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In this paper is considered the linguistic approach to the problem of the relationship between a human being and reality. If in the Christian tradition language was given by God and God endowed human beings with the ability to name objects, then in the 17th century German speaking philosophers, following Descartes' turn to the ego, had changed this thought. Since Herder and Humboldt language has been considered not as a representation of reality, but as a representation of a human mind. These thinkers were the first who revealed the inseparable interdependence of human thinking and language, the influence of language on the socio-cultural lifeworld of human beings, and the role of language in the development of the world-view.

*Keywords:* language, world-view, reality, Weltanschauung, Sprachdenken.

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# From Humboldt to Wittgenstein – Linguistic Picture of the World

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## ABSTRACT

*In this paper is considered the linguistic approach to the problem of the relationship between a human being and reality. If in the Christian tradition language was given by God and God endowed human beings with the ability to name objects, then in the 17th century German speaking philosophers, following Descartes' turn to the ego, had changed this thought. Since Herder and Humboldt language has been considered not as a representation of reality, but as a representation of a human mind. These thinkers were the first who revealed the inseparable interdependence of human thinking and language, the influence of language on the socio-cultural lifeworld of human beings, and the role of language in the development of the world-view. The second crucial phase in the linguistic turn to the attempt of description of reality was made in the first half of the 20th century by Wittgenstein. In his works he came up to the idea of language games, where language becomes an inseparable part of all human activities. Now language permeates the whole human lifeworld (or a form of life in Wittgenstein), and language helps humans to create a picture of the world. However, depending on different languages, language games and arrangements on the rules of these games, we come to the plurality of both the forms of life and of the picture(s) of the world. The surrounding reality is not only being constituted with and by language, but it plays an irreplaceable role in interpretations, explications, explanations, demystifications and understanding the physical structure, laws and patterns of the world around. Language is the primary and paramount way and instrument of communication between humans, it helps not only to describe and explain the reality, but to create new. This approach to language is not*

*new, it has been developed since Leibniz's, Hamann's, Herder's, Wilhelm von Humboldt's works.*

**Keywords:** language, world-view, reality, Weltanschauung, Sprachdenken.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The basic scheme of the human's linguistic interaction with reality in the triad *language – thought – world*. Humans are fully engaged in the *speech-world*. Language presents the world for us; it is our *window to the world*. Hatab (2017) in his book about the nature of language writes, that language inhabits and encompasses a “disclosive field,” triangulated across “the individual-social-environging world,” doing so, not timelessly, but with its own distinctive “temporal-historical structure” (Hatab 2017, 125–26, 129) and a distinctive embodiment in gestures and sounds; the “immediate presentation of meanings” in language, so construed, is the precondition of representational accounts (ibid., 130). This explanation and the following one are very close to the ideas of later Ludwig Wittgenstein and Wilhelm von Humboldt. Language is an instance of nature *intertwining* with culture, thereby accounting for the fact that language, fitted as it is to the *lived world*, is at once both conventional and cross-cultural (Hatab 2017, 142–43). Language and thought are inseparable in *life world*, we use speech for thinking, this process as well as meditation on something is impossible without language, thinking is an incorporation or internalization of speech.

The problem of the origin of language had not been not identified as a separate sphere of study in Europe until the 18th century among German-speaking thinkers. Before that time the *question of the origin of language, the problem of relationship between language and thought, relationship language and reality, how language represents reality*, were matters of philosophy, theology, while the other disciplines had not yet been strictly defined.

Before the 17th century the idea of nominalism was dominated in philosophy. Language was separated from actors, speakers. “Meaning by the seventeenth century has become almost entirely a property of words rather than deeds” (Tyler 1978, 167). Language was a gift from God<sup>1</sup> (Bible, Genesis 2:19)<sup>2</sup>, so, the origins of words were studied in relation to things they named.

(...) since language is the defining characteristic of our species, the choice of answer is intimately bound up with speculation about our nature and our works, about poetry, art, aesthetics, early civilization, society, and the foundations of culture. (Aarsleff 1986: 1).

Theologians claimed that the origin of language and speech is divine origin, the Divinity – God was the first teacher of humans. The latter hypothesis was modified by Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803). He believed that

(...) language is neither so far above men that the Divinity should have been necessary to invent it for him, not so far below man that the brute should have been able to invent it. It is the necessary and conjoint result of sensibility

<sup>1</sup> See Francisco Suárez, Spanish philosopher and theologian, one of the great scholastics after Thomas Aquinas, about ‘the incarnation of the Word’- ‘*De Incarnatione Verbi*’ (1590).

