Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Cambridge Period

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ABSTRACT: This article analyses in detail Wittgenstein’s ‘Cambridge period’ from his return to Cambridge in 1929 until his decease in 1951. Within the ‘Cambridge period’, scholars usually distinguish the ‘middle’ (1929–1936) and the ‘late’ (1936–1951) periods. The trigger point of Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and philosophy was his visit to Brouwer’s lecture on ‘Mathematics, Science, and Language’ in Vienna in March 1928. Dutch mathematician Brouwer influenced not only Wittgenstein’s ability to do philosophy again but also the development of some of his ideas. Namely, for Brouwer, language was a natural development of the social history of human beings. With the help of his friends, F. P. Ramsey, J. M. Keynes, G. E. Moore, and B. Russell, in 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge. The author argues that this was the crucial turning point in his philosophy that led to the revision of some of his ideas. Wittgenstein returned from self-isolation in remote villages of Lower Austria to the intellectual academic environment, where he could discuss his ideas with intellectual interlocutors and receive their valuable remarks and comments. This article is organised in chronological order: it describes the very ‘early’ middle period of 1929–1935 involving the development of Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenology’ and the origin of the ‘language-games’ concept in the Blue and Brown Books; 1935–1936 period of ‘romantic’ enthusiasm for Soviet Russia and a trip there; Wittgenstein’s life and work during the WWII-time; resign from teaching in Cambridge in 1947 to finally finish his Philosophical Investigations. The author suggests that the ‘romantic areal’ about the USSR was formed by Wittgenstein’s predilection for Russian poetry and literature of the nineteenth century, i.e., Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Pushkin. Analysing the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas on language in his Cambridge period, the author mentions the influence of N. Bakhtin and P. Sraffa. Also, the author touches upon the topic of the possibility of Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein’s life and thought.

KEY WORDS: Cambridge period, philosophy, philosophy of language, Wittgenstein.
Introduction

Wittgenstein’s corpus after *Tractatus* (1929–1951) is usually called the ‘late period’. All this time he was, one way or another, connected with Cambridge. The early Cambridge period in Wittgenstein’s philosophy (or the so-called ‘middle’ period)¹ is a time from Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge in 1929, publication of the *Some Remarks on Logical Form* (1929) (see Klagge, Nordmann 1993: 28, 36), where he was still talking about the atomic prepositions, reading ‘A Lecture on Ethics’ [1929] (Klagge, Nordmann 1993; Lee 1980; McGuinness 1979; Drury 1981; Monk 1991; Stern 2018; von Wright 1990), to about 1936, when he began a first draft of the early version of *Philosophical Investigations*. The years 1929–1935 are considered ‘true’ (Creegan 1989: 11) Cambridge period. In the following years, Wittgenstein sometimes left Cambridge for short periods, e.g., in 1935–36 and 1943–44, for vacations in Norway in his hut, where he was working hard on his manuscripts away from the routine of teaching and the hustle and bustle of university life. In 1949, he finally resigned his professorship, and deceased in Cambridge in his doctor’s house on 29 April 1951.

In recent years (Stern, Citron, Rodgers 2013: 162), the development of Wittgenstein’s philosophy during the first half of the 1930s has attracted increasing attention. One group of interpreters, including G. Baker, P. Hacker (see Baker and Hacker 1980, 1980a, 1985; Hacker 1990, 1996, 2012) and H. Glock (1996), assert that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy emerged in the early 1930s, relying on collaborated works with Waismann from 1932–34. Others have argued that Wittgenstein’s thought transformed during 1930–34. According to this reading, the transitional period in the early 1930s was difficult for Wittgenstein, and his new position became clearer only from about 1935 and later. The representatives of this reading are D. Stern (1991, 2004, ch. 5.2, 2005), J. Schulte (2002, 2011), A. Pichler (2004), and M. Engelmann (2011, 2013). Hacker (2000) insists that the radical changes in Wittgenstein’s philosophical thought occurred during the 1930s. Von Wright (1955: 538) assumed about Wittgenstein’s writings of 1929–1933:

Wittgenstein’s writings of this period are, therefore, of considerable interest to the historian of philosophic ideas. Their intrinsic value is certainly less than that of the *Tractatus* or the *Investigations*. This is natural, considering that they

represent a transitional stage in Wittgenstein’s development. He was, at this
time, fighting his way out of *Tractatus*.

Despite the inciting attention, Wittgenstein’s philosophical ideas from
the early beginning of the ‘middle’ period (1929-33) have not been
analysed in such detail as both periods of *Tractatus* and *Philosophical
‘in about 1933 a radical change took place in Wittgenstein’s thinking’.
By that time, Wittgenstein came up with the ideas which he continued
to develop and clarify for the rest of his life. In 1948, Wittgenstein (in
Drury 1984: 158) said: ‘My fundamental ideas came to me very early in
life’. The main feature of the ‘middle’ period was the abandoning both
the picture theory of language and the doctrine of the unspeakable. Since
the unpublished material has become available for readers, it has become
apparent that the transition from *Tractatus* to *Philosophical
Investigations* was somewhat complicated, in Stern’s words (2018: 2), ‘with many turn-
ing points and branching paths along the way’ (see Kienzler 2001). In a
letter to Wisdom (28 March 1947), commenting on the future article
on his philosophy for the Chambers Encyclopedia, Wittgenstein says:

> To say what sort of work I did after 1929, and not just that I was ‘impressed
by’ something or that my work led to something, is essential; and without it it
would, in my opinion, be wrong, because misleading, to print this article. Also
the remark that my researches are the subject of my lectures is essential. With-
out these statements I would consider the article unfair to me, and I hope and
believe that in your heart you’d like to be fair to me. (McGuinness 2008: 408)

The conjunction of Wittgenstein’s interests in the philosophy of psychol-
ogy and philosophy of mathematics (McGuiness 2008: 410) is interesting
because, in 1930, we may say, in Wittgenstein’s thought happened a turn
from abstract to concrete, from ‘a metaphysical subject that does not
belong to the world’ (Wittgenstein 1922: 74, 5.632) to a living human
being, to the personal experience, phenomenological problems, feelings,
perceptions, beliefs, language games, forms of life, ways of life, picture
of the world, in general, to the *lifeworld*.

### 1. Reasons to Return to Cambridge

What were the reasons and the trigger for changing his mind on philo-
sophical problems written in *Tractatus*? Why did Wittgenstein decide
to continue working on philosophy and its problems and to return to
academic life? Among researchers of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it is
considered that several important events prompted his return to Cam-
bridge in 1929: Ramsey’s visits to Wittgenstein in 1923 and 1924 at Puchberg; Ramsey’s and Wittgenstein’s meeting with the Keyneses in 1925; Keynes’s offer to return to Cambridge in 1925 (and correspondence between Ramsey and Keynes on how to make Wittgenstein return); Brouwer’s lecture on the foundations of mathematics in March 1928; and meetings and discussions with Schlick in 1927–28 (von Wright 1955: 536).

Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer (27 February 1881 – 2 December 1966) was a Dutch mathematician and philosopher. He was regarded as one of the greatest mathematicians of the 20th century. Brouwer founded intuitionism in mathematics and considered that mathematics was the creation of the mind, not the description of laws of nature or eternal truth. Brouwer delivered two lectures in Vienna in March 1928: ‘Mathematik, Wissenschaft und Sprache’ (‘Mathematics, Science, and Language’) on 10 March (Brouwer 1929A) and ‘Die Struktur des Kontinuums’ (‘The Structure of Continuum’) on 14 March (Brouwer 1930A). Wittgenstein attended only the first one. Herbert Feigl reported that it ‘spurred him into coming back to philosophy’ (Marion 2008: 96). According to Feigl (1981: 64):

When the Dutch mathematician Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer was scheduled to lecture on intuitionism in mathematics in Vienna, Waismann and I managed to coax Wittgenstein, after much resistance, to join us in attending the lecture. When, afterwards, Wittgenstein went to a café with us, a great event took place. Suddenly and very volubly Wittgenstein began talking philosophy – at great length. Perhaps this was the turning point, for ever since that time, 1929, when he moved to Cambridge University Wittgenstein was a philosopher again, and began to exert a tremendous influence.

Later, in a letter to George Pitcher, Feigl wrote that the evening ‘marked the return of Wittgenstein to strong philosophical interests and activities’ as he immediately ‘began sketching ideas that were the beginnings of his later writings’ (Pitcher 1964: 8n). Marion (2003) argued that Brouwer played a pivotal role in the transition from the early thoughts of Wittgenstein to the later ones. It should be noted that Frank Ramsey was also influenced by Brouwer’s intuitionism in mathematics (Marion

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2 Frank Ramsey was one of the most intimate friends who played a significant role in Wittgenstein’s life. He was the person who translated Tractatus, who visited Wittgenstein in Austria in 1925, and even had conversations with his family members in Vienna; he asked Keynes to facilitate Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge. Moreover, Ramsey was a prominent mathematician and intellectual interlocutor to Wittgenstein. McGuinness (2006: 25) claimed that ‘Wittgenstein clearly learned a lot from Ramsey and came back to philosophy with a knowledge of the thought of Weyl, Brouwer and Hilbert that he would not have had otherwise’.
According to Ramsey, Wittgenstein had already formed semi-intuitionist ideas that resembled Brouwer’s (McGuinness 2008: 185). Von Wright (1955: 537) wrote about this event:

Wittgenstein said that he returned to philosophy because he felt that he could again do creative work. An external circumstance of this important step may have been that in March of 1928, he had heard Brouwer lecture in Vienna on the foundations of mathematics. (It is rumoured to have been this which stirred him to take up philosophy again.)

