

“NOW YOU ARE ABLE TO ABOLISH
THE RETENTION OF WRONG VIEWS:”
HOW TO TEACH A BUDDHIST NOVICE
TO FIGHT OBJECTIONS
(*MADHYAMAKARATNAPRADĪPA*, CH. 5)

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1. Introduction

In this paper¹ my aim is to bring to the reader’s attention both the Tibetan edition and the annotated English translation of the fifth chapter of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa* (henceforth MRP; Tibetan title: *dBu ma rin po che’i sgron ma*), mainly devoted to the exposition of the two truths (*dve satye*; *bden pa gnyis*) and the affirmation of the Madhyamaka viewpoint against eight different objections raised by hypothetical opponents. Modern scholars have conventionally taken the conclusive statement of this chapter as its title: *NGes pa’i don gyi yang dag pa’i kun rdzob kyi skabs* (which can possibly stand for an original Sanskrit *Nītārthatathya-samvṛtiprakaraṇa*), namely, “Explanation of the right conventional truth in a definitive sense.”²

As far as the author of the MRP is concerned, let me summarize here some considerations I have put forward in a previous paper of mine (Del Toso 2014: 514–518) – in which I have discussed the subject in detail – and add some further observations. The MRP is extant only in its Tibetan

¹ I would like to express here all my gratitude to the unknown reviewers for their precious advices, suggestions and notes on the first draft of this paper, which helped me to improve some aspects of my translation and to correct unnoticed mistakes and typos. I’m also grateful to Mr. Christopher Parks for having checked the English of the final draft. Needless to say, all the flaws that the reader will find here are to be ascribed only to myself.

² The abbreviations used here for the Tibetan Canons are as follows: C: Co-ne bsTan-’gyur; D: sDe-dge bsTan-’gyur; G: dGa’-ldan bsTan-’gyur; L: Lha-sa bKa’-’gyur; N: sNar-thang bsTan-’gyur.

translation, and in its colophon mention is made of its author's name as Bhavya (in Tibetan transliteration: Bha-bya). This Bhavya, however, is not to be confused with the 6th century Mādhyamika namesake, also known as Bhāviveka. Indeed, the MRP was composed allegedly in the second half of the 10th century. This chronology seems to be supported by the fact that the text contains quotations from works dated up to the 9th or even to the early 10th century. Consequently, the occurrence of the name Bhavya in the colophon of the MRP could depend on the fact that the MRP is a text strongly indebted to the 6th century Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā* (henceforth TJ), the commentary written by Bhāviveka himself on his own *Madhyamakahrdayakārikā* (henceforth MHK). Indeed, throughout the MRP we find several passages taken from the TJ, which are oddly embedded in the body of the text without the usual quote expressions (final *zhes bya ba* etc.), as if they were original parts of the work (and chapter 5, the translation will show, represents a good example of this kind of "appropriation"). As I have pointed out in my previous study (Del Toso 2014: 519–521), this particular treatment of the TJ suggests that the MRP was probably conceived as a 10th century manual of Madhyamaka for Buddhist beginner students, based on the 6th century TJ. This suggestion finds ground in the fact that in many an occasion we can observe the author of the MRP lavishing dialectical and reading tips, as one would expect to find in texts like manuals and handbooks.

Considered its dependence on the TJ, the mention of Bhavya in the colophon of the MRP could possibly represent a sort of homage to Bhāviveka, the author of the TJ. At least two observations can sustain this hypothesis. First observation: since – as we will see below – its style is in several passages clearly conversational, it is possible that the MRP is the result of a rearrangement and reorganization of notes prepared for, or taken during, some philosophy class. We can imagine a teacher explaining the TJ and expanding on it, perhaps reading directly from a manuscript he had at hand, while adding quotes and references from other works to clarify this or that passage or concept. Therefore, since the TJ is the text on which the MRP depends and develops its discussion, perhaps for this reason the colophon of the latter contains the name of the author of the former. The colophon of the MRP may in other terms reflect the fact that the MRP, far from being a work of (a certain)

Bhavya, is a text strongly indebted to the 6th century Bhāviveka's TJ, of which many passages are collected extensively, quoted *verbatim* and unmarked. The second observation concerns another text preserved in the Tibetan Canon, namely, the short *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* (*dBu ma 'khrul pa 'joms pa*), whose colophon tells us that (Del Toso 2010b: 98) its author was a certain Āryadeva (*Ā rya de bas*) and that the Tibetan translation of this little work from the Sanskrit original was requested by the (unknown) king Sukhācārya (*rgyal po Su kha tsa ryas*). However, a close reading of the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* reveals that this text is nothing but a collection of excerpts taken *verbatim* from the MHK and, once again, the TJ (Del Toso 2010b: 80–81, note 11). Unlike the MRP, whose colophon does mention Bhavya, the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* seems to represent a very different case, namely, a total misappropriation (or, perhaps, forgery), in the sense that here the passages of the TJ that form the body of the text are slightly rearranged and ascribed not to Bhavya but to another author. The case of the *Madhyamakabhramaghāta* suggests therefore that if the TJ became at some point or in certain circles a text so attractive to be filched for the benefit of other texts or authors, the colophon of the MRP could mention Bhavya exactly with the intent to refer to the 6th century Bhāviveka, also known as Bhavya, in order to – as it were – give unto Caesar what is Caesar's.

But why the name referred to in the MRP is Bhavya and not Bhāviveka? This could depend on the epoch of composition and translation into Tibetan of the MRP. Let us begin by observing that both the colophons of the MHK and the TJ mention the author's name in the transliterated form Bha-bya, unlike for instance the colophon of the *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti*, i.e., Bhāviveka's commentary on Nāgārjuna's (1st–2nd century CE) *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (henceforth MMK), where it occurs in its usual Tibetan translation Legs-ldan-'byed (corresponding exactly to Bhāviveka). He and van der Kuijp (2014: 301–302) have clearly underscored that also the Chinese sources, like Xuánzàng 玄奘 (7th century), Wōnch'ūk (*alias* Yuáncè 圓測, 7th century) and Prabhākaramitra (6th–7th century), knew the 6th century author by the name of Bhāviveka, which they variously rendered as Qīngbiàn 清辯/辨, Fēnbiémíng 分別明 or Pópífèijiā 婆毗吠伽. Moreover, the two scholars stress also the fact that it was Wú Fǎchéng 吳法成 (9th century), in his Tibetan translation

of Wōnch'ük's Chinese commentary on the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*, the one who probably for the first time rendered Qīngbiàn with Bha-bya (Bhavya) and not with Legs-ldan-'byed. In addition to that, when we turn our attention to the epoch of the translations of Bhāviveka's works, we should notice that the Tibetan translation of the *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti*, whose colophon mentions Legs-ldan-'byed/Bhāviveka, was accomplished by Jñānagarbha and [I]Cog-ro kLu'i-rgyal-mtshan around the year 800 CE, whereas the Tibetan translations of the MHK and TJ were both accomplished in the 11th century by Adhīśa³ (980–1054) and his pupil TSHul-khrims-rgyal-ba (1011–1064). This leads us to suppose at least two things: that Bhāviveka was the name by which the author of the TJ was commonly known before the 9th century, and that around the 9th century for some reason Bha-bya/Bhavya began to be preferred over Bhāviveka. Since also the MRP, as its colophon tells us (see D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 289a6–7), was translated by TSHul-khrims-rgyal-ba, this time together with the Indian scholar Vīryasiṃha (11th century), and both under the supervision of Adhīśa, it is reasonable to believe that they adopted the transliteration Bha-bya, like they did for the MHK and TJ.

As a last point, it should be noticed that some modern scholars have maintained that the author of the MRP could have been Bhavyakīrti. In my previous paper (Del Toso 2014: 515–516) I have tried to show that, of the at least two Bhavyakīrti-s, who we know flourished around the 10th century and authored works on tantric subjects, none seems to fit well with the Bhavya of the MRP. One Bhavyakīrti, indeed, was a commentator of the *Cakrasaṃvaratantra* and was more prone to the Yogācāra and Pramāṇa schools than to Madhyamaka, i.e., the school the MRP defends and affirms over the other doctrines and philosophies, Yogācāra included. The second Bhavyakīrti, on the other hand, was affiliated to the Guhyasamāja tradition and was the author of commentaries on the tantric Nāgārjuna's (9th century ?) *Pañcakrama* and the tantric Candrakīrti's (9th–10th century ?) *Pradīpoddyotana*, he was a fine and elegant scholar

³ Modern scholars have long accepted Atiśa, or also Atīśa, as the corresponding Sanskrit form of Tibetan byname Jo-bo-rje, referring to the teacher usually known as Dīpa-karaśrījñāna. However, I prefer to follow Isaacson and Sferra (2014: 70–71, note 51), who have put forward quite convincing arguments in favor of a possible original form Adhīśa.

and in my opinion it would be quite extravagant to consider that such an erudite person, in one of his works allowed himself to filch from the TJ, a text of one of the most important masters of Madhyamaka, without even mentioning the author. In addition to that, it should also be noted that in none of the works of these two Bhavyakīrti-s preserved in the Tibetan Canon, the name of the author occurs as Bhavya, whereas in each and every occurrence the °kīrti/grags-pa element is always present (a consideration, this last one, that indirectly stresses the equation Bhabya = Legs-ldan-'byed).

For all these reasons, since it is impossible to clearly identify the author of the MRP, I will refer to him simply as the Author.⁴

1.1. Position of chapter 5 in the MRP

Let us now give a closer look to the composition of the MRP. The Author organizes the text in nine chapters that we can conceptually gather in two main parts. In the first part (chapters 1–6) the Author exposes the – as it were – intellectual ascending steps from the incorrect views to the correct knowledge and wisdom, whereas in the second part (chapters 7–9) he deals with the practice of meditation, the excellency of the Madhyamaka founder, Nāgārjuna, and the primacy of Buddhism over all the other schools. Of these, it is the first part, chapters 1–6, on the two truths, the conventional (*saṃvṛti*; *kun rdzob pa*) and the ultimate (*paramārtha*; *don dam pa*), that concerns us here in particular.

In this first part the Author depicts a path through the various levels of truth, beginning in chapter 1 – translated in Lindtner 1981: 169–177 – with an introduction on the two truths in their general terms. From chapter 2 to chapter 5, then, the text develops a gradual approach to the right conventional viewpoint (*tathyasamvṛti*; *yang dag pa'i kun rdzob*), according to a well defined ascending plan, as follows. In chapter 2 the incorrect conventional perspectives (*saṃvṛtibhrāntaprajñā*; *kun rdzob 'khrul pa'i shes rab*) are dealt with, such as the 363 wrong views, Sāṃkhya and Vaiśeṣika doctrines, the Jainas, the *kālavāda*, the *puruṣavāda*,

⁴ The reader can profitably find another insightful discussion of the MRP and its author in He and van der Kuip 2014: 323–329.

the Vātsīputrīya, the *svabhāvavāda*, the *īśvaravāda*, the Vaiṣṇava etc. All these erroneous viewpoints, the Author says peremptorily, must be dispelled (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 264b3: *blo gros 'khrul pa de dag bsal bar bya ba yin*). He turns at this point his attention to the right conventional perspectives, which, following a well-known Buddhist classification, are differentiated into provisional (*neyārtha*; *drang ba'i don*) and definitive (*nītārtha*; *nges pa'i don*). Chapters 3 and 4 are both devoted to the discussion of the provisional correct conventional perspectives (*neyārthatathyaśaṃvṛti*; *drang ba'i don gyi yang dag pa'i kun rdzob*). Of these, chapter 3 – translated in Lindtner 1986b: 182–190 – deals with the Vaibhāṣika views, whereas chapter 4 – edited in Lindtner 1986b: 192–197 and translated in Lindtner 1986a: 246–254 – with the Yogācāra. The Author contends that, contrary to the doctrines exposed in the previous chapter 2, these two are correct viewpoints, since they both accept the Buddhist standpoint. However, the Vaibhāṣika school lies on a lower level than the Yogācāra, insofar as the former does not accept the Mahāyāna stance. In any case, both are to be considered inferior to the Madhyamaka school because they fail to grasp the real or profound essence of the Buddha's message and hence their teachings remain confined on the provisional, i.e., figurative or metaphorical level, without reaching the definitive or final meaning. The main mistake of the Vaibhāṣikas, the Author explains, is to confuse the definitive with the provisional, in that they maintain that the aggregates (*skandha*; *phung po*), the atoms (*paramāṇu*; *rdul phra rab*), the intellect (*buddhi*; *blo gros*), all the Buddhist doctrines (*dharma*; *chos*) that constitute the path (*marga*; *lam*), and *nirvāṇa* ultimately exist (Lindtner 1986b: 182). Their error would be to embrace realism, without considering the truth revealed in the scriptures of the Prajñāpāramitā literature (Lindtner 1986b: 188), according to which nothing is ultimately real: on the contrary, everything is merely conventional. The Yogācārins, on the other hand, though adhering to the Mahāyāna, fail primarily in taking mind-only (*cittamātra*; *sems tsam*) as an ultimate reality, whereas according to the Author mind-only too is nothing but conventional. In so doing, the Yogācārins misunderstand the definitive with the provisional, with the consequence that they forcibly deny any external object (Lindtner 1986a: 247), thus falling into idealism. The only school that keeps itself far from the extremes of realism and idealism, and is therefore able to interpret correctly and understand in full the Buddha's

words, argues the Author, is the Madhyamaka, which is discussed in chapter 5. For this reason, only the Madhyamaka is reputed to convey the correct conventional perspective in its non-provisional, definitive sense (*nītārthatathyasaṃvṛti*; *nges pa'i don gyi yang dag pa'i kun rdzob*).

However, the Author specifies that the Madhyamaka does not represent the utmost level in the dialectics of the two truths because, since after all it still remains nothing but the expression of a conceptual point of view, the Madhyamaka too is entirely confined within the conventional framework of language and reasoning. The leap from the conventional to what is real is thence left to the short chapter 6 (only five stanzas), in which the essence of the understanding of the ultimate truth (*paramārthaprajñā*; *don dam pa'i shes rab*) is outlined.

It emerges therefore that chapter 5 represents a pivotal step in the gradual ascending path described in chapters 1–6, since on the one hand it is meant to correct the doctrinal flaws of the lower levels of the conventional by showing the proper interpretation of the Buddhist instruction, i.e., the Madhyamaka viewpoint, and, on the other hand, it functions as a sort of springboard towards the ultimate. Consequently, to unpack the topics contained in chapter 5 is of a crucial import for the comprehension of the nodal point in the line of argument on the two truths that the Author of the MRP is developing.

1.2. Structure and contents of MRP, chapter 5

The fifth chapter of the MRP can be conceptually divided into two main parts, each of which deals with several topics.

The first part is devoted to the explanation of the two truths. Here the Author recalls aspects he already expounded previously, mainly in chapter 1. Yet, far from being a mere repetition of concepts already explained, in this first part the conventional and the ultimate are summarized and further systematized by resorting to various quotations of illustrious Buddhist scholars, with the clear aim of providing a good theoretical ground for the arguments of the second part of the chapter.

Immediately after the introductory stanzas, in praise of the founder and principal standard-bearers of the Madhyamaka school, the Author begins the discussion by arguing that the correct understanding of the two truths takes place only when one gets rid of the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*; *ma*

rig pa) that impedes the right vision, which consists in considering things of this world as evanescent as dreams (*svapna*; *rmi lam*). The Author then addresses separately the conventional and the ultimate, mainly confining himself to quoting passages from several authoritative texts. However, if the quotes occurring in the section on the conventional truth are principally taken from Nāgārjuna's works, such as the MMK and the *Pratītyasamutpādayakārikā*, in the section on the ultimate truth we find a more sophisticated and wider set of citations: not only Nāgārjuna, but also Āryadeva (2nd–3rd century), Diñnāga (5th–6th century), Kambala (5th–6th century), Dharmakīrti (6th–7th century), Candrakīrti (7th century) and Padmavajra (allegedly 8th century).

The reference to Dharmakīrti and Diñnāga, as well as to Kambala, in support of the Author's Madhyamaka viewpoint, and especially in a text like the MRP, which is strongly indebted to the TJ, is quite telling. It suggests that the Author may have inherited a particular Madhyamaka tradition that can be traced back to at least Śrīgupta (allegedly 7th century), i.e., the one called in later times Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka. To my knowledge, Śrīgupta's *Tattvāvatāravṛtti* (*De kho na la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa*) represents indeed the earliest textual witness at our disposal in which an explicit attempt is made to hold together in one single perspective both Nāgārjuna's and Dharmakīrti's views, as for instance the following passage testifies (D, dBu-ma, Ha, 43a2–3):

'di ni byis pas go bya'i phyir //

sngon gyi slob dpon rnam kyis bshad // 19cd //

'di ni 'brel pa brjed pa dran pa nye bar bskyed pa'i phyir slob dpon kLu sgrub
la sogs pas bkod do // de lta ma yin na cir yang mi dgos pa'i phyir te /

dpe la gtan tshigs dngos po dang //

de dngos de mi shes la bstan //

m khas pa la ni gtan tshigs nyid //

'ba' zhig brjed par bya ba yin // [= *Pramāṇavarttika*, *Svārthānumāna* 27]⁵

zhes gang bshad pa yin no //

⁵ Compare this Tibetan version of the *Pramāṇavarttika*, *Svārthānumāna* 27 with its Sanskrit text (Miyasaka 1971–1972: 118): *tadbhāvahetubhāvau hi dr̥ṣṭante tadavedinaḥ / khyāpyete viduṣām vācya hetur eva hi kevalaḥ //*

This can be translated as:

This [example (*dr̥ṣṭanta*) of the reflection (*pratibimba*) having no intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*),] was mentioned by the *ācāryas* of the past [only] in order to be understood by the immature ones // 19cd //

This [example] was displayed by *ācārya* Nāgārjuna and others in order to thoroughly develop mindfulness in those who have forgotten the connection (**sambandha*) [between reason (*hetu*) and *probandum* (*sādhya*)]. If it is not so, [i.e., if the interlocutor is competent,] since [in an inference the example] is not necessary by all means, [for this reason Dharmakīrti said]:

In the example, [the link between] the condition of cause (*hetubhāva*) and the condition of that (*tadbhāva*) [*probandum*,] is taught to those who do not know that [pervasion (*vyāpti*)]. To the competent one, solely the very reason is to be expressed.

Thus is what is explained.

Such a syncretistic attitude was subsequently inherited by Jñānagarbha (7th–8th century), Śrīgupta's pupil, who in his *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* (*bDen gnyis rnam 'byed 'grel pa*) refers indeed to Dinnāga and Dharmakīrti in support of his argument against the upholders of the idea that cognition has no form (*nirākārajñānavādin*; *shes pa rnam pa med par smra ba*) (Eckel 1992a: 73, 120–121 and 158). Like Śrīgupta, also Jñānagarbha was a partisan of Bhāviveka's Svātantrika-Madhyamaka and perhaps it is for this reason that in some passages of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* Jñānagarbha seems to hurl against Candrakīrti (Eckel 1992a: 92 and 141–142) who, as is well known, with his Prāsaṅgika perspective was one of the most severe detractors of Bhāviveka's views.

