PROPER NAMES AND THEIR FICTIONAL USES

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Fictional names present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. The theory developed in this paper is motivated by a puzzle that depends on four assumptions: our intuitive assessment of the truth values of certain sentences, the most straightforward treatment of their syntactic structure, semantic compositionality, and metaphysical scruples strong enough to rule out fictional entities, at least. It is shown that these four assumptions, taken together, are inconsistent with referentialism, the common view that names are uniformly associated with ordinary individuals as their semantic value.

Instead, the view presented here interprets names as context-sensitive expressions, associated in a context of utterance with a particular act of introduction, or dubbing, which is then used to determine their semantic value. Some dubbings are referential, which associate names with ordinary individuals as their semantic values; others are fictional, which associate names, instead, with sets of properties. Since the semantic values of names can be of different sorts, the semantic rule interpreting predication must be complex as well. In the body of the paper, I show how this new treatment of names allows us to solve our original puzzle. I defend the complexity of the semantic predication rule, and address additional worries about ontological commitment.

1. Introduction

Fictional names—those names used for the purposes of creating a work of fiction—present unique challenges for semantic theories of proper names, challenges strong enough to warrant an account of names different from the standard treatment. In this paper, I provide an account that takes these challenges into consideration.

The view I present interprets names as context-sensitive expressions. More precisely, names are expressions that are associated, in a context of utterance, with a particular act of introduction, or dubbing, which is then used to determine their semantic values. Some acts of introduction will involve referring to an individual with a name. A dubbing of this kind would be referential. But there are other kinds as well. Fictional dubbings, for example, do not involve reference to an individual. Rather, they involve associating a set of properties with a name. While, in the referential case, names behave much as standard theories would predict, the fictional case
diverges from the standard view, as it should, since fictional names behave differently.

The theory developed here will be motivated by a puzzle. In §2, I describe this puzzle, as well as the assumptions that generate it, and I briefly explain how some of the most prominent treatments of fictional discourse run afoul of these assumptions. In §3, I motivate and sketch a semantic account of names significantly different from the standard account, one that can accommodate the assumptions of the motivating puzzle. In §4, I explain how, given this alternative account, names function in simple predications. Finally, in §5, I discuss two possible objections, one concerning compositionality and the other concerning ontological commitments.

2. Fictional Names and Truth

2.1 The Puzzle

The puzzle that motivates the theory of names I offer arises when comparing simple sentences containing fictional names to similar sentences containing their ordinary counterparts. Consider, for example, these four sentences:

(1) Bertrand Russell smokes
(2) Margaret Thatcher smokes
(3) Sherlock Holmes smokes
(4) Elizabeth Bennet smokes

I make four assumptions about these sentences and others like them, as well as about semantic theories generally. The first of these assumptions is that, intuitively, sentences (1) and (3) are true, while sentences (2) and (4) are false. The second assumption is that these sentences are syntactically alike except that they contain different proper names: each sentence contains a proper name, each contains the predicate ‘smokes’, and each has a name in the subject position of that sentence. My third assumption, a driving idea behind modern semantic theories, is that semantic interpretation must be compositional—the interpretation of a complex expression depends on the interpretations of its parts, in a way determined by the syntactic structure of the complex. Given the second assumption, that the four sentences all have the same syntactic structure, this third assumption now tells us that any semantic differences between the sentences must be explained in virtue of the semantics of proper names and their use in predication. The fourth and

1Though as we will see later, I do offer a somewhat complicated semantic account of what constitutes a simple predication.
2Given my purposes here, I ignore issues about tense.
3See Adams et al. [1997] for discussion of the idea that all proper names, both fictional and referential instances, should be treated as semantically alike because they are syntactically alike.
final assumption is that the truth or falsity of sentences such as (3) and (4) is not arrived at by exploring the properties of metaphysically controversial individuals. From an intuitive standpoint, Sherlock Holmes and Elizabeth Bennet, for example, do not exist. And if they did exist, they would have to be rather odd metaphysical entities, those that could be truly ascribed certain concrete properties without being concrete individuals in the world. In contrast, it is not controversial to assume that Bertrand Russell and Margaret Thatcher both exist, and that they can have the properties they are ascribed. The names in sentence (1) and (2) refer to the individuals Bertrand Russell and Margaret Thatcher, respectively—perfectly respectable objects in more ways than one.

The previous assumptions about sentences (1) through (4) lead to a puzzle when considered in conjunction with a certain thesis about names, which I will call ‘referentialism’—a thesis associated with writers such as Keith Donnellan [1974], David Kaplan [1979], and Saul Kripke [1980]. According to referentialism, the sole semantic function of a name is to refer to some object, its referent. A simple predication containing a name is then supposed to be true if and only if the referent of that name satisfies its predicate.

Let us now see how referentialism combines with our assumptions to create a puzzle. According to our first assumption, sentences (1) and (3) are true. Assuming that referentialism is likewise true, consider now only sentence (1), an instance of a true simple predication containing a name. Given referentialism, we now know something about the truth of sentence (1): we know that it must be true because the referent of the name satisfies its predicate. In other words, we know sentence (1) is true because the referent of ‘Bertrand Russell’, Bertrand Russell himself, satisfies the predicate ‘smokes’. By our second assumption, sentences (1) and (3) have the same syntactic form: both are simple predications containing names. This assumption, in conjunction with our third, semantic compositionality, entails that sentences (1) and (3) must be interpreted in exactly the same way. What we knew about sentence (1) now applies to sentence (3): we know that sentence (3) is true because the referent of ‘Sherlock Holmes’, the individual Sherlock Holmes himself, also satisfies the predicate ‘smokes’. But if ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers, it certainly does not refer to a concrete object in the actual world. Sherlock Holmes is, if anything, a metaphysically controversial entity. We therefore find ourselves explaining the truth of sentence (3) by exploring the properties of a metaphysically controversial entity, in violation of our fourth assumption.