Wittgenstein did not share Brouwer’s fundamental ideas. However, there were some similarities and possible influences of Brouwer’s concepts on later Wittgenstein, i.e., Brouwer’s understanding of language and some ideas on the philosophy of mathematics. In a 1939 lecture on the foundations of mathematics, Wittgenstein said: ‘Intuitionism is all bosh – entirely’ (Wittgenstein 1975: 237). Russell, in a letter to the Council of Trinity College (5 August 1930), remarked that what Wittgenstein ‘says about infinity tends, obviously against his will, to have a certain resemblance to what has been said by Brouwer’ (Russell in McGuinness 2008: 184). Goodstein wrote: ‘Wittgenstein was certainly influenced by the two discussions he had with G. Frege and L. E. J. Brouwer. He strongly disagreed with both of these on many points, but they certainly stimulated him’ (Gibson, O’Mahony 2020: 23). For instance, Brouwer’s approach to the principle of the excluded middle had been assumed by Russell and Whitehead in their Principia Mathematica, the book much criticised by Wittgenstein.

In the 1928 Vienna lecture on mathematics, science and language, attended by Wittgenstein, Brouwer introduced the notion of a *Pendelzahl* – a pendulum number or a ‘binary oscillatory shrinking number’. He argued that ‘we are not entitled to assert that such a number is either identical with or distinct from zero’ (Brouwer 1996[1928]: 1183). Wittgenstein thought much about this problem and the relation of *Pendelzahl* to the law of excluded middle. In the Philosophical Remarks (1929–31), he wrote his conclusion:

Brouwer is right when he says that the properties of his *Pendelzahl* are incompatible with the law of the excluded middle. But, saying this doesn’t reveal a peculiarity of propositions about infinite aggregates. Rather, it is based on the fact that logic presupposes that it cannot be *a priori* – i.e., logically – impossible to tell whether a proposition is true or false. For, if the question of the truth or falsity of a proposition is *a priori* undecidable, the consequence is that the proposition loses its sense, and the consequence of this is precisely that the propositions of logic lose their validity for it. (Wittgenstein 1975: 210) I need hardly say that where the law of excluded middle doesn’t apply, no other
law of logic applies either, because in that case we aren't dealing with propositions of mathematics. (Against Weyl and Brouwer.). (Wittgenstein 1975: 176)

Interestingly, Brouwer was much closer to mysticism and philosophical reflections than his colleagues. He was influenced not only by Kant but also by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche (Franchella 2015). Koestier (2005: 584) claimed that ‘Brouwer and Schopenhauer are in many respects two of a kind’. Earlier, Koestier (1998: 272) suggested that ‘Brouwer’s debt to Schopenhauer is fully manifest. For both, Will is prior to Intellect’ (see Brouwer 1932). Young Brouwer was thinking not only about the problems of mathematics and logic but also about morality (Over Moraal, 1904), life, art, and mysticism (Leven, Kunst en Mystiek, 1905). In the last article, he mainly anticipated Heideggerian ideas and Husserlian phenomenology of consciousness.

### 2. 1929–1935 Period

Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge University on 18 January 1929. He wrote to Schlick on 18 February that he decided to stay in Cambridge for a few terms and to work on visual space and other things (den Gesichtsraum und andere Dinge zu bearbeiten) but would be back in Vienna at Easter; also, in this letter, he sent greetings to all the Vienna Circle (to the Round Table) and to Mr Waismann (Waismann 1979: 17).

It was necessary to obtain a PhD degree to continue a research and teaching career in Cambridge. Hence, Russell offered Wittgenstein to use his Tractatus, translated into English by Ramsey and Ogden eight years ago, as a doctoral thesis. Frank Ramsey was formally appointed as his supervisor, and Russell and Moore were his examiners. Wittgenstein passed an oral examination on 6 June, and on 18 June, he was awarded his PhD degree from the University of Cambridge. This procedure was purely formal (Monk 1990: 255, 271; Braithwaite 1970; Klagge, Nordmann 1993). Rush Rhees recalled this examination in Personal Recollections of Wittgenstein: ‘As Wittgenstein came to be examined by Russell and Moore, Russell said smiling: “I have never known anything so absurd in my life”’ (Rhees cited in Nedo 2011: 8).

On 2 February 1929, Wittgenstein began work on a series of 18 manuscript volumes, but he finished his work only in 1940. On 19 June, he received a grant from Trinity College, arranged by Moore, Russell, and Ramsey. This one-off payment allowed him to continue his research work in Cambridge (see Russell cited in Nedo 2001: 9). On 13 July, Wittgenstein gave a lecture in Nottingham to the Joint Session of the
Mind Association and the Aristotelian Society, the annual meeting of British philosophers. He spoke on ‘Generality and Infinity in Mathematics’. The original written contribution, which he had submitted as ‘Some Remarks on Logical Form’, was published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* for 1929.

On 5 December 1930, Wittgenstein was elected a Fellow of Trinity College under Title B. In October 1930, after spending summer holidays in Austria, he started Volume III, in December Volume IV, of MS 107, III *Philosophische Betrachtungen* and accordingly MS 108, IV *Philosophische Bemerkungen*.

On 17 November, Wittgenstein gave a lecture on ‘Ethics’ to the Heretic Society in Cambridge, an association of free thinkers, at the invitation of C. K. Ogden, president of Heretics from 1911 to 1924. In the ‘Lecture on Ethics’ (1929), Wittgenstein did not betray his ideas on ethics expressed in the *Tractatus*. Moreover, he insisted that our language has boundaries and ethics and religion lie outside these boundaries:

> All I wanted to do with them was just to go beyond the world and that is to say beyond significant language. My whole tendency and, I believe, the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk about Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language. This running against the walls of our cage is perfectly, absolutely hopeless. Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. But it is a document of a tendency in the human mind which I cannot help respecting deeply and I would not for my life ridicule it. (Wittgenstein 2014: 51)

A few weeks later, Wittgenstein discussed this topic with the members of the Vienna Circle. The manuscript of the lecture on ethics did not have a title, and it was not written down by Wittgenstein. The first text of this lecture, published in *Philosophical Review* (1965), was a transcript of shorthand notes made by Friedrich Weismann during and after his conversations with Wittgenstein and Moritz Schlick in 1929 and 1930, and then edited with the assistance of Rush Rhees. On 20 January 1930, Wittgenstein gave his first 2–hour seminar, the first one of his Monday afternoon classes. Also, he organised a discussion class on Thursdays on problems of ‘Logic, Language, and Mathematics’. Wittgenstein taught on this schedule for the rest of the academic year 1929/1930 at Clare College. He was a regular attendee of sessions of the Moral Science Club, where his old friend G. E. Moore was a chairman.

In March and April 1930, he worked on the synopsis of a manuscript later known as the Typescript 208. He discussed this text with Bertrand
Russell in March, visiting him, especially for this purpose. Then Wittgenstein prepared a revision of Typescript 208 – TS 209, later known as Philosophische Bemerkungen – and returned the papers to Russell at the end of April. With this work, on Russell’s advice, Wittgenstein applied for a Fellowship at Trinity College in Cambridge, where he was admitted after evaluation of his work. Therefore, during the academic year 1929/1930 and Easter and summer holidays, Wittgenstein produced Typescript 208, its revision Typescript TS 209, which were both published posthumously in 1964 in Oxford under the title Philosophical Remarks, and TS 210, the synopsis of the first part of volume IV. For Wittgenstein’s admission to Trinity College, his work had to be evaluated by Russell and two Cambridge mathematicians, J. E. Littlewood and G. H. Hardy. Russell (1968: 2000), later in his autobiography, reproduced his opinion, which had been presented to the Trinity College committee:

The theories contained in the work of Wittgenstein are novel, very original, and indubitably important. Whether they are true, I do not know … when completed they may easily prove to constitute a whole new philosophy.

Finally, on 5 December 1930, Wittgenstein was elected a Research Fellow for five years by the Council of Trinity College and moved into his old rooms in Whewell’s Court, which he had occupied as a student before the war (see Monk 1990). At the end of the summer of 1930, he began writing MS 109 – the fifth volume of Philosophische Bemerkungen, and in December, MS 110 – the sixth volume of Philosophische Bemerkungen.

Volume VII (MS 111, VII. Bemerkungen zur Philosophie) was started in June 1931, Volume VIII (MS 112, VIII. Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Grammatik) in October, and Volume IX (MS 113, IX. Philosophische Grammatik) in November. During the summer holidays of 1931, Wittgenstein revised his manuscripts and began working on a summary of Volumes V to X. This large typescript, called TS 211, on 771 pages, was finally completed in the summer of 1932. The first twelve pages of the ‘Remarks on Frazer’s Golden Bough’ were also written in this period and came from the typescript TS 211. In the autumn of 1931, spending a holiday in Norway (for the third time in his quiet hut in Skjolden), Wittgenstein began working on MS 116 – Volume VII of Philosophische Bemerkungen. In the academic year 1931/1932, he concentrated on his writings; he taught only on Fridays in the format of discussion classes for interested students.