The strongly critical attitude of Jñānagarbha towards Candrakīrti seems however not to have been shared by the Author of the MRP. The occurrence in chapter 5 of quotes from Candrakīrti's *Triśaraṇasaptati* suggests indeed that the Author was not interested (or, better said, not primarily interested) in stressing the opposition between the Svātantrika and the Prāsaṅgika schools. On this matter, at least three considerations deserve our attention. First, a text like the *Triśaraṇasaptati* is definitely not as representative of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka as other works of Candrakīrti are. Therefore, citing passages from this particular text keeps in any case our Author far from any direct reference to strong Prāsaṅgika positions. Second, besides the *Triśaraṇasaptati*, in the MRP we meet also with other quotes from Candrakīrti's works, some of which remain

untraced and are probably to be ascribed to the so-called tantric Candrakīrti, but some other can be identified and are taken from one of Candrakīrti's Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka major works, namely, the *Madhyamakāvatāra*. In the first chapter of the MRP (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 261a2–3), for instance, the Author cites Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.80 (Lindtner 1981: 173) and in chapter 7 (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 277b5–7) he quotes *Madhyamakāvatāra* 6.4 and 6.5 (Del Toso 2014: 523). Yet, a close reading of these three stanzas shows that their contents are after all – and so to speak – innocuous for a Svātantrika thinker, since they represent general Madhyamaka viewpoints that also a follower of Bhāviveka could have shared and agree upon without betraying her/his specific doctrinal affiliation. Third, besides Nāgārjuna and Āryadeva, it is Candrakīrti the other Mādhyamika master whose greatness is praised in the opening stanzas of at least two chapters of the MRP, namely, in chapter 2 (where, together with Āryadeva, he is defined as “the lion's roar of the doctrine of emptiness;” D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 262b2: *stong nyid smra ba'i seng ge'i sgra*) and in chapter 5, translated below. These three considerations corroborate the idea that the Author was not interested in taking part in the polemic between Svātantrikas and Prāsaṅgikas, although he undoubtedly preferred to refer his readers to authorities like Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Dharmakīrti, rather than to Candrakīrti. Moreover, speaking of Dharmakīrti, in the first part of chapter 5 four verses occur, taken from one of his lost works, whose title has been reconstructed into Sanskrit as *Tattvanīṣkarṣa* (Lindtner 1980).

In the concluding lines of the first part the Author affirms that the sections on the conventional and the ultimate contain in a nutshell the essence of the oral instruction that allows to understand the *dharmatā* or true essence of things, and is useful to counter the objections of the detractors of Madhyamaka.

After having thus provided the reader with efficacious doctrinal tools, the second part of chapter 5 is entirely devoted to dismantle eight objections against the Mādhyamikas, attributed mainly to Buddhist realist (*vastugraha*; *dngos por 'dzin pa*) opponents – allegedly the partisans of the Sarvāstivāda school and derivative sects. As a matter of fact, the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth, outlined in the first part of the chapter, provides the theoretical background lying behind all

the Madhyamaka replies, which are exposed one by one immediately after the list of objections.

In his eight critical points the opponent seems to follow a well defined pattern, according to which the previous objection provides the logical ground for the subsequent one. As I will point out in greater detail in the notes to the translation, some of these objections are borrowed by the Author directly from Bhāviveka's TJ, although the replies not always follow Bhāviveka's counter-arguments. We also notice by passing that the objections are not complex – in fact they are very simple –, debating basic wrong views the Mādhyamikas are usually accused to uphold by their opponents, such as for instance the accusation of nihilism for the doctrine of emptiness (*śūnyatā*; *stong pa nyid*). This suggests once again that the MRP was probably meant for novice students, not for trained monks, already expert in dialectics.

The Author organizes these eight objections in two conceptual groups, each focused on criticizing primarily the Madhyamaka conception of non-arising (*anutpāda*; *skye ba med pa*) of things. The first group gathers objections 1 to 4, the second objections 5 to 8. With the first four objections the opponent intends to progressively discredit the Madhyamaka perspective on an ontological and doctrinal level, aiming at showing that the admission of non-arising of things is ultimately inconsistent with the Buddhist message. With the remaining objections the opponent intends to directly hit the Madhyamaka position on an epistemological level, pointing at demonstrating that the idea of non-arising leads the Mādhyamikas to several inconsistencies that eventually result in a contradiction with their own viewpoint. Let us now consider more closely the two groups.

First group of objections.

1. *Objection*: the Mādhyamikas are guilty of the dialectical defect of rejecting all viewpoints without propounding one of their own.

Reply: since everything is ultimately non-arisen (*anutpāda*; *skye ba med pa*), it follows that nothing is expressible (*anabhilāpya*; *brjod du med pa*) because no argument whatsoever can be coherently formulated on something that has no origination. Accordingly, not having a viewpoint is the only possible position one should consistently keep.

2. *Objection*: if you say that everything is ultimately non-arisen, then your idea of emptiness (*śūnyatā*; *stong pa nyid*) means mere non-existence.

Reply: to say that things are non-arisen does not mean that they are absolutely non-existent, since emptiness must not be considered in substantialistic terms. On the contrary, it simply expresses the real nature of things, namely, their lack of any intrinsic substantial existence. Once one realizes this, then also the very concept of emptiness should be abandoned.

3. *Objection*: if you admit the non-existence of all things, it follows that for you Mādhyamikas also the fundamental axioms of Buddhism are non-existent and therefore you are a nihilist (*ucchedavādin*; *chad par smra ba*), that is to say, you do not accept the moral and practical values of the doctrine to which you claim to adhere.

Reply: the accusation of nihilism finds ground if there is something that actually exists, and if there is someone who denies its existence. However, since the Madhyamaka provides the correct interpretation of the Buddha's teachings in terms of conventional and ultimate truth, there is no nihilism here. Indeed, on the conventional level the correct perspective is to consider things as devoid of any essence whatsoever, and awakening (*bodhi*; *byang chub*) as transcending both being (*sat*; *yod*) and non-being (*asat*; *med*), whereas on the ultimate level the *dharmatā* is since ever non-arisen. In both cases there cannot be nihilism, for there is nothing actually real to be denied.

4. *Objection*: if you gainsay the axioms of Buddhism, then you reject also the Buddhist scriptures, which convey the Buddha's true teachings.

Reply: this objection does not apply since the Mādhyamikas know that the non-Madhyamaka Buddhist scriptures are nothing but the expression of a conventional understanding of truth in a provisional sense, whereas the Madhyamaka scriptures have a superior value, being expression of the conventional understanding of truth in a definitive sense. However, since both the non-Madhyamaka and Madhyamaka scriptures are expression of a conventional understanding, this means that all of them should in any case be altogether abandoned once one proceeds from the conventional level towards the ultimate truth.

Second group of objections.

5. *Objection*: to admit that things are non-arisen leads to the denial of the validity of direct perception (*pratyakṣa*; *mngon sum*), which is however an undeniable means of valid knowledge.

Reply: this objection is pointless because the Mādhyamikas do accept direct perception, but only from a conventional point of view. From the ultimate point of view, on the contrary, since the Mādhyamikas are well aware that nothing is truly arisen or existent, of what could there be any perception?

6. *Objection*: if you do not admit direct perception, it follows that you reject also inference (*anumāna*; *rjes su dpag pa*), since inference is based on direct perception.

Reply: since nothing is ultimately arisen, and therefore nothing can be actually perceived, and since inference is grounded on direct perception, then nothing can be really established by way of inference.

7. *Objection*: if you do not accept both direct perception and inference, then your viewpoint proves to be also contrary to what is accepted by common consensus (*prasiddha*; *grags pa*), which is mainly grounded on what we perceive and infer.

Reply: since common people are still under the influx of ignorance, it follows that what is commonly admitted must be the result of wrong views and since the Mādhyamikas do not share wrong views, they do not accept common consensus.

8. *Objection*: if you do not accord validity to perception, inference and common knowledge, then you also contradict your own assertions, which must depend exactly on perception, inference and common knowledge in order to be validated.

Reply: this is not true, since the Mādhyamikas consider things according to the correct understanding of the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth. Therefore if a certain thing, on the basis of perception, inference etc., can be described on a conventional level as having certain characteristics, it is not so according to the ultimate truth. It is exactly the awareness of the distinction between conventional and ultimate that makes the Madhyamaka viewpoint non-contradictory.

As we will see in the translation below, the counter-arguments 5–8 are considerably briefer than those to the first four objections. This could

depend on the fact that the Author has already dealt in detail with some of these points previously in the MRP, namely, in chapter 1, where indeed he discusses our objections 3, 5, 7 and 8, on which see Lindtner 1981: 173–176. Moreover, we notice also that the counter-arguments to objections 6 and 8 consist in two very brief and not exhaustive statements. However, since objection 8 is comprehensively rejected in chapter 1, this leaves only objection 6 without a proper reply in the MRP. Of course, the text does provide arguments against the main criticism contained in this objection, but these arguments occur in a – so to speak – disorganic manner. In chapter 1 we find for instance a brief sentence against the logicians – namely, against those who primarily rely upon inference –, in which it is expressed the idea that inference does not lead to understand reality (Lindtner 1981: 169). Also, in chapter 5, in the section on the ultimate truth, the reference to MHK 9.14 clearly suggests that inference is not a reliable means of knowledge when used alone, and the four verses quoted from Dharmakīrti’s *Tattvaniṣkarṣa* tell us that inference is to be considered as a preliminary tool on the path towards ultimate knowledge, which should be abandoned when one enters into the deeper states of meditation.

Such a paucity of arguments against objection 6 could conceal a precise reason. Bhāviveka, indeed, did actually accept inference as a – so to speak – apophatic means, a quite useful intellectual tool we can have recourse to in order to approach the ultimate reality, as MHK 5.107 clearly testifies (Lindtner 2001: 70): *ato’numānaviṣayaṃ na tattvaṃ pratipadyate / tattvajñānavipakṣo yas tasya tena nirākriyā* // (“Hence, the object obtained by inference is not reality, [but] by means of this [inference] there is the removal of what is contrary to the knowledge of reality”). In other terms, even though inference does not grasp reality directly (as recalled also in chapter 1 of MRP), its main value lies in the fact that it helps to eliminate obstacles on the path towards reality. Therefore, the presence in chapter 5 of an objection concerning inference, and the lack of a proper counter-argument, leads us to suppose that the Author had at least two possible purposes in mind. On the one hand, by mentioning objection 6 in the second group of objections, he might have wanted to show his students and readers a possible step-by-step dialectical path a hypothetical opponent can resort to in order to hurl consequent

objections against the Madhyamaka – not necessarily Svātantrika – standpoint. A path entailing direct perception, inference (grounded on direct perception), common knowledge (grounded on both perception and inference), and finally self-contradiction (due to the Madhyamaka denial of the three previous elements). On the other hand, the absence of a well structured counter-argument to objection 6 in the MRP reflects quite well the lack of specific focus on this subject-matter in the TJ. This suggests that the Author was not interested in developing topics that could have pushed him too far from Bhāviveka's text: he confined himself to simply mentioning a debated issue, i.e., inference, the knowledge of which, even though in a non-detailed manner, he reputed useful for his beginner students.

Another angle from which to consider the possible reasons for the remarkable difference in length between the first and the second group of counter-arguments in chapter 5 is to evaluate the difficulty of the topics dealt with. Objections 1–4 focus on ontological matters, which are of course not simple in themselves, but are undoubtedly less thorny than epistemology, which is the main subject of objections 5–8. An epistemological discussion can easily be filled with more and more technicalities concerning the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*; *tshad ma*), as indeed the endless debates that dot the history of Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian philosophy show. If as we have said the MRP is a text originally meant for beginner students, it is not so outlandish to imagine that the Author decided to keep his readers – who were moving their first steps into the complexities of the art of debate – far from unnecessary sophistications. Maybe it is exactly for this reason that also the two longest replies in the second set of objections, i.e., counter-arguments 5 and 7, consist in nothing but two unmarked excerpts borrowed from the TJ. This leads us to suppose that the Author wanted to confine himself to making his still inexperienced students aware of Bhāviveka's views on the two topics of perception and common consensus, without going any further (and it may also be that he reputed his discussion of these objections in chapter 1 was sufficiently comprehensive for his audience). If perception and common consensus can be difficult matters, inference is perhaps the hardest subject in epistemology, whose technical aspects may be quite tough to tackle for a novice. Having been elaborated over and over by skilled

logicians during the long history of Buddhism, and especially of Māhāyana, the philosophy of inference reached at a certain point such high levels of dialectical subtlety and abstraction that it is not surprising that the Author, as said above, decided not to delve into the counter-argument to objection 6. Coming now to the last objection 8, it clearly presupposes the acquaintance with some passages of the TJ, particularly *ad* MHK 3.26, and its extreme brevity could depend mainly on the fact that the Author has already dealt with this same objection in chapter 1, considering perhaps unnecessary to repeat a second time his counter-argument (but, interestingly enough, this does not apply for instance to objection 3, which is discussed in detail both in chapter 1 and in even greater detail in chapter 5, suggesting again that the Author paid more attention to the first group of objections than to the second).

After the eight counter-arguments, the chapter ends with some conclusive stanzas.

1.3. *The purpose of MRP, chapter 5*

Coming now to the main purpose of chapter 5, I have mentioned above that this chapter explains in detail the correct understanding of the distinction between conventional and ultimate truth as a dialectical weapon to be used to win in debates against opponents. To provide the reader with good tools for winning in debates seems to be exactly the main purpose of chapter 5, as it is suggested by several textual clues, both (A) direct and (B) indirect.

A. Among the direct textual clues we can include sentences like the following ones, some of which, we notice by passing, have quite a conversational flavor:

- (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 272b1–2) *pha rol rgol ba bzlog pa dang // bstan bcos chen po'i dus dag tu // sngon gyi mkhas pas bkod pa bzhin // sgra dang tshad ma'ang smra bar bya //* (“On the occasions when you will rebut the attack of an opponent, and a treatise is large, you should mention verbal testimony and [the other] valid means of knowledge, in accordance with [what] has been written by the former erudites”).
- (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 273a1–2) *'di lta bu'i bden pa gnyis khong du chud pa ni gzhan gyi sde pa dang / rang gi sde pa'i rgol ba dag la*

'jigs pa dang / bag tsha ba ni ci yang med de / (“[If you] master the two truths in this way, you have no [reason] whatsoever to be afraid of, and anxious for, [the objections raised by] antagonists [both] of other schools and of your own school”).

- (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 273a6) *'dir rang gi sde pa [...] ma bzod nas shin tu rngams nas rgol bar byed de /* (“Here the other Buddhists [...] being unable to resist any longer, could dispute with extreme violence as follows”).
- (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 273b2) *de la 'dir bjrod par bya ste /* (“Thence, you should discuss in this way”).
- (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 276a7) *yang [...] log par lta ba 'dzin pa ni tshar bcad pa'i 'os yin pas / rgyang bsrings te bshad par bya'o //* (“Moreover, since you are able [now] to abolish the retention of wrong views [...] you should explain [the counter-argument by starting] from afar”).

What all these sentences have in common is that they are practical assertions having both the aim of reassuring the reader by telling her/him what set of skills and which kind of knowledge s/he should develop, and of providing her/him with advices on what is the proper method to use to win arguments in a dispute. Besides, the conversational style of many of these sentences reinforces the idea, already mentioned, according to which the MRP is the fruit of the rearrangement of oral instructions delivered by a teacher to his pupils. The fact that this text was mainly meant for students is explicitly declared in the third opening stanza of chapter 5, whose *pāda* d runs indeed thus: *slob ma dag la bshad par bya //* (“[The Madhyamaka teaching] should [now] be explained to the students”).

B. Among the indirect textual clues we can list many of the citations occurring throughout the text. By way of example, let us consider again the exposition of the conventional and ultimate truth in the first part of chapter 5. If we observe the way in which the Author deals with each of the two truths, we notice that he confines himself to quoting, one after another, several passages from authoritative texts, without adding any significant information. Far from representing a lack of zeal, this expository choice can hide a precise reason. Instead of enriching the text with personal considerations and framing the quotes with his own views, as

he does indeed in other moments, it seems to me that in this case the Author is rather concerned with providing his reader with convenient quotes, functional for managing and defending the Madhyamaka arguments in a debate with an opponent. As a matter of fact, the authoritative sources of the past are good weapons to rely upon when necessary during a debate, either in order to strengthen one's own position, or for attacking the opponent's viewpoint (as the Author himself recalls in D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 272b1–2, referred to above). It is not surprising then, that the Author did not add much of his own views in this section of the text: he knew how a debate should be conducted and perhaps he also considered himself – rightly or wrongly, it does not matter – not authoritative enough to be mentioned by his students during a dispute.

As a concluding remark, it is worth noticing that the TJ excerpts embedded unmarked in MRP, chapter 5, are almost entirely taken from TJ, chapter 3, which deals with the search for the knowledge of reality (*tattvajñānaiṣaṅā*; *de kho na nyid kyi shes pa tshol ba*). The majority of these TJ passages, are inserted into the counter-arguments to the aforementioned eight objections. In particular, significant fragments from the TJ are embedded in the replies to objections 2 and 3, whereas – as noticed before – replies to objections 5 and 7 consist entirely in two distinct quotes from the TJ, and the short reply to objection 8 clearly presupposes the knowledge of TJ on MHK 3.26. Such a peculiar use of the TJ may indicate that the Author's aim was not only to explain the contents of Bhāviveka's work to his students or readers, but also to show them how to resort to the TJ as an authoritative source, useful for practical purposes like conducting a philosophical debate. As I see it, this is the way the Author attempts to keep the 6th century TJ an actually living text within the 10th century Madhyamaka doctrinal tradition.

2. MRP, chapter 5: annotated translation and edition

In the following sections the reader will find the English annotated translation, together with the Tibetan edition of MRP, chapter 5. In the translation I have used the Sanskrit terms to render those Tibetan words that refer to basic Buddhist concepts, such as *dharma*, *dharmadhātu*, *nirvāṇa* etc. I have also inserted into brackets the usual Sanskrit correspondents

of Tibetan expressions that are relevant from a doctrinal, linguistic and/or textual viewpoint.

The edition of the Tibetan text is based on C, D, G and N. The folios numbers are indicated into subscribed square brackets. Moreover, to help the reader locate more easily the references, titles of mentioned texts are in italics, whereas the names of the thinkers and teachers, the appellations (like *slob dpon* and *sangs rgyas*) as well as the names of the schools are underscored.

In both the translation and the edition, small caps indicate the embedded portions of the TJ. In order to facilitate the comprehension of the main subjects dealt with in the various sections of the text, I have inserted uppercase titles into square brackets.

2.1. English translation

[A. OPENING STANZAS]

After having paid homage to the noble Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva and Candrakīrti, I will deal with the two truths (**dve satye*) according to the teachings of the venerable ones (**bhaṭṭaraka*).

From various countless births, to those who have good intellect, the Omniscient One (**sarvajña*) has taught the definitive meaning (**nītārtha*) as the quintessence of the proper practice.

Since the instruction of the *dharmatā* of *dharmas*, which constitutes the heart of the teachings, derives from Nāgārjuna, this should [now] be explained to the students (**śiṣya*).

Nowadays most people are hostile to the great Madhyamaka; since this field of all Buddhas (**viśayaḥ sarvabuddhānām*) arose from the mouth of Nāgārjuna,

With regard to this, hostility is unreasonable! Having the Sugata prophesied [on account of the greatness of Nāgārjuna],⁶ those who develop aversion towards all Buddhas do not embrace [any good] karmic maturation.

[B. INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS]

In the *Āryamañjuśrīyupadeśasūtra* it is said:

⁶ The Buddha's prophecy about Nāgārjuna's birth and the latter's magnificence is the object of MRP, chapter 8, a summary of which can be found in Potter 2003: 457.

