanding of the social construction of Leadership, particularly in the public sector. To help answer the call to develop a ‘leadership doctrine’ (Grint & Jackson, 2010) after repeated attempts to develop a Grand Theory of Leadership (Wren, 2006).

To provide an exploratory study into alternatives to positive leadership theories.

This research will hopefully provide a holistic leadership approach. This holistic approach could be seen as a possible advancement of Full Range Leadership (Antonakis & House, 2013; Avolio, 2010), acknowledging the work others have done on the incorporation of dark leadership (Itzkovich et al., 2020) and answering the call that FRL is the basis of Military Leadership (Bass, 2018). This evolvement would be a theory that acknowledges the need for both Dark/Light behaviours, which to varying levels enable leader effectiveness in VUCA environments—acknowledging that a “call for integrating the positive and negative side of leadership has been repeatedly echoed” (Lee et al., 2018, p. 13), but rarely enacted.

To progress the understanding of Bright/Dark leadership tendencies viewed from a leadership lens.

Very few studies have approached dark leadership behaviours with a neutral position. Most make a priori assumptions that these are negative behaviours. Fewer still approach with a leadership lens utilising a qualititative standpoint. This study will provide a qualititative viewpoint for this position and enhance our understanding of these behaviours from a holistic approach. This approach will make no a priori assumptions on the positive or negative outcomes of behaviours, and view all behaviours as holding some leadership values, depending on context, situation, organisational culture, and personality.
1.8 Thesis Structure

This section will briefly outline the structure of the thesis, including a summary of the
individual chapter content.

**Figure 2: Chapters of this thesis**

*Source:* Designed for this research

**Chapter One - Introduction:** Chapter One provided an overview of the organisational and
research background. This Chapter also highlights the research aims and its key definitions.

**Chapter Two - Literature Review:** Chapter Two is split into two main components. The
initial section uses the literature to provide an organisational overview. The following section
gives an in-depth appraisal and review of dark leadership.
Chapter Three - Research methodology: Chapter Three will give the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions. Formulated from these assumptions will be the research design.

Chapter Four - Data analysis and results: Chapter Four will present the results of data analysis in this research, including the analysis of participants' demographics. The Chapter will include novel ways of using analysis using NVIVO.

Chapter Five - Discussions and Implications: Chapter Five provides the discussions and implications of the research. The discussions will explore facets of the study that are of note, interest, or novel.

Chapter Six – Conclusions and Recommendations: Chapter Six provides the conclusions and implications of the research. This Chapter shows the individual conclusions for the specific aims, the research questions, and the findings on selecting a leadership model.

1.9 Summary

This Chapter has presented the foundations of this thesis and an overview of the research. The British Army is an ever-changing organisation gleaned from the organisational background (Appendix A). It sits at the mercy of the political will of whoever is in government.

Despite this, the British Army Officer must remain faithful to the culture and values of the British people. The British public expects a higher level of morality and decency than other leaders within the private sector. British Army Officers are the bastions of the
organisational culture. Their influence on soldiers' leadership styles and behaviour cannot be overemphasised.

The following chapter reviews the literature on the subjects of most importance to this thesis. It also identifies the research gaps leading to the research questions.
Chapter 2 - Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

Chapter 1 presented an overview of this research, briefly reviewing the background of the research, the research objectives, and the justification for the research. The previous chapter also presented a brief outline of the thesis.

The purpose of this chapter is to position British Army Leadership within Leadership theory more broadly before exploring dark leadership in organisations. This review will also, through dialectic interrogation, identify the research questions.

In general, an overview of leadership theories has been conducted as a foundational understanding and is held in Appendix G.

Figure 3: Chapter 2 Structure

Source: Produced for this research
This chapter begins with an introduction in Section 2.1. This section is followed by Section 2.2, which communicates the design of this specific literature review. Finding the gap, or more honestly, the area of under-research, is the aim of Section 2.3. Section 2.4 contains the actual Thematic Review of the literature. In section 2.5 we will explore pertinent leadership theories. The critical findings of the literature review are found in Section 2. These develop the Research questions in Section 2.6. Followed by a summary of the chapter.

2.1.1 Aims

The aims of this literature review are to:

1. Conceptualise key terms and establish the position of the research and this thesis.
2. Establish Sandhurst’s current position on Leadership by exploring and critiquing their definition of Leadership.
3. Explore what ‘Dark’ Leadership is, focusing on military contexts.
4. Finally, the literature review will highlight under-researched areas and produce refined research questions to address this gap and achieve the research aims.

2.2 Design

The literature review is of a traditional narrative literature review style (Grant & Booth, 2009; Jesson et al., 2011; Petticrew & Roberts, 2006) due to its aim and placement as part of a thesis. In addition, this approach is appropriate for Reflexive Research as it “includes the implicit biases of the author” (Fan et al., 2022, p. 173); these are presented as a traditional Literature Review (Grant & Booth, 2009; Jesson et al., 2011).

A systematic review would be less appropriate due to the divergent nature of the field of study (Fan et al., 2022). The traditional narrative review is appropriate for qualitative
research, particularly in social sciences. Due to the deductive nature of the research, the literature review will also explore literature around ‘dark’ leadership; this literature review calls to move beyond ‘mining’ in our silo of knowledge to ‘prospect’ into interdisciplinary domains (Breslin & Gatrell, 2020).

2.3 Finding the Gap

To evidence the gap, a detailed search was conducted. The specific words and Boolean search terms “British Army” AND “Leadership” were used to search the database.

Gap spotting has been critiqued in some fields of academia (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011; Breslin & Gatrell, 2020; Tadajewski & Hewer, 2011) with academics stating that gap spotting has ‘increasingly been seen as a disturbing problem in management studies’ (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2011, p. 251).

This thesis will assume that gap-spotting is utilised to re-enforce rather than select the research question. The research question will be selected, and then crucial literature will be engaged to refine the research question.

2.3.1 External Search (Web of Science)

Web of Science is a well-regarded academic database. The Social Science Index was established in 1973 with retrospective entries from 1956 (Norris & Oppenheim, 2007). Due to the relatively aged establishment, compared to other databases, Web Of Science has been commended as the best for Social Science searching (Dess, 2006). The following section will now explore how the search was conducted.

British

The focus on the British Army was conducted due to research that leadership may have differing levels of effectiveness across cultures (Aktas et al., 2016; Bass, 1997; Dickson
et al., 2012; House et al., 2014; Moan & Hetland, 2012). With cultures moderating specific leadership styles (Li et al., 2021). Therefore, by including the term British, the thesis acknowledges the national context and its potential moderating effect on leadership styles.

**Army**

Some acknowledge the Military as having a “unique culture” (Hall, 2011, p. 4). This claim of ‘uniqueness in culture’ is repeated by the components of the military, such as the Army (Hughes, 2013; Kasurak, 2016) and the “unique Air Force culture” (Mastroianni, 2006, p. 83). There have been few studies on an organisational culture's impact on leadership, the few that exist (Ogbonna & Harris, 2000) lack corroborations from other studies. This corroborations could be achieved by replicating the study in other organisational cultures.

**Search Terms**

The linkage of British and Army into a single search term, “British Army” is a deliberate decision. This linkage of national and organisational cultures is referred to as the “cultural context” (Nohria & Khurana, 2010, p. 336). Therefore, the specific cultural context of the study is the British Army. The specific behaviour being studied in this cultural context is Leadership. Therefore, the Boolean search term “British Army” AND “Leadership” was selected.

The search resulted in thirty-five publications (last checked on 25 Apr 22); refining this to English Language only reduced this return to thirty-one. Selecting Articles and disregarding book reviews and other items such as meetings reduced the return to twenty-four articles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fit to Fit – from military hygiene to wellbeing in the British Army</td>
<td>(Bricknell &amp; Ross, 2020)</td>
<td>Historical exploration of the term’s ‘health’ and ‘hygiene’ in the British Army</td>
<td>Not pertinent to the research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Surrenders and the South African War, 1899-1902</td>
<td>(Miller, 2019)</td>
<td>Historical review of primary research pertaining to over 1000 surrenders 1899-902.</td>
<td>Not pertinent to the research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Author(s)</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degenerate Days: Colonial sports tours and British manliness 1900-1910</td>
<td>Levett, 2018</td>
<td>Explores how the perceived failure during the Boer Wars directly connected with sports tours. More widely, a perception that the British working class were less fit and robust than their colonial counterparts.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical students’ unique experience of army leadership training: a qualitative study</td>
<td>Earis et al., 2017</td>
<td>A qualitative study of first-year medical students attending a British Army leadership course ran at a British Army Medical Regiment.</td>
<td>Selected for further exploration.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The British-led 14th Army in Burma, 1942-1945: The Remarkable Recovery and Successful Transformation of a Military Organization at War</td>
<td>Ho &amp; Kwan, 2017</td>
<td>Discusses Leadership but only in a surface way. It speaks a little about level 5 leadership but has no primary research and uses anecdotal evidence and narrative.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-education of German POWs as a German-Jewish Task: The Case of Adolf Sindler</td>
<td>Shiloh-Dayan, 2016</td>
<td>Concentrates on Leadership conducted by Jewish-German refugees to implement a British re-education plan for German POWs.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The biopsychosocial benefits and shortfalls for armed forces veterans engaged in archaeological activities</td>
<td>Finnegan, 2016</td>
<td>Explore the potential benefits of activity conducted by the Defence Archaeology Group (DAG) on veterans. No leadership synthesis, but it does use a similar methodological position.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Chance to Show His Mettle: War, Creativity and Reparation in the Work of Wilfred Bion</td>
<td>Ballinger, 2016</td>
<td>Examines the works of Wilfred Bion. Whilst containing a few anecdotal and personal references to Leadership. Bion’s focus is morale.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational learning capability and battlefield performance The British Army in World War II</td>
<td>Visser, 2016</td>
<td>It does not look at Leadership but applies a model of organisational learning using secondary data.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Maladaptation: Counterinsurgency and the Politics of Failure</td>
<td>Harkness &amp; Hunzeker, 2015</td>
<td>This research examines the British Army's adaptation to a counterinsurgency environment. The only leadership reference within the research is to the issue of leadership turnover.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The First World War and Public-School Ethos: The Case of Uppingham School</td>
<td>Halstead, 2015</td>
<td>Concentrates on the contribution of a single public school to the First World War Officers Corps.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technological Adaptation in a Global Conflict: The British Army and Communications beyond the Western Front, 1914-1918</td>
<td>Hall, 2014</td>
<td>Explores the British Army’s appetite and ability to enact adaptation in both its Command and Control and communication systems in World War 1. Little mention of Leadership.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command, Leadership, and Doctrine on the Great War Battlefield: The Australian, British, and Canadian Experience at the Battle of Arras, May 1917</td>
<td>Bechthold, 2013</td>
<td>Assesses whether doctrine played a part in the Canadians' ability to maintain their hold in the Battle of Arras whilst the British Army lost momentum and their foothold. No real mention of Leadership.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serving within the British Army: research into mental health benefits.</td>
<td>Finnegan et al., 2011</td>
<td>Research exploring the mental health benefits and problems of serving in the British Army. The research contains a sentence stressing the “importance of leadership” (Finnegan et al., 2011, p. 1260) but nothing more.</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concepts of Professionalism in the Canadian Army, 1946-2000:</td>
<td>Kasurak, 2011</td>
<td>Discusses the Canadian Army and its competing streams, one of the British Traditionalist approaches and the other the</td>
<td>Not pertinent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regimentalism, Reaction, and Reform


Breaking the covenant: governance of the British Army in the twenty-first century

(Forster, 2006) This research concentrates on the recent (claimed) change in how the government uses the military to forward political goals. The researcher would argue that other wars, for example, the first Boer War have similarities. Not pertinent to the research.

A construct-driven investigation of gender differences in a leadership-role assessment centre

(Anderson et al., 2006) Examines leadership differences in a British Army Officer Selection Centre within Genders. Talks about leadership styles and has cultural synergies with research. Not pertinent to the research.

A Scottish socialist reads Carlyle in Johannesburg prison, June 1900: Reflections on the literary culture of the imperial working class


Medicine and the culture of command: The case of malaria control in the British Army during the two World Wars

(Harrison, 1996) Talks of “managerial ethos” (Harrison, 1996) but has only a single mention of Leadership. Not pertinent to the research.

Table 3: Brief Review of Literature Search Results

Source: Produced for this research.

Individually interrogating these entries (see Table 3) revealed a single paper of any potential relevance. The remainder is primarily historical case studies on unrelated subjects.

Selected Entry of Potential Relevance

Medical students’ unique experience of army leadership training: a qualitative study

This paper was selected for its apparent focus on Army leadership. The abstract and title led the researcher to select this paper as the only one with any (if tenuous) linkage.

This research concentrates on civilian medical students (Liverpool University) who have attended a single military course run at a reserve Medical Regiment (208 Field Hospital).

This course is the Command, Leadership and Management Course.

The research is qualitative, using reflective assignments by the students to produce thematic analysis (Earis et al., 2017). This providing a qualitative insight into the participants experiences of attending the leadership training.
**Critique**

The research has little relevance to the British Army. Being conducted on a civilian populace, only being enabled by the British Army, using British Army instructors and infrastructure. None of the themes identified is leadership or leadership development. Furthermore, the article itself has weaknesses in its methods. The abstract indicates that 244 submitted a reflective essay; the results section states that 535 were used for data. With 255 submitted in Nov 2015 and 280 in Mar 2015 but gives no reason for this disparity. Also, the lead author from their other articles seemed to operate previously exclusively in being ontologically positivistic (Jones et al., 2005; Roland et al., 2004), and this was their only foray into the qualitative domain. Some may, therefore, rightly question the ontological foundations of this qualitative work. This thesis posits that the ontological foundation will affect how data analysis is conducted and interpreted. In short, a researcher’s ontological position influences every facet of research. The ontological position regarding Leadership is particularly pertinent for high-risk organisations (Maxfield & Russell, 2017).

**2.3.2 Internal Search (Joint Services Command and Staff College)**

The Joint Services Command and Staff College (JSCSC) sits within the Defence Academy and is responsible for the mandatory education of the Ministry of Defence senior leadership (Till et al., 2001) from all three Armed Services and the Civil Service.

One of these mandatory courses is the Advanced Command and Staff Course. This 42-week residential course results in Masters-level research outputs submitted to JSCSC as part of the embedded M.A. Defence Studies and MRes Defence Studies by Kings College London (Bird, 2008).

Unusually about these research outputs is the privacy in which they are held. This research is held on a stand-alone intranet system at JSCSC, which can only be accessed by
MOD employees who are physically at JSCSC. Research of this private repository of thousands of papers yielded several pertinent papers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Review</th>
<th>Assessment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Toxic Leadership</td>
<td>(Dagless, 2015)</td>
<td>Discusses ‘Toxic Leadership’ in a military setting, using both British and U.S. Military cultures,</td>
<td>Selected for further exploration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxic Leadership: a necessary evil?</td>
<td>(Campbell-Colquhoun, 2006)</td>
<td>Discusses the presence of potential toxic leader behaviours in historically effective leaders.</td>
<td>Selected for further exploration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Is there a place for toxic Leadership in the military?</td>
<td>(O'Sullivan, 2015)</td>
<td>This paper uses three military examples to illustrate toxic Leadership and its effects.</td>
<td>Selected for further exploration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Understanding Toxic Leadership in the British Army: Anathema or Inevitability?</td>
<td>(Kitching, 2015)</td>
<td>Explores Toxic Leadership using the Toxic Triangle and Dark Triad to highlight the cultural, situational, and contextual implications.</td>
<td>Selected for further exploration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Churchill and Leadership: The light and the dark</td>
<td>(Head, 2017)</td>
<td>This paper uses the historical figure of Winston Churchill, exploring both the Bright and Dark aspects of his leadership behaviours.</td>
<td>Selected for further exploration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Table Showing Exploration of Private Repository

Source: Produced for this Research

Before the researcher explores and critiques these papers individually, the thesis will broadly summarise some general findings. Despite these papers being named Defence Research Papers, they do not conduct any primary research or partake in any portion of the primary research process. These papers are more in keeping with literature reviews, with desk-based research being conducted. They cohere the wide-ranging literature into a single, pithy document which can be read and understood easily.

The papers were selected because they focus on the potential lens of dark leadership qualities. The search was conducted on the closed system by the librarian; search was conducted for “British Army” AND “Leadership” AND “Toxic” OR “Bad” OR “Dark”.

Toxic Leadership – Lieutenant-Colonel Dagless

The paper is compelling to read in that, in the preface, the author provides a practical example of toxicity in the workplace. The paper explores Toxic Leadership from a
practitioner’s viewpoint. The researcher is unsure if the Daily Mirror stating that Sgt Alexander Blackmans proved manslaughter of an insurgent was a failure in leadership is enough evidence in isolation to use as a basis for a paper. The paper leaps from leadership theory to theory with a scattergun approach. Whilst evidencing base knowledge, this wide-ranging style does not engage the critical thinking skills generally required within academia. The progression of the Toxic Triangle (Padilla et al., 2007) into the Military Toxic Triangle is not a giant leap and seems a common-sense progression, but it is done without evidence. Although helpful, the paper provides no new knowledge or information and is, for the most part, a repackaging of old information.

**Toxic Leadership: a necessary evil? – Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell-Colquhoun**

This Defence Research Paper summarises that “there have been great leaders such as Montgomery, Patton, Zhukov and MacArthur who were effective despite, or because of their toxicity” (Campbell-Colquhoun, 2006, p. ii). The paper does little to explain what makes these leaders ‘great’, and the researcher believes defending MacArthur in particular as ‘great’ is a difficulty, mindful of his perceived failure in Korea (Dingman, 1988; Patterson et al., 2000), which led to his ungraceful dismissal.

This paper also references Colonel Reed’s (below) paper on toxic Leadership. However, as will be discussed in later segments, Colonel Reed uses Toxic Leadership, Bad Leadership and Destructive Leadership interchangeably – this is also not the same context in which Colonel Campbell-Colquhoun uses the term. Campbell Colquhoun leaps from Dark Leadership traits to a Toxic Leader using traits like Narcissism. Indeed, the paper claims that “Patton had many toxic characteristics. He was a difficult, arrogant man who dislikes humour aimed at him” (Campbell-Colquhoun, 2006, p. 7). One could argue that merely being difficult or arrogant, whilst disliking ridicule, does not immediately constitute a Toxic Leader –
especially when the evidence is based on the accusation is Wikipedia. Wikipedia has recently improved its reputation, with some placing it on the same stage as a peer-review (Cummings, 2020). Wikipedia did not enjoy this reputation 15 years ago (Denning et al., 2005; Dondio et al., 2006), so any reviewer must question the integrity of work based on it in such a single-dimensional aspect.

**Is there a place for toxic Leadership in the military? – Wg Cdr O’Sullivan**

This paper is the first to acknowledge the dimension of perception, situation, and contextual aspects, evidencing a more holistic approach. Although not going as far as acknowledging these elements' social construction, it takes a small step in the right direction. Like others, this paper makes many unsubstantiated claims without offering supporting evidence.

**Understanding Toxic Leadership in the British Army: Anathema or Inevitability? – Lieutenant-Colonel Kitching**

This paper runs the well-trodden route of its predecessors, rolling out the oft-cited definition by Whicker as a starting point (Whicker, 1996) before engaging in a multi-disciplinary brief review of the field. He does acknowledge the Dark Side of Leadership but only in its most simplistic form as part of the good/bad leadership dichotomy. Despite this, the paper is a significant step above those previously written; it discusses a continuum of overlapping leadership styles, displaying a more comprehensive approach to leadership. This position has similarities with this thesis. The paper also acknowledges the confusion and interchangeable nature of negative leadership terms such as toxic, dark, and bad. Kitching provides clear definitions and outlines his position that leadership may inevitably contain darker elements.
Churchill and Leadership: The Light and the Dark – Lieutenant-Colonel Head

This paper regards, through a historical lens, the Leadership of Winston Churchill. Mostly a historiographic piece, lacking fundamental Leadership theory in any novel or new way. It correctly regards hubris as an element of Dark Leadership but also places several other unevidenced behaviours, such as bellicosity, in the Dark Leadership pool. This unevidenced addition indicates an immature and interchangeable view regarding Dark/Bad Leadership.

Toxic Leadership – Colonel Reed

All the papers above heavily cite and use the paper by U.S. Colonel (Rtd) George Reed, PhD. Colonel Reed’s original article (2004) cites many studies and describes in detail the outcomes and perceptions of people who believe they have been subjected to Toxic Leadership. It centres on the negative organisational outcome rather than specific behaviours – can this leadership style simply be ‘bad’ or ineffective? Is this a case of the emperor’s new clothes?

In a later paper, Colonel Reed alludes to this (Reed & Olsen, 2010) when he uses Bad Leadership, Destructive Leadership and Toxic Leadership interchangeably. A trend he continues in his later book (Reed, 2015b).

In this paper, he does offer some novel and interesting primary research. Reed admits that the sample size and response rates are weaknesses and prevent generalisation across the U.S. Army. Colonel Reed suggests there would be much overlap between the British and American experience with toxic leadership, but although using similar language, the actual denotations of leadership are not.

None of the ‘research’ works submitted for JSCSC has a tangible ‘research’ outcome, such as changes to practices, procedures, or knowledge. The other academic journal articles
generally lack engagement with British Army Leadership as a research area. They indicate British Army Leadership as an area of under-research in the leadership arena.

**Summary**

This thesis has explored the sparse map of the territory that is British Army Leadership. There are several papers on British Army Leadership. No research has been conducted in the areas of dark, bad, and toxic leadership in the British Army context. Not a single UK paper explores with a holistic approach the presence of Dark/Light traits within leadership in any organisational context. This thereby evidences a true area in which the context has been under-researched and is needed to be able to understand the contextual examples given in Chapter One.

**2.4 Thematic Review**

The task for a Thematic Review is the construction of themes. This Thematic Review aims to give the specific definitions this research will use, followed by exploring key leadership themes of significant relevance to this research.

The literature cannot and will not examine every facet of leadership but instead will focus on Dark Leadership’ aligned with the research aims. It will discuss those of most influence on the specified area of research briefly.

These areas and themes will be related (Zhao & Li, 2019), with the key to this literature review will be precise targeting and delineation of the themes.
2.4.1 Definition of Terms

*A definition is a sack of flour compressed into a thimble.*

Remy De Gourmont (1858–1915)
Source: (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 3)

The researcher has examined the various fundamental concepts and has selected the most appropriate to be applied to this research. Although this thesis will use specific definitions, some academics believe “all definitions are arbitrary” (Shamir & Eilam, 2005, p. 396) and can be unhelpful in progressing thinking regarding Leadership. This thesis agrees
that definitions can be contextual and situational, but arbitrary is a step too far. The thesis will therefore select the most appropriate in the researcher’s opinion as a handrail to guide the thesis – mindful that this thesis regards Leadership, Values, and many of the concepts as social constructs; therefore, so are their definitions.

**Leadership**

A single definition of Leadership is as intangible now as it ever has been (Alvesson, 2016; Harrison, 2017; Ladkin, 2010; Zehndorfer, 2013; Zoller & Fairhurst, 2007), with Stogdill’s oft-cited trope still extant that “there are almost as many different definitions of leadership as there are people who have attempted to define the concept” (Stogdill, 1974, p. 259). Leadership is “one of the most observed and least understood phenomena on earth” (Burns, 1978, p. 2). A few years later, this view was reinforced later by the statement, "Leadership is like the Abominable Snowman, whose footprints are everywhere but who is nowhere to be seen" (Bennis & Nanus, 2012, p. 12).

A single definition has proven to be as much a ‘wicked problem’ (Grint, 2010; Rittel & Webber, 1973) as the leadership contexts it enacted within (Beinecke, 2009; Grint, 2005, 2010) changes the behaviours required. The statement, "While there have been many studies of leadership, the dimensions and definition of the concept remain unclear” (Pfeffer, 1977, p. 105), still holds. Many would state that Leadership research is still in the position that Bennis observed over 30 years ago, that “leadership is like beauty: it’s hard to define, but you know it when you see it” (Bennis & Nanus, 2012, p. 17). Beauty is evidenced to be culturally (Madan et al., 2018), historically (Eco & McEwen, 2005; Herrington, 2016), contextually specific (Eaton, 1999; Herrington, 2016) and socially constructed (Saltzberg & Chrisler, 2006). The similarities between Leadership and Beauty are profound, particularly pertaining to the view of Leadership held by this thesis.
Many academics (Barker, 2001; Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995a; Pfeffer, 1977; Rost, 1993; Silva, 2016; Storey et al., 2016) have explored the use of a reductionist approach to conceptualise Leadership into a singular short, pithy definition they hope will gain recognition amongst both academia and practitioners, to no avail. Indeed others (Summerfield, 2014) have approached from a practitioner's viewpoint but have also failed to gain a widespread consensus.

Further groupings of academia have also tried to bound together all possibilities in a 'one cap fits all' approach which gives us an 'integrative definition' of leadership (Winston & Patterson, 2006), which, while attempting to appease all, appeases no one, in its near 700-word methodical approach (See Appendix D). Whilst also acknowledging with humility that this behemoth of a definition was not the ‘answer’ but merely a step in the journey (Winston & Patterson, 2006).

Many Leadership researchers are now repeatedly stating what they believe is a novel way to cut the Gordian Knot of the Leadership definition. The knot has different qualities and is viewed differently based on context. There are personal, social, contextual, and situational elements beyond what is easily defined by the hard sciences.

Some academics, including the author, argue that defining something as multifaceted, situational, and contextual as leadership with a reductionist approach is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. It is recognised that Leadership is socially constructed (Bresnen, 1995; Cunliffe, 2008; DeRue & Ashford, 2010; Fairhurst & Grant, 2010). Therefore, the definition would depend on a person's viewpoint and understanding (Pfeffer, 1977).

Murphy agreed with this position, who described Leadership and its definition as a “protean form” (Albert, 1941, p. 674). This view is corroborated by Calder, who states that leadership “exists only as a perception … not a viable scientific construction” (Calder, 1977), makings its measure by traditional methods of natural science difficult. Other academics
agree with this position (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003; Pye, 2005) and view this quest as impossible. This stream of academia and philosophical stance believe that even within a single organisation, people individually and socially construct their version of their definition of Leadership:

*The continuing search for the Holy Grail, which seems to characterize interest in Leadership, implies that research efforts are perhaps being directed at ‘solving the wrong problem’.*

(Pye, 2005, p. 31)

Due to this and the myriad of sub-strata regarding Leadership, no simple over-arching definition can come to the fore. Indeed a paper explored the fallacy of conducting leadership development without an accepted leadership definition (Barker, 1997).

The position of this research is that differing definitions will be most suitable and appropriate depending on the environment and personal perception. This contextual view is shared by academics (McCleskey, 2014). Also, different definitions can be placed in basic categories of either behavioural, process or ability (Harrison, 2017); others differ slightly on the categories placing them as the person (behaviour), result, position (ability) and process (Storey et al., 2016). This compartmentalisation creates difficulties for those seeking a holistic view of leadership. Are leaders held to these approaches individually, or is there a wider unspoken and immeasurable output to true leadership?

With the research position and context in mind, tempered by the natural need for a definition, the definition which is most appropriate to guide this thesis is:

*Leadership is a process whereby an individual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal*

(Northouse, 2018, p. 5)
The definition acknowledges the body of academia that views leadership as a constantly evolving process (Albert, 1941; Kotter, 2008) rather than innate ability (Carlyle, 1869; Robbins, 1994) or based purely on behaviours (Barnard, 1948; Hemphill, 1949) (see also Fig 5).

- **Trait Definition of Leadership**:
  - Leader
  - Leadership
  - Followers
  - • Height
  - • Intelligence
  - • Extraversion
  - • Fluency
  - • Other Traits

- **Process Definition of Leadership**: Leaders are seen as leaders through interaction with followers.

**Figure 5: The Different Views of Leadership**


This definition also removes the morality and the good/bad dichotomy from Leadership. Leadership can be moral or immoral (Nietzsche, 2019), good or bad. The researcher believes a leader can be effective despite having low morals or unethical behaviours. This contradicts other academics who state, “If it is unethical or immoral it is not leadership...” (Burns, 2003, p. 48). This thesis views morality as a social construction and not a static anchor and can change due to perception, even if the actions and behaviours have not changed (Allison et al., 2009). Also, those with a moralistic view of leadership must defend against the “Hitler Problem” (Ciulla, 1995), a decades-old question of whether Hitler was indeed a leader (Cuilla, 2004). Those with a moralistic view must declare Hitler as a tyrant or bully but not a leader (Burns, 1978). This causes complications when measured against others with an amoral viewpoint who state, ”No one could deny that Adolf Hitler was an effective leader.” (Drouillard & Kleiner, 1996, p. 30).
This definition has clear linkages with the position of the researcher and the thesis—however, with the thesis acknowledgement of the cultural bias, the thesis will now explore the appropriateness for the organisational setting.

**Symbiosis with the British Army**

This selected definition has clear linkages with the British Army, which makes it appropriate through its declaration that Leadership is a process, indicating it can be learned, practised, and honed; this is essential – it gives places like Sandhurst a reason to exist.

It also refers to an ‘individual influencing.’ This not only alludes to a more nuanced view of Leadership but of followership also. The ‘common goal’ has clear associations with the missions or tasks given to the British Army at every level.

2.4.2 British Army Leadership

Leadership in the Armed Forces is recognised to have unique facets and challenges (Gill, 2011). The definition is mandated to us in the British Army Doctrine book, Developing Leaders; its definition of British Army leadership is;

*Effective Leadership in the British Army is characterised by the projection of personality and purpose onto people and situations in order to prevail in the most demanding of circumstances. For this to be moral, just, and acceptable it must be underpinned by moral values and to be truly authentic, practiced by all ranks*

(British Army, 2014, p. 4)

The study will now explore this definition. The first line, ‘Effective leadership in the British Army is characterised by the projection of personality and purpose onto people,’ acknowledges the leader/follower relationship, with the leader projecting personality and
purpose, reflecting the hierarchical relationship of the British Army. This definition has similarities with Northouse’s statement regarding “a process of influence between a leader and follower” (2018, p. 5). The projection of personality is seen by some academics (Darr & Klammer, 2016; Johnson, 2019; Tourish, 2013) as a characteristic of Dark Leadership. The toxic effects of Leadership within the military have also been researched (Lindsay et al., 2016; Van, 2019) and will be explored in detail later.

Using the statement ‘effective leadership,’ the definition opens itself up to critique. Indeed some academics consider toxic leaders to be seen as effective leaders by some, depending on their viewpoint and exposure (Nevicka et al., 2018; Popper, 2001).

The definition does clear up some of the weaknesses later by demanding values and morality underpin them but again does not mandate if these are personal or organisational values., referring back to the loss of the British Army's position as a “total institution” (Goffman, 1961).

Even authenticity can be adversely interpreted; one can be authentic to poor and toxic behaviours acceptable within the soldiers' personal or social environment, but not the British Army organisation. The soldier would uphold the very definition of British Army leadership while undermining its mandated ethos and values. Indeed, more recently, the ‘authenticity paradox’ (Ford & Harding, 2011; Gardner & Cogliser, 2008; Ibarra, 2015; Nyberg & Sveningsson, 2014) has been explored, with nascent developments about ‘emotional labour’ of authenticity (Iszatt-White et al., 2021).

Any definition of leadership selected must consider the ‘lived experience’ (Kempster, 2006; Kempster & Parry, 2004) of the British Army. The lived experience is a tool for reflecting on an organisation's position and learning. The British Army is over 350 years old, and the thesis must consider the history and current practices of British Army leadership.
There is a view amongst a sector of academia that British Army Leadership cannot adhere to a single method, with it being regarded as a “critical action organisation” (Hannah et al., 2009, p. 900). This umbrella of organisations contains those that engage with extreme and dangerous events (Campbell et al., 2010; Hannah et al., 2009), but less often than others, such as trauma services. Leaders within these types of organisations often place themselves and their followers in dangerous situations (Hannah et al., 2009).

Also, despite developments and evidence of the New Leadership School, the British Army is an organisation where due to the situational context, at times, transactional Leadership may be required (Antonakis et al., 2003; Bass & Riggio, 2006; Geier, 2016), in the form of traditional British Army Leadership which comprises of dominant action and decisiveness (Fodor, 1978). As mentioned in the introductory chapter, context is key in selecting the leadership behaviours used, and although viewed by many as dichotomies, most theories have interrelation and overlap.

2.4.3 Sandhurst Leadership

*Leadership is just plain you*
Field Marshall, the Viscount WJ Slim (1891-1970)

The above quote is the most cited at the Sandhurst, constantly recited to cadets whilst reminding them that they are the leaders of the future.

The researcher thinks the statement given by Field Marshall Slim should be unpacked and contextualised. This was given at a speech to Sandhurst Officer Cadets after completing their Commissioning Course – so it is not just ‘plain me’ it was a specific statement to those officer cadets in Sandhurst after having been trained for a year as the future leaders of the
British Army. Slim lists some traits he believes the British Army Officer needs to be a good leader. These are willpower, initiative, knowledge, courage, and integrity.

In addition, Slim's focus is further revealed if further unpacked and situated in its more expansive place within the speech.

*Now leadership is that combination of example, persuasion, and compulsion that makes men do what you want them to. It is, in effect, the extension of personality. Leadership is the most personal thing in the world, for the simple reason that leadership is just plain you.*

(Slim, 1952)

Leadership and conflict have an almost symbiotic relationship;

*Leaders, whatever their professions of harmony, do not shun conflict; they confront it, exploit it, ultimately embody it. Standing at the points of contact among latent conflict groups, they can take various roles, sometimes acting directly for their followers, sometimes bargaining with others, sometimes overriding, certain motives of followers and summoning others into play.*

(Burns, 2003, p. 48)

As shown by Burns’ statement, there is a belief that Leadership is multi-faceted, complex and depends on differing stakeholders’ depending on the situation and context. Many academics would place words such as ‘exploit,’ ‘do not shun conflict, ‘confront it’ and ‘override’ in the bad/toxic/dark behaviours. The definition does not state why the Leader switches these behaviours. Is it to maximise organisational output? Alternatively, to maximise his position in that sub-clinical Machiavellian manner that this thesis will explore in later sections.

Indeed, General Wall, in an interview in 2015, stated, "Leadership is at a premium in the military: You’re asking people to do unnatural things in dangerous situations” (Newbery,
2015, p. 35). General Wall is undoubtedly an expert in the lived experience of the British Army, but one could argue that Leadership is a premium in any organisational culture. Despite these many views of what military leadership is, there is still an acknowledged vagueness to the term (Hannah & Sowden, 2013).

2.5 Pertinent Leadership Theories

The researcher will now examine and critique leadership theory pertinent to the research.

Figure 6: The Literature Review Funnel

2.5.1 Servant Leadership

“But whoever would be great among you must be your Servant, and whoever would be first among you must be slave of all. For even the Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give his life as a ransom for many.”
Despite the adoption of the motto “Serve To Lead” in 1947 in a move away from its focus on technical skills to leadership ability (Chacksfield, 2014) this should not be used to imply Servant Leadership was prevalent at RMAS since this date. Indeed, this is evidenced by the current use of VBL/ACL while still having this same motto.

The earliest recorded use of servant-leadership is within the bible and other religious and humanistic teachings (Spears, 1996).

‘Modern’ Servant Leadership was inspired by the novel by German, Herman Hesse named ‘Journey to the East’ (Northouse, 2018; Spears, 1996; van Dierendonck & Patterson, 2010). In this novel, the narrator goes on a pilgrimage with others. This group was attended to by a servant. At some point on the pilgrimage, the Servant (Leo) goes missing, and the group and the trip falls into disarray. The reader later finds that the Servant is the group’s leader; hence, was conducting servant-leadership (Hesse, 1968).

The first academic use of servant-leadership in modern leadership theory was captured by Greenleaf in his seminal work (1973). This work resonates well with the still-nascent work on followership, lines such as “more servants should emerge as leaders” (Greenleaf, 1973, p. 4) displaying its evident symbiosis with followership.

Greenleaf later declared what exactly a servant-leader was:

*It begins with the natural feeling that one wants to serve, to serve first. Then conscious choice brings one to aspire to lead. The best test is: do those served grow as persons; do they, while being served, become healthier, wiser, freer, more autonomous, more likely themselves to become servants? And, what is the effect on the least privileged in society; will they benefit, or at least, not be further deprived?*

(Greenleaf, 1977, p. 352)

Servant-Leadership encourages those in leadership positions to produce a balance of both serving and leading within their organisational environments (Spears, 1996). As early
as 1996, the Executive Director has begun to use the language ‘leader-follower’ rather than ‘servant-leader’ (Spears, 1996).

Although there is consensus on the facets of servant-leadership nearly 40 years later the theory still lacked rigorous empirical evidence (Farling et al., 1999; Northouse, 2018; Van Dierendonck, 2011).

The model has suffered similar critiques as other models (Adair, 1979) which are created with a practitioner focus and therefore, without empirical evidence.

Also, with time, each academic researcher has produced their own, slightly different interpretation of Greenleaf’s intent. They were producing a confusing myriad of servant-leader characteristics.

|-------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| • Developing people  
• Sharing leadership  
• Displaying authenticity  
• Valuing people  
• Providing leadership  
• Building community | • Serving and developing others  
• Consulting and involving others  
• Humility and selflessness  
• Modeling integrity and authenticity  
• Inspiring and influencing others | • Altruistic calling  
• Emotional healing  
• Persuasive mapping  
• Organizational stewardship  
• Wisdom | • Empowerment  
• Trust  
• Humility  
• Agapao love  
• Vision | • Transforming influence  
• Voluntary subordination  
• Authentic self  
• Transcendental spirituality  
• Covenantal relationship  
• Responsible morality | • Empowerment  
• Humility  
• Standing back  
• Authenticity  
• Forgiveness  
• Courage  
• Accountability  
• Stewardship |

Figure 7: Key Characteristics of Servant Leadership
Source: Adapted from (Van Dierendonck, 2011)

For the British Army, the servant-leader characteristics that are most symbiotic with the organisational culture are those of Wong & Davey (2007).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>British Army Value</th>
<th>Corresponding SL Characteristic</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Courage           | • Inspiring and influencing others  
• Modelling integrity and authenticity |
| Discipline        | • Inspiring and influencing others  
• Modelling integrity and authenticity |
Respect for Others
- Serving and developing others
- Inspiring and influencing others
- Consulting and involving others
- Humility and Selflessness

Integrity
- Modelling integrity and authenticity

Loyalty
- Humility and Selflessness

Selfless-Commitment
- Humility and Selflessness
- Consulting and involving others

Table 5: Symbiosis of Servant-Leadership and British Army Values
Adapted From: (British Army, 2008; Van Dierendonck, 2011; Wong et al., 2007)

SL has three main components, these being: antecedent conditions, Servant leader behaviours, and outcomes (Northouse, 2018).

Recent research has shown that servant-leadership is related to (Hanse et al., 2016) Authentic leadership. Another critical component of S.L. is that it can operate and be enacted with positive effect at both the operational and strategic level (Coetzer et al., 2017).

Table 6: Strategic and Operational SL
(Coetzer et al., 2017)

The adoption of servant-leadership can help quickly introduce new ideas and cultural norms (Melchar & Bosco, 2010).
Though I would caveat these studies results due to its focus on ‘for-profit’ sectors where the drivers and perceived outcomes will be different from those of a public-sector organisation.

**Figure 8: A Conceptual Model of Servant Leadership**
(Van Dierendonck, 2011, p. 1233)

Why would we use Servant Leadership? Greenleaf said that positive S.L. created healthy organisations and strengthened performance (Greenleaf, 1973, 1977; Northouse, 2018). Additionally, it promoted followers wellbeing and helped realise their true potential (Greenleaf, 1973; Van Dierendonck, 2011).

The positive impact on followers has also been evidenced (Bande et al., 2016; Chiniara & Bentein, 2016; Otero-Neira et al., 2016), although mindful of a leader-follower match (Meuser et al., 2011).

Servant-Leaders create other servant-followers. The care, empathy and mentoring given by servant-leaders are seen as cascading through the organisation (Hunter et al., 2013). This
flow would be particularly apt for the British Army with its hierarchical organisational structure.

Unlike LMX, AL and other ‘New Leadership’ theories, S.L. is utilised, and training is provided in a vast number of Fortune 500 companies (Northouse, 2018) and the public sector (Slack et al., 2019). Evidencing SL one of the few ‘New Leadership’ models, which is both empirically evidenced while also enjoying widespread support from business practitioners. One of many critiques is both is paradoxical position and the belief that the altruistic position S.L. demands cannot glean the results demanded in a capitalist culture (Northouse, 2018). Also, its perception as a religious style of Leadership (Wilkes, 1998), within today's culture of the prevalence of atheism (Gervais & Najle, 2018) make some uncomfortable with S.L. Servant Leadership is an appropriate theory for the British Army to explore, its ethos synthesises with that of the RMAS, and indeed its motto is “Serve to Lead”.

2.5.2 Contingency/Situational Approaches

\[ I \text{ am the master of my fate; } \\
I \text{ am the captain of my soul } \\
\text{Henley, Invictus} \]

There was a new need to redress the gaping holes within the Behavioural Theory construct (Harrison, 2017; Wilson, 2016). In the 1960s, the social landscape changed, and leadership theory had to evolve with organisational behaviour. This shift was towards open-systems thinking and cognitive perspectives (Wilson, 2016).

Contingency/Situational styles are closely related to the behavioural approach. With the use of the same variables initially identified by the Michigan Studies and Ohio State Studies (Izatt-White & Saunders, 2017). These approaches also looked to address the critiques of Korman (1966).
The contingency/situational theories are very similar, which causes some academics and practitioners to misuse them (Otaroghene Peretomode, 2012; Wilson, 2016) in each other’s place.

Others state that Contingency concentrates on a leader static behaviour being aligned with a task (Izatt-White & Saunders, 2017). Whilst situational lets the leader select a leadership style most appropriate for the task and even specific to those being led (Izatt-White & Saunders, 2017).

While the researcher can see logic- in this, this is another classic reductionist approach. An approach which lends itself to providing a sweeping generalisation, this is not appropriate for some leadership models such as CRT.

One thing all theorists can agree is that both theories concur there is no one best leadership style (Gill, 2011; Wilson, 2016). That the leadership style required is dependent on the situational environment and other factors.

Contingency and Situational leadership are no longer in vogue, and the discourse lacks the enduring popularity of some theories such as trait theory (Carroll et al., 2015). However, this style of leadership is critical in the leadership theory evolution in providing the base for the development of Transformational leadership (Carroll et al., 2015).

There are many Situational approaches which all appeared around the same time (Hersey & Blanchard, 1974; Vroom & Yetton, 1973) as did their critiques (Field, 1979; Graeff, 1983).

Due to its popularity and usage, the research will centre on Situational Leadership Theory as the primary model to represent the genre.

Situational Leadership Theory (SLT)
The situational approach was first developed by Hersey and Blanchard (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969) as an evolution of 3D Management Theory (Northouse, 2018; Reddin, 1967; Vecchio, 1987).

**Figure 9: 3D Theory**
Adapted From: (Reddin, 1967, p. 14)

It was initially named Life Cycle Theory of Leadership (Hersey & Blanchard, 1969), which evolved into Tri-dimensional leadership effectiveness model, eventually came to be known as SLT (Blanchard et al., 1993) in 1972 (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972).

Although Hersey admits that it should be Situational Leadership Model on reflection (Blackwell & Gibson, 1999) and it was called Situational Leadership post-1982 (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982).
SLT has come to be one of the most widely known leadership models (Sashkin, 1982; Thompson & Glasø, 2018; Vecchio, 1987) even more so than the Managerial Grid (Gill, 2011). Whilst concurrently being one of the most under-researched (Thompson & Vecchio, 2009).

SLT has itself gone through a number of revisions and updates. SLT itself contains four basic leadership styles – ‘telling’ (directive), ‘selling’ (consultative), ‘participating’ and ‘delegating’ – to the ‘readiness’/’development’/’maturity’ of followers (Gill, 2011).

‘Readiness’/’development’/’maturity’ is used to describe the ability, confidence and drive of the followers to carry out the task given. It is assumed that leaders would initially use a directive approach. Before with leaders and followers, confidence and ability improving, switching to a more delegative (empowering) style.

**Figure 10: Tri-dimensional leader effectiveness model**

Source: (Hersey & Blanchard, 1972)
The SLT model was also re-enforced with the development of a tool to help with analysis (Blanchard et al., 1982). This initially was named the leader adaptability and style inventory (LASI) (Hersey & Blanchard, 1974) which was at a later date renamed to the Leader Effectiveness and Adaptability Description (LEAD) instrument (Hersey & Blanchard, 1977).

---

**Figure 11: Original Situational Leadership Model**  
(Hersey & Blanchard, 1982)

Both the SLT Model and the tool (LASI/LEAD) have come in for some harsh criticism. Mostly around the model itself and its bell-shaped curvilinear nature. Hersey and Blanchard pointed critics into Korman's direction (1966). Stating that Korman suggested the “possibility of a curvilinear relationship rather than a simple linear relationship between initiating structure and consideration and other variables” (Hersey & Blanchard, 1977, p. 78).
An update to the model and its description made the relationship even more ambiguous (Graeff, 1983, 1997).

Hersey and Blanchard merely stated that “Situational Leadership has identified such a curvilinear relationship” (Hersey & Blanchard, 1982, p. 150). Hersey & Blanchard are graciously open about the “mixed results confounded by differing levels of understanding of the model” (Blanchard et al., 1993, p. 33).

Graeff, after discrediting SLT (Graeff, 1983), then went on to discredit SLII also, stating that it was reviewing concerns “which discredit its theoretical robustness and to limit its pragmatic utility” (Graeff, 1997, p. 154). The academic went on to state the model had absent/weak theoretical arguments, logical and internal consistency issues, and conceptual ambiguity.

Figure 12: Situational Leadership
Source: (Hersey, 1984)
The most damning critique I have seen in Hersey & Blanchard work comes from a peer-reviewed Journal (Academy of Management) and was published in 1983 after the SLT had become SL and the team had published their third iteration of the model.

Fifteen years of these renowned academics careers had now been spent on the model the critique stated at the start of Graeff’s conclusions that “The Hersey and Blanchard situational leadership theory makes minor contributions to the leadership literature” (Graeff, 1983, p. 290). One would not be happy with 15 years of their life being written off as a minor contribution.

Graeff in his two articles may be displaying bias in his sweeping scythe, cutting down SLT wherever he views it. Another study was analysed all three versions of the SLT Model and found them all equally poor (Thompson & Vecchio, 2009). However, more pertinent to this research is a study set in a military context which echoes many of the concerns highlighted by Graeff (Vecchio et al., 2006).

The study concludes that within the military setting that “results are in alignment with prior findings and suggest the theory may have little practical utility” (Vecchio et al., 2006, p. 407).

**Contingency Theory**

The psychologist Fiedler first established contingency Theory in the 1960s (Fiedler, 1964; Gill, 2011; Vroom & Jago, 2007).

At its base is the presumption that “leadership can vary across situations and that there may not be a universally effective way to lead” (Glynn & Dejordy, 2010, p. 123)

The theory divided leaders into two groups, those that are relationship motivated and those who are task motivated. Fiedler stated that this dichotomy was revealed by the Least Preferred Co-Worker (LPC) instrument (Vroom & Jago, 2007).
Which itself was a development of his Assumed Similarity between Opposites (ASo) measure (Hosking & Schriesheim, 1978). ASo was developed after Fiedler's studies (Fiedler, 1953; Fiedler et al., 1953) attempted to use the Q-Technique (Stephenson, 1953) but found the Q-Technique both laborious and time-consuming.

The LPC measure has changed slightly over several years, but the outcome has remained. Fiedler declares that low LPC are task-orientated leaders with task accomplishment, their primary goal. High LPC is relationship focussed and selects this over task accomplishment (Hunt & Larson, 1973).

The theory was developed initially using basketball teams (Fiedler et al., 1952; Fiedler et al., 1953) before Fiedler moved on to US Airforce participants in order to test the theories generalisability (Fielder, 1954).

Fiedler's research found that Low LPC Basketball captains affected how the team faired in the Illinois Basketball League. However, when applied to bomber runs, he found less correlation due to the bombing run having an over-reliance on a single person (bombardiers or radar operator, dependant on time of run).

Fiedler discovered that the captain’s relationship with this ‘key-man’ was also an indicator of effectiveness. Capable bombers had good relations with this Captain and Key-Man.

Fiedler declared that both High and Low LPC scorers could be effective leaders, dependant on the situation and the relationship with followers. The relationship with followers was crucial and the vehicle through which good leadership needed to flow.

*The sociometric endorsement and acceptance should be visualized more like a pipeline through which information and attitudes can flow. By itself, the pipeline is if neither-good nor bad, but unless their' is such a pipeline available, the leader's attitudes do' not have a*
channel through which they can reach the members of the group who directly affect performance. 
(Fiedler, 1958, p. 41)

The predictability of the model to glean a relationship between LPC score and team performance is dependent on ‘situational favourability’ (Yukl, 2012, p. 172).

The model has some quite severe criticisms laid at its door despite over 400 publications (Bass, 1997). The most damning of these states that the model has no real predictive validity and quite merely an inappropriate use of research methods and constructive analysis (Graen et al., 1970). Fiedler himself criticised Graen et al. (Fiedler, 1971). Bringing attention to their methodological weaknesses (Hunt & Larson, 1973).

More recently, the model was criticised over its lack of position on middle-range LPC scorers, whom can be more effective in certain situations (Yukl, 2010).