Wittgenstein continued his close friendship with Moore. They met regularly when Wittgenstein was in Cambridge, and Moore attended
Wittgenstein’s lectures in 1930–1933. He later published his lecture notes in *Mind* as ‘Wittgenstein’s lectures in 1930–33’ (Parts 1 and 2 in *Mind* 63, pp. 1–15 and 289–315; Part 3 in *Mind* 64, pp. 1–27 and 264). Aside from Moore’s, there are lecture notes by Maurice O’Connor Drury and Francis Skinner from this period.

In 1932, Wittgenstein finished TS 211, Part I of Volume X (MS 114 (1)), and revised TS 208 and TS 210. He cut these typescripts (211, 208, and 210) and prepared them for a collection of paper cuttings and collected extracts with additions; this is TS 212. He recommenced his regular teaching for the academic year 1932/1933 and lectured on ‘Language, Logic, and Mathematics’. In the next academic year, 1933/1934, Wittgenstein started dictating his lectures (the typescript TS 307, known further as the *Blue Book*) to his friends and students: A. Ambrose, H. S. M. Coxeter, R. Goodstein, H. Knight, M. Masterman, and F. Skinner. According to their recollections, he usually did not prepare for the lectures of this ‘middle’ period (he began to write detailed preparatory notes for lectures only in 1936). Each lecture was an intensive intellectual work. It did not look like a typical lecture when a professor speaks, and students sometimes raise their hands and ask questions or add comments. These lectures looked much more like living interactive seminars, discussions, and intensive labour of mind on a concrete problem. Wittgenstein, first of all, tried to teach everyone to think of his or her own. For him, real philosophy was possible only in the dialogue, in the interaction between interlocutors involving the immediate exchange of ideas; ‘a philosopher who did not join in discussions was like a boxer who never went into the ring’ (Wittgenstein in Drury 1996: Preface, no pag.).

### 2.1 The Blue and Brown Books

The *Blue Book* is a complex of notes written down by a group of his Cambridge students during the session 1933/1934. During the aca-
ademic year 1934/35, Wittgenstein gave only one course and dictated the so-called *Brown Book*⁴ (TS 308) in English for two hours four days a week to his student Alice Ambrose and his friend and disciple Francis Skinner. Skinner attended Wittgenstein’s lectures in 1931–1935 and was his intimate friend from 1932 to 1940.⁵ These books have extravagant names because of their coloured wrappers, and they were spoken of in that way by Wittgenstein’s students and other readers. The *Blue Book* and *Brown Book* vary not only in content but in form. The *Blue Book* is a set of notes; the *Brown Book* was a draft of something that could be published. The *Blue Book* was intended for duplication, and Wittgenstein distributed a few copies among his students and friends. The *Brown Book*, on the other hand, was not intended for early publication and duplication. There were only three copies of the *Brown Book*, and Wittgenstein did not support illegal replication and distribution against his will. He wished to revise all this material for a separate publication. The manuscript MS 148, Volume C 4, the first draft of the *Brown Book*, contains the beginning of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, originally written in German. The following year (1935), after having finished dictating the *Brown Book*, Wittgenstein began working on Part 2 of Volume XI, MS 115 (II): *Philosophische Untersuchungen: Versuch einer Umarbeitung*, and a German version of the *Brown Book*, *Eine philosophische Betrachtung*. He had revised a German version of the *Brown Book* many times. The last one was in 1936, but he did not finish it; he stopped around the beginning of the discussion of voluntary action and threw this case with an expressive note: ‘Dieser ganze “Versuch einer Umarbeitung” vom Anfang bis hierher ist nichts wert’.⁶ At the same time, he began the first part of *Philosophical Investigations*.

⁴ The *Brown Book*, published in 1958, was prepared for publication by Rush Rhees and was derived from a carbon copy, which was an incomplete draft. However, there exists the other version — Skinner’s manuscript of the *Brown Book*, which is more extensive and looks like a complete work ready for publication (Gibson, O’Mahony 2020: 19). This version contains revisions and remarks in Wittgenstein’s and Skinner’s hands. Also, this version, according to Gibson and O’Mahony (ibid.), ‘totally differs from all other extant versions of the *Brown Book*, including Rhees’s’.


⁶ ‘This whole attempt at a revision, from the start right up to this point, is worthless’ (Wittgenstein 1969: vi).
As said above, the *Blue Book* is a set of notes of lectures and drafts by Wittgenstein for his use, so we cannot find here a rigorous consecutive text with an analysis of language and/or other concepts. This text is important and is of interest to researchers because here, we can trace the development of Wittgenstein's thought and the formation of the main concepts of his last period. The central topic of the *Blue Book* was the analysis of individual language, while the *Brown Book* was devoted to language games. Venturinha (2012: 189) considers 'the fundamental question of the “Blue Book” “What is the meaning of a word?”', which for Wittgenstein should be answered in connection with the question of the ‘explanation of the meaning of a word’ (cf. Wittgenstein (BBB) 1960: 1). Wittgenstein derived a term ‘game’ from mathematics, and later realised that it applies to the actual world and ordinary language (Rodych 2018; Gibson, O’Mahony 2020: 40, 42, 49). In this text, for the first time, we can trace the change in his concept of philosophy as a method of investigation. Moreover, in it, we find different usages of the notion of language games. Wittgenstein was discussing his famous example of teaching a child language by pointing at a word and naming it. This example would be repeated in the full edition of the *Blue* and the *Brown Book* and then in *Philosophical Investigations*. He (2001: 12) wrote: ‘Language games are a clue to the understanding of logic’. This logic differs from that of Russell and Frege. In 1932, he denied the idea that mathematics and logic are one building with logic as the foundation, that mathematics derives from logic; he said that ‘Russell’s calculus is one calculus among the others. It is a bit of mathematics’ (Wittgenstein 2001: 13).

Wittgenstein was not consistent in definitions of his concepts, and in the *Blue* and the *Brown Book* we can see the development of his thought, a living elaboration of ideas. In the *Blue Book*, he introduced the plurality of language games, speaking about imagining different language games and different notations. In the *Brown Book*, he clarified that when we imagine language games, we do not imagine parts of the general system of language. There is no meta-system or meta-language game; all this plurality lies within one dimension. Wittgenstein wrote about different language games as ‘systems of communication’ (*Systeme menschlicher Verständigung*). He continued that he is ‘not regarding the language games which we describe as incomplete parts of a language, but as languages complete in themselves’ (Wittgenstein 1969: 81). The grammatical functions of one language may not be the same in different languages, and ‘agreement or disagreement with reality’ in various lan-
guages might differ. We understand that different languages (depending on their grammatical structure) reveal the phenomena of reality from different sides. Wittgenstein said that people usually do not make the clear distinction between understanding a word and explaining the meaning of a word as if they were correlative. In the Brown Book, he emphasised that learning a language game is more important and prior than the explanation. What we need is not explanation but training (how to use a word or a phrase in different situations). The ability to speak and understand spoken sentences for Wittgenstein does not imply the ability to express and explain the meaning of spoken words. The concept of language games helps to throw light on the relationship between words and the things that they stand for. Later, Wittgenstein developed these ideas in Philosophical Investigations.

2.2 Wittgenstein’s Phenomenology in the mid–1930s

Maurice O’C Drury (1984: 116) wrote in his recollections that professor Schlick ‘was due to read a paper to the Moral Science Club entitled “Phenomenology”’ (in about 1930, in Drury the date was written as ‘1930 (?)’). Wittgenstein replied that he ‘shan’t be there’ and added, ‘You could say of my work that it is “phenomenology”’ (Drury 1984: 116). According to Drury (1984: 220), ‘at the time of this conversation he was writing what is now in Philosophical Remarks’. Gier (1990: 273) pointed out that the debates about Wittgenstein’s relation to phenomenology started before the publication of the Philosophical Remarks in 1964 (where Wittgenstein used the term ‘phenomenology’).

The main feature of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology is that it deals with possibilities and establishes what is possible (grammar of descriptions). This feature allows us to draw a direct parallel with Husserl’s phenomenology. For instance, Wittgenstein emphasised the necessity of the intentional character of language: ‘If you exclude the element of intention from language, its whole function then collapses. What is essential to intention is the picture: the picture of what is intended’ (Wittgenstein 1998: 63, §20–21). Moreover, Wittgenstein wrote on

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7 H. Spiegelberg’s article (1968) was one of the major works on this topic. There were many other works on affinity of later Wittgenstein’s ideas and that of phenomenologists: Spiegelberg (1968), Kuroda (1979), Kienzler (1997), Mulhall (1990, 2001), Gier (1991 – a reply with more arguments on Reeder’s (1989) strong critique), Glendinning (1998), Morris (2007), Plant (2007), Overgaard (2007), Romdenh-Romluc (2017), Kuusela et al. (2018).
phenomenology in the *Big Typescript*, and the whole chapter of this book written in 1933 entitled ‘Phenomenology is Grammar’ is devoted to this topic. We can find Wittgenstein's first discussions of phenomenological language in 1929 texts, MS 105, 108ff, and *Some Remarks of Logical Form* (July 1929). Moreover, Hintikka (1996: 56) argues: ‘The phenomenological philosophy Wittgenstein is talking about in 1929 is the philosophy of the *Tractatus*.’ Hintikka (ibid.) also suggests that *Tractatus* was ‘an exercise in phenomenology’. He explains (ibid.) that the simple objects Wittgenstein discussed are actually ‘the objects of my immediate experience … phenomenological objects’, so, he continues his reasonings, ‘the world according to the early Wittgenstein is the world of phenomenological objects’. While Hintikka (1996) and Monk (2014) believe that Wittgenstein's phenomenology ended in 1929, Kuroda (1979), Gier (1981, 1991), and Spiegelberg (1968) argue that Wittgenstein continued developing phenomenology in his later works. The difference between Hintikka's and Monk's conclusions about Wittgenstein's phenomenology is in how much Wittgenstein was interested in phenomenology. Hintikka advocated the view that Wittgenstein was a phenomenologist between 1913 and 1929. On the other hand, Monk claimed that ‘flirtation with phenomenology lasted for a few months in 1929’ (Vrahimis 2014: 341). Concerning Wittgenstein's phenomenology, I partly agree with Kuroda's suggestions; we can find evidence in Wittgenstein's later texts that he continued to use a kind of phenomenological analysis. In Hintikka's words (1996: xi), ‘he rejected sharply the possibility of an independent phenomenological language. Yet reality remained for him phenomenological’. Wittgenstein said in his Cambridge 1930–1932 lectures:

The world we live in is the world of sense-data; but the world we talk about is a world of physical objects. (Wittgenstein 1982: 82)
Sense-data are the source of our concepts. (Wittgenstein 1982: 81)

Wittgenstein dismissed the idea of phenomenological language because he realised its impossibility. He wrote about the contradiction between phenomenological and physical:

If I describe a language, I am describing something that belongs to physics. But how can a physical language describe the phenomenal? …
The worst philosophical errors always arise when we try to apply our ordinary physical language in the area of the immediately given. …
All our forms of speech are taken from ordinary, physical language and cannot be used in epistemology or phenomenology without casting a distorting light on their objects. (Wittgenstein 1998: 88).
Moreover, the total work of the later Wittgenstein partly reminds us of phenomenological analysis. He tried to get to the essence of individual phenomena through a heap of established linguistic structures analysing phenomenological subjects, ‘what shows itself’, a feeling of pain, religious experience, emotions, and image-thinking. We can find much in common between Wittgenstein’s style of teaching and the work of phenomenologists. For example, Heidegger, in his memories, clearly described Husserl’s teaching and how then it has changed his own Heidegger’s way of thinking.

Husserl’s teaching took the form of a step-by-step training in phenomenological ‘seeing’, which simultaneously demanded that one relinquish the untested use of philosophical knowledge. However, it also demanded that one give up introducing the authority of the great thinkers into the conversation. (Heidegger 2003, 73)

Wittgenstein was also occupied with changing the way of seeing philosophical (and ordinary life) problems. Heidegger added that phenomenology is not a school. It ‘is the possibility of thinking’ (Heidegger 2003: 76). Hintikka (1996: xi) suggested:

In an important but qualified sense, Wittgenstein turns out to be a philosopher of immediate experience and, hence, a phenomenologist of sorts. It even seems that a comparison between Wittgenstein and Husserl as phenomenologists can throw helpful light on both parties.

3. 1933–1935 Period, Leaving Cambridge and Trying New Perspectives

Returning to the chronological line, in the summer of 1933, Wittgenstein was working on TS 213, the so-called Big Typescript. It was an extensive work based on a collection of cuttings TS 212 and TSS 214–218. Wittgenstein had been revising the first part of this Big Typescript (TS 213) until 1934: it was also an extensive work, and the task involved proceedings on the typescript itself, notebooks 156a and 156b, exercise books C 1, C 2 and C 3: MSS 145, 146 and 147, Part II of Volume X and Part I of Volume XI: MS 114 (II), Umarbeitung/Zweite Umarbeitung im großem Format, and MS 115 (I), Philosophische Bemerkungen Volume XI Fortsetzung von Band X, and MS 140, the so-called Große Format. The complete revision of all these texts mentioned above does not exist as a separate manuscript but only as a sort of virtual manuscript in the form of references linking all listed manuscripts; it was published as Part 1 of Die Philosophische Grammatik in Oxford in 1969. Part 2 of
the *Philosophische Grammatik* and its Appendix were derived from the second part of the *Big Typescript*; it was not revised by Wittgenstein. In the summer of 1934, he started MS 157a.

At the end of 1935, Wittgenstein's five-year Research Fellowship at Trinity College would expire. He had to think about what to do next. He did not like Cambridge and teaching; therefore, he would not like to stay there anymore (Monk 1990). Since 1933 (see (Rhees 1984: 42), he had been thinking resolutely of travelling and perhaps moving to the Soviet Union. He admired Tolstoy and Dostoevsky and sympathised with the early Communist regime. He had, to some degree, romanticised representation of freedom in the Soviet Union. Wittgenstein planned a journey to find out whether he could find a suitable post there. He tried to find the right place for himself, as we can see in a note in MS 125: ‘Return him [Man] to his rightful element and everything will unfold and appear as healthy’. I may suggest that his interest in Russian culture appeared after he had read Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. In a letter to Keynes from the summer of 1927, Wittgenstein wrote that he had forgotten to thank Keynes for a short book about Russia that Keynes had sent him about a year and a half ago (in about 1926) (von Wright 1974: 123). This book was *A Short View of Russia* and was published in December 1925 (Hogarth Press).

Wittgenstein had been learning the Russian language since 1933. His teacher was Fania Pascal (Polianovski). She was of Jewish origin, born in the former Russian Empire, and arrived in Cambridge in the 1920s after she completed her PhD in philosophy in Berlin (Salaman 1979). Wittgenstein told Pascal that he would like to read Dostoevsky.

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8 Pascal (cited in Rhees 1984: 43) warns us to refrain from hasty opinions on the topic that Wittgenstein ‘did not care for English ways of life’ based on his ‘harsh words’. She argued that Cambridge, especially Trinity, was the most suitable place for Wittgenstein. It was his free will, his choice to work there. This was the university that ‘unobtrusively gave help and made only the slightest demands on him’. Also, Wittgenstein was a person who needed dialogue to clarify his ideas; he needed to criticise other ideas to develop his own. First, ‘the work of English philosophers could serve as a basis for him to measure his work against, with less rancour attending the process than elsewhere’. Second, we should remember the importance of disciples and intellectual interlocutors for Wittgenstein. Pascal suggested that there were young men – representatives of the British middle class who were ‘of childlike innocence and excellent brain’ – who were the ideal pupils for Wittgenstein. In general, ‘nowhere else would he have met with such tolerance’ to his difficult character. However, this does not contradict his ‘detestation and denunciation of many things English, and his continuing great love and nostalgia for old Vienna’.

9 According to Pascal, this idealisation was shared by many Central European intellectuals of Wittgenstein’s time, for example, Rilke and Barlach: ‘[H]owever unusual and autonomous he was, Wittgenstein still belonged to his time and place’ (Rhees 1984: 44).
in the original. With Fania, Wittgenstein was learning to read and write in Russian. He diligently placed emphasis on every page of Dostoevsky’s *Crime and Punishment* (1866) and was planning a trip to Soviet Russia. Wittgenstein was working and having friendly relations with Fania for almost seven years. She left a memoir (finished in 1973) about Wittgenstein and their work together. As Pascal wrote in her memoir, a young postgraduate student, Francis Skinner, asked her to teach him Russian, and when she agreed, he asked if he could come with a friend. This friend was Ludwig Wittgenstein. Pascal knew Wittgenstein as an eccentric Cambridge lecturer and a member of the Moral Science Club. ‘Together they came to have Russian lessons with me’ (Pascal 1973: 23).

### 3.1 Influence of Nicholas Bakhtin

There was one more interesting person in that Wittgenstein’s period of life – white Russian intelligentsia émigré (since 1920), philologist, philosopher, and writer Nicholas Bakhtin (1894-1950). He moved to England in 1932, where he defended his thesis on Thessaly in the XIII century BC and received a doctorate in philology. Since 1935, he had been working as a lecturer in classics at Southampton University. He was a friend of both Wittgenstein and Skinner; they often visited Bakhtin together (Eagleton 1982, Raïd 2017). They were friends until Bakhtin died in 1950. McGuinness (2008: 259) referred to G. Thomson (Professor of Greek at Birmingham), who said that ‘Wittgenstein always liked to have long talks with Bakhtin and to speak Russian with him’.

In 1943, when Wittgenstein first approached the Syndics of Cambridge University Press intending to publish his *Philosophical Investigations*, he wished to print it together with his new representation of *Tractatus*. He explained later in the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations* that the idea of setting these texts together had come to him during re-reading and discussing *Tractatus* with one friend (Wittgenstein 2009: Preface). Hacker and Schulte, as editors of the Fourth Edition (2009) of *Philosophical Investigations*, in their historical introduction ‘The Text of the *Philosophische Untersuchungen*’, suggested that it was Bakhtin, a friend with whom he was re-reading *Tractatus* (in 1942). McGuinness (2008: 259) claimed:

> It was to Bachtin that Wittgenstein (as mentioned in the Preface to *Philosophical Investigations*) explained the *Tractatus* in 1943 and became aware that his later thought could best be understood by contrast to and against that background.
Wittgenstein chose a new title for the book, *Philosophische Untersuchungen der Logisch-Philosophischen Abhandlung entgegengestellt* (Philosophical Investigations counterposed with the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), and replaced the motto from Hertz’s *Principles of Mechanics* with a new one taken from Johann Nestroy, which binds the two works together. ‘It is in the nature of all progress that it looks much greater than it really is’ (Wittgenstein 2009: a page before Preface, no pag.). Bakhtin was a philologist interested in the philosophical problems of language. Their communication and discussions of philosophical and linguistic problems left their mark on the later Wittgenstein’s ideas. Bakhtin recognized that language is not a fixed structure but a living, growing, and developing system. He noted that language is an integral part of human activity and life in general.