O Mañjuśrī, when the *dharmadhātu* is regarded as authority, [then] there is neither conventional (**saṃvṛti*) nor ultimate (**paramārtha*).⁷

And in [the texts dealing with] the great arising of the Conqueror (**Jinamahāsūti* ?)⁸ it is also said:

All *dharmas* are unborn from the beginning and endowed with the door of [the letter] A.⁹

⁷ This same passage is quoted again in MRP, chapter 1, precisely at D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 259a5, where however it is said to belong to the *Āryadharmadhātuprakṛtyasambhedanirdeśasūtra*. Even if with a different Tibetan wording, the citation reminds us indeed of the following excerpt ('*PHags pa chos kyi dbyings kyi rang bzhin dbyer med par bstan pa'i mdo*; L, dKon-brtsegs, KHa, 232a6–7): '*Jam dpal gyis smras pa | btsun pa Śā rdva ti'i bu | khyod chos kyi dbyings kyi rang bzhin la kun rdzob dang | don dam pa yod par 'dod dam | smras pa | 'Jam dpal | chos kyi dbyings kyi rang bzhin la ni | kun rdzob dang | don dam pa dmigs su med do* // The *Āryamañjuśrīyupadeśasūtra*, we notice, is mentioned twice in Dharmamitra's (8th–9th century) *Abhisamayālaṃkārikākāraṅkāraṅprajñāpāramitopadeśasāstraṅkāraprasphuṭhapadā* (*SHes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel bshad tshig rab tu gsal ba*; D, SHes-phyin, NYa, 31a1 and 107b4).

⁸ The feminine Tibetan form *rgyal ba bskrun ma chen mo* leads us to suppose that the Author is here perhaps referring to some text belonging to the Prajñāpāramitā tradition, known also as the Great Mother (*Yum chen mo*).

⁹ To compare with the following Sanskrit passage in the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (Dutt 2000: 212): *akāro mukhaḥ sarvadharmāṅām ādyanutpannatvāt*. "A" in this context is to be intended as the first of the *dhāraṇīmukhas* (*gzungs kyi sgo*). On the *dhāraṇīmukhas* see Conze 1975: 160–162, Lamotte 1976: 1778–1779, note 2. Besides, consider also the *Kuśalamūlasaṃparigraha* ('*PHags pa dge ba'i rtsa ba yongs su 'dzin pa*; L, mDo-mang, NGa, 334a3–6): *chos thams cad ni | a zhes bya ba'i sgo can te | a zhes bya ba la 'jug pa ni | rnam pa med pa'i sgo gdags pa'i bshad pa'i gnas so // de mngon par sgrub pa ni | mtshams sbyor bar byed pa'o // de la mtshams sbyor ba'i yi ge dag gis a zhes bya ba ma byas te | de'i phyir chos ni | a zhes bya ba zhes bya'o // de ni | a zhes bya bas rnam par rig par byed cing | rnam par rig pa de'ang de'i mtshams sbyor ba'i tshig dang yi ge dag dang ldan par yongs su rdzogs par byed do // des na de bzhin gshegs pas 'dī skad du chos thams cad ni | a zhes bya ba'i sgo can no //* ("All *dharmas* are endowed with the door of 'A' and the entrance into 'A' is the abode of the teaching designated as the door of the shapeless. The full establishment of that [letter] serves to the diphthong [letters]. In this regard, 'A' is not composite by means of the diphthong letters and, because of that, the *dharmā* [which is primary] is known as 'A.' That [*dharmā*] is cognized by 'A' and, also, that cognition is fully perfected, being provided with words and letters of the diphthongs [which are the derivatives] of that ['A']. Hence, the Tathāgata said [that] all *dharmas* are endowed with the door of 'A'"). Also Jayānanda (12th century), repeats this Prajñāpāramitā statement in his *Madhyamakāvātāraṅkā* (*dBu ma la 'jug pa'i 'grel bshad*; D, dBu-ma, Ra, 48a5–6): *de ltar chos thams cad yi ge a'i sgo can te | gdod ma nas sbye ba med pa'i phyir ro //* ("Thus, all *dharmas*

So the two truths, in the *dharmadhātu*, should be recognized as having no differentiation. Moreover, since the irresolute one (**aniścayin*) has the eye of the intellect covered with a thick film of ignorance (**avidyā*) from beginningless time, he has become like a blind-born one (**jātyandha*). Since the evil spirit of the attachment to [the idea of the real existence of] things seeped into his heart, he has become like a madman (**unmatta*). Being under the influence of unwholesome friends (**akuśalamitra*), he does not rely upon the ultimate truth. Having become powerless – like [somebody who tries to lead] an elephant without hooks – because of the separation from wholesome friends (**kalyāṇamitra*),¹⁰ he is firmly tied up by the fetters of the four types of habitual tendencies (**vāsanā*),¹¹ being [thereby] like a silkworm [into its cocoon]. Once he has neutralized the state of deep sleep of ignorance, he must be able to [consider things] with respect to the vision of this side (**aparadarśana*),¹² [according to which everything is] similar to the state of dream (**svapna*). Even though we have [already] talked about [this matter] previously,¹³ nonetheless we shall here analyze in [greater] detail the two truths.

[B.1. CONVENTIONAL TRUTH]

Since the *ācārya* said:

The Buddhas taught the *dharmā* by having recourse to two truths: the worldly conventional truth and also the truth of the ultimate meaning,¹⁴

are endowed with the door of the letter A, because they are unborn from the beginning¹⁵).

¹⁰ On the importance of being constantly under the good influence of a *kalyāṇamitra* see Läänemets 2015.

¹¹ On the four *vāsanā* see Del Toso 2014: 542, note 19.

¹² The *aparadarśana* is the worldly, conventional perspective as opposed to the ultimate. The Author has already dealt with this concept in MRP, chapter 1. See Lindtner 1981: 170. The expression *aparadarśana* (*tshu rol mthong ba*) occurs also in Adhiṣa's *Satyadvayāvātāra* 10, on which see Apple 2013b: 516 (notice the reading *tshul rol* instead of *tshu rol*) and 2013a: 302.

¹³ The first chapter of the MRP is indeed devoted to the general assessment of the two truths. See Lindtner 1981: 169–177.

¹⁴ This is Nāgārjuna's MMK 24.8, whose Sanskrit runs thus: *dve satye samupāśritya buddhānāṃ dharmadeśanā | lokasaṃvṛtisatyāṃ ca satyaṃ ca paramārthataḥ ||* See de Jong 1977: 25, Yè 2011: 420.

in this regard, [because] the *ācārya* himself has enunciated first of all the conventional truth (**saṃvṛtisatya*), accordingly we should consider [it first]. How is it [this conventional truth]? He [*scil.* Nāgārjuna] said:

Just like a magical illusion, a dream, a city of Gandharvas [are unreal], likewise arising, likewise persistence, likewise cessation are declared [to be unreal].¹⁵

Afflictions, actions and bodies, with [their bond to] *karman*, doers and fruits themselves are similar to a mirage and a dream, they are just like a city of Gandharvas.¹⁶

It is also said:

Body, enjoyments and dwelling place (*dehabhogapraṭiṣṭhā*), *bhūmis* and *pāramitās*, the Buddhas' supernormal and emanative powers (**buddharddhiprātihārya*) and so on, *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*:

All those [things] appear to be like magical illusions, phantoms and [unreal] tangled net of hairs.¹⁷

¹⁵ This stanza corresponds to MMK 7.34, with some variant. Consider the Tibetan version (*dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa*; D, dBu-ma, TSa, 5b7): *rmi lam ji bzhin sgyu ma bzhin // dri za'i grong khyer ji bzhin du // de bzhin skye dang de bzhin gnas // de bzhin du ni 'jig pa gsungs //* See Yè 2011: 128. The Sanskrit text runs as follows (de Jong 1977: 11): *yathā māyā yathā svapno gandharvanagaram yathā / tathotpādas tathā sthānaṃ tathā bhaṅga udāhṛtam //*

¹⁶ This stanza reminds us of MMK 17.33, with relevant variants. The Tibetan translation of MMK 17.33 indeed reads thus (D, dBu-ma, TSa, 10b5): *nyon mongs las dang lus rnam dang // byed pa po dang 'bras bu dag // dri za'i grong khyer lta bu dang // smig rgyu rmi lam 'dra ba yin //* See Yè 2011: 288. The Sanskrit version is (de Jong 1977: 24): *kleśāḥ karmāni dehās ca kartāras ca phalāni ca / gandharvanagarākārā marīcisvapna-saṃnibhāḥ //* Compare MMK 17.33 with the tantric Nāgārjuna's *Pañcakrama* 3.42 (Isaacson's on-line ed.): *kleśāḥ karmaṣāḥ dehaḥ kartāras ca phalaṃ ca vai / marīcisvapna-saṃkāsā gandharvanagaropamāḥ //*

¹⁷ The first three *pādas* of the first stanza, together with the first *pāda* of the following half stanza, are quite similar to the tantric Āryadeva's (9th–10th century ?) *Svādhiṣṭhāna[krama]prabheda* 53, whose Tibetan translation is as follows (*bDag byin gyis brlab pa'i rim pa rnam par dbye ba*; D, rGyud, NGi, 114a2–3): *lus dang gnas dang longs spyod dang // sa dang pha rol phyin la sogs // sangs rgyas rdzu 'phrul rnam rol pa // thams cad sgyu ma'i rnam 'phrul yin //* The Sanskrit version of *Svādhiṣṭhāna[krama-]prabheda* 53 runs thus (Pāṇḍeya 1990: 24): *dehabhogapraṭiṣṭhā ca bhūmipāramitādayaḥ / buddharddhivikurvādi sarvaṃ māyāvicesṭitam //* This same stanza is quoted also in Abhayākara Gupta's (11th–12th century) *Śrīsaṃpuṭatantraraṅgaṭīkāmnāyamañjarī* (*dPal yang dag par sbyor ba'i rgyud kyi rgyal po'i rgya cher 'grel pa man ngag gi snye ma*; see D, rGyud, CHa, 181b7–182a1).

It is also said:

The first, the eighth and the ninth [element of the twelvefold dependent arising] are afflictions (**kleśa*), the second and the tenth are actions (**karman*), whereas the remaining seven are pain (**duḥkha*): the twelve *dharmas* are [so] gathered into three [groups].

From the three [afflictions], the two [actions] arise, whereas from the two [actions] the eight [pains] arise; [in this way] the wheel of existence (**bhavacakra*) operates again and again.

All beings [are nothing but] cause and effect; any entity (**sattva*) whatsoever here [in this world] is not different [from cause and effect]: from merely void *dharmas*, merely void [*dharmas*] arise.

The recitation, the mirror, the lamp, the seal, the Sun stone, the sour, the seed and the sound [are all examples used to explain] the recomposition (**pratisaṃdhi*) of the personal *skandhas* [in a new existence]: the learned one will [therefore] realize that there is no transfer [from one life to another].¹⁸

Whoever imagines the cessation of even an extremely subtle thing, [this] completely unwise man does not perceive the meaning of [what] arises from conditions.¹⁹

So it is said. Moreover, [since till now we have dealt with the so-called internal dependent arising (*adhyātmikapratītyasamutpāda*),] for the manner of the external dependent arising (**bāhyapratītyasamutpāda*) you should see the commentary on the *Āryaśālistambasūtra* [written] by the *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna] himself.²⁰

¹⁸ The message conveyed by the last two *pādas* of this stanza is repeated in Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 62 (Lindtner 1987: 202–203): *de bzhin phung po nying mtshams sbyor // srid pa gzhan du skye ba dang // 'pho ba med par mkhas rnams kyis // rtag to nges par bya ba yin //*

¹⁹ These five stanzas correspond to Nāgārjuna's *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā* 2–6. A close comparison between the MRP version and the text of the *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā* edited in Jamieson 2001: 90–91 will reveal many variant readings. This task, however, goes far beyond the purposes of the present study. Yet, we shall at least notice the particular discrepancy concerning *Pratītyasamutpādahṛdayakārikā* 3, the MRP version of which, besides having in many places a different wording, has only three, not four, *pādas*.

²⁰ To Nāgārjuna it is attributed a commentary on the *Śālistambasūtra*, bearing the title *Śālistambanāmahāyanasūtraṭīkā* (*Sa lu ljang pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo'i rgya cher bshad pa*; D, mDo-'grel, NGi, 20b4–55a3). A thorough study of both the text and its Indian commentaries has been accomplished by Schoening (1995), to which I refer the reader for further details on Nāgārjuna's views on the external dependent arising.

[B.2. ULTIMATE TRUTH]

Here, moreover, the *ācārya* [Nāgārjuna, on account of] the ultimate truth (**paramārthasatya*) said:

I pay homage to the perfect Buddha, the sublime master of [all] the speakers, by whom dependent arising was taught as without cessation, without arising, without annihilation, without permanence, not diverse, not single, without coming, without going, appeasement of conceptual proliferations, auspicious.²¹

And the *ācārya* also said:

It is called also translucent (*prabhāsvara*) consciousness (*vijñāna*), *nirvāṇa*, all-empty (*sarvaśūnya*) and also *dharmakāya*.²²

And again he said:

This ultimate truth is without appearance and without characteristics; it is called ultimate truth and it is the abode of all the Tathāgatas.²³

²¹ These are the two well-known *maṅgalaśloka*s that open Nāgārjuna's MMK. Their Sanskrit version runs thus (Yè 2011: 12): *anīrodham anutpādam anucchedam aśāsvatam / anekārtham anānārtham anāgamam anirgamam // yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañco- paśamaṃ śivam / deśayāmāsa sambuddhas taṃ vande vadatāṃ varam //* On the main differences between the Tibetan and the Sanskrit text of these stanzas, see MacDonald 2005: 16, notes 44–45.

²² These three *pādas* correspond to the tantric Nāgārjuna's *Piṇḍikṛtasādhana* 43d–44ab, whose Sanskrit runs thus (Wright 2010: 81–82): *vijñānaṃ ca prabhāsvaram // nirvāṇaṃ sarvaśūnyaṃ ca dharmakāyaś ca gadyate /* Compare our Tibetan text with the corresponding Tibetan translation of the *Piṇḍikṛtasādhana*: *rnam shes kyang ni 'od gsal dang // mya ngan 'das bcas kun stong dang // chos kyi skur yang bshad pa yin //* Note the variant *bcas* > *dang* in the second *pāda*. The term *sarvaśūnya*, in the tantric context and particularly in the Ārya school, indicates the fourth and higher form of emptiness, corresponding to the full emergence of the light (*prabhāsvara*) of the knowledge of reality. The first three modes of emptiness are: “empty” (*śūnya*), corresponding to “light” (*āloka*), “extremely empty” (*atīśūnya*), corresponding to “appearance of light” (*ālokābhāsa*), and “great empty” (*mahāśūnya*), corresponding to “perception of light” (*ālokaḥlabdhi*). See Davidson 2008: 40.

²³ This stanza is clearly a quote of *Piṇḍikṛtasādhana* 45, with a relevant variant in *pāda* a, as it emerges from a comparison with the Tibetan translation of the same (Wright 2010: 82): *'di ni don dam dkyil 'khor te // snang ba med cing mtshan nyid med // don dam bden pa zhes bya ba // de bzhin gzhags pa kun gyi gnas //* The corresponding Sanskrit text is as follows: *paramārthamaṅḍalam hy etan nirābhāsam alakṣaṇam / paramārthasatyanāmāpi sarvatāhāgatālayaḥ //*

Furthermore, in another [stanza] it is said:

[THE *dharmakāya*] NEITHER IS SEEN BY THE PHYSICAL EYE, NOR IS SEEN BY THE DIVINE EYE; BY THE CONCEPTUAL AND THE NON-CONCEPTUAL COGNITION IT IS NOT VISIBLE EITHER.²⁴

Moreover, *bhaṭṭāraka* Āryadeva said:

There is not existence, there is not non-existence, neither existence and non-existence, nor is there the negation of both [existence and non-existence]; the Mādhyamikas recognize reality as [consisting in] the complete liberation from the four extremes.²⁵

There is not permanence (**śāśvata*), there is not destruction (*uccheda*), nor is there both permanence and destruction; the Mādhyamikas recognize the meaning of that as [consisting in] the complete liberation from the four extremes.²⁶

²⁴ This is Bhāviveka's MHK 3.285 (Lindtner 2001: 39): *na māṃsacakṣuṣā dr̥śyo na dr̥śyo divyacakṣuṣā / savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy eṣa dudr̥śaḥ //* To compare with the Tibetan version of the same (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 14a4–5): *sha yi mig gis de lta min // lha yi mig gis blta ma yin // rtog bcas rnam rtog med pa yi // shes pas kyang ni mthong bar dka' //*

²⁵ This stanza corresponds to *Jñānasārasamuccaya* 28, attributed to Āryadeva, whose Sanskrit version runs as follows (Mimaki 2008: 241): *na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakaṃ / catuṣkoṭivinirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ //* Its Tibetan translation is: *yod min med min yod med min // gnyi ka'i bdag nyid kyang min pas // mtha' bzhi las grol dbu ma pa // mkhas par rnam ky de kho na'o //* This same stanza is also found as verse 27 of Advayavajra's (gNYis-su-med-pa'i-rdo-rje; 11th century) *Tattvaratnāvalī*. See Mathes 2015: 70, 359 and Ui 1963: 6.

²⁶ Unfortunately, I was unable to identify this stanza among the works of Āryadeva, to whom it is attributed by the Author. However, six *pādas*, very similar in content, occur in a text attributed to Advayavajra, namely, the *Āryamañjuśrīnāmasaṃgītiṭīkāśārābhisamaya* ('PHags pa 'jam dpal gyi mtshan yang dag par brjod pa'i 'grel pa snying po mngan par rtogs pa; see D, rGyud, TSHi, 107b5): *sna tshogs rtag pa ma yin zhing // chad par yang ni khas mi len // rtag dang chad pa gnyi ga med // gnyi ga yin pa ma yin pa // mtha' bzhi las ni rnam grol ba // de ni dbu ma pa yi rigs //* The first four *pādas* of these six, in their turn, correspond to Advayavajra's *Tattvaratnāvalī* 28 and *Mahāyānaviṃśikā* 4, whose Sanskrit is preserved (Mathes 2015: 71, 360 and 193, 466): *na mataṃ śāśvataṃ viśvaṃ na cocchedi samīhitam / śāśvatocchedinor yugmaṃ nānubhayaṃ vinobhayam //* See also Ui 1963: 6. The remaining two *pādas* of the *Āryamañjuśrīnāmasaṃgītiṭīkāśārābhisamaya* remind us of Āryadeva's *Jñānasārasamuccaya* 28cd (identical with Advayavajra's *Tattvaratnāvalī* 27cd).

Also, the *ācārya* Candrakīrti said:

The own nature (**svabhāva*) of *dharmas* is termination, detachment, *nirvāṇa*, cessation, emptiness, appeasement, suchness (**tathatā*): thus is explained.²⁷

[Here, there are these other verses:]

This [ultimate (*paramārtha*)] is not recognized by means of both conceptual and non-conceptual knowledge. The common usage (**vyavahāra*) of verbal testimony (**śabda*) and [the other] valid means of knowledge (**pramāṇa*) is not necessary for the meditation (**bhāvanā*) on that [ultimate] meaning.²⁸

[But] on the occasions when you will rebut the attack of an opponent and the treatise is large (**mahāśāstra*), you should mention verbal testimony and [the other] valid means of knowledge, in accordance with [what] has been written by the former erudites.²⁹

A blind person, who ascends a mountain by chance, [since he cannot see where he is going] will not obtain [any] happiness [because it is highly probable for him to fail the task of reaching the summit; similarly] IT IS NOT EXTRAORDINARY THAT THOSE WHO RELY MERELY UPON INFERENCE WILL COMPLETELY FALL DOWN.³⁰

Just like [one who gropes with his hands] into ricks of clover (**vanālu* ?),³¹ looking for an object (**dravya*) in the darkness [and does not find that

²⁷ This is, with some variants in the third and fourth *pādas*, Candrakīrti's *Triśaraṇasa-ptati* 28, the Tibetan version of which runs thus (Sørensen 1986: 32): *zad dang chags bral mya ngan 'das // 'gog dang stong pa nyid zhi ba // de bzhin nyid kyang chos rnam kyī // rang gi ngo bo de nyid bshad //*

²⁸ The first two *pādas* of this stanza reminds us of MHK 3.285cd (Lindtner 2001: 39): *savikalpāvikalpena jñānenāpy eṣa durdṛśaḥ //* The Tibetan translation of the same is (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 14a5): *rtoḡ bcas rnam rtoḡ med pa yi // shes pas kyang ni mthong bar dka' //*

²⁹ The meaning of this stanza is perhaps better understood if we compare it with another similar one, occurring in MRP, chapter 7, and precisely at D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 281a3: *pha rol rgoḡ ba bzlog pa dang // bstan bcos chen po'i gzhung dang ni // rtsod pa chen po byung dus su // rigs pa'i dBu ma'i gzhung smra bya //*; that is: "On the occasion when a great dispute (**mahāvighraha*) occurs and you have to rebut the attack of an opponent and write a large treatise (**mahāśāstra*), you should mention the Madhyamaka scriptures on reasoning (**yukti*)."