It is now evident that the four assumptions about sentences (1) through (4) conflict with referentialism. One cannot adhere to referentialism as a semantic theory of names, and, at the same time, to all four of these assumptions. If one wishes to maintain the assumptions, a different theory of names and their role in predication is required.

\[4\text{Many others defend this view as well, including Devitt [1981], Evans [1982], Marcus [1986], and Salmon [1998].}\]
2.2 Three Failed Approaches

In order to position the account presented here within the literature, I begin by considering three standard treatments of fictional discourse. Each of these accounts, as we will see, rejects one or more of the assumptions underlying our motivating puzzle.

The first approach—associated most prominently with Gareth Evans and David Lewis—is one I will call the ‘operator approach’ [Evans 1982; Lewis 1978]. It is essentially this: the truths expressed by the sentences of fictional discourse, such as our (3), ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’, are best understood as qualified versions of the truths standardly taken to be expressed by those sentences, where the qualifier is represented as a sentential operator. Most commonly this operator is taken in one of two ways. One might, first of all, follow Evans and assume that the operator refers to some game of make-believe or pretence. On this view, the content of the assertion that Sherlock Holmes smokes could be expressed with a sentence like: ‘It is make-believedly the case that Sherlock Holmes smokes’. Alternatively, one might follow Lewis in taking the operator as making explicit reference to some story or other. On this approach, the content of the assertion that Sherlock Holmes smokes, for example, would be captured by some sentence like: ‘According to the stories by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Sherlock Holmes smokes’. Both versions of the operator account maintain referentialism about names, since the sentence placed within the scope of the operator is given a standard referentialist analysis. The discrepancy between sentences such as (1) and (3) is explained by the modifying influence of the sentential operator, not by the semantics of names and their use in predication.

Now how does the operator approach fare with respect to our four assumptions? Not well. But seeing this requires exploring the approach in more detail. In fact, the approach can be developed in several different ways, each of which runs afoul of one assumption or another.

One way of taking the operator approach is as providing an account, not of the literal truth of sentence (3), but only of the appearance of its truth. The explanation is a pragmatic one. The operator modifies the truth expressed by an utterance of sentence (3) in a certain context, but this analysis is not to be taken as a semantic analysis of the sentence itself; the analysis applies only to the meaning of the utterance, not to the literal meaning of the sentence being used in the making of the utterance. Sentence (3) only appears to be true because what gets conveyed by an utterance of ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ is not the literal meaning expressed by that sentence, but rather—through a pragmatic process—the meaning expressed by some other sentence, one qualified by an operator. This interpretation of the operator approach raises a number of issues—such as that of providing some clear account of the pragmatic process through which the utterance of a sentence like (3) comes to be associated with the truth expressed by its qualified variant. However, this is not an issue I pursue here, for the simple reason that my goal is to provide an account that respects our first assumption—not that an
utterance of (3) is somehow associated with a truth, but that this sentence is itself literally true.\(^5\)

Alternatively, then, we might interpret the operator approach as providing an account of the literal truth of the sentence (3) itself. On this interpretation of the operator approach, the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ is actually supposed to mean that, according to the story, or in some game of pretence, Sherlock Holmes smokes. But, of course, sentence (1), ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’, is likewise true, and it is not reasonable to assume that the truth of this sentence also involves a story operator—it simply means that Bertrand Russell smokes. So how is it that the analysis of one sentence involves an operator and the other does not? We seem to be left with a dilemma. Either there is some syntactic difference between the sentences themselves, a difference that justifies applying the operator interpretation to one sentence and not the other, or else the semantic interpretation of these sentences is not determined by their syntax.\(^6\)

The first of these options is implausible; and in any case, it violates the second of our assumptions, that sentence (1) and sentence (3) share the same syntactic form. The second option is also implausible, and violates our third assumption, that our semantic interpretation of these sentences is compositional. And, again, as we have seen, the only other way of taking the operator approach—the pragmatic analysis—requires the violation of our first assumption, that sentence (3) is literally true.\(^7\) None of the variants of the operator approach, therefore, can solve our puzzle.

A second kind of approach in the literature, very different from the operator approach, is one that I will refer to as the ‘ontological approach’ [van Inwagen 1977; Salmon 1998]. This allows us to accept that sentence (3) is true, that sentences (1) through (4) have the same syntax, and that an analysis of those sentences should accord with semantic compositionality. According to this approach, however, (3) must be true for the same reason that (1) is true—it must be true in virtue of facts about an individual referent for the name in question. The position of the ontological theorist is characterized by her rejection of the assumption that ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is an empty name; this theorist thinks the name has a referent. Sentence (3), then, would be true because it can be truly said of the referent of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ that he smokes, and sentence (4) would be false because the same cannot be said for the referent of ‘Elizabeth Bennet’. Of course, the referents for the names ‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Elizabeth Bennet’ will not be real persons, but instead, fictional characters to which predicates like ‘smokes’ can be said to apply.

\(^5\)Of course, ‘literally true’ should always be understood as meaning literally true relative to a context. The literal truth of a sentence relative to a context is to be contrasted with the pragmatic association of a sentence with something true.

\(^6\)There is one other option: to claim that sentences containing fictional names are themselves ambiguous, but this option raises the same questions as the other approach mentioned. That is, why should we take it that sentences containing fictional names are ambiguous, but those that do not fail to be ambiguous?

\(^7\)Lewis himself does not specify how his approach is to be taken. He claims only that the assertion of a sentence like ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ should not be taken at face value. Whether he intends his approach to count as a semantic analysis or as a pragmatic analysis is left open. Currie [1988], in contrast, thinks that fictional names ought to be given a semantic analysis distinct from that provided for referential names; his view is that fictional names are not genuine names. Yet Currie agrees that fictional names function syntactically as names. He must therefore be committed to rejecting compositionality.
Like the previous operator approach, this view also raises a number of interesting issues. For one thing, the ontological theorist owes us an account of the way in which a fictional character could truly be said to satisfy a predicate like ‘smokes’. But again, this is not an issue I will pursue here, since the account violates our fourth assumption—that the truth or falsity of sentences like (3) and (4) is not determined by the properties of metaphysically controversial entities.