All the diverse areas of human activities involve the use of language. Quite understandably, the nature and forms of this use are just as diverse as are the areas of human activity. This, of course, in no way disaffirms the national unity of language. Language is realized in the form of individual concrete utterances (oral and written) by participants in the various areas of human activity. These utterances reflect the specific conditions and goals of each such area ... through ... thematic content, style and compositional structure ... inseparably linked to the whole of the utterance and are equally determined by the specific nature of the particular sphere of communication. (Bakhtin 1986: 60)

Bakhtin noticed the distinction between the neutral dictionary meaning of a word and its meaning in context or dialogue. These meanings could be different, and the meaning of a word in a context depends on this context.

Neutral dictionary meanings of the words of a language ensure their common features and guarantee that all speakers of a given language will understand one another, but the use of words in live speech communication is always individual and contextual in nature. (Bakhtin 1986: 88)

The idea that the meaning of a word depends on its application was not central to Bakhtin’s study. However, he distinguished different modes of meaning: fixed (dictionary) meaning, meaning in the context, special meaning for other person, and a meaning for me. Such an explanation affects not only the logical and grammatical aspects of the language but also the psychology of the speaker. Bakhtin was interested in the problem of intersubjective understanding and expression of inner experience through language. He asserted that ‘the event of the life, of the text, that is, its true essence, always develops on the boundary between two
consciousnesses, two subjects’ (Bakhtin 1986: 106). Meaning is being constituted on the boundary limit between two subjects.

3.2 Trip to the USSR

Wittgenstein was romantic (O’Mahony 2012: 149) about Russia. On 10 June 1935, he asked J. M. Keynes for an introduction to the Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan M. Maiski (Ostashevsky 2008: 374). Before that, Wittgenstein had sent letters to two Russian universities, the Northern Institute in Leningrad (1924–1991, before and after Saint Petersburg) and the Institute for National Minorities in Moscow. On 6 July, he wrote to Keynes (Wittgenstein cited in von Wright 1974: 132): ‘These Institutes, as I am told, deal with people who want to go to the “colonies”, the newly colonised parts at the periphery of the U.S.S.R.’ G. H. von Wright wrote that in 1935 Wittgenstein had plans for settling in the Soviet Union. He visited the country with a friend and apparently was pleased with the visit. That nothing came of his plans was due, partly at least, to the harshening of conditions in Russia in the middle thirties. (von Wright cited in Moran 1972: 85)

Wittgenstein arrived in Leningrad on 12 September 1935. He met Guryevich, a lecturer at the Northern Institute at Leningrad University. The next day, he arrived in Moscow, where he met Russian scientists and philosophers from Moscow University whose views were close to Mach Marxism and the Vienna Circle. One of them was Sofia Janowskaja, a mathematician who was the editor of Karl Marx’s mathematical writings. She told Wittgenstein that he should read more Hegel (Monk 1990: 375). Wittgenstein did not have any desire. Despite these misunderstandings, he kept in touch with Sofia and helped her by sending insulin when there was a lack of it in the USSR in the late 1930s. They met one more time in the Summer of 1939, when Wittgenstein made his second trip to the USSR, travelling to Moscow from Berlin (Hofsteller 2017: 95). That day, 13 September 1935, in Moscow, Wittgenstein met a correspondent of the British Daily Worker, Pat Sloane, who commented on his meeting with Wittgenstein: ‘He is hardly a suitable person to come to live and work in the USSR. His mind is so narrowly confined (amounting almost to insanity)’ (O’Mahony 2012: 149). Wittgenstein was invited to teach philosophy at Leningrad University by the philosopher Tatiana Nikolayeva Gornstein, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. He made a short trip to Kazakhstan, where he was offered a teaching
position. Finally, on 1 October 1935, he was back to Cambridge. Finally, Wittgenstein gave up on the idea of moving to the USSR. He said to Gilbert Pattison, returning to Great Britain:

One could live there, but only if one kept in mind the whole time that one could never speak one's mind. ... It is as though one were to spend the rest of one's life in an army, any army, and that is a rather difficult thing for people who are educated. (From an interview with Pattison.) (Wittgenstein in Nedo 1989: 69)

It was significant for Wittgenstein that it was impossible to speak one's mind there. Wittgenstein could not imagine his life without freedom of speech.

In the 1930s, Wittgenstein keenly felt the crisis described by Spengler and Weininger, then mentioned by Husserl, Heidegger, Tillich, and many other thinkers. In 1930, in a conversation with his friend Maurice O'C Drury, he explained what had made him distressed one day.

I was walking around in Cambridge and passed and passed a bookshop, and in the window were portraits of Russell, Freud, and Einstein. Further on, in a music shop, I saw portraits of Beethoven, Schubert, and Chopin. Comparing these portraits, I felt intensely the terrible degeneration that had come over the human spirit in the course of only a hundred years. (Monk 1990: 299)

Concerning Spengler, Wittgenstein recommended Drury to read The Decline because this is the book 'that might teach me [Drury] something about the age we were now living in. It might be an antidote for my [Drury's] “incurable romanticism”' (Drury 1984: 113). According to a short note by Waismann (W 142) of Wittgenstein's 1931 remark concerning Schlick's reaching in the USA, Wittgenstein was speaking quite harshly on contemporary culture and situation in the world: ‘What can we give the Americans? Our half-decayed culture? The Americans have as yet no culture. But from us they have nothing to learn...’ (Wittgenstein cited in Rhes 1984: 205). Stern (2001: 254) claimed that ‘Weininger, like Spengler and Kraus, was preoccupied with the decay of modern times, and took an aristocratic view of the rise of science and business and the decline of art and music’. In 1949, to sum up his personal life experience, Wittgenstein (1980: 79e) wrote: 'My thinking about art and values is far more disillusioned than would have been possible for someone 100 years ago. ... It only means that I have examples of degeneration in the forefront of my mind which were not in the forefront of men's minds then'. I dare say, according to many recollections and notes, Wittgenstein was disappointed entirely in the whole civilised world, both Western and
Eastern. The world and spirit of Beethoven, Schubert, and Chopin had disappeared, as well as the world of Pushkin, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy.

### 3.3 Influence of P. Sraffa

One of Wittgenstein’s good friends was Italian economist Piero Sraffa, who fled the Mussolini regime and was the close friend of famous Italian thinker and communist Antonio Gramsci (Davis 2002a, 2002b). Wittgenstein and Sraffa had become friends in 1929. Interestingly, they were both made fellows of Trinity College on the same day (Gibson, O’Mahony 2020: 5; see Smith 2001). Franco Lo Piparo (2010) argued that Sraffa’s influence on Wittgenstein can only be fully accessed if we consider Antonio Gramsci and his influence on Sraffa (Venturinha 2012: 182). Sen (2003: 1241) claimed: ‘It may be important to reexamine Sraffa’s interactions with Wittgenstein ... in the light of Sraffa’s relationship with Antonio Gramsci, the Marxist theorist, who had a strong influence on Sraffa’. Venturinha (2012: 182) suggested: ‘There are many aspects in Gramsci’s thought that are truly reminiscent of issues characteristic of the later Wittgenstein’. Other researchers, for instance, Janik (2006) and Sinha (2006), argued that the influence of Sraffa on Wittgenstein is exaggerated and is a matter of speculation, especially in connection with Gramsci and Marxism. In a letter to Sraffa from 19 January 1934, Wittgenstein confessed to him: ‘[W]e have given each other all that we can give. I have learned an enormous amount from you in the conversations we had during the past 2 or 3 years’; he goes on: ‘until I feel more powerful, I avoid having a conversation with you’ (McGuinness 2008: 223). Once, in the other letter to Sraffa from 15 March 1939, Wittgenstein, insisting on carefully reading a quotation from Spengler, justified himself: ‘I hope this doesn’t sound as though it were meant as an advice from a wiser man to one less wise. (You know what I think of myself)’ (McGuinness 2008: 302). According to their correspondence, Sraffa was one of most important Wittgenstein’s intellectual interlocutors of his later period. The first published collection of Wittgenstein’s Cambridge letters (1995) contained correspondence with his chief friends – B. Russell, R. Moore, G. M. Keynes, and F. Ramsey – and there was only one letter by P. Sraffa. The next enlarged edition of Wittgenstein’s letters and documents 1911–1951 (2008), contains much more correspondence with P. Sraffa. On these letters, McGuinness writes (2008: 2): ‘[They] enable us to form rather more than a speculative idea of the conversations to which Wittgenstein ascribed much of the
For since I began to occupy myself with philosophy again, sixteen years ago, I could not but recognize grave mistakes in what I set out in that first book. I was helped to realise these mistakes to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life. – Even more than to this – always powerful and assured – criticism, I am indebted to that which a teacher of this university, Mr P. Sraffa, for many years unceasingly applied to my thoughts. It is to this stimulus that I owe the most fruitful ideas of this book. (Wittgenstein 2009, Preface)