³⁰ This stanza is very similar to MHK 9.14, quoted few lines below. In particular, the last two *pādas* are identical with MHK 9.14cd.

³¹ I don't grasp in full the meaning of this simile and I am not aware of other occurrences of the expression "ricks of clover" (*'ol tshogs dag*) in other Buddhist texts or elsewhere. Maybe the sense conveyed is something like: "to find a needle in a haystack."

object], in the same way, also by [those who rely upon] inference the [ultimate] meaning is similarly not known.

LIKE A BLIND PERSON WHO RUNS THROUGH A DREADFUL PATH BY [RELYING ONLY UPON HIS ABILITY TO] GUESS [THE WAY ON THE BASIS OF THE TACTILE FEEDBACK] OF THE FEET [AND EVENTUALLY FALLS IN A RAVINE,³² SIMILARLY] IT IS NOT DIFFICULT [TO SURMISE] THAT THOSE WHO RELY MERELY UPON INFERENCE [IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH TRUTH] WILL FALL DOWN.³³

Mahāsukhanātha [Padmavajra] also said:

Reality (*tattva*) is known personally,³⁴ it is not comprehensible when taught by others; it becomes comprehensible by the cultivation of devotion (*bhaktibhāvanā*), it is not comprehended otherwise.³⁵

³² The TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 277a4) explains that a blind person who is running on a dreadful path can end up falling in a precipice (*g.yang sa lam nas 'gro bar byed pa*).

³³ This is MHK 9.14, whose Sanskrit version is (Lindtner 2001: 93): *pādasparśādivāndhānām viṣaṃe patha dhāvātām | anumānapradhānānām pātas teṣāṃ na durlabhaḥ ||* To compare with the Tibetan translation of the same (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 31b7–32a1): *long ba rkang pa'i tshod dpags kyis || nyam nga'i lam du rgyug pa ltar || rjes su dpag pa gtsor 'dzin rnams || ltung bar dka' ba ma yin no ||* For a discussion of this stanza see Eckel (2008: 39–40), who analyzes it in the light of Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya* 1.42, which seems to have inspired Bhāviveka. Interestingly enough, MHK 9.14 quoted here contains a *pūrvapakṣa* of a hypothetical partisan of the Mīmāṃsā school.

³⁴ The Author's selection of quotes at the end of this section – especially Mahāsukhanātha's, Kambala's and Dharmakīrti's stanzas – shows his particular attention to stressing the idea that ultimate reality cannot be actually grasped by logic or with the help of other people. Logic and teachers' instructions are indeed only, so to speak, pointers that can indicate the right direction, but realizing the knowledge of reality remains a purely personal fact. This is a concept already occurring for instance in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, stanza 2.146 (*pratyātmavedya*; see Vaidya 1963: 37), better specified in 10.163ab (see Vaidya 1963: 118: *pratyātmavedyayānam me tārikikāṅām agocaram* /; that is: “My vehicle, which is personally known, is not within the range of logicians”), and well known also to Bhāviveka, who indeed in his MHK 3.10 explains that the ultimate meaning is “personally known” (*pratyātmasaṃvedya*; *so so rang rig*). See Heitman 2004: 96–99 and Lindtner 2001: 8. The Author embeds MHK 3.10 in MRP, chapter 6 (see D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 276b7), the shortest chapter of the text (only 5 stanzas), devoted to the understanding of the ultimate meaning (*paramāthaprajñā*; *don dam pa'i shes rab*).

³⁵ This stanza corresponds, with several variants, to Padmavajra's *Guhyasiddhi* 3.71 (the full title of this work is: *Sakalatantrasadbhāvasaṅcodanīśrīguhyasiddhi*; Tibetan: *rGyud ma lus pa'i don nges par skul bar byed pa dpal gsang ba grub pa*). Compare our stanza with the Sanskrit version of *Guhyasiddhi* 3.71 (Rinpoche 1987: 26): *svasaṃvedyaṃ tu tat tattvaṃ vaktuṃ nānyasya pāryate | bhaktibhāvanayā gamyam na gamyam cānyathā nu tat ||*; and with its Tibetan translation (D, rGyud, Wi, 12a1–2): *rang gi rig pa'i de nyid de || gzhan gyis brjod par nus mi 'gyur || gus dang bsgom pas rtogs 'gyur gyi || de ni gzhan du rtogs mi nus ||* As we can observe, the translators into Tibetan of the

Moreover, *śrī* Kambala said:

This [reality], being subtle, is known personally; it is the domain/object of those who have subtle [intellect]; it is not known by the coarse intellect of [blockhead] beings like me.³⁶

Furthermore, the *ācārya* Dīnnāga said:

There, [only] the one-thousand Noble Ones, who know selflessness by means of the radiant sun of the Tathāgata’s words, enter into the citadel [at the end of] the path [that leads] to *nirvāṇa*; [this goal] is not within the domain of [those who have] coarse intellect.³⁷

Also Dharmakīrti, who is the crest-jewel of the excellent logicians that understand the logical reasoning[, said]:

If one wants to pursue the meaning of reality (**tattvārtha*), one should not rely upon the inferential reason (**anumānaheṭu*), [since reality] is to be

Guhyasiddhi, Kṛṣṇapaṇḍita and TSHul-khrims-rgyal-ba, seem to have taken the compound *bhaktibhāvanayā* as a *dvandva* (*gus dang bsgom pas*: devotion and cultivation), whereas the Tibetan translation contained in the MRP can be interpreted either as a *tatpuruṣa* (as I have translated it) or as a *karmadhāraya* (*gus par bsgom pas*: “the cultivation that is devotion”). It is worth noting that this stanza occurs with some variant also in the tantric Āryadeva’s *Caryāmelāpakapradīpa*, chapter 8 (Wedemeyer 2007: 453): *svasaṃvedyaṃ kṛtaṃ tattvaṃ vaktuṃ nānyasya pāryate | bhaktibhāvanayā gamyam agamyam cānyathā tu tat ||*

³⁶ Christian Lindtner (1982: 175, note 39) identifies this stanza with *Ālokamāla* 13: *svasaṃvedyā tu sā saukṣmyād buddhānām sūkṣmadarśinām | mādrśaiḥ svāśrayasthāpi sthūladhībhir na drśyate ||* However, a comparison between the two versions shows that the text quoted in the MRP presents relevant variants. Compare our text also with the Tibetan translation of *Ālokamāla* 13 (Lindtner 2003: 16): *rang rig de yang phra ba’i phyir || sangs rgyas rnam kyis phra ba gziḡs || rang la gnas kyang bdag ’dra bas || rtsing ba’i phyir ni mthong ba med ||* Lindtner (2003: 17) translates: “It [i.e., reality] can, however, due to its subtlety be personally experienced by the subtle-seeing Buddhas. Though (thusness) rests in one’s own body it cannot be seen by blockheads like me.”

³⁷ I owe to the kindness of David Rawson the identification of this stanza with a verse occurring at the end of the *Abhidharmakośavṛttimarmapradīpa* (*CHos mngon pa’i mdzod kyi ’grel pa gnad kyi sgron ma*; the stanza occurs in D, mNGon-pa, NYu, 214a5) commentary, attributed to Dīnnaga, on Vasubhandu’s *Abhidharmakośa*. Dīnnaga, however, repeats the stanza probably from the *Pudgalaviniścaya* section of Vasubandhu’s (4th century) *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, whose Sanskrit is preserved (Śāstrī 1998: 956): *imāṃ hi nirvāṇapuraikavartinīm tathāgatādītyavacoṃśubhāsvatīm | nirātmātām āryasahasravāhītām na mandacakṣur vivṛtām apīkṣate ||* The corresponding Tibetan version reads as follows (D, mNGon-pa, KHu, 95a5–6): *de bzhing gshegs pa nyi ma’i gsungs ’od kyis || snang ldan mya ngan ’das grong lam gcig pa || bdag med ’phags pa stong gis bgrod pa ’di || phyé yang dman pa’i miḡ gis mi mthong ngo ||*

experienced by means of a correct meditation (**bhāvanā*); due to that [meditation, reality] is known personally, it is not comprehended [by logic].

The essence (**hṛdaya*) of the meaning of reality is not experienced by means of the knowledge [derived from] inference (** anumāna*); one will experience [that essence] by means of meditation, after having followed a good teacher (**guru*).

When one observes that one's own [school] and all the other schools without exception take part in the wrong path (**asanmārga*), since those [other schools] and also one's own are [mutually] hostile, [in order to find the right way] one should then speak [by having recourse to] inference.

Since delusion (**moha*) is [covering our understanding] from beginningless [time], one should first train the mind by logical reasoning (**yukti*), after that, with the will of [progressing into] meditation, there is no [longer need to] rely upon inference.³⁸

Thus it is said in the *Tattvaniṣkarṣa*.

[B.3. CONCLUSION OF THE TEACHINGS ON THE TWO TRUTHS]

[If you] master the two truths in this way, you have no [reason] whatsoever to be afraid of, and anxious for, [the objections raised by] antagonists of other schools and of your own school. [Here there is a stanza:]

After you have bridled [the argument] by means of the reins of logical reasoning (**yukti*), so that you shall ride the chariot of the two systems, [having] properly entered the Āgama path, hit [your opponent] with the whip of the teacher's oral instructions (**upadeśa*).³⁹

[On account] of whatever conventional thing (**saṃvṛtibhāva*), the erudites that comprehend in full [the ultimate (*paramārtha*)] exactly as non-arising (**anutpāda*) have no craving (**rāga*), aversion (**dveṣa*) and confusion (**moha*), since they understand the reality (**tattva*) of things as the *dharmatā* of *dharmas*.

³⁸ On these four stanzas and on the title *Tattvaniṣkarṣa*, apparently a lost work here attributed to Dharmakīrti, see Lindter 1980.

³⁹ The first two *pādas* of this quote remind us of Śāntarakṣita's (8th century) *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* 93ab, whose entire stanza runs thus (Ichigō 1989: 222): *tshul gnyis shing rta zhon nas su // rigs pa'i srab skyogs 'ju bye dpa // de dag de phyir ji bzhin don // theg pa chen po pa nyid 'thob //* The "two systems," to which Śāntarakṣita (and the Author too) makes allusion to here, are the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra.

HOW SO? IF EVEN THE YOGINS OF [THIS] WORLD – [AFTER HAVING] MEDITATED UPON THE BASIS OF INFINITE SPACE (**ākāśānāntyāyatana*), THE BASIS OF INFINITE CONSCIOUSNESS (**viññānāntyāyatana*), THE BASIS OF NOTHINGNESS (**ākīṃcanyāyatana*) AND THE BASIS OF NEITHER EXISTENCE NOR NON-EXISTENCE (= *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana*) – [ARE ABLE TO] ELIMINATE TEMPORARILY ALL THE NOTIONS OF FORM (**rūpasamjñā*) AND THE NOTIONS OF IMPENETRABILITY (**pratighasamjñā*), AND LIKEWISE THEY [ARE ABLE TO] DISPEL THE NOTION OF FORM, HAVING BECOME ACCUSTOMED TO THE MEDITATION ON THE EIGHT LIBERATIONS (**vimokṣa*), ON THE BASIS OF OVERCOMING (**abhibhvāyatana*) AND ON THE BASIS OF TOTALITY (**krtsnāyatana*), [IF THESE WORLDLY YOGINS ARE ABLE TO DO ALL THESE THINGS,] WHAT TO SPEAK OF WHAT THE UNSURPASSED YOGINS OF THE MAHĀYĀNA WILL [BE ABLE TO] GRASP ON FORM? [THEY,] WHO – [AFTER HAVING] MEDITATED FULLY TRAINED ON THE ABSENCE OF INHERENT NATURE (**svabhāva*) OF [ALL] THINGS (**bhāva*) OF COUNTLESS AEONS – ABIDE IN THE PERFECTION OF THE EIGHTEEN KINDS OF EMPTINESS AND THE THREE GATES OF EMANCIPATION (**vimokṣasamukha*).⁴⁰

⁴⁰ This is a passage borrowed from the TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 65a3–6), which serves as an introduction to MHK 3.40 (Iida 1968: 130–131): *gang gi phyir 'jig rten pa'i rnal 'byor pa nam mkha' mtha' yas skye mched dang / rnam shes mtha' yas skye mched dang / ci yang med pa'i skye mched kyi snyoms par 'jug pa sgom pa la gnas pa dag kyang re zhig gzugs kyi 'du shes dang / thogs pa'i 'du shes rnam pa thams cad du nub cing de bzhin du rnam par thar pa brgyad dang / zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched dang / zad par gyi skye mched dag bsgom pa gams par 'jug tu yang gzugs kyi 'du shes spong bar 'gyur na / theg pa chen po bla na med pa'i rnal 'byor pa bskal pa dpag tu med par dngos po'i rang gi ngo bo nyid du bsgoms pa stong pa nyid dang / mtshan ma med pa dang / smon pa med pa bsgom pa mthar phyin pa la gnas pa rnam gzugs su 'dzin par 'gyur ba lta smos kyang ci dgos te / As we can see, the text preserved in the MRP differs in many points from the TJ. The expression *yod min med min skye mched* occurring in the MRP refers to *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* and is an abbreviated form of *'du shes yod min med min skye mched*, namely, *'du shes med 'du shes med min gyi skye mched*. The four bases of meditation listed here correspond to the so-called four formless absorptions (*ārūpyasamāpatti*; *gzugs med pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa*), of which – we notice – the *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* is mentioned in the MRP but does not occur in the TJ. On its absence in the latter text see Iida 1968: 251, note 47. The notions of form (*rūpasamjñā*; *gzugs kyi 'du shes*) and impenetrability (*pratighasamjñā*; *thogs pa'i 'du shes*) are construed over two characteristics typical of the material objects and are eliminated when one enters the domain of formless absorptions. On the meditation on the eight liberations (*vimokṣa*; *rnam par thar pa*), the basis of overcoming (*abhibhvāyatana*; *zil gyis gnon pa'i skye mched*) and the basis of totality (*krtsnāyatana*; *zad par gyi skye mched*), see Iida 1968: 251, notes 48, 49 and 50. On the eighteen kinds of emptiness, which are not referred to in the corresponding passage*

[Put] the non-self (**anātman*) in the midst of the space and dissolve [it] into the *dharmadhātu*; the *prajñāpāramitā* [consists in grasping that] the object to be seen (**dṛśya*), the one who sees (**draṣṭri*) and the act of seeing (**darśana*) do not exist.⁴¹

[C. THE OPPONENT'S EIGHT OBJECTIONS]

Here the other Buddhists, the majority [of whom] believe in the reality of matter (**bhāvagraha*),⁴² being unable to resist any longer, could dispute with extreme violence as follows:

- [1.] You Mādhyamikas are fraudulent (**viḍambakārin*) cheaters (**śaṭha*), since you refuse the others['] viewpoints] without asserting your own opinion (**svamata*).⁴³
- [2.] Since you consider non-arising (**anutpāda*) as being non-existence (**abhāvātā*), you believe exclusively in non-existence.⁴⁴

of the TJ, see Lamotte 1976: 2028–2162. The three gates of emancipation are emptiness (*śūnyatā*; *stong pa nyid*), signlessness (*ānimitta*; *mtshan ma med pa*) and wishlessness (*aprañihita*; *smon pa med pa*), which are mentioned explicitly in the TJ.

⁴¹ A stanza having the same first *pāda* of this one occurs also in Kalyāṇavarman's (10th century) *Pañjikā* on *Catuspīthatantra* 1.3.8. See the notes to Kalyāṇavarman's text in Szántó 2008: 13–14, where the possible Sanskrit original is suggested: *khamadhye kuru nairātmam*.

⁴² The realist schools of Buddhism adumbrated here are of course the Sarvāstivāda, the Vaibhāṣika and the Sautrāntika.

⁴³ This same objection – namely, that the Mādhyamikas would only disprove others' thesis (*gzhang gyi phyogs sun 'byin pa*) without having a thesis of their own (*rang gi phyogs bzhaḡ pa med pa*) and therefore they would be guilty of a dialectical abuse (*viḍambanā*; *co 'dri ba*) –, is expounded and rejected also by Bhāviveka in his TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 60b6–7). See Iida 1968: 109–110. It occurs again in TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 121b5–6) and rejected in the subsequent stanza MHK 3.266. See Eckel 1992b: 158. The Mādhyamikas' abstention from pointing out any positive proposition is a dialectical expedient that can be traced back to Nāgārjuna himself. Such an attitude can be indeed detected for instance in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 29. See Bhattacharya, Johnston and Kunst 1990: 14, 61, 113. Later on, the so-called Prāsaṅgika school of Madhyamaka took quite rigorously the principle of rejecting the opponents' viewpoints without putting forward any position of its own, whereas the Svātantrikas admitted positive propositions, but only at a conventional level, in order to substantiate those inferences that are useful for denying the opponents' perspectives. The Svātantrikas' indulgent position towards positive assertions cost them the criticism of Candrakīrti and his Prāsaṅgika followers. For an overview of the disputes between the Prāsaṅgikas and the Svātantrikas see, among others, Della Santina 1995, Seyfort Ruegg 2006.

⁴⁴ This is quite a common objection raised against the Mādhyamikas. Its main point consists of assuming from an ontological standpoint that the well-known Madhyamaka

- [3.] Since you denigrate all the [Buddhist] *dharma*s, such as cause, effect, truths, jewels etc., you are nihilists.⁴⁵
- [4.] Since you disparage the scriptures (**āgama*) of the Tathāgata, you are [in your turn] discredited by the scriptures [because they contain the teachings of the Tathāgata and therefore are reliable sources].⁴⁶
- [5.] Since you denigrate direct perception (**pratyakṣa*), you are [in your turn] discredited by direct perception [because you are denying both your own and other people's direct experience].⁴⁷

negation of arising expresses nothing but an absolute non-existentialist stance. The theoretical roots that could have provided ground to such a criticism can be found, again, in Nāgārjuna's works, like for instance MMK 7.20, 21.12–13, *Lokāitastava* 19, *Acintyastava* 50cd etc. See respectively de Jong 1977: 10, 29; Yè 2011: 120, 354, 356; Tola and Dragonetti 1995a: 114 and 123, 119 and 131. Consider also *Ratnāvalī* 4.86, on which see Hahn 1982: 126–127.

⁴⁵ This objection reminds us of, for instance, Nāgārjuna's opponent's criticism depicted in MMK 24.1–6. See de Jong 1977: 34; Yè 2011: 416, 418. Interestingly enough, the Author has already dealt with a similar accusation of nihilism in MRP, chapter 1. See Lindtner 1981: 174 for the objection and 1981: 175–176 for the Madhyamaka reply. The Author's reply to this objection, translated below, makes it clear that “nihilism” in this context does not have an ontological value, rather a moral one. In particular, “nihilism” is used here in reference to the typical Cārvāka/Lokāyata point of view, which is considered nihilistic insofar as it does not admit the validity of any real moral retribution of good and bad deeds.