<sup>2</sup> Greek Septuagint και ἐπλασεν ὁ θεὸς ἔτι ἐκ τῆς γῆς πάντα τὰ θηρία τοῦ ἀγροῦ και πάντα τὰ πετεινὰ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ και ἤγαγεν αὐτὰ πρὸς τὸν Ἀδὰμ ἰδεῖν, τί καλέσει αὐτὰ, και πᾶν, ὃ ἔαν ἐκάλεσεν αὐτὸ Ἀδὰμ ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, τοῦτο ὄνομα αὐτοῦ. (my italics and bold) King James Version (English translation) And out of the ground the LORD God formed every beast of the field, and every fowl of the air; and brought them unto Adam to see what he *would call* them: and whatsoever Adam *called* every living creature, that was the *name* thereof. (Italics and bold by me.)

and reflection, both of them acting upon the basis if man’s natural organization and of his connection with the external world. It is his reflection that has converted the sounds of nature into significant signs, and invested them with a human element; and it is, again, his reflection which, in connection with feelings, has converted the forms and colors of the external world into sounds of speech. (Adler 1866, 14)

So, there is no one simple answer to the question of what the language is. It is not just a product of human physical organization (the speech – vocal apparatus), not only the result of arbitrary social convention. It is a special complex phenomenon, one of the distinctive characteristics of the human race. In general, Herder theory of language was much more poetical, than philosophical.

The theoretical foundations of the *linguistic turn* and study of philosophy of language were laid by Wilhelm von Humboldt). His theory of language as both mental and social action was the most thoroughly developed among his contemporaries: Hamann, Herder, Schlegel (McLuskie 2003, 34). Humboldt read Herder’s *Essay on the Origin of Language (Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, 1772)*, where Herder first wrote about the diversity of languages and cultural pluralism, that every nation (and corresponding culture) possesses its own identity. Herder focuses on the language as a special ability of human mind that distinguishes humanity from other species, and the creative capacity of language that produces human differences and diversity of cultures, “that language, from without, is the true differential character of our species as reason is from within” (Herder, 1966, 127). For Herder human mind and language are inseparable because they are both the manifestations of a single essential human characteristic. If before the 17th century language was understood as the re-presentation of the whole world, Humboldt’s and his contemporaries’ linguistic turn was in proposing to understand language as a representation of a humankind.

### *Humboldt’s Sprachdenken*

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835), as well as J. G. Herder, K. W. F. Schlegel, stood at the origins

of modern linguistics (Forester 2011). But they were not the first thinkers who drew attention to the theoretical comprehension of language and its inextricable connection with the human mind and total life. Their work constituted the earliest modern linguistic turns in philosophy; however, this phenomenon is usually related to the following century (McLuskie 2003; Rorty 1992; Wellmer 1974).

Linguistic skepticism and detection of limits of language, on the whole, can be traced back to Humboldt, Herder, Schlegel, Hamann, Weisgerber, through Romanticism and French Symbolism, through genesis of Austrian linguistic philosophy at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, Sapir and Whorf and American linguistics and philosophy of language, up to modern times.

Wilhelm von Humboldt was the first who used the term 'philosophy of language' in 1793, arguing that language is evidence for the spirit and charter of people speaking it. We can know much about the spirit and life of ancient Greeks from Ancient Greek language, we can trace foreign inflections and constructions in language, and thus know about their interactions with other nations (Humboldt GS I, 263-5). Humboldt discussed questions not only concerning the "(...) origin, the definition, the essential nature of language, (...) the formation of roots, words and grammatical form", but one of the first discussed "the organic principle and character of language, the idea of language, (...); and finally, the development of language in history, and its relation to the latter" (Adler 1866, 13).

Aarsleff (1999, xxvi) suggested that Humboldt combined his linguistic interests and Kantian problem of the relation between reason and sensibility in experience. Reason here was understood as mind's spontaneity and sensibility as a receptivity. For Aarsleff Humboldt's philosophy of language is a product of synthesis of "Kantian concerns about the proper unity of reason and sensibility in the constitution of experience and Condillac's and *idéologues'* focus on the union of concepts and language" (ibid., xxvii). Humboldt wrote in 1798 "my stay in Paris

is making a (new) epoch in my thinking" (Humboldt 1840, 62). He synthesized the following ideas in his own theory: (1) "the idea that representation is (...) a product of mental activity and mind's receptivity;" (2) "the idea that the external linguistic sign contributes to the synthesis of the manifold of intuition to produce a representation." (ibid.)