As mentioned above, Sraffa was a friend and comrade-in-arms of Antonio Gramsci, a famous Italian Marxist philosopher and leader of the Communist Party of Italy, who was imprisoned by Mussolini’s regime (see Sen 2003). Later, Sraffa became a Fellow of Trinity College, as well as Wittgenstein, and took part in Wittgenstein’s conversations. Von Wright (1955: 539) acknowledged: ‘He said that his discussions with Sraffa finally made him feel like a tree from which all branches had been cut. That this tree could become green again was due to its vitality’. Moreover, according to Monk (1990: 249), who referred to Rush Rhees, Sraffa’s criticism did not concern details. He was the person who could force Wittgenstein to revise the whole perspective, to make Wittgenstein see things anew. Sraffa could produce an ‘anthropological’ way of considering philosophical matters (Venturinha 2012: 189; Sen 2003: 1242, 1245–1247 and 1252; Sen 2009: 120–121). If *Tractatus* dealt with isolated language ‘in a vacuum’, Wittgenstein’s later works discuss a ‘living’ language, a ‘stream of speech’ (*Philosophical Investigations* §272), where ‘speaking of language is part of an activity or of a form of life’ (*Philosopi-
Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life? – In use, it lives. Is it there that it has living breath within it? Or is the use its breath? (Wittgenstein 2009: 135e, §432, italics in the original)

Much of all this can be answered by emphasizing that speaking and writing belong to intercourse with other people. The signs get their life there, and that is why the language is not just a mechanism. (Wittgenstein 1998: 38, italics in the original)

Monk (1990: 249) suggested that if this change of perspective was derived from Sraffa, ‘then his influence on the later work is indeed of the most fundamental importance’. Gakis (2015: 926) suggested that the shift from Frege-Russell’s influence of the early period to Ramsey-Sraffa’s influence in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy may be viewed as a shift from a logical point of view on language to the anthropological. Once, Sraffa asked Wittgenstein, ‘What is the grammar of that?’ pointing at a Neapolitan gesture. This question was provocative and crashed Wittgenstein’s previous doctrine of the crystal character of logic (McGuinness 2008: 10). According to McGuinness (2008: 10), ‘Sraffa had shown him that he had to accept as a sign something for which he could not give the rules and grammar’. This helped Wittgenstein to realise the lack of the metaphysical ‘essence’ of language. According to Malcolm (2001: 58, see 3), ‘the question at issue ... was whether every proposition must have a “grammar”, and Sraffa asked Wittgenstein what the “grammar” of that gesture was’. Sen (2003: 1242 and 2009: 120–121), in his critique, tried to de-mystify Sraffa’s famous Neapolitan gesture and its exaggerated influence on Wittgenstein’s thought. According to Venturinha (2012: 190), this problem, the ‘grammar’ of the gesture, ‘is something Wittgenstein will only come to grips with late in his work’. In his Whewell’s Court Lectures, 1938–1941, Wittgenstein (2017: 18) tried to resolve this paradox with an analogy: ‘To refer to a gesture (instead of a state of mind) is like talking of the position of a pointer on a clock, instead of the time’.

In October 1941, Sraffa wrote a series of critical notes on Wittgenstein’s Blue Book. For instance, in a note I21/2, Sraffa argued that when Wittgenstein described the puzzles of language and prescribed the remedy, he acted as a scientist, like Freud, with a scientific attitude. ‘Have you found out whether these puzzles have arisen out of this attitude to language, have you made sure that they did not exist before anyone took that attitude, etc? And also, is it a fact that the disease is cured by your prescription?’ (Sraffa in Venturinha 2012: 184). Sraffa
continued that, even if Wittgenstein is right, and ‘the disease is cured’ by his ‘prescription’, then it is only based on his assertion; Wittgenstein had not given the evidence. Again, Sraffa compared Wittgenstein with Freud, not in favour of Wittgenstein, writing that Freud had produced a mass of actual examples (Sraffa in Venturinha 2012: 184). Sraffa blamed Wittgenstein for the lack of references and quotations from other philosophers’ books and the torn off of his made-up examples from their circumstances. Sraffa also paid attention to the fact that Wittgenstein never neither dealt with theology nor criticised it.

The main topic of his criticism was metaphysics, but according to Sraffa’s remark, both metaphysical and theological puzzles are very similar. ‘But could it be said that theol[ogical] puzzles only arise when people take the calculus’ attitude to language?’ (Sraffa in Venturinha 2012: 184–185; added by editor). Sraffa’s discerning remark is important for the understanding of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I suppose that the sphere of theology and ethics, including Sraffa’s examples of ‘omniscience in god and freewill in man’ (Sraffa in Venturinha 2012: 184), was some kind of ‘sacred’ and ‘untouchable’ for Wittgenstein, and that this is the reason why he did not criticise theology. He criticised religion, especially canonical Christianity and Catholic Church, for being dogmatic (Wittgenstein 1980: 28e). However, Wittgenstein distinguished between faith as a sacred intimate sphere of human life and dogmatic Church apparatus. Young Wittgenstein, in *Tractatus*, realised that the mystical and ethical are spheres beyond logic. These topics could not be said clearly, so they must be left in silence. I suppose that in his later period of philosophy, Wittgenstein followed his own rule to leave these spheres in silence. There are two reasons why Wittgenstein never criticised true faith or religious feeling: (1) the special meaning and special place of the mystical in his own life; (2) this is the sphere that we should keep silent about, it is impossible to be spoken clearly, but it is, it does exist. In *Public and Private Occasions*, we find the following enigmatic passage:

Now I often tell myself in doubtful times, ‘There is no one here.’ and look around. Would this not become something base in me! I think I should tell myself, ‘Don’t be servile in your religion!’ Or try not to be! For that is in the direction of superstition.

A human being lives his ordinary life with the illumination of a light of which he is not aware until it is extinguished. Once it is extinguished, life is suddenly deprived of all value, meaning, or whatever one wants to say. One suddenly becomes aware that mere existence – as one would like to say – is in itself still empty, bleak. It is as if the sheen was wiped away from all things, ‘everything is dead’. (Wittgenstein 2003: 207)
Returning to assumptions of the possibility of Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein, we should realise that, particularly, the circle of Wittgenstein’s Marxist friends was broader. Gakis (2015) claimed that Marxism should be traced as a significant aspect of the context in which Wittgenstein’s later philosophy was developed. Abreu and Neto (2008) tried to read Wittgenstein as a materialist philosopher working in the same philosophical tradition as Marx and trying to develop a possible dialogue between their philosophies.\(^\text{10}\)

In a note dated November 1931, in the eighth volume of *Bemerkungen zur philosophischen Grammatik*, Wittgenstein contrasted his philosophical method with Ramsey, calling the latter a ‘bourgeois thinker’.

Ramsey was a bourgeois thinker. I.e., he thought with the aim of clearing up the affairs of some particular community. He did not reflect on the essence of the state – or at least he did not like doing so – but on how this state might reasonably be organised. The idea that this state might not be the only possible one partly disquieted him and partly bored him. He wanted to get down as quickly as possible to reflect on the foundations – of this state. (Wittgenstein 1998: 24)

Hut (cited in Monk 1991: 343) remembered Wittgenstein once described himself as ‘a communist, at heart’. In a letter to the USSR’s ambassador to Great Britain Maisky, in which Keynes was applying for a visa to come to the USSR for Wittgenstein, Keynes pointed out that Wittgenstein ‘is not a member of the Communist Party, but has strong sympathies with the way of life which he believes the new regime in Russia stands for’ (Keynes cited in Nedo 2011: 17).

Indeed, Wittgenstein was not an adherent of the bourgeois way of life. He renounced his wealth, spoke out against the ownership of private property (land-ownership, see Redpath 1999: 15–16), and did not have his own proper home; thus, with all his unpretentious way of life, he demonstrated the complete opposite of bourgeois values. Janik and Toulmin (1973: 89–90) referred to Wittgenstein’s ‘intense distaste for private property’ and ‘extremely strong belief (though largely a theoretical one) in the dignity of manual labour and the brotherhood of men unencumbered by material possessions’. However, it is arguable if it was the influence of Marx rather than Tolstoy (Moran 1999: 23). Wittgenstein’s asceticism is of another source than Marxism. It is of an ethical-religious

\(^{10}\) For more information, see Janik (1985); Kitching, Pleasants (2002); Kirching (1988) about the relationship between Marxism and the philosophy of praxis; Rubinstein (1981) on Marx and Wittgenstein on social praxis and social explanation; Easton (1983) on Wittgenstein’s social philosophy and humanist Marxism. Davis (2002) insisted on the existence of Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein via Sraffa.
foundation. For Wittgenstein modesty and religious feeling were interconnected. In 1930 he wrote: ‘Genuine modesty is a religious matter’. Wittgenstein was demonstrating his adherence to modesty and simplicity all his life (Wittgenstein 2003: 61). On 24 March 1924 Ramsey wrote a letter to Keynes, where he described his anxiety about Wittgenstein. He claimed that after a meeting with Wittgenstein’s sisters and the rest of his family, he knew that his family tried to help Wittgenstein; they tried to give him money, presents, but he rejected everything. ‘They are very rich and extremely anxious to give him money or do anything for him in any way, and he rejects all their advances; even Christmas presents or presents of invalid’s food, when he is ill, he sends back’ (Ramsey in Nedo 2011: 15). The reason was not that they were not on good terms, ‘but because he won’t have money he hasn’t earned’ (ibid.). Ramsey believed that Wittgenstein was teaching in remote villages in Low Austria to earn money, and ‘would only stop teaching if he had some other way of earning money which was preferable’ (ibid.). According to Rhees (1984: 207), Wittgenstein felt an inclination towards manual labour. I suppose that this was the direct influence of Tolstoy’s ideas. Tolstoy wrote in the ‘Manual Labour and Intellectual Activity’ (1984 [1887]):

> In our perverted society in the society called civilized we need, above all things, to speak of manual labor, because the chief fault of our society has been, and up to the present time still is, the striving to rid ourselves of manual labor, and without mutual concessions to profit by the labor of the poor, uneducated, and indigent classes who are in a state of slavery akin to that which obtained in antiquity. … I never believe in the sincerity of the philosophical and moral principles of a man who compels a servant girl to wait on him. (Tolstoy 1984: no pag.)