⁴⁶ With this objection the opponent may have in mind to discredit the way Mādhyamikas interpret Buddhist scriptures according to the two categories of provisional (*neyārtha*; *draṅg ba'i don*) and definitive (*nītārtha*; *nges pa'i don*) meaning. In chapters 3 and 4 of the MRP, indeed, the Author explains that the tenets the Śrāvakas and Yogācārins derive from the scriptures in order to substantiate their respective doctrines are to be considered provisional, which is another way to say that they are not expression of the ultimate meaning (*paramārtha*; *don dam pa*). See Lindtner 1986b: 182, 1986a: 247. This means that, from the Author's point of view, the scriptures the Śrāvakas and Yogācārins rely upon should be accepted as valid only as long as one does not enter the advanced stages on the path towards the realization of reality (*tattva*; *de nyid*). The more one progresses on that path, the more one becomes aware that the true teaching is contained in the texts conveying the definitive meaning, namely, the writings accepted by the Mādhyamikas (as the very title of this chapter 5 clearly suggests). The possible target of the present objection may be, for instance, Nāgārjuna's MMK 25.24, where it is stated that the Buddha or Tathāgata actually did not teach anything to anyone at any place. See de Jong 1977: 40, Yè 2011: 460. Such an assertion could lead indeed to thinking that, according to the Madhyamaka school, none of the Buddhist scriptures does really represent the Buddha's teaching.

⁴⁷ The objection concerning perception, together with the following one on inference, points at discarding the Madhyamaka assumption according to which none of the so-called

- [6.] Since you discredit inference (**anumāna*), you will be [in your turn] denigrated because of that[, i.e., because inference is the way according to which we can establish presently unknown things on the basis of things we already know].⁴⁸
- [7.] Since you discredit [what is] well-known (**prasiddha*) [among people], you are [in your turn] denigrated because of that[, i.e., because common opinion, which you deny, is considered valid by everyone].⁴⁹
- [8.] Since you discredit [even your own] assertions (**svavacana*),⁵⁰ by reiterating this path, both you and the other degenerate erudites [of your school] will be lost and your scriptural tradition abandoned.

valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) are actually valid. Such a viewpoint was articulately expressed by Nāgārjuna himself for instance in his *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 30–51. See Bhattacharya, Johnston and Kunst 1990: 15–21, 62–72, 114–124. In MRP, chapter 1, the Author has already considered and discussed a similar objection on perception. See Lindtner 1981: 173 for the objection and 1981: 174 for the Madhyamaka counter-argument. In the TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 60a3–4) the same objection is expressed and rejected by Bhāviveka. In particular, Bhāviveka makes it clear that the opponent’s position is grounded on the widely acknowledged idea that direct perception through sense organs (*dbang po rnams kyi mngon sum yin par grags*) is the only way to approach all objects with certainty (*yul so sor nges pa la ’jug pa nyid*). See Iida 1968: 104–106, Heitmann 2004: 126–127.

⁴⁸ As far as inference is concerned, besides the reference to MHK 9.14 and to Dharmakīrti’s *Tattvanīṣkarṣa*, quoted above in section B.2, it is noteworthy that in chapter 1 of the MRP the Author clearly refutes the point of view of those logicians (*tārkika*; *rtog ge ba*) who merely rely upon inference. See Lindtner 1981: 169. According to the Author – and to Bhāviveka too, as for instance MHK 5.107 clearly shows (see Eckel 2008: 295–296, 442–443) –, indeed, the reality of things, namely, what really matters, cannot be grasped by means of inference. It is this position that seems to be targeted by the opponent here.

⁴⁹ The same objection has already been discussed by the Author in MRP, chapter 1. See Lindtner 1981: 173 for the opponent’s position and 1981: 174–175 for the Madhyamaka reply. Also Bhāviveka tackles a similar objection in his TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 60a4–6), where the opponent disputes the fact that, since it is accepted also by common people like highlanders and outcasts (*ri khrod pa dang gdol pa yan chad la yang grags*), it is clear that the idea of intrinsic nature of things is valid (*dnagos po’i ngo bo nyid gsal bar byed pas*), exactly because it is acknowledged worldwide (*’jig rten thams cad la grags pa’i*). See Iida 1968: 105–106, Heitmann 2004: 126–127.

⁵⁰ A similar objection was already raised by the opponent in MRP, chapter 1, where the Mādhyamikas are accused of inconsistency insofar as, on the one hand, they admit for instance the *skandhas* etc. (from a conventional perspective), and on the other hand they negate them (from the ultimate perspective). See Lindtner 1981: 173 for the objection and 1981: 174 for the counter-argument. This same objection, aiming at showing how the Madhyamaka position is self-contradictory, is discussed and rejected also in the TJ (D,

[D. INTRODUCTION TO MADHYAMAKA REPLIES 1–4]

Thence, [while replying to these objections] you should discuss in this way:

Alas!, within [the sphere of] the beginningless *saṃsāra*, since the great eye disease (**akṣiroga*) of ignorance (**avidyā*) has covered the eye of understanding (**matinayana*), by virtue of that very [fact] there is no liberation (**mukti*). [It is for this reason that] the teachers of the profound way (**gambhīranaya*) are held in disfavor (**aprasādasamjñā*) and the [people’s discerning faculty of] hearing (**śrava*) is covered up. In accordance with the scriptures of the definitive meaning (**nītārtha*) of the Tathāgata, since the ignorant ones have not collected the two accumulations [of merit and knowledge],⁵¹ they are unable to adhere to, to study and to practice such a [profound] way. Listen up:

dBu-ma, DZa, 60a1–3): *khyed kyis kyang de khas blangs de nyid ’gog par byed na khas blangs pas gnod do* // See Iida 1968: 104–106, Heitmann 2004: 124–125.

⁵¹ Here reference is made to *puṇyajñānasambhāradvaya* (*bsod nams dang ye shes tshogs rnam pa gnyis*). According to the Mahāyāna literature, the accumulation of merit and knowledge represents a fundamental practice on the *bodhisattva* path through the six perfections (*pāramitās*). To refer here to just one example, in Vasubandhu’s *Mahāyāna-saṃgrahabhāṣya* on Asaṅga’s (4th century) *Mahāyānasamgraha*, *puṇyasambhāra* and *jñānasambhāra* are explained as follows (*THEg pa chen po bsod pa ’i ’grel pa*; see D, Sems-tsam, Ri, 163b7): *de la sbyin pa la sogs pa la pha rol tu phyin pa gsum ni bsod nams kyi tshogs so // shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa ni ye shes kyi tshogs so* //; that is: “In this regard, the three perfections of giving etc. [namely, *dāna-*, *śīla-* and *kṣāntipāramitā*] are the accumulation of merit; the perfection of wisdom (**prajñāpāramitā*) is the accumulation of knowledge.” In the Madhyamaka tradition, the centrality of *puṇyajñānasambhāradvaya* is stressed since Nāgārjuna’s writings, as we can observe from for instance *Ratnāvalī* 3.12–13 (Hahn 1982: 74): *sangs rgyas rnam kyi gzugs sku ni // bsod nams tshogs las byung ba ste // chos kyi sku ni mdor bsod na // rgyal po ye shes tshogs las ’khrungs // 12 // de lta bas na tshogs ’di gnyis // sangs rgyas nyid ni thob pa ’i rgyu // de ltar mdor na bsod nams dang // ye shes ’di ni rtag brten mdzod // 13 //* (“The Buddhas’ form-body derives from the accumulation of merit. The *dharm*a-body, in brief, O king, arises from the accumulation of knowledge. Therefore, these two accumulations are the cause of the attainment of buddhahood. Accordingly, in brief, [you should] rely always upon these merit and knowledge”), and 3.21 (Hahn 1982: 76): *bsod nams mtha’ yas zhes pa dang // ye shes mtha’ yas zhes pa des // lus dang sems kyi sdug bsngal dag // myur ba nyid du sel bar byed* // (“These so-called limitless merit and limitless knowledge quickly cause the removal of the pain of body and mind”). Consider also Nāgārjuna’s *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 60. See Scherrer Schaub 1991: 18. As is well known, Nāgārjuna’s pupil Āryadeva devoted the first half of his *Catuhśataka*, which is a guide for the would-be *bodhisattvas*, to the

[The fact that] a person is on the path of the *dharma* tradition and the Great Chariot [= Mahāyāna] should be explained by means of [the development of] a straightforward intellect, [which has been cultivated by that person] AFTER HAVING REMOVED THE POISON OF FALLING INTO PARTIAL VIEWS.⁵²

[D.1. REPLY TO THE FIRST OBJECTION]

[1.] We do not have the taint of the fault of your first objection, since it has been said that to perceive that supreme reality (**tattvaṃ taṃ uttamaṃ*) [means that] there is nothing to perceive.⁵³ If there is nothing to perceive, thence, how could there be [anything at all]? [And accordingly,] in which way should [something non-perceivable] be asserted?

The *ācārya* himself said:

If a thing were existent, it would be necessary to adopt verbal [communication], [but] since the[re is] non-arising of [any]thing [whatsoever], what should one assert [about things]?⁵⁴

For us Mādhyamikas a thing that [according to you] should be asserted, even [if it had] the size of an atom (**paramāṇu*) split in one hundred

accumulation of merit, and the second half to the accumulation of knowledge. See Lang 2003: 17.

⁵² The third *pāda* of this stanza corresponds to MHK 9.18c (Lindtner 2001: 94): *paḥṣapātaviṣaṃ hitvā*; the Tibetan translation of the same runs thus (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 32a3): *phyogs su lta ba'i dug spangs nas* // However, the Tibetan version of the TJ confirms our reading (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 278a2): *phyogs su lung ba'i dug spangs nas* //

⁵³ The idea, according to which one can actually grasp reality when the comprehension that there is nothing at all to grasp comes forth, is a common refrain of several Mahāyāna Sūtras. We find it, for instance, in the *Āryabrahmaviśeṣacintiparipṛcchāsūtra* (*'PHags pa tshangs pa khyad par sems kyis zhus pa*; see L, mDo-sde, Pa, 121a5: *mi mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba yin no* //), the *Āryājātaśatrūkaukṛtyavinodanasūtra* (*'PHags pa ma skyes dgra'i 'gyod pa bsal ba*; see L, mDo-sde, Ma, 392a5–6: *ma mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba'o* //), the *Āryadharmasamgītisūtra* (*'PHags pa chos yang dag par sdud pa*; see L, mDo-sde, DZa, 106a4–5: *chos thams cad ma mthong ba ni yang dag par mthong ba'o* //) and so on. Of course, it occurs also in Bhāviveka's TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 56a5: *mthong ba med pa ni de nyid mthong ba*) and *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti* (D, dBu-ma, TSHA, 247b3: *mthong ba med pa ni de kho na mthong ba*).

⁵⁴ This stanza somehow reminds us of *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 30: *yadi kīncid upalabheyam pravarteyaṃ nivartayeyaṃ vā / pratyakṣādibhir arthais tadabhāvān me'nupālambhaḥ* // Compare our text with the Tibetan translation of *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 30 taken from Nāgārjuna's auto-commentary (*rTSod pa bzlog pa'i 'grel pa*; D, dBu-ma, Tsa, 128b6–7): *gal te mngon sum la sogs pa'i // don gyis 'ga' zhig dmigs na ni // bsgrub pa'am bzlog par bya na de // med phyir nga la klan ka med //*

thousand [parts], cannot be defined [by words, since it is non-arisen and thus is non-existent].

A thing, even [if it is as small as] an atom, which [according to someone] should be asserted, [in truth] does not exist because it is originally non-arisen, like a child of a barren woman.

For example, [let's ask our opponent] the question: who is your son, [the one you have conceived] with a barren woman? Concerning this, since that [son] is non-existent, he cannot be spoken of.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ The idea lying behind these two verses is that verbal designations are mere conventions and do not refer to real things, because things, when analyzed, are discovered not to be real. They are nothing but a bunch of parts, which are in their turn unreal too, since each of these parts is constituted by other parts and so on. Therefore, when we call something by its name, we are referring by convention not to an actual thing, rather to the sum of its constituent parts, which in their turn are not actual things either. Accordingly, it would be an error to assert any opinion (about being, non-being etc.) on what is not real. As is well known, a text that strongly puts forward such a perspective is the *Milindapañha*, in which indeed the monk Nāgasena exemplifies the ultimate unreality of things by means of the simile of the chariot (*ratha*). See Trenckner 1997: 26–27. The Author, however, might rather have had in mind here the TJ, as the reference to atoms (*paramāṇu*) suggests. Indeed, in the TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 63a6) Bhāviveka puts forward the following objection, which he rejects in MHK 3.32. The opponent maintains that things have substantial existence even when they are reduced to atoms (*rdzas su yod pa kho nar yang 'dod de / 'di ltar gang rdul phra rab tu bshig kyang de'i*). Bhāviveka's counter-argument (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 63a6–b3) moves in two directions: firstly, if the opponent upholds that things are collections of atoms, then it is the atoms and not things that should be considered as substantially existent but, secondly, since atoms are not perceived, their substantial existence cannot be established, and consequently the substantial existence of things, which according to the opponent are nothing but a bunch of atoms, cannot be established either (*gang tshogs pa'i yan lag ma bzung na gzung du med pa de ni rdzas su yod pa ma yin te /*). Like Nāgasena's illustration of the theory by means of the reference to the chariot, also Bhāviveka mentions an example, namely, the “forest” (*vana; nags tshal*), which does not exist as a substantial existence apart from its constituent parts, that is, the trees (*shing dha ba dang seng ldeng dang / pa la śa la sogs pa ma gtogs par*). Therefore, the name “forest” is nothing but a conventional designation that does not refer to something real (*'dus pa la ni nags tshal zhes tha snyad gdags su rung ngo /*). See Iida 1968: 118–120. On the wake of Bhāviveka's example, Jñānagarbha in his *Satyadvayavibhāṅgavṛtti* refers to trees, which cannot as well be considered as real entities, because they too are in their turn a collection of parts, such as roots, branches and so on. This way of analyzing things, specifies Jñānagarbha, eventually leads us to understand through a *regressus ad infinitum* that also atoms have parts (above, below, front, back, right, left) and hence, like chariots, forests, trees etc., they too are not ultimately real. See Eckel 1992a: 90, 176. Jñānagarbha's conclusion on the unreality of atoms seems to be an implicit reference to Vasubandhu's *Viṃśatikākārikā* 11–14, where the non-reality of atoms is established in similar terms. See Anacker 2002: 90, 176.

Therefore, in front of the wisdom (**prajñā*) of us Mādhyamikas, your opinion (**mata*) that things are existent, non-existent and so on, is like nothing whatsoever, because all *dharmas* are non-arisen and [thus] inexpressible (**anabhilāpya*).

[D.2. REPLY TO THE SECOND OBJECTION]

[2.] We do not have the taint of the fault of the second objection [either]: in this case, [since] there is no existence [of things], thence it is those who grasp things [as real] that are to be blamed[, not us].

[It is true that i]n a Sūtra it is said:

Holding (**graha*) that the self is as large as the Mount Sumeru is better than the view of emptiness (**śūnyatādr̥ṣṭi*), [which is] the view of the incurable one.⁵⁶

But in the *Āryaḥanavyūhasūtra* it is also said:

The view of [the real existence of] the self (**ātmadr̥ṣṭi*) as large as the Mount Sumeru is innoxious (**anupaghātī*) [when compared to] the view of

⁵⁶ Compare the opening passage of this second counter-argument with the following excerpt, occurring in the TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 121b1): *gang yang yod pa ma yin pa de la dngos por 'dzin par byed pa de dag ni smad par 'gyur te / ji skad du / gang stong pa nyid du lta ba de ni gsor mi rung bar nga smra'o zhes gsungs pa lta bu'o //* The Sūtra sentence quoted by the Author occurs also in Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti* (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 238b7) and Avalokitavratā in his *Prajñāpradīpaṭikā* (*SHes rab sgron ma rgya cher 'grel pa*; D, dBu-ma, Za, 261b5) informs us that this citation is taken from a text belonging to the Ratnakūṭa collection: *'phags pa dkon mchog brtsegs pa'i mdo las*. Even though I was unable to find a corresponding passage with this exact wording, the quote seems nonetheless to summarize the following two excerpts from the *Kāśyapaparivartasūtra*. The first part reminds us of (Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2002: 26 [SI P/2, 33r2, §64]): *sumerumātrā pudgaladr̥ṣṭir āśritā na tv evādhimānikasya śūnyatādr̥ṣṭimālinā*. Compare with the Tibetan translation (*'PHags pa 'od srung gi le'u*; L, dKon-brtsegs, CHa, 231a4–5): *gang zag tu lta ba ri rab tsam la gnas pa bla'i / mngon pa'i nga rgyal can stong pa nyid du lta ba ni de lta ma yin no //* The same sentence, with some variant, occurs also in the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Vaidya 1963: 60): *varaṃ khalu sumerumātrā pudgaladr̥ṣṭir na tv eva nāstyastivābhimānikasya śūnyatādr̥ṣṭiḥ*. The second part of the quote could instead have been inspired by a phrase occurring twice in the *Kāśyapaparivartasūtra* (Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2002: 26 [SI P/2, 33v3–4, §65]): *śūnyatādr̥ṣṭis tam aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi*. Compare with the Tibetan text (L, dKon-brtsegs, CHa, 231a6 and 231b2): *gang stong pa nyid kho nar lta ba de ni gsor mi rung ngo zhes ngas bshad do //* The place of the second Tibetan occurrence makes us understand that the second Sanskrit occurrence was supposedly contained somewhere in the fols. SI P/2, 34–36, §§66–69, now lost.

emptiness, [which is] noxious (**upaghātī*) in consequence of the false mental construction (**kalpita*) of pride (**māna*).

By means of the yoga practice, [however, the view of] emptiness should not be yoked to unseemly (**asthāna*) [thoughts]. If it is yoked to unseemly [thoughts], it will become a poisonous elixir.

Because of the presence in the embodied beings (**dehin*) of whatever kind of variety of [wrong] views, the method of emptiness has been taught [exactly] in order to remove completely [those] views.

But having learned the view of emptiness, if someone does not dissolve [also that very view after the removal of the wrong views], [in that case] it is like a sick person that gives a medicine to one who has an incurable sight.⁵⁷

We Mādhyamikas, accordingly, do not accept [emptiness as a substantial view]. Having understood this point, also the *ācārya* said:

Emptiness means non-arising, void [of intrinsic nature] and selflessness. [On the contrary,] what is spoken of [about emptiness] by those of an ordinary nature, that will bring forth here [the vision of an existing] self.⁵⁸

THEREFORE, IF, AFTER HAVING REFUTED THE [NOTION OF THE] EXISTENCE OF THINGS, I [WERE TO] MAINTAIN THE[IR] INTRINSIC NON-EXISTENCE, ACCORDINGLY, THEN, I WOULD BE (**bhaveyam*) [A BELIEVER IN NON-EXISTENCE]. FOR THAT REASON, IN ORDER TO POINT OUT THE MĀDHYAMAKA PATH, BY ABANDONING THE TWO EXTREMES, I SHALL REFUTE ALSO THE [NOTION OF] NON-EXISTENCE.