Fielder was a believer in field tests and was unconvinced that real leadership could be replicated in laboratory settings. Fiedler stated this when saying “the model is more likely to be correct than the laboratory studies” (Fielder & Chemers, 1974, p. 83).

Fiedler kept the faith and instead controversially said: “The Contingency Model is today one of our best-validated leadership theories” (Fielder & Chemers, 1974, p. 89) this is refuted by other academic whom state that “much more work is required as a one-best-fit leadership style, or an oversimplified contingency approach to leadership is still common practice” (Western, 2013, p. 43).

There has been an excellent and unbiased assessment of LPC conducted. This study using the United States Military Academy at West Point as participants supported the predictive validity of the model (Chemers & Skrzypek, 1972).
2.5.3 Dark Leadership.

In Chapter 1, the researcher shared experiences such as Cpl Payne’s and Sgt Blackman's criminal trials for their crimes. However, although they certainly displayed dark tendencies, the behaviours of the leaders around them and how they had helped shape environments and situations where these occur was of more interest to the researcher. The leader of Payne is evidenced to have had elements of narcissism, a self-belief in their perfectionism, and a Machiavellian management of others. These behaviours had obvious positive outcomes for some of these individuals. So, the researcher was highly interested in how these elements may be evidenced in Sandhurst. If Sandhurst is where British Army Officers learn leadership, the seeds of these behaviours might be sown here.

Some authors use ‘bad’ leadership terms such as toxic leadership, destructive leadership, dark leadership (Dagless, 2018; Lipman-Blumen, 2010; Reed, 2004; Singh et al., 2018) and others interchangeably. The researcher will admit and agree with others that there is “some conceptual overlap among these concepts, no agreed-upon definition or overarching concept” (Einarsen et al., 2007, p. 215). It is agreed with others that these dark leadership styles are ‘shades of grey’ (Braun, Kark, et al., 2019) within the ‘bad leadership’ arena (see Table 2). Dark leadership has been selected to explore the researcher's anecdotal autoethnographic life experience that some dark leadership tendencies can result in positive personal and organisational outcomes in specific contextual and situational settings.

The thesis will now unpack some of the terms. Within the military context, toxic leadership has been subject to some research from the U.S. Army cultural position (Boisselle et al., 2014; Lindsay et al., 2016; Reed, 2004; Reed & Olsen, 2010; Steele, 2011; Van, 2019; Williams, 2005) and a limited number of with weaknesses mentioned earlier investigate from the British Army position (Dagless, 2018; Kitching, 2015; O'Sullivan, 2015).
Some arenas view toxic leadership as a catechism for all ‘negative’ leadership traits (Dagless, 2018).

Some subject dark leadership to language which betrays a lack of objective critique, with journal papers about ‘Defeating’ (Gonzalez-Morales et al., 2018; Milosevic et al., 2020) and ‘menacing’ (Singh et al., 2018) leadership. Words like menacing and defeating are ‘loaded language’ and affect the objectivity of the thesis and reader (Cox & Roland, 1973).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Example authors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership derailment</td>
<td>McCall and Lombardo, 1983; Tepper, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toxic leadership</td>
<td>Conger, 1997; Hogan and Hogan, 2001; Benson and Hogan, 2008; Padilla and Malvey, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative leadership</td>
<td>Kellerman, 2004; Lipman-Blumen, 2005; Padilla and Malvey, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evil leadership</td>
<td>Conger, 1990; Hogan and Hogan, 2001; Benson and Hogan, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Dark-side’ leadership</td>
<td>Conger, 1990; Ashforth, 1994b; Tepper, 2000; Askland et al., 2008; Rowland and Higgs, 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abusive leadership</td>
<td>Ashforth, 1994a; Maccoby, 2000, 2004; Tepper, 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destructive leadership</td>
<td>Kets de Vries, 1993; Klein and House, 1995; Hogan and Hogan, 2001; Padilla et al., 2007; Padilla and Malvey, 2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Literature relating to bad Leadership.

Source: (Higgs, 2009, p. 168)

The dark side of Leadership has been explored for over three decades with one of the first studies conducted by Conger (1990) but has only recently become subject to significant exploration within the leadership research arena.

The Good

Leadership has traditionally been romanticised (Collinson et al., 2018; Meindl, 1995; Meindl et al., 1985) with the concept of being ‘good’ (Furtner et al., 2017; Higgs, 2009). From the very foundations of leadership theory study, leaders were aligned as heroes (Carlyle, 1869). New Leadership theories such as ethical Leadership (Brown & Trevino, 2006; Den Hartog, 2015), authentic Leadership (Bass & Gardner, 2003; May et al., 2003),
transformational leadership (Burns, 1978) and spiritual leadership (Fry, 2003) all have a position in that the leader should be a ‘good’ person.

The term ‘good’ is extremely difficult to quantify. With only 10% of leaders being attributed with both successful outputs (effectiveness) and promotion (success) (Luthans et al., 1988), does that relay to a view that only 10% of leaders are, in fact, ‘good’?

This research will have a critical approach to Leadership (Hosking, 2008). It will be moving beyond merely “looking at a critical situation and attempting to designate certain individuals as heroes or villains, good leaders or bad leaders” (Chandler & Kirsch, 2018, p. 191). This leadership progression beyond the over-simplistic moralistic dichotomies (Nietzsche, 2019) still holds prevalence in Leadership research (Collinson, 2020a).

**Dark Leadership Behaviours**

Recent research has focused on the behaviours that underpin dark leadership. A landmark paper exploring dark behaviours identified a Dark Triad: narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002).

![Correlations among measures of Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy](source.png)

*Figure 13: Correlations among measures of Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy.*

*Source:* (Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 559)
These are on the sub-clinical scale and therefore easier to mask into everyday life. The study by Paulhus and Williams (2002) asserts that these traits are moderately correlated whilst also acknowledging that the Dark Triad are “overlapping but distinct constructs” (Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 556). There are some commonalities within the constructs, with Paulhus stating, “all three entail a socially malevolent character with behavior tendencies toward self-promotion, emotional coldness, duplicity and aggressiveness” (Paulhus & Williams, 2002, p. 557).

This research has similarity to many studies using a convenience sample, a group of American students; this creates a known problem with generalisability (Peterson & Merunka, 2014) with the use of students under particular recent critique (Hanel & Vione, 2016; Peterson & Merunka, 2014). The sample also has little cultural similarity with the British Army. These critiques equally apply to another more recent paper which explores the relationship between Machiavellianism and Psychopathy, arguing that they are anything but distinct constructs (Sharpe et al., 2021).

This triad was further developed into a Dark Tetrad (Chabrol et al., 2009) by adding sub-clinical sadism to the triad. This development was rejected by the original authors, who continued to utilise the Triad (Furnham et al., 2013; Jones & Paulhus, 2017).
This was followed more recently by Paulhus offering an alternative Tetrad (Paulhus et al., 2018) with Aggression as the additional behaviour making up the Tetrad before Paulhus finally accepted the 2009 development (Paulhus et al., 2020).

“Several studies indicate that the manipulative behaviors of members of the Dark Triad put them at an advantage in face-to-face settings in the workplace” (Babiak & Hare, 2019, p. 128). Further studies spotlight the role that the Dark Triad behaviours may play in Officer Cadet ‘resilience’ (Kuna et al., 2021; Sękowski et al., 2021; Sheykhangafshe et al., 2021).

Examining the Dark Triad from a positive lens will also help redress the “imbalance in our knowledge” (Jonason et al., 2015, p. 112; Judge & LePine, 2007) created by the repeated explorations of the adverse outcomes associated with the Dark Triad.

Some of these negative associations may not be so, with some academics going as far as to declare that flaws in mental capacity may be helpful for leaders in crises (Ghaemi, 2012). The researcher has concerns with the use of secondary data only and lack of academic rigour to re-enforce the sweeping generalisations made by Ghaemi, such as “In times of
crisis, we are better off being led by mentally ill leaders than by mentally normal ones” (2012, p. 3). The use of generalisations is deeply unhelpful.

Research exploring the Dark Triad has further indicated that two behaviours (Narcissism and Machiavellianism) may relate positively to personal outcomes such as leadership development and leadership position in an organisation (Spurk et al., 2016). This may be due to the combination of these traits resulting in a prevalence of ‘soft tactics’ such as compliments (Jonason et al., 2012). Conversely, Psychopathy has been evidenced to decrease organisational outcomes (Spurk et al., 2016) and is viewed as a purely negative trait (Rauthmann & Kolar, 2012) by many academics. However, more recently, a paper has proclaimed the positive leadership outcomes of the ‘Charismatic Psychopath’ (Welsh & Lenzenweger, 2021). Many academics (Lyons, 2019a; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Smith et al., 2018) believe that the Dark Triad has the potential to promote adaptive rather than maladaptive behaviours.

Whilst most studies have focussed solely on the negative impact of the Dark Triad, a small number have focused on searching for positive outcomes of the Dark Triad (Jonason et al., 2014; Jonason & Webster, 2012). As elements of the Dark Triad, similar to the Dark Tetrad characteristics “are distinct from one another” (Spain, 2019, p. 131) and therefore can be researched individually due to the clear, distinct demarcation. With this demarcation in mind, the research will use the Dark Triad Framework as a guide, extrapolating Narcissism and Machiavellianism for further research.

Whilst this thesis concentrates on the positive outcomes of the Dark Triad —of course, the thesis acknowledges the research into negative factors associated with the Dark Triad, such as prejudice (Hodson et al., 2009), acceptance of violence (Blinkhorn et al., 2020) linking back to the actions discussed in the introduction by Payne and Blackmans.
However, both suffer the weaknesses discussed by using the convenience sampling of undergraduate students; of particular concern is granting course credit for participation, which may influence the findings. In addition, “research must always consider context in studying social phenomena and in particular when addressing leadership” (Alvesson & Sveningsson, 2003, p. 376).

**Dark Leadership in the Military Context**

There has been previous research on the potentially catastrophic results of military personnel with these malevolent characteristics (Adorno et al., 2019; Greiner & Nunno, 1994; Mann, 1973). These studies have all concentrated on Nazi war criminals and those who participated in the Mỹ Lai massacre, participants with extreme levels of the dark triad. Further research has investigated if this dark triad is centred around a dark/evil core (Book et al., 2016; Book et al., 2015; Jones & Figueredo, 2013).

There is also an argument that organisational cultures such as the military can create a ‘fast life history strategy’ through ‘environmental harshness’ (Ellis et al., 2009; McDonald et al., 2012). One could postulate that the British Army may adhere to a fast life strategy, particularly during combat operations. A fast-life strategy results in “low empathy, poor executive control, low agreeableness, enhanced impulsivity, risk taking” (Furtner et al., 2017, p. 80; Glenn et al., 2011); people with a ‘fast-life strategy’ are more likely to exhibit dark traits (Furtner et al., 2017).

This research will concentrate on those with more marginal levels of behaviour at the sub-clinical level – to explore whether the social construction of leadership within Sandhurst influences who is selected as a Sword of Honour. One outcome is the tendency to select those who display such behaviours. The researcher’s position is in concert with others in the presupposition that “dark leader traits can have positive as well as negative consequences for
organizations and influence leader emergence and leader effectiveness” (Volmer et al., 2016, p. 413). This research re-enforces other studies which concur that these traits, within certain contextual and situational aspects, can be positive (Harms et al., 2011). This study has pertinence with its military organisational setting and focuses on possible extremes of both situation and context.

The Bad – Moving into the Shadow

Relatively recently, a grouping within academia (Conger, 1990; Kurtulmuş, 2018; Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Spain, 2019) has, in some part as a reaction to this positivity, explored in more depth the concept of ‘dark leadership’. The dark/light dichotomy has now entered the lexicon of leadership, leadership studies have had a history that “dualisms pop up everywhere” (Harter, 2007, p. 90; Levine, 1971).

The “dichotomizing tendency is so extensive and embedded in leadership studies” (Collinson, 2014, p. 38; 2020a). By adopting this worldview of polarisation and agreeing that all can be good ethical leaders, all the time, this view plays into the inauthenticity paradox (Ford & Harding, 2011; Gardner & Cogliser, 2008). Leaders can succumb to 'mirroring’ in their quest to reflect the British Army's values and subordinates' expectations (Takala, 2010). This ‘mirroring’ can create “captains who sail under false colors … spiritual leaders who are false prophets” (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999a, p. 188) as they do what is expected of them or what

As this study has previously positioned, Leadership is not about the oversimplistic dichotomies which are often utilised (transformational/transactional, leader/follower, leadership/management). However, that Leadership should be considered a continuum and move away from the “bi-polar shopping list approach” (Grint, 1997, p. 3). Towards a
leadership continuum that is situational, contextual (Johns, 2006; Porter & McLaughlin, 2006) and ever-changing (Kellerman, 2012; Tourish, 2013).

Many differing leadership styles sit under the umbrella of ‘Bad leadership’, such as Toxic, Destructive, Abusive, Unethical and Dark (Furtner et al., 2017). This research will focus only on ‘Dark Leadership’, a term that itself is interpreted in different ways (Furtner et al., 2017). This research will regard Dark Leadership as having sub-clinical traits of the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). This thesis's ‘shade of grey’ (S. Braun et al., 2019) regards dark leadership traits as an unavoidable part of leadership. These traits, which are deemed ‘bad’ do not directly correlate to, or affect the causation of ‘bad’ Leadership. The researcher agrees with others that Leadership academia needs to move toward “eschewing this moral assumption” (Chandler & Kirsch, 2018, p. 187) regarding leadership and that leadership itself is not good or bad (Nietzsche, 2019; Sardais & Miller, 2011).

The lack of research on this dark leadership lens has been a critique of leadership studies (Higgs, 2009) for decades, with Heilbrunn stating in the 1990s that “the science of Leadership has devoted too little attention to what might be called the darker side of the question. Ruthlessness, mendacity, dishonesty and cunning – all are qualities that the leadership theories flinch from” (Heilbrunn, 1994, p. 10). Despite this declaration over 20 years ago, “Although there has been increasing interest in the ‘dark side’ of personality, the empirical literature on the topic is scarce” (Furtner et al., 2017; Harms et al., 2011, p. 1; Jonason & Webster, 2010) this is particularly true of qualitative research, most likely due to the sensitive natures being discussed.

Recent research has bucked this trend with evidence that “research has increased each year with a large number of papers being published in the past few years, reaching nearly two thousand in 2018” (Campbell & Crist, 2020, p. 152), exploring the Dark Triad in particular. However, as mentioned, these are mostly quantitative, focusing on a psychological viewpoint
in which traits are identified, measured, and demarked. These are different approaches to this thesis, which explores the how/why questions.

“Dark Triad Traits do have positive sides too…Dark Triad traits can be loyal friends, effective leaders, and heroic rescuers” (Lyons, 2019b, p. 14). The researcher's position concurs with others “the exact same behavior can be ‘bright’ or ‘dark’ depending on the perspective it is judged from or the time frame” (Campbell & Campbell, 2009, p. 229; Hogan & Kaiser, 2005). Recent research shows that even this acknowledged ‘brightness’ can be culturally skewed (Ma et al., 2021). It is, therefore, as contextual, and situational as all other leadership behaviours.

2.5.4 Narcissism

It is probably not an exaggeration to state that if individuals with significant narcissistic characteristics were stripped from the ranks of public figures, the ranks would be perilously thinned

Source: (Post, 1993, p. 99)

Narcissism Defined

Etymologically the word Narcissism is related to Ovid’s tale of self-love to the point of death. The sixteen-year-old Narcissus conducted such after he spurned the nymph Echo and was brought to the attention of the Greek goddess Nemesis. Narcissus was then destined to die whilst staring lovingly into a pool of water at his reflection, unable to tear himself away or even eat (Freud, 1989; Ovid et al., 2020).

Narcissism in Context

Narcissism and Leadership go together like picnics and ants. Leadership is a goal for narcissists because it means status, power, and attention.
Our current view of Narcissism in its sub-clinical form is primarily based on the seminal work by Raskin and Hall (1979), where a number of individual traits of Narcissism are delineated.

A growing body of recent research argues against Narcissism as a purely negative trait (Campbell, 2001; Judge & LePine, 2007; Judge et al., 2009; Spurk et al., 2016).

*A solid dose of narcissism is a prerequisite for anyone who hopes to rise to the top of an organization*  
(De Vries & Balazs, 2010, p. 389)

There is a more positive aspect of Narcissism, with academia acknowledging that “narcissism seems well-suited for leadership” (Campbell & Campbell, 2009, p. 224). Narcissism has been researched as a critical indicator of leader-emergence in new groups (Brunell et al., 2008). Another study also concluded that specific aspects of the ‘bright’ side of Narcissism were an indicator of leader emergence (Brunell et al., 2008), particularly in military settings (Paunonen et al., 2006); this could be due to its linkages with aggression (Kjaervik & Bushman, 2021).

Narcissism seems to be thought of differently than the other behaviours within the Dark Triad – with it being seen as an indicator of being ’bright’ (Rauthmann & Kolar, 2012). Narcissism also has evidenced a positive correlation with Emotional Intelligence (Petrides et al., 2011), an area which has come to the fore as a leadership requirement in recent years (Goleman, 2009).

Other research based on subordinates' perceptions also shows evidence that narcissistic leaders improve subordinate career success (Volmer et al., 2016) and that narcissism correlates with charismatic elements of transformational leadership (Clark &
Gruber, 2017; Schreyer et al., 2021). Maccoby called these narcissistic leaders who, not in despite but conversely because of their Narcissism, were successful, ‘productive narcissists’ (Maccoby, 2004). Other research has highlighted narcissists' high levels of self-esteem (Campbell et al., 2002; Sedikides et al., 2004) and good mental health (Sedikides et al., 2004). Recent research has acknowledged and explored the double-edged nature of narcissism (Campbell, 2001; Liu et al., 2021).

Some regard the combination of Narcissism and Machiavellianism as a combination used to ‘cheat’ the system (Jonason et al., 2014; Jonason & Webster, 2012) and produce outcomes beyond what would typically be produced.

*The outspoken types tend to achieve leading positions in life and resent subordination unless they can—as in the army or other hierarchic organizations—compensate for the necessity of subordination by exerting domination over others who find themselves on lower rungs of the ladder.*

(Reich, 1949, p. 201)

A body of academia argues that Leadership and Narcissism have a symbiotic relationship (Campbell & Crist, 2020; Hoffman et al., 2013; Rijsenbilt & Commandeur, 2013). Furthermore, "narcissism is a prerequisite for anyone who hopes to rise to the top of an organization" (de Vries, 2004, p. 188). Narcissism is present in many CEOs of large corporations and democratically elected heads of state, and research shows that attaining a top leadership position correlates with Narcissism (Rosenthal, 2006). Although, another study of CEOs noted that a narcissistic leader had similar long-term outcomes to non-narcissistic ones (Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007).
2.5.5 Machiavellianism

Machiavellianism is a term coined using the behaviours encouraged in the seminal work ‘The Prince’ (Machiavelli, 1532, 2018 Edn), written by Niccolò Machiavelli, an Italian philosopher and statesman who lived 1469-1527AD. Machiavelli’s book sets out political behaviours. However, this is regarded from an amoral standpoint, unencumbered by ethical concerns (Vecchio, 2007).

Since 1970 (Christie et al., 2013), Machiavellianism has been subject to significant research (Lyons, 2019b). More recent research has found that Machiavellianism is not the negative trait it has long been regarded as; conversely, in moderation, it has a positive effect on performance (Zettler & Solga, 2013), particularly Machiavellians being “able to control social interactions and effectively manipulate others” (Vecchio, 2007, p. 141).

Research on a lack of ethical behaviours indicates linkage to Machiavellianism (Castille et al., 2018), and this lack may be evidenced in their willingness to use manipulation of others for the Machiavellian’s own benefit.

Within a military setting, Machiavellianism has been linked with deliberate and cautious behaviours (Williams et al., 2010) that enables a relaxed, calm demeanour when placed under external pressures. This perception could be due to Machiavellians' extreme awareness of their self-image rather than actual calmness (Sherry et al., 2006). The real-life representation of the graceful swan of a Machiavellian, ever conscious of his image, all whilst kicking his feet like mad under the water, barely keeping afloat.

Another aspect of someone with Machiavellian behaviours is their competitiveness (Zhang et al., 2021). Therefore, selecting an award such as the Sword of Honour is highly appropriate.

Clausewitz believed that “War is not merely a political act, but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce” (Clausewitz, 2013, pp. Kindle Locations
then other research becomes pertinent in line with an acceptance that war and, therefore, leadership in warfare has a political aspect and is the ‘big stick’ (Berexa, 2019) of the international stage. In this political, organisational setting, Machiavellianism correlates with both perceptions of leadership effectivity, charisma and longevity (Deluga, 2001; Simonton, 1986). Research into Machiavellian leaders is scarce, and the conversation is immature (Belschak et al., 2018).

Linking back positively to the ‘projection of personality’ is a critical aspect in the British Army leadership definition.

**Dark Triad?**

There are, as in all things, detractors from the Dark Triad. Some researchers state that the use of self-reports and the cross-sectional nature of most studies hamper the research picture (Muris et al., 2017). Others target the weaknesses of convenience sampling and mono-method approaches (Miller et al., 2019). Another similar problem is the over-use of prisoners within the convenience samples, “Much of the research on the Dark Triad (namely, Psychopathy and narcissism) has been conducted in prison samples” (Lyons, 2019b, p. 153). Papers call for a broader sample outside of prisons, acknowledging factors like incarceration, lower education levels and other factors that will affect results (Mededović, 2017).

Therefore, this thesis will address some of those concerns by using a sample of leadership practitioners in the organisational context, also, by utilising interviews rather than self-reported questionnaires/surveys.

**2.5.6 Organisational Context in Leadership**

Having read much leadership literature, there is much cross-over in the usage of the terms ‘context’ and ‘situation’(Ayman & Lauritsen, 2018; Oc, 2018). Also, “there is neither a
systematic approach to nor agreement regarding what constitutes the context for leadership” (Oc, 2018, p. 218). Many researchers attempt to ignore the context operating in a ‘context-free’. However, for organisations with unique facets, such as the military, this research believes a ‘context-specific’ (Blair & Hunt, 1986). Even for those that recognise the importance of context, the perceived context of leadership has evolved from the ‘traditional’ position of context (Hunt & Osborn, 1982; Khandwalla, 1977; Melcher, 1976, 1977). The ‘traditional’ position was that whilst regarding context as important, it broadly identified context as a predominantly static construction. In the fast-paced VUCA (Rodriguez & Rodriguez, 2015) environment, many no longer regard context in this way, with organisational change always present (Flood & Coetsee, 2013).

For clarity, this thesis will use the concepts in the following ways:

Organisational Context – This is the overall operating environment – this can change but does so in a less dynamic way than the situation. The organisational context does take the setting into consideration but also considers less tangible organisational factors such as restructuring, organisational pressures, scrutiny. Context generally “refers to the set of forces stemming from the environment … that impact behavior in the work setting” (George & Jones, 1997, p. 154). This position is in keeping with what Johns regarded as ‘Omnibus Context’ (Johns, 2006).
“Military leadership is distinguished from leadership, in general, not by the leadership practises themselves, but by the context” (Fosse et al., 2019, p. 709). The context can be a benign non-operational environment or ‘extreme contexts’ such as warfighting with ‘extreme contexts’ or ‘crisis’ already evidenced to have an effect on leadership perception (Emrich, 1999).

Different contexts require differing leadership behaviours, styles and practices, “change the context and leadership changes” (Osborn et al., 2002, p. 797).

“Context is talked about politely in leadership research but rarely studied” (Larsson & Hyllengren, 2013, p. 35), recently a call to address this was made (Lord & Emrich, 2000) to request leadership scholars to explore, in particular, the macro level of contextuality in Leadership (Osborn et al., 2002) and later the context of leadership, due to a continued lack of engagement (Antonakis et al., 2004). Even with increased engagement with the organisational context, some question if the void is yet filled (Porter & McLaughlin, 2006).

It has been acknowledged that context is a crucial component of understanding leadership effectiveness (Yukl et al., 2009). In addition, Organisational Context links with
Social Construction in that “leadership is an emerging social construction embedded in a unique organization — it is contextual leadership” (Osborn et al., 2002, p. 832).

Leadership styles in the context of combat operations have been evidenced to reduce follower turnover (Eberly et al., 2017).

2.5.7 The Situation in Leadership

*The study of leadership needs to reflect not only leaders' personal characteristics and behaviors but also the situational factors which influence leadership emergence and effectiveness*  
(Shamir & Howell, 1999, p. 279)

Situation – Is for this thesis taken to mean something much more dynamic and specific than organisational context. There can be many differing ‘situations’ within a single organisational context. These ‘situations will constantly evolve and change, with the situation being essentially an external construct.

For this thesis, the situation contends of the ‘discrete context’ as identified by Johns in his seminal work organisational behaviour (Johns, 2006) as they are “specific situational variables that influence behavior directly or moderate relationships between variable” (Johns, 2006, p. 393).

Academics have, for many years, regarded ‘situation’ in Leadership. Fifty years ago, Perrow’s seminal work argued that a leader's behaviours, actions and traits are enabled or constrained by the organisational structures (Perrow, 1970). That in effect, within constrained organisations where leadership power is limited, the organisation creates the leadership style. Other academics believed that the key to organisational success lay in matching leaders with the specific situation (Fiedler, 1976).
The researcher believes the critical weakness in these studies is the presumption that both the organisation and leader are static entities and do not consider their development or change. Alternatively, more eloquently discount the possibility that “Old ways of doing things are being replaced, improved…the way we make things is being revolutionized. The world is changing and leadership is no exception” (White et al., 1996, p. 1).

Military research acknowledges that the leadership situation within a Barracks and on the battlefield demands different skill sets for leaders (Hunt & Phillips, 1991). Additionally, some within academia regard that “military leaders, more so than political leaders and corporate executives, face overwhelming volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity” (Laurence, 2011, p. 490).

Knowledge and understanding of the role of the situation and its effect on leadership are critical, particularly for the collection of qualitative data (Johns, 2006). Understanding the situation's influence on leadership is essential as “there may be situational factors that moderate the effect of traits and behaviors on the various leadership effectiveness outcomes” (Derue et al., 2011, p. 42).

### 2.6 Key Findings

There is a lack of interdisciplinary research in leadership studies, with an overwhelming bias toward positivistic, quantitative research (Gardner et al., 2011) of the Psychological variety. Whilst acknowledging the Psychological dominance of Leadership Research, the research concurs with other academics in that “discursive leadership and leadership Psychology as alternating lenses; one is neither superior to nor derivative of the other” (Fairhurst, 2008, p. 511). This interdisciplinary type of study is suitable for the ‘Prospector' approach (Breslin & Gatrell, 2020).
The thesis has demonstrated an area of under-research, particularly regarding a lack of primary research on leadership in general, with not a single UK paper containing primary research on any of the forms of ‘bad’ leadership (toxic, abusive, unethical, dark) in a military context.

In addition, exploring the papers revealed a broader sampling bias. The regular use of students (Nielsen et al., 2017) and prisoners (Lyons, 2019b) in convenience sampling highlight a weakness within the sampling regimes of many leadership studies. This thesis, being based on real leadership practitioners, will also help to, in a small part, address this research weakness.

Research into Machiavellian leaders is scarce, and the conversation is immature (Belschak et al., 2018).

2.7 Research Questions

The research questions have been refined by focussing on the elucidation of the research question through “dialectical interrogation” (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013, p. 49). The questions are the ultimate result of “reflecting on and reformulating the research questions are central points of reference for assessing the appropriateness of the decisions you take at several points” (Flick, 2006, p. 105). This is the norm in social science research (Creswell, 2007).

Social science has suffered from the constant focus of research questions. This constant focus has made some academics worry that research has become “increasingly specialised narrow and incremental’ (Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013a, p. 3; Tourish, 2020b).

This view is not a new phenomenon, with academics concerned 30 years ago that ‘incremental, footnote-on-footnote research’ was becoming the norm (Daft & Lewin, 1990, p. 1). This type of niche research comes hand-in-hand with a niche interest, further limiting the
value of the research (Alvesson et al., 2017; Alvesson & Sandberg, 2013a; Courpasson, 2013; Ritzer, 1998; Tourish, 2019b, 2020b) with recent calls to widen the perception of ‘impact’ to pivot toward phenomenon-based and problem-driven research (Wickert, Post, Doh, Prescott, & Prencipe, 2020).

Academics argue that this search for value and relevance within Business Research has led some academics to “contravene their academic identity” (Butler, Delaney, & Spoelstra, 2015, p. 731; Tourish, 2019a).

This research will ensure that the questions posed have both practical and scientific interest; therefore, value and relevance without compromising the research philosophy or position of the researcher. In addition, the research will be problem-driven. The problem is that leadership delivered at Sandhurst is still producing public incidents of leadership failure even at its own academy (Nichol, 2020; Starkey, 2020).

The research questions follow the ‘Critical Approach’ to question formulation (Swaminathan & Mulvihill, 2017a). This thesis will utilise the tenants of the critical approach to research questions; these will be crucial to the formulation of the research questions.

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<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Critical Approach Framework</th>
<th>Linkage to research questions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The capacity to interrogate and inquire against the grain.</td>
<td>Questions will explore Dark Leadership as a facet of the social construction of Sandhurst leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>The skill to ask questions that confront prevailing assumptions leading to an analysis, dismantling, and uncovering of omissions and invisibilities.</td>
<td>Questions will challenge the assumption that the teaching of VBL has a correlation to the production of Values-Based Leaders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Paying increased attention to power and privilege.</td>
<td>Acknowledge that Officer Cadets and Permanent Staff relationship is affected by their position and power. This impacts the social construction of Leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Learning to eschew “absolute truth” in favor of multiple or “partial” truths and perspectives.</td>
<td>Acknowledge that the social construction of Leadership will be different depending on the ‘lens’ it is viewed through.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Privileging the perspectives of the marginalized for purposes of empowerment, equity, and freedom.</td>
<td>The Officer Cadets could be viewed as the marginalized group with Permanent Staff and the Headquarters owning ‘the message.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>Examining context and structure along with individual agency.</td>
<td>Exploring from an Officer Cadets’ lens the social construction of Leadership will therefore consider all of these.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Using questions to challenge neoliberal ways of knowing and the conditions giving rise to them.</td>
<td>This research regards neoliberal as in Peck’s (2010) conception of it. Therefore challenging</td>
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</table>
these neoliberal notions such as “Corporations can do no wrong, or should not be blamed if they do” (Lave et al., 2010, p. 662).

| 8. | Resisting atomization of the research process and the researcher. | The research has a holistic approach – the questions will regard the whole social construction of Leadership. |

Table 8: Critical Approach Linkages to the Research Questions
Adapted From:(Swaminathan & Mulvihill, 2017a, p. 5)

2.7.1 Primary Research Question

- *How do Officer Cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst socially construct leadership?*

Sub Questions

- SubQ1 - *What, if any, dark leadership practices are present at Sandhurst, and how are they perceived by Officer Cadets?*

- SubQ2 – *How does the competitive nature of Sandhurst Events, such as the Sword of Honour, result in changes to Leadership practice?*

These questions sit within Collinson’s definition of Critical Leadership Studies (CLS)

*broad, diverse, and heterogeneous perspectives that share a concern to critique the power relations and identity constructions through which leadership dynamics are often produced, frequently rationalised, sometimes resisted and occasionally transformed*

Source: (Collinson, 2011, p. 181)

2.8 Summary

In this chapter, there has been a focus on the leadership theories pertinent to British Army Leadership.

The review has identified various problematic effects, criticisms, and gaps within the theories and our current leadership knowledge.
The review has highlighted the limitations of current and historical British Army leadership studies while re-enforcing the importance and under-research that the research questions will address.

British Army leadership must always be a style that can be used in ‘state on state’ war. The perceived weakness of any Values-Based model is that “a man who acts virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief among so many which are not virtuous” (Machiavelli, 1532, 2018 Edn, p. XV).

The Researcher’s view of Leadership is that it is contextual, situational, socially constructed, and processual. Today's' answer' could be tomorrow's toxicity, constantly evolving with the situation, context, and culture. Fairhurst aptly sums up the position:

*Leadership is co-constructed, a product of sociohistorical and collective meaning making, and negotiated on an ongoing basis through a complex interplay among leadership actors, be they designated or emergent leaders, managers, and/or followers*

(Fairhurst & Grant, 2010, p. 172)

Maybe leadership academia needs to take a life lesson from the Navy Seal and one of their sayings, “Get comfortable being uncomfortable” (Fraher et al., 2017, p. 246) with the processual and ever-changing nature of leadership. Academia must stop climbing trees, thinking they can grasp the stars and simply get out the telescope and hope to understand them.

Some academics have realised that “The more leaders I encounter, the more difficult I find it to describe a typically effective leadership style” (de Vries, 2004, p. 9).

The next chapter will explore the research philosophy, methodology and methods used to conduct the research.
Chapter 3 - Research Philosophy, Methodology and Methods

“Philosophy does not advance knowledge; it clarifies what we already know.”
(Dummett, 2010, p. 21)

3.1 Introduction

Chapter 2 reviewed the literature and research issues relevant to the leadership styles of Officers Cadets at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.

This chapter explains and justifies the research methodology used to collect and analyse the data.

This chapter opens by giving a clear definition of Research for this thesis. It will then examine, select, and defend the research philosophy. The chapter continues by discussing the ethical considerations inherent within research studies and the specific ethical considerations of this research. Finally, examining validity, reliability and generalisability before the chapter concludes with a summary.

3.1.1 Aim

This chapter aims to give an overview and justify selecting the research philosophy before detailing the research design in-depth.

3.1.2 Chapter Structure

The thesis will follow the logical structure of most social science papers and is commended by others (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008).
3.2 Philosophical Underpinnings

*Figure 16: Chapter Structure*

Source: Produced for this Research

3.2 Philosophical Underpinnings

A map is not the territory it represents, but, if correct, it has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness.

Source: (Korzybski, 1933, p. 58)

We will never know the entire territory, which is the academic adventure. The philosophical underpinnings are those of today – using the current map.
3.2.1 Leaderships Ontological Position

The research will now examine and explore ‘Leadership’ having a single specific ontology. The difficulty with this position is that without a single definition of leadership, it is impossible to have a single ontology (Kelly, 2014). There are academics who regard leadership as an ‘empty signifier’ and, as such, all ontologies and epistemologies’ are available to it (Kelly, 2014).

Many leadership positions can be based on the ‘tripod of leadership’ (Bennis, 1985; Drath et al., 2008), with others progressing this work to use the ‘tripod of leadership’ to examine and develop a leadership ontology (Drath et al., 2008; Kelly, 2014).

The researcher believes leadership models and styles will have different definitions and ontologies. Indeed some popular leadership models, such as Authentic Leadership, deliberately fail to give their ontological position (Avolio & Luthans, 2003a). The researcher believes that a model without an ontological position is built on sand – ontology gives the position and lens through which the thesis must be viewed. Without giving an ontological position, the researcher is handing over a telescope telling them to view the moon but not sharing the settings to be used to view it.

3.2.2 Research Ontological Position

Even within research, the distinction of how we view reality is itself grey, with different ontological positions overlapping each other within the literature.
The golden thread of their research methodology, the ontological position of this thesis, will be **Relativism**, a position that has profound similarities with **Constructionism** (Bryman, 2012; Bryman & Bell, 2015), **Constructivism** (Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2019), **Interpretivism** (Collis & Hussey, 2013) or **Subjectivism** (Saunders et al., 2016), these ontological labels are used by some interchangeably. This is enabled by a lack of clear demarcation between them (Howell, 2012).

All these ontologies sit with the researcher’s belief that reality is relative to the researcher’s position and viewpoint.

All ontologies have equal supporters and detractors, with none having a consensus as ‘the one’ (Ben-Ari & Enosh, 2019).

**Relativism**

*There is one thing a professor can be exactly sure of; almost every student entering the university believes, or says he believes, that truth is relative*

(Bloom, 1987, p. 25)
The above may seem like a sweeping generalisation, but there is empirical evidence to back the claim made by Bloom (Mosteller, 2008).

Relativism is the ontological position in which phenomena and their observations depend upon the observer's situation and perspective (Easterby-Smith et al., 2018).

Epistemic Relativism and Ontological Relativism have recognisable differences, which are sometimes not fully acknowledged appropriately by the layperson (Hales, 2011).

Relativism, like many central ontological categories, can be further subdivided. Generally, all of these subdivisions believe that reality is dictated partly or in whole by the human mind (Mosteller, 2008).

**Nominalism**

General Nominalists occupy “the position that there are no universals” (Effingham, 2013, p. 12). These are also known as ‘anti-realists’ (Effingham, 2013).

**Pure Nominalism** is the position that ‘Universals’ are socially constructed by our thoughts and ideas (Scruton, 2012).

**Resemblance Nominalism** positions itself as a solution to Plato’s Problems of Universals (Rodriguez-Pereyra & Press, 2002), containing issues known as ‘Plato’s Beard’ (Quine, 1948). Resemblance Nominalists use resemblance to justify their claims, e.g. the wedding dress is white, and it is so because it resembles other white dresses (Effingham, 2013).

### 3.2.3 Constructionism as Epistemology

*We are all constructionists if we believe that the mind is active in the construction of knowledge*  
(Schwandt, 2000, p. 189)
Table 10: Paradigm Positions on Selected Practical Issues
Source: (Guba & Lincoln, 1994, p. 112)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Positivism</th>
<th>Postpositivism</th>
<th>Critical Theory et al.</th>
<th>Constructivism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inquiry aim</td>
<td>explanation; prediction and control</td>
<td></td>
<td>critique and transformation; restitution and emancipation</td>
<td>understanding; reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature of knowledge</td>
<td>verified hypotheses established as facts or laws</td>
<td>nonfalsified hypotheses that are probable facts or laws</td>
<td>structural/historical insights</td>
<td>individual reconstructions coalescing around consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge accumulation</td>
<td>accretion—&quot;building blocks&quot; adding to &quot;edifice of knowledge&quot;; generalizations and cause-effect linkages</td>
<td>historical revisionism; generalization by similarity</td>
<td>more informed and sophisticated reconstructions; vicarious experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goodness or quality criteria</td>
<td>conventional benchmarks of &quot;rigor&quot;; internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity</td>
<td>historical situatedness; erosion of ignorance</td>
<td>trustworthy and authentic and misapprehensions; action stimulus</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Values</td>
<td>excluded— influence denied</td>
<td>included— formative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethics</td>
<td>extrinsic; tilt toward deception</td>
<td>intrinsic; moral tilt toward revelation</td>
<td>intrinsic; process tilt toward revelation; special problems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voice</td>
<td>&quot;disinterested scientist&quot; as informer of decision makers, policy makers, and change agents</td>
<td>&quot;transformative intellectual&quot; as advocate and activist</td>
<td>&quot;passionate participant&quot; as facilitator of multi-voice reconstruction</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>technical and quantitative; substantive theories</td>
<td>technical; quantitative and qualitative; substantive theories</td>
<td>resocialization; qualitative and quantitative; history; values of altruism and empowerment</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>in control of publication, funding, promotion, and tenure</td>
<td></td>
<td>seeking recognition and input</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accommodation</td>
<td>commensurable</td>
<td>incommensurable</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although some academics use the term Constructionism, the researcher prefers the term Social Constructionism to place the epistemology more descriptively. If needed, this can further narrow this into Constructivism (Gergen, 2009; Howell, 2012), where research concentrates on individuals and how they construct their personal reality (Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009; Lee, 2012); this is also known as Piagetian Theory (Burr, 2015; Piaget, 1976). More broadly, using the term Postmodernism (Baert et al., 2011; Gergen, 2009; Hibberd, 2005), Postmodernism in its truest sense is the ‘invention’ of realities (Howell, 2012).

As always seems to be the case in academic terms lacking clear demarcation, they are used interchangeably (Bryman, 2012; Bryman & Bell, 2015; Creswell & Creswell, 2017;
Klenke et al., 2016; Weinberg, 2014), along with others such as Symbolic Interactionism, Post-Structuralism and Critical Theory (Rickards, 2015).

To further confound understanding, Social Constructionism operates at two levels, either as a meta-theory (epistemology) or a practical theory (Yang & Gergen, 2012). This research will be regarding Social Constructionism as an epistemology, a lens through which to learn more about the world.

What is Social Constructionism?

*Meaning is not discovered but constructed.*

(Crotty, 1998, p. 7)

Although Social Constructionism is a relatively nascent concept in popular social science, we can trace its origins through philosophical exploration.

Since then, the term has come to the fore through various well-received academic publications (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009; Hacking & Hacking, 1999)

There is no recognised single version of a definition; it is, though, generally accepted that there are some vital general assumptions for social constructionism (Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009; Weinberg, 2014):

1. **Critical thinking without pre-supposition of knowledge.**

   Positivists believe that knowledge is a construct of objective, unbiased opinions of the world (Burr, 2015). Social Constructionists believe there is always bias and that research is a participatory, inclusive process (Gergen, 2009), and that scientific knowledge is also proven (Latour & Woolgar, 1979) to be at least in part created by communal construction (Gergen, 2009).

2. **Cultural/Societal Specificity.**
A Social Constructionist believes that ‘one view’ is not ‘the view’. Cultures and Societies build their own versions, realities, and concepts (Burr, 2015; Crotty, 1998; Gergen, 2009; Yang & Gergen, 2012). Therefore, the reality is “contextually dependant” (Hibberd, 2005, p. 21). Therefore, there is rarely a single universal answer. Research can therefore examine and evidence the leadership of a single societal/cultural/organisational group at a specific place in time. However, generalisability is not deemed attainable due to individual perceptions, concepts, and realities outside of the specific group.

3. **Knowledge is a social process.**

Knowledge is constructed through social interactions (Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009). Through shared opinions, negotiated truth and all mediums (social media, discussion). Social Processes construct knowledge; therefore, the ‘truth’ of knowledge is similarly socially constructed.

4. **Knowledge does not sit in isolation.**

Although knowledge is socially constructed, its construction is still susceptible to the power relations of its broader society/culture. Social Constructionism has a practical effect on society; an example used by Burr is how the Temperance Movement changed the alcoholic from a blameworthy participant to a victim (2015).

**Whose Social Constructionism?**

With much being assigned as social constructions by some academics (Hacking & Hacking, 1999), there is a need to explore what it is and, as importantly, what it is not.

Within Social Constructionism in isolation, there are several different versions of Social Constructionism (Baert et al., 2011; Burr, 2015; Grandy, 2017; Holstein & Gubrium,

**Weak Social Constructionism** is generally regarded as the type utilised by Searle (Pernecky, 2016; Searle, 2010; Searle & Willis, 1995); this version acknowledges that whilst aspects are social constructions, there are natural laws that underpin it (Howell, 2012; Pernecky, 2016). Although Pernecky places the weak constructionist position with Searle, the researcher is not convinced that the demarcation is clear. The researcher can understand the Social Constructionism of the previous decades having this oppositional Hard/Gergen (Gergen, 1985) and Soft/Searle (Searle & Willis, 1995) stance. Searle’s position seems to have strengthened (Searle, 2010) throughout the decades.

Pernecky also, in the same publication (2016), calls Strong Social Constructionism the versions espoused by Gergen (2009), which is confusing as Gergen considers himself a **Soft** Social Constructionist in current times, a move away from his position of the 70s and 80s (Cisneros Puebla & Faux, 2008). Pernecky cites the position of Gergen as one which excludes natural laws and believes all of life is socially constructed. The researcher has several issues with this position:

1. Gergen has never stated that his version of Social Constructionism is an ontology (Gergen, 2009). If it is not an ontology, then as an epistemology, he believes only learning and knowledge are socially constructed. Gergen's phrase for Social Constructionism is “ontologically mute” (Yang & Gergen, 2012, p. 133). In addition, Gergen agrees that Social Constructionism can have a relativistic ontological foundation (Yang & Gergen, 2012), as has this thesis.
Gergen also states that he does not discount the natural sciences or reality. “Social Constructionists do not say ‘There is nothing’, or ‘There is no reality’” (Gergen, 2009, p. 4).

The researcher believes that his positivist position clouds Pernecky’s understanding of Gergen's Social Constructionism. Social Constructionism is not about decrying positivism or the natural sciences. It is a dialectic position (Cassell et al., 2017) to examine problems in new ways, considering other viewpoints that may have been overlooked. “A constructionist sensibility also opens a new domain of dialogue” (Gergen, 2001b). Others agree with Gergen's view, particularly within the field of management and organisation studies (Prasad, 2005).

The researcher’s epistemological version of Social Constructionism first came to the fore in the late 1960s (Burr, 2015; Gergen, 2009; Hibberd, 2005; Weinberg, 2014) with the seminal text by Mead, Berger and Luckmann (1967). However, this beginning is a pinprick of light in the concept’s evolution to today's spotlight. In addition, there are further synergies with previous concepts, such as symbolic interactionism (Mead & Mind, 1934; Thomas & Thomas, 1928).

Although it is accepted as a formal epistemology today, it had previously shied away from that label (Berger & Luckman, 1967; Weinberg, 2014). The use of Social Constructionism as an alternative lens through which to view knowing offers researchers’ opportunities to explore viewpoints which were previously not used. With these viewpoints comes a more holistic understanding of knowing.

**Epistemological Position of the Researcher**

The researcher believes that his position aligns with Gergen's later years. The researcher acknowledges there are natural sciences with laws (Howell, 2012; Pernecky, 2016;
Searle & Willis, 1995); despite this, the researcher agrees with the general rules of Gergen's version of social constructionism (Gergen, 2001b, 2009) stated above. Although acknowledging there may be natural laws (universals), the researcher sees no issues in approaching these with scepticism and the open-mindedness afforded by social constructionism to advance understanding and knowledge further. This is a soft position contrasted by others who state, “All reality, as meaningful reality is socially constructed. There is no exception” (Crotty, 1998)

The Researcher sought to clarify his understanding of both his position and that of Gergen’s. The researcher did so by emailing his position to Gergen – the email, in summary, that Social Constructionism is not something to live by per-say, but another lens through which to view the world. It offers a different viewpoint and, through this, a broader, more holistic understanding. Below is an extract from the response from Professor Gergen:

*I congratulate you on a level of understanding of social constructionist theory (at least in my way of voicing it) that exceeds that of many scholars, students, and practitioners. The common tendency is to look at theory as ‘a new truth’, as opposed to a potentially valuable perspective for living our lives together on this planet.*

**Source:** Appendix D

There are varying types of Social Constructionism, with the position of the researcher further focused on that of the relational constructionist. Relational constructionism places emphasis on the “relationality and co-ordinations between people and their text/context” (Fletcher, 2006, p. 427).

**Criticisms of Social Constructionism**

Many papers are written by critics (Hibberd, 2001; Liebrucks, 2001; Maze, 2001; Stam, 2001) of Social Constructionism. They state that a social constructionist stance can “confuse relations with properties and qualities, display (at times) an ambivalence towards
ontology, disregard traditional logic, perpetuate the notion of construction and misuse the word “knowledge” (Hibberd, 2005, p. 174). However, this is a selection of a whole tome positioned to unpick Social Constructionism in general and Gergen in particular. There may be bias here due to a long-running positional dispute between them (Gergen, 2001a; Hibberd, 2001).

Positivists see the whole constructionist argument as unhelpful in their hope of social science joining their positivist natural science compatriots (Latour, 1999).

**Research Impact of Social Constructionism**

The epistemological position significantly impacts how the researcher can view leadership (Fairhurst & Grant, 2010). A social constructionist cannot adhere to the great-man trait theories in isolation (Gergen, 2009). Although power and position will have had merit, these great men are socially created; those around them and even those academics, historians, and scholars of today have socially constructed the leader’s efficacy or otherwise.

There have been many occasions where leaders with all the attributes of the great leader fail to gain the consensus of his peers or gain those willing to follow. The social constructionist accepts this X-factor of what they call Relational Leadership (Crevani, 2015; Fairhurst & Grant, 2010; Gergen, 2009), as the leader with all the attributes still has to gain consensus of those around to accept and co-construct his position as a great leader. This relational leadership explores the intangible x-factor, which may contain elements of Emotional Intelligence (Goleman, 1996; Peter, 2010) and Social Intelligence (Boyatzis, 2020; Goleman, 2007).
Table 11: An illustration of the entity and constructionist perspectives and some of the differences between them

Source: (Crevani, 2015, p. 192)

Defining Leadership, if that is one's aim, also becomes difficult from this position. “Social constructionist approaches reject the claims of the ultimate correctness of a definition” (Rickards, 2015, p. 23).

3.2.4 Epistemological Position of Leadership

There have been varying claims about the epistemological position of leadership, but the acknowledgement that it is a dominant position (French, 2016). Scholars state that they consider leadership as an ‘emerging social phenomena’ (Bohl, 2019), social constructionism (Gergen, 2009) or virtue epistemology (Baehr, 2011).

3.2.5 Axiology

Axiology has, like many other academic terms, etymological roots in Greek. Axios meaning value or worth and ology as discussed regarding theory (Hart, 1971). Therefore, its literal meaning is the ‘Theory of Value’.
The modern researcher’s paradigm must include axiology. “Values are a part of the basic beliefs that undergird and affect the entire research process” (Klenke et al., 2016, p. 18).

**Figure 17: Expanded paradigm triangle**  
*Source:* (Klenke et al., 2016)

The researcher is from within the organisation. That creates a bias that is acknowledged. However, due to the Relativistic/Social Constructionist position, this subjectivity is accepted as the researcher is part of the research. The research acknowledges that their values will, in however small part, influence the research.