One more similarity between Wittgenstein and Tolstoy is their negative attitude to science understood predominantly as technology and the replacement of manual labour by machines. For example, Tolstoy wrote: ‘What in our society is called science and art, is only a monstrous soap-bubble, a superstition into which we usually fall as soon as we free ourselves from other superstitions’ (Tolstoy 1984: no pag.).

Pascal (cited in Rhees 1984: 21) wrote in her recollections that Wittgenstein did not like to talk about politics. ‘Whenever a political issue came up, he would bristle’. She continued that ‘once … he said something derogatory about Marxism’, and she ‘turned on him furiously’, saying that it was not as discredited as his own ‘antiqued political opinions’ (in the context of Anschluss just before the outbreak of World War II). Wittgenstein answered that she lacks sagacity (Pascal cited in Rhees 1984: 21). Hence, to conclude, thanks to abundant correspondence and
recollections available nowadays, we can get to know that Sraffa pushed Wittgenstein to the anthropological turn and was an important intellectual interlocutor. However, Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein is extremely doubtful. Wittgenstein indeed did not respect the bourgeois lifestyle, but this might display his aristocratic arrogance,\(^\text{11}\) rather than any inclination to Marxism.


Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge after his trip, and the routine of the last academic year started on 8 October 1936. He began his series of seminars on the Philosophy of Psychology, preliminary the Philosophy of Mathematics, and Foundations of Mathematics on 11 October. Among his students were R. Rhees, G. H. von Wright, N. Malcolm, A. M. Turing, and T. Redpath. In 1936 he began working on MSS 149, 150, and 181 on the ‘Privacy of Sense Data’. He left lots of notes in English preparing for these lectures. Rhees edited and published selected passages from MSS 148, 149, 151, and 181 as ‘Notes for the Lectures on Private Experience and Sense Data’ in *Philosophical Review* in 1968. Moreover, he had finished writing the exercise books C7 and C8 and manuscripts MSS 151, MSS 152, and MSS 166 – ‘Notes for the Philosophical Lecture’.

At the end of Eastern Term 1936, Wittgenstein’s research fellowship expired. Therefore, he had to think immediately about some regular income. He had an idea to study medicine and try psychiatric practice jointly with his friend Drury. They discussed it during Wittgenstein’s short visit to Drury in Dublin. However, he soon gave up on this idea; psychiatric practice was not what Wittgenstein had been inclined to. At the end of August 1936, Wittgenstein moved to his hut in Skjolden, where he usually productively worked in quietness, away from the bustle of the university life. There, he began his revision and translation of the text of *Brown Book* MS 115 (Part 2, Volume XI) under the title (II) *Philosophische Untersuchungen: Versuch einer Umarbeitung (Philosophical Investigations: Attempted Revision)* in German. In early November he gave it up, leaving a remark on page 292 of MS 115 that ‘this whole “Attempt at a Reworking” is worthless from page 118 up to here’ (Wittgenstein in Schulte 2015: no pag.). After that, he began with MS 142, the first revision of the *Philosophical Investigations* §§1–189a. This 167-page

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\(^\text{11}\) E.g., ‘What belongs to a language game is a whole culture. … In aristocratic circles in Vienna people had [such and such] a taste, then it came into bourgeois circles and women joined choirs, etc.’ (Wittgenstein cited in Rhees 1967: 8).
manuscript was composed preliminary in Skjolden; it was the place where Wittgenstein could work most productively. This manuscript was typed later in 1937 as a typescript TS 220. After a trip to Britain in the Summer of 1937, in August, Wittgenstein again returned to Skjolden. On his way to Norway, he began Volume XIV of Philosophische Bemerkungen, then in Skjolden Volume XII, then Volume XV, and in November Volume XVI. He continued them by 26 April 1938 (MS 117, MS 118, MS 119, MS 120). Moreover, he worked on the continuation of TS 220. Paragraphs of TS 220 since §189 were about the philosophy of mathematics: calculation, proof, inference, and logical compulsion. The result of the revision and sequel of TS 220 was TS 221 (1938). This typescript corresponds to Part I of the Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics. In the summer of 1938, Wittgenstein talked with Syndics of Cambridge University Press about his intention to publish his text (a conjunction of TS 220 and TS 221) under the title Philosophical Remarks in bilingual edition. However, in October he changed his mind. He had some doubts and hesitations about publication. Additionally, by the time Wittgenstein had finished Volume XV, which had started in August 1937, it was published partly as ‘Ursache und Wirkung: Intuitives Erfassen’ (‘Cause and Effect: Intuitive Understanding’) and appeared in Philosophia, 6 (Rhees 1976: 391–408).

4.1 During WWII

It was 1938, the year of the Austrian Anschluss with Nazi Germany, that became the next crucial point for Wittgenstein; there was no way back to Austria for him. The situation in central Europe had become ever more threatening, the enforced convergence of Austria with Nazi Germany ever more apparent. The only way to be safe was to stay in Great Britain and work in Cambridge. Wittgenstein understood the horror of the situation. The German Reich had incorporated his homeland Austria by Anschluss, and since then, he had become a German citizen. It was a serious problem because Wittgenstein had Jewish ancestors. Intending to get help to apply for British citizenship, Wittgenstein turned to his friends Sraffa and Keynes for advice. Sraffa replied to Wittgenstein:

In the present circumstances I should not have qualms about British nationality if that is the only one which you can acquire without waiting for another ten year's residence: also you have friends in England who could help you to get it: and certainly a Cambridge job would enable you to get it quickly. (Monk 1990: 392)

Wittgenstein explained his difficult situation to Keynes. He wrote to him asking for help in two aspects: first, to provide and ensure an
academic job at Cambridge and, second, to apply for British citizenship. He told Keynes that by *Anschluss*, he had automatically become a German citizen, and by new Nuremberg Laws (Reich Citizenship Laws), a German Jew. Wittgenstein retold Keynes Sraffa’s argument about the danger of travelling to Austria, that his Austrian passport would be taken away, and he would not be issued a new passport being a Jew (Monk 1990: 395), and, therefore, he would be unable to leave Austria. The following year, on 2 June 1939, Wittgenstein finally received his British passport.

Returning to work in the spring of 1938, he started the seventeenth volume: MS 121 *Philosophische Bemerkungen* XVII. At the same time, he continued writing on Volume XIII and notebooks MSS 158 and MSS 159. He revised the manuscript volumes from XIII to XVI, the second half of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, and the notebook 162a in typescript 221, which he then revised again in typescripts TSS 222, 223 and 224, that are published almost complete as Part I of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics* in Oxford (1956). In August, he wrote the preface (TS 225) to an earlier version of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*, known as the ‘Pre-war version’ (TS 220). He began an English translation of the manuscript of *Philosophische Untersuchungen* with the help of his friends Rush Rhees and Yorick Smythies and made some initial attempts to arrange publication. According to an entry in the records from 30 September, Cambridge University Press was initially willing to publish the book under the title *Philosophical Remarks*. Difficulties with translating the manuscript eventually led Wittgenstein to abandon the desire to publish it.

In October 1939, the Faculty of Moral Science of the University of Cambridge finally made Wittgenstein a full member. It became possible due to Moore’s retirement from the professorship of philosophy at Cambridge. Therefore, his chair became vacant, and Wittgenstein could apply for it. In February 1939, he was elected as Moore’s successor as a Professor of Philosophy by the University of Cambridge (Drury in Nedo 2011: 12). In August 1939, Wittgenstein’s fellowship at Trinity College was renewed. He returned to his old rooms in Whewell’s Court. Later, in October, Wittgenstein began Volume XVIII MS 122 of *Philosophische Bemerkungen*; it was published partly in 1956 with comments from manuscript Volume VIII as Part 3 of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*. This month, he started the academic year 1939/40 with a series of seminars on *Philosophische Untersuchungen*. He again participated in sessions of the Moral Science Club with Moore as a chairman (until 1944). In February 1940, he gave one paper and a
lecture to the Mathematical Society. That year, he worked on notebook MS 162b and continued MS 123 of *Philosophische Bemerkungen*. The following academic year, 1940/41, he held seminars on Philosophy and some problems from *Philosophische Untersuchungen* and private seminars and discussions on Aesthetics. In 1941, he was working on notebooks MSS 164 and 165. In the summer of 1941, he finally finished MS 123. Then, a great tragedy happened in his life – his close friend Francis Skinner died in October of poliomyelitis.

Combining academic work with volunteering at Guy’s Hospital in London during WWII, Wittgenstein suspended giving lectures, listed in the academic lecture calendar, and concentrated on private courses on Saturday afternoons and Sunday mornings on the *Foundations of Mathematics*. His manuscript MS 125, started in December 1941, with some comments from MSS 126 and MSS 127, was published in Oxford in 1956 as Part IV of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*.