THE COGNITION “THINGS DO NOT EXIST” IS NOT ADMITTED AS BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH REALITY (*yathārtha*), BECAUSE [THAT COGNITION IS]

⁵⁷ This excerpt corresponds, with negligible variants, to a passage of the *Āryaḥṇavyūhasūtra*: 'PHags pa rgyan stug po bkod pa; see L, mDo-sde, CHa, 74b4–7: *ri rab ri bo tsam 'gyur ba'i || bdag tu lta ba mi gnod kyi || stong nyid lta ba gnod pa ni || nga rgyal mi bden brtags pa'o || rnal 'byor spyod pas stong pa nyid || gnas ma yin par sbyar mi bya || gnas min gal te sbyar gyur na || bdud rtsi dug tu 'gyur ba yin || lta ba ji snyed gang yang rung || lus can rnam la yod pa yi || lta ba rnam par spang ba'i phyir || stong pa nyid kyi tshul bstan to || stong pa nyid kyi lta bros kyang || la la'i lta ba ma zhig na || gsor mi rung ba'i lta can te || sman pas gtang ba'i nad pa bzhin ||* Worth of note are the variants in *pādas* a (*thos < bros*) and d (*btang pa < gtang ba*) of the fourth stanza.

⁵⁸ This corresponds, with relevant variants in *pādas* cd, to Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavaraṇa* 49, whose Tibetan translation is (Lindtner 1987: 200): *skye med dang ni stong nyid dang || bdag med ces byar stong pa nyid || bdag nyid dman pa gang sgom pa || de de sgom par byed pa min ||*

ESTABLISHED DUE TO MENTAL CONSTRUCTION (*kalpana*), LIKE THE COGNITION OF A MAN IN LIEU OF A TRUNK [OF A TREE].⁵⁹

TO SOME WHO CLAIM THUS: “OF THINGS, NEITHER THERE IS COMPLETE EXISTENCE, BECAUSE OF THE CESSATION OF THE MOMENT OF THE CAUSE (**hetukṣaṇanirodhāt*), NOR IS THERE COMPLETE NON-EXISTENCE, BECAUSE OF THE ARISING OF THE MOMENT OF THE EFFECT (**phalakṣaṇotpādāt*),” IT IS EXPLAINED:

THUS, BY VIRTUE OF THE LEARNED ONES’ REFUTATION OF [BOTH] THE COGNITIONS OF EXISTENCE AND NON-EXISTENCE, AND OF THE OBJECT OF COGNITION, THE MIND (*mati*) WITHOUT CONCEPTUAL CONSTRUCTION [ARISES] IN CONSEQUENCE OF THE ABSENCE OF ARISING.⁶⁰

THEREFORE, EMPTINESS IS EMPTINESS OF THE INTRINSIC NATURE (*svabhāva*) OF EMPTINESS ETC. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LEARNED ONE DOES NOT EVEN SEE EMPTINESS AS EMPTINESS.⁶¹

⁵⁹ This passage (“Therefore, if, after having... a trunk [of a tree]”) is clearly borrowed from the TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 120b1–3): *dngos po rnams kyi yod pa nyid bkag pas med pa’i ngo bo nyid bsgrubs par gyur na ni de ltar yang ’gyur ba zhid na gang gi phyir kho bo miha’ gnyis spang ba’i tshul gyis dbu ma’i lam ston pa’i shes pa rtogs par ’dod pa de’i phyir med pa nyid kyang ’gog par byed de / dngos rnams med ces bya ba’i blo // don bzhin yin par mi ’dod de // rtog pa’i sgo nas grub pa’i phyir // mtho yor la ni mi blo bzhin //* The stanza corresponds to MHK 3.259, whose Sanskrit version runs as follows (Lindtner 2001: 36): *na santi bhāvā iti vā yathārthā na matir matā / kalpanādvāranirvṛtteḥ sthānoḥ puruṣabuddhivat //*

⁶⁰ This passage (“To some who claim thus... absence of arising”) corresponds to TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 120b5–6): *gang dag ’di skad ces dngos po rnams ni gcig tu yod pa nyid kyang ma yin te / rgyu’i skad cig ma ’gag pa’i phyir ro // gcig tu med pa nyid kyang ma yin te / ’bras bu’i skad cig ma skye ba’i phyir ro // de’i blo yañ yod med kyi ngo bo nyid kho na’o zhes zer ba de dag gi phyir bshad pa / yod med blos ni rtogs bya ba // bkag phyir de bzhin mkhas rnams kyi // rnam par mi rtog blo gros ni // skye ba med pa’i tshul gyis skye //* The stanza contained in the quotation is MHK 3.261 (Lindtner 2001: 37): *sadasadbuddhiboddhavyaniṣedhād evam eva tu / jāyate’jātiyogena nirvikalpā matiḥ satām //* For an overall discussion of the philosophical implications of this point of view, related to the so-called doctrine of momentariness (*kṣaṇavāda*, *kṣaṇikatvāvāda*), I refer the reader to, for instance, Vasubandhu’s commentary on Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* 18.82–83. See Bagchi 1969: 143–146.

⁶¹ This stanza corresponds to MHK 3.263, with little variants. Compare it with the Tibetan translation of the same (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 13a7): *gang phyir stong nyid stong sogs kyi // ngo bo nyid kyi stong de’i phyir // mkhas pa stong pa nyid la yang // stong pa nyid du lta mi ’gyur //* Its Sanskrit version is (Lindtner 2001: 37): *sūnyatādisvabhāvena yataḥ śūnyā hi śūnyatā / na paśyati tato vidvān chīnyatety api śūnyatām //*

SINCE THINGS ARE NOT ESTABLISHED IN ANY WAY, THERE, EVEN THE COGNITION WITHOUT MENTAL CONSTRUCTIONS DOES NOT ARISE: IN SUCH A WAY IT IS EXPLAINED BY NĀGĀRJUNA.⁶²

Hence, the *ācārya* himself said:

Those [whose] intellect (**buddhi*) has completely surpassed “it exists” (**asti*) and “it does not exist” (**nāsti*), and is non-dwelling (**anāśrita*), by them the meaning of conditions (*pratyayārtha*), [which is] profound (**gambhīra*) and without support (**niralamba*), is cultivated.⁶³

Moreover:

The narrow-minded ones, who perceive in terms of existence and non-existence, do not perceive the cultivation of the full pacification of the conceptual proliferations of those [notions].⁶⁴

Those who [uphold] the view of perceiving intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), other-nature (*parabhāva*), thing (*bhāva*) and no-thing (*abhāva*), they do not perceive the reality (*tattva*) in the Buddha’s teachings.⁶⁵

⁶² This stanza reminds us of MHK 3.266, but with relevant variants in *pādas* a and d, as we can observe by comparing our text with the Tibetan translation of MHK 3.266 (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 13b1–2): *shes bya rnam kun ma grub phyir // gang la rnam par mi rtog pa'i // blo yang skye bar mi 'gyur ba // de nyid mnyam med de mkhyen gsung //* The corresponding Sanskrit version runs thus (Lindtner 2001: 37): *jñeyasya sarvathāsiddher nirvikalpāpi yatra dhīḥ // notpadyate tad atulyaṃ tattvaṃ tattvavidō viduḥ //*

⁶³ This is Nāgārjuna’s *Yuktiṣaṣṭika* 1. The Tibetan version contained in the MRP seems to follow the Tibetan translation of the stanza as it is preserved in Candrakīrti’s *Yuktiṣaṣṭikavṛtti*. See Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 24.

⁶⁴ This corresponds to MMK 5.8, with relevant variants. The Sanskrit of this stanza runs as follows (de Jong 1977: 7): *astitvaṃ ye tu paśyanti nāstitvaṃ cālpabuddhayaḥ / bhāvānāṃ te na paśyanti draṣṭavyopaśamaṃ śivam //* The Tibetan translation of the same reads thus (D, dBu-ma, Tsa, 4a4–5): *blo chung gang dag dngos rnam la // yod pa nyid dang med nyid du // lta ba des ni blta bya ba // nye bar zhi ba zhi mi mthong //* See Yè 2011: 82. In particular, by comparing *pāda* d in MRP with *pāda* a in MMK, should we conjecture an original Sanskrit reading *bhāvanam* (*sgom pa*) in the MRP instead of *bhāvānām* (*dngos rnam la*) of MMK?

⁶⁵ This stanza corresponds to MMK 15.6, whose Sanskrit original is (de Jong 1977: 19): *svabhāvaṃ parabhāvaṃ ca bhāvaṃ cābhāvaṃ eva ca / ye paśyanti na paśyanti te tattvaṃ buddhaśāsane //* Compare it with the Tibetan translation of the same (D, dBu-ma, Tsa, 8b7–9a1): *gang dag rang bzhin gzhān dngos dang // dngos dang dngos med nyid lta ba // de dag saṅs rgyas bstan pa la // de nyid mthong ba ma yin no //* See Yè 2001: 238. Consider the interesting lexical variant in *pāda* a of the MRP: *bdag dngos* (MMK: *rang bzhin*).

Also:

“It exists” is the viewpoint of eternity, “it does not exist” is the viewpoint of annihilation.⁶⁶

Thus, and so on, it has been extensively said. Also the *ācārya* Āryadeva argues [the same] by saying:

There is not existence, there is not non-existence, neither existence and non-existence, nor is there the negation of both [existence and non-existence]. The Mādhyamikas recognize reality as [consisting in] the complete liberation from the four extremes.⁶⁷

Also in the scriptural sources, [such as] the *Āryaprajñāpāramitā*, it is said:

What does not exist, that is known as non-existent. Existent and non-existent, both are non-existing *dharmas*. [But] by the simple-minded one, the existent is conceptually constructed and [so] he makes [also] the non-existent.⁶⁸

Moreover, the Bhagavan said:

Existence and non-existence, both are extremes. Pure and impure, these are extremes as well. Therefore, the learned one, after having completely abandoned the two extremes, does not abide in the middle either.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ These two *pādas* correspond to Nāgārjuna’s *Acintyastava* 22ab (Tola and Dragonetti 1995a: 117): *astīti śāśvatī dṛṣṭīr nāstīty ucchedadarśanam /*

⁶⁷ This verse has already been quoted before in this chapter of the MRP (see section B.2) and, as we have seen, corresponds to *Jñānasārasamuccaya* 28.

⁶⁸ These three *pādas* correspond to stanza 1.13abc of the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā*, although in the MRP *pādas* b and c are inverted. The original Sanskrit of the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* runs as follows (Obermiller 1992: 12): *yo’sau na vidyati sa eṣa avidyamāno tām bālu kalpayi avidya karoti vidyām / vidyā avidya ubhi eti asanta dharmā*. Since the *Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā* has been incorporated into the *Aṣṭadaśasahasrikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra*, in the Tibetan version of this latter text our three *pādas* occur at: L, SHer-khri, Ga, 254b4–5.

⁶⁹ This stanza corresponds to *Āryasarvadharmasvabhāvasamatāvīpañcitasamādhīrājasūtra* or, in short, *Samādhīrājasūtra* 9.27 (Vaidya 1961: 48): *astīti nāstīti ubhe’pi antā śuddhī aśuddhīti ime’pi antā / tasmād ubhe anta vivarjayītvā madhye’pi sthānaṃ na karoti pañḍitaḥ //* The MRP quote contains some variant in respect of the Tibetan version of the *Samādhīrājasūtra*, which runs thus (*’PHags pa chos thams cad kyi rang bzhin mnyam ba nyid rnam par spros pa ting nge ’dzin kyi rgyal po*; our stanza occurs in L, mDo-sde, Ta, 43b5–6): *yod dang med ces bya ba gnyi ga mtha’ // gtsang dang mi gtsang ’di yang mtha’*

[D.3. REPLY TO THE THIRD OBJECTION]

[3.] We do not have, either, the taint of the fault of [your] third objection. [On account of that, let us begin by considering that] outsiders (**bāhyaka*)⁷⁰ say this:

O beautiful woman!, cook and eat properly! [The belief in a life] after death is like the [story of the] wolf's footprints (*vykapada*).⁷¹

Let a man live happily as long as there is not death [because] from death nobody escapes. When also the body is burnt to ashes, from where, indeed, a future life will be?

Therefore, there is not an existence preceding or subsequent [the present one]. In order to be happy in this very life, revere the *devas* and subjugate the *piśācas* and the *rākṣasas*: thus you will attain nobleness, richness and authority.⁷²

How can [you opponent] look at nihilists⁷³ such as those [who have written these verses] and at us Mādhyamikas as one [and the same school]?

yin te // de phyir gnyis ka'i mtha' ni rnam spangs nas // mkhas pa dbus la'ang gnas par yong mi byed //

⁷⁰ The Tibetan *pha rol pa* indicates those who do not adhere to one's own school and therefore are outsiders (*bāhyaka*). For this reason in some texts *pha rol pa* is used to translate also the Sanskrit *tīrthika*, that is, a non-Buddhist heretic.

⁷¹ These two *pādas* are a somehow abridged version of two stanzas traditionally attributed to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata school. Since I have thoroughly discussed both the stanzas and their Buddhist and Jain occurrences (included the abridged one in the MRP) in another occasion (Del Toso 2019), I refer the reader to that study of mine for further details.

⁷² Also these two stanzas are traditionally ascribed to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata and it seems the Author is quoting them from a doxographical work attributed to Āryadeva (probably a later namesake of Nāgārjuna's pupil), the *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi* (extant only in its Tibetan translation: '*KHrul pa bzlog pa'i rigs pa gtan tshigs grub pa*'; the two stanzas quoted here correspond to D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 19b5–6). I have already analyzed both the stanzas and their meaning elsewhere (Del Toso 2010a), therefore I feel unnecessary to repeat myself here. What is worth noticing, however, is that the Author of the MRP seems to have been well acquainted with the *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi*, since in MRP, chapter 2 (see D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 263b5–6), he quotes another passage taken from this text (which corresponds to D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 19b3–4 of the *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi*).

⁷³ What the Author is about to demonstrate in his rebuttal of the opponent's third objection is, in sum and substance, that the Madhyamaka cannot be assimilated to any nihilistic position because nihilism is a perspective that does not accept previous or future lives, confining every existence only to this very life. This perspective is explained as follows by Bhāviveka in his *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti* on MMK 16.1 (D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 164a7–b1): '*di ltar ma shi ba'i bar du gnas pa rnam la blo gcig kho nar zad pa'i phyir te / de ltar re zhig 'jig rten snga ma med do //*' ("Thus, since until the[ir] death, there is nothing

[Indeed,] since they repudiate dependent arising, cause, effect, [Noble] Truths, [three] jewels and so on,⁷⁴ they are partisans of nihilism (**ucchedavāda*). We Mādhyamikas, since we abide in the method of the two truths, are not nihilists. If you ask how [is it so], [we reply] as follows: we are not nihilists, because of the method of the conventional [truth].⁷⁵ The *ācārya* spoke [in this way about] the internal dependent arising (**ādhyātmikapratītyasamutpāda*):

Beginning with ignorance and ending with aging-and-death, how could there be [any] twelvefold dependent arising? Here I proclaim the twelvefold dependent arising to be similar to an illusion and a dream.⁷⁶

Moreover, [on account of] the external dependent arising (**bāhyapratītyasamutpāda*), Dharmakīrti, excellent in understanding logical reasoning (**yukti*), said:

but one [single faculty of] cognition for [each of] those who abide [in this world], accordingly, at this point [nihilists maintain that] a former life does not exist;” and of course the same should be asserted for a future life). Such a viewpoint cuts off any possibility for whatever moral retribution based on the cause-effect bond between actions and results, that is, *karman*, which is the ground on which Buddhists have built their ethical views. The denial of *karman* involves indeed the idea that the present life is neither the effect of good and bad deeds accomplished in a previous existence, nor it is the cause of the condition of a future life depending on good and bad deeds accomplished here. On the contrary, the Mādhyamikas accept the law of *karman*, and hence also the moral bond between previous and future lives, but only from a conventional point of view. From the point of view of the ultimate meaning, however, the real nature of things (*dharmatā*; *chos nyid*) is in any case without arising and consequently also without cessation because what lacks origin cannot actually cease. The doctrinal outcome of such a viewpoint is that being without beginning and end does not entail nihilism, since nihilism necessarily assumes that there is something that does actually exist, which eventually comes to a definitive end.

⁷⁴ These are all topics the Author is going to take into consideration in the following lines, in which he explains by way of several quotes that, unlike the nihilists, are not denied by the Mādhyamikas, who indeed accept them but only from a conventional perspective.

⁷⁵ The sentence contains the Tibetan particle *kyang* (in its negative meaning “neither”), which I have preferred not to translate since it would sound out of place in English. This *kyang* functions as a correlative of the other *kyang* (“nor”) that introduces below the denial of nihilism from the point of view of the ultimate truth.

⁷⁶ This stanza seems to correspond to Nāgārjuna’s *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 59, whose Tibetan text reads as follows (Lindtner 1987: 202): *ma rig nas brtsams rgya ba yi // mthar thug yang lag bcu nyis kyi // brten nas byung ba’i bya ba ni // kho bo rmi lam sgyu ’drar ’dod //* It provides the argument for the first topic tackled by our Author, namely, that the Mādhyamikas do not deny dependent arising.

If one asserts that the perceived [causal] power of the sprout and so on, of [the color] blue and so on, is conventional: be it exactly as it is said!⁷⁷

Also, in the scriptural sources it is said:

Wholesome (*śubha*) and unwholesome (*aśubha*), therefore, are non-existing things too; nevertheless, yet, wholesomeness [must be performed and what is] unwholesome is not [to be performed]: by virtue of worldly convention, which is similar to the moon [reflected] in water, wholesome is dear, [whereas] pain is ever unpleasant.⁷⁸

Similarly, the three jewels, too, are not denigrated [by us]. In this case, the three jewels arise thanks to the yogic cultivation of us Mādhyamikas, but they too are conventional.⁷⁹

[Furthermore,] the Bhagavan said:

Also the *siddhis* are conventional. The same adamantine mind (**vajrasattva*) of the Buddha is fully established by conventionality.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ These are, with relevant variants, three *pādas* from Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇavārttika*, more exactly *Pratyakṣapariccheda* 4bcd, whose Sanskrit version is: *bījāder añkurādiṣu | dṛṣṭā śaktiḥ matā sā cet saṃvṛtyā astu yathā tathā ||* Compare our text with the Tibetan translation of the same *pādas*: *sa bon sogs ni myug sogs la || nus mthong gal te de kun rdzob || 'dod na ci ste de ltar 'gyur ||* See Miyasaka 1971–1972: 42 and 43. This quote provides the argument for the second topic, namely, that the Mādhyamikas do not deny cause and effect.

⁷⁸ This stanza, whose source I was unable to locate, occurs with some variant also in a short work attributed to Advayavajra, namely the *Kudṛṣṭinirghāta*. Compare our text with both the Tibetan translation of *Kudṛṣṭinirghāta* 12 (Mathes 2015: 328): *dge dang mi dge gang phyr dngos med kyang || de ltar dge ba nyid bya mi dge min || 'jig rten kun rdzob chu yi zla 'dra yang || de las yid 'ong sdug bsngal yid mi bde ||*, and the Sanskrit version: *śubhāśubhaṃ yady api niḥsvabhāvakam tathāpi kuryāc chubham eva nāśubham | jalendu-bimbopamalokasaṃvṛtaṃ sukhaṃ priyaṃ duḥkham ajasram apriyam ||* The Author recurs to this quote as an argument for the third topic, that is: the Mādhyamikas do not deny the Noble Truths, which represent the way Buddhists recognize that life is essentially painful, and indicate how to eliminate pain through a wholesome and proper behavior.

⁷⁹ Here the Author explains the fourth topic, concerning the Madhyamaka acceptance, from a conventional point of view, of the three jewels: Buddha, monastic community (*saṅgha*; *dge 'dun*) and doctrine (*dharma*; *chos*).