Humboldt's approach to the study of language, against, was scientific. He did not support the theory of the Divine origin of language. In his letter to Rémusat he expressed against direct divine intervention, the human speech is originated by the '*génie inné à l'homme pour les langues*' (Humboldt Werke, Vol. VII, 337).

He thought that language could not be invented, because language is an integral part of human nature, a human has a general capacity for speech. He wrote: "that language could not be invented unless its type already pre-existed in human intelligence." Also, "that man is a man, (*i.e.* a human being) only in virtue of speech, and that consequently to invent speech he would already have to be one" (Humboldt Werke Vol. III, 252-258). It resides in every human being (Humboldt 1999b, xii).

Humboldt was one of the first linguists and philosophers who drew attention to the national content of language and thinking, noting that different languages are the organs of their original thinking and perception for the nation. Humboldt came to look upon each language as an organism, all its parts bearing harmonious relations to each other, and standing in a definite connection with the intellectual and emotional development of the nation speaking it. These ideas dominated the romantic theory of language. „Die Idee der Sprache als eines dem Menschen wesentlichen Organs der Wechselwirkung beherrscht die gesamte romantische Sprachtheorie“ (Müller-Vellmer 2018, 305). Each language bears the relation to language in general that the species does to the genus, or the genus to the order, and by a comprehensive process of analysis he hoped to arrive at those fundamental laws of articulate speech which form the *Philosophy of Language*, and which, as they are also the laws of human



thought, with those of the *Philosophy of History* (Brington 1885). “Humboldt used language as a tool to study the human mind and interpret human cultural difference” (McNeely 2011, 131). While language is never a word of an individual, it is the product and the property of the entire nation.

Language for Humboldt was ‘the animatic breath’ (Humboldt 1999b, 44), the ‘formative power (...) in the act of altering the world’ (ibid.). Humboldt considered language as an ‘intermediate world’ between thinking and reality, while language captures a particular national worldview. Language is a medium or a link of communication. The external world becomes converted into internal by the act of speech. Adler (1866, 16) writes that thus language is a *perpetual prosopopoeia*, in other words - never-ending personification. Language as a totality is an intellectual world and constitutes a medium (a sort of the ‘middle ground’ (ibid.) between human and nature (external). So, it is a medium of communication not only between individuals, but between an individual and nation, between the past and present.

Humboldt emphasized the difference between the concepts of the intermediate *world* and the *picture of the world*. The first is a static product of linguistic activity that determines the perception of reality by a person. Its unit is a ‘spiritual object - a concept. The picture of the world is a mobile, dynamic entity, since it is formed from linguistic interventions in reality. Its unit is a speech act. Humboldt was the first who outlined the constitution of reality with language. He considered language as the eternal labor of the mind.

Considering new languages Humboldt discovered an architecture of language, its inner structure – *innere Sprachform* – ‘the deep structure of language’ (Turner 2014, 135). Humboldt showed how this *innere Sprachform* of a language ‘manifests the inner life and worldview of a people and how this *Sprachform* in turn shapes the spirit in conveys’ (ibid., 136). Humboldt used the term *inner language form* in a few occasions (M.-E. Conte 1976, 617) in his prominent book *Über die*

*Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues und ihren Einfluss auf die geistige Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts* (Berlin: F. Dümmler, 1836)<sup>3</sup>. Either Humboldt did not provide any strict definition of this term, Steinthal, his disciple (1860, 242), wrote that Humboldt just ‘suspected’ the meaning of the ‘inner form’. Other scholars tried to formulate a definition of this ‘inner form’.

It seems clear that von Humboldt’s ‘innere Sprachform’ is the semantic and morpho-syntactic structure of the given language (...). (Salus 1976, 98)

Humboldt’s *innere Sprachform* is the semantic and grammatical structure of a language, embodying elements, patterns, and rules imposed upon the raw material of speech. (Robins 1979, 175)

Humboldt wrote that,

(...) the concept of language form stretches beyond the rules of syntax and even beyond morphology, inasmuch as by the former one understands the application of certain general logical categories...on the roots and stems themselves. (Humboldt 1999b, 69)

So, the concept of language form itself does not relate neither to semantic nor to grammatical structure of language. This inner form can be detected only through the structure of language. Language is linked with the human mind inextricably. Humboldt claimed that language is the ‘ever repeating work of the psyche to make the articulated sound capable of expressing thought’ (Humboldt 1999b, 56). According to Humboldt, language is the basis not only of human thinking or reason, he used the phrase *menschlichen Geistes*<sup>4</sup>. Humboldt thought that there is a special

<sup>3</sup> There are different English translations of the title of this book: ‘*On language: the diversity of human language-structure and its influence on the mental development of mankind*’, trans. by Peter Heath, introduction by Hans Aarsleff, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988. ‘*On language: on the diversity of human language construction and its influence on the mental development of the human species*’, ed. Michael Losonsky, trans. by Peter Heath, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999b.