Despite this, the research will not be ‘value-free’ (Risjord, 2014c). The researcher does not believe that research must be completely objective; no social science can indeed be achieved by making this claim (Risjord, 2014c).

When epistemic values are maintained, research can claim to be ‘value-free’ (Risjord, 2014c). However, epistemic values are themselves open to interpretation (Bueter, Accepted/In Press), with deep controversy over what the epistemic values (Douglas, 2013; Longino, 1996) are and if the distinction is even needed or warranted (Rooney, 2017).

The Axiological position this thesis will take is that:

*Moderate Thesis of Value Freedom: Science is objective when only epistemic*
The researcher's position is similar to others, who state that it would be difficult for primary research to be conducted value-free, even if it was possible; values are an intrinsic part of the social science process (Longino, 2004).

3.2.6 Truth Claims

There are no hard distinctions between what is real and what is unreal, nor between what is true and what is false. A thing is not necessarily either true or false; it can be both true and false.

Harold Pinter – Nobel Prize Lecture (2005)
Source: (Cohen, 2009, p. 2)

The researcher will be attempting to unveil the ‘truth’ of Royal Military Academy Sandhurst Leadership. It is, therefore, essential to qualify these truth claims.

The researcher’s position is that truth is not quantifiable, measurable, or indeed provable. Truth is about humanity - “Truth is something that happens to beings, a happening based on the entirety of human being” (Heidegger et al., 2010, p. 380). Truth can be socially constructed, and differing truths can co-exist in truth pluralism (Edwards, 2018).

This position fits the researcher's paradigm and acknowledges ‘scope problems’ (Lynch, 2009; Sher, 2004).

The researcher would riposte some academics who state that “certain constructivists, postmodernists and postcolonial theorists, and even some feminists […] have contributed to the current climate in which truth, facts and rationality are treated with disdain” (Horsthemke, 2017, p. 274).
Summary

The research philosophy indicates the research design, or the research design options the researcher can select. Indeed “Which method to use is arguably a more important question than how to use that method” (Vogt, 2008, p. 1). Once selected, the research philosophy enables the researcher to start answering the question of Which.

This research has an ontology of Relativism with an epistemological position of Social Constructionism.

3.3 Approach to Theory

The research philosophy has indicated that the research will have an ontology of Relativism with an epistemological position of Social Constructionism (Cisneros Puebla & Faux, 2008; Gergen, 2009). These research philosophies shape the design into a Qualitative design. This design is appropriate to the research of Leadership and is an accepted position in academia (Bryman, 2004; Bryman et al., 1996; Conger, 1998; Klenke et al., 2016). The position sits within the broader interpretivist tradition.

Two basic approaches are utilised in social science (Alvesson & Karreman, 2011). Others are less well used but are still valid (Blaikie, 2000).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inductive</th>
<th>Deductive</th>
<th>Retrospective</th>
<th>Abductive</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aim</td>
<td>To establish universal generalisations to be used as pattern explanations</td>
<td>To test theories, to eliminate false ones and corroborate the survivor</td>
<td>To discover underlying mechanisms to explain observed regularities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From</td>
<td>Accumulate observations or data</td>
<td>Borrow or construct a theory and express it as an argument</td>
<td>Document and model a regularity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Produce generalisations</td>
<td>Deduce hypotheses</td>
<td>Construct a hypothetical model of a mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To</td>
<td>Use these ‘laws’ as patterns to explain further observations</td>
<td>Test the hypotheses by matching them with data</td>
<td>Find the real mechanism by observation and/or experiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.3.1 Induction

Induction uses observations/research to develop theory (Blaikie, 2000; Bryman, 2012). However, this is not in total isolation; although the approach is predominantly inductive, at times, the research could demand the use of abduction or deduction (Bryman, 2012).

Induction is thought of as the Qualitative method, especially in the utilisation of Case Studies (Alvesson & Karreman, 2011)

Induction has its critics; Popper, the famous deductivist, declared that induction is a myth (Musgrave, 2011). Popper stated that inductivist approaches can be explored and rejected at three levels of analysis and believes he can overcome these issues (Popper, 1971). Popper, forever the modest man, decided to ‘solve inductionism’.

_I think that I have solved a major philosophical problem: the problem of induction. This solution has been extremely fruitful, and it has enabled me to solve a good number of other philosophical problems._

(Popper, 1972)

One major problem with Popper's claims was that he had not ‘solved’ induction (Maxwell, 2017).

The use of induction is prevalent in social science in general and qualitative research in particular, and induction is also used within grounded theory (Alvesson & Karreman, 2011).

This research will use the **Inductive** method of theory development. This is due to its synthesis with qualitative research—the need for research before the building of theory. In addition, the inductive “strategy is useful for answering ‘what’ questions” (Blaikie, 2000).
3.4 Methodological Choice

The Qualitative/Quantitative debate historically defined the research paradigm; in more recent years, a “blurring of disciplinary boundaries” has come” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2008, p. vii).

Some academics state that research cannot be Qualitative/Quantitative and that this divide is only applicable to data (Biesta, 2010). Whilst other academics claim that the divide simply should not be present and that either data is simply just data (Miles et al., 1994; Sandelowski et al., 2009) or, even more radically, that the nature of all data is qualitative due to its need to be interpreted (Berg & Lune, 2007). The researcher’s position is that research differs from that of Berg & Lune – whilst the researcher understands their position and argument, the researcher does not think the interpretation of quantitative data makes it qualitative. This thesis regards the quantitative and qualitative divide as just that, a divide – although more of a sea border without clear demarcation.

Interpretive/Relativistic Social Science is not involved in pursuing scientific laws (Gephart Jr, 2017) but is more interested in the pursuit of ‘common-sense’ scientific theory (Gephart Jr, 2017).

3.4.1 Why Qualitative?

Qualitative research is underrepresented in Leadership Studies (Bryman et al., 1996; Cassell et al., 2017; Conger, 1998; Klenke et al., 2016; Lowe & Gardner, 2000; Stentz et al., 2012; Tierney, 1996) with Leadership research being “dominated by positivistic or neo-positivistic assumptions” (Alvesson, 1996, p. 455). This reflects a trend in most social sciences, although one which has been on a downward spiral since the publication of Van Maanen’s influential call for Qualitative recognition (1979).
Hegemony will remain with Quantitative Research for the foreseeable future (Bryman et al., 1996; Lowe & Gardner, 2000), but some scholars can foresee Qualitative Research becoming the dominant method in social science (Guba & Lincoln, 2005).

Others call for pluralism of research, particularly in qualitative research in the AL field (Izsatt-White & Kempster, 2019; Parry et al., 2014). Others share this view (Steiner, 2002) and lambast the lack of qualitative research, and recognise that research “has been dominated by questionnaire-based research”(Jackson & Parry, 2011, p. 35), a critical new weakness of most ‘new leadership’ styles (Jackson & Parry, 2011).

Many leadership/business research textbooks are written with a clear Positivist and Quantitative bias (Antonakis & Day, 2017; Collis & Hussey, 2013; Easterby-Smith et al., 2018; Izsatt-White & Saunders, 2017; Northouse, 2018; Saunders et al., 2016).

Qualitative methods in leadership studies will help negate instances of ‘McNamara’s Fallacy’(Basler, 2009; Handy, 2011), also known as ‘Quantitative Fallacy’ (Fischer, 1970). There is evidence that this fallacy has already had a level of impact on leadership study (Bass, 1995).

A qualitative study of leadership is well-regarded in the field (Bryman, 2004; Bryman et al., 1996; Klenke et al., 2016; Parry et al., 2014) but still does not stand equally in all fields with Quantitative Research (Bryman, 1995).

### 3.4.2 Methodological Choice

Now that the ontological, epistemological position is decided. The approach to theory and type of research is known.

The thesis must now declare a methodological choice.

**Mono-Method Qualitative Study**
The single method of research (SMR) was the bedrock of the doctoral student for decades but has fallen by the wayside of late. Some believe this is due to the prevalence of MMR, which is increasingly seen as becoming a metanarrative of research (Freshwater, 2007) and “researchers tend to adopt MMR as a mindless mantra” (Freshwater, 2007), and that is now seen as a default or “viewed as disciplinary best practice” (Ahmed & Sil, 2012, p. 967).

However, good-quality SMR will remain the bedrock of research. MMR among students leads to less than ideal training in both disciplines and is a poor grounding for ECR (Ahmed & Sil, 2012). SMRs are excellent and the key to answering certain types of research questions.

Summary

This research will use qualitative Mono-Method; however, to gain differing perspectives across the cohort of Officer Cadets. Mono-Methods is an essential requirement for the conduct of Case-Study Research (Gillham, 2000). This will provide the rich data discussed earlier.
3.5 Research Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Application</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Interpretive Science Uses</th>
<th>Examples</th>
<th>Reference Sources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case Study Strategy</td>
<td>Detailed description of phenomenon and how it changed over time</td>
<td>Describe first order meanings</td>
<td>Orikowski (1996) study of situational change at a software firm</td>
<td>Mills, Doupos &amp; Wiebe (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnographic Strategy</td>
<td>Insider description of a culture or micro-culture developed through participation in the culture</td>
<td>Produce rich and meaningful descriptions of actual organizational behaviour and first order meanings</td>
<td>Weeks (2004) study of the culture of complaints at a British bank</td>
<td>Agar, M. (1980)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grounded Theory Strategy</td>
<td>Inductive construction of theory from systematically obtained and analysed data</td>
<td>Identification of members’ first order meanings using in vivo coding</td>
<td>Perlow (1997) study of work practices and time management of software engineers</td>
<td>Glaser &amp; Strauss (1967)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethno-semantic Analysis Method</td>
<td>Structural approach to inductive discovery of folk terms and categories in ethnographic interviews and data</td>
<td>Identification and verification of first order concepts and their cultural meaning to members</td>
<td>Bodhilie (2005) ethnography of how tattoo parlour recruited customers</td>
<td>Spradley (1979)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpretive Textual Analysis Method</td>
<td>Strategy for undertaking computer supported textual analysis</td>
<td>Construction of folk taxonomies</td>
<td>McCurdy, Spradley &amp; Shandy (2000)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Qualitative research strategies and methods of analysis for interpretive social science

Source: (Gephart Jr, 2017, p. 40)

Some academics state that for business research that there are even fewer recognised designs (Bryman & Bell, 2015). However, the researcher is reluctant to state every strategy/design and discount or endorse it in turn.

The research position is that these are Research Designs, and to call it a Research Strategy has connotations that simply are not present. Research does not sit within any of the generally accepted definitions of a strategy (Chandler, 1990; Porter, 2011).

The style of research question will help denote the type of study and available research designs (Yin, 2017). As used in this research, a ‘What’ question denotes an exploratory design; as such, all research strategies/designs can be used (Yin, 2017).
Table 14: Summary of Differences Between Exploratory and Confirmatory Approaches to Qualitative Data Analysis

Source: (Guest et al., 2012, p. 6)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Exploratory (“content-driven”)</strong></th>
<th><strong>Confirmatory (“hypothesis-driven”)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For example, asks: “What do x people think about y?”</td>
<td>For example, hypothesizes: “x people think z about y”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific codes/analytic categories NOT predetermined</td>
<td>Specific codes/analytic categories predetermined</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Codes derived from the data</td>
<td>Codes generated from hypotheses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data usually generated</td>
<td>Typically uses existing data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most often uses purposive sampling</td>
<td>Generally employs random sampling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More common approach</td>
<td>Less common approach</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having an exploratory design also has some connotations with other research areas, such as how Data is generated, what type of sampling is used and even the coding method (Guest et al., 2012).

Due to the research philosophy, the researcher will discuss a few which are particularly pertinent.

3.5.1 Why not Constructivist Grounded Theory?

The popularity and near-religious (Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005) following of Grounded Theory in general and CGT in detail is compelling. Although some see grounded theory as the panacea of qualitative research (Suddaby, 2006), not all are convinced. These doubters highlight methodological issues they see (Breckenridge et al., 2012; Cutcliffe, 2000; Glaser, 2002). Some academics are questioning if the re-modelling of GT to CGT is a step too far and considering if CGT is no longer a facet of GT but a different methodology (Breckenridge et al., 2012; Bryant, 2009; Thomas & James, 2006).

The researcher is not convinced of the GT element of CGT. While CGT would sit with the researcher’s philosophy, it feels like a half-finished nascent methodology. Also,
practical issues are apparent, such as conducting any GT method is highly time-consuming (Backman & Kyngäs, 1999; Goulding, 1999) and possibly not within the realms of a 4-year part-time doctorate.

The researcher acknowledges that despite this, many researchers continue using elements such as data saturation and some GT coding styles. This is an approach used by many researchers within the management and business fields (O'Reilley et al., 2012). This was considered but discounted for reasons discussed in Section 3.7.4.

### 3.5.2 Case Study

“It is more useful to study one animal for 1,000 hours than to study 1,000 animals for one hour.”

Source: (Kerlinger & Lee, 2000, p. 457)

The case study is a widely used method (Cassell et al., 2017; Stake, 2008), which also suffers from some profound misunderstandings (Barratt et al., 2011; Baskarada, 2014; Stuart et al., 2002). The case study is regarded as ‘small-n research’, particularly in the fields of Psychology and political science (Blatter & Haverland, 2012; Byrne & Ragin, 2009; Lieberson, 2000). There are over 25 definitions of a case study (Wynsberge Van & Khan, 2007). These various definitions contest that a case study is either a research design, methodology or method (Klenke et al., 2016).

Many eminent scholars consider the case study a method (Eisenhardt, 1989; Jankowicz, 2005; Stake, 2008; Yin, 2017). This research considered the case study “a wrapper for different methods” (Thomas, 2016, p. 44). This wrapper can contain any method, depending on the case being researched.
Case studies themselves have undergone something of a renaissance (Cassell et al., 2017) in the last decade, improving academic standing from that of the 1970s (Ragin & Becker, 1992), where they were seen as a method of collecting anecdotes or as a preliminary research tool (Campbell, 1975; Flyberrg, 2010; Stake, 2000a). This change in perception has increased their use and popularity (Gagnon, 2010; Hyett et al., 2014; Stake, 2000a; Thomas, 2011).

Case studies in business and organisational studies are already prevalent (Dyer Jr & Wilkins, 1991; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2015; Mills et al., 2010; Swanborn, 2010; Vissak, 2010), even when using single case studies (Cave et al., 2004; Gummeson & Piercy, 2003; Stuart et al., 2002).

In the more specific realm of leadership, single research case studies are also a respected and already utilised method (Escamilla & Venta, 2010; Weed, 1993). The case study offers a depth of exploration, which is challenging to replicate with other methods (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Stake, 1995; Yin, 2017). The case study gives a truly 3-dimensional view of the subject of research (Thomas, 2010), what Foucault terms the “polyhedron of intelligibility” (Burchell et al., 1991, p. 76).

**Types Of Case Study**

The case study methodology used should be determined by the research philosophy. There are a few significant contributors to the research conversation on case studies (Creswell & Creswell, 2017). However, many others also have contributed to this field (Merriam, 1998; Simons, 2009).

**Constructionist Case Study**
Stake's version of a case study method has a Constructionist philosophical base (Easterby-Smith et al., 2018). Therefore, it has an epistemological fit with the research. This can be ethnographic (Thomas, 2016) and would suit this study, with the researcher being embedded within the organisation.

Stake (2000b, pp. 437-438) identifies three different versions of case-study research:

1. An *Intrinsic Case Study*. Where the case is of specific interest. The person works or has some other form of personal interest. It focuses on exploring a single case to develop a deep understanding.

2. An *instrumental Case study* is the examination of a case to seek insight. Although the Case (British Army) is studied in-depth, the actual focus usually is not a single level of analysis. In this research, the actual focus is leadership.

3. The *collective case study* explores, compares, and contrasts several case studies to investigate a specific phenomenon.

Stake acknowledges that these definitions are porous, with some case studies straddling the divide (Stake, 2008).

This thesis argues that the researcher’s case is one of these ‘straddling cases. The case was previously identified; this is one of the features of an *intrinsic case study* (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Stake, 2008). While focusing on leadership, the examination of the British Army is an example of *Instrumental case study designs* (Stake, 2008).

The selected case study research method (Stake, 1995, 2000b, 2008) selected has an emergent (Lee & Saunders, 2017a) rather than an orthodox approach.
Table 15: Summary of different aspects of orthodox and emergent approaches

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Orthodox</th>
<th>Emergent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions of design of case - see Chapter 1</td>
<td>Quasi-experimental</td>
<td>Naturalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Underlying philosophy</td>
<td>Primarily positivist and realist, although potentially interpretivist and realist</td>
<td>Tendency towards constructivist and interpretivist although also realist and interpretivist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived relationships of concepts to empirical reality</td>
<td>Tendency to view as either a single or one of many possible interpretations or representations of external reality</td>
<td>Tendency to view as either one of many possible interpretations or representations of external reality or one of many possible accounts of reality that has been constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source of initial knowledge</td>
<td>Etic</td>
<td>Emic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of logic employed to build theory</td>
<td>Primarily deductive or abductive</td>
<td>Primarily inductive or abductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of knowledge sought</td>
<td>Probably nomothetic</td>
<td>Probably ideographic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective of theorizing or contribution from case(s)</td>
<td>Primarily theoretical or empirical generalization</td>
<td>More likely to be particularization, but different forms of generalization possible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of selection of cases</td>
<td>Potential for analytic generalization</td>
<td>Probably particularization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for evaluation</td>
<td>Positivist criteria to help ensure consistency and generalizability across cases</td>
<td>Contingent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: (Lee & Saunders, 2017b, p. 30)

The Emergent Approach sits well with the researcher's Research Philosophy, emphasising relativist/constructionist concepts. In addition, it supports a multi-method design as it relies on several sources of data (Lee & Saunders, 2017a).

The Emergent Approach to Case-Study

The emergent approach has several key characteristics:

1. Naturalistic Design. This is a design that acknowledges the researcher within the research (Gillham, 2000). It also encourages data collection within the natural setting of the case (Cassell et al., 2017; Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 1998)
2. *Underlying Philosophy.* The emergent approach has philosophical linkages with the researcher’s epistemological position.


4. *Sources of Initial Knowledge.* The emergent approach is Emic (Harris, 1976). This means the researcher is within the case study and operates within the organisation's culture (Creswell, 2007).

5. *Type of Logic employed to build theory.* This approach accommodates the deductive approach.

6. *Type of Knowledge Sought.* In this approach, Idiographic knowledge is sought. Idiographic research focuses on the individual (Allport, 1962; Thomas, 2016) and is typically sought by those in the interpretivist/relativist paradigm (Williamson & Johanson, 2017).

7. *Particularization.* This research agrees with a retort to Gerring’s work (Mahoney, 2007) and does not assert that “particularizing/ generalizing distinction is rightly understood as a continuum, not a dichotomy” (Gerring, 2017, p. 219). The researcher's view is that we need to understand and acknowledge the particularisation of case studies (Stake, 1995). Not be fearfully searching for generalisability.

**Case Study Retorts**

There are several weaknesses claimed against case studies, mainly single case studies. Generalisation is a weakness oft laid against the case study (Thomas, 2016). Particularly those with a Positivist philosophy (Thomas, 2015; Yin, 2017). As mentioned above, the researcher’s defence of a lack of generalisation is by simply acknowledging it, and the case study particularisation prevents generalisation. This is specifically ‘empirical generalisation’,
which can also be labelled ‘external validity’ or ‘transferability’ (Lewis et al., 2003). This research can claim ‘representational generalisation’ and ‘theoretical generalisation’ (Lewis et al., 2003). The lack of case studies claiming theoretical generalisation has been highlighted previously, with Platt stating that:

*It is curious how often criticisms of case studies as a basis for 'generalization' use ideas of representative sampling, appropriate only for estimating the prevalence of a characteristic in a population, to dismiss their adequacy for making contributions to theoretical explanation.*

(Platt, 1988, p. 17)

Also, academia highlights methodological issues, citing the lack of clarity on the methodology of an interpretivist case study (De Vaus, 2001; Gerring, 2017; Thomas, 2015) as “‘Practitioners continue to ply their trade but have difficulty articulating what it is that they are doing, methodologically speaking. The case study survives in a curious methodological limbo’” (Gerring, 2004, p. 341).

**Summary**

Now that the position of thesis has been explored, one can now select the most appropriate definition for a case study. This being: -

*Case study is an in-depth exploration from multiple perspectives of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular project, policy, institution, programme, or system in a ‘real life’ context. It is research-based, inclusive of different methods and is evidence-led. The primary purpose is to generate in-depth understanding of a specific topic (as in a thesis), programme, policy, institution, or system to generate knowledge and/or inform policy development, professional practice and civil or community action.*

(Simons, 2009, p. 21)
This definition sits within the researcher's philosophy, understanding of a case study, and the aim of awarding a Doctor of Business Administration.

### 3.6 Data Collection

So, the research will be conducted using a case-study, data collection methods will now be explored, after precisely qualifying what type of case study we will be conducting.

#### 3.6.1 The Reflexive Researcher

When applying reflexive TA, there have been calls for positional statements regarding researcher reflexivity (Braun, Clarke, et al., 2019). The researcher situates Reflexive Researcher as someone who acknowledges their place within the research. They are not an objective observer of an experiment – the reflexive researcher themselves are embedded into the research (Davies, 2002; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b; Terry et al., 2017a). Although this acknowledgement does not focus on the mean-making aspect as a heuristic researcher would (Moustakas, 1990).

Reflexivity is about self-awareness, being aware of the environment and context (Swaminathan & Mulvihill, 2017b), and using “personal experience as a legitimate source of knowledge” (Etherington, 2004, p. 19). Reflexivity also acknowledges that “social background and assumptions can intervene in the research process” (Hesse-Biber, 2013, p. 130). In addition, some academics can layer and delineate reflexivity as Systemic or Epistemic (Ryan, 2007) and is particularly pertinent when conducting interviews (Mann, 2016).

Reflexivity can be broken into three areas according to British Feminist Sue Wilkinson (Wilkinson, 1988), also noted by others (Braun & Clarke, 2021b). It should be
noted that Dr Wilkinson states she “originally attempted to distinguish between two aspects of reflexivity which I termed ‘personal’ and ‘functional’. The researcher will regard these as so closely linked as to be inseparable (Wilkinson, 1988, p. 494).

These are:

1. Personal Reflexivity – How the interests and values have helped guide the research and the reciprocal relationship with the knowledge produced.

2. Functional Reflexivity – How methods of research design have impacted the process/practice of conducting research.

3. Disciplinary Reflexivity – How the fields/schools and disciplines of academia have impacted knowledge construction.

Reflexivity itself has a history within military research (Ben-Ari, 2014) as a tool to gain insights. Reflexivity will be practically achieved using a reflexive journal. The Pensieve, as some researchers have come to regard it (Gerstl-Pepin & Patrizio, 2009), will enable the researcher to revisit the research journey and be a vehicle to share the journey with others.

Acknowledging the researcher's experience and knowledge of the British Army, the researcher will acknowledge their place as an active participant in the construction of the interview. Not an inactive presence to receive, but an active participant, empowered to offer comments, challenge, and probe.

3.6.2 Levels of Analysis

Much case-study literature demands the clear identification of levels of analysis. Due to the ideographic nature, the primary level of analysis will be analysing the individual Sandhurst Officer Cadet.
The secondary level of analysis will be at the organisational level, analysing Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. There are acknowledged issues with this level of analysis; to evidence ‘external validity’, the research would need to evidence stability and reliability by conducting primary research in other Officer training academies around the world (Risjord, 2014b). This is out of scope for this research due to the logistical and medical (COVID19) restrictions. Due to the use of these levels of analysis, this research will be an embedded case study (Lee & Saunders, 2017a).

### 3.6.3 Time Horizon

The practicalities of conducting a part-time DBA make a longitudinal (Bryman, 2015; Creswell & Poth, 2018) study unrealistic. This Case Study will be a cross-sectional study, which may be known as a “one-shot” (Creswell & Poth, 2018; Sekaran & Bougie, 2010, p. 119) or ‘snap-shot’ (Thomas, 2016). These studies are bounded by time, with data capturing conducted during a finite moment. This type of study is appropriate for Doctoral level research due to proscribed timelines.

### 3.6.4 Sampling

There is a myriad of sampling strategies and techniques. With their terms “used to describe sampling strategies, theoretical, purposeful, and purposive, have wide-ranging and occasionally contradictory meanings” (Emmel, 2013b, pp. 1-2). Due to its selection method, the case study is a Non-Probability, Purposive (Guest et al., 2006; Robinson, 2014) sampling. When conducting research containing a voluntary sample, the researcher must be aware of ‘self-selection bias’ (Costigan & Cox, 2001) and, more importantly, its possible impact on the research and results.
The word sampling to signify this style of targeted engagement is critiqued (Crouch & McKenzie, 2006; Emmel, 2013a). The researcher would agree with these scholars’ thoughts – these participants are not sampled from the general population – they are selected in this instance due to their position at Sandhurst. Sandhurst is the ‘sample universe’ (Guest et al., 2006; Robinson, 2014).

Saturation

In modern academia, there is a prevalence in which the number of interviews is guided by saturation (Bowen, 2008) or ‘information redundancy’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). “Saturation has in fact, become the gold standard by which purposive sample sizes are determined” (Braun & Clarke, 2021b; Guest et al., 2006, p. 60) and “the flagship of validity for qualitative research” (Constantinou et al., 2017, p. 585). Recently academia has acknowledged the practical difficulties (Guest et al., 2006) in achieving saturation with an admission that “Sometimes the researcher has no choice and must settle for a theoretical scheme that is less developed than desired” (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, p. 292).

There have been numerous stopping criteria already evidenced by others (Francis et al., 2010), who state that after ten initial interviews, saturation would be measured after each subsequent interview (Francis et al., 2010, pp. 8-9); others viewed that 12 interviews produced saturation in a relatively homogeneous grouping (Fugard & Potts, 2015; Guest et al., 2006).

It would be easy for the researcher to cite saturation as the stopping criteria and wallow in the confidence of achieving the ‘gold standard’ mentioned above. However, the researcher's position is in synch with Braun and Clarke, amongst others (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b). They view that this Saturation is “not congruent with reflexive TA” (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, p. 16), and others state that;
Understanding saturation as the point at which no new information emerges is a logical impossibility, as anyone who has gone back to reanalyze a data set has discovered.

(Low, 2019, p. 135)

This school of thought questions whether saturation is the gold standard and is nothing more than a convenient aid to limit the number of interviews conducted (Braun & Clarke, 2021c; Low, 2019).

Their approach is best summarised in this statement;

*When you’re doing an analysis, you don’t finish analysis, you stop. It’s not like you get to the final point. You could do more, you could go further, but you make a decision that this is the point at which I’m going to stop.*

(Braun, Clarke, et al., 2019, p. 7)

Saturation, therefore, is a researcher-constructed element. If the researcher looked, they would always find something more, a slight marginal difference which would preclude them from claiming data saturation.

Indeed Reflexive TA position is that themes are co-constructed; they do not emerge like a flower from the soil (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b; Terry et al., 2017a) or are discovered like a hunter searching for his quarry (Braun, Clarke, et al., 2019). Therefore, the whole data saturation argument is moot from a Reflexive TA position.

The researcher's position is a more traditional and pragmatic one when it comes to ceasing data collection. The researcher agrees that “researchers cease data collection when they have enough data to build a comprehensive and convincing theory” (Morse, 1995, p. 148); this could be regarded more appropriately as information power (Braun & Clarke, 2021b; Malterud et al., 2016).
Sample Size

“With vague guidelines on the use of saturation, a priori sample sizes will remain a part of qualitative research” (Beitin, 2012, p. 244; Robinson, 2014) due to the pragmatic practicalities of working to timelines or requests for funding (Guest et al., 2006; Hammersley, 2015; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, 2021c).

Despite some academics stating that “There are no rules for sample size in qualitative enquiry” (Patton, 2002, p. 244) and that sample size “cannot be predicted by formulae or perceived redundancy” (Malterud et al., 2016, p. 2). This thesis will use the guide produced by Braun and Clarke for planning purposes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source: (Terry et al., 2017a, p. 22)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Table 16: Project Sample Size Recommendations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Focus groups</th>
<th>Qualitative surveys</th>
<th>Story completion tasks</th>
<th>Media texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate or Honours project</td>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>2–3 (4–8 participants in each group)</td>
<td>20–30</td>
<td>20–40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters or Professional Doctorate project</td>
<td>6–15</td>
<td>3–6</td>
<td>30–100</td>
<td>40–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD/larger project (TA data as only a part of the whole project)</td>
<td>15–20</td>
<td>3–6</td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>100+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD/larger project (TA data as whole project)</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>200+</td>
<td>400+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For a professional doctorate, an upper number of fifteen interviews is recommended. Others concur with this opinion stating, “As a rule of thumb, it can be said that interview studies tend to have around 15 participants” (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 59). However, there is no real consensus with others in academia stating differing sample size numbers (Boyd, 2001; Charmaz, 2006; Morse, 2000; Morse, 2015; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b; Thomas & Pollio, 2002).

There is another quantitative tool designed for TA sample sizes (Fugard & Potts, 2015), although some regard it as a tool which “provides a life-raft to cling to in the sea of
uncertainty that is qualitative research” (Braun & Clarke, 2016, p. 739). However, due to the regard given by other learned academics within the Reflexive TA arena, this was discounted for the reasons given by others, e.g., (Braun & Clarke, 2016; Byrne, 2015; Emmel, 2015; Hammersley, 2015). Also, the planning figure is just that; there is precedent for interview numbers to be adjusted during the data collection, particularly within research that has an idiographic aim (Robinson, 2014).

3.6.5 Interviews

My job is to listen to people say things they very badly want to tell but are afraid nobody else will understand.

The Manticore
Source: (Davies, 1972, p. 11)

Interviews are the most widely used data collection strategy in qualitative research (Nunkoosing, 2005; Risjord, 2014a; Sandelowski, 2002; Terry & Hayfield, 2021c); however, they are not without detractors who state that the nature of data collection lacks scientific objectivity (Risjord, 2014c).

“Qualitative research on leadership tends to give greater attention to the ways in which leaders and styles of leadership have to be or tend to be responsive to particular circumstances”(Bryman, 2004, p. 752).

“Increasingly, qualitative researchers are realizing that interviews are not neutral tools of data gathering but rather active interactions between two (or more) people leading to negotiated, contextually based results” (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005, p. 698). The interview is “not merely a tool of sociology but a part of its very subject matter” (Benney & Hughes, 1956, p. 138). This research regarding the interviews as “reality-constructing and interactional events” (Koro-Ljungberg, 2013, p. 430) is a well-recognised position within
Interviews are an established and evidenced method of data collection in Modern Leadership Research, with a study revealing that 20% of published Leadership Quarterly articles use interviews (Lowe & Gardner, 2000). A similar study in the journal Leadership (Bryman, 2011) unveiled the semi-structured interview as one of the two most prominent methods, re-enforcing its appropriateness for this research. In the conduct of leadership research utilising a case study, semi-structured interviews were used in 52.8% of published articles (Bryman, 2011, p. 77). Interviews are also appropriate for military studies (Moore, 2014).

In addition, interviews are seen as a critical method for seeing genuine authenticity (Atkinson & Silverman, 1997); this will be essential in the socially loaded organisational environment that is Sandhurst, which some have described as a year-long interview. The key will be interviewing the persons behind the uniform – not the ‘game-face’ portrayed by the Officer Cadet. This use of interview is hoped will have a significant effect.

Qualitative interviews give participants the opportunity to describe experiences in detail and to give their perspectives and interpretations of these experiences. The interviewer has the opportunity to discuss and explore with the participants and to probe more deeply into their accounts.

Source: (Taylor, 2005, p. 40)

The view of the researcher in an interview is automatically ‘a narrative’ per se. However, it considers the interview itself and activity (Christensen et al., 1992). Therefore the interviews will be of a phenomenological focus due to their use of experiences to glean data (Brinkmann, 2013).
There are many interview styles; the interview style appropriate to this research's philosophical and practical nuances is ‘Relational Interviewing’ (Fujii, 2017). Relational interviewing and Reflexive TA regards the research as a co-construction between interviewee and interviewer (Brinkmann, 2013; Fujii, 2017; Terry & Hayfield, 2021c), acknowledging the interview as a ‘social interaction’ (Warren, 2012). Relational Interviewing is a humanist, reflexive interviewing style that focuses on the ethical treatment of participants (Fujii, 2017; Josselson, 2013); it has many overlapping properties with Reflective Interviewing (Roulston, 2010a).

However, others discount this relational style, regarding only two prominent positions, namely neo positivism and romanticism (Alvesson, 2003), with a third lesser-known position of a ‘Localist’ (Alvesson, 2003) interview, which is also known as a ‘constructionist’ interview (Roulston, 2010b), this interview type shares many aspects of the relational interview (Fujii, 2017; Josselson, 2013).

This constructionist interview focuses on the sense-making and co-construction of reality, involving both the participant and interviewer (Roulston, 2010b). This co-construction or ‘joint construction’ (Mishler, 2009a) is signified by the interviewer and participant's reflexive approach to the interview (Mishler, 2009a).

This approach dictates an interview style guided by an interview protocol and not wed to it. Academic experts state, “Interview questions should help guide an interviewer but not so rigidly that an interviewee is not able to shift footings and perspectives” (Gubrium et al., 2012b, p. 251).

This view on the construction of the interview acknowledges that the interview is not simply a passive tool to collect data but an active element of the research journey (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995).
Therefore, the interview style selected will have aspects of both Relational Interviewing, such as the reflexive style underpinned by a focus on participants' treatment. Whilst also acknowledging the co-construction of the interview.

The interview type utilised in this research should be regarded as a Relational Constructionist Interview. However, the researcher recognises that this may also be recognised as a Hermeneutic interview (Dinkins, 2005).

Within Reflexive TA, interviews are an evidenced data collection method, e.g., (Braun et al., 2009; Douglas et al., 2009; Pickens & Braun, 2018). However, there is a lack of Reflexive TA using interviews as a method within the leadership research forum.

Interviews have virulent detractors, and “Perhaps no other social science information gathering technique has been subjected to such scrutiny” (Gubrium et al., 2012a, p. 2).

**Narrative Inquiry**

Narrative is a word derived from the Indo-European word ‘Gna’, which means both ‘show’ and ‘tell’ (Hinchman & Hinchman, 1997), displaying its multi-faceted nature. Following organisational studies, leadership studies have recently undergone the ‘Narrative Turn’ (Gergen & Gergen, 2006). The narrative turn progresses “away from inquiry aimed at establishing universal relationships among abstract concepts and towards the understanding of how human beings make meaning, constructing experience, knowledge, and identity through narrative” (Fenton & Langley, 2011, p. 1174).

Narrative interviews are a particular sub-field; narrative interviews “produce subjects, texts, knowledge, and authority” (Briggs et al., 2007, p. 552).

Interviews have long been a mainstay of social science inquiry; however, the value of storytelling is a nascent concept. Interviewers have traditionally ‘suppressed’ storytelling because it was previously perceived as lacking research value (Mishler, 1991; Mishler,
The belief that a story was ‘owned’ by its teller has progressed to a conceptual approach and an understanding that stories can be co-constructed (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2020).

Narrative Inquiry can be utilised from an interpretive epistemic position (Vaara et al., 2016). In addition, there has been previous use of interviews to ask participants to recount stories to “recapitulating past experience, in particular a technique of constructing narrative units which match the temporal sequence of that experience” (Labov & Waletzky, 1967, p. 13).

However, “the vast majority of leadership research that has a narrative focus concentrates on big stories … that are looked at from a realist perspective as windows into the storyteller’s world, rather than as constructions of that world” (Clifton et al., 2019, p. 19; Holmes et al., 2011).

This position that the story-telling is a construction rather than a perfect re-telling of the event (Schoofs & Van De Mieroop, 2019) accommodates the ‘narrative soothing’ which can occur (Freeman, 2006).

This co-construction can result in interviewees self-censoring (Sacks & Jefferson, 1995) and constructions that evolve as they are “shaped by social and cultural expectations and conventions” (Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017a, p. 404; Sacks & Jefferson, 1995; Schwartzman, 2015) which are changing at a terrific pace (Murray, 2019).

With narrative smoothing to minimise deprecation, this social creation of stories can form a “hybrid fictionality” within the story (Hatavara & Mildorf, 2017b). This hybrid fictionality is likely not a participant deliberately attempting “to deceive its audience” (Nielsen et al., 2015, p. 63) but shaped by the participants’ character, bias and imagination, amongst other factors. The depth that can be gleaned from storytelling is apparent, but it is beholden upon the researcher to pursue the ‘rich’ data needed.
Critique

The thesis has explored the danger of over-positive ‘Prozac Leadership’. Alvesson also warns of over-positivity and participants painting themselves and their organisations in their best light, “be careful about relying on informants producing data with a strong ingredient of ‘moral storytelling,’ i.e., presenting themselves and their ambitions and accomplishments in explicit or subtle self-celebratory terms” (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2016, p. 9).

3.6.6 Interview Design

While this is not a usual interview, and it is the storytelling aspect we seek, there still must be a framework that must be used as a guide. The researcher has utilised the research experience of others (Holloway & Jefferson, 2000) in order to refine the questions using their experiences and failures to inform my own choices.

Despite this guide, the researcher is aware that this type of interviewing relies more on the interviewers ‘tools’ than specific questions.

In addition, Officer Cadets and all participants will be giving their time willingly; therefore, the interview must be designed to minimise personal impacts on them whilst maximising research value. Several academics cite 90 mins as the ideal interview length (Hermanowicz, 2002). There are many varying interview styles; the style selected for this research is the semi-structured interview.

3.6.7 Semi-Structured Interview

Semi-structured interviews are the “most widespread ones in the human and social sciences” (Brinkmann, 2013, p. 21); although its theoretical groundings have changed with the advent of reflexive or relational interviewing, the process of the method has been
relatively unchanged since its first conception in the 1940s (Merton & Kendall, 1946).

Within semi-structured interviews, there are several different fields.

The interview type for this research would be Descriptive/interpretive. Previous researchers have evidenced this type to uncover and discover individuals' social constructions and perceptions, e.g. (Dyregrov, 1999). Semi-structured interviews have been used with Reflexive Thematic Analysis before, e.g. (Pashaei Sabet et al., 2017).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview Type</th>
<th>Purpose</th>
<th>Epistemological Privilege</th>
<th>Role of Participant</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive/confirmative</td>
<td>Assessment</td>
<td>Known</td>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Confirmation of fit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive/corrective</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Knower and the known</td>
<td>Collaborator</td>
<td>Refutation, elaboration, correction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive/interpretive</td>
<td>Discovery</td>
<td>Knower</td>
<td>Informant</td>
<td>Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Descriptive/divergent</td>
<td>Contrast</td>
<td>Groups of knowers</td>
<td>Informants</td>
<td>Discernment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 17: Heuristic Typology of Semi-Structured Interviews**

Source: (McIntosh & Morse, 2015, p. 3)

3.6.8 Interview Enablement

The conduct of the interview will follow the loose interview protocol attached to Appendix F, Annex E. The researcher agrees with others that this should be used as a guide rather than a script (Beitin, 2012). The researcher must interview in a style similar to that of everyday conversation.

**Location**

“Relatively little attention has been paid to the question of where the interview takes place” (Herzog, 2012, p. 207). Location is a crucial decision for the researcher, and some academics cite it as part of the research paradigm (Herzog, 2012). Other academics have evidenced that participants who select the location may feel empowered (Elwood & Martin, 2000) and, therefore, more likely to share their stories freely and appropriately.
Participants will be offered to conduct interviews in the Company Anterooms. Each Company is given an anteroom in which they can relax and socialise. These rooms are not used during the working day and would be a safe space for the participant. Alternatively, the College Conference room could be used – again a quiet room in an isolated academy area. Whilst the researcher acknowledges that the participant, even though selecting the location, is still subject to the power/relations produced by the interview (Herzog, 2012).

### 3.7 Data Analysis

The thesis will now position itself regarding its selected method of data analysis.

#### 3.7.1 Reflexive Thematic Analysis

There selected method of analysis used will be thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2017).

**Why?**

The researcher has selected Reflexive Thematic Analysis as this method allows for an inductive bias whilst not totally disregarding presuppositions and deductive thinking, which the researchers support experience within the organisation. In addition, the flexibility of Reflexive TA allowed the inductively biased analysis to capture both semantic and latent codes with a focus on mean-making. Reflexive TA allows the locating “of experiences within wider sociocultural discourses” (Hayfield et al., 2014, p. 358).

TA's specific ‘flavour’ is reflexive Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; Terry & Hayfield, 2021a, 2021b) in keeping with the researcher’s reflexive position. Reflexive TA is appropriate for use through the lens of social constructionism (Braun & Clarke, 2013, 2021a; Terry & Hayfield, 2021a) e.g. (Bartram et al., 2019; Didymus & Backhouse, 2020).
To be clear, Reflexive TA is a “method rather than a methodology” (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, p. 5) and “is not a neutral activity, but a values-based situated practice” (Braun & Clarke, 2021b, p. 22). This method has evolved from its original iteration (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; Braun, Clarke, et al., 2019; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b), which was brought to the fore in 2006 (Braun & Clarke) and is seen as one of the Big-Q (Braun & Clarke, 2019, 2021b; Kidder & Fine, 1987; Terry et al., 2017a) approaches to qualitative research.

There is a number of acknowledged variations of reflexive TA. Relativist TA is the specific version of reflexive TA used for this study due to the appropriate philosophical assumption (Terry & Hayfield, 2021d). Some continue to state that TA is "absent explicit guidelines on how to undertake it” (Xu & Zammit, 2020, p. 1). The researcher's stance sits with that of others (Braun & Clarke, 2021b), that ‘explicit guidelines’ are an unachievable goal. Each process of conducting Reflexive TA will differ depending on a myriad of external factors. “Reflexive TA offers robust process guidelines, not rigid rules” (Braun & Clarke, 2021b, p. 10).

3.7.2 Phases of Reflexive Thematic Analysis

Reflexive Data Analysis consist of six phases (Braun & Clarke, 2021a; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b):

1. **Phase 1: Familiarisation.** In interview studies, familiarisation is initiated during the interview itself (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b); we will “consider data collection as part of the familiarization process” (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, p. 32). However, the use of a research journal to reflect on the interview and any observations will also be utilised as best practice (Braun & Clarke, 2013, 2021b; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b). Familiarisation will also involve listening and transcribing the interviews.
2. **Phase 2: Coding.** The coding for this research will take a deductive approach (Braun & Clarke, 2006; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b). As mentioned by others, the researcher will ensure that codes consist of a “short phrase” or “pithy label” (Clarke et al., 2015, p. 235). Reflexive TA develops “two levels of coding; semantic and latent” (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, p. 38). Semantic codes closely mirror the meaning of participants. Latent codes are more interpretative and rely on the reflexivity of the researcher (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b). Coding will be supported by the researcher using NVIVO; this is a widely evidenced method when using TA (Joffe, 2012), e.g. (Bowen et al., 2012) when combined with interviews, e.g., (Alexander & Lopez, 2018; Cassell et al., 2005; Didymus & Backhouse, 2020; Golenko et al., 2012; Jackson & Nowell, 2021; Judger, 2016).

3. **Phase 3: Initial Theme Generation.** Reflexive TA has a recursive approach to theme generation with Themes being prototyped. In reflexive TA, “codes are like the bricks, tiles and wood, you would need to build your house (your theme)” (Braun & Clarke, 2017; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, p. 46). With codes clustered into themes and a thematic map created. The construction of the themes is fully explained in the discussion section as appropriate for reflexive TA (Braun & Clarke, 2019).

4. **Phase 4: Developing and Reviewing Themes.** Once initial themes have been generated, they need to be refined and reviewed. For experienced researchers, this may be a simultaneous, recursive journey, but it is recommended that for nascent researchers, “it is worth making them clear and distinct phases” (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, p. 55). The end product should have a few elements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ser</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Application</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>The best of various candidate themes developed themes through all the phases.</td>
<td>It was developed through recursive test-piloting.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The best shape for the developed themes based on your data
Recursive consideration of the codes into themes after testing.

The combination of these themes that tell the best story of the data
Themes appropriately consider the answering of the Research questions and the research aim

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The best shape for the developed themes based on your data</td>
<td>Recursive consideration of the codes into themes after testing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The combination of these themes that tell the best story of the data</td>
<td>Themes appropriately consider the answering of the Research questions and the research aim</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 18: End Product of Reflexive TA**

*Source:* Adapted from information (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, pp. 55-56)

The end of this phase is difficult to determine as it lacks demarcation and is guided by the researcher. The ending of the phase is a pragmatic decision by the researcher, which is guided by when the researcher ‘feels’ that themes are appropriately developed.

5. **Phase 5: Naming and Defining Themes.** This phase will start with the researcher providing explicit definitions of each of the themes, providing both conceptual and philosophical groundings. Once these definitions have been clarified, they will form the basis of the name generation of these themes and subthemes.

6. **Phase 6: Writing Up.** Reflexive TA follows initially generally accepted protocols and standards (Levitt et al., 2018). The results section has some specific nuances for reflexive TA, with the themes themselves used as headings to guide and direct the section.

3.7.3 **Lived Experience of Reflexive Thematic Analysis**

Although the researcher has detailed the phases and provided some background, Braun and Clarke also suggest a first-person methodological write-up (V. Braun & V. Clarke, 2021), which I will place below in italics to differentiate this first-person reflective account.

*The six phases of Reflexive Thematic Analysis summarised above were undertaken across two similar, although distinct datasets of semi-structured...*
interviews. These datasets were both consisting of Officer Cadets in Royal Military Academy Sandhurst but were in different terms or points within their training. One of my main learned experiences is the actual time needed – not the usual time needed to power through transcription or code. I found my most significant breakthroughs or moments of clarity were found in moments of genuine reflection on my research. Just sitting and thinking about the statements and underlying meaning – about body language, how they answered, considering my bias, etc.

The Data itself was generated in very compacted sessions. 1 week for each dataset. This was primarily due to Officer Cadets’ access and availability in a very compressed training programme for them. Lessons typically start at 0800 and end at 2145hrs.

Once I had collected data, I started to conduct Data Familiarisation. Due to my own personal time constraints of working a full-time job, I was hoping to use transcription software – specifically Otter.ai. However, due to the seemingly unique language, colloquialisms and specific terms of the British Army, Otter proved woefully inadequate. This was, in some ways, a blessing in disguise; the requirement for verbatim transcription forced me to become familiar with the interviews in a way I think would have been unachievable by simply listening to them.

This real engagement with the research led to a real discovery of latent meanings and helped immerse me in leadership's social construction and the mean-making of officer cadets. Multiple discourses regarding poor leadership were repeatedly cited on numerous occasions, which displayed a shared understanding of what ‘poor’ leadership was. These poor leadership vignettes also elicit strong emotional responses amongst a traditionally extremely guarded cohort regarding the display of emotion. These recountings had much more of an impact on me than I
previously presumed as a representative of the Army and with a son of a similar age (21 years) to most of the Officer Cadets. I felt both an organisational and Paternal responsibility – this also amounted to some profoundly personal feelings of disappointment and shame for some of the behaviours these young people had encountered. Although this is a reflexive interview co-constructed, I had to be mindful of their personal story and relay it appropriately.

The coding itself was initially a very process-driven and systematic activity. However, as I began to look beyond the primarily semantic codes and engage with more latent analysis, I felt that this really improved the coding. The coding led to reinforce my belief that the social construction of leadership amongst Officer Cadets is stable. That although they cannot always vocalise or conceptualise leadership, they can quickly identify what is deemed effective or otherwise from their observations.

The development of themes was initially very semantic and oversimplified. The themes are now more in keeping with Reflexive Thematic Analysis – mindful of the pitfalls observed by Braun and Clarke in one of their paper’s themes deemed “cutesy and unscholarly” (V. Braun & V. Clarke, 2021, p. 112) by the notorious reviewer 2. Phase 4, when we’re encouraged to “let things go” (V. Braun & Clarke, 2013, p. 234), really was difficult. To focus on true coding and explore the codes’ connection to the Research Questions again.

I identified a number of themes, but although of interest, some, such as ‘Tactical Actions rather Then Leadership’, were not directly connected to the research aim or the objectives.

Overall acknowledging my reflexivity was vital. It would have been inauthentic to have masqueraded as an impartial value-free observer when in reality,
every interaction is value-laden, specifically when discussing something truly personal such as Leadership.

3.7.4 Summary

The thesis discussed earlier that the “map is not the territory it represents” (Korzybski, 1933, p. 58). This is true for reflexive TA, with it “designed not as a strict recipe or rule book but rather as an approach” (Terry & Hayfield, 2021b, p. 85). The researcher, though, will utilise the framework for assessing Reflexive TA (Braun & Clarke, 2021a) so that this thesis is a high-quality representation of reflexive TA.

3.8 Research Ethics

The only safe way to avoid violating principles of professional ethics is to refrain from doing social research altogether.

(Bronfenbrenner, 1952, p. 452)

The quote above exhibits that the tightrope between collecting high-standard, quality research and ethical considerations, “between the intrinsic and the extrinsic values” (Hammersley & Traianou, 2012, p. 135) is not a new one, but one which has existed for at least 70 years and more likely longer. Though the researcher disagrees with this statement—it is a tightrope, admittedly, but one which the social scientist MUST tread to maintain any credibility.