The final approach one sometimes finds in the literature simply rejects the claim that sentences such as (3) are literally true. This view, associated with ideal-language theorists, and others from the positivist tradition, such as Rudolf Carnap [1950], as well as Gottlob Frege [1918], is one I will refer to as the ‘denial approach’. According to this view, because the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ would not appear in an ideal scientific language, we need not be concerned with its truth or falsity at all. Referentialism, therefore, can be straightforwardly applied to sentences (1) and (2) to yield the appropriate truth values without any need to account for the truth values of sentences (3) and (4). The truth or falsity of sentences (3) and (4) can safely be ignored.

If one is concerned with natural language, however, rather than with an ideal scientific language, this denial approach is not a viable option. For speakers of a natural language would intuitively count sentences (3) and (4) as true or false. The denial approach simply rejects the intuition that sentence (3) is true and, unlike the pragmatic version of the operator approach, it rejects any need to account even for the appearance of its truth.

At this point, it’s worth giving some defence of the assumption that is rejected by both the denial approach and the pragmatic version of the operator approach—that sentence (3) is literally true. Why should we embrace this assumption? Well, intuitively, sentence (3) seems like a good thing to say. I suspect that most speakers of English who are familiar with the Conan Doyle stories at all would assent to this sentence. But things are different with sentence (4), which seems like a bad thing to say. Most speakers who are familiar with the Jane Austen story would categorize an utterance of (4) as false.

There is, therefore, a difference between sentences (3) and (4), one that requires explanation—speakers will assent to one and dissent from the other. A natural explanation is that one of these sentences is in fact true, while the other is false, and that speakers, by and large, tend to assent to true sentences and dissent from false sentences. But any theorist who denies the literal truth of sentence (3) could not appeal to this natural explanation—since, for such a theorist, both (3) and (4) would be equally false, or alternatively, equally lacking in truth value. It is, of course, possible to try to account for the differences between sentences (3) and (4) in some other way, without appealing to differences in truth value. But any explanation along these lines would then have to confront the fact that speakers tend to regard the difference between sentences (3) and (4) as very

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8See Ludlow [2006], Salmon [1998] and van Inwagen [1977] for examples of writers who give treatments of, or raise issues concerning, how predicates apply in fictional contexts or to fictional characters.
similar to the difference between sentences (1) and (2), their referential counterparts. Ordinary speakers tend to classify sentences (3) and (4) as true and false respectively, without hesitation, just as they do with the sentences (1) and (2). Any theorist who claims that one pair of classifications is legitimate, while the other is not, must therefore be attributing some kind of confusion to speakers in their ordinary judgments.

Since speakers themselves do not distinguish between the two pairs of sentences in assigning them truth values, I claim that the only reason not to take such assignments at face value is the difficulty of providing a semantic theory to justify them. My aim in this paper is to provide such a theory.

3. Names: An Alternative Theory

As we have seen, referentialism conflicts with our four assumptions. But even apart from those four assumptions, referentialism is, in some ways, implausible as a general theory of names. Indeed, names can be used in a variety of ways that pose problems for referentialism—not only in fictional contexts, but, for example, to keep track of imaginary friends, to track things with which speakers are acquainted only descriptively, or to track acts of failed reference. These various uses suggest that names are more than simple devices of reference. But rejecting referentialism entirely does not seem right either, because referentialism seems to provide the correct analysis for those names that do refer.

There appear to be different uses of names—on the face of it, sentences (1) through (4) are true or false for different reasons. Presumably, sentence (1), ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’, is true for the standard referential reason—because some individual, Bertrand Russell, has the property of being a smoker. Likewise, sentence (2), ‘Margaret Thatcher smokes’, is false because another individual, Margaret Thatcher, fails to have this property. In contrast, sentence (3), ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’, is true for an entirely different reason. It is true because Conan Doyle, while composing the Holmes stories, wrote the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’, or an equivalent thereof, or some set of sentences entailing this sentence. And sentence (4), ‘Elizabeth Bennet smokes’, is false, at least partly because Jane Austen, the author of the novel Pride and Prejudice, did no such thing with respect to this sentence. While the truth or falsity of sentences (1) and (2) depends on facts about particular individuals, the truth or falsity of sentences (3) and (4) must be based on something entirely different.

So the challenge now is this: How can we give a systematic semantic treatment of sentences (1) through (4) that respects the similarities and differences among them, and yet maintains, as far as possible, our four assumptions? The answer lies in offering a semantic account of proper

9See Burge [1973], Dummett [1981], Frege [1892], Katz [2001], Quine [1953], and Russell [1919] for other arguments that a name should not be understood as a mere device of reference.

10I say this is only part of the reason for the falsity of (4) because the failure of the novel to contain ‘Elizabeth Bennet smokes’ or a sentence entailing this sentence, is not sufficient for the falsity of (4). Other background assumptions might come into play about what facts held of women and their role in society in Austen’s time to determine the falsity of ‘Elizabeth Bennet smokes’.
names and of their use in predication, an account different from the standard referentialist picture, but one that gives a unifying treatment of the ways in which proper names can be used.

3.1 Intuitive Explanation

What I propose is to think of names as context-sensitive expressions that get their meaning, in a context of utterance, from the events in which particular uses for these names are introduced into discourse. These events, or acts of introduction, I call ‘dubbings’. A dubbing is understood as an event in which an agent stipulatively associates a name with some content. The view I offer is one that makes such acts of naming, or dubbings, fundamental to a name’s interpretation, not simply its reference to an individual.