<sup>4</sup> „Der Zweck dieser Einleitung, die Sprachen, in der Verschiedenartigkeit ihres Baues, als die notwendige

mental power 'Geisteskraft', and this power is responsible for language and cultural diversity (Aarsleff 1999b, xi). This word *Geist* has a wide field of meanings, depending on the context, we can translate it as spirit, mind, intellect, psyche. Thus, language affects all parts of human life as a human, and a perfect language affects the spirit in all directions: „allseitig und harmonisch durch sich selbst auf den Geist einwirken“ (Gesammelte Werke, Bd. Iv, 311). Further in my work I will use this word *Geist* without translation when it is necessary to define in one word the sphere of the spiritual and intellectual life of a human. Also, Humboldt said about language, that it is the *organ* which forms a thought. „Die Sprache ist das bildende Organ des Gedankens“ (Gesammelte Werke, Bd., vi, s. 51). He claimed that the structure of every language reflects the mental characteristics of the nation that generated it (Turner 2014, 135). The form of language correlates with the national character of people speaking this language. Language is a kind of mirror into a culture, socio-cultural features of a nation, into the way of thinking of people using a certain language. Within language speakers agree with each other on the meanings of the words and structures of sentences. Language is like a reflection in the mirror, it reveals the history of nations; comparing the evolution of languages shows the corresponding progress of civilisations using those languages. Also, in turn, language is an action or a kind of human labor.

(...) it is produced by states that are internal to the mind, for example feelings, desires, beliefs, thoughts, and decisions. These internal mental states are active powers or forces that bring about the external phenomena of culture, including human language. (Aarsleff 1999b, xi)

Humboldt in his *Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues* most clearly stated the hypothesis of J. G. Herder, that language and thought are inseparable, each conditions the

Grundlage der Fortbildung des menschlichen Geistes darzustellen, und den Wechsel seitigen Einfluss des Einen auf das Andre zu erörtern, hat mich genötigt, in die Natur der Sprache überhaupt einzugehen.“ (Humboldt, *The Philosophical Grammar of American Languages*, 1855, vi, S. 106)

other, every nation has a specific spirit expressed in its language (ibid., 136). Language is inextricably connected with human intellect. There is a kind of symbolic relationship between language and intellect, 'whereby without language there would be no intellect and without intellect there would be no language' (Trauth 1989, 411). Humboldt wrote in the chapter on 'inner form' in *Verschiedenheit des menschlichen Sprachbaues* (ibid., 104-114) about the laws that direct mental activity of a human and govern and systematize both intellect and language. The major part of systematization is categorization. Humboldt did not write in detail about categorization unlike Kant for whom this topic was one of the central in his system of philosophy. I will write about the role of language in Kant's transcendental schematism further.

One of the main Humboldt's hypotheses was that due to the relationship and connection between language and intellect people do think differently using different languages. This hypothesis has been revived by some cognitive scientists nowadays (Deutscher 2010, Boroditsky 2010). He wrote about the special laws, and in language the human intellect operates according to these laws, speech itself is a product of rational instinct which nature is the human reason (Humboldt, see: Werke, Vol. II: 240, Vol. III, 253). And speech plays a central role in a sign-producing process, it matches the segmentations of thought with articulations of sound. Language is a product of the intellectual instinct of man (Adler 1866, 15).

Either, Humboldt's studies of language anticipated modern communication studies-communication theory of society or theory of communicative action (McLuskie 2003). Wittgenstein in his middle Cambridge period in the *Brown Book* spoke of different language games as 'systems of communication' (*Systeme menschlicher Verständigung*).