3.8.1 Ethical Approval

This research is unusual in its requirement to satisfy two ethics boards. Not only that of the university but also the Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee (MODREC). MODREC is renowned for its difficulty in navigating, particularly in a timely manner.
(Roberts, 2016). This is particularly acute for those researching social science, with the whole MODREC process formulated with a bias towards medical research. This was exampled when MODREC took a considerable time (months) to find a person they deemed suitably qualified to review; even then, the qualified person was a non-doctoral Occupational Psychologist, which brought its own nuances as everyday practice, such as member-checking had to be explained.

3.8.2 Ethical Philosophy

The research has been planned mindful of ethical considerations. However, it has gone so far as to take the position of ‘moralism’ where the position is that “ethics is foundational to the telos of the research enterprise” (Mertens & Ginsberg, 2009, p. 2). The researcher has a more pragmatic view than those deontologists who would happily “Let justice be done though the heavens fall” (Quinton, 1988, p. 216). The researcher's position would be more suitably labelled ethical relativism. “Ethical relativism is the thesis that ethical principles or judgements are relative to the individual or culture” (LaFollette, 1991, p. 146); this statement from LaFollette sums up succinctly the researcher's position. This position has some acknowledged weaknesses; ethical practices in some cultures may be considered unethical in others, so they must be underpinned by a more comprehensive understanding of normative ethics. The researcher would also like to expand this position, not only do they believe that it is relative to individuals and culture, but ethical principles are also relative to time. An ethical practice which is deemed acceptable today may, with a change in culture, data, or another external factor, no longer be deemed acceptable tomorrow.
3.9 Summary of Research Rationale

The researcher is part of the organisation being researched, but although detractors could highlight this as a weakness, the researcher observes this viewpoint through a positive lens. That being, the researcher does not have to work to understand the nuanced organisational culture. The researcher seeks to use his experience as an advantage as others have, e.g. (Jans, 2014; Moskos Jr, 1977).

In addition, the researcher believes “No method of research can stand outside the cultural and material world” (Holstein et al., 1997, p. 249), that simply by conducting the research process, the researcher becomes a part of it, embedded within it, put succinctly in this paper “we conduct research with people rather than on them” (Didymus & Backhouse, 2020, p. 2). During this chapter, we have explored and now selected the research design for this thesis with a brief rationale captured below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Framework</th>
<th>Methodological Choice</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
<th>Strengths</th>
<th>Weaknesses</th>
<th>Reference</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ontology</td>
<td>Relativism</td>
<td>Reality is relative to the researcher’s position and viewpoint.</td>
<td>Linkage to researchers’ position.</td>
<td>Lack of clear definitions and used interchangeably.</td>
<td>3.2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemology</td>
<td>Relational Social Constructionism</td>
<td>Gergen concurs that Relational Social Construction should have a relativistic foundation.</td>
<td>Position acknowledges universals.</td>
<td>Positivists view the constructionists an unhelpful and ‘unscientific’.</td>
<td>3.2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological Choice</td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>The ontological and epistemological position naturally aligns with a Qual lens.</td>
<td>Answers calls for pluralism in research.</td>
<td>Regarded as ‘less-than’ by some within academia.</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Approach to theory</td>
<td>Induction</td>
<td>Induction wis widely recognized in social science and Quals in particular.</td>
<td>Not totally inductive, can at times us deduction and abduction.</td>
<td>Some (like Popper) completely disregard induction.</td>
<td>3.3-3.3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researchers Position</td>
<td>Reflexive Researcher</td>
<td>Reflexivity acknowledge and re-enforces the researcher position in the organisation</td>
<td>Acknowledge personal experience as a legitimate source of knowledge</td>
<td>Positivist may posit that a reflexive researcher within the organisation is organizationally biased.</td>
<td>3.6.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Brief Rationale of Research Philosophy
Chapter 4 – Results

This chapter focuses on presenting the data, emphasising the social construction of leadership, which underpins leadership practice from the viewpoint of Officer Cadets at Sandhurst. The thesis will start by outlining the background of the journey that Officer Cadets must make and a brief setting of the scene in which the research was conducted.

Chapter Structure

Figure 18: Chapter Structure

Source: Produced for this Research
4.1 Context

In this section, the thesis will briefly introduce the empirical context for this study to assist situate and make sense of the results that follow. Only essential information is provided here: Appendix A discusses the British Army formation and organisational changes, Appendix B establishes the historical context of a British Army Officer, and Appendix C situates the historical context of Sandhurst.

4.1.1 Participants

The participants in this study are Officer Cadets in their Intermediate Term of the Regular Commissioning Course. The Regular Commissioning Course is roughly one year in duration and broken down into three terms (Juniors, Inters, Seniors). Joining the British Army as a direct entry officer takes time and is a competitive process.

Barriers to Enlistment

Applicants must be aged 18-29 years, have no underlying medical issues, and have a BMI of 18-29.9. With additional academic criteria and strict guidelines on body art or piercings.

Interview

Those conducting the interviews are, for the most part, retired Lieutenant-Colonels, or Colonels. They will assess for suitability and act as the initial filter for subsequent attendance at Army Officer Selection Board (AOSB) Briefing. This is an interesting notion – interviewers may be recruiting for ‘their’ Army. The Army of a decade ago had a different socio-demographic configuration, ethnic make-up, and overall organisational behaviour than today. Even at this early stage, interviewees could be selected based on the interviewer’s
social construction of an Army Leader, which would have been established originally in Sandhurst about three decades prior, and through ongoing practices and observations within the military context.

This method of selection may produce tensions – for example, the interviewers are from a British Army that did not allow females to join Combat Arms. The researcher has personally encountered these tensions on occasions, particularly regarding misogyny, probably because the protagonist viewed the researcher as a 20+ years Infantry Officer as a ‘safe space’ to air their prejudices.

**Army Officer Selection Board, Briefing**

This single-day event consists of basic physical tests, group discussions and psychometric tests. Most who attend the briefing will be invited back, with around 80% being granted a place; however, the AOSB Briefing will shape the time delay in attendance (up to 2 years).

**Army Officer Selection Board, Main Board**

Main Board is a 3-day event held at Westbury, Wiltshire. Applicants will conduct several physical and cognitive assessments, individually and in teams, with a final interview to conclude. The pass rate for first-time applicants at Main Board is around 37%. Applicants know the stark pass rate, which could further foster competition as applicants vie to be in the 37% and not the 63% who ‘fail’ on their first attempt.

**The Journey**

This journey is, from the outset, one that is constituted by competition and selection. A protracted struggle, which, at minimum, will take around nine months, but for others, up to
3 years before their arrival at Sandhurst. With less than one-third being offered a place on their first attempt. Also, each selection event is held in Wiltshire, with Sandhurst conducted in Berkshire. All must travel to Wiltshire for, in the case of AOSB Briefing, what is a single-day event.

Although unimportant at first glance, the location of these events – compounded by most Army Headquarters also being in the south of England- weighs applicants disproportionately from the South-East of England. Resulting in an Officer Corps, which is highly biased to the South-East of the UK, against a Soldier cohort which is predominantly based outside of the South-East.

The Process

From their arrival on ‘Ironing Board Sunday’, so named because all Officer Cadets arrive clutching an ironing board, the competition at Sandhurst makes that experience during their journey a gentle introduction.

They are assessed using a form known colloquially as a SAF, which stands for Student Assessment Framework. SAFs are conducted for all formal appointments on Exercise. However, other than that, the staff can SAF for anything they deem. Officer Cadet is late – they get a negative SAF. If an Officer Cadet organises something without direction – positive SAF.

Every action by the Officer Cadet is at this point geared towards the Regimental Selection Board, which occurs on Week 26 of their 42 Week journey.

The Regimental Selection board, although within their first six months of their career, will select their cap badge, with those going to Combat Arms gaining a significant advantage on becoming a General within the Armed Forces. Since 1970 every Chief of the General Staff has been Infantry bar four: of those four, two were Combat (Cavalry) and the others were
Combat Support (Royal Engineers and Royal Artillery). No Chief of the General Staff has ever been in Combat Service Support. Therefore, any Officer Cadet’s dream of overseeing the Army is shaped in their first six months, with the door being either widened, kept open, or completely closed, depending on the Cap badge they are selected to join. Creating an environment with an extreme intensity of competition also needed to be ‘liked’ due to the internal feedback mechanism which plays a part in your report.

In principle, the Commissioning Course delivers a real-life example of the fictional Hunger Games. With Officer Cadets creating alliances to better their position with the victor. As in the Hunger Games, all is not, in fact, equal, and in fact, Sandhurst is even more polarised than in the Hunger Games. With Sandhurst Officer Cadets breaking into three general groupings. There are those who are the majority within Sandhurst who are very similar to the “Careers” of District 1 – they have the British Army linkages through family or friends, went to the ‘right’ schools and played the ‘right sports’. Those who have no military connection are more akin to the more middle-class districts. Working Class Officer Cadets are more like District 13 and must overcome a few of the biases and barriers of Katniss Everdeen.

4.1.2 The Protagonists

The staff whom the Officer Cadets have the most contact with is their Platoon Permanent Staff. The platoon has a Colour Sergeant (second in command) and a Platoon Commander (Captain).

Platoon Colour Sergeant

The Platoon Colour Sergeant is the most experienced member of the platoon. They will have served in the British Army for 10-15 years. To be selected to be an instructor at Sandhurst, they must complete a 4-week selection cadre. This involves assessments of lesson
delivery and physical and cognitive ability. Being a Platoon Colour Sergeant at Sandhurst is a highly sought-after position, seen and reported on as the most prestigious appointment for that rank in the British Army.

The army demographic of the Colour Sergeant instructors is skewed due to this selection cadre and is not broadly representational of the British Army. With over 80% of the Colour Sergeant from the Infantry, over 95% are male, and 90% identify as white.

Most officer cadets are instructed by a colour sergeant who is white, male, and an Infanteer as their colour sergeant. The colour sergeant's reference point of leadership is leadership in combat in Afghanistan and Iraq. Whilst this should not be an issue – it may create where leadership in high-stress situations are given precedence due to their lived experience.

**Platoon Commander**

Platoon commanders have completed 6-10 years and will have completed several leadership focussed career courses. There is no formal selection course, but to be selected to attend, the officer must be in the top one-third of Army captains. However, captains being graded within their Corps provides a much wider spread of cap badges and genders. Infantry makes up less than 25% of platoon commanders, and females account for over 30% of platoon commanders, making the platoon commanders cohort much more representative of the wider army.

**The Researcher**

The researcher has spent 24+ years in the British Army and has led combat operations in three operational theatres on seven occasions. Currently, the researcher is the Assistant Chief Instructor of the intermediate term at Sandhurst. The researcher is keen to explore how
leadership is constructed at the Royal Military Academy, having observed tensions between theory and practice.

The researcher also posits that leadership in combat is not a ‘good’ activity and that the attribution of morality to an amoral construction denies the possibility of positive elements of Dark or Shadow Leadership. Furthermore, a holistic, genuine, and honest approach to leadership is needed to progress beyond the moralistic dichotomies.

This belief, although reinforced by Sandhurst, is not its exclusive unmasking; the researcher had seen many Leaders who were excellent in the crucible of combat who, when returned home, were found lacking some aspects of morality, excellent leaders whilst being ‘bad people.

4.1.3 Thematic Framework

Below is presented the thematic framework. This is produced as a visual guide, and it is acknowledged that the actual research, as with all interpretive research, is much messier with specific data and themes interlinking at various levels before branching back out.
Figure 19: Thematic Framework
Source: Produced for this Research
4.1.4 Thematic Framework Development

After several revisions over time through evolvement and reflection, the analysis has constructed three main themes incorporating several subthemes. ‘I am the Prince’ will discuss the Machiavellian elements of Officer Cadets at Sandhurst. ‘Look at Me’ explores the narcissistic elements and particularly how those narcissistic elements interplay with the power/relation dynamics within Sandhurst. ‘You are in the Army now’ regarding Sandhurst's organisational constructs, cap badge rivalry/snobbery. Look At Them explores the notion of role modelling in the social construction of Dark Leadership behaviours.

4.2 Social Construction of Leadership

During the interviews, the participants were asked about whom they learned leadership from and their leadership role models. When asked about the behaviours of these role models, they rarely cited any of the British Army Values (see figure 13). The examples the Officer Cadets cited as the behaviours of their leadership role models focussed on ‘soft’ skills.
Behaviours

The Data shows that the Officer Cadets identified as essential to being a good leader were not behaviours particularly discussed at Sandhurst or the mandated Army values.

I suppose they were charismatic in terms of, say, like the speeches that they gave, they were confident. The displayed behaviours that made you want to follow that individual.

I think he was definitely kind of transformational type of leader.

Participant 7
The words used, such as charismatic and transformational leadership, are symptomatic of a specific type of personality-based Leadership that will be explored in the following chapter. The behaviours of ineffective leaders were also not predicted.

4.3 I am The Prince

We will now explore the Machiavellian aspects of the data, split into two further first-order themes (See Fig 12). These themes are names DS Watching and Impression Management.

4.3.1 DS Watching

DS Watching is a colloquial term used by Officer Cadets to describe an activity where an Officer Cadet attempts to observe when Staff are present and is almost symbiotically linked to impression management which we will discuss later. Officer Cadets use DS Watching to manage others’ perceptions of them.

The term DS watching has Sandhurst specificity and further re-enforce this focus. The term DS is no longer used as Sandhurst and has not been used for over five years, with the term Permanent Staff used in all communications. It seems that this and other specific, socially constructed terms that we will later explore are passed between Officer Cadets and are embedded into the Social Construction of Sandhurst.

It’s obviously passed down like Cadet to Cadet and then Intake to Intake.

Participant 5

Participant 5 acknowledges that the term DS is not correct or appropriate but harks to a time of yesteryear.
This Thesis will now draw upon responses from participants when asked to give a couple of basic definitions of their social construction of DS Watching:

*In people’s behaviours, they all of a sudden start to work hard when DS are around, they all of a sudden start to volunteer for things and get busy and then when the DS leave, they stop.*

**Participant 17**

The above statement concentrates not only on working hard when Permanent Staff are present but also on the need to be viewed to ‘do more’ and volunteer for extra responsibilities whilst observed. Participant 17 also alludes to the clear demarcation between the Officer Cadets' behaviours when observed, with their repeated use of “all of a sudden”. Participant 17 also states how transparent they perceive the act of DS Watching, using very pointed language. The DS Watchers do not lessen activity or decrease tempo, and Participant 17's view is that they simply stop working when unobserved. The apparent lack of concerns for reputational damage caused by this lack of work will be explored later in the chapter.

One constant theme throughout the data was the acceptance and understanding of DS Watching being woven inextricably into Officer Cadets’ ‘lived experience’ (Kirchner, 2018) at Sandhurst. The view that DS Watching was present within the actual fabric of Sandhurst is shared by all participants.

The data shows that all Twenty-Five Participants commented on the embedded nature of DS watching within the Sandhurst construct. The language used regarding the volume, “loads” (Participant 17), “a lot” (Participant 20) and its prevalence, “definitely” (Participants 11, 22, 5), seem to indicate that its enduring use as an aspect of the socially constructed leadership construct
amongst Officer Cadets was at some level accepted. In addition, Participant 3 highlights the crossover between DS Watching and Social Loafing, which will be explored in the next chapter.

*It's actually ridiculous how much DS watching goes on.*

**Participant 10**

The results indicate an inevitability regarding the presence of DS Watchers. This ‘inevitability’ and the power of the word used, rather than more subtle language, indicates a fundamental expectation and an acceptance of these DS Watching behaviours. Referring to such behaviours as ‘ridiculous’ reinforced the Officer Cadet's feeling of the unsurmountable quantity of this behaviour.

There appears to be a widespread acceptance of these poor behaviours. With a socially constructed DS watching level, activities below this threshold are accepted as the norm. With Integrity being one of the core values of the British Army, it seems paradoxical that the organisational culture of Sandhurst seems to enable DS Watching.

With the prevalent acceptance of these DS Watching actions, Officer Cadets tacitly accept the actions of these Officer Cadets, who are presenting their best selves as opposed to their true selves.

*I think the sway Permanent Staff have over us, and like the power the sway they have the influence they have but like I also the actual tangible power they have ... And I want them to like me, and the best way to do that, Is it with a beer in my hand, right?*

**Participant 21**
The data repeatedly shows that Officer Cadets have great concern about the Permanent Staff perception. We can see from the above statement that they acknowledge both the biased power structure and the inextricable linkage with alcohol. Officer Cadets understand the Permanent Staff wield power in authoring their report, which in turn informs Regimental Selection Boards.

Although DS Watching may be deemed low risk by Officer Cadets, it is not without cost. However, Officer Cadets are reticent to directly call out these behaviours in Permanent Staff presence, as mentioned previously. They have, as a group, a socially constructed code of conduct which causes these unsavoury behaviours to potentially have a detrimental impact on those instigating DS Watching.

*Other Cadets notice it and they dislike that a lot. In fact, it’s a bit of a... when an officer cadet is noticed to be playing up to the staff, they tend to ...one of my mates call it Darwinism. The Platoon will turn on that person pretty quickly if they’re not careful.*

**Participant 6**

This ‘Darwinism’ described by Participant 6 indicates this socially constructed ethical code is accepted by the group and regarded as a natural balance to the prevalence of DS watching. The ‘cost’ of DS Watching is the possibility, if deemed to be extreme, is that you are ostracised for it. The language used, ‘turn on,’ is particularly visceral. As Officer Cadets, one may expect them to ‘call out’ or that they would directly engage with the individual, not as a grouping ‘turn on’ that person.

This Jekyll and Hyde euphemism the researcher would assess through anecdotal experience could be applicable to Permanent Staff. Those Permanent Staff who have instigated
these abuses of power described during the interviews actively conducted them at their chosen
time and place. Showing to their superiors Dr Jekyll whilst peers and subordinates see Mr Hyde.

The worst example you’ll see in the Academy actually, [Redacted] was having a chat to [Redacted]. They’re literally walking, pairs-navex, walking around having a chat. And he [Platoon Commander] went for the classic soldier line of ‘just stop flirting, like just keep it down’. And yeah, is that especially for [Redacted] she said, ‘sir I have just been taking the lecture off Colonel Crawford etc. about reasonable challenge if you like something, then say don’t do it, and he [Platoon Commander] didn’t really appreciate that. And he went, “Oh, fuck off [Redacted]”. Which of caused her to, of course, to erupt into floods of tears. And basically, then basically had to go sit in a room and be counselled by the rest of Platoon. And it was that that was the that’s the worst example of that.

Participant 13

Permanent Staff are briefed and know they have no duty inquiring into personal relationships or commenting on them. Reasonable Challenge is something that is instilled in Officer Cadets as something to contribute to the defence against Groupthink. The data shows that once challenged, as they had been told to, the Platoon Commander reacted with profane language and sought to quickly re-establish their dominant position in the hierarchy. With no further care for what they had done to the Officer Cadet through this negative interaction. The statement above also has links to section 4.4.2, Power Relations. With the incident described above by Participant 13 being a push to exert Power over the individual – it should be noted that there is no reference to an apology in the above statement.
It may be difficult to ascertain how this individual came to be in such a position of power, leading and commanding a platoon of 30+ young people at a revered establishment such as Sandhurst. This goes back to the Jekyll and Hyde euphemism first highlighted by Participant 13.

This distinct separation of personas, in conjunction with the notion of the ‘performance’, may be particularly relevant to the British Army due to its performance reporting structure. Which currently has a complete lack of 180° or 360° feedback or reporting. Performance reports are written by an Officer’s direct supervisor and their direct supervisor. This creates an environment where some feel that peers’ opinion or other supervisors' opinions, except their own, are unimportant. Larger organisations compound these issues – for example, there are 90 Officer Cadets in a Company. These Officer Cadets will be placed in order of merit based on the opinion of their Platoon Commander alone. To succeed, one must ensure that their direct supervisor only sees Dr Jekyll, keeping Mr Hyde hidden and exposed only to subordinates and peers.

*They all of a sudden start to work hard when DS are around, they all of a sudden start to volunteer for things and get busy, and then when the DS leave they stop and they actively lie. I've seen people you know, be in absolute bits in a trench. And then as soon as the staff come around, they wipe their eyes and go oh, yeah, this is brilliant. This is what I joined for, well its like but you were crying five minutes ago.*

Participant 17

The statement by Participant 17 is fascinating. Firstly, we can see that they indicate the DS Watching Officer Cadets, working hard in Permanent Staff presence. However, the Participant deliberately links DS Watching with lying. This provides further evidence of the Officer Cadets' symbiosis of DS Watching with other behaviours we will discuss. With Integrity
being one of the British Army's core values, not only lying but indeed being a bystander whilst lying is ongoing is not appropriate.

Participant 17 then reveals a story of an Officer Cadet in a trench crying, but who masks their crying when approached by Permanent Staff. This could again be highlighted as a lack of integrity and honesty, which objectively it is. From a subjective perspective, the Officer Cadet could have been crying about anything – also, crying could be perceived as a weakness on exercise and pressure we will explore in Section 4.3.2 may have come into the Officer Cadets' decision cycle. Two separate Officer Cadets reported this as an example of DS Watching.

“There’s an Officer Cadet in my Platoon who does not like being in the field at all. They cry most nights and I’ve... I’ve literally seen this person go from being flat out tears.. [finger click] spotting a member of Platoon Staff, quick wipe of the eyes, Colour Sergeant asks, ‘How are we getting on’? ’ Yeah, absolutely. Loving it. It’s brilliant’. They go away again and we’re back down.

Participant 1

Of all the incidents of Sandhurst, these Officer Cadets chose to socialise an incident where an Officer Cadet was at their lowest; they at no point offered assistance, comfort, or support, just the disdain that this Officer Cadet had seemingly managed their Platoon Staff’s view of them. This may be an example of the ‘Dog-Eat-Dog’ mentality that we will explore further in section 4.3.1.

This ongoing management of Officer Cadets' exposure to Permanent Staff and eternal attempt to control themselves and others around them leads to friction within the platoons. This leads to incidents that can lead to momentary unmasking of themselves.
He went, erm, “get a grip. You’re making me look bad” in front of everyone. I think everyone just lost respect from that. If you said, “Get a grip, you’re making the team that bad”, it’s just that word he said, “making me look bad “… I think that that stuck with me that…that was awful.

Participant 14

The fact that this statement was made when isolated from Permanent Staff may indicate a Machiavellian aspect. The Officer Cadet may have been less inclined to work to manage their perception due to the lack of superiors in the locality.

In addition, in an organisation that prides itself on teamwork, the Officer Cadet did not seem to indicate care for the wellbeing or reputation of the Platoon or company. If there was any consideration for those groupings, we can take from the language used and particularly the use of ‘me’ that they place all other considerations below their own, a very narcissistic viewpoint. Another aspect is that vocalising what is a primarily accepted activity and placing themselves above the team led to a reputation loss. It is interesting that the behaviours and feelings are accepted, but the simple vocalisation of these feelings made this action memorable for its abhorrence.

The Officer Cadet was not being Machiavellian but simply honest. They were vocalising what all Officer Cadets genuinely believe but are conditioned not to openly state. Despite the ‘awfulness’ as stated by Participant 14 data, many in Leadership positions at Sandhurst as Officer Cadets do not consider the effect on the Platoon above their own. With incidents where Participants reported that Officer Cadets placed their own reputation above that of the Platoon (Participant 17) and conducted knowledge hiding to attempt to give individuals an advantage over others in the Platoon (Participant 18).
The pressure caused by the need to manage the Permanent Staff to view the Officer Cadets positively has led to some deplorable behaviours. The felt need for Officer Cadets to be constantly good and efficient and the pressures brought about by the constant mantra relayed by Permanent Staff of, ‘You are the Leaders of the future’, drive inauthenticity and behaviours that may be diametrical to what is expected of a British Army Officer.

There is also a view exampled by the above that Permanent Staff do not ‘see’ the DS Watchers; particularly for the more astute ones, they may benefit from this activity. The Officer Cadet above may have a myriad of reasons to want to be dishonest with their experiences, such as wanting to join Combat or simply wanting to look the ‘best’ in the eyes of the DS.

_Erm yeah, it’s quite astounding. The level of DS Watching, actually, some people. The staff always say, oh, yeah, we know what goes on... they don’t have a clue._

**Participant 1**

Why do Officer Cadets have these behaviours? The data shows that Officer Cadets risk alienation from the Platoon, among other detractions. The Officer Cadet may logically weigh this up against the rewards.

It seems that through learned experience, that Officer Cadets realise that this strategy achieves its aim, which is to use these actions to leverage advantage over others. So, there is an element of these poor behaviours being learned by Officer Cadets on arrival as others are exampleing them in the more senior terms.
There’s one person who the staff regard this Officer Cadet very highly, and they are regarded the worst by the Platoon

Participant 1

Also, the learned experience is that exposure and Permanent Staff opinion matter no matter how good an Officer Cadet is. The experience of Participant 1 will not only naturally give them less trust in the Chain of Command but will also encourage DS Watching amongst his whole Platoon. As they view that this Officer Cadet is enacting a DS Watching strategy and profiting from it.

Whereas, yeah, I think sometimes he may be the type of person who should be JUO or should be Sword of Honour but might not get it because it’s not always seen.

Participant 14

Being Seen seems to be as important as being liked by their Permanent Staff. The data shows that being ‘good’ or working hard is not required. It is being seen by those above them in the hierarchy to be doing those things that is important. Some regard this effort, which is unsighted by Permanent Staff, as wasted as it is without recognition.

I’ve seen some officer cadets just completely chinned stuff off. So, when we go out and do TEWTs, for example, completely chin it off, then at the end, come over and go ‘what have you got, what have you got’. And then when it comes to going through it, who’s the first person with a hand up [to answer a question], the person who did no work but has gone and got the ideas from everyone else.

Participant 1
The above links into a general frustration of Participant 1 that DS Watchers are profiting from their behaviours. At no point did the Participant, bystading whilst these behaviours occurred, challenge the individual. The Participant, by the language and tone, if their statement seems exasperated and powerless. This is through a joint venture – the DS Watcher has not done the work, according to participant 1. However, someone shared their answers despite these behaviours to enable this officer who did not work to pose question.

*I think it is a case of there’s both positive and negative DS watching, in my opinion, so there’s good as watching, which reinforces good habits that people should have anyway, but some don’t, i.e. Because if DS walks around the corner, you’re not the correct firing position, scramble and get in the correct firing position.*

Participant 15

Participant 15 position is unusual and unique in this data. Their social construction of DS watching seems different than most. Participant 15 states that for some, DS Watching may re-enforce good habits. This may be because Participant 15 has DS Watched, which may have led him to reprocess DS Watching into an activity that can be positive (if they do it) and negative (when others do it) to help justify his position.

4.3.2 Impression Management

Impression Management can be combined with DS Watching to target Permanent Staff, but at times Impression Management is also used in isolation to build an impression among peers. The interviews resulted in several views on the ‘why’ of DS Watching; some Officer Cadets believe it is used to ‘game’ their time at Sandhurst. The use of the term ‘gaming’ was
particularly applicable to those with prior military experience who have had a learned practice of what achieves results in a Military environment.

*And he’s got experience gaming the system and knowing that that is how you perform well, that’s how you get respected ultimately, that’s how then you get the DS like to see that’s what they want. They want to see that perfect person who, in their eyes, embodies everything about the values and standards.*

Participant 13

The phrase gaming may hold particular significance, which will be unpacked and explored in the following chapter. These Officer Cadets with prior military experience are well regarded, particularly initially by other Officer Cadets.

Those with military experience tend to have confidence and comfort with the Sandhurst process, which makes them more engaged and tends to alter the power relationship of the Platoon to their favour. Participant 13 may also be describing Sandhurst as a performance that ‘gaming the system’ leads to performing well. This gaming performance may involve using their knowledge to influence the Platoon into adopting the Officer Cadets’ intent.

The use of the word ‘performance’ is interesting, with its links to theatre and entertainment. This could be an apt reflection of the ‘performance’ when observed by Permanent Staff as a means of impression management. A performance of this nature would be reserved for when the audience, in this case, the permanent staff, was present. The Officer Cadet may need to rest between performances to protect the integrity of his performance; this resting could be regarded as ‘social loafing’.
Participant 4 then talks about the importance of being liked, as did Participant 21 earlier in the analysis. This extremely subjective language again places likability above an outcome-based or objective goal.

This likability has a real tangible benefit for those trying to influence, and if an Officer Cadet can improve likability through impression management, then the power they wield within their platoon and company is increased.

The participants repeatedly concur, relaying that it is subjectivity that is important, being liked and respected by others.

*I think it is a very competitive place, but I’ve been in quite competitive like places all my life and I, so I find it difficult to recognise it, I think. I think it brings out behaviours. I think the big thing with this place is if you’re liked, you’re fine if even if you’re bad at something, so for example, for Sovereigns Banner like it’s a platoon competition. People in the platoon’s skills vary over many different, like, things. But I would say the thing I have noticed the most is if you’re not liked, and you’re not very good at something, that’s when people become very.. not very erm accepting*

Participant 4

This constant competition to establish a social ranking through impression management seems logical and will be explored more in later sections. A repeated outlier in the data seems to be ‘likeability’ from the above statement. The Officer Cadet indicates that ‘likeability’ can overcome the barrier of professional competence. Participant 4 goes further than this; they indicate that ‘likeability’ will overcome the professional competence barrier, even in the highly regarded and competitive environment that the Sovereigns Banner Competition promotes. A competition, which does to the competitiveness, is reported to encourage other Officer Cadets to
‘Tactically Biff’, a term we will further explore later. Further re-enforcing the importance of likeability as a barrier to all these negative behaviours and connotations, and therefore of importance to an Officer Cadet wanting to ‘do well’.

*I think early on the, it’s the first loudest, but not the loudest people but the people that say the suggestion first. The platoon kind of adopt something, and it never changes in that sense.*

**Participant 14**

This management of views of Permanent Staff is mentioned repeatedly by Officer Cadets and is seen as a crucial element when combined with DS Watching. We see from the above comment by Participant 14 that some Officer Cadets view that it is those that who suggest ideas first have the most impact. Also, the ease with which the Platoon adopts the first ideas once these ideas are in motion seems to indicate a level of Groupthink within the platoon.

The Data indicates that those with Impression Management tendencies seem to attempt to manage every interaction. Officer Cadets noticing in some personality changes so dichotomic and pronounced that they are easily noticeable amongst other Officer Cadets.

*It’s almost like a bit of Jekyll and Hyde personality, not in the way that one’s good and one’s bad, but in the way that the out front when he is talking to Permanent Staff. He won’t crack jokes, won’t have a bit of banter, won’t really engage in patter but is quite rigid and formal. And then with us is more relaxed and shows maybe a bit more of his ego.*

**Participant 13**

These contrasting behaviours and the concept of presenting their best selves as Officer Cadets are repeated in the data. Hiding, in some cases, some very extreme reactions whilst on
exercises, such as crying, in fear that they may in some way detract from their standing or reputation. This Jekyll and Hyde reference is pertinent, as not only could the Officer Cadet be referring to the contrasts of personality, but also to the performance of those contrasts of personality by actors.

4.4 Look At Me

4.4.1 Narcissism

This constant re-enforcement that these Officer Cadets are the future leaders of the Army may lead to some developing narcissistic tendencies.

_I think imagine being told every day you’re going to be the next generation of leaders. I look at it especially from my dad’s perspective as a soldier, as I know you were as well, sir. You can imagine why people look at us as Ruperts. This place is a bit strange in the fact that every day we’re told you know you’re going to lead, you’re going to do this, you know you’re... and it’s so that arrogance comes naturally whether you’re an arrogant person or not, you start to then go, do you know what I am, I am pretty special._

Participant 10

Participant 10 indicates that Officer Cadets are all made’ arrogant’ by Sandhurst, regardless of the proclivities before arrival. The Data then from Participant 10, therefore, states that every British Army Officer who commissions from Sandhurst is arrogant to various degrees.

Some Officer Cadets relayed incidents where they were delighted to have dominated or belittled someone else for their own means, without realising the narcissistic nature of their actions or relaying this incident as a positive experience.
I was Platoon Sergeant pre-Montys, and I turned around to him, and I went absolutely transactional with him, to put it politely. And I said yeah, I put him in his place completely swept the rug out from underneath his feet.

Participant 6

The Officer Cadet relayed with glee and enthusiasm how they had managed to dominate the situation. In an “absolutely transactional” way.

*We have, we have a lot of child protégés in my platoon. It’s the people who have, from a very young age, been told that they are god’s gift, that they are top of the class and top of the cohort, you’re going to have an amazing life. They’ve gone away and achieved something pretty spectacular, just by grasping at things, still just like, this is just the way their life has gone. They got here, and because they have gone through this child protégé life, when they have first encountered failure, they have absolutely crumbled.*

Participant 21

Participant 21 relayed that they thought some of the Officer Cadets had an element of privilege. Participant 21 was extremely agitated whilst relaying this vignette. The underlying premise of Participant 21 position was that some Officer Cadets had been gifted many things that others at Sandhurst have had to work hard for, the tensions of this were tangible and profound. Participant 21 seemed joyful in relaying the ‘crumbling’ after failure of these ‘protégés’.

This a further example within Sandhurst of the underlying ‘class-war’. The researcher and padre have been asked to coach and mentor those from less affluent backgrounds whom the Harrow/Eton public schools deliberately isolated within their Platoons and Companies.

These elements may also play into the Narcissism of some Officer Cadets, that this cohort, in addition to being told repeatedly as Participant 10 indicated that they are the Leaders
of the future. Some within the Harrow/Eton fraternities have been told they are the Leaders of the Future and that they are special for a much longer time.

**Personal Life Intrusion**

During these drunken exercises of power, Permanent Staff felt that they had a right to question Officer Cadets’ personal relationships. Again, another area that Permanent Staff should not be addressing Officer Cadets regarding.

*I think it stressed me out more because we were all in separate relationships outside of the Army, and I still am. I know myself, and I know I would never do something like that. My and my platoon make jokes because we hang out, and he’s like one of my closest friends … But then once the staff got involved and said that to me when he was drunk as well. I was just a bit like a. This doesn’t have anything to do with you. b. if you actually just wanted to check, I was okay. If it was like a welfare thing. And he just kind of made it feel that.

Oh, like me and the other staff are aware of it. And I was just like, there’s nothing to be aware of. And I don’t like the fact you’ve done this when you’re drunk. And I think that’s something I would just not do … I was confused as to why as being debriefed because I was like, I felt like my reputation was being like, run through the mud in a sense. And also like my just personal life*

*Participant 4.*

Everyone is entitled to a Private Life without external interference; this is in direct conflict with the statements received from Participants who regularly relay stories of incidents where this right to a private life was compromised.
Officer Cadets, find it challenging and communicate that they are ‘confused’ when drunkenly given a Carlsberg Debrief by Permanent Staff on personal matters.

So that’s, that’s, that’s another thing, that there’s stuff that blends between like obviously in the Army your personal life and your private life is sort of the same thing. I think that a lot of cadets, like even myself that, weren’t in the military beforehand, it’s a weird adjustment to make to all of a sudden not knowing what’s your Colour Sergeants or Platoon Commanders business and what isn’t.

Participant 12

Participant 12 discusses the difficulty and specifically uses the word ‘weird’ regarding the seemingly required shifting of the public/private line at Sandhurst.

This interest in the private lives of Officer Cadets by Permanent Staff is at best misguided but could even be construed as illegal. In addition to the legality and ethics of this is a power exchange.

Pro-Social Teasing

On occasion, the Officer Cadets let the mask slip and reveal their narcissistic tendencies while trying to maintain their persona constantly.

Probably goes back to again, When he’s on the lines [Platoon] when he’s around individuals. He just knows he’s better and will tease people about that sometimes. Not to his friendship group, but even I find it sometimes upsetting.

Participant 13
Firstly Participant 13 is noticeably clear on the geographical boundaries of the unnamed person's behaviours. ‘The lines’ is a term for the Platoon Lines; this is where Officer Cadets live. This is deemed a ‘safe space’ for them, and Permanent Staff access is restricted, particularly outside working hours. In this protected environment the unnamed Officer Cadet can be less guarded with their less savoury behaviours, safe in the knowledge they will be unobserved by Permanent Staff.

Participant 13 also alludes to the arrogance and lack of humility explored earlier in the data by their ‘knowing’ regarding their perception of their ability. Of note is the use of the word ‘tease’; we will explore pro-social teasing in the discussion chapter. However, it seems a word that may have been selected to minimise through their selection of language, a behaviour that could easily be regarded as taunting or ridiculing.

### 4.4.2 Power Relations

This study will first explore the power relations utilised by some Permanent Staff members over Officer Cadets. These relations help enable a context and environment where staff and officers feel empowered to exercise their Agency. This repeated exercise of power upon not only Officer Cadets on each other but is also reinforced by Permanent Staff regularly exercising and re-affirming their Agency over Officer Cadets.

**Carlsberg Debriefs**

As understood by Officer Cadets, the meaning of a Carlsberg Debrief is given below by Participant 12.
Sort of when Colour Sergeants or Platoon Commanders. Give feedback on your performance after they’ve had a few beers, like at a social or something.

Participant 12

These ‘Carlsberg Debriefs’ are entirely at odds with the policy of the Academy, which states that Permanent Staff should not be inebriated in the presence of Officer Cadets.

Drunkenness has long been an issue at the forefront of military discipline – there have been many attempts to change the culture. This is not a nascent problem with other academics wrestling with this issue 25 years ago:

Military social events should set the example that drunkenness is a vice. Leaders must discourage drunkenness. Soldiers should never see an intoxicated officer.

(Mosteller, 1997, p. 68)

Inappropriate Punishment

In addition to Permanent Staff exerting their power and agency through inappropriate questions regarding personal lives, Permanent Staff exercise their Agency by reaffirming their place of dominance through punishment.

I think it’d be one lecturer, who was a Captain, who was giving a lecture on. I think it was ground briefs or something. But there are people arriving late to the lecture, and they were very, they were, you know, annoyed. But this has already been explained previously if you were coming in late and ended up giving them press-ups, and I think the quote was something like, “I like being mean, it’s good fun”. And you know, whether that was in a joking way or not, I certainly didn’t feel like that was an appropriate thing to be said.

Participant 9
In the above statement, the situation has moved beyond verbal rebukes into the domain of physical punishments. The Officer Cadet acknowledges that it may have been said in jest but feels that the actions were inappropriate. The Officer Cadet also cannot fully remember the lesson; they think they remember the subject but clearly remember the incident, such was its impact on them.

An organisational Army bias discounts this action as a ‘normal’ consequence. However, the academic lens highlights concern with the physical punishments of young people for tardiness. This interaction is undoubtedly about Agency, showing the officer cadet that Permanent Staff can enforce uncomfortable activity upon them at will, for nugatory indiscretions. The action also has narcissistic and Machiavellian undertones – as it is a move to re-assert the captain as the dominant power (Machiavellianism), but they do this publicly so that all can see how powerful they are (narcissism).

4.5 You are In The Army Now

4.5.1 Constant Competition

Competition creates a prized status where none existed before, thereby giving us something to desire. Then it insures that not everyone can get it. Finally, competition requires that those who obtain the reward can do so only by defeating everyone else. Both the objective and subjective conditions for Envy are established, in other words: restricted access to something desired and a (quite accurate) belief that someone else has got it at one’s own expense

(Kohn, 1986, p. 141)

One can see from the description above that there is a myriad of Sandhurst situations that would fit the definition from Kohn (1986), such as the competition for Cap badges, Sovereigns
Banner Competition, the Queen’s Medal, and Sword of Honour are a small selection of the elements that make up the constant competition of Sandhurst.

_I do think that maybe that leads into then; there is still a kind of a culture of it pays to be a winner. And I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that. But equally, I think there are quiet winners as well. But then there are louder winners, let’s say_

**Participant 7**

The phrase “Pays to be a winner” migrated to the British Army in the late 1980s from the US Navy Seals (Doherty et al., 1981, p. 15; Morris, 2019, p. 51). In these scenarios, Basic Underwater Demolition (BUD/S), the colloquial name for the Navy Seal selection course, attendees are given ‘extras’ such as sleep or food in exchange for extraordinary achievement or effort. With knowledge of its origins, using this language may be unhelpful for young Officer Cadets in their first six months of British Army membership. The Officer Cadet does not think anything is wrong with the competitive culture but indicates that some of the winners may be gregarious in their victory and lack humility – humility is something we will further explore in the discussion chapter.

This ‘pays to be a winner; mentality further feeds into the Officer Cadet's perception that everything is a competition at Sandhurst, that you can ‘Win’ at being best in drill, best turned out, and in a myriad of normal daily activities. This hunger for recognition is normal human behaviour and particularly prevalent in rank-based organisations (Fuller, 2004).

_ I think that [Competitiveness] then means you can’t really show total humility and be actually, you know what? Yeah, so I was wrong there because you’re trying to fight your corner, really. Because if you don’t,
Participant 3

Participant 13 and Participant 7 concur that the competitiveness and the Alpha Male mentality discussed earlier acts as a barrier to the Officer Cadets showing humility in victory. Participant 13 goes further, and they seem to indicate that it is a barrier to reflective honesty. This is paradoxical in an organisation with Serve to Lead as its motto with humility at its core.

I think that [COVID Lockdown] kind of built into that kind of dog-eat-dog competition. People saw everyone, you see what PT they’re doing; you see what, what every aspect of their life, and it just got rather on top of each other.

Participant 6

Participant 6 describes a particular type of competition, a ‘dog-eat-dog’ environment, a term loaded with gender bias and indicative of a hypermasculine environment. Furthermore, ‘Dog-Eat Dog’ is a ‘zero-sum’ phrase, where competition relies on the detraction of the competition for your betterment – an action with clearly Machiavellian connotations. A competition in which the only means of success is the failure of others. Sandhurst should strive to progress team goals, not enable the ‘zero-sum’ approach.

It's also a competitive environment. Just the way that you know, lots of stuff you do that best you know, PT is pretty much always best effort. It's quite rare, and we do actually things as a platoon or squad in a way, and that's what we found hardest time about the march and shoot, for example, was having to go slow as a group.
Participant 23

Participant 23 indicates that Sandhurst actively promotes a competitive atmosphere. This is particularly prevalent during the physical training events linking with participant 6 states about PT's difficult environment and Participant 7 about the need to win this constant treadmill of individual competitions.

The Officer Cadets acknowledge the linkage between Narcissism and their constant quest to ‘Be The Best’.

*I think it comes from being that, wanting to be the best, it's, I think. I’m not saying that all officers are narcissistic. But I think it's lots of people want to be perceived as being the best in a group. So regardless, like if you still got better, the best score, but you came second, but you want to be at the top.*

Participant 22

Participant 22 also acknowledges that such is the level of Narcissism that ‘lots of people’ would sacrifice professional competence for the pleasure of ‘at the top’ – in a purely personal competition with no external intrinsic reward. The language used within the first line is also interesting, thus indicating that most officers are Narcissistic. Another interesting angle was the relaying of this information, during which the Participant was in no way ashamed or reticent to relay this information. They did not associate it with negative connotations, more simply a statement of fact.

Data from Officer Cadets further supports this notion of their revelry in the competitive aspect of Sandhurst due to their character and behaviours.
Competition fuels performance. I think it’s necessary and important. I think if you don’t have that, then people just get lazy because there’s nothing to work for. I do think it brings the best out of people in terms of selecting to beat someone but be a bit worse. I think I will always, would rather be first I’m incredibly competitive. But if I, what is more, important to me than coming first is being the best that I can be.

Participant 17

We can see that not only does the statement above promote the need for Sandhurst's competitive nature, but it also goes further, declaring both of import and necessity. The Participant is correct in that competition can enhance performance within some people, but it must be healthy competition, and again this is not a catch-all. The Participant also indicates that Officer Cadets would be lazy without this competition. When Officer Cadets commission and are without this competition, they do not immediately become lazy. However, that could be due to Pavlov-type conditioning, or the Officer Cadet could create personal competition where none is readily apparent. Participant 17 also, like many others, elected to ‘beat someone’ and be first rather than professional competence.

The data shows that Sandhurst is a competitive atmosphere, and some of the Officer Cadets explored with more depth than the one-dimensional aspect. The participants reflected on the nature of ‘why’ with one Officer Cadet, implying that the competitive nature may be partly born out of personal reasons.

I think there’s an element of competition that’s born out of people wanting to be the best, and there’s an element of competition born out of people wanting to cover insecurity and make themselves feel good.
This is a fascinating statement by Participant 17, that this competition may be not simply an element of managing perception and image but also may have a narcissistic element. Also, Officer Cadets actively wants to ‘cover insecurities’. We will explore this covering insecurity in the discussion chapter regarding Vulnerable Narcissism.

4.5.2 Cap badges

One element of the constant competition is cap-badges; there was a view that Sandhurst has strived to counter that the Officer Cadet cohort is split broadly into thirds, with the top third going to Combat, the middle third to Combat Support (CS), and the bottom third to Combat Service Support (CSS). Competition can get high-pressured and may lead to poorer behaviours; that will now be explored below.

I there’s always going to be an element of it because one is literally going into battle, one is enabled and one’s enablers.

Participant 1

Despite the work amongst the Leadership of Sandhurst, the barrier, as displayed in the statement from Participant 1, is still apparent. The enabled is Combat and enablers, a term that groups together CS and CSS. The language is unusual for an Officer Cadet who will have been exposed to nothing above a Company Attack, where those terms are not in use. Enablers/Enabled are terms which hark from Op Herrick (Afghanistan), so they would not be present in the lexicon
of either Platoon Commander or Officer Cadets. Therefore, these terms and the opinions of Participant 1 show much influence from the Colour Sergeant cohort.

*Where they go at RSBs, yes, it’s the Infantry model, the Infantry wants the top third that’s where they generally tend to go. So, it does work for the Infantry. But does it then mean that someone who could be a future GOC signals officer is getting seen off of the Academy as a bottom third because he does not get tactical actions?*

**Participant 13**

The Infantry themselves will not change the status quo; as Participant 13 points out, it works for the Infantry. Another issue is that the cohort it works for also tends to occupy British Army leadership’s upper echelons. Why do Leadership and Combat have such a symbiotic relationship at Sandhurst? Despite its progressive musings, is the British Army still wedded to the idea of Heroic Leadership and particularly the facet of it known as ‘Battle Leadership’ (Cohen, 2010, p. 3)? Others in contemporary military academia have indicated a need to move away from this viewpoint due to the complexity of modern warfare (King, 2019). These complexities require more of a “primus inter pares” (King, 2019, p. 264) than what is traditionally taught.

*Whether it is deliberate or not, the Army’s current leadership paradigm and doctrine encourage Soldiers to view Leadership through a leader-centric, hierarchical lens. Leaders issue orders to their subordinates*

(King, 2019, p. 13)

So, the Army still subscribes to the Heroic Leadership school, at least unconsciously. These Heroic Leaders come from the Infantry, which is selected from the top quartile of
Sandhurst. This competition amongst friends/colleagues harks back to the ‘pays to be winner’ mentality discussed earlier. For a high-stake prize, it makes Officer Cadets who were friends/allies in the weeks previously into direct competitors.

_I had a period where I wanted to leave my Platoon Bec.. in this term because RSBs changed [Redacted] Platoon, we went from being like a really tight-knit group to the people that had we’re doing really well in this process and started to be quite horrible to the people that weren’t doing so well, and kind of picking them out. I really didn’t like that, and I had to think really long about can I stick with this platoon, I don’t know if I even can move platoons, but I was just, I don’t want to be here, I don’t want to be part of this._

**Participant 2**

As the data shows from the statement above by Participant 2 – this competition amongst the more narcissistic members who revel within it produces some less-savoury behaviours. What were once coherent, high-performing teams morph into something akin to representing the Hunger Games. With the stronger Platoon members, isolate and highlight weaknesses in others. If conducted in the presence of Permanent Staff, this highlights the weakness of other competitors, therefore lessening their competitor reputation management; they hope it maximises their chance of an Infantry spot.

_Status in the military comes with combat, particularly in the Army._

**Participant 6**

Participant 6 states that status in the Army is symbiotic with combat, inferring that the other two-thirds of the Army are deemed ‘lesser’. This is an unnerving statement. Does Sandhurst and the British Army write off two-thirds of the Officer cohort within the first six
months of their career? This is, of course, an extremely short-sighted endeavour. The British Army does not do this- but due to the perception of Status and that the ‘best’ go to Combat – it creates a barrier and bias in every subsequent military course.

The education that all officers are equally regarded, valued and essential should start at Sandhurst. The data shows the opposite to be true, and it is Sandhurst providing these biases.

4.5.3 Tactical Biffing

One of these behaviours is ‘tactical biffing’. This is when the Officer Cadets collegiately decide to ‘encourage’ a weaker member of the Platoon to report medically sick through a process called eConsult. This is conducted before some form of physical competition.

*I mean, there are Platoons that tactically biff cadets in their platoon, or they try and manage who is going to be injured or well for certain events...Basically, some platoons tell some of their weaker members to eConsult a week before or a few days before an event.*

*Participant 12*

In the case of ‘tactical biffing’, those deemed more professionally competent and physically fit seem to form a group. These informal groupings tend to sway the Platoon’s behaviours. They seem to groupthink, swayed by informal leaders within these groups, to their own ends.

Data from other Officer Cadets also corroborate this concept of a specific ingroup leading the conversation regarding Tactical Biffing.

The Platoon forms an ingroup with language specific to Officer Cadets and their terms of reference that the researcher had not come across before in more than 24 years in the British
Our Platoon, well this group in our Platoon are very confident if some people tactically biff on different events that we will win, and I don’t think that’s what it’s about. Well, it shouldn’t be what it’s about.