A name’s interpretation, then, depends on the nature of the dubbing with which it is associated. Consider an example. It is natural to take the instance of ‘Bertrand Russell’ in (1) to refer to the great philosopher, Bertrand Russell. I will call this use of a name a ‘referential’ use. On my view, while this use of the name is referential, it is not referential simply because the semantic function of a name is to refer to an object. Rather, this use of the name is referential because the dubbing associated with it is one in which a particular individual, the great philosopher himself, is assigned to the name as its content. According to the theory to be set out here, a referential dubbing will contain an individual referent as one of its parts, as the content associated with a name by an agent. The semantic value of the name will then reflect this fact. Indeed, on my view, a name that is associated with such a dubbing will function in much the same way as referentialism suggests.

But while a dubbing may involve the introduction of a referential use for a name, it needn’t do so. There is nothing inherent about a dubbing—the act of introducing a particular use for a name into discourse—that requires reference to an individual. Reference to an individual will not play a role in a fictional dubbing, for instance. While instances of names from fiction have some kind of content associated with them, they are not plausibly associated with individuals. Instead, the idea I want to explore is that the content of a fictional use of a name is to be identified with the set of properties associated with that name by the author of the fictional works in which that use of the name is established—so that ‘Sherlock Holmes’, for example, is associated with the properties of being tall, clever, balding, a smoker, and so on.

Names, then, are expressions whose interpretations are determined by the contexts of introduction, or dubbings, with which they are associated. But a name can be associated with more than one dubbing—it may, in fact, be associated with a large set of dubbings. The name ‘Elizabeth’, for instance, may be used to discuss Elizabeth Taylor, the frequently married movie star, or Queen Elizabeth II, the current monarch of England, or even to discuss Elizabeth Bennet, the spirited female protagonist of Pride and Prejudice.

Because a name can be associated with a set of dubbings, it is crucial to the current theory that one of these dubbings must be selected before any particular instance of the name can be interpreted. An instance of a name
occurs, of course, in a particular context of utterance. A name, therefore, must also be associated with a function mapping each context of utterance to one of its dubblings. Because a name is associated both with a set of dubblings, and with a dubbing selection function, the semantic interpretation of names, on this view, is not simple, nor are the semantic values into which they are interpreted. Indeed, these semantic values turn out to be pairs of things—contents, together with what I will call ‘modes of introduction’, which determine whether a particular use of a name is referential or fictional. Both contents and modes, I will show, play a role in allowing us to provide the right interpretations for referential and fictional uses of names.

3.2 Sketch of a Formal Theory

What must the semantic interpretation of a name be like in order to reflect the picture sketched thus far? I have claimed that a name is an expression that is associated with a variety of acts of introduction, or dubblings, and also with a function that maps each context of utterance into one of these dubblings. Let’s suppose, then, that $D_n$ represents the entire set of dubblings that might be associated with the name $n$, and that $f_n$ is the function mapping any context in which this name might occur into a particular dubbing from $D_n$. We now consider these two components separately.

Dubbings are themselves structured entities—they have parts. But what parts? An actual dubbing considered as an event in the world may have any number of features—not only the agent of the dubbing, but its time, the place, what the weather was like that day, and so on. Let’s suppose, however, that the only semantically relevant features of a dubbing are the content it assigns to a name, together with the mode of that dubbing. In that case, dubblings could be represented as ordered pairs of the form $<Q,M>$, where $Q$ is the component that most closely corresponds to the traditional content of a name, and $M$ is the mode of dubbing. I will assume that there are two modes, referential and fictional, which I refer to with the tags REF and FIC, respectively. If the mode of a dubbing is referential, I refer to that dubbing as a ‘referential dubbing’, and if the mode is fictional, I refer to it as a ‘fictional dubbing’.

The first component of a dubbing, corresponding to the traditional content of a name, is the component that plays the most direct role in determining the truth value of a sentence in which a name occurs. In the case of a referential dubbing, I rely on the standard assumption that this content will be an individual, while in the case of a fictional dubbing, I will appeal instead, as I said earlier, to the assumption that its content is a set of properties. Formally, then, a dubbing $<Q,M>$ is governed by the following constraint: if $M$ is the tag REF, so that the dubbing is referential, then the content $Q$ must be an individual, while if $M$ is the tag FIC, so that the dubbing is fictional, the content $Q$ must be a set of properties.

Recanati [1993] likewise uses the tag REF to indicate an essential component of a name’s semantic value; see also Taylor [2000]. Although I borrow the REF tag, I put it to a different use in the current theory.
Let us now turn from dubbings in general to the set of dubbings associated with a particular name. Consider, for example, the set of dubbings $D_{\text{Bertrand Russell}}$ associated with the name ‘Bertrand Russell’. Among the set of these various dubbings will be one that occurred upon the birth of Bertrand Russell, the great philosopher. This dubbing would contain Bertrand Russell, the great philosopher himself, as its content, and the tag REF to represent the referential mode of introduction. The dubbing, then, could be represented as the pair $<\text{Bertrand Russell}, \text{REF}>$. But, of course, as previously mentioned, there may be other dubbings associated with the name ‘Bertrand Russell’. Suppose some author introduces the name ‘Bertrand Russell’ in a work of fiction, perhaps ironically, as a name for the village idiot. The dubbing associated with this event would then contain a set of properties associated with the name as its content—the properties predicated of the village idiot by the author of this particular work of fiction—along with the tag FIC to indicate the fictional mode of the dubbing.

Or consider the set of dubbings $D_{\text{Sherlock Holmes}}$ associated with the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’. One of these dubbings will be the fictional instance in which Conan Doyle introduced a set of properties—let us say the properties: tall, clever, balding, and smokes—and associated them with the name. This dubbing would then be represented by the ordered pair $<\{\text{tall, clever, balding, smokes}\}, \text{FIC}>$. But as before, there could well be other dubbings for the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Imagine, for example, that an individual wishes to name her dog ‘Sherlock Holmes’, because of its exceptional intelligence, and does so by baptizing the dog with that name. The dubbing associated with this event would then contain this dog as its content, and the tag REF to indicate the referential mode of the dubbing.