For Humboldt language was not an isolated object, it was connected with an intellect (and in some way conditioned the way of thinking), it conditioned and opened up historico-socio-cultural world of a nation for others and for people of this nation. Later Heidegger continued

this work painstakingly analyzing the hidden meanings of words hidden in the roots and prefixes, since the language matures in itself the ancient history of a nation. Language is an activity itself; it is not just a system of mental objects. First of all, language for Humboldt was an object of scientific study, but he believed that there is always still part of language that escapes scientific understanding. Our attempts to explain socio-cultural and linguistic phenomena from time to time run into knots that resist further resolutions. These knots are mental powers, which ‘can neither be wholly penetrated in (their) nature, nor calculated beforehand in (their effects)’ (Humboldt 1988, 23). Science cannot fully understand language, because what the science understands is a finished product, it is ‘abstraction’ or ‘dead contraption’ (Humboldt 1988, 49-50). Language, instead, is not static, finished, it is not a product (*ergon*) but an activity (*energeia*) (ibid.). It is a living production because it is a product of human intellect. Also, language cannot be understood fully scientifically because of the part of freedom. Language is an involuntary activity but it is also the creative activity, inasmuch as human mental power to speak is free (Humboldt 1999b, xii), but nor absolutely, it is not free of all compulsion. As it was written above, according to Humboldt language and human intellect obey special laws. And the latter allows us to study language by scientific methods. This intellectual power, that generates language consists of ‘special laws of procedure or directions or endeavors’ (Humboldt 1988, 90). Humboldt calls these laws ‘the form of language’ (Humboldt 1999b, xiii; 1988, 50). For Humboldt the form of language consists of two main parts: *the external (sound) form* and *internal (intellectual) form*. These two parts constitute the individual form of language (Humboldt 1999b, xiii). The first sound form is the ‘truly constitutive and guiding principle of the diversity of languages’ (ibid.). The internal part, also, consists of two parts: *the inner conceptual form* and the *inner linguistic form*. Human mind (or here intellect) is a system ruled by special laws, concerning the inner conceptual form these are ‘the laws of intuiting, thinking and feeling as such’, ‘they are the universal *forms of intuition* and the logical ordering of concepts’

(Humboldt 1988, 81; see 84). Unfortunately, Humboldt did not provide the system of these laws. Nevertheless, he provided diverse examples of these laws concerning different aspects: predication, conjunction, modality, spatio-temporal relations. The second part – inner linguistic form consists of laws that help to express the mind’s concepts and its inner conceptual form in language. These laws are common for all human beings. Although the inner conceptual and linguistic forms are universal, languages are diverse. It is possible due to ‘the unpredictable, immediately creative advance of human mental power’ (Humboldt 1836, 33). Language for Humboldt, to the greater extent, is a work of art (Aarsleff 1999b, xiv). On the one side, language is governed by rules (laws), on the other side, it ‘cannot be measured by the understanding’, and this ‘free’, ‘creative’ dimension of language is ‘the deepest and inexplicable part’ of it (see: Humboldt 1836, 108,119; 1988, 81, 89).

Humboldt broke with logocentrism dominated earlier, which was in Habermas’ words ‘the *ontological* privileging of the words of entities, the *epistemological* privileging of contact with objects or existing state of affairs, and the *semantic* privileging of assertoric sentences and propositional truth’ (Habermas 1998c, 408, italics in the original). Humboldt was one of the first philosophers who considered language in an inextricable connection with the human lifeworld. “And that unites Humboldt with late Wittgenstein and Austin” (ibid.) He provided a challenge to the Cartesian view on language (see: Chomsky 2009; Aarsleff 1982). Habermas (1998, 40) claimed that Humboldt’s analysis of language allows us to say that ‘Language, world view and form of life are interwoven.’ In Humboldt’s words: ‘language is indispensable for the development of their mental powers and the attainment of the world-view’ (Humboldt 1999, xi). It is better to say that a language is a product of individual life-worlds that in total compound it.

Returning to the main topic of my article, it is important to note that for Humboldt language determines how humans think. Along with the idea of the diversity of languages, the idea of