Participant 2

The in-groups, or as Participant 2 refers to them, ‘cliques’, are another example of the ‘me’ being placed above the team. Participant 2 also alludes to the acknowledgement that this is a socially constructed ingroup term – when they correct themselves to the term ‘light-duties’, which is the typical term for what Officer Cadets call ‘biffing’.

You get people saying, you know, this person can’t do it otherwise, we will lose.

Participant 11

Participant 11 again reinforces that ‘me’ is more important than the team. With an explanation that the ingroup or clique seeks buy-in from the remainder of the Platoon and that excluding individuals they deem to be lesser will enable them to succeed as a platoon or team.

This pressure is due to the DS Watchers wanting to manage perceptions and is compounded by the constantly competitive nature of Sandhurst. Permanent Staff attitudes and approaches would vary from an absolute disdain for tactical biffing and all it represented, as communicated below by Participant 15.

I think the biffing in terms of like Sovereigns Platoon events and stuff that’s not that prevalent. It does happen, but I think that this staff, especially from my experience of it, are very anti that’s going to happen.
Participant 15

There is, for some, active encouragement to ‘Tactical Biff’, which was conveyed below when Participant 17 expressed concerns over the pressure placed on Officer Cadets.

And also, it comes from a fear of getting it wrong. Tactical biffing is so easy. I think some of it comes from the cadets that are around them. Although for the march and shoot, one of the other platoons in my company, I spoke to everyone in the platoon, and they were like yeah, we can’t believe that she has [tactically] biffed knowing full well that she has. And they think it was the individual and the staff more than anyone. But I think it’s the staff that need to stop it. It is so obvious, but then there’s an element of Oh, yeah, what if they actually are injured, but there’s also an element of the staff care about it more than the cadets do.

Participant 17

We can see from Participant 17 that some members of Platoon Staff enable Tactical Biffing. This is a Permanent Staff example of ‘me before team’. The Platoon Commander, who wins the Sovereigns Banner Competition, is given a letter from the Queen to congratulate them.

4.5.4 Knowledge Hidings/Sabotage

Data collection in this context and the stories participants have shared have shed light on what this competitive environment looks like in practice. They go on to reveal the behaviours that contribute to it and are a result of it.

Amongst these was the notion of knowledge hiding and knowledge sabotage used as a tool by some Officer Cadets to set themselves apart from others to furnish a competitive advantage.
Whereas RSB is one part that you can perceive to be quite a selfish motivation... where you want the most facetime, you want to look the best out of everyone. And ultimately, I think some of those things [values] are sacrificed along the way where, for example, you’d organise a meeting to go and speak to one of the regimental Colour Sergeants you want to speak to, but you wouldn’t necessarily tell the other two or three guys that you’re going to do it because you want that facetime... you want to be seen to have that initiative on. Having done it, it’s little behaviours like that.

Participant 18

We see from the statement above a textbook example of knowledge hiding. To separate themselves from their direct competition in the Platoon, the Participant arranges their opportunity for ‘facetime’. They deliberately hid these details from his fellow Officer Cadets, who also wanted to join the same cap badge. When relating this story, the Participant was not ashamed or concerned that some may question that these actions are at odds with the British Army Core Values such as Integrity, Selfless Commitment, and Respect for Others. This indicates that Officer Cadets accepted behaviours like this as ‘normal’ practice. The Officer Cadet wanted to be acknowledged for this deception and “to be seen to have that initiative”.

In addition to this apparent sabotage were more nuanced versions which be referred to as ‘grade dragging’. For context, all Officer Cadets are scored by the Permanent Staff when they are in a Command Appointment. These are known as Student Assessment Frameworks (SAFs) and are the only tangible evidence of their standard and performance report. SAFs are seen as quite an objective tool and an easy, objective way to determine who the best Officer Cadets are to use SAF scores. We can see their importance in the view of Officer Cadets below.
I don’t know if it’s maybe the environment, the environment set here is it’s very competitive. And it’s all about your SAF scores, like, especially like juniors and inters you’re really conscious of your SAF scores, and it doesn’t matter if you’re if the person’s got... if you’ve got 95 And your second, but the person in front of you, you’re going to the same cap badge, and there’s only one spot.

Participant 22

Officer Cadets know this and therefore have enacted ‘Grade Dragging’, which is the use of discrete actions to impact an officer cadet’s performance and, therefore, SAF Score. This tactic is only used against those deemed by the Officer Cadet to be in direct competition with them. Although they are discreet actions, there is an acknowledgement that these behaviours happen.

I think there’s an element of toxicity, but you can’t stamp that out, people are always self-serving and trying to be tactical. And I think it’s very hard to sort of stamp those people out early on unless you end up with about four people in the army.

Participant 17

Participant 17 acknowledges the ‘me before team’ that the Officer Cadet was previously alienated for earlier when he stated that the Platoons performance made him look bad rather than the team. Participant 17 also indicates its widespread proclivity that the majority enacts this view.
Participant 1, with brutal honesty, explains how he identifies people who think ‘they are the shit’ as a candidate for his ‘grade-dragging’ behaviours.

And there isn’t necessarily correlation between people who are competent or not as to who I do work hard for. I work hard for some people who aren’t as competent because I know how hard they’re working. Where there’s some people, and you’re just like... you think you’re the shit, so....

Participant 1

One can see from the statement above that there is a real focus on competency. Participant 1 has justified the ‘social loafing’ above by stating that arrogance is its reason. Certain Officer Cadets, it seems, will actively underperform for those they feel are in direct competition.

We have viewed DS Watching through a negative lens, but for all, this is not the case. One Participant expressed that they believed it could have a positive outcome both personally and organisationally.

Participant 1 seems comfortable freely exercising his agency, selecting who to work for and not to work for with apparent ease. Once a target of his agency is identified, Participant 1 does not run as hard, which seems like a tiny adjustment, but in the context of a section attack- it must move at the slowest person’s pace. If several Officer Cadets make these minor adjustments, it could potentially have a catastrophic effect on the outcome of the platoon attack and, therefore, the all-important SAF Score.

Participant 1 seems to target those who are confident in their ability for his ‘grade-dragging’.
Participant 1 revealed these behaviours again with seeming impunity, happily relaying how they would work less demanding for people who were confident and most likely his competitive peers.

The Why? It is an interesting question – surely Officer Cadets, with their integrity and respect for others, should trust the ‘system’. That the proper Officer Cadets will be assigned to the right roles and cap-badges based on their performance, as honestly critiqued by their Permanent Staff.

4.6 Look At Them

4.6.1 Role Models

The Thesis will now explore the data regarding positive and negative aspects of leadership role models as relayed in the words of participants at Sandhurst.

4.6.2 Positive Role Models

During the interviews, participants were asked to discuss one of their Leadership role models, with no further guidance given—leaving the Participant open to select military or civilian role models, dead or alive. This allowed the responses to be left fully open without a bias towards military role models.

When asked this question, despite 20% of the participants being female, which is a reasonable replication of the gender makeup of Sandhurst, only around 5% of the role-model examples given were female. Many would draw upon their Platoon Commander as their Leadership Role model.
I think my platoon commander Captain [Redacted], he’s got a big influence, obviously, for training everything but in terms of, as I say, probably learn from my mistakes the most when he’s the one who like, corrects me or pointing in the right direction. He’s definitely where I would start on that.

Participant 9

Curiously, none of the Officer Cadets gave their Platoon Commander as a Leadership inspiration if they were female and would either select their Colour Sergeant or reach back further in their memory for someone they deemed a suitable male role model.

 colour Sergeant [Redacted] is in my mind, one of the best of all colours sergeants here he is very fair with the way he deals with us and treats us ... And is I would say, body embodies the values and standards and is very ably supported by our platoon commander as well.

Participant 8

The interview excerpt above shows that Participant 8 elect to select their male Colour Sergeant rather than their Female Platoon Commander. They also state at the end that it is the Platoon Commander supporting the Colour Sergeant when the Leader-Follower dynamic is the other way around—elevating in his social construction of the leadership of the Platoon, the position of the Colour Sergeant to one that is seemingly above the Platoon Commander.

Probably first, say, my former schoolmaster who was ex Royal Anglian,

Captain [Redacted].

Participant 13
Other Officer Cadets selected other historic male role models. This selection may be coincidental but may indicate a gender bias when selecting role models. The data previously gave us the term ‘dog eat dog’, but this ‘Alpha Male’ mentality is continually reinforced in Participant Responses.

_We are sometimes being dicks, to be quite honest. It’s the way it is Sandhurst, it’s that best, alpha male mentality._

**Participant 6**

The Participant in this instance was male, but this male bias is an ongoing theme. The data suggests that Participant 6 thinks that this is a positive environment. The line “it’s that best, alpha male mentality” shows a lack of consideration of the 20% of Officer Cadets at Sandhurst that are female—marginalising and minimising their contribution as ‘less than’ their male counterparts.

Many participants regularly referred to ‘men’ when referring to those they would be leading. Women have been debarred from all roles in the Armed Forces since 2018. The Officer Cadets interviewed arrived at Sandhurst in 2021, 3 years after the change, which makes the researcher question the basis for this gender bias.

_I also understand who you want to lead, Men with bayonets fixed._

**Participant 13**

This is a romanticising of their leadership; this is simply due to the traditional story of the Heroic Leader leading their men into battle.
4.6.3 Negative Role Models

Despite Sandhurst being regarded as the ‘Gold Standard’, the poor behaviour of permanent staff in specific isolated incidents has impacted some of the Officer Cadets' leadership experience at Sandhurst.

One of the worst of the typical behaviours conducted by those deemed as negative role models are Carlberg Debriefs, and Tactical Biffing, which Officer Cadets suggest is only conducted due to external pressure from specific permanent staff.

*I think it's the staff that need to stop it. It is so obvious, but then there's an element of Oh, yeah, what if they actually are injured, but there's also an element of the staff care about it more than the cadets do.*

*Participant 17*

Carlsberg Debriefs if the Permanent Staff complies with Sandhurst policy is something that cannot happen to Officer Cadets. Sandhurst Alcohol Policy (Sandhurst 2022) clearly states that Permanent Staff are not to be drunk in the presence of Officer Cadets. Nevertheless, the lived experience is that it happens with such regularity that Officer Cadets have designed an ingroup vocabulary to describe the action of a member of Permanent Staff Drunkenly giving (typically extremely negative) feedback on performance.

The alcohol culture of Sandhurst indicates that Officer Cadets and Permanent Staff regularly drink together. With Officer Cadets regularly in interviews retelling tales of drunkenness with Permanent Staff, with one discussing how a Colour Sergeant had urinated in the corner of an anteroom after a charity dinner night.

After being close-down appropriately within Alcohol Policy, these dinner nights would then decamp en-masse to local nightclubs.
I think the sway Permanent Staff have over us. And like the pow...not only the sway they have, the influence they have but like I also the actual tangible power they have over us. It’s not a good thing, but at the same time, like it’s there, it’s this whole thing that if they like my Colour Sergeant is my is my immediate leader, as well as my Platoon boss. I like them both. And I want them to like me. The best way to do that is with a beer in my hand.

Participant 21

Permanent Staff and Officer Cadets should not be going to the same Nightclub according to the rules and regulations of Sandhurst. Both parties need space from each other. Interestingly, despite acknowledging the agency that the Permanent Staff hold over them, Participant 21 also refers, like many participants, to the need to be liked by their Permanent Staff.

In a civilian nightclub, the reputational risk is further heightened whilst concurrently, Sandhurst's ability to manage/oversee is completely negated.

Relationships with cadets were a big one. Just... just being, I think, generally just being very unprofessional and not knowing where that line was. Kind of going out for a few drinks is fine. But then it comes to a point where you leave, and the Officer Cadets continue their night, and they didn’t know where that line was.

Participant 19

Participant 19 was referring to relationships between Officer Cadets at UOTC and instructors rather than Sandhurst. However, these UOTCs sit within the Sandhurst Group. UOTCs are seen as an essential Sandhurst Engagement tool, and we can see that Participant 19 deemed their interaction with UOTCs unprofessional and inappropriate, particularly when alcohol is involved. The fact that Participant 19 felt that they knew where the ‘line’ was in a
more informed way than the Permanent Staff. The wording is deliberate; Participant 19 does not refer to errors in judgment or minor lapses. They refer to the experience as ‘very unprofessional’. indicating an enduring and repeated culture of unprofessional behaviour.

Dinner nights, when Officer Cadets and permanent staff usually drink alcohol together, also resulted in some examples of what the Officer Cadets named ‘Lazy Leadership’. An Officer Cadet identifying any poor action by a Permanent Staff is always a difficult conversation, but the subject being leadership in the Army centre of excellence for leadership is particularly perplexing.

*On the Saturday night, the [Redacted] staff, I won’t say who, set off, and it was witnessed, set off the fire alarm at three o’clock on the dot to clear everyone out. Now that included [Redacted] who were all asleep, they had to get up and parade on the parade square as well. And what it meant was that the entirety of [Redacted] and all their guests all cleared out, and it was just an easy and quick way of doing it. And actually, that was lazy leadership because rather than putting the graft in and actually going, this is going to be shit, but I’ll accept it.*

**Participant 17**

Participant 17 seems to attribute a level of work to effective leadership, using words like ‘graft’ to indicate someone who has led well. Whilst concurrently labelling an individual whom he deems less effective as conducting ‘lazy leadership’.

Permanent staff have also reportedly belittled Officer Cadets, shouted at Officer Cadets without appropriate reason, questioned them on personal relationships, and awarded physical punishments for infringements that are at most minor. In on Platoon, the culture set by the platoon commander created an environment where no Officer Cadet wanted to ask a question or
be seen to highlight themselves. Less they found themselves within the eye-line of the platoon commander and were shot down by them.

My platoon commander in juniors. The sort of main example he was just a bit brash occasionally in how he spoke to us, and so that one example is basically one I would use it, and we were pretty afraid to put our hands up and speak in class.

Participant 23

Participant 23 language is a damning indictment of their Platoon Commander. To have a Platoon too ‘afraid’ to put their hands up or speak out is a very ineffective teaching/coaching environment.

One reported incident of poor leadership which was reported involved permanent staff laughing as an Officer Cadet attempted to give a set of orders – seemingly without appropriate mentoring or guidance.

I think potentially in last term, there was a platoon commander that I don’t think was necessarily fair, and I think there was one cadet, in particular, that did seem to be kind of picked on by the Colour Sergeant as well actually. And it just kind of spiralled a little bit. I think the staff kind of fed off each other, and this Cadet kind of got...he took it very well, and I think that was why it continued to the point that it did, but he was always being picked on, he was always the first one that everyone looked at.

Participant 5
Participant 5 talks of many behaviours that could be easily interpreted as Bullying, Harassment or Discrimination (BHD). Words which indicate the actions were unfair, the Officer Cadet was singled out, picked on, ridiculed, and undermined in front of their superiors and peers.

**Negative Leadership Lessons**

Officer Cadets communicated that they had learned more about what not to do regarding leadership.

*I think I actually learned more about what kind of leader like I don't want to be by looking at like just certain traits that people have rather than necessarily. People who I've got, there are some people that I've seen to have like a great leadership style, but I think that's generally is because it's unique, and it's unique to them. So, I don't necessarily look at someone and think, oh, I want to lead like that because I don't think that's me. I think I learned more about like specific traits that I don't want to have, and in that way, that kind of shapes. How I lead, I think.*

**Participant 4**

It would be easy to demonise the Sandhurst for Participant 4 response – however, Participant 4 is learning holistically. Effective and less-effective behaviours are a highly efficient way of learning and assimilating leadership practice.

*I think the overriding view amongst officer cadets, especially in my company, I think is that it seems like we’ve learned probably more about how not to lead than to lead. And I know that sounds really, really bad.*

**Participant 20**

Participant 20, despite being over ten months into their year-long leadership course, was more confident in the lessons they had learned about ineffective leadership than effective
behaviours. Of note, the Participant limits this accusation to their Company and not the intake. Indicating that he felt the issues were at the Company HQ level rather than the Platoon. Company HQ within Sandhurst consists of the OC, a Major, and the Company Sergeant Major. These people are empowered to mentor the SNCO and Officers, and, unusually, they are the target of Participant 20.

*Do as I Say, Not As I Do*

Leading By Example is a crucial tenet of British Army Leadership; with Sandhurst being the home of Officership and Leadership, one could believe that the staff here would be beyond reproach in this respect. In addition, the data shows that Officer Cadets themselves believe it is of critical importance.

*First and foremost, lead by example. As I've mentioned, it's important to me.*

**Participant 6**

*I think, first and foremost, is definitely leading by example. I think, to me, that's the one that most important they set really a really good example, like pace-set and show what the standard is and what they expect of you.*

**Participant 13**

*Sort of reflecting the values of the team really well, and not to sound really like, like, cheesy, but leading by example.*

**Participant 22.**
The fact that these three Officer Cadets have such similar perspectives indicates that the prevalence that Leading by example is “First and Foremost” may be a retelling of a lesson or guidance by their Platoon Staff. This, therefore, brings doubt into this question. They may be constructing their understandings of leadership, drawing upon what is discussed in the context of Sandhurst. This retelling of the exact phrase may indicate the dominance of the Platoon Staff in the construction of leadership for officer cadets.

Unfortunately, as we will explore later, there are as many poor Leadership examples as good ones given by Officer Cadets. With Permanent Staff feeling enabled and willing to exercise their power at regular periods:

*There's examples where we've been allowed off the coaches on our way to an exercise on the way back from exercises. Given five minutes, whatever you do, okay, there's a loo stop, not allowed to go and get food, you come back on the coach, and that staff member is now holding a Starbucks or something. When obviously, I understand the practicalities of you can't get the entire company through in that, but one individual can go through but in terms of leading by example, even if he was wanting one individual to have done that. The point is that even if you could practically have done that, you shouldn't have done that because you've just told the entire company not to.*

**Participant 16**

The Officer Cadets would clearly have identified, as Participant 16 did, that this activity was a lack of integrity and a failure to lead by example. Despite the lessons during Junior Term on a reasonable challenge and calling out poor behaviours, we see evidence again that the power dynamic within this Platoon is such that Officer Cadets do not feel empowered enough to do this. Instead, the 53 Officer Cadets on the coach sit hungrily in silence whilst the two Permanent Staff ate a takeaway.
4.6.4 Effective Leadership Behaviours

Empathy

Officer cadets cited empathy repeatedly in their understanding of effective leaders. This is not a value that one usually associates with Army leadership. One could easily surmise that, particularly amongst the homogenous Colour Sergeant cohort, the Sandhurst staff may find it challenging to empathise due to their lack of shared experiences, but seemingly, some of this cohort empathise exceptionally well. This is evidenced to significantly impact the Officer Cadet's social construction of what effective leadership practice is.

So, in Juniors, we had in our platoon was twenty-six men and four women, and we had an issue with toilets and showers that we had in the block and the boys just refusing to understand...So we had one like, you know, identified female toilet that we could use, and they would refuse to not use it, and it was just unsanitary all the time. And it didn't matter when we asked them on multiple occasions in nice ways and not to not to use it or to explain that it was like a sanitary space that we can use that; they just refused to accept our offer. So, in the end, we I went, I went to CSgt [Redacted], and I was a bit like oh God, is he really gonna understand what this is about? And actually, he was furious with the boys but went and explained to them in front of all of us, you know, that it wasn't acceptable, and really backed the female officer cadets, that was a really great moment because it was early on in juniors like week three, and I had, we all had absolute trust. And then, from that moment on, I understood that's what we needed.

Participant 2

This male infantry Colour Sergeant understood and empathised with the female cadets and ensured reasonable adjustments were made to support them. It also shows that this slight adjustment was instrumental in building trust between the Colour Sergeant and the female
Officer Cadets. The use of language such as ‘from that moment on’ shows that the participant did not think that the Colour Sergeant would empathise or act prior to this event.

**Gender and Empathy**

The statement also reflects the ongoing tensions regarding gender in the British Army. The Participant upfront feels the need to point out the gender mix within the platoon in their opening statement. Another is the use of language regarding gender; initially, it is quite measured, using female and male as identifiers. However, when discussing the incident, she reduces the male gender to ‘boys’ while simultaneously maintaining the females' status. This could indicate a perception that the ‘boys’ were acting childish and therefore earned this title through their actions.

The gender debate in the British Army is unpicked by this statement above – the British Army is trying to make itself gender-free, whilst a more appropriate aim is to be gender fair. Both sexes need accommodation and specific requirements at times; the above is a simple example of that.

*I think the greatest trait of a good leader is being empathetic but flexible, so recognising, you know, there's a time to be the individual carrying the team, and there's other times to just give the team the resources they need to carry themselves.*

**Participant 10**

Participant 10 cites being empathetic as the ‘greatest trait’; this statement would show tensions if viewed through as behavioural leadership theory. However, the Officer Cadet is presumed not to be using this lens, and their frame of reference would be the dictionary.
definition of a ‘trait’ as a label for a combination of behaviours. In addition, the use of the word ‘greatest’ really displays the worth and power placed upon this by Participant 10. They also recommend the need for ‘Mission Command’, a military term for providing resources and guidance whilst letting those around you be empowered to devise solutions within that resource envelope.

Conversely, other Officer Cadets cited the lack of Empathy as poor leadership behaviour and one that detracted from the team.

So, it was lack of empathy because we simply weren't able to in terms of the change parades and stuff that would happen in juniors and things there simply was not time to get in and out in five minutes, and he sort of took that as him being ignored, I suppose there, there was a physical impossibility to be able to meet the timing in that way. And then also and then the lack of empathy, their lack of empathy in terms of the people wanted to get away.

Participant 16

Participant 16 uses the word Empathy three times in the above statement and felt genuinely slighted by the lack of it, in this case, from a fellow Officer Cadet. In addition to the empathy connected to it is the care and concern given by the Colour Sergeant of Participant 2.

Care and Concerns

The thesis will now explore the theme of ‘Care and Concern’, which, repeatedly, participants vocalised, citing both as evidence of an effective Platoon Commander. Whilst conversely citing lack of it as a behaviour re-enforcing Leadership ineffectiveness.

Just always seems very kind of concerned about you in a way that makes you think like he really cares. And I don't think everyone's going to personally,
but I still somehow feel like he does actually care about everyone. And it's I think it's just the way he kind of presents himself is the thing that's maybe unique about him.

Participant 5

This care and concern that the person indicated by Participant 5 indicates a level of social and emotional intelligence. Current Sandhurst Leadership entirely ignores these two aspects of Leadership. The researcher would surmise that these elements may be essential in the context of ‘in-camp’ Leadership, practised while training within the barracks when officer cadets are exposed to external pressures and intrusions. Such as using social media (officer cadets’ phones are removed when on exercise).

My platoon commander is just genuinely interested in my success and doing well. ... Because coming off of Juniors, I had a not-so-great platoon commander. Who was about to leave, and it seemed like he didn't care, but this one we have now he's, yeah, he genuinely cares about our future after here.

Participant 14

We can see from the above that Participant 14 talks about the contrast between a platoon commander that shows interest and cares, to one that Participant 14 believes does not care about the Officer Cadets.

One could critique that it is not caring that the participant craves but the appearance of caring. The second ‘caring’ Platoon Commander could have cared less than the first but had the social and emotional intelligence to present as caring.
Participant 14 also, in his statement, seems to believe that he can differentiate between ‘genuine’ interest and interest that may again be part of ‘the show’ will be discussed in the next chapter.

**Approachability**

Approachability was the most cited behaviour of a Leadership Role Model across participant responses. Timeously, the first sentence of the Officer Cadets' response highlighted its importance.

*Approachable. Some of the men and women under their command will actually want to talk to them and feel that they can trust them.*

**Participant 7**

This vein of social and emotional intelligence being of import is often repeated through constant reinforcement through Participants' responses. Due to the unapproachability of others within Sandhurst, approachability is an exceptionally highly valued behaviour. It is also interesting that Participant 7 needs to highlight that both men and women, rather than the more general terms of officers or soldiers. Again, this quote further unveils the tensions surrounding gender in the military environment.

*If there ever is a dressing down and you disagree with it, obviously don't do it at the time, but if you ever want to go and have a chat about anything, any issue G1 or whatever, even just straight after you’ve been dressed down and he's more than happy to switch tact straight off the bat and discuss it.*

**Participant 8**
Here we see approachability utilised as a critical aspect of conflict resolution within the Platoon. That by being approachable, the Colour Sergeant and Officer Cadet can address concerns in a safe environment, in which the Officer Cadet feels empowered to give feedback on actions or behaviours highlighted by the Colour Sergeant.

The data also indicates that approachability to others is critical for the individual and in helping achieve team goals.

*I think being very calm in all situations and being approachable, I think is key. And what that means is that enables a sort of a comfortable atmosphere with to sort of emerge where people can express ideas, bring them bring them problems as well, which kind of drives the whole organisation sort of forward.*

**Participant 20**

Participant 20 states that calmness combined with approachability enables an atmosphere of divergent collaboration with an organisational impact. The above participant talks about an open forum where personal or organisational problems and solutions are equally considered and regarded. This inclusive environment is what the British Army strives for; if it is of import, then approachability should also be regarded equally as a key behaviour of a leader.

According to participant responses to questions regarding a role model, the leader's approachability is crucial. However, that is only one facet of the requirement, which will now be unpacked in more detail below.
4.7 The Golden Thread

The research will now elaborate on the findings, showing explicit linkages to leadership at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst with a golden thread from the literature review.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Sub-Theme</th>
<th>Link to Literature</th>
<th>Sandhurst Leadership Value Link</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I am the Prince</td>
<td>DS Watching</td>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>Selfless Commitment Integrity</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Impression</td>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>Integrity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>Look At Me</td>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td></td>
<td>Respect for Others</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Power Relations</td>
<td>Machiavellianism/Narcissism</td>
<td>Respect For Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>You’re In The Army Now</td>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>Narcissism/Machiavellianism</td>
<td>Respect for Others</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Competition</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cap Badges</td>
<td>Narcissism</td>
<td>Loyalty Integrity Respect For Others</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Tactical Biffing</td>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>Integrity Respect For Others Loyalty</td>
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<td>Knowledge Hiding</td>
<td>Machiavellianism</td>
<td>Integrity Respect For Others Loyalty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Look At Them</td>
<td>Positive Role</td>
<td>Servant Leadership</td>
<td>Contains all in a positive way.</td>
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<td>Models</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Negative Role</td>
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<td>Models</td>
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**Table 20: Golden Threads Linkages**

4.8 Summary

There is a saying in the Army, ‘Everyone has the best RSM,’ which means that Commanding Officers have only one RSM, and they view the placing of that RSM as a reflection on them and their unit. These behaviours could reflect the belief that the Sword of Honour winner reflects the Platoon and the platoon commander. The more Machiavellian and Narcissistic platoon commanders place more weight and are “focussed on pushing” (Participant 22) for self-serving reasons.

*A Platoon's staff might not really care, which might be the best the best way of doing it, but care about passing out good quality officer cadets. Whereas...*
like another platoon, staff might really be focused on pushing, pushing people towards it and negating... making sure that everyone goes through at a good standard, but also that, like I know with with the Sword with our intake, if there was like the lots of like, a couple of Platoon staff have really like sort of tried to really help those that have gone...that are going for it. It’s just sort of felt like they.... not that it’s been unfair, but like it’s, they’ve given them like a leg up whereas other people haven’t.

Participant 22

However, despite feelings, particularly in the case of the Sword of Honour, no conditions for the award were socialised. The consensus is that for this intake, the process has worked.

I don’t know if this is controversial to say; out of all of the JUOs, there’s not a single one. That I thinks there because of politics or DS watching and I think that’s the general consensus, which was a surprise to me, because I thought it was all politics and all going to be, you know, one of the girls or someone of colour or something.

Participant 17

Despite all the DS Watching, Machiavellian and Narcissistic manoeuvres, and ruminations, all the Officer Cadets were content with the overall result. Some thought one of the none JUOs was not correct, but all agreed with the Sword of Honour winner.

The names that I would say DS watch quite a bit; everybody had them down to be picked as JUOs or Sword of Honour. And it was, I mean, right from day one, sort of all through juniors and inters, it was so and so he’s gonna get the sword. And it’s actually been quite nice that the people that deserve it have been recognised.

Participant 19
This is unexpected for such a subjective notion. The fact that all agreed with the selecting of a single person as the best Officer Cadet. This is either a tangible dividend for the process or evidence of groupthink, compounded by a reluctance to challenge a 2* General.

*People think they have achieved more than they, and they go I’m a commissioned officer, so I’m the shit when actually we haven’t done anything yet. We have achieved something incredible, brilliant, relative to maybe the average person in the population, but in the profession that we’re in, we haven’t achieved anything. So, it’s important to recognise that, to get a good bit of intrinsic reward because we have had an achievement relative to society, but relative to the rest of our profession, what have we done?*

**Participant 17**

Participant 17 demonstrates a real self-awareness in his words. They also reveal that despite all the negative actions and behaviours we have unmasked in the data, they still believe in the brilliance of their achievement to become British Army Officers. The Participant also acknowledges that despite this achievement, they are still just starting their journey.

Officer Cadets can be narcissistic and can operate with humility – it may be the measure of the Officer Cadet of when and how they apply these behaviours.

Most of these incidents have been conducted by a handful of Captains with over fifty currently serving in the Academy; probably >5% of staff enact these poor behaviours. None of those identified with the worst incidents currently serve at the Academy, or the researcher would have been placed in a difficult position regarding anonymisation. Of the twenty-seven incidents of negative behaviour relayed – with Officer Cadets asked to relay a negative incident enacted by Permanent Staff and another by other Officer Cadets so, a total of
54 incidents. Only one related to a female (this was a staff member). This is undoubtedly influenced by Female Officer Cadets making up around 20% of Officer Cadets, 20% of Platoon Commanders and 0% of Colour Sergeants.

There are many checks and balances against these behaviours – such as anonymous internal validations (INVAL). However, the Officer Cadets did not use them – the researcher hypotheses that despite the practical measures, the organisational culture around the Officer Cadets does not seem to support ‘whistleblowing’.

Another issue is that Officer Cadets ‘learn’ Leadership from their Platoon Commanders; they are seen as the exemplar of Army Leadership. If they have Machiavellian and Narcissistic Platoon Commanders, then Officer Cadets will try to mirror them, rightly or wrongly.

4.9 Chapter Closure

This chapter illustrated the participants’ evolving understandings of leadership and its social construction at Sandhurst from the viewpoint of officer cadets and provided novel insight into the discourses that shaped their constructions of leadership. The discourses presented in this chapter are connected to the Thesis’s re-conception of leadership as practice at Sandhurst and serve as a foundation for the conceptual clarity and theoretical contribution presented in the following chapter.
Chapter 5 – Discussion

5.0 Introduction

The preceding chapter summarised the study's results, interpreted the data and proceeded with the co-construction of themes from the analysis. This chapter will expand on the previous contextualisation of the data and ultimately confirm the thesis's central argument.

Additionally, this chapter will address the research objective: to make an original theoretical contribution to the foundations of leadership theory and a practical application within a workplace setting.

The research aim is:

*To explore the Officer Cadets’ social construction of dark leadership elements in their conception of Leadership at the Sandhurst.*

The chapter will begin with a discussion on the lived experience of Leadership at Sandhurst from the viewpoint of Officer Cadets. Showing clear linkages between literature, data, and contrasting between Sandhurst and Officer Cadets’ perspectives. The discussion section will draw out the themes identified in the previous chapter. The thesis will focus these themes on results and discuss them by referring to the data in the previous chapter. We will then explore the thesis's contribution before moving the Chapter 6 (Conclusions and Recommendations).
Chapter Structure

5.1 Officer Cadets Social Construction

5.2 Constructs

5.3 Research Questions

5.4 Methodology Discussion

5.5 Results and Analysis Discussion

5.6 Summary

Figure 21: Chapter Structure
Source: Produced for this Research

5.1 Officer Cadet's Social Construction of Leadership

The thesis will first explore the role of Machiavellianism and Narcissism in the Social Construction of Leadership amongst Officer Cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. These Dark Leadership elements, if present, would indicate the presence of Dark Leadership elements within the Social Construction of Leadership amongst the Officer Cadets. How can these narcissistic and Machiavellian behaviours go unchecked within Sandhurst? This may be due to their acceptance within the underlife of the Academy.
5.1.1 The Underlife of Sandhurst

The elements listed above may form the “underlife” (Smith, 2006), which in Goffman's view, is an intrinsic part of organisational culture, “whenever worlds are laid on, underlives develop” (Goffman, 1961, p. 267).

This is evidenced by the everyday use of terms like ‘tactical biffing’, ‘blade runner’, and ‘Carlsberg debrief’, Carlsberg debriefing is a term that holds no meaning amongst the Permanent Staff of the Academy, with them having a vague awareness of the other terms.

Some of these actions, such as ‘Carlsberg Debriefs’ and ‘Tactical Biffing’ should be regarded as “secondary adjustments” (Goffman, 1961, p. 172; Halnon, 2012), where an action, although not formally mandated, is accepted at some organisational level, in this case these ‘secondary adjustments’ are held at the Platoon or company level. We can see this acceptance in the Data; Carlsberg Debriefs are typically conducted on social occasions in the presence of others; Tactical Biffing is even encouraged by some Platoon Staff.

There is evidence that the use of ‘secondary adjustments’ in the British Army is not isolated to Sandhurst (Kirke, 2010) and that this ‘underlife’ is based on drunkenness and unethical actions in other military contexts (Jansen & Kramer, 2019).

5.2 Constructs

The various constructs will now be introduced and discussed in turn.
5.2.1 I am the Prince (Machiavellianism)

The study discovered that Machiavellian behaviours, evidenced through D.S. watching and Impression Management, influence every facet of the lived experience of Leadership within Officer Cadets at Sandhurst, with 100% of participants having experienced D.S. Watching in some form. Many academics “view impression management as a normal and vital component of organizational life” (Collinson, 2006, p. 186), therefore am embedded behaviour.

Machiavelli himself talks about making sure others observe and know of any ‘liberal’ actions – this is the essence of DS Watching and Impression Management, ensuring that all positive actions are being observed and noted (DS Watching) whilst concurrently hiding away your negative behaviours, presenting ‘your best self’ (Impression Management).

Liberality exercised in a way that does not bring you the reputation for it, injures you; for if one exercises it honestly and as it should be exercised, it may not become known, and you will not avoid the reproach of its opposite

(Machiavelli, 1532, 2018 Edn)

The Machiavellian method of controlling and managing the Permanent Staff’s views of Officer Cadets is regarded as ‘DS Watching’. One could counter this argument: the best method of being recognised as an effective Cadet is to be constantly effective. The Machiavellian sees this consistently high performance as an uneconomical effort. With Machiavellians choosing to manage their efforts more effectively, with high-performance spurts during times when exposed to those of influence, sandwiched by low-performance windows when being unobserved by superiors. Therefore, for the Machiavellians to feel comfortable in their behaviours, they must deem that the anti-social behaviour of DS watching’s rewards outweighs the risks.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Sandhurst is a world-renowned centre of excellence for leading (Deakin, 2013; Rennie, 2019b). Which regarded ‘good’ Leadership as the altruistic Servant Leadership (Greenleaf, 1973) captured by its Motto ‘Serve to Lead’ (Chandler, 1991). D.S. Watching seems diametrically opposed to these mottos and positions.

To further explore the influence, we can see elements of Machiavellianism perceived by Officer Cadets, both amongst themselves (D.S. Watching) and as enacted by Permanent Staff (Sovereigns Banner). There are indications that this behaviour is not limited to the Officer Cadet cohort; results would indicate that it is endemic throughout the Army and not limited to the cultural specificity of Sandhurst. Machiavellian Behaviours are associated positively with leadership positions (Karkoulian, Samhat, & Messarra, 2009; Spurk, Keller, & Hirschi, 2016). Those with the highest leadership position whom Officer Cadets look up to are more likely to be Machiavellian the higher they raise their eyes.

**D.S. Watching**

Impression Management is a term first coined by Goffman (1959, Repr2021) and for this research is deemed as “the process by which individuals attempt to control the impressions others form of them” (Mathieu, 2021, p. 127); the facet of Impression Management we are exploring is D.S. Watching.

D.S. Watching was perceived by most Officer Cadets as a negative behaviour and is essentially, “captains who sail under false colors” (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999b, p. 188)—presenting their best self, as opposed to their true self.
D.S. Watching’s prevalence and acceptance were at a level which was neither forecasted nor expected by the researcher. Indeed, most participants were surprised by the regularity and commonality of D.S. Watching.

The research shows that Officer Cadets themselves acknowledge a level of positivity from it. Officer Cadets also have indicated that despite their apparent disdain, most have, at some level, engaged in ‘impression management’, particularly when pressured by the events surrounding Regimental Selection Boards.

A more nuanced exploration of the data reveals that Machiavellianism per se is not the issue if it is of a level that the other Officer Cadets perceive as acceptable. These results are consistent with previous authors who have evidenced that an ‘intermediate level’ of Machiavellianism and its social acceptance is also academically evidenced as the most effective regarding Organisation Citizen Behaviour (Zettler & Solga, 2013).

In addition, their yearly report is currently compiled by their immediate senior officer and supervisor within an organisation that still does not fully conform to peer reporting. This reporting system where their subordinates and peers lack input helps breed a culture of ingratiating to superiors, evidenced as a behaviour in which a Machiavellian excels (Curtis et al., 2022; Pandey & Rastogi, 1979).

Sandhurst itself is slightly different in this regard than the Field Army in that it mandates peer reviews, known colloquially as ‘slate-a-mate’ in which the reporting officer (Platoon Commander) is present. This prevents the Machiavellian from being enabled to completely own the Platoon Commanders' perception of them without external influence.
However, when an Officer Cadet commissions, and the organisational mediation of peer ‘Darwinism’ and slate-a-mate are removed. Machiavellian tendencies will be unchecked and rely on the individual to solely maintain their behaviours.

The best DS Watchers go undetected; those with darker aspects to their personality “are masters at shadow puppetry and, given the right light, they can convince their audience that what they see is the entire story” (Mathieu et al., 2020, p. 607). DS Watchers are their story’s main characters – whose outward perception is controlled by the Machiavellian behaviours they possess.

**Impression Management through Jekyll and Hyde**

This “Jekyll and Hyde personality” (Participant 13) is derived from the 19th Century book of fame (Stevenson, 1886). More recently, academia has used it to encapsulate the exploration of Narcissism within Leadership (Fatfouta, 2019). Further evidence shows no clear delineation between these (Machiavellianism/Narcissism) sub-clinical components. The Machiavellian aspect of someone’s personality considers the effects and plans accordingly, maximising recognition and reward most effectively. “Machiavellians generate and nurture emotions to meet a goal of asserting dominance” (Côté et al., 2011, p. 1076).

There were many data points regarding the dualism of personalities when D.S. Watching. Other research has acknowledged the nature of this dualism (Lee et al., 2018). This Jekyll and Hyde mentality is not only limited to Sandhurst; indeed, other Military Leadership academies have found similar instances during research. At West Point, it is called “Putting on the Show” (Henshaw, 2007, p. 286), where Officer Cadets “act one way when officers are around and another when it’s just us cadets” (Henshaw, 2007, p. 286)—indicating
that this dualism is not simply limited to Sandhurst but maybe a Military Cultural issue with a much broader scope. This evidences that Sandhurst is not unique in generating the culture and pressures required to enable and promote “Putting on the Show.” That Military Academies, specifically those within the Western cultures may have similarities in their Officer Cadet experience.

**Social Loafing**

They were many instances where Officer Cadets relayed that D.S. Watchers would work harder when they knew of observation by Permanent Staff. Working at a lower level when they are deemed able to do so falls into the definition of “Social Loafing” (Latané et al., 1979; Wilhau, 2021).

The D.S. Watchers are not content with simply attempting to impact the Permanent Staff’s perception of themselves. They identify the competition and will actively not work hard whilst they are in appointment to impact the Permanent Staffs assessments of others.

There are two ways to build the tallest building in town.

*One way is to build your building taller than anyone else’s. The second way is to go around town tearing down the other people’s buildings so that yours is the only one left to see.*

(Hillsman, 2011, p. 33)

The Machiavellian officer cadets seem to attempt to do both concurrently – managing Permanent Staff’s perception of them whilst simultaneously decreasing the standing of those around them they deem a threat to their position, “pulling the other down to one’s own position” (Van de Ven et al., 2009, p. 419). There seems to be a lack of moral penalty in the form of ‘active’ social loafing (Latané et al., 1979; Wilhau, 2021; in Machiavellian eyes, they are not
‘giving up’; they are just not trying as hard as they could. Some within academia believe this is a Machiavellian means to conserve resources as a method to increase future performance (Bluhm, 2009).

The evidence shows that ‘social loafing’ is a fundamental cognitive decision, not merely an unconscious practice. Evidence supports the view that Officer Cadets would risk a slight reputational loss whilst in lesser appointments (Section Commander) to enact a sizeable reputational loss to a competitor (Zizzo, 2003; Zizzo & Oswald, 2001).

For British Army people (regardless of rank) to deliver all we ask of them in their private and professional lives is beyond the pale. Social loafing could have formed as a coping mechanism for an Army that is asked too much of it.

**Grade Dragging**

Sometimes Officer Cadets are even maliciously working at a lower level when a peer or competitor is being assessed.

This deliberate attempt to diminish a competitor's position could also be a form of “malicious envy” (Lange et al., 2018) or “dispositional envy” (Lange & Crusius, 2015). This is a type of Envy that “that motivates to damage the position of the envied person” (Van de Ven et al., 2009, p. 428) and is closely linked to narcissism and Machiavellianism (Côté et al., 2011; Krizan & Johar, 2012; Lange et al., 2016; Lange et al., 2018). This type of Envy would be expected to manifest in an organisational culture such as Sandhurst. According to philosophers such as Aristotle, “we envy those who are near us in time, place, age, or reputation.” (Barnes, 2014, p. 1308). The researcher can easily understand how the organisational culture fulfils most of those requirements and how direct competitors (or at least those believed to be) would fulfil
the final requirement of similarity in reputation. This has been explored before, “a private in the army would normally envy a corporal or a sergeant not a field marshal, since a field marshal is not part of his reference group” (Aaron, 1992, p. 571).

Another area of academia in which the action described above by Participant 1 could be further explored is “knowledge sabotage” (Serenko & Choo, 2020), where the saboteur would actively withhold knowledge to the detriment of someone else. This behaviour has clear and evidenced links to narcissism and Machiavellianism (Serenko & Choo, 2020; Wu & Lebreton, 2011), with the withholding or sabotage of knowledge used as “Impression management techniques as a mechanism for employees not to hide what they know” (Siachou et al., 2021, p. 210). The research indicates that the altruistic nature of Servant Leadership should act as a barrier to Knowledge-Hiding (Abdillah et al., 2020; Anser et al., 2021), yet the statement by Participant 1 indicates otherwise.

The Officer Cadet must believe through learned experience that D.S. watching has a positive outcome, or they would not engage in it. This position is academically evidenced by “individuals high in Machiavellianism only engage in antisocial behavior when the rewards outweigh the risks” (Jones & Mueller, 2022, p. 536). This positive outcome is supported by research (Wayne & Kacmar, 1991), with those who enacted Impression Management tactics receiving higher performance reviews. One must never forget that “when it comes to dark personalities, I.M. is not a tactic; it is a way of life” (Mathieu, 2021, p. 196).

Sovereigns Banner
Most Officer Cadets perceived the Sovereigns Banner Competition as the single most significant contributor to the need for ‘Tactical Biffing’. According to the data, the prevalence of Tactical Biffing depended on Permanent Staff pressure and perception.

To unpick that, one must explore what the Sovereigns Banner outcomes are. For Officer Cadets, to be deemed the Sovereigns platoon is a prize which organisationally is not sought after by Officer Cadets, they got a ‘special’ lanyard which denoted them out as serving the Sovereigns Platoon.

However, the Permanent Staff are recognised formally by a letter from the queen, also informally given the kudos ‘best platoon’.

Therefore, the reward for Permanent Staff far outweighs the rewards for Officer Cadets. This, therefore, provides background and weight to the statement by Participant 17. Permanent Staff care more because it impacts them personally and professionally.

That said, the encouragement by Permanent Staff to Officer Cadets to de-select themselves from critical events based on their perceived inability simply should not be in the Sandhurst Permanent Staff playbook.

It would be easy to remove the event; that would be naïve and close-minded. The issues of Permanent Staff influence on tactical biffing are symptomatic of a cultural issue at Sandhurst. Certain Permanent Staff think their Platoon is a direct reflection on them, so they attempt to ‘game’ (Jones & Paulhus, 2010). This is because Permanent Staff “With an extreme Machiavellian style…assumes that organizational life is a win-lose proposition” (DeLuca, 1999, p. 17). As a result, they feel personal, self-induced pressure for their Platoon to win every event – which drives them to promote questionable behaviours such as enabling ‘Tactical Biffing’. 
The Great Game

Officer Cadets referred to those with previous military experience as particularly astute at ‘gaming’ the system.

The phrase gaming is interesting, with Paulhus connecting the idea of “strategic gaming” (Jones & Paulhus, 2010, p. 26) with Machiavellianism in previous research. The original research's context was evidence that Machiavellians are distinctly different when it comes to mating strategies of the others (Narcissists, Psychopathy) within the Dark Triad (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). Machiavellians being strategic, “pursue more open, flexible, pluralistic strategies” (Jones & Paulhus, 2010, p. 25); this could also be applied to a Machiavellian goal of becoming a JUO, targeting a high-profile cap badge at Regimental Selection Boards. Using his bi-strategic skills, the Machiavellian enabled them to use “both prosocial and antisocial tactics” (Jones & Paulhus, 2010, p. 5) to achieve that aim, giving them a competitive advantage over other groupings.

It is not just a behaviour that is ‘turned on’ like a light switch, but D.S. Watching is a constant for some, it is also an embedded and learned behaviour in schools (Brummelman et al., 2021).

Another element of the Great Game is the highly competitive, winner-takes-all ‘dog-eat-dog’ competition, a phrase used by Officer Cadets.

The phrase ‘dog-eat-dog’ is mired in masculine competition (Berdahl et al., 2018; Glick et al., 2018; Munsch et al., 2018), which is a ‘zero-sum’ phrase. A dog-eat-dog competition relies on the detraction of the competition for their betterment – an authentic Machiavellian action (Côté et al., 2011).

‘Dog-Eat Dog’ is a ‘zero-sum’ phrase where competition relies on the detraction of the
competition for your own betterment – an authentic Machiavellian action (Côté et al., 2011).

In addition, when it comes to achieving goals, “Denigrating other people” help Permanent Staff Machiavellians accomplish these goals” (Côté et al., 2011, p. 1076)

5.2.2 Look At Me (Narcissism)

During the research, several Narcissistic elements came to the fore, with the data indicating these may be core behaviours for some Officer Cadets. These core behaviours may be reinforced by the learned behaviours and Officer Cadets’ mirroring’ (Takala, 2010) of their Permanent Staff.

The main Narcissistic element of Permanent Staff was using their power over cadets to ‘debrief’ them at inappropriate times. This has come to be known colloquially as a ‘Carlsberg Debrief’.

It was acknowledged that Officer Cadets placed credence on the Sandhurst message of ‘You’re the leaders of the future’ as a contributing element to narcissism.

Sandhurst Organisationally could have “instilled an inflated sense of entitlement and deservingness” (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998, p. 220) through these actions, which has coalesced into a sense of entitlement, which is again closely related to narcissism (Carlson, 2013; O'Reilly III et al., 2014; Rosenthal & Pittinsky, 2006)

Narcissism may be established at Sandhurst or conversely Army Officer Selection Board unconsciously selected Officer Cadets for this behaviour. Research indicates that participants with Narcissistic tendencies fare better in interviews (Nuzulia & Why, 2020), which is largely part of the selection process. Both pre-Sandhurst and once they have arrived and are selected for cap badges.
Why might the British Army need these Narcissistic individuals – the thesis discussed the marked increase in Leader Emergence of Narcissists in the last chapter. If the thesis now regards this from a more practical standpoint. In that case, one can envisage how having a self-reliant leader who, as a “narcissistic individuals have little concern for others, they are unlikely to be concerned about developing equitable exchange relationships with members of their organizations” (Resick et al., 2009, p. 1374).

Through over 20 years of experience, the researcher can foresee how an individual with self-confidence and without needing external support may be appropriate in specific operational environments. One example would be Helmand Province, where platoons would operate in total isolation from each other – occupying platoon locations.

Whilst this research has focused on the presence of narcissism; it also identified true humility within the Officer Cadets. Returning us to the notion that Leadership is about context.

**Teasing**

Several incidents of Officer Cadets were reported of ‘teasing’ or belittling others. In their platoon lines away from Permanent Staff.

Teasing other Officer Cadets is entirely against the values and standards of the British Army. ‘Teasing’ is linked to narcissistic individuals (Besser & Zeigler-Hill, 2011). However, Narcissistic individuals seem to view ‘teasing’ through an unusually positive lens (Gorman, 2008). Research evidences that “prosocial teasing was positively related to general narcissism” (Podnar, 2013, p. 109). Indeed concerning the discomfort, they cause others, there is a view that “the narcissist enjoys being the source of this discomfort by teasing, insulting, embarrassing, pointing out the flaws of others” (Burke & Fox, 2016, p. 139). The narcissist uses this teasing as
a “way of demonstrating power and control over the other person.” (Brown, 1998, p. 61).

This teasing could be an exercise of workplace dominance. Not for the individual being teased, but as an exercise of Agency on the informal hierarchy of the Platoon.