Having introduced the set $D_n$ of dubbings associated with the name $n$, the next question is: How does a particular dubbing get assigned to the use of the name $n$ in some particular context? At one level, of course, the process is mysterious, or at least unexplained—having to do with speaker’s intentions, presuppositions, common knowledge, salience, and so on. But as is often the case, it can be useful to abstract away from the mystery and suppose that the relevant information is carried by the dubbing selection function $f_n$, which

12 Of course there are more than four properties associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’, and of course the precise set of properties is difficult to determine. They can’t merely be the explicitly introduced properties, but must include those introduced in virtue of deductive closure, and perhaps those reached by abductive reasoning as well. This issue is not my concern here and, for simplicity, I assume that only the four properties listed are associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’.

13 A possible problem for my theory is that fictional stories are written over time, often in several volumes. How, then, can I say that a fictional name’s semantic value is determined by a context of introduction, or dubbing, which plausibly occurs in a very short period? Admittedly, for the purposes of simplicity, I presented a rather static picture of the introduction of a fictional name. An example that better suits the theory as presented here might be ‘Little Miss Muffett’, which arguably did have all of its properties associated with it upon its introduction into discourse, or at least very shortly thereafter. To deal with most cases of fictional names, the current theory would have to be complicated somewhat. In order to allow for the set of properties associated with a fictional name to change, I would have to offer some analysis according to which a fictional name’s initial context of introduction determines its initial semantic value, but that, through anaphoric chains connecting contexts of ongoing creative activity by an author, the set of properties associated with a name could change over time.
can be taken to map any particular context of use for the name \( n \) into the dubbing appropriate for that context.\(^{14}\)

So, for example, if \( j \) is some context in which the great philosopher himself is under discussion, we can suppose that the function \( f_{\text{Bertrand Russell}} \)—the dubbing selection function associated with the name ‘Bertrand Russell’—maps the context \( j \) into the dubbing that contains the great philosopher as its content, and the tag REF as its mode of introduction. More formally, we have:

\[
f_{\text{Bertrand Russell}} (j) = \langle \text{Bertrand Russell}, \text{REF} \rangle.
\]

Likewise, if the context \( k \) involves, perhaps, a book club devoted to the Conan Doyle stories, we can suppose that the function \( f_{\text{Sherlock Holmes}} \) will map the context \( k \) into the dubbing containing the appropriate set of properties along with the tag FIC—or, again, more formally:

\[
f_{\text{Sherlock Holmes}} (k) = \langle \{\text{tall, clever, balding, smokes}\}, \text{FIC} \rangle.
\]

With this machinery in place, we can now define a semantic interpretation function \( v \) that maps a particular instance of a name \( n \) in a context \( i \) into its semantic value \( v_i(n) \). My proposal is simply that the semantic value of a name in a particular context should be identified with the dubbing associated with that name in that context. Given this proposal, our task of defining an interpretation function \( v \) is absolutely straightforward, since we can simply identify the semantic value of the name \( n \) in the context \( i \) with the dubbing that the appropriate dubbing selection function \( f_n \) associates with the name in that context. Put generally, this gives us:

\[
v_i(n) = f_n(i).
\]

The proposal can be illustrated by calculating the semantic value of ‘Bertrand Russell’ in \( j \), the particular context of use specified above, as follows:

\[
v_j('\text{Bertrand Russell}') = f_{\text{Bertrand Russell}} (j) = \langle \text{Bertrand Russell}, \text{REF} \rangle.
\]

\(^{14}\)My treatment of names raises the following question: why should we treat names as context-sensitive expressions, rather than treating them as ambiguous? That is, why think there is only one word ‘Elizabeth’ rather than multiple homophonous, but distinct words, one for each Elizabeth? There are, in fact, several considerations against treating names as multiply ambiguous. The first is simply methodological: in theorizing about natural language, we must always be constrained by questions of acquisition. For this reason, positing ambiguity should always remain a mechanism of last resort, because acquiring a highly ambiguous language is more difficult than acquiring a less ambiguous language. Another consideration comes from natural language usage itself: ordinary speakers would tend to say that Queen Elizabeth and Elizabeth Bennet share the same name. Of course, neither of these considerations is conclusive evidence against the ambiguity theorist. Indeed, the matter is controversial: for further arguments against the ambiguity hypothesis, see Pietroski’s [2010]; for the opposition, see Segal’s [2001]. Although the matter is controversial, I still choose, in this paper, to treat names as context-sensitive expressions. It would be possible, however, to adopt the ambiguity hypothesis while still maintaining the essentials of the current approach: the nature of a proper name’s semantic value, as well as the way in which its semantic value is derived from a dubbing. The sole difference would be that, instead of being associated with many dubbings, each name would be associated with only one.
And likewise, the semantic value of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in the context k is calculated in a similar fashion:

$$v_k('Sherlock Holmes') = f_{Sherlock Holmes}(k)$$

$$= \langle \{\text{tall, clever, balding, smokes}\}, \text{FIC} \rangle.$$  

4. Names and Predication

4.1 Intuitive Explanation

Given the account of names I offer, predication is slightly complicated, for two reasons. The first is that the semantic value assigned to a name is non-standard. Typically, the semantic value of a name is identified with its traditional content—the component of our semantic value $$<Q,M>$$ represented here by Q, either an individual or a set of properties. Therefore, typically, what combines with a predicate to produce something truth-evaluable is exactly what one would expect, something that can contribute to a sentence’s truth-theoretic properties. But on the present view, the semantic value of a name is more complex, containing both a component corresponding to the name’s traditional content and a tag representing its mode of introduction. It is for this reason that I distinguish between semantic value and content. The rule for predication, therefore, must accommodate the fact that a name’s semantic value includes, in addition to its traditional content, a tag representing its mode of introduction.