⁸⁰ These three *pādas* correspond to *pādas* a, c and d of the last stanza of the second chapter of a tantric work titled *Āryatārākurukullekalpa* (*'PHags pa sgrol ma ku ru ku lle'i rtog pa*; see L, rGyud, NGa, 287b1). In addition to the discussion of the four topics, the Author adds also the present and the following quotes, concerning respectively the *siddhis*, or supernatural powers, and awakening (*abhisamaya*; *mngon par rtogs pa*), namely, the final purpose of the entire Buddhist path. In so doing, he aims to show how the scriptural

AND, MOREOVER, THE BHAGAVAN SAID:

“THE ESSENCE OF AWAKENING APPEARS SOLELY IN THE NON-ACQUISITION OF [THE SENSE OF] I.” SO IT IS SAID. IN THE SAME WAY, O VENERABLE ŚĀRIPUTRA, THERE IS BOTH THE ATTAINMENT (*prāpti*) AND THE CLEAR REALIZATION (*abhisamaya*) [OF AWAKENING, BUT] ONE CAN TALK OF THE[SE] TWO [ONLY] BY MEANS OF WORLDLY CONVENTION, [SINCE] ACCORDING TO THE ULTIMATE MEANING [ATTAINMENT AND REALIZATION] ARE NOT EXISTENT.⁸¹

THUS AND SO ON IT HAS BEEN SAID.⁸² Hence, attainment [of the *siddhis*] and clear realization [of awakening] are effects depending on convention.

Furthermore,⁸³ a certain *bodhisattva*, endowed with the resolve to awaken (**bodhicitta*)⁸⁴ arisen out of [his] great compassion (**mahākaruṇā*), may

sources maintain that also these high attainments, though final, pertain to the conventional level. These additional topics are perhaps meant to provide examples of how a student should interpret the expression “and so on” (*ādi*; *la sogs pa*) that we met with at the end of the above mentioned list of four topics in this counter-argument. It seems to me that the Author’s general purpose is to make it clear that, from the basis up to the top of the Buddhist path, everything should be accepted only from a conventional stance, since the ultimate truth lies beyond everything.

⁸¹ Compare this quotation with the following Tibetan passage from the *Pañcaviṃśati-sahasrikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (*SHes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa*; L, NYi-khri, Ka, 518a1–2): *tshes dang ldan pa Śa radwa ti’i bu ’thob pa yang yod / mngon par rtogs pa yang yod de / gnyis kyis ma yin gyi / tshes dang ldan pa Śa radwa ti’i bu ’thob pa’am mngon par rtogs pa ni ’jig rten gyi tha snyad kyis gdags pa’o //* The Sanskrit of this excerpt runs thus (Dutt 2000: 261): *asty āyusman śāriputra prāptir asty abhisamayo na punar dvayam / api tu khalu punar āyusman śāriputra lokavyavahāreṇa prāptiś cābhisamayaś ca prajñāpyate.*

⁸² This passage corresponds to TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 85a4–5) on MHK 3.115ab: *bcom ldan ’das kyis / nga ni thob pa med pa kho nar byang chub kyi snying po las langs so zhes gsungs pa dang / de bzhin du / tshes dang ldan pa Śa ra dwa ti’i bu thob pa yang yod // mngon par rtogs pa yang yod de / de ni ’jig rten gyi tha snyad kyis gnyis su brjod par zad kyi don dam par ni yod pa ma yin no zhes bya ba la sogs pa gsungs pa lta bu’o //* See Iida 1968: 223.

⁸³ After having so far shown that the Madhyamaka school does not deny any of the topics mentioned by the opponent in his third objection, and therefore cannot be accused of nihilism, now the Author deals with the figure of the *bodhisattva*, namely, of the one who compassionately embraces the vow of accompanying every sentient being towards final awakening, before entering s/he her-/himself into the state of spiritual emancipation. In particular, the quotes selected by the Author clearly underscore the importance of adhering to (*sevanā*; *sten par byed pa*), or having faith in (*abhiśraddhadhātī*; *yid ches pa*), the law of *karman*, which is exactly what any nihilist worthy of this name would rather firmly reject.

⁸⁴ On the term *bodhicitta* and its meaning see especially Wangchuk 2007.

consider: according to the ultimate meaning, all the *dharmas* are originally non-arisen, but according to convention these living beings of the five destinies (**pañcagati*)⁸⁵ must be anyway liberated from the river of pain, [therefore] by virtue of the supreme methods of the four means of gathering (**catvāri saṃgrahavastūni*)⁸⁶ and so on, I will establish all these [living beings] together in the great full awakening without remainder (**nirupadhiśeṣamahāsaṃbodhi*). When [every sentient being will achieve] for her-/himself the Buddha field (**buddhakṣetra*) of the complete perfected awakened one (**abhisambuddha*), then let there not resound even the names of hearer (**śrāvaka*), solitary awakened one (**pratyekabuddha*), sentient being (**sattva*), pain (**duḥkha*): how can there be view of nihilism for the great being (**mahāsattva*) that thinks so?

[On account of this,] also the *ācārya* said:

Isn't it a marvelous thing to bestow one's own body and properties [for the benefit of others]?

Those who have recognized the emptiness of these *dharmas* and adhere to (**sevanā*) the fruit of *karman*, they are more wonderful than the wonderful ones and more admirable than the admirable ones!⁸⁷

And:

Those who observe [things] through the viewpoint of emptiness and always, by means of body, speech and mind, in this way act for the benefit of sentient beings, how could they be nihilists?⁸⁸

⁸⁵ The five destinies are the five existential conditions into which one can be reborn: infernal beings, animals, hungry spirits, humans and gods. Interestingly enough, Bhāviveka at MHK 1.19 (Lindtner 2001: 3) speaks not of five, but of six destinies (*ṣaḍgati*), adding demons (*asura*; *lha ma yin*) to the list.

⁸⁶ The four means for gathering followers are: generosity (*dāna*; *sbyin pa*), gentle speech (*priyavaditā*; *snyan par smra ba*), beneficial conduct (*arthacaryā*; *don spyod pa*) and consistency between words and deeds (*arthasamānatā*; *don mthun pa*).

⁸⁷ These six *pādas* correspond, with some variants, to Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 87cd–88, whose Tibetan translation runs as follows (Lindtner 1987: 210): *de dag rnam kyī rang lus dang // nor rnam sbyin pa ngo mtshar min // [87cd] chos rnam stong pa 'di shes nas // las dang 'bras bu sten pa gang // de ni ngo mtshar bas ngo mtshar // rmad du 'byung bas rmad du byung // [88]*.

⁸⁸ This stanza, with many variants and a change in the *pādas* order, corresponds to *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* 101, the Tibetan translation of which is (Lindtner 1987: 212): *lus ngag*

Also in the scriptural sources, [such as] the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, it is said:

Recognize that all the *dharmas* are non-arisen, but have faith in karmic maturation. Comprehend all the *dharmas* are without self, but develop great compassion towards all sentient beings. Hand over copious generosity, but do not expect any [favorable] consequence. Act in the three realms with commitment, but go beyond suffering by means of contemplation.⁸⁹

Nor⁹⁰ is there nihilism [in the Madhyamaka viewpoint], because of the method of the ultimate meaning (**paramārtha*). Accordingly, if one says that, like a person killed by an infection, a pot broken down by a hammer or a wood burnt by fire, things [formerly existing but presently dissolved] are not established (**siddhir na vidyate*) according to the ultimate meaning (**paramārtha*) [and that] this is nothing but nihilism, [we reply that] whether the Buddhas appear or not in the world, the *dharmatā* of the *dharmas* is from the [very] beginning devoid of arising [so, how could there be nihilism?] The *ācārya* Candrakīrti [clarifies this point as follows]:

The own nature (**svabhāva*) of the *dharmas* is termination, detachment, *nirvāṇa*, cessation, emptiness, appeasement, suchness (**tathatā*): thus is explained.⁹¹

So he said. [Moreover:]

The teaching of non-arising is for those who believe in [the real existence of] things. [But since] things are primordially without arising, [also]

yid kyiis rtag par ni // de ltar sems can don byed pa // stong nyid rtsod par smra rnam la // chad pa'i rtsod pa nyid yod min //

⁸⁹ There is a weak correspondence between this quotation and a sentence occurring in *Kāśyapaparivartasūtra* (Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2002: 13 [SI P/2, 14r5, §16]): *karmavipākam cābhiśraddadhātī | nairātmyaṃ cāsya kṣamate sarvasatveṣu mahākaruṇā* [...]. The corresponding Tibetan translation reads as follows ('*PHags pa 'od srung gi le'u*; L, dKon-brstegs, CHa, 219a7): *las kyi rnam par smin pa la yang yid ches pa dang / de bdag med par yang bzod la sems can thams cad la yang snying rje che ba*.

⁹⁰ After having expounded his counter-argument on the basis of the conventional viewpoint, now the Author begins his rebuttal of the third objection from the angle of the ultimate truth.

⁹¹ This verse corresponds to Candrakīrti's *Triśaraṇasaptati* 28, which has already been quoted by the Author before in this chapter, section B.2. See Sørensen 1986: 32.

non-arising is nothing but a [mental] superimposition (**samāropa*) due to convention (**vyavahāra*).⁹²

Moreover, if also (**eva*) a non-existent thing (**abhāva*) is not established, how then could there be a [n established] thing? [So,] in the original absence of things, nihilism is [an] improper [concept].⁹³

[This is how we make it clear that] we do not have the taint of nihilism!

The *ācārya* [explained indeed]:

When there is admission of [the real existence of] things (**bhāvābhyupagama*), there it arises the fear of annihilation (**ucchitti*) etc. In the absence of the admission of things, how could there arise [any] fear of annihilation?⁹⁴

If things are real, there it occurs also [the idea] that the world is finite or infinite, and so on.⁹⁵

Just so much etc. (**ityādi yāvat*) it is said. [Let us now make] an example. If a person says: “The sky (**ākāśa*) does not exist, [so] a water lily and a lotus in the sky do not exist,” is this nihilism? On this point, in the scriptural sources, [such as] the *Āryamahāprajñāpāramitā* [we find the following explanation]:

⁹² This stanza is very similar to the second verse of a short work ascribed to the 8th–9th century Tibetan master gNYen dPal-dbyangs, the *mTHA'i mun sel sgron ma*, which indeed runs thus (D, sNa-tshogs, No. 384b1–2): *skye ba med ces bstan pa'ang // dngos por 'dzin pa bzlog phyr te // sgyu ma ye nas skye med la // skye med snyad kyi sgra mi gdags //* See also Karmay 2007: 80–83.

⁹³ I have been unable to trace back the original source of this stanza, whose meaning seems to be the following one. The non-existence of things cannot be established, therefore, since non-existence exists only in relation to existence, because it is its negation, if the former is not established, consequently also the latter cannot be established. But if we cannot admit the existence of things, then nihilism, which stresses the fact that things will eventually face their own destruction, cannot be a proper viewpoint.

⁹⁴ The first *pāda* of this stanza corresponds to Nāgārjuna's *Yuktiṣaṣṭikakārikā* 46a. See Scherrer-Schaub 1991: 15. Unfortunately, I have been unable to find any correspondence in Nāgārjuna's writings neither for the remaining three *pādas*, nor for the whole stanza.

⁹⁵ These three *pādas*, though with relevant variants, remind us of Nāgārjuna's *Acintyastava* 49a,cd. Compare our text with the Tibetan of *pāda* a (Lindtner 1987: 156): *gang la rdzas shig ste 'gyur ba //*, and of *pādas* cd: *de la 'jig rten mtha' yod dang // mtha' med par yang 'gyur ba lags //* The Sanskrit version of *pāda* a is: *dravyam utpadyate yasya*, whereas of *pādas* cd is: *antavān nāntavānś cāpi lokas tasya prasajyate //* See also Tola and Dragonetti 1995a: 119.

O Subhūti, if [the aggregate of] form (**rūpa*) were established as a [real] thing, it would be [characterized as] void (**śūnya*), non-void, isolated (**viveka*), non-isolated, pleasant (**sukha*), non-pleasant, quiet (**śānta*), non-quiet etc. [Hence, since the *bodhisattva* must avoid all these ephemeral characterizations in order to develop the resolve to awaken, it follows that] form is not established as a [real] thing.⁹⁶

Having said thus and so on, [in this way] it is explained at length so much of the knowledge of all the aspects (**sarvākārajñāna*).⁹⁷

[D.4. REPLY TO THE FOURTH OBJECTION]

[4.] We are not tainted by the fault of the fourth objection as well. How so? Regardless of how all your source-texts, O Śrāvaka and Yogācārin, have been explained earlier in detail [in terms of] the so-called “provisional meaning” (**neyārtha*), yet we Mādhyamikas do not repudiate them. Those [texts of yours] are a method gradually (**kramaṇa*) guiding [to our perspective of definitive meaning], according to the four special intentions (**catvāro’bhiprāyaḥ*) and the four indirect implications (**catvāro’bhisandhayaḥ*).⁹⁸

⁹⁶ I have been unable to identify this excerpt in the collection of texts belonging to the Prajñāpāramitā literature. However, it shall be noticed that the quote recalls a longer refrain occurring here and there, in particular in the *Pañcaviṃśati* version. See Dutt 2000: 51ff.

⁹⁷ The knowledge of all the aspects (*sarvākārajñāna*; *nam pa thams cad mkhyen pa*) refers to the knowledge of the true nature (*dharmatā*) of all *dharma*s, that is to say, their unique characteristic of being devoid of any characteristic. This knowledge is developed only by the fully awakened Buddhas.

⁹⁸ On the four special intentions and the four indirect implications, let us read what Vasubandhu writes in his commentary on Asaṅga’s *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* (Bagchi 1969: 80–81): *caturvidho’bhisamdhir deśanāyāṃ buddhasya veditavyaḥ / avatāraṇābhisamdhir lakṣaṇābhisamdhīḥ pratipakṣābhisamdhīḥ pariṇāmanābhisamdhīś ca / tatṛvātāraṇābhisamdhīḥ śrāvakeṣu draṣṭavyaḥ / śāsanāvātāraṇārtham anutrāsāya rūpādya-stītvadeśanāt / lakṣaṇābhisamdhīs triṣu parikalpitādisvabhāveṣu draṣṭavyo niḥsvabhāvānutpannādisarvadharmadeśanāt / pratipakṣābhisamdhir doṣāṇāṃ vinaye draṣṭavyo yathāśṭāvaraṇapratipakṣāgrayānaśambhāṣānuśaṃṣe [...] / pariṇāmanābhisamdhīr abhidhānaḡāmbhūre draṣṭavyo [...] caturvidho’bhiprāyaḥ / samatābhiprāyo yadāha / aham eva sa tasmīn samaye vipaśvī samyaksambuddho’bhūvam ity aviśiṣṭadharmakāyātvāt / arthāntarābhiprāyo yadāha / niḥsvabhāvāḥ sarvadharmā anutpannā ity evam ādi ayathārūtārthtvāt / kālāntarābhiprāyo yadāha / ye sukhāvatyāṃ pranidhānaṃ kariṣyanti te tatropapatsyanti ity abhiprāyaḥ / pudgalāśayābhiprāyo yat tad eva kuśalamūlaṃ kasyacit praśaṃsate kasyacid viḡarhate’lpamātrasaṃtuṣṭasya; that is: “In*

Moreover, concerning [the part of the objection, according to which in the opinion of our opponent we would be] discredited by the scriptures, [you can reply] in this way: If you [opponent] say that we are discredited by those eighteen bad views (**kudṛṣṭi/akuśaladrṣṭi*) that have been taught in the *Mahādharmādarśasūtra*,⁹⁹ [well, you should know that] there is

the Buddha's teachings, indirect implication is to be understood as fourfold: indirect implication of introduction, indirect implication of characteristic, indirect implication of opposition and indirect implication of transformation. There, the indirect implication of introduction should be considered in [the case of sentences addressed to] the Śrāvakas, because the teaching of the existence of form etc. [are supposed] not to frighten them, in order to introduce them to the instruction. The indirect implication of characteristic should be seen in [the sentences dealing with] the three natures, [namely,] the imagined etc., because the teaching that all *dharma*s are devoid of intrinsic nature and unproduced [is supposed to disclose the characteristic of things]. The indirect implication of opposition should be seen in [the sentences dealing with] the removal of faults, namely, in the beneficial discourses of the foremost vehicle, which are in opposition to the eight obstructions [...]. The indirect implication of transformation should be seen in the profundity [of the meaning] of words [...]. Special intention is fourfold. Special intention of equality, when [the Buddha] said: 'It is exactly I who was at that time Vipāśvin, the perfect Buddha,' because the *dharma*-body is undifferentiated. Special intention of another meaning, when [the Buddha] said: 'All *dharma*s are devoid of intrinsic nature and unproduced' and so on, because the meaning is non-literal. Special intention of another time, when [the Buddha] said: 'Those who will accomplish a vow in the direction of the Sukhāvati will be born there,' [this is] a special intention [expressed] by means of [the reference to] another [future] time. Special intention of personal disposition, as when [the Buddha] praises the same root of wholesomeness of someone [very virtuous], but reviles [that very root of wholesomeness] of someone else who is quite satisfied with merely a little [virtuous behavior]." For a deeper analysis of these concepts see Broido 1984.

⁹⁹ This text is apparently lost and only few Sanskrit fragments are known to us. Interestingly enough, the *Mahādharmādarśa* (*CHos chen po'i me long gi mdo*) is mentioned in Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (with the Tibetan title *CHos kyi me long chen po*), where however we are told that the bad views listed in there are not 18 (*bco brgyad*) but 28 (*nyi shu rtsa brgyad*), as follows (see *CHos mngon pa kun las btus pa*; D, Sems-tsam, Ri, 104b–105a): *mtsan mar lta ba dang / btags pa la skur pa 'debs pa'i lta ba dang / kun tu rtog pa la skur pa 'debs pa'i lta ba dang / de kho na la skur ba 'debs pa'i lta ba dang / yongs su 'dzin pa'i lta ba dang / bsgyur ba'i lta ba dang / kha na ma tho ba med par lta ba dang / nges par 'byung bar lta ba dang / dpa 'za ba'i lta ba dang / rab tu 'khrug pa'i lta ba dang / phyin ci log tu lta ba dang / 'phel ba'i lta ba dang / khas mi len pa'i lta ba dang / ngan g.yo'i lta ba dang / bkur sti'i lta ba dang / rmongs pa bren pa'i lta ba dang / rtsa ba'i lta ba dang / lta ba la lta ba ma yin par lta ba dang / sbyor ba sel ba'i lta ba dang / nges par 'byin pa ma yin par lta ba dang // sgrub pa sogs pa'i lta ba dang / bsod nams ma yin pa 'phel ba'i lta ba dang / 'bras bu med pa'i lta ba dang / chad pas bcas pa'i lta ba dang / skur ba 'debs pa'i lta ba dang / bsnyad pa ma yin pa'i lta ba dang / lta ba chen po dang / mngon pa'i nga rgyal gyi lta ba'o //*; that is: "[1] view of characteristics

not discredit on the Madhyamaka by those [bad views]. Rather, having [you] abandoned the method of the two truths, [it is you the] one who says that something, which [actually] is non-existent, is real (**tattva*),¹⁰⁰ and that nothing exists, but all is pure by nature (**prakṛtivyūdhā*).¹⁰¹

(**nimittadr̥ṣṭi*), [2] view of the denial of verbal designation (**prajñāptyapavādadṛṣṭi*), [3] view of the denial of imagination (**parikalpāpavādadṛṣṭi*), [4] view of the denial of reality (**tattvāpavādadṛṣṭi*), [5] view of possession (**parigrahadṛṣṭi*), [6] view of change (**parinatidr̥ṣṭi*), [7] view of faultlessness (**anavadyatādr̥ṣṭi*), [8] view of deliverance (**niḥsaraṇadr̥ṣṭi*), [9] view of disgust (**avajñādr̥ṣṭi*), [10] view of wrath (**prakopadr̥ṣṭi*), [11] view of wrong [understanding] (**viparītadr̥ṣṭi*), [12] view of furtherance (**prasa-vadr̥ṣṭi*), [13] view of non-admittance (**anabhyupagamadr̥ṣṭi*), [14] view of trickery (**kūṣṭidr̥ṣṭi*), [15] view of reverence (**satkāradṛṣṭi*), [16] view of massive confusion (**dṛḍhamūḍhatādr̥ṣṭi*), [17] basic view (**mūladṛṣṭi*), [18] view of [perceiving] the unseen in the seen (**dṛṣṭāv adṛṣṭadr̥ṣṭi*), [19] view of banishment of practice (**prayoganirā-karanadr̥ṣṭi*), [20] view non-conducive to emancipation (**anairyaṇīkadṛṣṭi*), [21] view of accumulation of obstructions (**āvaraṇopacayadr̥ṣṭi*), [22] view of furtherance of non-meritorious [deeds] (**apūṇyaprasavadr̥ṣṭi*), [23] view of fruitlessness (**vaiphalyadr̥ṣṭi*), [24] view of punishment (**nigrahadr̥ṣṭi*), [25] view of false accusation (**abhyākhyānadṛṣṭi*), [26] view of the unutterable (**akathyadr̥ṣṭi*), [27] view of greatness (**mahādr̥ṣṭi*), [28] view of self conceit (**abhimānadṛṣṭi*).” See also Pradhan 1950: 84. For an explanation of each of these bad views see Rahula 1971: 140–141, notes. The discrepancy on the number of bad views between the MRP and the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* leaves open the door to several hypotheses: either the Author and Asaṅga are referring to two different passages of the *Mahādharmaśāstra*, or they are referring to two different texts bearing allegedly the same or a very similar title, or they are rather referring to two different versions of the same text, or the Author wrongly recollected the number of bad views, or also some sort of corruption of the MRP text occurred here, either in the line of scriptural transmission or during the translation into Tibetan from the original Sanskrit.