Workplace dominance is closely tied with narcissistic individuals (Chatterjee & Pollock, 2017; Grijalva & Harms, 2014; O'Reilly III et al., 2014).

It would be easy to assume that people displaying these behaviours would be somehow isolated from the group. However, research shows that this isolation is linked directly to “high expertise” (Xu et al.). An elevated level of professional competency is a barrier to ostracism and promotes social acceptance.

It seems paradoxical that whilst the Army works to improve behaviours; its social structure empowers highly proficient narcissistic individuals who are evidenced through research to be more likely to enact “unethical behaviours” (Blair et al., 2017; Blair et al., 2008; Hoffman et al., 2013).

**There is a ME in Team**

They were repeated numerous incidents where Officer Cadets prioritised their position, with the team trailing behind in precedence of importance.

The focus on the ‘me’ rather than the ‘team’ is “considered a face-valid linguistic marker of narcissism” (Carey et al., 2015, p. 1); however, research does not corroborate this, and in fact, numerous studies discount (Carey et al., 2015; Raskin & Shaw, 1988) correlation between ‘I-talk’ and grandiose narcissism. Recent studies (Berry-Blunt et al., 2021; Dorough, 2018) have shown a possible correlation with ‘covert’ (Wink, 1991) or ‘vulnerable’ (Miller & Campbell,
narcissism. However, these studies share common failings of containing student-based participants and require further studies with differing samples.

There is a view that people who place themselves above the team perform better in competitive environments due to their narcissism; this positive correlation is evidenced through research within academia (Luchner et al., 2011), although there are some questions regarding if this applies to competitiveness or hyper-competitiveness (Houston et al., 2015), but also infers that Vulnerable Narcissism may be at play (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Miller et al., 2011).

I am the best leader

Narcissism is a crucial predictor of leader emergence (Brunell et al., 2008; Härtel et al., 2021) – society seemingly selects Narcissists as leaders in every sector, including schools (Brummelman et al., 2021), business executives (Schnure, 2010) military cadets (Paunonen et al., 2006).

It would seem that narcissistic behaviours are regarded most favourably by other narcissists (Den Hartog et al., 2020). The Army may not be actively recruiting narcissistic officers deliberately; it may be a by-product of already being saturated with them. Another possibility is that Narcissists have high leadership emergence due to “self-selection bias” (Epitropaki, 2018). Without the over-confidence Narcissists possess, others are hamstrung, as “even slight reluctance to lead reduces leader emergence because reluctance is inconsistent with leader prototypes” (Tussing, 2018, p. 2). “Those high in the dark triad had an elevated leadership motivation that remained unaltered when they were self-uncertain” (Guillén et al., 2022, p. 1)

The narcissists, though, feed into a leadership paradox as “those who are particularly well-suited to lead are less likely to become leaders” (Tussing, 2018, p. 6), as their hesitancy or
lengthy consideration is deemed unfitting of a leader, which creates a void in which the narcissist steps willingly.

**Do you think I’m any good?**

What is an outlier is ‘likeability’ from the data; the need to be liked by Permanent Staff was repeatedly vocalised. This likability, though, is extremely important; research indicates that likability is more critical than competence (Casciaro & Lobo, 2005; Singh & Tor, 2008), even when the human factor is removed (Cameron et al., 2021). This likeability premium is particularly pertinent in small teams. “It can make sense to trade competence for likability in a team in even technically demanding environments” (de Rond & Hytner, 2012, p. 4; Midwinter et al., 2011); the statement above is most likely the practical application of psychological safety.

With Officer Cadets allowing likability to take precedence over professional competence.

**5.2.3 You are in the Army Now (Culture and Agency)**

The Army environment is, in some ways, unique, but constant competition is not one of them. There are many workplaces with similar pressures.

That said, despite one of the interviews defending workplace competitiveness as an essential part of the Sandhurst fabric. Co-worker competitiveness has an evidenced positive effect on co-worker knowledge sabotage (Serenko & Choo, 2020). Although competitiveness was a negative factor for the loss with low competitive behaviours, one could hypothesise that those selected are highly competitive, so this would not be a factor (Fletcher et al., 2008).

**Combat Bias**
This barrier is not an exclusively British Army issue; in the U.S. Army, “80 per cent of Army generals come from the Combat Arms branch” (Lim et al., 2009, p. 3), with an acknowledgement amongst British Officer Cadets that, like their American cousins “Combat Arms officers are much more likely to be promoted to the top ranks of the Army” (Lim et al., 2009, p. 15).

Again, this imbalance towards Infantry is shared with our American brethren (Glass, 1982). This bias towards the Infantry breeds intense competition for their places. From the Officer Cadets' view, a prestigious regiment will indicate the likelihood of being a General even at this early stage.

Another viewpoint is harking back to the romanticisation of Leadership. This could have been manifested from the connection that some identify between the Infantry Officer and the Knight, “aristocratic warriors increasingly started to dismount from their armoured steeds to take command of infantry units on the battlefield” (Donvito, 2013, p. 49).

One could understand the allure of becoming an Infantry Officer if one believed, like some historians, that “the medieval knight did not disappear from the European Battlefield; he simply changed clothes, becoming an Infantry Officer” (Donvito, 2013, p. 52).

Private Life

Many years ago, when the British Army was all-encompassing, members lived, worked, and socialised within the external fence, known colloquially as the ‘wire’. The British Army could easily be deemed a “total institution” (Goffman, 1961).

_A place of residence and work where a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life_
This position has been eroded as the accommodation standard has decreased and moved outside of the ‘wire’. With the prospect of a life-long career diminishing, so does the Army's right to demand the associated requirements of a ‘total institution’. The social construction of this requirement seems to differ between the Permanent Staff, particularly the Colour Sergeants.

This is due to their learned training experience, which would have occurred over a decade during which some elements associated with being a ‘Total Institution’ may have been demanded of them.

As the British Army has lost its position as a ‘Total Institution’, it has lost the right to make demands above that of a ‘normal’ employer on an Officer Cadets' social life. The European Court of Human Rights Article 8 re-enforces the right to a private life without external interference (Kilkelly, 2003; Moreham, 2008; Taylor, 2002).

This is particularly difficult for the current generation, which requires a clear demarcation between their public/private lives (Atkinson, 2018; Juklestad Helgheim & Skibeli Larsen, 2019). With an acknowledgement that Generation Z “gives more importance to the balance between the work and the private life” (Pulevska-Ivanovska et al., 2017, p. 920).

**Agency at Sandhurst**

Research has been conducted that seems to show power as an amplifier for Machiavellian behaviours (Wisse & Sleebos, 2016).

The Carlsberg debrief is an excellent example of the use of Agency to assert dominance.
Sandhurst must be careful here; the British Army deems an act that uses “the exercise of power and domination for its own sake” (Kirke, 2007, p. 11) as Bullying. Particularly for a formal power relationship like that at Sandhurst (Stuart & Szeszeran, 2021).

Research shows that Machiavellians are extremely ambitious (Gürlek, 2021), with their career being their priority and all other items, such as the team, being deemed of lesser importance (Zettler et al., 2011).
The use of Agency and power dynamics have been an area of under-research in the field of leadership research (Collinson, 2020b, p. 3).

5.3 Research Questions

_The best research questions evolve during the study_  
(Stake, 1995, p. 33)

Overall Question

_How do Officer Cadets at the Sandhurst socially construct leadership?_

The research has established that the Social Construction of Leadership amongst Sandhurst Officer Cadets is done chiefly through Leadership as Practice. However, they are taught many lessons on Leadership. When asked, they revert to experiences of Leadership, both positive and negative, as their points of reference. The Permanents staff have an exceptionally prominent position – Officer Cadets seemed to regurgitate answers given to them as ‘truth’ and incorporated that into their construction.

There seem to be ‘levels’ of Leadership in Officer Cadets, with certain leadership behaviours reserved when they are unobserved by superiors.
Most Officer Cadets clung to a social construction of leadership that harked back to Heroes’ romanticisation as leadership examples. Despite these ethereal constructions, their lived experiences of leadership were multi-faceted and incorporated behaviours that would be deemed both bright and dark.

Sub Questions

1. **How does the competitive nature of Sandhurst Events, such as the Sword of Honour, result in changes to Leadership practice**

The competitive nature of events has resulted in some changes in the underlife of Sandhurst. Tactical Biffing is a straightforward example of this. However, even Carlsberg Debriefs may be impacted as Officer Cadets let incidents go unreported in the knowledge that Permanent Staff impact on things such as Regimental Selection Boards is critical to their journey. Both examples are Machiavellian behaviours – without any Machiavellian behaviours within Sandhurst, then these behaviours would likely cease to exist.

2. **What, if any, dark leadership practices are present at Sandhurst, and how do Officer Cadets perceive them**

DS Watching is the academy's most straightforward Dark Leadership practice to reveal. Its tacit acceptance is a measure of how ingrained it is into the culture of Sandhurst Officer Cadets. DS Watching is a combination of both Machiavellianism and Narcissism. Officer Cadets to balance their appearance to others (Narcissism) but, at times, only to those above them in the hierarchy of power so that they may gain an advantage (Machiavellianism).

The thesis has established during research that Machiavellianism and Narcissism are extremely influential behaviours at Sandhurst. Those behaviours influence Impressions Management through D.S. Watching and management of their position within the Platoon.
The behaviours are also subject to some form of internal socially constructed code. If other Officer Cadets deem another Officer Cadet is too narcissistic or Machiavellian, they will actively ‘call out’ these behaviours.

The crux of the issue is not the presence of these behaviours – the research results put their presence beyond doubt. The question has evolved into, ‘how much is too much’ ‘what are the acceptable levels’, and ‘how and why are they decided’? Do they change in different environments?

It seems from the results that there is a level of Machiavellian and Narcissism that is socially acceptable and helps promote the ‘gaming’ of the system. Those with low levels of narcissism and Machiavellianism risk being outmanoeuvred. Whilst those with elevated levels of these behaviours are deemed to be in excess of the socially accepted standard and risk being ostracised from the group.

Officer Cadets must constantly walk on the tightrope – if they have too little of these behaviours, they risk perceived performance, too much ostracization, and being ‘called out’.

Also, these narcissistic and Machiavellian behaviours are inevitable due to the constant competition and D.S' Watching due to the reporting system, the intense rivalry created between individuals, Sections, Platoon, and companies. With their linkages to Leader Emergence, these Dark Behaviours naturally ensure that those with the darker tendencies come to the fore. With Officer Cadets tempering their D.S. Watching in order also to achieve likeability – the combination of which easily overcome Professional Competence when determining informal hierarchy within the Platoon. This informal hierarchy naturally has a serious effect on formal placings.
5.4 Methodology Discussion

Very few research projects have been conducted on Officer Cadets within the Academy. The researcher surmises this may be due to access and the renowned difficulty of appeasing the MOD Research and Ethics Committee.

The research that has been previously conducted (Walker, 2021) shows Officer Cadets as ethical and predominantly altruistic individuals. Officer Cadets faced by anyone who has not ‘seen behind the curtain’, will revert to “Putting on the Show” (Henshaw, 2007, p. 286). Due to the researcher being part of the organisation, the researcher has been able to enable gain absolute honesty and frankness in the co-construction of the interview, which previously has been held from view.

This is the first research study conducted from within the British Army through a Social Constructionist lens conducted with a Reflexive Thematic Analysis by a Reflexive Researcher. Hopefully, this will lead to the British Army being more organisationally open to Interpretivist/Qualitative research than it has previously. This could ideally open debates around the British Army's positivistic lens.

Quantitative Research dominates dark Leadership research with instruments such as Likert-style MACH-IV (Christie et al., 2013, pp. 15-18) of the Forced-Choice version known as the MACH-V (Christie et al., 2013, pp. 18-26) regularly used. This research looks at the problem from a different, qualitative viewpoint – through a highly interpretivist lens.

5.5 Results and Analysis Discussion

Machiavellianism may be appropriate if managed sufficiently. In a combat situation, a Machiavellian would be awarded a level of leadership motivation which is unmatched by those
The results have shown that most, particularly those going to Combat Arms, have significant Machiavellian and Narcissistic behaviours. Nevertheless, 90% of Sword of Honour winners are also from Combat Arms.

So What? Does the British Army deny the presence of the behaviours, or continue to discount them as ‘bad’ Leadership, or do we approach Leadership more holistically? Going beyond this issue, the researcher thinks that this and others' acknowledgement of ‘Bright Sides’ to behaviours previously regarded as ‘Dark’ or ‘Bad’ is the future of Leadership Theory. Utilising this new lens, the researcher has reservations about terms such as Toxic Leadership, which is particularly prevalent in the U.S. Army lexicon of Leadership (Johnson, 2019; Major, 2018; Reed, 2015a; Steele, 2011; Van, 2019; Williams, 2005) and has now entered the British Army school of thought (Dagless, 2018; Kitching, 2015).

Indeed, these people with these less effective behaviours are better described as people utilising toxic behaviours in leadership positions rather than toxic leaders. The behaviours that these individuals enact would be assessed as toxic in any situation/context, be they Leader or Follower.

### 5.5.1 The British Army Officer

The British Army unconsciously selects the appropriate individuals through learned behaviour. The selection process itself is not flawed; it is simply the understanding of the process and its outcomes which demand refinement.
The AOSB and RSB process select officers that, in a Combat situation, can use subterfuge (Machiavellianism), inspirational self-belief (Narcissism/Machiavellianism), with a constant need to improve themselves and their subordinates…to ‘Be the Best’.

The issue is the ‘Good Leadership’ with the altruistic perception that the organisation has itself perpetuated. British Army Officers view themselves as Knights in Shining Armour, rather than the ‘Rough People’ spoken of below.

This quote is commonly miss-attributed to George Orwell:

*People Sleep Peacefully in Their Beds at Night Only Because Rough Men Stand Ready to Do Violence on Their Behalf*

(Grenier, 1993)

Of course, it is equally likely to be ‘Rough Women’ in the modern British Army, but the notion is the same. British Army Officers are expected to be brilliant, critical thinkers who are willing to lead a platoon to kill the enemy or adversary. The taking of any life is undoubtedly one of the most selfish, self-serving notions—the taking of another life to save their own.

The taking of life for a leader or officer is an area where one may need Narcissistic and Machiavellian self-belief. Although the ‘Nuremberg Defence’ (Wright, 1947) of ‘I was just following order’ is no longer legally admissible. The researcher surmises that many involved in combat take some relief in their own mental absolution of responsibility. Others in academia that a soldier “waives his natural right to decide whether or not he will use lethal force against enemy soldiers, and waives it in favour of his superior officers” (Miller, 2016, p. 158).

The Officer has no such comfort; they must give the order, and hesitation may cost a life – they must be confident in themselves, their decision making and their ability.
Recognising that the British Army Officer needs to be all the above and more, dependant on the situation, context and whom they are leading. Hence, it could be hypothesised that the Leadership practice demands a more holistic approach to British Army leadership. That at times the altruistic servant leader will be required, but at others, the ruthless Machiavellian leader, who, through their narcissistic behaviours, will accept nothing but complete victory, is the ‘ask, of an Army Officer. This acknowledgement of this holistic approach has already been researched and evidenced in high-performing teams. These team members use ‘Dark’ behaviours such as Machiavellianism when required (Cruickshank & Collins, 2015). These results are in keeping with other researchers who acknowledge that the pigeon-holing of behaviours into good/bad is unhelpful and acknowledge there is a ‘Bright’ side to these behaviours (Judge & LePine, 2007; Judge et al., 2009; Kuna et al., 2021; Ma et al., 2021; Volmer et al., 2016).

In hand with this acceptance of the Dark and Bright notions of Leadership – The British Army needs to recognise that it is leadership effectiveness it seeks rather than the over-simplistic dichotomic ‘good leadership’.

A prince, therefore, being compelled knowingly to adopt the beast, ought to choose the fox and the lion; because the lion cannot defend himself against snares, and the fox cannot defend himself against wolves.

(Machiavelli, 1532, 2018 Edn, p. 52)

We can see from the above quote that even in 1532, there was an acknowledgement that Leadership was situational. It was not a one-cap-fits-all, ‘The Prince’ must have all behaviours at his disposal. Selecting the style to fit the aim, situation, and context, just as a Golfer selects the appropriate club.
5.5.2 Fallen by the Wayside

If the British Army indeed attracts and empowers these Machiavellian and Narcissistic Leaders, then some behaviours can become a casualty of these people. The British Army must acknowledge that there are tough, conceptual, and ethical challenges.

Morality

The Machiavellian's grasp to reach the top is unimpeached by such an impediment as morality or honour (Rayburn & Rayburn, 1996). There has been research regarding the narcissistic linkages between Impression Management and morality (Blair et al., 2008). If the British Army is beholden to its core value of Integrity, then Narcissists are evidenced through research to stand out for lack of this (Blair et al., 2017; Blair et al., 2008). As a result, the British Army should actively seek not to recruit those with high Narcissistic tendencies if Integrity is of paramount importance.

Humility

Officer Cadets stated they simply had no opportunity to show humility due to the competitive environment of Sandhurst, although there is research which shows the presence of Machiavellian or Narcissistic personalities as a predictor of a lack of humility (Morris et al., 2005).

It seems paradoxical that in an organisation with ‘Serve to Lead’ as its motto (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005) and servant leadership supposedly at its centre (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005), Officer Cadets feel that they cannot show humility due to the competitiveness of Sandhurst.
However, others have stated that they believe that the linkage between humility and narcissism can be maintained, “Although it seems that humility and narcissism are rarely observed in a single individual, the paradox perspective suggests that two conflicting and opposite situations can coexist” (Norouzinik et al., 2021, p. 2).

Humility is seen as crucial in Leadership (Maldonado et al., 2022; Morris et al., 2005). Therefore, if Sandhurst's efforts in Leadership reduce humility, it needs to address these failings – or come to recognise that Narcissism and Machiavellianism come at the expense of some other behaviours.

5.6 Summary

Looking at the current war in Ukraine (2022), leaders may need to be Narcissistic and Machiavellian. There may be a need to believe they are better to succeed in the crucible of combat. They may be asked to do things against cultural codes of morality and integrity for the greater good. Machiavellian traits allow them to do this. Ultimately, military deception at its lowest level is simply lying. How could this moralistic leader that the British Army Officer seemingly

*I see many soldiers: if only I could see many warriors! What they wear is called uniform: may what they conceal with it not be uniform too!*

(Nietzsche & Hollingdale, 1974, p. 74)

If Nietzsche is correct, and Officer Cadets are simply an example of wider Army officership, it would seem we are an Army led by Narcissistic and Machiavellian Officers. If it is – surely it must be the most effective Army in the world.

Regarding social loafing, to explore this from an utterly contradictory viewpoint, we need
officers who manage their endeavours in such a way. We ask too much of our soldiers and officers. The only way for them to excel (at least from our view) is to manage these interactions with a Machiavellian viewpoint. For British Army people (regardless of rank) to deliver all we ask of them in their private and professional lives is beyond the pale. This social loafing is a behaviour that has formed as a coping mechanism from an Army that is simply asked too much of it.

This chapter has advanced the results of Chapters Five and expanded on them concerning existing theory bases. The fundamental theories of Leadership, narcissism, and Machiavellianism were presented. The conceptual framework that emerged from this study was presented, along with an explanation and illustrative examples.

The following section (Chapter 6 - Conclusions and Recommendations) provides a summary of the thesis, a critical analysis of the methods used to conduct the research, and an indication of potential limitations and future research areas.
Chapter 6 – Conclusion and Recommendations

To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science.

*Albert Einstein 1879-1955*

Source: (Infeld, 1971, p. 92)

6.0 Introduction

This chapter will summarise the thesis, encapsulate the primary points of the arguments and contributions. The chapter will then go on to demonstrate how the research aims and objectives have been achieved.

The research will be evaluated using appropriate research quality criteria, to acknowledge limitations and identifying areas for additional research. The thesis will be concluded with a summary of this chapter.

- To make an original methodological and empirical contribution to the Leadership field through the use of digital MP3s embedded into the thesis, enhancing reflective capabilities and depth of insight into participants’ experiences of Leadership.
- Make a practical contribution to leadership practice in a workplace setting by recommending changes and alterations to help positively develop Officer Cadet leadership effectiveness.

Chapter Structure
6.1 Review of Contribution of the Thesis

This thesis aimed to investigate leadership and expand understanding by gaining insight into how this is socially constructed in an organisational context. The Social Construction of Leadership has been investigated within the context of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, an extremely hierarchical organisation where Permanent Staff hold agency at extreme levels. The overall research question was:

*How do Officer Cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst socially construct leadership?*
Officer Cadets socially construct leadership through a combination of social interactions, experiential learning, and formal taught lessons. Their peers and Permanent Staff help regulate their constructions, by offering feedback and example effective and ineffective examples.

The following sub-questions were also posed in order to explore the above fully:

*What, if any, dark leadership practices are present at Sandhurst, and how are they perceived by Officer Cadets?*

The dark leadership behaviours evidenced through research where impression management and DS Watching, with these having linkages to both Machiavellianism and Narcissism. The are both seemingly accepted practices amongst Officer Cadets, that said, there is a socially constructed level to which peers will accept these behaviours before they act to correct them.

*How does the competitive nature of Sandhurst Events, such as the Sword of Honour, result in changes to Leadership practice?*

The Sword of Honour was not evidenced widely to change leadership practice, the Sovereigns Banner Competition was evidenced with Permanent Staff support to drive behaviours such as; ‘tactical biffing’.

**Overview of Contributions**

This thesis makes two significant theoretical contributions to the body of knowledge in the Leadership Field.

The thesis begins by discussing the literature on dark Leadership, The Dark Triad, to conceptualise and investigate how leadership may be socially constructed from a critical, holistic viewpoint. Frameworks of Leadership which are based on attaching morality to leadership, are
challenged. Concerns about agency and structure are identified as fundamental obstacles to the current thinking. The results have reinforced these concerns with agency and structure evidenced as barriers to Officer Cadets, particularly regarding authenticity.

Second, a contribution is made to studies regarding the social construction of leadership by introducing the notion of Holistic Leadership, recognising interactions between bright and dark leadership combined to result in effective leadership.

*Holistic Leadership is the combination of the appropriate enactment of Bright and Dark leadership behaviours, in order to provide effective leadership*

Depicting this process as a triangle, however, it is not equilateral with context, the environment (physical/mental), the situation and the intended outcome all being factors. Therefore, the shape of the triangle changes as Dark/Bright behaviours changes in their priority and dominance dependent on those factors.

### 6.1.1 Review of Theory Bases

The first objective of this thesis was

*To critically review the Dark Leadership and Dark Triad theory bases to conceptualise key terms and identify any gaps in current knowledge.*

Chapter Two – Literature Review - illustrates the accomplishment of the objective above.

The literature review critically reviewed the theoretical bases of Dark Leadership and the Dark Triad, including in the Dark Triads (Furnham et al., 2013; Paulhus & Williams, 2002) individual components of Narcissism (Den Hartog et al., 2020; Ma et al., 2021), Machiavellianism (Christie et al., 2013; Sherry et al., 2006).
Furthermore, the literature review revealed issues such as the prevalence of Positive Organisational Behaviours and ‘Prozac’ (Collinson, 2012; Grint & Smolovic, 2016) or ‘Upbeat’ (Alvesson, 2020) Leadership.

The literature examined linking moral (good) leadership to an amoral construct (Nietzsche, 2019). Progressing beyond the much-criticised romanticisation of leadership (Collinson et al., 2018) and, therefore, beyond merely “looking at a critical situation and attempting to designate certain individuals as heroes or villains, good leaders or bad leaders” (Chandler & Kirsch, 2018, p. 191).

This review revealed that Leadership, beyond the moralistic good/bad dichotomy, should encapsulate a holistic approach that acknowledges that in certain situations and contexts, Dark and Bright Leadership behaviours are needed. This is an underdeveloped sector within the field of Leadership Research, with many calling for more research (Sundermeier et al., 2020) to address the “overlooking of the dark side of leadership” (Furtner et al., 2017; Itzkovich et al., 2020, p. 852) with more needed to acknowledge the “paradoxical utility” (Judge et al., 2009, p. 864) of behaviours that are currently regarded as dark leadership.

6.2 Contributions

A professional doctorate, although “smaller in scope” (Northumbria University, 2017, p. 18) to a PhD, unlike a PhD, requests the development of “professional practice” (Northumbria University, 2017, p. 18) in addition to the production and defence of original research. The contribution will be unpacked and discussed in two sections. Firstly, the thesis will discuss the methodological contribution to research, followed by the practical contributions to professional practice at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.
6.2.1 Methodological Contribution

The Second and Third research objectives of the thesis were:

- To develop an appropriate methodological approach and design a data collection process, to gain rich insights into participants' experiences of leading.

- To make an original methodological and empirical contribution to the Leadership field.

The achievement of objective two is demonstrated through Chapter 3 – Research Philosophy, Methodology and Methods, and a brief discussion regarding this will be made below.

The achievement of objective three is supported by the nascent use of digital MP3s embedded into the thesis, enhancing reflective capabilities and depth of insight into participants’ experiences of leadership, which will be more fully explored separately below.

Additionally, this thesis offers a methodological contribution in applying a relational social constructionist perspective through the use of qualitative research design, including the use of semi-structured, unmasking rich insights into how leadership is experienced and socially constructed by Officer Cadets at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

This thesis offers a methodological contribution by utilising a relational social constructionist perspective and Reflexive Thematic Analysis using NVIVO. These are nascent methods in the Leadership field and are likely unique when conducted in combination.
Nascent Methods as Contribution

During the transcription phase, there was difficulty for an external regarding the presumed knowledge of the interviewer by the Officer Cadets. This, combined with many British Army-specific terms, made transcription using many protocols difficult. Research is written on the tensions between using naturalised or denaturalised protocols (Hutchby & Wooffitt, 2008). The researcher explored many methods to get the most accurate protocols of Conversational Analysis. Considering two main types (Wooffitt, 2005, p. Appendix), one of the transcription systems (Jefferson, 2004) considered was deemed as “Jefferson's transcription system is to CA what the electron microscope is to the sub-cellular structure of matter” (Clift, 2016, p. 44). Therefore, the best-placed method to replicate the feel of the interviews. However, on reflection, there are many ways to interpret each interview; researchers may place provenance on a single word that someone else may not. Researchers lead the data through unconscious bias in this manner. Additionally, the researcher felt the reductionist approach negated any feelings and emotions within the interviews.

Therefore, the researcher chose to insert quotes as hyperlinked Mp3s. This provides the reader with a raw and unfiltered insight into the feelings and underlying connotations of a statement or phrase made. This method has been called for as a development which gives enables “thicker descriptions, greater understanding of the participants' voice and perspectives, and greater persuasive reporting” (Markle et al., 2011, p. 14). This is a view share by other academics, that “Today . . . voice can mean not only having a real researcher—and a researcher’s voice—in the text, but also letting research participants speak for themselves” (Chandler et al., 2015; Lincoln et al., 2011, p. 123).
In addition the embedding of MP3s helps protect against researcher making
transcriptions look “tidier” (Poland, 1995) or errors in punctuation or grammar which accidently
alter the intent of the statement (Easton et al., 2000; Tilley, 2003).

This practice of embedding MP3s shares the ‘true voice’ with all its connotations of
feeling, tone, and emotion. These nuances can be lost in the positivistic reductionist approach of
using transcription systems.

This use of embedded MP3s to relay the true voice, if not completely unheard of, nascent
in the field of Leadership Studies and therefore is offered as an original methodological
contribution.

6.2.2 Practical Contribution to Professional Practice

A DBA has a necessity for a contribution to professional practice (Banerjee & Morley,
2013; Dent, 2002; Duke & Beck, 1999) with an aim at Northumbria University to “Developing
and improving professional practice; developing research and enquiry skills; application and
reflection” (Banerjee & Morley, 2013, p. 179). Therefore, the Researcher will now lead with
data supported by personal experience and results to conceptualise practical outputs that will
have an impact. The levels of analysis selected are Sandhurst Institutionally, Sandhurst
Permanent Staff and finally Officer Cadets, although the researcher acknowledges crossover will
occur.
6.2.3 Sandhurst Organisational Construction

Within Sandhurst, factors have been raised repeatedly by participants as barriers to effective Leadership, which, due to changes in culture and practice, need to be highlighted and addressed at the organisational level.

Alcohol

The participants related many incidents that they viewed negatively related to excessive alcohol consumption.

At an organisational level, Sandhurst should work to overcome the apparent malaise of “officers unwillingness to confront what most of them considered to be a significant problem” (Jones & Fear, 2011; Kopperman, 1996, p. 445). Whilst the researcher accepts the ritualistic cohesion that some events involving alcohol can promote (Bury, 2017) – these should be limited to the field army rather than training.

Sandhurst must work to ensure that it is not seen as an extension of the University Rugby Club and is seen as a professional environment in which excellence in officership is honed and practised.

Alcohol has evidenced links with narcissism (Hill, 2016; Stenason & Vernon, 2016; Welker et al., 2019) and other counterproductive work behaviours (CWB). An environment which promotes alcohol as a by-product helps to promote and environment conducive to Grandiose Narcissism in particular.

Actions

To do this, it must target appropriate alcohol consumption in several ways.
1. **Culture.** Excessive alcohol must have negative connotations at the organisational level. Excessive consumption needs to be named in the Sandhurst Role Performance Statement as an outlier to professional officership. The amount of endorsed and supported functions with alcohol should be reduced. All alcohol should be personally purchased so that Sandhurst is not seen as enabling consumption by providing it for free. Officer Cadets and Permanent Staff need education on alcohols functions within Sandhurst.

2. **Bars Facilities.** This may seem to the external observer counter-productive, but all bar facilities need to be opened at the Royal Military Academy. Currently, many bars are not open due to an inability to provide contracted services. This enables an underlife which accepts alcohol in the Officer Cadets' living quarters. The consumption of alcohol in this manner cannot be monitored or observed. The second-order effects of alcohol in private rooms are there to be seen by all; incidents of misconduct (Nichol, 2020; Nicholls, 2018; Starkey, 2020), particularly sexual assaults and similar increase dramatically when alcohol is consumed ‘behind closed doors’.

**Sexual Assaults**

There have been numerous sexual allegations at Sandhurst recently (BBC, 2019; Corke, 2019; Gordon, 2020; Robinson, 2021). Although now participants addressed these incidents directly, they repeatedly mentioned the ‘Alpha Male Mentality’, inappropriate relations and overfamiliarity between Officer Cadets and Permanent Staff.

In order to target sexual assaults and inappropriate sexual behaviours, the Royal Military Academy needs to look at what the US Army has done to combat similar sexual harassment and
assault problems at West Point (Caslen Jr et al., 2015). West Point has worked to develop a “skills-based ecological approach to sexual violence prevention” (Arbeit, 2017b, p. 959) which acknowledges the ‘gulf’ between organisational goals of gender equity and the ‘lived experience’ of Officer Cadets of West Point (Arbeit, 2017a, 2017b; Lewis, 2020).

Research on sexual assaults amongst male victims whilst serving evidence linkage with alcohol (Wright et al., 2021, p. 31) in the US Military has confirmed the intimate relationship between alcohol and uninvited sexual incidents (Gidycz et al., 2018). A connection between alcohol and sexual incidents is also evidenced in FE institutions (Marchell & Cummings, 2001). Research also indicates a linkage to sexual assaults by narcissistic individuals when alcohol is a factor (Mouilso & Calhoun, 2016). Narcissism also has evidenced links to hostile masculinity which in a military setting is linked to Sexual Assaults (Orchowski et al., 2023).

**Actions**

Sandhurst needs to have a strategy that targets sexual assaults (Officer Cadet's perpetrator) and sexual exploitation (Permanent Staff perpetrator). One of the methods suggested by research is the establishment of empowered Female Forums for Officer Cadets (Lewis, 2020). These Forums should be formalised structures within Sandhurst, with defined outputs, aims and objectives to support females, particularly those with an ambition to join Combat Arms.

Research has been conducted on male veterans subjected to sexual abuse/assault whilst serving in the Armed Forces (Wright et al., 2021). The recommendations given to the military then (Wright et al., 2021, p. 34) would be equally transferable to Sandhurst, such as:-
1. **Better Reporting Systems.** Sandhurst should set up an anonymous ‘whistleblowing’ email address. To promote any member of Sandhurst reporting any poor behaviour if they feel unwilling to do so openly.

2. **Training.** The report recommends training of the type, which will be explored in detail in the next section (Behaviours).

3. **Victim Support.** Sandhurst needs to understand its role fully and adequately in victim support. The researcher's personal experience indicates that personnel in the academy lack understanding of the mandated role of Victim Support Officers and Care Action Plan Leads. Sandhurst should formally place the roles and expectations of their particularly vital role in the Sandhurst Standing Orders Books so that all can understand the requirements and expectations.

4. **Protection.** Victims lack confidence in the ‘system’. The default setting for any allegation **must** be civilian police. The Regimental Military Police's effectiveness is regularly a source of derision in repeated court-martials. Institutionally, Sandhurst needs to act to the highest standard – and be seen to do so, to build trust and confidence in the system.

5. **Independent Support.** This element has crossover with all other levels of analysis.

   There are currently no Mental Health professionals who are employed at Sandhurst with responsibility for either Permanent Staff or Officer Cadets. As a HE establishment, Sandhurst should offer embedded counselling support in line with civilian HE
organisations (Broglia et al., 2018). This would comprise of one mental health assessor per college and a qualified counsellor in the Sandhurst. This is, of course, an extremely low commitment compared to universities but is a vast increase in what is currently offered.

Behaviours

Sandhurst needs to target poor behaviours transparently. Too often, Sandhurst has used internal proceedings to conduct discipline that should be conducted externally by policing authorities. One Officer Cadet was recently convicted of four counts of disgraceful behaviour and dismissed from the British Army (Robinson, 2021), but only because a change in the chain of command re-explored the original incident nearly a year later, as the accusing Officer Cadet felt very rightfully wronged that this cadet simply received a warning.

Sandhurst Organisation has not learned from this – only last term, an Officer Cadet spoke to others about how they would like to rape one of the female Permanent Staff members. Other Officer Cadets wilfully handed in statements regarding what they had heard, and this was submitted to the chain of command, who made him repeat 12 weeks of training as a punishment. To the disdain of his peers, Permanent Staff, and the targeted female member of staff who regularly sole-worked on the floor beneath his sleeping quarters. We can see how what is perceived as a process lacking transparency can negatively impact the Welfare of both Permanent Staff and Officer Cadets.
Actions

To combat poor behaviours and sexual assaults, Sandhurst should engage with an external party to conduct Active Bystander training to try and improve the behaviours at Sandhurst.

Moving bystanders to be from a passive to an active role has been researched nearly 20 years ago (Berkowitz, 2002; Clinton-Sherrod et al., 2003; Fabiano et al., 2003) This type of intervention has had positive outcomes in the US Army (Potter & Moynihan, 2011; Potter & Stapleton, 2012), although the sample size for this research was too small to evidence true transferability. Active Bystander training is a Leadership Activity (Gidycz et al., 2018; Katz, 2018); therefore, as a Leadership Academy, Sandhurst must engage in it. The bystander programmes with the “most empirical support for effectiveness” (Mujal et al., 2021, p. 381) are ‘Bringing in the Bystander’ and ‘The Men’s Program’ so the Sandhurst version needs to acknowledge their efficacy in its construction of a programme.

The US has learned many lessons from their implementation, which may be transferable to Sandhurst (Gidycz et al., 2018).

Overall Actions.

The thesis will now discuss and explore actions which traverse the silos and themes.

Mental Health Actions

All the above can impact both Permanent Staff and Officer Cadets. As mentioned previously, Mental Health Professionals should be embedded for Officer Cadets.
Due to organisational barriers, Permanent Staff should be granted opportunities to access online counselling, with online counselling recognised by research as efficacy (Wells, 2021).

An organisational end state that would maximise ease of implementation whilst ensuring Sandhurst adheres to NHS guidelines and standards would be a solution like www.kooth.com, which implements an app-based solution to online counselling and mental wellbeing.

**Mental Wellbeing**

Currently, the British Army has granted access to all to the Headspace App. Headspace is a mindfulness and meditation app which is evidenced to improve mindfulness (Economides et al., 2018; Wen et al., 2017). There are two barriers to use amongst Officer Cadets in particular.

1. **Access.** Currently, access is only granted to Permanent Staff due to the need for a government email address (@gov.uk) which is only given to Officer Cadets after commissioning. This should be an easy fix using the Sandhurst emails given for access to MOD Office 365 on their Surface Pro laptops.

2. **Time.** Particularly in the first term, which many deem the most stressful and therefore where this application would potentially have the most impact – every second is timetabled. Therefore, access alone will not facilitate involvement Mindfulness needs to be baked into the timetable to ensure opportunity is given to participate.

**6.2.4 Sandhurst Officer Cadets**

**Behaviours**
Officer Cadets themselves need to understand and feel they are entering a contract to be professional military leaders. Sandhurst is not an extension of the university Rugby club. Officer Cadets must hold the British Army value of Respect for Others at their core. Although we have explored severe incidents of poor behaviours by Permanent Staff, most incidents of Bullying, Harassment, Discrimination and Sexual Assault are conducted by fellow Officer Cadets. (Nicholls, 2018; Robinson, 2021).

There are too many occasions where Officer Cadets only receive an informal warning for behaviours that would, in some cases, have resulted in criminal convictions (Robinson, 2021) in a civilian environment. In the incident in question (Robinson, 2021), an Officer Cadet conducted himself disgracefully on no less than four separate occasions.

In addition, we previously discussed that the Officer Cadet socialise with their peers and that they would like to rape a specific member of female Permanent Staff. This is another occasion where rather than external civilian police involvement, the decision was made to retrain this person.

**Action**

1. **Education.** Officer Cadets need to understand that they have elected voluntarily to choose this organisation and, by doing so, its values. Officer Cadets are to engage in Bystander training as delivered and highlight views such as Sexism, Homophobic behaviours, and Extremism. This is an integrity call – Officer Cadets should be under no mistake of the dim view taken on them if a Leader chooses to ignore one of these behaviours.
2. **Discipline.** Officer Cadets need to understand that, like many other public institutions, it is not a case of being on/off duty. It is more nuanced than that and is more akin to more/less on-duty.

6.2.5 Sandhurst Permanent Staff

**Welfare**

The Officer Cadets are currently provided with a visual and easily recognised welfare ‘wrap’. They have a Welfare Officer designated to each college, and their number is placed on boards for all to see. The same cannot be said for Permanent Staff – the researcher has spent over two years at Sandhurst and would not themselves know who is responsible for Permanent Staff welfare.

**Action**

Permanent Staff must be afforded access to external Mental Health Professionals. However, the researcher would comment as mentioned in the section above.

**Sexual Harassment**

In July 2022, the British Army produced an Army General Instruction which formally bars Permanent Staff from having relations with Officer Cadets. Due to this, of course, is an abuse of power as “in hierarchical organisations, harassment stems from power imbalances that create an environment where a supervisor feels free to act unimpeded” (Bakken, 2020, p. 260); in this case, the author is writing about West Point, but the lessons are transferable.
Action

The research would recommend consent training be placed into the Sandhurst Induction package for all permanent staff so they are fully informed of how the power dynamic skews notions such as consent.

6.2.6 Sandhurst Centre of Army Leadership

Army Leadership suffers from many large organisations ‘Prozac Leadership’ (Collinson, 2012). However, the British Army Leadership needs to find its ‘position’, which needs to be explored, unpacked, and researched. The below should be completed over the next 5-10 years:

1. Doctoral Research 1. Research should be conducted on establishing the social construction of British Army Leadership for the Brigade, Divisional and senior commanders of the Army.

2. Doctoral Research 2. Research should be conducted on establishing the social construction of Leadership in the British Army as viewed by MPs, Senior Civil Servants, and public members.

3. Doctoral Research 3. Fusion of this thesis and the last two pieces of doctoral research, tempered with practitioners' input to commence theory building around the British Army Leadership’s ontology, epistemology, definition, and model construct.

With an end state of moving towards a holistic and academically rigorous British Army Leadership Theory.
6.3 Reflexivity

Reflexivity is a research method in the qualitative area in which researchers openly recognise "the personal and political informing the research" (Burr, 2003, p.157).

It permits acknowledgement that the researcher will contribute influences, interests, and perspectives from the researcher's background to the study effort, as will the other participants (Watt, 2007), and is seen as a critical component of the ‘doctoral journey’ (Fox & Allan, 2014).

Instead of observing this as a weakness, it is welcomed in order to understand what occurs and why in the research (Alvesson et al., 2008).

A reflexive research approach is essential in recognising how the researcher the participants "co-produce" or co-construct knowledge together (Brinkmann, 2013; Mishler, 2009a; Tedlock, 2000, p. 467; Terry & Hayfield, 2021b).

This reflexive position has guided the methods, with the interview style containing aspects of relational interviewing (Fujii, 2017), such as ethical treatment of participants and elements of constructionist interviews, whilst having many overlapping qualities. The constructionist interview is conducted from a reflexive position emphasising sense-making and co-construction (Mishler, 2009a; Roulston, 2010a).

The reflexive position even had an impact on the analysis method, with the method taken being Reflexive Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006, 2021b; Terry et al., 2017b); some could deem the specific flavour within as a Relativist approach to Reflexive TA (Terry & Hayfield, 2021d). The different means of maintaining reflexivity throughout the thesis will now be described.
6.3.1 Reflexive Language

The thesis has considered the use of inclusive and first-person language. It is a personal story; the researcher’s organisation and the researcher are part of the research and therefore make first-language use appropriate at times (Hyland, 2002), particularly when having a position of Social Construction (Shotter, 2019). Anyone reading is an ‘active reader’ (Hyland, 2001) and is also a part of the research journey as part of the co-creation of this thesis.

The researcher has acknowledged that many demand the use of third-person language (Gong & Dragga, 1995; Spencer & Arbon, 1996).

Also, the writing style will be deliberately simplistic; academia, like many institutions, may unintentionally use language as a barrier (Green, 2010; Lippi-Green, 2012). As a northern man from a family which was barely working class, The researcher has issues with adding to these barriers, which are still present (Blanden & Machin, 2004; Reay et al., 2010), and if this in any way helps in a small way to enable the ‘slip stream’ (Wainwright & Watts, 2019) of working-class into academia then the researcher is content with its appropriateness, it is the right thing to do.

6.3.2 Reflexive Reflection

Reflexive reflection was key to unlocking the research. Exercises such as Section 3.7.3, where the researcher wrote down their thoughts and processes, were vital. Indeed Reflexive Journals in qualitative research are deemed critical (Watt, 2007), mainly when conducting interviews (Meyer & Willis, 2019).
The researcher utilised two methods of Reflexivity; the first was the physical manifestation of reflection of the experiences of conducting elements of the DBA. These were used as entries into NVIVO as notes.

*During both the conduct and the transcription of the interviews, I was shocked, particularly by the incidents involving Permanent Staff. Officer Cadets are newly inducted into the military, and it will, of course, take time for them to assimilate and become comfortable with the values and standards of the Army.*

(NVIVO Entry 12/01/2022)

Another highly effective method was for the researcher to simply reflect on the day’s activities. It felt that just making time and simply thinking about what happened contributed. The researcher would Run around 7km per day at a sub-maximal pace to create a space where the researcher could simply think and reflect. The researcher regarded this as engagement with critical self-reflexivity (Cunliffe, 2002, 2008).

6.3.3 Reflexive Interactions

The conversation with others and the “telling, retelling and recalling of experiences” (Corlett, 2013, p. 454) is a part of the Reflexive journey, particularly for doctoral students (Fox & Allan, 2014). Corlett discusses this as an aspect of reflexivity regarding participants; however, it is a transferable assumption.

As a student in extremely non-academic and practitioner-based employment, the researcher has had much more opportunity than most to engage reflexivity in the vein of Corlett's definition.
The researcher has not only had the opportunity to regularly engage with the assigned three-person supervision team but also to engage with supervisors from other fields who work at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

The researcher has also managed to present at the internal conferences at Northumbria Research Community and externally at the International Studying Leadership Conference (2021).

The external engagement resulted in conversations regarding the topic with academics from Leadership schools in the Royal Navy and Royal Airforce. Also, engagement with Professor Kenneth Gergen to check the researcher's understanding of Gergen's Social Constructionism was in line with their own.

This section has offered an overview of the reflexive researcher and how this has been utilised in a variety of ways throughout the research journey. A critical assessment of the research process follows using an evaluation methodology.

### 6.4 Evaluative Framework

Whilst acknowledging the claim from some that from a Social Constructionist viewpoint “is incompatible with standards for the evaluation of epistemological claims (Flick et al., 2004, p. 185; Shotter, 1990). Although this and other limitations have been highlighted, an evaluative framework must typically be provided, particularly for doctoral research. The selected evaluative framework (Steinke, 2004) for this research and how the researcher evidences its attainment is contained below.
6.4.1 Communicative Validation

Communicative Validation (Flick et al., 2004; Kvale, 1995, 2007) is in itself a reflexive process (Glückler & Panitz, 2021), and for this research, the accepted method (Flick et al., 2004) of member checking was utilised. In addition, the interaction with the supervision team and feedback on the interview can be regarded as ‘Peer Debriefing’ (Flick, 2022, p. 1239), as data was communicated between the researcher and supervision team, such data as the interview protocol.

6.4.2 Triangulation

In its original form, Triangulation was taken to mean complementary methods or theories (Denzin, 1978) and resulted in mono-method studies falling out of favour. The researcher would declare that this thesis fulfils triangulation through its use of Theory Triangulation (Denzin, 1978, p. 297). This thesis encapsulates theories from Leadership, general social science, and Psychology. In addition, within-methods triangulation is claimed through the interview protocol and is an accepted claim, mainly when asking interview participants to relate experiences and therefore solicit semantic knowledge (Flick, 2022, p. 658).

6.4.3 Validation of the Interview Situation

Although there is an acknowledged power difference which is seen as a barrier to validation, the revealing and sensitive nature of the experiences conveyed by Officer Cadets is indicative of the evidence of the presence of trust and openness. This presence is crucial for validating the interview-situation (Steinke, 2004, p. 185).
6.4.4 Authenticity

Authenticity in qualitative research is not a nascent aim (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, pp. 245-250). Whereas positivism has similar aims, it should be noted that the constructivist/constructionist criteria delineate from its positivist cousin (Guba & Lincoln, 2001). Constructivist Authenticity has five pillars (Guba & Lincoln, 2001):

1. **Fairness.** This research has been conducted fairly in the “negotiated emergent construction” (Guba & Lincoln, 2001, p. 7).

2. **Ontological Authenticity.** The research has a golden thread of Ontological Authenticity, which runs through the thesis and helps inform and design each element.

3. **Educative Authenticity.** Through the active reading of this thesis, individuals will become more empathic toward the social constructions of others.

4. **Catalytic Authenticity.** This thesis indicates the extent of the action that intends to take—reflected in the actions for the critical actors.

5. **Tactical Authenticity.** The researcher, whilst not empowered to complete all the actions proposed by the thesis, is relating the results and conclusions to the 2* General who can enact these changes.

6.5 Limitations

This thesis has provided theoretical and methodological contributions, as detailed throughout this chapter. Nonetheless, several limitations of this research have been unveiled by critical reflection on the research, input, and interaction with others throughout the process.
This thesis concentrated on groups of Officer Cadets at various stages of the Commissioning Course. Ideally, this study would have interviewed Officer Cadets from many different cohorts if it were not bound by the constraints of time and access.

In addition, although the researcher did their best to minimise any perceived power imbalance, it would be naïve to state that it was not there. However, the researcher conducted interviews in civilian clothing, not at their office. A truly external researcher may have elicited different responses.

To further evidence of similarities to ‘the show’ of West Point, it would have been useful to have conducted interviews with a West Point cohort of Officer Cadets. If the researcher were to complete a similar piece of research again, they would alter to a multi-method approach. In addition to interviews, this would involve group work where the group would be asked to agree on definitions. This would allow the researcher to observe how Officer Cadets ‘agree’ on the definition of the construction and how the group's power dynamics interact.

6.6 Future Research

There are several fields and areas that the researcher would like to explore further in future research. The most pertinent, engaging, and offering value is held in section 6.6.5.

6.6.1 Impact of Instructors

Impact of Machiavellian Instructors on Officer Cadets – do High MACH instructors generate more Sword of Honour winners and other positions due to their perception that they are a direct reflection of their competency? The researcher would present the hypothesis that their
Permanent Staff may over-report on and promote the interests of these Officer Cadets for their self-interest.

6.6.2 Longitudinal Study

Data were collected over six months and focused on a single Sword of Honour winner. A longitudinal study may find that Sword of Honour winners are not universally endorsed like the one who commissioned Apr 22. Furthermore, a longitudinal study could further confirm the results and conclusions of this study. A failure to replicate or use other studies to confirm the results of research is a critique of management research (Tourish, 2019, p. i)

6.6.3 Transferability

This researcher agrees with others that it is transferability rather than generalisation which is the aim (Guba & Lincoln, 1989, p. 36; Lincoln & Guba, 1985, p. 110)

Future research could explore this transferability of research to other fields of work. To see if there are similarities in the presence of Machiavellian and narcissistic tendencies in the Prison Service, Police Force, Royal Navy and Royal Air Force or other Military Academies with similar cultures such as West Point.

6.6.4 Hubris

Recent research on Hubris in Management (Sadler-Smith & Tourish, 2021) demonstrates a construct that overlaps with Narcissism and Machiavellianism. More research could be done on whether this is an actual overlap – or if Hubris is a separate entity.
6.6.5 Competition Theory

The nascent literature on Forced Competition Theory (Hoempler, 2021) is the researcher believes an area of future research. This would help shape how Sandhurst conducts competition in the future, and Sandhurst would provide a prime organisation to progress the theory of this field.