The second reason predication is complicated is that different names, or even different uses of the same name, can have different kinds of semantic values. As we have seen, a typical use of ‘Bertrand Russell’, such as that in the sentence (1), ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’, uttered in our context j, is associated with an individual as its content and the tag REF to indicate its referential use, whereas a typical use of ‘Sherlock Holmes’, such as that in the sentence (3), ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’, uttered in our context k, is associated with a set of properties as its content and the tag FIC to indicate its fictional use. One would, therefore, expect their roles in predication to differ.

My basic idea is that our predication rule should embody, in effect, two separate notions of predication. When a predicate is applied to a name, if the use of the name is referential, the predication is then, in a sense, ordinary—to see if the predication is true, one determines if the referent of that name, some individual, has the property expressed by the predicate. In contrast, if the use of a name is fictional, predication takes a different form, pioneered by Frege and developed by Montague [Frege 1884; Montague 1974]. In this case, to see if the predication is true, one determines whether the set of properties that functions as the content of the fictional name contains the particular property expressed by the predicate.

Returning to our examples: the instance of ‘Bertrand Russell’ uttered in j, as we have seen, is associated with $$<\text{Bertrand Russell}, \text{REF}>$$ as its semantic value. Our predication rule thus dictates that such an instance of
‘Bertrand Russell’ functions in the ordinary way in predication—it is a fact about Bertrand Russell, about that individual, that makes an assertion of ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’ true or false. By contrast, the semantic value associated with the instance of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in the context \( k \) is \(<\{\text{tall, clever, balding, smokes}\}, \text{FIC}>\). In this case, then, we appeal to our second notion of predication—if ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ is true, it is true because the property of smoking lies among the properties associated with this use of the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’.

As a result, both sentences (1) and (3) are evaluated as true relative to their respective contexts, but for different reasons. The sentence ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’ is evaluated as true because it is the case that Bertrand Russell bears the property of smoking. In contrast, the sentence ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ is evaluated as true because it is the case that the property of smoking is a member of the set of properties associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’.

At this point all that remains is to combine our two notions of predication into a single predication rule. The rule itself is disjunctive, of course, and works in the following way: either a name carries the tag REF, and the normal kind of predication is at work, or the name carries the tag FIC, in which case, the Frege/Montague notion of predication is relevant.

### 4.2 The Predication Rule

To see how all of this works out formally, I first introduce two bookkeeping functions, \( c_1 \) and \( c_2 \), whose role is to simply pick out the first and second components of a name’s semantic value in a context: when \(<Q,M>\) is the semantic value associated with some instance of a name, \( c_1[<Q,M>] \) is \( Q \), the name’s content, and \( c_2[<Q,M>] \) is \( M \), the name’s mode of introduction. The idea of the predication rule is that, once we have the pair \(<Q,M>\) as the semantic value for a name in a context, we first apply \( c_2 \) to that semantic value to extract the tag \( M \), and then look to see if the name is referential or fictional, which then tells us what to do with the content extracted by \( c_1 \). If the value of \( c_2 \) is REF, then the content extracted by \( c_1 \) combines with a predicate in the ordinary way. If the tag extracted is FIC, then predication is of the Frege/Montague variety.

Suppose more exactly, that \( Fn \) is a simple predication involving the name \( n \) and the one-place predicate \( F \), where \( v(F) \)—the semantic value of \( F \)—is some property of individuals. We can then specify the conditions under which \( v_i(Fn) \) is true—that is, the conditions under which \( Fn \) is true at the context \( i \)—through the following predication rule:

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(*) v_i(Fn) \text{ is true if and only if either (1) } c_2[v_i(n)] \text{ is REF and } c_1[v_i(n)] \text{ bears the property } v(F), \text{ or (2) } c_2[v_i(n)] \text{ is FIC and } v(F) \text{ belongs to the set } c_1[v_i(n)].
\]

Now let \( v_i(n) \) be \(<Q,M>\); that is, \(<Q,M>\) is the semantic value assigned to the name \( n \) in the context \( i \). Then what this rule tells us is that a sentence of the form \( Fn \) is true at the context \( i \) under one of two conditions. First,
c₂[<Q,M>] is REF, so that the name is referential, and its content, the individual c₁[<Q,M>], bears the property associated with the predicate F. Or second, c₂[<Q,M>] is FIC, so that the name is fictional, and the property associated with the predicate F belongs to c₁[<Q,M>], the set of properties assigned as its content.

Returning once more to our examples for illustration, we begin with the sentence ‘Bertrand Russell smokes’ uttered at j. As we have seen, the semantic value vₐ(‘Bertrand Russell’) is the pair <Bertrand Russell, REF>. In this case, then, c₂[<Bertrand Russell, REF>] is the tag REF, so that the name is referential. What the predication rule (*) tells us, therefore, is that the sentence is true just in case the content c₁[<Bertrand Russell, REF>] of the name, Bertrand Russell himself, bears the property v(‘Smokes’). Supposing that this property is simply that of smoking, the sentence is true, then, since Bertrand Russell smokes.

In the case of ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’ uttered at k, the sentence is again true, but for a different reason. In this case, as we have seen the semantic value vₖ(‘Sherlock Holmes’) is the pair <{tall, clever, balding, smokes}, FIC>. Since c₂[<{tall, clever, balding, smokes}, FIC>] is FIC, this use of the name is fictional. In this case, then, the rule (*) tells us that the sentence is true just in case c₁[<{tall, clever, balding, smokes}, FIC>], the set of properties assigned to the name as its content, contains the particular property v(‘Smokes’), the property of smoking. The sentence is therefore true, since smoking is one of the properties that constitute the content of ‘Sherlock Holmes’.