The following year, in 1942, Wittgenstein finally completed MS 125 and started MS 126 on Logic and Mathematics. This time, he was preliminary interested in the problems of mathematics. A mathematician Georg Kreisel was among his students, and Wittgenstein considered him to be competent enough to help him to continue work on the *Foundations of Mathematics*. They discussed a *Course of Pure Mathematics* by G.H. Hardy, an introduction to differential and integral calculus, widely disseminated in British universities. MS 126 and MS 127 were based on the comments of Hardy’s book. It should be noted that Wittgenstein did not have a high opinion of Hardy’s book *A Mathematician’s Apology* (1940). According to McGuinness (2008: 313), ‘the publisher’s announcement of this book forms part of Wittgenstein’s Collection of Nonsense’. In 1944 Wittgenstein wrote that Hardy’s book was miserable (*elenden*), and the remarks on the philosophy of mathematics in it ‘were not philosophy at all, but, like all such effusions (*Ergüsse*), could and ought to be a raw material for philosophising (MS 124)’ (McGuinness 2008: 469).

In January 1943, Wittgenstein continued working on MS 126 and MS 127 *F,* ‘Mathematik und Logik’. These manuscripts, MSS 126 and 127, were both published in Part V of the *Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics*.

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12 Godfrey Harold Hardy, a fellow of New College, Savilian Professor of geometry at the University of Oxford, late fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. *Course of Pure Mathematics*, discussed by Wittgenstein in its third edition, was published in 1921.

13 Wittgenstein kept a *Collection of Nonsense* where he wrote down different items of spiritualism (for example, ‘extrasensory’ perception), physics, and mathematics (see McGuinness 2008: 469).
of Mathematics in Oxford in 1956. This year, Wittgenstein worked with Dr R. T. Grand in Guy’s Hospital on wound shock therapy (Badusen 1963, Drury 1984). Later, in his Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, published posthumously in 1980, Wittgenstein wrote that psychological words are similar to those that pass from everyday language into medical language, implying shock. At that time, he was living mainly in Newcastle, where he transferred with Grant’s research group. He rarely travelled to Cambridge because he had no more formal teaching, and, therefore, he had to give up his rooms in Trinity College. In Newcastle, he wrote the exercise books MSS 179, 180a, and 180b. He spent the holidays in Swansea, where, again, he revised the Philosophische Untersuchungen TS 239.

In 1944, Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge. In the spring of 1944, he finished MS 127; in the summer, he completed his work on MS 124. That year, staying again in Swansea, he wrote MS 128 and MS 129. On the last page of MS 128, he wrote the title of his new book, ‘Philos. Untersuchungen der Log. Phil. Abh. Entgegengestellt’. Moreover, in Swansea, he started typescript 227 of the Philosophische Untersuchungen, on which he continued to work until 1949/1950.

In October 1944, at the start of the academic year 1944/1945, Wittgenstein returned to teaching. He had four hours of seminars in sessions for two hours two times per week, where he spoke on problems connected with Philosophische Untersuchungen. In November, Wittgenstein took Moore’s chair as the head of the Moral Science Club. In 1945, he continued working on MS 182 of Philosophische Untersuchungen; it contained some comments that supplemented the typescript of Philosophische Untersuchungen of 1944/45, which was finally published in that version. He wrote a new Preface to Philosophische Untersuchungen, the fourth part of TS 247, and typescript 228 (Bemerkungen I). The first three variants of Bemerkungen were held in typescript 241, based on manuscript MS 129. Moreover, he began writing Typescript 229, published as Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology in 1980, and Typescript 230 (Bemerkungen II), on which he worked until 1947.

4.2 After WWII and Final Years (1946–1951)

In the 1945/46 academic year in Cambridge, Wittgenstein held seminars on Philosophy of Psychology twice a week. In 1946, he wrote MSS 130, 131, 132, started MSS 133, and continued typescript 229. The following academic year, 1946/47, he continued holding seminars on the Philoso-
phy of Psychology, again on the Foundations of Mathematics, and gave lectures to the Moral Science Club. In a letter to Rhees dated 7 February 1946, Wittgenstein wrote that he was talking about the problems of Gestalt psychology and that the topic was ‘frightfully unclear’ and he was ‘unable to get to the deep aspects of the matter’ (McGuinness 2008: 396). In the spring of 1947, Wittgenstein finished MS 133, which contained MSS 134 and 135. He started dictating typescript 232, which was based on MSS 135, 136, and 137, to Gitta Deutsch (Austrian immigrant). This typescript was published in Volume II of the Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology in 1980. Moreover, in 1947, he started writing in notebooks MSS 167, 168.

In the autumn of 1947, Wittgenstein took a sabbatical leave for the next academic year, 1947/48, to concentrate primarily on his writings. However, in October, he decided to give up his professorship. In winter, he travelled to Ireland and stayed in Dublin with his friend Drury, where he started MS 136 Band ‘Q’. There, in 1948, he started MS 137 Band ‘R’. In October, Wittgenstein travelled to Cambridge for a few weeks, where he revised MSS 135, 136, and 137 and continued dictating typescript 232 to Gitta Deutsch. In December in Ireland, he continued working on Band ‘R’. He created his first will, making Rush Rhees and Burnaby of Trinity College his executors. He wrote about it to Moore on 31 December. In January 1949, Wittgenstein finished MS 137 Band ‘R’, then he started MS 138. This manuscript volume MS 138 and the second half of volume ‘R’ were published as Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology in Oxford in 1982.

In June, he travelled to Cambridge again as a guest of G. H. von Wright. In July 1949, Wittgenstein took a journey to the USA to Ithaca, New York State, as a guest of his pupil Norman Malcolm (Malcolm 2001 [1984]). His health was rapidly deteriorating. He was forced to seek medical help at the hospital and was very afraid of dying in foreign lands. Nevertheless, he successfully returned to England in October, where later he was diagnosed with cancer by Dr Edward Bevan. In 1949, he continued working on MS 144 (revision of the second part of Philosophische Untersuchungen), notebooks MS 169, 170, and 171, and

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14 Wittgenstein resigned his professorship in October 1947. It became effective on 31 December. See von Wright (1974: 88). He considered giving up teaching earlier due to health problems. Wittgenstein wrote about his desire to von Wright on 21 February 1947: ‘My mind, for reasons I don’t know, often feels very exhausted. (I am, by the way, in perfectly good health.) This equilibrium of mine is so labile that, before long, my lectures may become hopelessly inadequate and that, after a struggle, I may have to give up teaching’ (Letter 367) (in McGuinness 2008: 407).
dictating typescript 234 (the last version of part II of *Philosophische Untersuchungen*). In April 1950, Wittgenstein visited Cambridge as a guest of G. H. von Wright one more time, and then he visited Rush Rhees in London and Elizabeth Anscombe in Oxford. At that time, he was working on MSS 172, 173, and 174 and started MS 175. In November, by invitation of his doctor, Dr Bevan, Wittgenstein moved to his house in Cambridge. On 29 January 1951, he changed his final will in Oxford, appointing R. Rhees a direct executor and R. Rhees, G. H. von Wright, and G. E. M. Anscombe administrators of his literary estate. In February, Wittgenstein continued working on MS 135 and started MS 116 on 21 March. The manuscripts from MS 172 to 177 were later, for the most part, published. Part I of the *Remarks on Colours*, published in Oxford in 1977, came from manuscript MS 176, Part II from MS 172, and Part III from MS 173. In the volume entitled *On Certainty*, published in Oxford in 1970, comments from 1 to 65 came from MS 173, from 66 to 192 from MS 174, 193 to 299 from MS 173, and 300 to 676 from MSS 176 and 177. Wittgenstein began working on his last manuscript, MS 177, on 25 April. The last note is dated 27 April. On the evening of 28 April, he lost consciousness, and the following morning, 29 April 1951, Ludwig Wittgenstein died. Until the last moment, when he was conscious, was talking about philosophical issues (Drury 1984, Rhees 1984, Malcolm 2001).

**Conclusion**

This article analysed Ludwig Wittgenstein's Cambridge period of life and philosophy mostly from the bibliographical point of view. The trigger point of Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and philosophy was his attendance at Brower’s lecture on ‘Mathematics, Science, and Language’ in Vienna in March 1928. Considering the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas on language in his Cambridge period, I have mentioned the influence of Bakhtin (professor of philology, with whom Wittgenstein discussed his works, including *Tractatus* and *Philosophical Investigations*, the idea of language as an activity, meanings depending on context). Several of Wittgenstein’s friends and pupils helped him to develop his thoughts on language and reality, not explicitly but through intellectual conversations, in a dialog, especially Ramsey (symbolism in mathematics, intuitionism) and Sraffa (criticism of Wittgenstein’s previous ideas in *Tractatus*, turn to ‘anthropological’ way of considering philosophical matters – to ‘living language’). Moore, Keynes, Drury,
Rhees, von Wright, and some other friends and pupils did not influence his thoughts directly. However, they left some correspondences, notes, recorded lectures, and recollections that helped to restore his ideas more consistently and to clarify controversial and incomprehensible passages. Wittgenstein immediately started writing several manuscripts since the very beginning of his return to Cambridge. All these manuscripts contain his new ideas on philosophy, notably different from those of *Tractatus*. Cambridge became a favourable environment for the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas, since he was a person who needed to discuss his ideas with others. It was Cambridge where Wittgenstein could get interlocutors smart enough to understand his thoughts and give critical comments, e.g., Russell, Bakhtin, Moore, Ramsey, Keynes, and Sraffa. Moreover, in Cambridge, Wittgenstein found faithful disciples and good friends who were very indulgent to his complex nature and stayed with him until his end.

References