6.6.6 Role of Gender in Military Leadership

Particularly revealing when reviewing the data was a bias in language toward masculinity. Many participants would regularly refer to ‘men’ regarding those they would be leading. Women have been debarred from all roles in the Armed Forces since 2018 (Jones et al., 2020). The Officer Cadets interviewed arrived at Sandhurst in 2021, 3 years after the change, which makes the researcher question the basis for this gender bias. At Sandhurst, females make up around 20% of the intake. The leadership practice of Officer Cadets is to lead men and women.

This result must be interpreted with caution and leaves much room for further progress to be made regarding the gendered language of Leadership at Sandhurst.

One interpretation which would need further research to evidence would be the gender barrier regarding language. Although the bar has formally been lifted, many infantry terms in traditionally male-dominated regiments many terms of reference, such as Guardsman, and Kingsman, are unchanged. These terms increase the masculine presumption of position (Archer & Kam, 2022).

I also understand who you want to lead. Men with bayonets fixed.

Participant 13
More research will need to be done to unpack these initial results appropriately. They could be, for example, due to a lack of military female role models. Nevertheless, the Researcher knows that around 25% of Platoon Commanders are female, and the British Army recently promoted its first 2* Female General, which anecdotally counters this argument.

The researcher hypothesises on the currently available data that the reasoning is more a compounding of more minor nudges. Female leaders may not fit the Heroic Leadership mould that is regularly retold at Sandhurst, as historical Military leaders have their stories retold regarding their ruthlessness and bravery. Not a single female leader is currently taught in the syllabus of Sandhurst. Sandhurst has seemingly not moved far from Robert Winsor’s observation in 1996 that “Virtually every popular rendition of organizational militarism employs exclusively male voices and perspectives” (Winsor, 1996, p. 39).

This further research would answer calls that “Urgent studies are needed in relation to men, masculinities and organizations in many specific transnational arenas, such as: militarism” (Hearn & Collinson, 2017, p. 17).

There is a separate conversation to be had regarding the continued romanticism of heroic leaders in Sandhurst (Collinson et al., 2018; Goethals & Allison, 2019).

Heroism is, for the researcher in their experience, not actually a behaviour; heroism is simply the management of fear, and those that can manage fear best are denoted heroic.

### 6.7 Reflections of the Researcher

Over the last four years since I started this journey, I have moved home twice, changed jobs three times, and we have undertaken a global pandemic which at times impacted my job dramatically. I have adopted two exceptional children, amongst a myriad of other things. One
central area I believe I have improved is my mental resilience. Although the British Army sponsors my Doctorate, due to the fast-paced environment of the Forces, any direct interaction regarding my reviews of my research from the British Army stopped around 3 ½ years ago. I now operate in a kind of academic isolation, which is fine, but working a 50hr week role in a highly competitive environment where we are promoted by being in the top 25% of that cohort has been difficult. Whilst also having a young family and conducting research. Another takeaway is the need to love and believe in your research. I feel if I had approached almost any other subject with any other supervision team, I would have faltered.

Also, I think the supervision team I have had has been so complimentary, a triad of knowledge that has regularly held me up, motivated and challenged me. Professionally I discovered that I found it challenging to focus on one thing, particularly at the beginning, like a magpie, seeing new knowledge and immersing myself in it, regardless of if it is totally disconnected from my thesis. I learned quickly that I needed to be much more efficient with my most precious resource, which was time.

Despite this knowledge, I was not as efficient or effective as I could have been. If I had planned the methodology and methods better initially, I would not have wasted weeks, for example extracting the quotes into MP3s. I have learned so many new applications, such as NVIVO, MindGenius and Audacity, to name a few. Moving forward, this new knowledge will be key in my future research to make it more efficient.

My confidence in my work has also grown; I now think of myself as an expert in my highly narrow field, with a unique understanding of both Leadership Practice and Leadership Theory regarding the British Military.
I am more confident with my own Worldview and position and how that impacts my perceptions, and more empathetic to the position of others.

The impact on my workplace is also profound; I am much more critical. I will ask people regularly to give me their understandings and definitions, to make sense of how they construct and sense their contexts and experiences. Through this, I challenge people to go back to ‘first principles’ to look at old problems in new ways, to think.

This journey has helped me to reflect on my personal story – an academic pathway proves knowledge and a level of intelligence, but that level of intelligence must have always been there, the ability to learn. I reflect on the barriers to having that evidence, such as funding and upbringing. I would like to help others utilise the Army to overcome one barrier (funding) whilst acting as a ‘trusted friend’ to help protect against the other.

In addition, although “Reflexivity is not always an easy or pleasurable experience” (Iszatt-White, 2021, p. 83), I feel it was truly transformative and cathartic for me. I reflected on incidents and stories from years previously. I had locked away these incidents and never re-explored them, especially from a critical viewpoint. This ‘reliving’ led to my opinions on people changing and my very position in the British Army being questioned and re-explored. I re-connected with why I joined the Army and remained, and it re-invigorated my joy and pleasure in serving.

6.8 Chapter Summary

This chapter offers a brief review of the thesis. This section summarises this research's theoretical, methodological, and professional contributions. The achievement of the research questions, sub-questions and objectives have been addressed. The study's potential weaknesses are recognised, and future research topics are offered.
This journey has been challenging and tiring, and as the researcher draws to the end – they seem to be in the same position as other academics.

“The more I read, the more I realized how ignorant I was”
(Grint, 2003, p. 89)

Like Grint, the researcher believes a reductionist approach to Leadership is simply unachievable. Following the statement above, he unpicks many reductionist approaches to Leadership. Explores how Leadership is contextual and situational, therefore impossible to predict. An effective Leader can have none of the ‘traditional’ behaviours of a leader and still be highly effective.

The researcher concludes that Leadership is not bright/shadow, dark/light, but varying shades of grey, which encompass different elements of both sides of the traditional dichotomy of Leadership behaviours. These shades depend on context, situation, culture, and a myriad of other intangible elements.
Appendix A - British Army Organisational Background

There is no beating these troops in spite of their generals. I always thought them bad soldiers, now I am sure of it. I turned their right, pierced their centre, broke them everywhere; the day was mine, and yet they did not know it and would not run.

Marshall Soult, Battle of Albuera, 16 May 1811

Formation of the British Army

"Pay well, command well, hang well."

Maxims for the Management of an Army (1643)

Sir R. Hopton

As we can see in the opening quote, the British Army of the 17th Century was very much of the view that it was a transactional relationship (Northouse, 2018).

The British Army was first formed in 1707 (Chandler & Beckett, 2003; Mallinson, 2009a) following the formation of the United Kingdom after both English and Scottish parliaments had passed into law the Union act (Government, 1707).

Despite this formal raising, the British Army culturally and organisationally can draw many associations from the New Model Army, which itself was raised in 1645 (Chandler & Beckett, 2003; Mallinson, 2009a; Rogers, 1968). The New Model Army was the English's actual first full-time professional force. Many historical detractors cite this as a radical religious movement (Bradstock, 2010) due to the presence of the London Levellers and other Puritan Sects within the New Model Army (Bradstock, 2010; Chandler & Beckett, 2003).
However, more contemporary research has critiqued this standpoint (Kishlansky, 1978; Kishlansky, 1983). These researchers believe that previous authors "polarize and exaggerate the situations they observe" (Kishlansky, 1983, p. ix).

The New Model Army can example their organisational and cultural similarities with the British Army by their use of 'red coats'; although not the first use of 'red coats' (Arch, 2007), the New Model Army was the first to have a uniform of this type for a whole army (Arch, 2007). Of note was that the New Model Army sought to professionalise the Officer Corps and move it away from the gentleman's sport it had traditionally been.

Captured in Cromwell's famous quote;

"I had rather have a plain, russet-coated Captain, that knows what he fights for, and loves what he knows, than that you call a Gentleman and is nothing else"

(Carlyle, 1904, p. 154).

The New Model Army exampled this by removing the rights of generals to personally 'approve' commissioned officers (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005)

The New Model Army was disbanded in 1660 (Mallinson, 2009a); the movement slowly decayed following the death of Oliver Cromwell in 1658. The disbandment in 1660 was an unusual affair. The remnants of the New Model Army in Scotland marched to London to secure the capital for the return of Charles II.

The formal disbandment consisted of laying down their weapons before the King, minutes later, taking back up Arms in the name of King Charles II as part of the English Army (Mallinson, 2009b). This new English Army was an amalgam of the New Model Army of
Cromwell and exiled royalists (Childs, 1976), although other historians claim that the majority of the New Model Army was paid off and disbanded (Clayton, 2014).

This period was difficult for the English Army. Parliament was not convinced of its need for a standing Army and severely limited its size (Clayton, 2014; Mallinson, 2009a). The perceived lack of need led to the reformation of some regiments to act as the King's Guards, thereby bypassing this restriction (Mallinson, 2009a). These regiments are the first green shoots of the British Army as we see it today. Red-coat-wearing professional soldiers deployable around the world.

**Major Organisational Changes**

"The snake which cannot cast its skin has to die. As well the minds which are prevented from changing their opinions; they cease to be mind."

Friedrich Nietzsche

Source: (Ford, 1967, p. 417)

The British Army has gone through many significant organisational changes to mould itself into the Contemporary British Army we see today. These are due to both internal and external factors. We will briefly talk about the significant organisational changes in chronological order from the formation of the British Army up to the turn of the 21st century.

**Cardwell Reforms 1868-1874**

_The helplessness of the British soldier, when left to himself is proverbial_

J. H. Stocqueler 1857

(Lafflin, 1966, p. xvii)
The British Army found itself for the first time since its formal inception in 1707, operating concurrently across Europe, North America, the Caribbean, and North Africa. Although the Navy was well used to these overseas forays, the nascent British Army was less comfortable with numerous simultaneous operations across multiple continents (Mallinsson, 2009a).

The Cardwell reforms came because of perceived problems with the British Army's performance during both the Crimean War 1853-1856 and the Indian Rebellion of 1857. "Crimean War has been regarded as the most ill-managed in British history" (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 146) and is an example of laissez-faire leadership. Lord Raglan "could hardly bear to issue an order" (Dixon, 1976, p. 39)

Cardwell reforms were significant in three principal areas: -

1. The abolishment of Purchase – No longer could officers purchase their commission.

2. Manning – Cardwell reduced service from 12 years with an option to serve for a further 12yrs. To a flexible 7-12 years' service. On leaving the British Army, the soldier automatically remained in the reserve. Cardwell also abolished flogging, and a year later, in 1871, branding followed suit.

3. Localisation – Before 1870, the British Army was a national endeavour. Recruits were assigned to whichever regiment had the most need, regardless of geography. Cardwell re-designated regiments within counties, depending on population density, allowing soldiers to be pooled and work with people and officers connected with their local areas.

All these changes sound entirely positive, but more recent reflections on the reforms are less convincing. Purchasing was gone, but officers still had to pay for their uniforms and billeting,
meaning that a supplementary income was necessary. The requirement for supplementary income ensured only those who could have previously afforded purchase, were the same gentleman who could afford to be officers.

The reduction of staffing did give the Boer War some 80,000 reserves to draw from, but their training and tactics were outdated and inadequate. Overall, Cardwell's reforms seemed to be half-executed, the sentiment was correct, but their application was not (Tucker, 1963).

**Childers Reforms 1881**

*...the world has no stauncher man than is the British soldier intrinsically*

Archibald Forbes 1894
(Lafflin, 1966, p. xvii)

Childers Reforms were, in many ways, a simple continuation of those started by Cardwell. Army Seniority numbers were abolished, and regiments re-organised to be appropriately staffed and named within their regimental localisation. Also, uniforms were re-designed to ensure standardisation across the military (French, 2005).

**Haldane Reforms 1907**

"If you organise The British Army, you'll ruin it."

Remark by Senior Officer to Haldane's Military Secretary
(Mead, 2014)
Bias may have influenced Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haigh's remark that Haldane was "the greatest Secretary of State for War England has ever had" (Dunlop, 1938, p. 231), as his military compatriot throughout the pre-war years, he would, of course, have some bias.

However, the Haldane reforms though were vital in the preparations for the First World War and without them and the 'strategic reserve' that was created by those reforms, the British effort would have been severely hampered (Reynolds, 1938).

These reforms were, for the most part, an implementation of the Lord Esher Report (Foot, 2010). Which itself came because of his placement on the Elgin Commission, examining the South African War.

The Haldane reforms centred around the creation of an Imperial General Staff and an Expeditionary Force (Sheffield, 2004). Also, the creation of the Territorial Force and Officer Training Corps helped bolster the defence of the mainland should the expeditionary force be utilised.

The Haldane Reforms were superior in both scope and implementation to the more well-known Cardwell or Childers Reforms. Haldane changed the organisational behaviour of the British Army. Gone was the red coat except for ceremonial duties, and infantryman's pay was linked for the first time to his efficiency with this rifle (Mallinson, 2009a).

**War Years 1914-1945**

*Though the little British Army that fought at Mons won glory enough to last the nation for all time, little more was said about it than if Mons had been a sham battle on Salisbury Plain.*

Frederick William Wile (An American) 1918

(Lafflin, 1966, p. xviii)
During both World War years and the inter-war period, despite the British Army increasing/decreasing in size, the 'regimental system' and the British Expeditionary force endured.

_The French are frightened of the Germans. They are wrong. The only emotion a sane man need feel for the Germans is a certain wary scorn_  
(Bartlett, 1940, p. 20)

**Sandy Review 1957**

The Sandys Review was conducted due to the diplomatic failure of the Suez Crisis in 1956. Although the British Army did achieve its aims, it was embarrassed by its perceived inadequate equipment and technical obsolescence (Varble, 2008). The review results in the 1957 White Paper (Defence, 1957).

The review indicated a shift towards nuclear deterrence and missiles, the end of national service and a reduction in overseas garrisons. Besides, the regional focus of the Cardwell reforms, such as regimental depots, ceased. Soldiers began training in Brigades by function rather than regional affiliation (Mallinson, 2009a).

**Healey Review 1967**

The new Ministry of Defence was formed in 1964 as a result of the Mountbatten-Thornycroft reforms (Beckett & Gooch, 1981). The new Labour government, under its new Secretary of State for Defence, immediately conducted a review, this being the first review driven purely by financial will.

The review involved halving the size of the territorial army, cancelling major equipment programmes and termination of all further aircraft carrier construction.
**Mason Review 1974**

Again, a newly elected Labour government, on their assumption, conducted a review of the Armed Forces. The review is driven by economic reasoning rather than any strategic basis. The results of the review were that the defence budget would be reduced by 12% over ten years, and staffing would be reduced by 11% over the same period.

The review moves the British Army from a mobile force to one more attrition focussed. Their highest priority is the protection of the NATO front-line in Germany.

**Nott Review 1981**

The British Army came away unscathed from the Nott Review. The Royal Navy was losing one-fifth of its frigates and destroyers. In addition to their amphibious assault ship HMS Intrepid and HMD Fearless (Defence, 1981).

However, all these losses were rapidly torched following the Argentine invasion of the Falklands in 1982. The very ships earmarked for removal proved to be essential, and most of the Nott Review quietly rowed back.

**Options for Change 1990**

*Our proposals will bring savings and a reduction in the share of GDP taken by defence. We need force levels which we can afford and which can realistically be manned, given demographic pressures in the 1990s.*

Mr Tom King, Secretary of State for Defence, House of Commons, 25 July 1990
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the operating environment changed. Service chiefs invited this review as they sought to modernise the British Army into an agile, flexible fighting force (King, 25 July 1990).

The British Army, however, sowed what they reaped. The programme reduced the British Army from 160,000 to 120,000. A 1/3 of the British Army had been lost overnight (McInnes, 1993).

**Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study 1994**

The Front line first study brought about by the conservative government of the day concentrated on support. The review was conducted and came to three main conclusions: -

1. Command structures across the MOD should be streamlined.
2. Support functions could be carried out more effectively by the civilian sector by the use of Private Finance Initiatives (PFIs).
3. Future operations would be more than likely carried out on a Joint Service basis.

The unofficial mantra of the study was "go first, go fast, go home" (Dannatt, 2010, p. 178). Although seeming simple in their conclusions, their execution was left wanting. Some lead commanders commented in reflection about the review;

"The review resulted in the ability of the military medical services to support military operational deployments being virtually eliminated."

(Garden & Ramsbotham, 2004)

**Strategic Defence Review 1998**

After New Labour won the 1997 Election, they immediately looked to fulfil its manifesto promise of holding a defence review. All recent reviews had been dominated by fiscal issues
and, therefore, the treasury. Mr Robertson, the new SoS, was adamant that this review would be foreign policy-led (Grattan, 2011) and a "Policy for People" (Dodd & Oakes, 1998, p. 59).

Despite the fanfare, the review was evolutionary rather than revolutionary. The MoD was organised to suit the new informal mantra of "go first, go fast, go home" (Dannatt, 2010, p. 178). This mantra resulted in a more joint 'purple' structure, things like the Defence Logistic Organisation and the Joint Helicopter Command.

General Sir Richard Dannatt, later to become head of the Army, noted the monetary undercurrents of these moves. Stating there are “those who know the cost of everything, but the value of nothing” (Dannatt, 2010, p. 182), quoting Oscar Wilde. Some thought, though, that this was a new benchmark for defence planning and that this evolutionary review set a precedent and, indeed, the standard for SDRs of the future (Cornish & Dorman, 2009).

**Strategic Defence Review 2002**

SDR 2002 was an immediate reaction by Geoff Hoon to the attack on the Twin Towers. With a renewed focus on terrorism and a new focus on asymmetric warfare. It also attempted to address the recruitment and retention issues acutely felt in the British Army – although in no way comparable to those of the present day. This review is seen as a quick rehash rather than dialectic, evidenced-based and process-driven enquiry (Cornish & Dorman, 2009).

The SDR 2002: A New Chapter's most serious detractors were from within the parliament.

*MoD has not addressed the risk of over-commitment leading to overstretch. The Committee believes that these issues need to be urgently considered by the MoD in an*
open and inclusive manner.

(Committee, 2003, p. 45)


The Defence White Paper (Secretary Of State, 2003) was a more focused review, examining how the British Army could respond to the current threat. This threat was assessed as international terrorism, failed states and WMD. This new assessment drove the new organisational make-up of the British Army (Library, 2004).

**Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010**

The SDSR (Prime Minister, 2010) was one of the most divisive of recent restructuring. Driven by financial austerity following the financial crash, the MOD further alienated the Government with its lack of fiscal oversight and management (Hartley, 2010).

The financially driven outcome was a reduction of 17,000 soldiers in addition to numerous capability cuts, including heavy armour and artillery.

Defence commentators have repeatedly repeated that genuine savings in the MOD can be made only by reforming the way it performs, not by cutting it (Cavanagh, 2011)

SDSR detractors claimed that the whole review was simply about the numbers with little heed paid to the overall strategy (Cornish & Dorman, 2011).

**Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015**

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This review was the first time the National Security Strategy and the SDSR had been merged into one report (*National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015*, 2015). In an era of austerity and with Defence not being 'ring-fenced' in pre-election promises (Conservative Party, 2015), the cuts made by Cameron's fledgeling government were feared by the MOD.

These fears proved unfounded. External pressure from NATO and the US, combined with internal pressure from Conservative Back-benchers and eminent Defence specialists, resulted in the scythe not cutting as deep as initially feared (Dorman et al., 2016).

Some commentators see the SDSR as a genuinely strategic document which recovers its reputation in light of recent reviews (Keohane, 2016). However, while it did maintain the 82k soldier commitment, it did so while committing to cutting 30% of civil servant posts.

*Modernising Defence Programme 2018*

The Modernising Defence Programme was a removal of the MOD element out of the National Security and Capability Review. The MDP was not fiscally neutral, so it was the first review in recent years where the priority was not financially driven.

After much fluff and time-wasting, the MDP was finally delivered just before Christmas 2018. It was a vacuous and trite document with extraordinarily little substance or focus.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regular Army</th>
<th>Reserve Army</th>
<th>Total Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1710</td>
<td>70,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1800</td>
<td>163,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Strength</td>
<td>Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>151,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>3,820,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3,120,000</td>
<td>Included</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>364,000</td>
<td>83,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>258,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>113,000</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019</td>
<td>81,430</td>
<td>29,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Strength of the British Army

Sources: (Defence, 2019d), (Rasler & Thompson, 2015) (Mallinson, 2009a)

Current British Army

The British Army has a liability of 82,000 soldiers (Defence, 2019d). However, many places are unfulfilled, which remains as of 1 Oct 18 with a deficit of 7.5% (British Army, 2019, p. 6).

The British Army is charged with helping to deliver 25 tasks within the National Security Objectives (Defence, 2018, p. 20). The British Army is, as of Jan 2019, deployed on operations in 31 countries around the world (Lancaster MP, 2019).
Appendix B - The British Army Officer

We will now explore the British Army Officer. Focussing on how their responsibilities and, to some extent, their reputation have evolved along with the British Army.

Historical Overview

Officer of the Restoration Army 1660 to 1900

Until the Haldane Reforms, the British Army Officer had to purchase his commission (Clayton, 2014; Mallinson, 2009a). However, the same was true for the majority of government positions of the time (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005). There was a time during the Napoleonic Wars when purchasing was suspended, and this gave gentleman who could never have customarily afforded purchase an opportunity to serve as an officer.

However, at the end of hostilities, these less wealthy officers were tactically forced out of the British Army by the regiments, deliberately changing their uniforms more than once a year and ramping up tailoring costs (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005).

The establishments of regiments of the English and then, post-1707, the British Army were remarkably similar. They were commanded by a Colonel, who was assisted by a Lieutenant-Colonel and a Major. A Captain commanded the sub-units with a lieutenant and an ensign. These officers commanded within each sub-unit 120 private gentlemen.

Officers of this period were expected to be a gentleman and have a supplementary income. Indeed no barracks were available, and officers were expected to pay for their accommodation and uniforms (Clayton, 2007).
The officers (except for the Guards regiments) tended to come from upper-class families who had fallen on hard times. All officers had to purchase their commissions. Paying the Secretary of War directly with no other qualification or testing (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005; Mallinson, 2009a)

Cardwell reforms initially made punishment more equal across the regiments. Floggings were abolished, and Field Punishments were made available in their place. Also, Cardwell banned the purchasing of commissions (Holdsworth & Pugsley, 2005).

As a result, the rank structure of regiments changed due to a lack of Colonels, and it was now Lieutenant-Colonels who commanded regiments. However, the officer demographic was little changed due to the enduring requirement for officers to still pay for their billeting uniforms and sustenance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Officer</th>
<th>Price in 1798</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>£2,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Captain</td>
<td>£1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
<td>£1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ensign/Adjutant</td>
<td>£400</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 23: Price of Purchasing Commissions in 1798**

Source: (Thomas, 1961)

Haldane managed to use his term to enable the reforms planned by Cardwell to be realised. Haldane, in many academic views, revolutionised military education with what he coined 'Haldane's Mackindergarten' (Sloan, 2012). This course was delivered by the London School of Economics for British Army Officers.

It was designed to teach regular business and efficiency practices to these officers and was the first in an evolutionary approach to educating officers using business principles.

**Officer of the 20th Century Army**

*Army officers lead and care for their soldiers. They make sure that their teams of soldiers have the right skills and motivation to perform at their very best.*

(Defence, 2019b)

The officer of the 20th Century was the most professional of all officers since the formation of the British Army (Clayton, 2014). This professionalism was due to substantial amounts of troops held at readiness due to the Cold War, while these highly trained troops had little in the way of 'work' to occupy their time. This work ethic led to a lifestyle of relaxed enjoyment more akin to the 18th Century 'gentleman-officer' (Clayton, 2014)
Contemporary British Army Officer

It is generally accepted that British Army Officers are promoted for their competence in their current role (Mileham, 2004a, 2004b) rather than their suitability for the next one. However, other academics have critiqued the interpretation of ‘competence’ (Moore & Trout, 1978).

The Armed Forces are seen by some academics as a prime example (Brasset, 1988; Kumazawa, 2010; Michelson, 2013; Peter & Hull, 1969; Segal & Segal, 1970) of the ‘Peter Principle’ (Peter & Hull, 1969). In that, the British Army promotes a level of incompetence.

Due to acceptance that competence is based on both followership and leadership, the focus is placed on officer cadets' understanding of both active following (Rost, 2008) and leading, their lived experience of them. Their understanding of these concepts is a dyadic relationship (Buchanan, 2007; Kleiner, 2008) which is not mutually exclusive, as agreed by other academics (Townsend & Gebhardt, 2003). The researcher also acknowledges the position of Bennis that the terms are outdated and “a decade from now, the terms leader and follower will seem as dated bell bottoms and Nehru jackets” (Bennis, 2008, p. xxvi), but we are over a decade since that statement, and I believe they are still the most suitable terms.
Appendix C - Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (RMAS)

Sandhurst is the location where all British Army Officers currently receive their initial training. This initial training consists of 44 weeks of intensive training in both leadership and command (Defence, 2019c).

Sandhurst was first established in 1812; this was in response to the idea of Major-General Le Marchant to professionalise officer education (Chandler, 1991; Shepperd, 1980; Thomas, 1961). This institutionalisation of officer education was not a new idea with Royal Military Academy Woolwich established in 1741, but the RMA was a niche concentrating on training artillerymen and, in 1806, engineers. Le Marchant's idea of a national military college was visionary.

The Academy initially rented accommodation at Great Marlow while the new build of the Royal Military College (RMC) later Sandhurst was completed.

With the Napoleonic Wars raging, the establishment of Sandhurst came on time. "The war had made the Army popular with the nation, and Sandhurst was training officers for the Army; expense was nothing" (Mockler-Ferryman, 1900, p. 22).

After the Cardwell Reforms (1875), the RMC and, indeed, British Officer training, at least superficially, came to be remarkably like that of today.

With the removal of ensigns and cornets, sub-lieutenant the gentleman students were taught over eight months. This was further broken down into three equal terms. The length of the terms has slightly increased and decreased over time as certain subjects were added or removed.

The Sandhurst was formed in 1947 after the amalgamation of both the RMC and RMA. This amalgamation was profound, as with it came the abolishment of fees. Opening attendance
and selection to be a British Army Officer up to all rather than those who could afford it (Thomas, 1961). After the amalgamation on 14 July 1948, the first of the famous and now annual Sovereigns Parade took place.
Email from Major J R Tibbett

Good Evening Professor Gergen,

My name is Captain Jeff Tibbett, a part-time DBA student exploring British Army Leadership.

If I may I am hoping to ask a few moments of your time.

I believe I am a social constructionist but thought I would ask a few questions of you if I may to deepen my understanding.

I figure the worst that can happen is I get no reply – then this still serves as a brief reflection of my position.

I have read a number of paper and books by eminent scholars such as Hibberd and Pernecky. They seem at seem combative or defensive at best, and naïve/close-minded at worst.

My take on Social Constructionism is that it is a dialectic framework in which to advance knowledge through dialogue. It seeks to explore old problems in new and radical ways, beyond our own pre-conceptions and biases.

Social Constructionism is not ontological we do not exist by it and hold it like a beacon to our grave but utilise its worth within the advancement of knowledge.

It does not seek to usurp Positivism, Social Constructionism seeks to advance knowledge by opening the minds of researchers, unlocking natural scepticism. Helping them to explore concepts and viewpoints closed to them by the presuppositions of other paradigms?
I may be wrong, but this is my view – I was wondering what are your thoughts on this. Am I way off point?

Kind Regards

Captain Jeff Tibbett
Response from Professor K J Gergen PhD

Dear Captain Tibbett,

Thank you for your kind inquiry, and I congratulate you on a level of understanding of social constructionist theory (at least in my way of voicing it) that exceeds that of many scholars, students, and practitioners.

The common tendency is to look at theory as "a new truth," as opposed to a potentially valuable perspective for living our lives together on this planet. But let me add two points: First, the invitation is not only to open possibilities of understanding, but to invite the creation of new ideas and practices, and particularly, to innovate in ways that take account of the values and peoples who may be helped or harmed by these innovations. Second, and related, many practitioners who are moved in this direction do treat constructionist concepts in a realist fashion (for example, narrative therapy and narrative mediation do presume the reality of narrative - at least for purposes of developing their practice). I hope this is useful for you, and I wish you well in your studies and profession.

Sincere best wishes,

Ken Gergen
Appendix E - Integrative Definition of Leadership

A leader is one or more people who selects, equips, trains, and influences one or more follower(s) who have diverse gifts, abilities, and skills and focuses the follower(s) to the organization’s mission and objectives causing the follower(s) to willingly and enthusiastically expend spiritual, emotional, and physical energy in a concerted coordinated effort to achieve the organizational mission and objectives. The leader achieves this influence by humbly conveying a prophetic vision of the future in clear terms that resonates with the follower(s) beliefs and values in such a way that the follower(s) can understand and interpret the future into present-time action steps. In this process, the leader presents the prophetic vision in contrast to the present status of the organization and through the use of critical thinking skills, insight, intuition, and the use of both persuasive rhetoric and interpersonal communication including both active listening and positive discourse, facilitates and draws forth the opinions and beliefs of the followers such that the followers move through ambiguity toward clarity of understanding and shared insight that results in influencing the follower(s) to see and accept the future state of the organization as a desirable condition worth committing personal and corporate resources toward its achievement. The leader achieves this using ethical means and seeks the greater good of the follower(s) in the process of action steps such that the follower(s) is/are better off (including the personal development of the follower as well as emotional and physical healing of the follower) as a result of the interaction with the leader. The leader achieves this same state for his/her own self as a leader, as he/she seeks personal growth, renewal, regeneration, and increased stamina—mental, physical, emotional, and spiritual—through the leader-follower interactions. The leader recognizes the diversity of the follower(s) and achieves unity of common values and directions without destroying the uniqueness of the person. The leader accomplishes this through innovative flexible means of education, training, support, and protection that provide each follower with what the follower
needs within the reason and scope of the organization’s resources and accommodations relative to the value of accomplishing the organization’s objectives and the growth of the follower. The leader, in this process of leading, enables the follower(s) to be innovative as well as self-directed within the scope of individual-follower assignments and allows the follower(s) to learn from his/her/their own, as well as others’ successes, mistakes, and failures along the process of completing the organization’s objectives. The leader accomplishes this by building credibility and trust with the followers through interaction and feedback to and with the followers that shapes the followers’ values, attitudes, and behaviors towards risk, failure, and success. In doing this, the leader builds the followers’ sense of self-worth and self-efficacy such that both the leader and followers are willing and ready to take calculated risks in making decisions to meet the organization’s goals/objectives and through repeated process steps of risktaking and decision-making the leader and followers together change the organization to best accomplish the organization’s objectives. The leader recognizes the impact and importance of audiences outside of the organization’s system and presents the organization to outside audiences in such a manner that the audiences have a clear impression of the organization’s purpose and goals and can clearly see the purpose and goals lived out in the life of the leader. In so doing, the leader examines the fit of the organization relative to the outside environment and shapes both the organization and the environment to the extent of the leader’s capability to insure the best fit between the organization and the outside environment. The leader throughout each leader-follower-audience interaction demonstrates his/her commitment to the values of (a) humility, (b) concern for others, (c) controlled discipline, (d) seeking what is right and good for the organization, (e) showing mercy in beliefs and actions with all people, (f) focusing on the purpose of the organization and on the well-being of the followers, and (g) creating and sustaining peace in the organization—not a lack of conflict but a place where peace grows.
These values are the seven Beatitudes found in Matthew 5 and are the base of the virtuous theory of Servant Leadership.

(Winston & Patterson, 2006)
Appendix F - MOD Research and Ethics Application

Ministry of Defence

Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee (MODREC)

MODREC Application Form
Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee (MODREC)

MODREC Application Form

Please ensure the Research Sponsor checklist has been completed and this application has received a SAC approval prior to applying to MODREC.

The Research Sponsor checklist and any other supporting documents must be included as annexes to the main body of the application. Once the application has been completed in full, the guidance text in blue italics can be deleted and the application emailed to the MODREC Secretariat (DST-MODRECTeam@mod.gov.uk).

CV’s should be provided as separate documents.

Enter text in the grey boxes, which will expand automatically to encompass your text.

Remove the blue guidance text prior to submitting.

1. Study Title (including any abbreviated titles)
3. Summary of Project

British Army leadership is world-renowned (Rennie, 2019a) as the ‘gold standard’ of Military Leadership (Deakin, 2013). This research is exploring the social construction of leadership at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst (Sandhurst), using the awarding of the Sword of Honour as the focus point. This study aims to explore Leadership through a holistic lens and explore if the Officer Cadets’ (Officer Cadets) lived experience of Leadership and Social Construction reflects the leadership lessons/models taught at Sandhurst. This will be a qualitative case study from a Relativistic ontological viewpoint and through a social constructionist epistemological lens – specifically the lens as espoused by Kenneth Gergen (Gergen, 2009). The research will deductively explore the presence of ‘dark leadership’ elements (Paulhus & Williams, 2002) within Officer Cadets’ perception of Sword of Honour winners in their intakes; exploring if there are ‘dark’ traits as exampled by Paulhus Dark Triad (sub-clinical Machiavellianism, sub-clinical narcissism and psychopathy). This study will use purposive sampling of Officer Cadets using data collected by semi-structured interviews and analysed using reflexive Thematic Analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2017). Ultimately, this will explore Leadership theory holistically and evidencing if Sandhurst teachings reflect Officer Cadets’ lived experience of Leadership.
4. Investigators

4a. Chief Investigator

Name and Title: Jeffrey Roy Tibbett

Grade/Rank: Captain

Post Title: Assistant Chief Instructor

Department: New College

Establishment: Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

Address: Camberley

Telephone: 07496179985

Email: Jeffrey.tibbett844@mod.gov.uk

4b. Does this project contribute towards a qualification? Yes/No

Type of qualification: Doctor of Business Administration (DBA)

Research Supervisors: 1. Dr Rachael Thompson
                        2. Dr Alistair Bowden

Post Title: 1. Senior Lecturer
            2. Senior Lecturer.

Department: Newcastle Business School

Establishment: Northumbria University
**Address:** Sutherland Building, 2 Ellison Pl, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST

**Telephone:** 0191 232 6002

**Email:** info@northumbria.ac.uk

4c. **Other Investigators/Collaborators/External Consultants**

N/A

4d. **Name of the Volunteer Advocate or Independent Medical Officer**

Dr Russell Warhurst

**Address:** Sutherland Building, 2 Ellison Pl, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST

**Telephone:** 0191 232 6002

**Email:** russell.warhurst@northumbria.ac.uk

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5. **Research Sponsor**

**Research Sponsor Contact/Authoriser:** Lieutenant-General D. Capps CBE

**Organisation:** Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

**Title:** Lieutenant-General

**Position:** Commandant

**Role:** Director of Leadership

**Address:** Royal Military Academy Sandhurst

**Phone Number:** N/A
Email: N/A

6. Preferred Timetable

6a. Preferred Start Date: 1 November 22

6b. Expected Date of Completion: September 22

7. Other Organisation(s) Involved and Funding

7a. Department/Organisation Requesting Research (if applicable): N/A

7b. If you are receiving funding, please provide details here: Research is funded through the Army Higher Education Pathway.

7c. Please declare any competing or conflicts of interests:

7d. Type of research
   i. Student (Psychological/social survey)
   ii. 

8. Scientific Assessment Approval

8a. Name of SAC that has reviewed/approved this application: Army

8b. Date of SAC approval: 12 October 2021

8c. SAC reference number: 423

9. Purpose of the Study and Defence Benefit
Primary Research Aim

To explore whether dark leadership behaviours/practices exist within potential winners of the Sandhurst Sword of Honour.

With Dark Triad identified by Paulhus (2014) namely the presence of Machiavellianism, Psychopathic and Narcissism, all at the sub-clinical level. Identified as the behaviours that underpin Dark Leadership.

Research Objectives

- Explore the social construction of Leadership by Officer Cadets at Sandhurst through interviews.
- Reflect in an auto-ethnographic manner on personal leadership experiences.
- Explore the presence of dark traits within Sandhurst Officer Cadets through the lens of the Sword of Honour.
- Assess if the lived experience of Officer Cadets reflects the current Army Leadership definition.
- To explore and evidence an argument for the reconceptualization of leadership at Sandhurst.

Potential Contributions to Leadership Theory

There are several areas to which this research can potentially contribute:

Progress of Social Constructionist Knowledge of Leadership. This thesis will expand our theoretical understanding of the social construction of Leadership, particularly in the public sector, to help answer the call to develop a ‘leadership doctrine’ (Grint & Jackson, 2010) after the repeated attempts to develop a Grand Theory of Leadership (Wren, 2006) by others in academia.

To provide an exploratory study into realistic alternatives to positive leadership theories. This research will aim to provide a holistic leadership approach by recognising dark leadership traits within Sandhurst leadership construct by moving away from the positive organisational behaviours and ‘Prozac Leadership’ (Collinson 2012) into an approach that acknowledges dark behaviours. This research could be seen as a possible advancement of Full Range Leadership (FRL) (Antonakis & House, 2013; B. J. Avolio, 2010), acknowledging the work others have done on the incorporation of dark leadership (Itzkovich, Heilbrunn, & Aleksic, 2020) and answering the call by Bass that FRL is the basis of Military Leadership (B. Bass, 2018). This would be the development/construction of a theory that acknowledges the need for Dark behaviours, which to varying levels enable leader effectiveness in VUCA environments.
To progress the understanding of Dark leadership tendencies viewed from a leadership lens. Very few studies have approached the Dark leadership behaviours with a neutral position; most studies make a priori assumptions that these are negative behaviours (Dagless, 2015; Reed, 2004; Williams, 2005). I argue that Dark Leadership behaviours can result in some circumstances in positive Leadership outcomes. Fewer studies still approach with a leadership lens utilising a qualitative standpoint. This proposed study will provide a qualitative viewpoint for this position on Dark Leadership research and enhance our understanding of these Dark behaviours from a holistic approach.

Practical Value to Defence: Rationale. To evaluate the social construction of Leadership amongst Sandhurst Officer Cadets. This research will re-enforce or refine the current approach of leadership development within the academy and advance the academic understanding of British Army Leadership in the context of Sandhurst.

10. Study Design, Method, and Data Analysis

This research proposal is a qualitative single case study. Participants will be volunteer Officer Cadets selected using purposive sampling. Data collection will be undertaken using semi-structured interviews. These interviews will take a social constructionist approach with a reflexive (Etherington, 2004) standpoint, using the telling of vignettes or small stories to conduct mean-making of the construction of leadership at the Sandhurst. Chosen due to my epistemological position – my research strategy should flow logically from your position.

There will be a small auto-ethnographic element to the study, with the researcher using his lived experience gleaned during 23 years in the British Army to reflect on leadership issues in the introduction.

The interview structure and nature of questions is shown in Annex B. No sensitive topics will be directly addressed, but some participants might disclose some sensitive information.

Topics addressed will be centred on examples of effective leadership.

Participants will mainly be Officer Cadets volunteers of Sandhurst, and remaining participants will be trained officers or veterans. Trained officers or veterans may use stories of combat to relay instances of leadership. The researcher has now completed his Mental Health First Aid qualification in order to address this potential issue. All Officer Cadets will be offered opportunity to correct or remove sensitive sections during the ‘member checking’ phase.
Interviews will be conducted by the Chief Investigator as the Interview is conducted through the social constructionist lens with a Reflexive Thematic Analysis, the interview is a co-construction between interviewer and interviewee.

Bias is therefore a logical outcome, that said, in order to help minimise, all interviews will be conducted with the Chief Investigator are with subordinates or superiors they will be conducted in civilian dress in a neutral location. All participants will not be directly subordinate or superior to the Chief Investigator.

**Sample Group**

Purposively sampled semi-structured interviews, largely Officer Cadets from the Sandhurst, based in Camberley, Surrey. Interviews will be around 1hr, though this can be reviewed continuously.

There will be three distinct criteria for sample selection: -

1. **Officer Cadets** (*n* 15): The first sample will consist of British Army Officer Cadets from the Sandhurst (Table 1). The potential participants will be selected from the Intermediate Term of the Commissioning Course.

   **Table 1.0: Project Sample Size Recommendations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Interviews</th>
<th>Focus groups</th>
<th>Qualitative surveys</th>
<th>Story completion tasks</th>
<th>Media texts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Undergraduate or Honours project</td>
<td>6–10</td>
<td>2–3 (4–8 participants in each group)</td>
<td>20–30</td>
<td>20–40</td>
<td>1–100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Masters or Professional Doctorate project</td>
<td>6–15</td>
<td>3–6</td>
<td>30–100</td>
<td>40–100</td>
<td>1–200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD/larger project (TA data as only a part of the whole project)</td>
<td>15–20</td>
<td>3–6</td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>100+</td>
<td>4–400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PhD/larger project (TA data as whole project)</td>
<td>30+</td>
<td>10+</td>
<td>200+</td>
<td>400+</td>
<td>4–400+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   **Source:** (Terry et al., 2017a, p. 22)

2. **Permanent Staff** (*n* 6): The next interview sample will consist of Permanent Staff (Captain Rank) of the Sandhurst, who will discuss their understanding of the Sword of Honour and Leadership at Sandhurst.

3. **Others** (*n* 4): The final interview sample will consist of ‘interested parties’ regarding Leadership at the Royal Military Academy.
a. Director Leadership.  
b. Head of Leadership.  
c. Academy Sergeant Major.  
d. Staff of the Centre of Army Leadership.

There will of course be a natural bias regarding Officer Cadets - the informed consent form and participant brief will both re-enforce the 'voluntary' aspect of the research.

Anyone who has been in any way 'shaped' or 'guided' into providing research will not be allowed to participate. In order to protect the integrity of the research participants must be volunteers.

4. Data Analysis

The data will be analysed using reflexive thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2017, 2021a) with NVIVO.

11. Safety

11a. How will the safety of the research be managed?  

The safety of the research will be managed by Risk Assessments conducted by Captain Jeffrey Tibbett at each stage of data collection and data analysis.

11b. Who is the named person taking responsibility for the overall safety of the research, and who will be responsible for day-to-day safety?  

Captain Jeffrey Tibbett

11c. How will the researchers conducting this study be made aware of?  

i. Their responsibilities for reporting any new safety issues which arise after the start of the project, and  

ii. Their responsibilities for reporting adverse events in the conduct of the project.

Northumbria University Ethics Handbook

12. Ethical Considerations

Consent: Informed consent and organisational consent will be sought prior to data collection.

Anonymity: All participants will be anonymised and any wording etc, which could be used to identify them, censured from transcripts. All data will be held on an encrypted USB stick.
I will, in particular, need to ensure the anonymity of Senior Academy Staff, which may result in the redacting of some elements of their interviews.

Coercion: Interviews will be conducted in civilian clothing, but it would be naive to suggest that the Officer Cadets would not have awareness. To try and overcome this the researcher is trying to use a storytelling approach – asking the Officer Cadets to tell stories and give examples. This will hopefully help to overcome the bias Officer Cadets naturally have to seeking to give the 'right' answer.

13. Participants

13a. Number of Participants: 20-25

13b. Lower Age Limit: 18

13c. Upper Age Limit: 55

13d. Birth Sex (male/female): Mix

13e. Please provide justification for the sample size, and age/sex restrictions:
A mixed sample reflecting the diversity of Officer Cadets and Permanent Staff at Sandhurst. The characteristics of the sample will be determined by the volunteers and limited by the conditions of entry to Sandhurst.

14. Selection Criteria

14a. List your participant inclusion criteria:
British Army Officer Cadets in the Intermediate or Senior term of the Commissioning Course. Permanent Staff of Sandhurst and those deemed 'Interested Parties'.

14b. List your participant exclusion criteria:
International Officer Cadets. Much Leadership research highlights the differences in Leadership style which occur due to organisational contexts and cultures (Dickson et al., 2012).

15. Recruitment
15a. Describe how potential participants will be identified:
Identified through attendance on the Commissioning Course. Any UK Officer Cadet who is attending Sandhurst is eligible to participate. Any member of Sandhurst cadet-facing staff. Anyone from the list of ‘interested parties’.

15b. Describe how potential participants will be approached:
Via a central briefing. All Officer Cadets will be given a central PowerPoint brief during Week 1 of the intermediate term. If more than 15 participants volunteer, then names will be selected randomly to participate.

15c. Describe how potential participants will be recruited:
Participants will be invited to op-in completing an application by email, the email address will be promulgated at the briefing. Then viewing the participant information sheet and completing the informed consent form after a 24-hour cool-off period.

16. Consent

16a. Describe the process you will use when seeking and obtaining consent:
Informed consent form completed after perusal of the Participant Information Form. Interested Parties will be given a separate personal briefing.

16b. Do you plan to include participants who are children (under 16 yrs)? No

16c. Do you plan to include participants who are aged 16 or 17? No

16d. Do you plan to include participants who lack capacity to consent? No

16e. Do you plan to include any prisoners? Yes/No

16f. Are there special pressures that might make it difficult for people to refuse to take part in the study (e.g. subordinates)? Yes, the researchers rank/position may make participants feel pressure to participate. This will be combatted by holding a central briefing, during which the research’s voluntary nature will be re-enforced. In addition, researcher will wear civilian clothing and actively avoid the use of rank.
17. **Participant Involvement: Risks, Requirements and Benefits**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17a. Describe potential hazards, risks or adverse effects that may be associated with the study?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The explanation of leadership through lived experience in Officer Cadets may prove difficult for some Officer Cadets, Permanent Staff or ‘Interested Parties’ mentally. In order to help mitigate this the researcher has undertaken a Mental Health first-aider course and will signpost anyone needing support to impartial specialist organisations for further support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17b. Will pregnant or nursing mothers be included?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No – serving Officer Cadets cannot be pregnant or nursing due to the arduous nature of the course. Likewise, for Permanent Staff of Sandhurst. Those deemed as ‘interested parties’ are all male.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17c. Does your study involve invasive procedures such as blood taking, muscle biopsy or the administration of a medicinal product?</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes/No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>17d. If medical devices are to be used on any participant, do they comply with the requirements of the Medical Devices Directives?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N/A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
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<tr>
<th>17e. List the locations or sites where the work will be done:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Royal Military Academy Sandhurst</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>17f. Will group or individual interviews/questionnaires discuss any topics or issues that might be sensitive, embarrassing or upsetting?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| No sensitive topics will be directly addressed, but some participants might volunteer some sensitive information. Participants will mainly be Officer Cadets volunteers of Sandhurst, and remaining participants will be trained officers or veterans. Trained
officers or veterans may use stories of combat to relay instances of leadership, which may prove a little difficult for some to relay. The researcher has now completed his Mental Health First Aid qualification in order to address this potential issue. All Officer Cadets will be offered opportunity to correct or remove sensitive sections during the ‘member checking’ phase. Participants may stop interviews at any time should they be in distress. Also, Chief Investigator will refer any distressed individuals to 3rd party impartial organisations for further support. Which will be Combat Stress – with exact details on the Debrief sheet which will be provided to all participants.

17g. Is it possible that criminal or other disclosures requiring action, e.g. evidence of professional misconduct, could be made during the study? There could be potentially disclosures of poor practice. Officer Cadets will be briefed that unless a civilian crime has been committed or another Caldicott Principle has been broken then confidence will be kept. Trust will not be broken for any matters deemed to have failed the service test or British Army Values.

17h. Describe any expected benefits to the research participant: None

17i. Under what circumstances might a participant not continue with the study, or the study be terminated in part or as a whole?
The participant could voluntarily withdraw at any point.

18. Financial Incentives, Expenses and Compensation

18a. Will travel expenses be given? No.

18b. Is any financial or other reward, apart from travel expenses, being offered to participants? No

18c. Has payment of the Experimental Test Allowance been considered (JSP 752, chap 10 section 3)? No

18d. If this is a study in collaboration with a commercial organisation No
19. Confidentiality, Anonymity and Data Storage

19a. What steps will be taken to ensure confidentiality.
Confidentiality will be kept. The Caldicott Principles will be broken by the researcher in instances such as revealing information which is unlawful or places someone in danger. However, incidents which do not break UK Civilian Law but are against Army Values will not be revealed. Physically the data will be held on an encrypted USB stick. The Data can only be accessed by the researcher.

19b. Give details of any anonymisation procedures to be used (if applicable)
The identify of participants will be anonymised by attributing codes to each participant and any transcription that could possibly identify them will be redacted.

19c. Who will have access to the records and resulting data?
Only the researcher.

19d. Where, and for how long, do you intend to store the Consent Forms and other records? For a minimum of 7 years in line with current GDPR policy.

19e: Have the Consent Form(s) and Participant information been reviewed and confirmed to be DPA 2018/GDPR compliant in accordance with organisational arrangements?
Yes/No reviewed as part of the Northumbria University ethical clearance and MODREC.

Supporting Documentation
The following appendices, where applicable, are included in this document (please indicate):

Research sponsors checklist (attached separately)
CVs (attached separately)

Annex A: Evidence of permission from organisation (e.g. hospital/university) where research is to be conducted
Annex B: Questionnaire/topic guide/interview questions

Please list any other documents that you are submitting to support this application:
Annex A: Participant Information Sheet

Application Number: 2098/MODREC/21

An exploration of Leadership in British Army Officer Cadets

Participant Information Sheet

You are being invited to take part in this research. Before you decide it is important for you to read this leaflet, so you understand why the research is being carried out and what it will involve.

Reading this leaflet, discussing it with others or asking any questions you might have will help you decide whether or not you would like to take part.

What is the Purpose of the Research?