5. Objections

The account of names I have proposed leaves several issues open for further investigation. Some of them concern linguistic data about the use of names in general, while others focus on fictional names in particular. A complete theory would have to address the use of names in phrases or sentences such as ‘The Holmes I know’, ‘He’s a real Napoleon’, or ‘All of the Alberts in the class passed the test’. These are cases in which it appears that names have a predicative, rather than a referential use. Other issues relate to more complicated kinds of fictional discourse, or even ‘mixed’ contexts. These involve, for example, sentences that relate fictional characters either to one another or to the real world, as in ‘Sherlock Holmes is smarter than Inspector Clouseau’ or ‘Sherlock Holmes is admired by Bertrand Russell’. Accounting for the apparent truth of sentences like these has been taken by many theorists to require positing a referent for names like ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Finally, a number of issues arise regarding specific details about

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15My own view is that these mixed cases form a mixed bag. Some—such as ‘Sherlock Holmes is smarter than Inspector Clouseau’—can be associated with truth values in a relatively straightforward way. ‘Sherlock Holmes’, for example, might be associated with a certain degree of intelligence among his properties, and likewise ‘Clouseau’, and as we all know, the degree of intelligence associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’ is greater than that associated with ‘Inspector Clouseau’. Others—such as ‘Bertrand Russell admired Sherlock Holmes’—must be taken as literally false, since being admired by Russell was not one of the properties associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’ by Conan Doyle. But the apparent truth of sentences like these can be
the theory offered. The most important of these concern the precise nature of the intentions associated with referential and fictional modes of introduction, the nature of the speech act an author performs while writing a work of fiction, the nature of dubbings in general, and of fictional dubbings in particular.

While I can’t consider all of these issues here, I do want to consider two particular objections, since they constitute a direct threat to the current account.

5.1 Compositionality

The first objection concerns compositionality. I have claimed that the theory offered is compositional, since both sentences (1) and (3) are evaluated by the same semantic rule, our previous (*). But it is possible to object that the evaluation rule itself is disjunctive, or conditional, and therefore that the ways in which sentences (1) and (3) are evaluated differ. Two different kinds of predication are invoked, and folding them into a conditional definition, and then claiming uniformity, may seem not only *ad hoc*, but also to undermine the point of giving a compositional theory at all.

This objection raises interesting issues about what compositionality actually requires. I claim that introducing a conditional rule of predication is not simply an *ad hoc* way to satisfy the compositionality requirement, since the data show that the use of names is semantically complicated, so that the predication rule must be complicated as well. As long as the complications found in the rule reflect those found in names and their various uses, the rule is not *ad hoc*.

Nor does allowing for a conditional definition in our semantic evaluation rule necessarily undermine the point of giving a compositional theory, for there are many cases in which a unitary concept is given a conditional definition. Take, for instance, the notion of the absolute value of a number $x$—its distance from zero—indicated as $|x|$. This concept is itself generally explicated through a conditional definition: $|x|$ is defined as $x - 0$ if $x > 0$, but as $0 - x$ if $x \leq 0$. Just as the unitary notion of absolute value is defined conditionally, so, I claim, a unitary notion of predication can likewise be captured through a conditional definition. Anyone who rejects the predication rule (*) as illegitimate simply because it is conditional must explain why the standard definition of absolute value is not similarly problematic.

Nevertheless, suppose one does reject the conditional definition of predication in the rule (*) on the grounds that it fails to respect compositionality. What could I say in this case? Well, the simple answer is that the conditional definition could, in fact, be eliminated in favour of a non-conditional definition. This could be done by appealing to the Frege/Montague-style of predication uniformly, not just for fictional uses of

explained by other facts in the near vicinity—such as, for example, the fact that Bertrand Russell values the properties associated with the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’. 
names, but for referential uses of names as well. Just as with fictional uses of names, the content of a referential use would likewise be identified with a set of properties—but in this case, the properties would be those possessed by the object standardly taken to be the referent of the name. Simple predications containing such a name, then, would again be true whenever the property expressed by the predicate was a member of the set of properties associated with that name. As a result, any simple predication of the form \( F_n \) could now be evaluated through the uniform rule

\[
(**) v_i(F_n) \text{ is true iff } v(F) \text{ belongs to the set } c_i[v_i(n)],
\]

whether or not the occurrence at \( i \) of the name \( n \) is fictional. Turning again to sentences (1) and (3), as uttered in the previous contexts \( j \) and \( k \) respectively, the property predicated of the subject does belong to the subject in both cases—the set associated with the name ‘Bertrand Russell’ as its content would contain the property of smoking, and so would the content associated with ‘Sherlock Holmes’. Both instances of the sentences (1) and (3) would, therefore, be true.

If we appeal only to our new, uniform predication rule (**), then the treatment of sentences (1) and (3) is undoubtedly compositional: the kind of content associated with the different uses of names in (1) and (3) is the same, and the corresponding predication is of one kind. But now, what of the differences between these sentences, and in particular, between the names they contain? As we have seen, the two names—‘Sherlock Holmes’ and ‘Bertrand Russell’—would now both be associated with sets of properties as their contents. But the association between these two kinds of names and their contents would be achieved in different ways; and the tags REF and FIC could still be used to track these differences.

In the case of a fictional use of a name, the tag FIC could be said to carry the information that the relevant set of properties is assigned directly, by stipulation—as, for example, the content associated with our use of ‘Sherlock Holmes’ was stipulated by Conan Doyle to contain the properties of being tall, clever, balding, and a smoker. In the case of a referential use of a name, the tag REF could be said to carry the information that the relevant set of properties are those possessed by the particular individual baptized with that name in its context of introduction—as, for example, the content associated with our use of ‘Bertrand Russell’ is identified with the set of properties possessed by the great philosopher himself. It follows that, for a name associated with the tag FIC, there is no individual that determines the set of properties assigned to the name as its content, whereas there is such an individual for a name associated with the tag REF. Put
another way, the content of a fictional name would still be controlled by the author of some work of fiction, while the content of a referential name would still be controlled by the properties of some individual in the world.