language determination of human thought underlies modern linguistic relativism. Contemporary linguistic relativism has been typically associated by researchers with works of linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf (their hypothesis of linguistic relativity), and with later Ludwig Wittgenstein (Sayers 1987; Haller 1995; Williams 2007; Coliva 2010a, b; Heckel 2010). Returning to Humboldt's ideas on the relation between language and thought, we can notice that the idea of linguistic relativity and the determination of thought on language is traced to his writings. Humboldt wrote that language is a necessary condition of human thinking, it is the 'formative organ of thought' (Humboldt 1988, 54, 56). One of the main points of this dependence is a sound. Humboldt explains that without sound human process of thinking cannot achieve clarity. Without sound the representation (*Vorstellung*) will not become a concept (*Begriff*). These mind's representations are products of inner mental activity. The sound of language helps to take these representations from the mind (from the subjective) and transform it into an object (real objectivity). So, with sounds thoughts as products of inner mental life become objective. It is a way to transform inner into outer, subjective becomes objective. Not all mental activity necessarily implies articulation and reproduction in the form of sounds, Humboldt allows the existence of the process of thinking without the participation of language. But the formation of concepts – 'true thinking' is impossible without language and objectivation of the internal mind's representations by sounds. Cognitive thinking (involving judgment) fully depends on speech. One of the most important functions of language is designating objects. While perceiving objects without language 'there can be no object for the mind' (Humboldt 1988: 59). Language designates objects and makes concepts. Without notion of concepts our perceptions and objects of our perceptions are unknown. For example, we perceive an object, in language we designate it as a cat. Imagine, we do not have language, what would we see? It is very difficult to imagine something and not to use any concepts at all. We are so involved in language, got used to use concepts automatically. Describing a cat, we will

use: cat, four, legs, two, eyes, ears, one, nose, small, animal, black, stripes, even an object or something, etc., all these words are concepts. It is a rather deep idea. Objects we experience are possible for our cognition and mind only by language. Only language makes concepts for the mind. As well, humans categorize and classify the concepts in a thought. Languages are both ruled by common laws and are diverse in their structure, and they are necessary for human cognition. So, in every language resides a characteristic world-view (*Weltansicht*<sup>5</sup>). Each language creates its special world-view. Each nation speaking one language has a common world-view, that distinguishes it from the world-views of our nations speaking their own languages. 'Languages are bound and dependent on the nations to which they belong' (Humboldt 1988, 24). Humboldt believed that to learn a new language is 'to acquire a new stand point' (Humboldt 199, xvii), it expands the horizons of knowledge and world understanding. The new world-view is superimposed on the previous world-view learned from childhood.

It should be noted that among Humboldt's ideas on language there are two that Wittgenstein singled out in his later works. Language constitutes a world-view or a picture of the world. And the second one is that it is impossible to understand the world of a non-human, because non-humans do not have language that is governed by human's mind, they do have other kind of mind (or do not have it at all, only simple organs of perception), and so they have other form of life and the following picture of the world. In *PI* §327 (2009) Wittgenstein wrote: 'If a lion could talk, we wouldn't be able to understand it.'

#### *Wittgensteinian linguistic turn*

The role of language in the constitution of reality in late Wittgenstein's philosophy is not well

<sup>5</sup> Humboldt used the word '*Weltansicht*', not '*Weltanschauung*'. Both of them are translated into English as '*worldview*'. They are similar, but there is a fine distinction in senses. In the first term the second part of the word is '*Ansicht*' – a point of view or view. In the second word the second part is '*Anschauung*', it is a basic opinion but not just a point of view. Collins dictionary gives a definition that '*Weltansicht*' is a '*view of the world*' and '*Weltanschauung*' is a '*philosophy of life*' or '*ideology*'.

disassembled and analyzed in the works of researches of Wittgenstein's philosophy. There are numbers of outstanding works of separate Wittgenstenian concepts: language games, forms of life, belief, family resemblance and the others, there are numbers of comparative analyses of Wittgenstein's ideas and thoughts with concepts and ideas of other philosophers. But there is, yet, no full analysis of Wittgenstein's representation of the process of constitution of reality and the role of ordinary language in it.

The origin of *linguistic turn* in the 20th century is associated with Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Glock, Kalhat 2018), where Wittgenstein argued that philosophical problems arise from the misleading of language (misleading of its logic). However, Michael Dummett (1991) considered it to be dated to Gottlob Frege's idea that words have meaning only in the context of proposition, expressed in Frege's *Foundations of Arithmetic (Grundlagen der Arithmetik, 1884)* as a *context principle*.

In the enquiry that follows, I have kept to three fundamental principles:

always to separate sharply the psychological from the logical, the subjective from the objective;

never to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation, but only in the context of a proposition;

never to lose sight of the distinction between concept and object. (Frege 1960, xxii)

Wittgenstein repeats Frege's context principle in *Tractatus* 3.3 and 3.314.

3.3 Only the proposition has sense; only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning.

3.314 An expression has meaning only in a proposition. Every variable can be conceived as a propositional variable. (Including the variable name.)

Frege's approach to the logic of propositions and their relations to facts was continued by Bertrand Russell in essay *On Denoting* (1905) and later developed in his concept of *logical atomism*.