The aim of this research is to explore the way that Officer Cadets, Permanent Staff and ‘interested parties’ perceive and understand leadership at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Why have I been invited?

You have invited because you are an Officer Cadet in Intermediate Term, Permanent Staff, or an Academy Senior Leader, at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst.
Do I have to take part?

No. It is up to you whether you would like to take part in the research. I am giving you this information sheet to help you make that decision. If you do decide to take part, remember that you can stop being involved in the research whenever you choose, without telling me why. You are completely free to decide whether to take part. You may choose to take part and then leave the research before completion.

What will happen if I take part?

You will be asked to attend an interview held in the Assistant Chief Instructor's (Plans) Office. This will be arranged at a day/date of your convenience. After signing a consent form, the researcher will ask you to a series of questions in a semi-formal interview regarding your experience of Leadership at Sandhurst. After you have completed the interview, the researcher will give you a debrief sheet explaining the nature of the research, how you can find out about the results, and how you can withdraw your data if you wish. It is estimated that the total time to complete this interview will be around one hour. With your permission this interview will be audio recorded.

You may experience a practical loss of time. You might also feel emotional, discomfort and possibly embarrassment. At any time, you may stop the interview also you may of course withdraw consent and the interview will be destroyed. All these issues will be minimized where possible. All interviews will be anonymous where possible and information given will be confidential and securely stored.

What are the possible disadvantages of taking part?

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

There is no direct benefit of taking part.
**Will my taking part in this research be kept confidential and anonymous?**

Yes. Your name will not be written on any of the data we collect; the written information you provide will have an ID number, not your name. Your name will not be written on the recorded interviews, or on the typed versions of your discussions from the interview, and your name will not appear in any reports or documents resulting from this research. The consent form you have signed will be stored separately from your other data. The data collected from you in this research will be confidential. The only exception to this confidentiality is if the researcher feels that you or others may be harmed if information is not shared. For any direct questions regarding GDPR please contact the researcher or the Data Protection officer email: dp.officer@northumbria.ac.uk.

**How will my data be stored?**

All paper-based data, including the typed transcripts from your interview and your consent forms will be kept in locked storage. All electronic data; including the recordings from your interview, will be stored on a secure removable usb drive, which is password protected. All data will be stored in accordance with University guidelines, MOD guidelines and the Data Protection Act (1998).

**What will happen to the results of the research?**

The general findings might be reported in a scientific journal or presented at a research conference, however the data will be anonymized and you or the data you have provided will not be personally identifiable, unless we have asked for your specific consent for this beforehand. The findings may also be shared with other organizations/institutions that have been involved with the research. We can provide you with a summary of the findings from the research if you email the researcher at the address listed below.
Who is Organizing and Funding the Research?

Organiser is Newcastle Business School, Northumbria University. The British Army has helped fund this research through the sponsorship of the researcher’s tuition fees.

The Faculty of Business Research Ethics Committee at Northumbria University and the MOD Research and Ethics Committee have reviewed the research to safeguard your interests and have granted approval to conduct the research. Additionally, The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst has given their organisational consent.

Contact for further information: Jeff Tibbett

Researcher email: Jeffrey.tibbett844@mod.gov.uk

For independent advice about the project please contact Dr Rachael Thompson

Email: Rachael.Thompson@northumbria.ac.uk

Compliance with the Declaration of Helsinki

This study will be conducted in accordance with the principles defined in the Declaration of Helsinki ¹ as adopted at the 64th WMA General Assembly at Fortaleza, Brazil in October 2013.

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¹ World Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki [revised October 2013]. Recommendations Guiding Medical Doctors in Biomedical Research Involving Human Subjects. 64th WMA General Assembly, Fortaleza (Brazil).
Annex B: Consent Form for Participants in Research Studies

Title of Study: An exploration of leadership in British Army Officer Cadets

MODREC Reference: 2098/MODREC/21

Please Initial or Tick Boxes

- The nature, aims and risks of the research have been explained to me. I have read and understood the Participant Information Sheet and understand what is expected of me. All my questions have been answered fully to my satisfaction.

- I understand that if I decide at any time during the research that I no longer wish to participate in this project, I can notify the researchers involved and be withdrawn from it immediately without having to give a reason. I also understand that I may be withdrawn from the study at any time by the research team. In neither case will this be held against me in subsequent dealings with the Ministry of Defence.

- I consent to the processing of my personal information for the purposes of this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as confidential and handled in accordance with the provisions of the Data Protection Act 2018.

- This consent is specific to the particular study described in the Participant Information Sheet and shall not be taken to imply my consent to participate in any subsequent study or deviation from that detailed here.

- I understand that in the event of my sustaining injury, illness, or death as a direct result of participating as a volunteer in this research, I or my dependants may enter a claim with the Ministry of Defence for compensation under the provisions of the no-fault compensation scheme, details of which are attached.

- I agree to participate in this study
Participant's Statement:

I ………………………………………………………

agree that the research project named above has been explained to me to my satisfaction, and I agree to take part in the study.

Signed: Date:

Investigator's Statement:

I ………………………………………………………

confirm that I have carefully explained the nature, demands and any foreseeable risks of the proposed research to the Participant.

Signed: Date:
Contact Details of Chief Investigator:
Name: Jeff Tibbett
Address: 11 Dawnay Road, Camberley, GU15 4LR
Tel No: 07496179985
E-mail: Jeffrey.tibbett@northumbria.ac.uk

Contact Details Volunteer Advocate
Name: Russell Warhurst
Address: Sutherland Building, 2 Ellison Pl, Newcastle upon Tyne NE1 8ST
Tel No: 0191 232 6002
E-mail: RUSSELL.WARHURST@NORTHUMBRIA.AC.UK
Annex C: Arrangements for the Payment of No-Fault Compensation
to Participants in MoDREC Approved Studies

1. The MoD maintains the 'No Fault Compensation Scheme' specifically for the payment of no-fault compensation to, or in respect of, a volunteer who suffers illness and/or personal injury as a direct result of participating in research conducted on behalf of the MoD. The no-fault compensation arrangements apply to research participants (Military, Civilian, or non-MoD) who take part in a trial that has been approved by the MoD Research Ethics Committee.

2. A research participant wishing to seek no-fault compensation under these arrangements should contact the Directorate of Judicial Engagement Policy, Common Law Claims and Policy (DJEP-CLCP), Ministry of Defence, Level 1, Spine 3, Zone J, Whitehall, London, SW1A 2HB who may need to ask the Claimant to be seen by a MoD medical adviser.

3. CLCP will consider reasonable requests for reimbursement of legal or other expenses incurred by research participants in relation to pursuing their claim (eg. private medical advice, clinical tests, legal advice on the level of compensation offered) provided that they have been notified of the Claimant's intention to make such a claim.

4. If an injury is sufficiently serious to warrant an internal MoD inquiry, any settlement may be delayed at the request of the research participant until the outcome is known and made available to the participant in order to inform his or her decision about whether to accept no-fault compensation or proceed with a common law claim. An interim payment pending any inquiry outcome may be made in cases of special need. It is the Claimant's responsibility to do all that they reasonably can to mitigate their loss.

5. In order to claim compensation under these no-fault arrangements, a research participant must have sustained an illness and/or personal injury as a direct result of participation in a trial/study approved by MoDREC. A claim must be submitted within 3 years of when the incident giving rise to the claim occurred, or, if symptoms develop at a later stage, within 3 years of such symptoms being medically documented.

6. The fact that a research participant has been formally warned of possible injurious effects of the trial upon which a claim is subsequently based does not remove MoD's responsibility for payment of no-fault compensation. The level of compensation offered shall be determined by taking account of the level of compensation that a court would have awarded for the same injury, illness or death had it resulted from the Department's negligence.

7. In assessing the level of compensation, CLCP, in line with common law principles, will take into account the degree to which the Claimant may have been responsible for his or her injury or illness and a deduction may be made for contributory negligence accordingly.

8. In the event of CLCP and the injured party being unable to reach a mutually acceptable decision about compensation, the claim will be presented for arbitration to a nominated Queen's Counsel. CLCP will undertake to accept the outcome of any such arbitration. This does not affect in any way the rights of the injured party to withdraw from the negotiation and pursue his or her case as a common law claim through the Courts.

---

2 Section agreed with DJEP-CLCP Dep Hd 28/10/13.
Additional/Alternative Compensation Arrangements

9. **Compensation for Service Personnel.** Service personnel who took part in studies before 06 April 2005 and who consider that they may have suffered later harm or disability due to that study should contact MoD Defence Business Services-Veterans (DBS-Vets), Service Personnel and Veterans Agency (SPVA) for consideration of a war disablement pension. The personnel who are entitled to make claims under the war disablement pension scheme are laid out on the SPVA website, as are details of the claim’s process.

10. In the event of service personnel suffering injury or disability as a result of their participation in MoDREC approved MoD research on or after 06 April 2005 then they may be entitled to compensation under the Armed Forces Compensations Scheme (AFCS). The details of the AFCS are promulgated on the MoD Intranet, and are also available on the DBS-Vets website. Claims should be made to DBS-Vets following the instructions available on the MoD Intranet and DBS-Vets website.

11. In the event of service personnel suffering injury or disability as a result of their participation in MoDREC approved MoD research which is sufficiently serious for subsequent medical discharge from the services, their medical records will automatically be forwarded to DBS-Vets for consideration of compensation and pension enhancements in addition to whatever MoD pension/gratuity they are already entitled to by virtue of their service. Similarly, in the event of death as a result of their participation in MoDREC endorsed MoD research, their dependants may be entitled to receive a supplemented pension.

12. However, if either a Service person or their dependants receive payment under the MoD ‘no fault compensation’ arrangements (or as the result of a common law compensation claim) for the same condition as that for which a pension is received, any pension entitlement may be reduced since compensation should not be paid twice for the same injury, disability, or death.

13. **Civilian Pensions.** In the event of a civilian research participant suffering injury or disability as a result of their participation in MoDREC endorsed MoD research sufficiently serious for them to subsequently suffer a loss in earnings capacity; they may be eligible for benefits under Section 11 of the Principal Civil Service Pension Scheme (PCSPS). Further details are available in the PCSPS booklet Injury at Work. Similarly, in the event of death as a result of participation in MoDREC approved MoD research, their dependants may be entitled to receive benefits.

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3 [http://www.veterans-uk.info/pensions/wdp_new_index.html](http://www.veterans-uk.info/pensions/wdp_new_index.html)
6 [http://www.veterans-uk.info/pensions/afcs_new.html](http://www.veterans-uk.info/pensions/afcs_new.html)
7 [http://www.veterans-uk.info/pensions/med_discharge.html](http://www.veterans-uk.info/pensions/med_discharge.html)
14. **Common Law Compensation.** If a research participant or their representative believes that injury, disability or death was caused by the negligence of the MoD or its staff, and do not wish to pursue the possibility of a 'no-fault' compensation payment, a common law claim for compensation should be submitted to Directorate of Judicial Engagement Policy, Common Law Claims & Policy (DJEP-CLCP) (at the address in Para 2 above) detailing the full facts of the claim and stating that common law compensation is being sought.

**Multinational/Multicentre Research and Research Involving Other Government Departments**

15. When MoDREC is involved in studies which involve Departments other than the MoD there may be a requirement for specific Compensation Arrangements on a study by study basis.
Completion of this form is required whenever research is being undertaken by Business and Law staff or students within any organisation. This applies to research that is carried out on the premises, or is about an organisation, or members of that organisation or its customers, as specifically targeted as subjects of research.

The researcher must supply an explanation to inform the organisation of the purpose of the research, who is carrying out the research, and who will eventually have access to the results. In particular issues of anonymity and avenues of dissemination and publications of the findings should be brought to the organisations’ attention.

Researcher’s Name: ____Jeffrey Tibbett____________________

Student ID No. (if applicable): ____ W15032063_______________

Researcher’s Statement:

The Aim of this research is to evidence/select/explore the social construction of leadership for the modern British Army Officer Cadet in Sandhurst.
Research will take the form of interviews. All participants will be anonymised. Given information via the Participation information form and will be volunteers.

All research will be carried out personally by Capt Tibbett and research and thesis will not be released to for publication in a scientific journal without further consent from Royal Military Academy Sandhurst.

Any organisation manager or representative who is empowered to give consent may do so here:

Name: ___Lieutenant-General D. Capps CBE____________________

Position/Title: _____Head of British Army Leadership____________________

Organisation Name: __Royal Military Academy Sandhurst____________________

Location: ___Hague Road, Camberley, GU15 4PQ____

If the organisation is the Faculty of Business and Law, please completed the following:

| Start/End Date of Research | Start:21/01/2020  
| End: 01/08/2022 |
| Programme | DBA |
| Year | 2021 |
| Sample to be used: seminar group, entire year etc. | Purposive sampling of 20-25 interviewees |
Has Programme Director/Leader, Module Tutor being consulted, informed. Yes

Anonymity must be offered to the organisation if it does not wish to be identified in the research report. Confidentiality is more complex and cannot extend to the markers of student work or the reviewers of staff work but can apply to the published outcomes. If confidentiality is required, what form applies?

- [X] No confidentiality required
- [   ] Masking of organisation name in research report
- [   ] No publication of the research results without specific organisational consent
- [   ] Other by agreement as specified by addendum

Signature: ___________________________ Date: _______________________

This form can be signed via email if the accompanying email is attached with the signer’s personal email address included. The form cannot be completed by phone, rather should be handled via post.
**Annex E: Interview Protocol Matrix**

Script prior to the interview:

I want to thank you once again for being willing to participate in the interview aspect of my research. As I have mentioned to you before, my research seeks to understand Leadership at Sandhurst and specifically the leadership traits surrounding the awarding of the Sword of Honour. The research also seeks to understand how Sandhurst Leadership sits within the wider academic sphere of leadership and identify any correlation with current models. This research aims to explore the Leadership of students in Sandhurst. Focussing on the potential presence of dark leadership traits within potential winners of the Sandhurst Sword of Honour. Our interview today will last approximately one hour, during which I will be asking you about your personal experiences and career so far within the British Army.

[review aspects of informed consent form]

You have completed a consent form indicating that I have your permission (or not) to audio record our conversation. Are you still ok with me recording (or not) our conversation today? ___Yes ___No

If yes: Thank you! Please let me know if at any point you want me to turn off the recorder or keep something you said off the record.
If no: Thank you for letting me know. I will only take notes of our conversation moving forward.

Before we begin the interview, do you have any questions? [Discuss questions]

If any questions (or other questions) arise at any point in this research, you can feel free to ask them at any time. I would be more than happy to answer your questions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Background Information/ Context</th>
<th>Research Question 1</th>
<th>Research Question 2</th>
<th>Research Question 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Background</strong></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To begin this interview, I would like to ask you some general questions about your career and background.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. What is, is your age?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. How long have you been in the British Army?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. What is your current role?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Can you give a brief explanation of that position and an outline of your leadership responsibilities within that role?</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Leadership**

*Thank you for your responses. I would like to now ask you questions regarding your understanding and idea of Leadership.*

5. What do you think when I say the word 'Leadership?'

6. Who were your leadership role models in your youth? Who did you learn leadership from?

7. What do you think are traits & behaviours of a good leader?

8. Can you think of the best/worst examples of leadership you have seen in the British Army? Explain the background incident? What poor behaviours did they display?

**Leadership Reflection**

*Thank you for sharing information ideas about leadership we are going to reflect on some facets of Sandhurst leadership*

9. Who either in history or present day is your embodiment of British Army Leadership? Why?
10. Can you think of a leader in the platoon (currently or when you served as an Officer Cadet) who you think is or was good? What was it about them

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sword of Honour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Thank you. I would like to now ask you a few questions specifically about the Sandhurst Sword of Honour.

11. Can you describe to me your understanding of the SoH?
   Why is it awarded?

12. Who do you think will win the SoH?
   What positive leadership behaviours do they display?
   Can you give me an example?
   Are they perfect or are they negative behaviours?
   Example?

13. Who do you think should win the SoH?
   Why? What is different about them?

14. Do you want to win the SoH?
   Reflecting on your leadership style – what positive leadership behaviours do you have? What negative ones?
15. Thank you for your time and finally what has surprised or shocked you the most about leadership at Sandhurst?

Before we conclude this interview, is there something about your experience of Sandhurst leadership which you would like to discuss or anything else that we have not yet had a chance to discuss?
Annex F: Debriefing Form

UNIVERSITY OF NORTHUMBRIA

DEBRIEFING FORM/SCRIPT
An exploration of dark leadership in British Army Officer Cadets

Thank you for your participation in this research study.

If you have questions.

The researcher conducting this study is Captain Jeff Tibbett at the University of Northumbria, Department of Business and Law. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may contact Captain Tibbett at Jeffrey.tibbett844@mod.gov.uk or at 07496179985 If you have any questions or concerns regarding your rights as a research participant in this study, you may contact the University Ethics Committee on ethicssupport@northumbria.ac.uk.

Potential Adverse Effects.

If this interview has caused you any distress or any further difficulties. Please in the first instance contact Major Lorraine Thomas is a trained Mental Health First Aider and can be contacted via email Lorraine.Thomas182@mod.gov.uk. All correspondence will be held in confidence. However, if for some reason you do not feel comfortable with this avenue you could contact: -

Sandhurst Medical Officer. Tel 01276 412234

Combat Stress. Is a free, confidential, 24-hour helpline available to all serving military personnel
Tel: 0800 323 4444
Text: 07537 404 719
Email: helpline@combatstress.org.uk
Appendix G - A Brief Overview of Leadership Theories

“A leader is a dealer in hope.”
Napoleon Bonaparte

We will now conduct a brief overview of historic leadership theory. This review will be thematic rather than chronological. The review will only be focused on the major leadership theories as identified by the researcher that is pertinent to where we currently find ourselves in the leadership journey.

This brief overview is in no way a systematic review of leadership literature; One will let more learned researchers than myself conduct those in-depth critical analyses. Some leadership theories are coming to the fore again based on fads, trends, and organisational circumstances.

The themes will be based on the approaches outlined in the chapters by Northouse (2018). Most academic literature cannot agree and the specific themes or discourses of leadership, with most theories potentially filling more than one theme. Indeed, Rost believes that grouping theories into distinctly separate groups are unhelpful (1993).
Figure 23: The Leadership Eras
Source: Adapted from (Alimo-Metcalfe, 2013; King, 1990)
Other academic theorists view the progressions with more of a discursive view (Carroll et al., 2015; Western, 2013; Wilson, 2016). With differing theories taking prominence but all being omnipresent (Carroll et al., 2018).

The view of the researcher is that the discourse approach is the most appropriate. That all leadership theories all, to certain levels, co-exist and that theories do not merely disappear but become less prominent.

![The Discourses of Leadership](image)

**Figure 24: The Discourses of Leadership**
Source: (Western, 2013, p. 281)

**The Ancients – Pre-19th Century**

*When god fashioned you, he added gold in the composition of those of you who are qualified to be Rulers*

(Plato et al., 2007, p. 415)

The ancient writers believed that great leaders were divinely selected. They had been chosen and given something extra. Indeed, this could be seen as the original Great Man Theory, where the great man was selected by God himself and divinely granted the specific powers and attributes to be a great leader.
Trait theories have been an enduring phenomenon in leadership for around 2,500 years (Gill, 2011). This theory is evidenced in historical literature (The Art of War, 2017; Storey, 2013).

Regardless of how they are selected, we cannot sit at believing that leadership was invented recently. Leadership is a social science that, as a social construct, it has always surely existed. The term social science was first used in 1824 (Thompson), but leadership is, of course, much older than that.

Indeed, there are even Egyptian Hieroglyphs for the particular words pertaining to leadership; therefore, it was a recognised construct thousands of years ago.

Figure 25: Egyptian Hieroglyphs for Leadership, Leader, and Follower

Source: (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 5)

Research indicates that even authentic leadership (Humphreys, 2002; Humphreys et al., 2011) can be seen in and that all contemporary leadership models can be seen in ancient times (Humphreys & Einstein, 2003; Rindova & Starbuck, 1997).
Indeed, academics declare that they can see leadership in many eminent historical figures. Such as Confucius (Bi et al., 2012)

Later academics gave their thoughts on leadership that would not be out of place in today’s cultural environment. Hegel believed that one had to experience being a follower before becoming an effective leader (Bass et al., 1990).

Even the classical books of Homer spoke of leadership, “He serves me most, who serves his country best” (The Iliad (Penguin Classics), 2011, pp. Book 10, Line 201) and his writings on social distance would strike chords with the Army Officer of the 19th and 20th Century, “The leader, mingling with the vulgar host, is in the common mass of matter lost” (The Iliad (Penguin Classics), 2011, pp. Book 3, Line 297)

**Trait Theories, 19th Century Onwards**

**Great Man Theory**

*Great leaders are bred from great causes, but leaders, at their best, also breed great causes*

(Handy, 1996, p. 8)

The Great Man Theory, or as Carlyle also called it, ‘Hero-worship” (Burns, 2003; Carlyle et al., 2013), was the first pure leadership science (Wilson, 2016). Carlyle was seen as the first ‘modern’ leadership writer (Alvesson, 2011). Carlyle built up knowledge of this leadership theory through the delivery of a series of six public lectures (Spector, 2016), followed a year later by the publishing of a book on the subject (Carlyle, 2019).

Carlyle believed it at the base of all humanity “Society is founded on Hero-worship. All dignities of rank, on which human association rests, are what we may call a Heroarchy” (Carlyle et al., 2013, p. 29).
Another person working on a similar theme was Galton. Galton believed that one could “produce a highly-gifted race of men by judicious marriages during several consecutive generations.” (Galton, 1869, p. xv). Galton believed that people are not born equal – that although he acknowledged that education and upbringing had little influence, he placed most of the emphasis on the hereditary lineage. Galton conducted research that today would not stand up to any form of rigour or critique. One example of this is when he claims;

*Enemy's bullets are least dangerous to the smallest men, and therefore small men are more likely to achieve high fame as commanders than their equally gifted contemporaries whose physical frames are larger.*

*(Galton, 1869, p. 145)*

Although the reasoning on the surface seems in some way logical, the argument itself is hugely flawed. The whole book makes sweeping generalisations, masquerading as sound logic.

For example, a commander may be shot due to poor positioning, his reputation making him a target and a myriad of other reasons. It cannot be reduced to a single overarching reason, his size.

One is also not sure ‘wrestlers of the north’ or ‘oarsman’ would be classified as Genius today. Others looked to progress the work and produced their criteria and lists of ‘Great Men’ (Cattell, 1903; Ellis, 1904).

Bowden progressed this research with his study on behaviours (Bowden, 1926) that also placed personality within the Great Man Theory as an article of ‘genius’.

Critics of the Great Man theory appeared as early as 1927 (Bingham & Leadership), with academia questioning the hereditary traits and if these qualities can be learned or developed.
The theories of Galton and his eugenics position have been disproved repeatedly over the years both by assessing intellect in adoption studies (Teasdale & Owen, 1984) and birth twins (McGue et al., 1993).

Great man theory also had a revival at the hands of Freud, who, although nuanced, still bought into the baseline beliefs that ‘great men’ needed to lead others (Spector, 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Great Man Theory</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carlyle</td>
<td>Freud</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great men were sent by God to be heroes and these heroes became leaders through the righteous process of hero worship</td>
<td>Core of theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>God</td>
<td>Source of authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male—by virtue of history</td>
<td>Gender</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>Exchange with followers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loyal reverence</td>
<td>Role of followers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not recognizing great man</td>
<td>Inherent danger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uplift</td>
<td>Outcome of obedience</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 24: Comparing the contributions of Carlyle and Freud**

Source: (Spector, 2016)

“Great Man theory of leadership is treated with scant respect, yet it is still widely in use” (Mouton, 2019, p. 91); this is evidenced by the vast sums paid to CEOs to lead organisations (Spector, 2016).

**Warrior Theory**

The Warrior Model is quite a niche area of research. It is spoken briefly about by Bass (2009) and is discussed in more detail by Nice (1998). The theory seems a product of its
time. Whilst it could easily be applied in some countries (Russia, N. Korea, China), many western democracies, due to their culture, would not allow you to apply, for example, the belief that “Success is more important than how it is achieved” (Nice, 1998, p. 325).

**Trait Theory**

Trait Theory is a direct descendant of Great Man Theory. It was thought that by identifying the specific behaviours and traits of Great Men, this blueprint could be used to identify and recruit future Great Men.

Trait theory is believed to developed after the development of the Stanford-Binet intelligence test (Terman, 1916). This was further developed by Bingham (1919), who himself was a critic of Great Man Theory.

These academics tried to reduce leadership to any individual who has specific talents or skills. This research on trait identification did not produce consistent results (Bird, 1940; Cowley, 1931; Craig & Charters, 1925; Jenkins, 1947a; Kohs, 1920; Tead, 1935).

With Craig & Charters producing their leadership traits and Teads’ producing a completely different set of qualities, even at this stage, the incoherence of trait theory was apparent. Jenkin's study further compounded the issues by finding that no single trait can predict leadership effectiveness.
Despite this early lack of empirical evidence, trait theories are still in use today (Conard, 2019; Judge et al., 2004; Miller, 2017; Sun & Shang, 2019; Zaccaro et al., 2004). Many large organisations use personality questionnaires to identify amenable traits for those at their higher levels.

A study of specific relevance to this research in the field of trait theory is that by Jenkins (1947b) due to its concentration on the military. A real area of research interest is that he found no correlation between combat effectiveness and leadership performance at the US Army Officers Staff School.

The British Army presumes that this relationship is symbiotic, and maybe it is, but the style of leadership the instructors searched for in this era was possibly of little relevance rather than leadership itself.

Figure 26: Studies of Leadership Traits and Characteristics

Another later study which may be particularly relevant to this research is one which identified the traits of leaders and responders in disasters (King et al., 2019). This study could have generalisability with Armed Forces operations and could be an area for further study.

Table 25: Comparison of Mean Rankings of Leader and Responder Competencies

Source: (King et al., 2019)

The researcher believes that the search for specific traits/attributes is naive – the reason that the researchers have had difficulty identifying traits is that they are situationally variable. Depends on the organisational behaviour/structure, situation, and leaders themselves, amongst a myriad of other variables.

Academics also concurred with this criticism (Mann, 1959) and began to form a consensus that “leadership as a particular or unique combination of traits … is a fabrication” (Hendry, 1944, p. 385).
This variable depends on the situation, organisational culture, and co-workers. These traits will even change within departments of a single SBU. We can also associate changes in trends with societal changes, social intelligence and emotional intelligence (Kotzé & Venter, 2011); for example, I would say the admirable traits of our period would not be suitable when for example, Mann conducted his study.

However, maybe these traits were present all along. Our societal and organisational culture blinded us. Social intelligence and EQ seemed very present in the leadership style of Florence Nightingale (Hegge, 2011).

Stogdill concludes that leaders regularly differ in personal dispositions or traits and are placed into a leadership position by the needs of the situation (Stogdill, 1948).

Interest in Trait theory continues (Adams et al., 2018; Derue et al., 2011; Sun & Shang, 2019), but recent studies have also concentrated on the traits of Toxic or Dark Leaders (Braun, Kark, et al., 2019; Judge et al., 2009; Landay et al., 2019; Strobl et al., 2019) and their commonality.

The British Army regarded trait theory as a crutch on which to support such things as the classist commissioning of officers — citing the number of great military leaders this small country produced as evidence. When the numbers actually directly correlate with the amount of conflict endured (Schneider, 1937).

**Skills Approach**

The skills approach concentrates on what the leader can do. It concentrates on the skills required to conduct his/her role. These are skills and not personality traits and therefore can be trained, honed, and improved.

This view came to the fore in 1995, with an evolutionary article being published in the Harvard Business Review (Katz, 1955).
Katz ignored the latent traits that most researchers were still chasing and set out three necessary administrative skills which could be trained and, therefore, available to all. These skills, according to Katz, are technical, human and conceptual (1955, p. 34). Technical skills are those skills needed to complete a role. They are generally specific for a position, for example, excel expertise for an accountant. They usually are processes, actions, methods or procedures (Katz, 1974).

Human Skills are the ability to work with people well (Katz, 1955). Katz later evolved these skills into two areas. The ability to work within one’s area and the ability to operate efficient ‘intergroup relations’ (Katz, 1974). EI and social skills would be good examples of these skills. Understanding bias and assisting in creating a trustworthy organisational culture.

Conceptual skills are about ideas and the cognitive ability to mull over abstractions and hypotheses (Katz, 1974). Katz surmised that these three facets changed dominance depending on one of three organisational positions.

Katz also indicated that the identification of the skills varying prominence meant that executive development should focus on the promotion and evolution of conceptual thought (Katz, 1974).
The skills approach championed by Katz was primarily not utilised until the American Army re-invigorated it for its own devices in the 1990s (Northouse, 2018).

These skills approach suited the American Army; it indicated that with the right learning and development that all could lead to varying degrees.

Further studies went on to identify components of the skills model. This research explored the relationship between a leader’s skills and output.
Figure 28: Three Components of the Skills Model


There has been some debate regarding technical ability. Some research indicates that technical abilities (expertise) are essential throughout a leadership career (Haq, 2011; Lord & Hall, 2005; Shiba, 1998), and others indicate that the technical abilities change as you move up the institutional ladder (McCall & Lombardo, 1983; Zaccaro, 2001).

Figure 29: Leadership skill requirements across organizational levels controlling for organizational speciality and location.
There is a field of academia that think the need for technical skills lessens as one promotes and is more detached from the ‘shop floor’ where technical excellence matters (Katz, 1955; Northouse, 2018). Opposing evidence, though, is also provided (Mumford et al., 2007).

Table 26: The relationship between the leadership strataplex and previous conceptualizations of leadership skill requirements

Source: (Mumford et al., 2007, p. 155)

Critics of the skills cite that the Skills Approach offers no predictability with regard to leadership effectiveness attributed to specific skills (Northouse, 2018).

**Behavioural Approach**

The behavioural approach came to prominence as an evolution of the work of Stogdill (1948) work. This theory was born out of necessity.

During the Second World War, a vast number of officers and NCOs could no longer rely on an officer’s background or traits to ensure leadership potential. The militaries of the west had to believe that leadership could be taught; there was no other way of sustaining the number of leaders required (Sheffield, 2000; Van Maurik, 2001).
This evolution developed the premise that leaders have two types of behaviours. Task behaviours which work towards goal completion. Relationship behaviours relate to team and followership cohesion (Northouse, 2018). The approach can be broadly broken down into distinct schools.

**Iowa State Studies**

These studies centre around Kurt Lewin. They were the first to demonstrate the step-change from Trait Based Theories to the behavioural realm (Gordon et al., 1990). These studies had a focus centred on managers' personal leadership styles. The research conducted by Lewin identified three distinct styles (Lewin, 1999; Lewin et al., 1939).

This study was an evolution of his previous work, which underpinned it (Lewin & Lippitt, 1938). The style identified being autocratic (also known as authoritarian), laissez-faire which is translated as “leave well alone” (Pawar, 2014, p. 13) and democratic (also known as participative); this was believed by Lewin et al. to be the most effective style (Gandolfi & Stone, 2017) due to its ease at moving followers towards a common goal.

**Ohio State Studies**

The Ohio State University Leadership Studies (Morris & Seeman, 1950; Seeman, 1953; Stogdill, 1948, 1949; Stogdill, 1950; Stogdill & Shartle, 1948) were initiated in 1945 (Shartle, 1979), building on the behavioural work of Lewin (Lewin et al., 1939). These studies themselves were a further development of earlier work (Shartle & Dvorak, 1943) done to examine military and government jobs and their aptitude or traits requirements for the Bureau of Manpower Utilization of the War Manpower Commission.

Ohio State team described themselves as truly interdisciplinary research on leadership (Morris & Seeman, 1950); however, on reflection, Shartle described them as
multidisciplinary (Shartle, 1979). The studies would examine “problems of leadership in the military, business, industrial, educational and governmental organization” (Stogdill, 1949, p. 279). It is evidenced by the team formed of psychologists, sociologists and economists (Morris & Seeman, 1950).

The team first sought to cement the field of behavioural leadership further. It did so in one of its first works – stating in the discussion of the paper that “leadership is not a matter of passive status. [sic] or of the mere possession of some combination of traits.” (Stogdill, 1948, p. 66).

The Ohio State team worked to produce a paradigm for the study of interdisciplinary leadership (Morris & Seeman, 1950). This paradigm, although slightly reworked later (Stogdill & Coons, 1957), formed the basis for the team's research.

The team worked on developing looked at quantifying leadership behaviours and from that identification helped produce a questionnaire (LBDQ) (Halpin & Winer, 1957; Hemphill & Coons, 1957), which, with interrogation with the jobs roles could in Ohio States eyes helped in identifying the best leaders for each role/job (Hemphill, 1948).

This questionnaire was shortened six years later and became the LBDQ-XII (Stogdill, 1963). This instrument “became the most widely used instrument in leadership research” (Northouse, 2018, p. 74).

Analysis of the results of the LBDQ-XII revealed that people generally cluster around two leadership behaviours. Those types of behaviours are ‘initiating structure behaviours’ (task-type behaviours) or ‘consideration behaviours (relationship-type behaviours). This discovery led to the development of the “Four Quadrant Model” (Stogdill & Coons, 1957).
Figure 30: Four Quadrant Model for Categorizing Leadership Styles

Source: (Stogdill & Coons, 1957)
Figure 31: A Paradigm for The Study Of Leadership

Source: (Morris & Seeman, 1950, p. 151)
The Ohio State studies did come in for some critique; indeed, Korman stated that “there is as yet almost no evidence on the predictive validity of ‘Consideration’ and ‘Initiating structure’” (1966, p. 360).

Another enduring criticism of the Ohio State studies, which is readily admitted by its Director, was that “situational variables might make a leader or an organization that was rated at the top in a study at the bottom six months later” (Shartle, 1979, p. 132).

Additionally, another review of the study stated, “there is as yet almost no evidence on the predictive validity of “Consideration” and “Initiating Structure” (Korman, 1966, p. 366).

**University of Michigan Studies**

Research conducted under Likert concurrently focussed (Bowers & Seashore, 1966) on the impact of the leader’s on the output of small groups (Katz & Kahn, 1951; Katz et al., 1951; Katz, 1955). The team made similar findings to that of Ohio. With a dichotomy of product orientation and employee orientation.

There is considerable overlap between the F-FTQ and LBDQ, and there remain questions if these are indeed still unique and individual measures (Yunker & Hunt, 1976). Another criticism levelled at behavioural leadership by Vroom is that “relationships between leader behavior and effectiveness varied markedly from one study to another” (Vroom & Jago, 2007, p. 19).
Table 27: Correspondence of leadership concepts of different investigators
Source: (Bowers & Seashore, 1966, p. 248)

Managerial (Leadership) Grid

Possibly the most renowned model of management behaviour is the managerial grid (Northouse, 2018). This model was developed and refined by Blake and Mouton (Blake & McCanse, 1991; Blake & Mouton, 1975; Blake & Mouton, 1985; Blake et al., 1962).

The Managerial Grid, which is now renamed to Leadership grid, gave a place on a matrix based on two factors (Daft, 1999; Northouse, 2018). These factors selected were based on task and relationships; the results of these factors placed the leader in a grid of five main styles (Van Maurik, 2001).
Each of the four styles had its characteristics and traits, which were explained within the work, and this fifth style was added later (Blake & McCanse, 1991; Iszatt-White & Saunders, 2017). Blakes and Mouton (Blake & Mouton, 1985) themselves decreed that the most effective leaders are those who score with high concern for both axes.

The studies are regularly still used in the consulting and practitioner domains of leadership and management (Northouse, 2018).

---

### Figure 32: The Leadership Grid

Source: (Blake & McCanse, 1991)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concern for People</th>
<th>Concern for Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,9</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country-Club Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thoughtful attention to the needs of the people for satisfying relationships leads to a comfortable, friendly organization atmosphere and work tempo.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Team Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work accomplishment is from committed people. Interdependence through a common stake in organization purpose leads to relationships of trust and respect.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle-of-the-Road Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequate organization performance is possible through balancing the necessity to get work out while maintaining morale of people at a satisfactory level.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impoverished Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exertion of minimum effort to get required work done as appropriate to sustain organization membership.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authority–Compliance Management</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency in operations results from arranging conditions of work in such a way that human elements interfere to a minimum degree.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
However, several detractors criticise these studies based on their empiricism (Gill, 2011; Northouse, 2018). Yukl was even pronounced in his misconceptions of the grid, stating, “Studies on the implications of the two behaviours for leadership have not yielded consistent results. Survey studies using behaviour descriptive questionnaires failed to provide much support for the idea that effective leaders have high scores on both dimensions” (Yukl, 1999b, p. 34).

**Key Behavioural Studies**

One pivotal study for this particular organisation centred on Behavioural Leadership is centred on the behaviours of the leaders of soldiers. The study found “it is the ‘management.’ and not the ‘foremen’ who play the critical role in determining the nature of the rank and file’s military experience” (Bleda et al., 1977, p. 48).

**Path-Goal Theory**

Path-goal is a bit of an oddity in leadership seeming to span two styles. Some authors place path-goal as a contingency style (Bass & Bass, 2009); others believe it to be more of a behavioural style (Antonakis & Day, 2017).

Path-Goal theory was first developed by House in the early 1970s (House, 1971) with it first describing a leaders function to give “personal pay-offs to subordinates for work-goal attainment and make the path to these pay-offs easier to travel by clarifying it, reducing roadblocks and pitfalls, and increasing the opportunities for personal satisfaction en route” (House, 1971, p. 324).
This was an ‘expectancy model’ for work motivation (Gill, 2011), which was an evolution of research conducted by Evans (Evans, 1970) and Vrooms Expectancy Theory (Vroom, 1964). The leaders can adopt different leadership styles, but the essence of the Path-Goal Theory is transactional leadership (Gill, 2011).

The model says that leaders must shape their leadership style to maximise motivation of their followers based on the components of the model (Northouse, 2018).
The theory went through several iterations of improvement to silence various academic critics and to close perceived weaknesses within the theory. A research project conducted in 1975 was funded by the U.S. Navy as they sought to identify the appropriateness of the model for their use (House & Mitchell, 1975).

In the latest iteration (House, 1996) to include eight classes of leadership behaviour. However, most contemporary research on Path-Goal uses the original four leadership behaviours.

With particular follower and task characteristics attributed to each style.

**Figure 34: Major Components Of Path-Goal Theory**

Source: (Northouse, 2018, p. 119)
Table 28: Path-Goal Theory: How It Works
(Northouse, 2018, p. 123)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Leadership Behavior</th>
<th>Follower Characteristics</th>
<th>Task Characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Directive</strong></td>
<td>Dogmatic</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides guidance and</td>
<td>Authoritarian</td>
<td>Unclear rules</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>psychological structure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Complex</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Supportive</strong></td>
<td>Unsatisfied</td>
<td>Repetitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides nurturance</td>
<td>Need for affiliation</td>
<td>Unchallenging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need for human touch</td>
<td>Mundane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Participative</strong></td>
<td>Autonomous</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides involvement</td>
<td>Need for control</td>
<td>Unclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Need for clarity</td>
<td>Unstructured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Achievement Oriented</strong></td>
<td>High expectations</td>
<td>Ambiguous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides challenges</td>
<td>Need to excel</td>
<td>Challenging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Complex</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 35: Path-Goal Theory
Source: (House & Mitchell, 1975)
The model suffers many of the same criticisms as other behavioural models of the time (Bryman, 1992; Yukl, 1999a). In that, it has only partly supported by empirical research (Bass & Bass, 2009; Gill, 2011; Northouse, 2018).

Path-goal is a useful tool. Allowing the leader to re-calibrate the motivation of his followers, but in today’s organisational culture, the one-way street that Path-Goal lends itself too can be overbearing — placing too much pressure and emphasis on the leader whilst not giving sufficient ownership to the follower.

**Leader-Member Exchange**

LMX takes on a deliberate interest in followership. It focuses on the interactions between leader and followers. LMX believe that these interactions are dyadic (Northouse, 2018). It has been a popular leadership theory, spawning over one thousand empirical studies (Sheer, 2015).

LMX was a progression of VDL (Dansereau Jr et al., 1975) with VDL being ‘Stage 1’ of the progression (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995b).

![Figure 36: Dimensions of Leadership](Source : (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995b))
Although some other studies had considered the follower, LMX was the first one to acknowledge the multi-domain aspect of leader, follower and situation (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995b). Moreover, it is the quality of these dyadic exchanges, which is of note in LMX (Northouse, 2018).

These can range from low-quality transactional exchanges such as contracts of employment (Liden & Graen, 1980). To high-quality dyadic exchanges such as coaching/mentoring (Scandura & Schriesheim, 1994) and empowerment or as the British Army calls it, ‘Mission Command’ (Liden et al., 2000). These dyadic exchanges are all individual and dependant on follower situation and preferred style (Northouse, 2018).

![Diagram of Vertical Dyads](source)

**Figure 37: Vertical Dyads**  
Source: (Northouse, 2018, p. 141)

The basis of LMX is that better dyadic exchanges create more effective outcomes. This is based on both social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Homans, 1958, 1974; Wayne et al., 1997) with its theory based around reciprocity (Sahlins, 1972; Sparrowe & Liden, 1997).
Reciprocity, in this instance, would be ‘interdependent exchanges’ (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). Insinuating that the follower would feel the need to repay and positive dyadic exchanges.

The LMX theory believes there are two organisational groups, in-groups who are proactive, go above and beyond the requirements and actively seek high-quality dyadic exchanges (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995b; Northouse, 2018; Sheer, 2015). The out-group conversely operates strictly within their organisational and contractual obligations and demand only low-quality LMX (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995b; Northouse, 2018; Sheer, 2015).

One of LMX’s criticisms is how it creates and seems to promote divisiveness in the work-place, through its difference in LMX between the in-group and the out-group (Northouse, 2018; Scandura, 1999). Some academics try to allay this fear of division, stating that “each party must see the exchange as equitable and fair” (Graen & Scandura, 1987, p. 182). The researcher can see Graen and Scandura’s reasoning, but merely stating an observation does not make it a reality.
The researcher would find it hard to theorise an in-group who thought that their hard work and constant commitment with the out-group whom would only deliver the minimum standard. In contrast, how can the out-group compare the fairness of their leader’s hands-off approach compared to the mentoring and coaching received by the in-group

Another criticism is that there has never been a single given definition of LMX (Sheer, 2015). The final and most damning is regarding the measurement of the LMX. With no single agreed measure for LMX out of its 10+ iterations (Schriesheim et al., 2001; Sheer, 2015).

**New Leadership**

New leadership paradigm was first published by political scientist James Macgregor Burns in his evolutionary text (1978). New Leadership contains under its umbrella “charismatic, visionary, inspirational, values-oriented, and change-oriented leadership” (Bass & Bass, 2009, p. 619; Jackson & Parry, 2011)

New Leadership as always has detractors whom worry that it could be “mutton dressed as lamb” (Western, 2013) or that the research “uses the same superficial methods that have been prevalent for decades” (Yukl, 1999b, p. 42).

**Transformational Leadership**

The first appearance of Transformational Leadership was in a book by Downton (1973). Downton claims that within Transformational Leadership “charisma, endowed with transcendental qualities and magnetic personality, is transformed into a social category” (Jaworskyj & Downton, 1975, p. 846).

Although this the first recorded instance, its lack of impact means that the first evidence of Transformational Leadership that affected was that written by Burns (Alvesson,
Transformational Leadership was something that Burns felt necessary to the “crisis in leadership … the mediocrity or irresponsibility of the men and women in power” (Burns, 1978, p. 1).

Transformational leaders do not only reward the excellent work in a transactional nature like previous theories. Transformational leaders have a more emotional and symbiotic relationship with their followers. This relationship results in followers exceeding both their own and their leaders' expectations (Bass & Steidlmeier, 1999b). Transformational leaders themselves “rise to higher levels of motivation and morality” (Burns, 1978, p. 20).

Transformational leadership has been the “single most studied and debated idea within the field of leadership studies” (Alvesson, 2011, p. 299). Transformational Leadership attempts to move the follower up Maslow’s Hierarchy (2013) of needs in order to release their effectiveness and realise their full potential (Bass & Bass, 2009).
One key observation regarding Transformational Leadership is its ability reduce turnover size after extreme stress situations like combat (Eberly et al., 2017). The researcher would currently caveat this research though due to its small sample size.

Figure 40: Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs
Source: (Maslow, 2013)

Figure 41: Transformational Leadership
Source: (Northouse, 2018, p. 173)
Of course, transformational theory still has its critics whom view it as “another behavioural theory under a different guise” (Jackson & Parry, 2011, p. 27) whilst others warn of the follower dependence (Kark et al., 2003) which could be created by the charismatic style influence and admiration of transformational leaders (Conger & Kanungo, 1998).

**Adaptive Leadership**

Adaptive Leadership was a term first coined in the 1990s (HEIFETZ & Heifetz, 1994) this seminal work in adaptive leadership (Northouse, 2018). This style of leadership sits directly opposite Authentic Leadership and to some extent, servant leadership also. This theory sits within Complexity Leadership Theory (Uhl-Bien et al., 2007) as a sub-set of it (Northouse, 2018).

![Figure 42: Model of Adaptive Leadership](image)

Gone is the ‘Heroic Leader’ who is there to save the company/organisation. The adaptive leader is seen as value-less and Heifetz all leaders, regardless of values or morality, can be effective leaders (HEIFETZ & Heifetz, 1994).
Adaptive leadership is a follower of centric theory, helping others to adjust their leadership style regarding his environment. This type of leadership is dyadic, and this adaptive leadership is a “complex dynamic process that emerges in the interactive ‘spaces between’ people and ideas” (Lichtenstein et al., 2006)

At its core, Adaptive Leadership is based on Social Constructionism (DeRue, 2011). With the social interactions between leaders and followers co-creating the leadership environment.

**Figure 43: Adaptive leadership theory: a conceptual model**

Source: (DeRue, 2011, p. 132)

Within the Adaptive Leadership domain, those who would generally be described as leaders would be better described as “Chief Learning Officers” (Nicolaides & McCallum, 2013, p. 249).

**Summary**

There seems to be as many leadership styles and models as there are definitions. With much crossover and interrelation. With leadership models and styles seemingly going in and out of
fashion dependant on the business school and wider need of the times. None of these are the answer but all are a tiny brick on the road of leadership.
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Biff</strong></td>
<td>Derogatory term for someone who is injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Block</strong></td>
<td>Colloquial term for military accommodation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change Parades</strong></td>
<td>Term for times when Officer Cadets must get changed quickly due to the uniform requirement of the next lesson.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Company</strong></td>
<td>An Army formation comprising of three platoons. Totaling around 90 Officer Cadets and around 10 Permanent Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DS</strong></td>
<td>Directing Staff, outdated term which for the last 5 years is Permanent Staff (Permanent Staff)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>eConsult</strong></td>
<td>Method of Officer Cadets reporting sick using an online portal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G1</strong></td>
<td>An overarching term for something to do with Welfare.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intake</strong></td>
<td>An intake is non-regular formation which is only used for Sandhurst. It comprises of three Companies. So around 270 Officer Cadets and around 30 Permanent Staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Inters</strong></td>
<td>Officer Cadets use for the Intermediate (second) term of the commissioning course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Juniors</strong></td>
<td>Term Officer Cadets use for the Junior (First) term of the commissioning course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>JUO</strong></td>
<td>Junior Under Officer, a prestigious appointment given to the Officer Cadet deemed ‘best’ in a platoon at the end of the Commissioning Course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>L.E.</strong></td>
<td>A Late-Entry officer has been promoted through the ranks after joining as a Private soldier. A journey normally taking around 22 years from Private to Captain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Lines</strong></td>
<td>Colloquial term for the living accommodation for a platoon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Officer Cadets</strong></td>
<td>Officer Cadets are the ‘students’ of the year-long commissioning course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parade</strong></td>
<td>An action where all Officer Cadets must form up in three lines. Typically conducted at the beginning and end of each day.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Platoon</strong></td>
<td>A formed unit of around thirty individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Platoon Commander</strong></td>
<td>Platoon Commander is a Permanent Staff member and is the platoon's assigned leader.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Permanent Staff</strong></td>
<td>Permanent Staff have been selected to attend Sandhurst due to their excellent reports and standing within their Regiments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sandhurst</strong></td>
<td>Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. Where all officer initial training is conducted for Regular, Reserve and Professionally Qualified Officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUO</strong></td>
<td>Senior Under-Officer, a highly prestigious appointment given to the Officer Cadet, was deemed the best in the Company.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RSB</strong></td>
<td>Regimental Selection Board – this is a set of interviews where the Officer Cadets reports and interview are used to decide the Cap badge they will join. This happens on Week 12 of the intermediate term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Seniors</strong></td>
<td>The final (third) and most senior term of the commissioning course.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sovereigns</strong></td>
<td>Name normally used by Officer Cadets for Sovereigns Platoon but is also used to describe the Pass-off Parade (Sovereigns Parade).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sovereigns Banner</strong></td>
<td>Sovereigns Banner Competition – a series of inter-platoon competitive events to determine who is awarded Sovereigns Platoon,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sword of Honour</strong></td>
<td>The most sought-after award of the Commissioning Course given the Officer Cadet deemed to be the best within the Intake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Term</strong></td>
<td>The Regular Commissioning Course is broken down into three 14-week terms with time of in between. These are named Juniors, Inters and Seniors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TEWT</strong></td>
<td>The term TEWT stands for Tactical Exercise Without Troops and captures many of the lessons on the combat estimate and giving orders that Officer Cadets undertake.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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