5.2 Ontological Commitments

The second potential objection I address here concerns the ontological commitments of the theory. Intuitively, there is no Sherlock Holmes, and I claim that my account respects this intuition. But one might question whether this is so. I say that the content of a fictional name is a set of properties. Am I saying, then, that Sherlock Holmes is a set—that the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ refers to a set of properties, just as the name ‘Bertrand Russell’ refers to an individual? If the answer is ‘yes’, then I have not avoided an ontological commitment to Sherlock Holmes at all, and indeed have postulated an odd sort of thing to be Sherlock Holmes. But this objection relies on thinking of the relationship between a name and its assigned content necessarily as a relationship of reference, and this I reject. On my view, the notion of reference can be defined as follows: if a use of a name is referential, then its referent is the content associated with that name; otherwise it has no referent. More exactly: if a use of name has $<Q,M>$ as its semantic value, then it refers to $Q$ if the tag $M$ is REF, and otherwise does not refer. Thus, Russell himself is the referent of a typical use of the name ‘Bertrand Russell’, but a typical use of the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’, though it has a set of properties as its content, has no referent at all.

The view I am suggesting opens up a new way of looking at the relationship between names, contents, and referents—where the content of a name is that component of its semantic value that plays the most direct role in determining the truth value of sentences in which that name occurs, and where this content can sometimes, but not always, be identified with the name’s referent. The content of the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’, for instance, is a set of properties, and it is this content that plays the most direct role in determining the truth value of sentences in which this name occurs. In the case of ‘Bertrand Russell’, by contrast, it is again the content of this name that plays the most direct role in determining the truth value; but, in this case, the referent of the name itself functions as its content. The content of a name, then, performs a certain function in determining the truth value; but only in the case of referential names can the item that fulfills that function be identified with the name’s referent.

The resulting picture is, in some ways, reminiscent of a debate between Michael Dummett and Ernst Tugendhat concerning the interpretation of Frege’s notion of *Bedeutung*, commonly translated as ‘reference’ [Dummett 1993; Tugendhat 1970]. Tugendhat argued that a name’s reference, in Frege’s sense, should be identified, not necessarily with its bearer, but with...
what he called its ‘truth-value potential’—an abstract representation of the role played by that name in determining the truth value of a sentence in which it occurs. He thus wanted to divorce the notion of reference from the name/bearer relation. Dummett argued, by contrast, that it is the bearer of a name itself that determines its truth-value potential. If we identify the current understanding of the content of a name with Tugendhat’s idea of truth-value potential—that is, with its contribution to determining truth value—and if we identify the referent of a name with its bearer, we can, in a sense, split the difference between these two writers. We can agree that all names, both fictional and referential, have a truth-value potential, a content, while allowing that, in the case of referential names, this truth-value potential can indeed be identified with the bearer of that name, its referent.19

One might still feel—as indeed Dummett did—that the name/bearer relation, the relation of a name to its referent, is a better understood idea than any abstract notion of truth-value potential. Indeed, it is this name/bearer relation that is taken as primitive in most semantic theories. Here, however, I would have to take Tugendhat’s side, instead favouring the relation of a name to its content, its truth-value potential, as the more fundamental semantic relation.

The advantage I claim for my approach is this: working with the more general relation of association between names and contents, we are now able to define what had previously been taken as a primitive name/bearer relation as the special case of this more general relation. As the literature shows, however, it is much harder to move in the opposite direction, trying to extend the standard name/bearer relation from referential uses of names so that it applies to names more generally, including fictional uses of names. The disadvantage of my approach, of course, is that the relation of a name to its content, its truth-value potential, is even more abstract than the standard name/bearer relation, and so seems to cry out even more strongly for analysis. Still, though more familiar, even the ordinary name/bearer relation is not well understood, as the literature also shows. In fact, both relations—the ordinary name/bearer relation and the more general notion of association between a name and its content—would require careful explanation, involving questions well beyond the scope of this discussion, such as how names come to have any meaning at all.

6. Conclusion

We began with a puzzle, based on four motivating assumptions, which could not be solved by referentialism. The theory described here solves this puzzle, allowing us to maintain all four of our original assumptions. First, as we have seen, both sentences (1) and (3)—‘Bertrand Russell smokes’ and ‘Sherlock Holmes smokes’—can now be evaluated as true, at least relative to

19While it is a consequence of the current view that fictional names do not have referents in the technical sense in which the term is used in philosophy of language, it is true that we commonly speak of referring to, or talking about, one fictional character rather than another. I believe that the current theory could, in fact, be developed to accommodate our ordinary talk of fictional characters, but doing so would be a substantial task, beyond the scope of the present paper.
an appropriate context. Second, the account allows both sentences to be treated as syntactically alike, as simple predications containing names—neither sentence must be understood as having any covert operators, or other covert syntactic items, that are part of one sentence but not the other. Third, the interpretation of sentences (1) and (3) is compositional—since the sentences have the same syntactic form, they are evaluated by the same semantic rule (*), or alternatively by the rule (**). And, finally, the truth of sentence (3) is explained without appeal to any metaphysically controversial individuals—no abstract or non-actual characters play any role in explaining its truth.

While it is true that my account solves the original puzzle, other considerations determine what counts as a good solution to the puzzle. It is clear that the truths expressed by sentences (1) and (3) intuitively have different grounds. But it is equally clear that the two sentences, as simple predications containing proper names, must have their semantic values derived in the same way. This account respects both the intuitive similarities and the differences between sentences (1) and (3)—they are both given the same semantic treatment, yet they are still true in different ways. The theory also allows us to see how referentialism, while failing for the fictional case, succeeds as an analysis of a sentence such as (1). It allows names to have referential uses without making this use of names constitutive of their semantic role. The theory is thus strongly Kripkean in nature, and indeed, can be seen as a generalization of Kripke’s own view. As in Kripke’s theory, it relies on the notion of a dubbing to determine the content of a name, and identifies that content with a referent, at least for referential uses of names; but the current theory also allows for non-referential uses in which the content of a name is not identified with its referent. Thus, the theory works like referentialism where referentialism works, but it does not force cases in which referentialism seems to fail to fit the referentialist mould.\(^{20}\)

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