The term *linguistic turn* was popularized by Richard Rorty in his anthology *The Linguistic Turn* (1967). According to Rorty (1991) this term was introduced by Gustav Bergmann in 1960<sup>6</sup> and was described as 'the most recent philosophical revolution,' (Bergmann 1964, 177) as it was proclaimed by A. J. Ayer et al. in the book of the same name, it is a *new way of seeing*. However, Rorty (1967, 8f) related to linguistic philosophers (and the participants of this revolution in philosophy) not only Wittgenstein, but a large group of thinkers: the members of Vienna Circle, Wittgenstein and his followers, Oxford philosophers, and some American linguistic philosophers, including Quine. These thinkers advocated two different approaches to solve philosophical problems. One group – 'ideal language philosophers' proposed to reform language, the other group – "ordinary language philosophers" proposed to understand more about the ordinary language that we actually use (Hacker 2005, 10).

It should be noticed that Bergmann was himself a member of the Vienna Circle and regularly attended its meetings in the late 1920s and in the 1930s (Hacker 2013). It is difficult not to agree with Ernst Gellner, despite his negative intent, that it was one of the crucial turns in philosophy, and the most significant in the last 100 years.

It has often been said that man in the past saw nature and God, in his own image. It now also appears that he saw things in the image of his own language. So, the overcoming of logomorphism supplements the overcoming of anthropomorphism. (Gellner 1959, 27)

I agree with Bergmann, that Wittgenstein was the originator of the *linguistic turn*<sup>7</sup> and its most influential and interesting spokesman. Hacker (2005, 11), analyzing the origin of the *linguistic turn*, suggested that it was taken when the following statements were proposed:

<sup>6</sup> In Bergmann's critical review of P. F. Strawson's book '*Individuals*' (1959). Bergmann, G. (1960). Strawson's Ontology. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 57(19), pp. 601–622.

<sup>7</sup> Subsequently W. V. O. Quine and Saul Kripke continued the mainstream analytical line of this linguistic turn.

- That the goal of philosophy is (a) the understanding of the structure and articulations of our conceptual scheme, and (b) the resolution of the problems of philosophy (to be specified by paradigmatic examples), which stem, *inter alia*, from unclarities about the uses of words, from covert misuses, and from misleading surface grammatical analogies in natural languages.
- That a primary method of philosophy is the examination of the uses of words in order to disentangle conceptual confusions.
- That philosophy is not a contribution to human knowledge about reality, either superior to or on the same level as scientific knowledge, but a contribution to a distinctive form of understanding.

Hacker, also, agreed with Bergman, that the linguistic turn had been originated by Wittgenstein since *Tractatus*. On the other side, Dummett (1978, 458) and Williamson (2005, 107) attributed the linguistic turn to Frege and his works.

Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of *thought*; secondly that the study of *thought* is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological process of *thinking*; and, finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought consists in the analysis of *language*. (...) the acceptance of these three tenets is common to the entire analytic school. (Dummett 1978, 458; italics in the original)

Hacker argued that Dummett's articulation was mistaken. Frege did not express such views, he did not have special views on the philosophy of mind, psychology, ethics. Moreover, Frege did not support the position that the only proper way of analyzing the thought (*Gedanke*) is by analyzing natural language (Hacker 2005, 12). In his letter to Husserl, Frege claimed:

It cannot be the task of logic to investigate language and determine what is contained in a linguistic expression. Someone who wants to

learn logic from language is like an adult who wants to learn how to think from a child. (Frege 1980(1906), 67f)

According to Frege there was a proper method to analyze thought by means of the function-theoretic concept-script that he invented (Hacker 2005, 12).

The linguistic turn increased focus on logic and philosophy of language, Wittgenstein changed our *way of seeing* of many aspects of our knowledge and ordinary life. Despite the modest phrases from the notes of 1931 (Wittgenstein CV 1980, 19<sup>e</sup>): 'I don't believe I have ever *invented* a line of thinking. I have always taken one over from someone else. (...) What I invent are new *similes*' (italics in the original). Wittgenstein tried to change the style of thinking of his pupils. Unfortunately, as von Wright (1955, 542) noted, that Wittgenstein's enormous influence as a teacher was 'harmful to the development of independent minds in his disciples', and 'there grew up much unsound sectarianism among his pupils', which 'caused Wittgenstein much pain'. 'Because of the depth and originality of his thinking, it is very difficult to incorporate them into one's own thinking' (ibid.). However, in the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein hoped 'to bring light into one brain or another' (2009 (1953), 4<sup>e</sup>).

In the collection of notes from his lectures written down by his students entitled *Lectures and Conversations* we can find the following call:

40. How much we are doing is changing the style of thinking and how much I'm doing is changing the style of and how much I'm doing is persuading people to change their style of thinking.

41. (Much of what we are doing is a question of changing the style of thinking.) (1967, 28)

In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein called us 'Back to the rough ground!' (PI 2009, 51<sup>e</sup>-§107). Wittgenstein wrote:

There is nothing absurd in the thought that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end of humanity, and that

humanity, trying to make its way into the future, relying on scientific rationality, is trapped. (Wittgenstein CV 1980, 63)

In my research I make an attempt to analyze and describe this change in the ‘way of seeing’, offered by Wittgenstein in concern with the concept of constitution, how a human constitutes the world around with the help of language. What is the relationship between language and reality, in accordance with Wittgenstein’s late ideas? Also, I should define what was the previous *way of seeing* which Wittgenstein has changed and what was his change itself. And was Wittgenstein’s philosophy metaphysical?

The concept of perspicuous representation is of fundamental significance for us. It earmarks the form of account we give, the way we look at things. (Wittgenstein PI 2009, §122) (Is it similar to *Weltanschauung*?)

This interesting passage and, especially the end of it ‘*the way we look at things*’ resembles Husserl’s ‘*attitudes of consciousness*’ and *Weltanschauung*. Also, Wittgenstein used a concept *Weltanschauung* describing our (human) form of representation, the way how we look at things in the manuscript TS 213 in a part entitled *Methode der Philosophie: die übersichtliche Darstellung der grammatischen Tatsachen. Das Ziel: Durchsichtigkeit der Argumente. Gerechtigkeit. (The Method of Philosophy: the Clearly Surveyable Representation of Grammatical Facts. The Goal: the Transparency of Arguments. Justice)*

The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It designates our form of representation, the way we look at things. (A kind of “*Weltanschauung*”, as is apparently typical of our time. Spengler.) (Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript 2005, 307e)

Methode der Philosophie: die übersichtliche Darstellung der grammatischen<sup>1</sup> Tatsachen. Das Ziel: Durchsichtigkeit der Argumente. Gerechtigkeit.

He used this term once earlier in 1916, criticising the modern illusion that the laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena. ‘At bottom the whole *Weltanschauung* of the moderns involves the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena’ (Wittgenstein *Notebooks 1914-1916*, 1961, 72<sup>e</sup>).

Wittgenstein used a metaphor of a picture, saying about changing a way of seeing of a reader.

But was I trying to draw someone’s attention to the fact that he is able to imagine that? — I wanted to put that picture before him, and his acceptance of the picture consists in his now being inclined to regard a given case differently: that is, to compare it with this sequence of pictures. I have changed his way of looking at things. (Indian mathematicians: “Look at this!” (Wittgenstein PI 2009, §144)

## II. CONCLUSION

Linguistic approach to reality – the notion that language *constitutes* reality, that the words function not just labels added to concepts, an attempt to eliminate externalism and Cartesian dualism was later subsequently developed in the works of structuralists and poststructuralists<sup>8</sup> combining ideas of later Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ferdinand de Saussure, Friedrich Nietzsche and others. Returning to Bergmann, who was mentioned above as the inventor of the term *linguistic turn*, according to his words, is a ‘*fundamental gambit as to method*’ agreed upon by two different groups of linguistic philosophers: ‘*ordinary language philosophers*’ (exemplified, in Bergmann’s view, by Strawson) and ‘*ideal language philosophers*’ (such as Bergmann himself) (Hacker 2013).

The history of the *linguistic turn* (not only in the meaning of analytical tradition), could be traced long ago in the history of philosophy. I argue that the crucial *linguistic turn* was made by German philosophers in the 18th century just after the Kantian ‘Copernican revolution’, the main figure

<sup>8</sup> The most influential representatives of this movements are: Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Luce Irigaray, Julia Kristeva, Gilles Deleuze, Judith Butler.



here was Wilhelm von Humboldt. However, the prerequisites for this turn were laid much earlier by a large number of thinkers of the past of the European philosophical tradition, starting with the ancient Greeks.

In this article I have shown the similarities of Humboldtian ideas on language and reality (connection of language and thinking, it is an activity, a product of a community of people, systems of communication, that language constitutes a world-view or a picture of the world, and that it is impossible to understand the world of a non-human since our languages and minds are different) with the such of late Wittgenstein's.

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