¹⁰⁰ Here the Author is rejecting the Śrāvakas’ viewpoint. Previously in the MRP, chapter 3, he indeed summarized the Vaibhāṣika perspective by stressing the fact that (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 264b7–265a3), according to this view, aggregates (*skandha*; *phung po*), atoms (*paramāṇu*; *rdul phra rab*), intellect (*buddhi*; *blo gros*), dharmas (*chos*) and *nirvāṇa* (*mya ngan las ’das pa*) are all believed to actually exist ultimately (*paramārthatas*; *don dam par*), albeit the Buddha taught that we are supposed to accept that all these things exist ultimately only in a provisional sense. See Lindtner 1986b: 182.

¹⁰¹ The viewpoint the Author is referring to, here, is the Yogācāra doctrine, according to which dharmas do not exist but are nevertheless pure by nature. Asaṅga, for instance, in his *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* 13.16a, explains that (Bagchi 1960: 86) *dharmābhāvopala-bdhiś*, “dharmas do not exist, yet they are perceived.” Vasubandhu expands on this very concept in his *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya* (*THEg pa chen po bsdu pa’i ’grel pa*; D, Sems-tsam, Ri, 150b4–5) by arguing that, as space (*ākāśa*; *nam mkha’*) is not actually soiled by fog (*nīhāra*; *khug rna*), since it is clear by nature (*prakṛtiprabhāsvara*; *rang bzhin gyis ’od gsal ba*), so also the dharmas are not actually soiled by afflictions (*saṃkleśa*; *kun nas nyon mongs pa*) etc., since they are likewise clear or pure by nature. The Author

Moreover, since you are able [now] to abolish the retention of wrong views, such as “a conventional thing does not exist according to convention,”¹⁰² you [pupils] should explain [the Madhyamaka counter-arguments to these first four objection by starting] from afar.

[E. INTRODUCTION TO MADHYAMAKA REPLIES 5–8]

Nor will we be sullied by the taint of the fault of the fifth, the sixth, the seventh and the eighth objections. Because, by means of the conventional truth (**saṃvṛtisatyā*), all these [*scil.* perception, inference, common knowledge and our assertions] are [in any case] accepted as a garland of appearances, and there is therefore no denigration [on us] by those [objections]. Moreover, [in the case you are] asserting in accordance with the ultimate meaning (**paramārtha*), we are not discredited by those [objections] either.

[E.1. REPLY TO THE FIFTH OBJECTION]

[5.] ACCORDINGLY, WE ARE NOT DISCREDITED BY MEANS OF DIRECT PERCEPTION, EITHER. SINCE ALSO DIRECT PERCEPTION IS A [FALSE] PRESUMPTION (**abhimāna*), SIMILAR TO THE LACK OF THE ABILITY TO SEE ETC. BOTH BECAUSE THE OBJECTS (**vastu*) ARE FALSE AND BECAUSE THE SENSES (**indriya*) ARE DULL, LIKE THE APPEARANCE OF [ILLUSIONARY] HAIRS, FLIES, FLOWING NEEDLES ETC. TO ONE WHO HAS A VISUAL DISORDER (**timīra*), AND LIKE THE RESOUND OF AN ECHO (**pratiśrutkā*) [THAT IS NOT THE REAL VOICE] ETC. THEN, AFTER A CERTAIN DIRECT PERCEPTION HAPPENS [AS A SUBJECTIVE FALSE PRESUMPTION], WHERE WILL THERE BE DISCREDIT OF

has already discarded the Yogācāra perspective in greater detail in MRP, chapter 4. See Lindtner 1986a: 246–254, 1986b: 192–201.

¹⁰² The Author explains that the right view consists in admitting the existence of conventional things according to *saṃvṛti*, yet denying their existence according to *paramārtha*. On this point Jñānagarbha’s *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* maintains that (Eckel 1992a: 185–186): *de ltar na kun rdzob kyi dngos po med pa’i bdag nyid la yang rtag pa dang chad pa’i chos nyid thag ring po kho nar gnas so* // Eckel translates (1992a: 100): “If things did not exist in the relative sense, they could very well be permanent or annihilated. But there is no opportunity [to hold] such a view if [they do not exist] in the ultimate sense.”

THAT?¹⁰³ Hence, there is not discredit of direct perception [by us and from this it follows that we as well are not discredited by it].

[E.2. REPLY TO THE SIXTH OBJECTION]

[6.] Nor is there discredit [on us] by means of inference (** anumāna*), since ultimately (*paramārthatas*) there is nothing to be established.¹⁰⁴

[E.3. REPLY TO THE SEVENTH OBJECTION]

[7.] NOR IS THERE DISCREDIT [ON US] BY MEANS OF [WHAT IS] WELL-KNOWN (** prasiddha*) [AMONG PEOPLE]. WHY? SINCE PEOPLE (** loka*) ARE BLINDED

¹⁰³ This passage corresponds to TJ (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 60b1–2) *ad* MHK 3.26: *mngon sum gyis gnod pa yang med de / yul rnams log pa yin pa'i phyir dang / dbang po rnams blun pa yin pa'i phyir mthong ba la sogs pa'i nus pa med pa bzhin du yang rab rib cad la skra dang sbrang ma dang sbrang bu la sogs pa snang ba lta bu dang / brag ca la sogs pa ltar mngon sum yang mngon pa'i nga rgyal yin pas de'i phyir gang la ci zhig mngon sum du gyur na des gnod par 'gyur /* See Iida 1968: 107, 108–109, Heitmann 2004: 128–129. Here the argument seems to be set up as follows: a direct perception produces always misleading representations insofar as it grasps objects that are admitted only by convention, but are ultimately unreal. So, from the ultimate point of view there is no difference between perceptions of normal objects and perceptions of hallucinations due to some visual disorder: both are false perceptions. Therefore, if all perceptions are always fallible, wherein lies the discredit from direct perception that the opponent talks about?

¹⁰⁴ Inference is a logical process that aims at establishing something not yet known on the basis of something else that we know. The case of inferring the presence of fire when we see smoke, because wherever there is smoke, there is also fire, is one of the typical examples Indian texts use to illustrate how inference works. As is well known, Bhāviveka (and his acolytes) does actually accept inference as a valid means that is useful to reach – so to speak – the border of reality (*tattva*). Yet, it remains the fact that in order to move forward and enter the full comprehension of reality, Bhāviveka asserts the necessity of abandoning inference because, if inference is supposed to establish things, in reality there is nothing to be established. See for instance TJ on MHK 5.107 (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 226a5–6): *rnam par mi rtog pa'i de kho na nyid kyi shes pa'i mi mthun pa'i phyogs brtags pa zhes bya ba de ni rjes su dpags pa'i shes pa 'dis zlog par byed pa yin gyi / rjes su dpag pa'i spyod yul du de kho na nyid sgrub par byed pa ni ma yin no* (“[The meaning of the idea according to which, by inference, it is] ‘investigated the opposite of the knowledge of reality, which is non-conceptual,’ [is that,] since that [opposite] is removed by this inferential knowledge, the realization of reality is not within the reach of inference”). See Eckel 2008: 296, 443. What the Author intends to say is that, since ultimately there is nothing to be established, and since inference cannot in any case grasp reality, it follows that according to the ultimate standpoint the inferential process has no validity. Consequently, also the opponent’s objection does not apply.

BY THE CATARACT (**paṭala*) OF IGNORANCE, [THEN] IN THE MOMENT OF THE ULTIMATE ANALYSIS (**paramārthacintā*) [THEY] ARE JUST LIKE A BORN-BLIND ONE THAT DOES NOT GRAB THE PRECIOUS GEM (**ratna*) [AMONG OTHER VALUELESS STONES] WHILE EXAMINING [THEM]. SINCE IN THIS MOMENT [OF ULTIMATE ANALYSIS] PEOPLE DO NOT GRAB [REALITY], THERE IS NO DISCREDIT OF [US BY WHAT IS] WELL-KNOWN [AMONG PEOPLE].¹⁰⁵

[E.4. REPLY TO THE EIGHTH OBJECTION]

[8.] Because we properly abide in the two truths, there is not discredit of [our own] assertions (**abhyupagama*) either.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰⁵ To compare with TJ on MHK 3.26 (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 60b2–3): *grags pa'i gnod pa yang med de / gang gi phyir 'jig rten na mi shes pa'i ling tog gis mdongs pa yin pas don dam par dpyad pa'i skabs su de ni nor bu rin po che brtag pa dag la dmus long ma brtags pa bzhin bu mi rtogs pas grags pa'i gnod med do //* See Iida 1968: 107, 109; Heitmann 2004: 128–129. We notice parenthetically that objections 5 and 7 are also raised briefly in TJ on MHK 4.9 and the Madhyamaka reply is outlined in TJ on MHK 4.10. Objections and reply run as follows (Eckel 2008: 320): *blo de ni yul dang bcas pa yin pa'i phyir la ma skyes pa nyid du btags pa la ni rigs pa med pa'i phyir mngon sum gyis kyang gnod la / 'jig rten gyi yang dag par rig pa bkag pas na grags pas gnod pa yang skye ba med par smra ba la yod do //* [...] *shes pa dmigs su med pa'i phyir mngon sum yang 'byung ba yod pa ma yin la / 'jig rten ni mi shes pa'i rab rib kyis bsgrigs pa'i phyir 'jig rten gyi grags pa dang / mngon sum gyi gnod pa yang bdag gis don dam pa nyid mi 'byung ngo;* that is: “[Objection:] Since cognition is [always] accompanied by an object and since the concept that [things] do not arise is unsuitable, [non-arising] is furthermore discredited by direct perception. Because it negates the worldly correct understanding [of things], the proponent of non-arising is also discredited by common consensus. [...] [Reply:] Since cognition is not apprehended, also direct perception does not occur, and since [ordinary] people are obscured by the visual disease of ignorance, also the discredit of worldly common consensus and of direct perception is for us ultimately impossible.”

¹⁰⁶ Also Bhāviveka deals with this same objection in his TJ on MHK 3.26. Hence, in order to provide the possible background that the Author could have had in mind for his own short counter-argument, let us consider in full the TJ passage in which Bhāviveka expounds his reply (D, dBu-ma, DZa, 60a6–b1): *don dam par zhes dam bcas pa'i khyad par yod pa'i phyir khas blangs pa dang mngon sum dang grags pa'i gnod pa med do // gang gi phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis bden pa gnyis bka' stsal pa / de la kun rdzob tu ni chos rnam kyis ngo bo nyid dang / mtsan nyid tnam par gzhas pa yang mdzad la / don dam par ni ngo bo nyid med par gsungs te / de ltar yang Kau śi ka chos thams cad ni ngo bo nyid kyis stong ste / chos thams cad ngo bo nyid kyis stong pa gang yin pa de ni dngos po med pa'o // dngos po med pa gang yin pa de ni shes rab kyis pha rol tu phyin pa'o zhes gsungs pa la sogs pas dngos po nyid kyang med na de'i ngo bo nyid tsa ga la yod de / de'i phyir khas blangs pas gnod pa yang med do //;* that is: “Since [in our discourse] there is the qualification (**viśeṣa*) of the proposition (**pratijñā*) ‘ultimately’ (**paramārthatas*),

[F. CLOSING STANZAS]

Having entered the vehicle of the two methods, the helm of reasoning is kept properly under control. Having entered the path of Āgama, there is no [more] wandering on the wrong path (**ummārga*).

Just as a bird (**śakuni*) with non-damaged wings has no preclusion and limits [to fly anywhere] in the sky (**antarikṣa*), similarly, also the one who is provided with the two methods has no obstacle over all the *dharmas*.

Just as all wild animals are terrified and frightened by the lion's roar (**siṅgasvara*), similarly, all the antagonists are frightened and terrified by the leonine sound of emptiness.

Since [with the method of the two truths] one masters the non-existence of things, consequently there is the utterance of the lion's roar for all the [Buddhist] schools, ours and the others', [which is] the essence (**ātmata*) of all things [that is emptiness].

Thus the explanation of the right conventional truth in a definitive sense is concluded.

2.2. *Edition of the Tibetan text*

C, dBu-ma, TSHa, 275b3–281b4.

D, dBu-ma, TSHa, 371a5–376b7.

G, dBu-ma, TSHa, 388a2–396a1.

N, dBu-ma, TSHa, 314a1–320b1.

there is no discredit of [our own] assertions, of direct perception and of what is well-known [among people]. For what reason? [Because] the Bhagavan has spoken of the two truths (**dve satye*). In this regard, from the conventional [viewpoint] he established (**vyavaṣṭhā*) the own nature (**svarūpa*) and the characteristics (**lakṣaṇa*) of the *dharmas*. Yet, from the [viewpoint of the] ultimate meaning, he taught that there is no own nature: 'Yet, O Kauśika, all *dharmas* are empty of own nature and all the *dharmas* that are empty of own nature are non-existent (*abhāva*). That which is non-existent, that is the *prajñāpāramitā*.' Thus and so on it is said. If even a thing (**bhāva*) does not exist, in which way can there be a [thing's] own nature? Therefore, there is no discredit of [our own] assertions.' See Iida 1968: 106–108, Heitmann 2004: 128–129. The quote occurring in this passage seems to be taken from the *Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra* (Kimura 1986: 115): *kauśika sarvadharmā svabhāvena śūnyāḥ | yaś ca dharmāḥ svabhāvena śūnyāḥ so'bhāvo | yaś cābhāvaḥ sā prajñāpāramitā |*

[A. OPENING STANZAS]

'phags pa kLu sgrub 'PHags pa'i lha //
zLa ba grags par phyag byas nas //
 rje btsun dag gi gsungs bzhin du //
 bden pa gnyis la 'jug par bya //

skye ba grangs med de dang der //
 legs par sbyangs pa'i bdag nyid can //
 blo gros bzang po de dag la //
 thams cad mkhyen pas nges don gsungs //

chos nmams chos nyid ston pas ni //
 bstan pa'i snying por gyur pa nyid //
kLu sgrub las ni 'byung ba 'di //
 slob ma dag la bshad¹⁰⁷ par bya //

ding sang skye bo phal cher ni //
 dbu ma che la sdang bar byed //
Sangs rgyas kun gyi yul 'di ni //
kLu sgrub zhal nas byung bas na //

'di la sdang bar bya mi rigs //
 de ni bde gshegs lung bstan¹⁰⁸ pas //
Sangs rgyas kun la sdang bar 'gyur //
 mam par smin pa bsam mi khyab //

[B. INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO TRUTHS]

'PHags pa 'jam dpal gyi man ngag gi mdo las /

'Jam dpal chos kyi dbyings tshad mar byas nas kun rdzob kyang [D 271b1]
 med¹⁰⁹ don dam pa yang med do¹¹⁰ //¹¹¹

zhes gsungs pa dang / rGyal ba bskrun ma chen mo las kyang /¹¹²

chos thams cad ni gdod ma nas skye ba med de / a'i sgo can no¹¹³

¹⁰⁷ N: *bshang*.

¹⁰⁸ C inserts the *e* sign over the *na*.

¹⁰⁹ G: one *shad* inserted. N: two *shad* inserted.

¹¹⁰ G: *medo*.

¹¹¹ C, D: both *shad* omitted.

¹¹² G: *shad* omitted.

¹¹³ G: *cano*.

zhes gsungs pas chos kyi dbyings la bden pa gnyis dbyer med par shes par bya'o //

yang na thog ma med pa ^[G 388b1] nas ma rig pa'i¹¹⁴ ling tog mthug pos¹¹⁵
 blo gros kyi mig bkab pas dmus ^[C 276a1] long lta bur gyur pa / dngos por
 'dzin pa'i gdon chen po snying la zhugs pas smyon pa¹¹⁶ lta bur gyur pa
 / mi dge ba'i bshes gnyen¹¹⁷ gyi dbang¹¹⁸ du song bas nges pa'i don la
 yid mi ches pa / dge ba'i bshes gnyen dang bral bas lcags kyu med pa'i
 glang po che ltar rang dbang med par gyur pas bag chags bzhi'i 'ching
 ba dam pos¹¹⁹ bcings pa / dar gyi srin bu ltar gyur pa / ma rig pa'i gnyid
 'thug pos¹²⁰ log ^[N 314b1] pas rmi lam¹²¹ gyi gnas skabs lta bu'i tshu rol
 mthong ba'i ngor¹²² byas nas sngar yang smras mod kyi / 'dir yang bden
 pa gnyis nram par dbye bar bya ste /

[B.1. CONVENTIONAL TRUTH]

slob dpon¹²³ gyi zhal snga nas¹²⁴ /

Sangs rgyas mams kyis chos bstan pa //
 bden pa gnyis la yang dag brten //
 'jig rten kun rdzob bden pa dang //
 de bzhin don dam bden pa'o //

zhes gsungs pas de la dang por kun rdzob kyi bden pa slob dpon nyid
 kyis gsungs pa bzhin du shes par bya'o // ji ltar zhe na¹²⁵ 'di skad du //

sgyu ma dang ni rmi lam dang //
 dri za'i grong khyer ji bzhin du //
 de bzhin skye¹²⁶ dang de bzhin gnas //

¹¹⁴ G: *ma rigs pa'i*.

¹¹⁵ G: *thug pos*.

¹¹⁶ G, N: *bsnyon pa*.

¹¹⁷ N: *bshes mnyen*.

¹¹⁸ G: *dgang*.

¹¹⁹ G, N: *bzhi yis dam por*.

¹²⁰ C, D, N: *mhug po*.

¹²¹ G: *rmi la*.

¹²² D: *dor*.

¹²³ G: *slong dpon*.

¹²⁴ G, N: *zhal nas*.

¹²⁵ G, N: one *shad* inserted.

¹²⁶ G: *skye ba*.

de bzhin du ni 'jig pa¹²⁷ gsungs //
 nyon mongs las dang las can lus¹²⁸ //
 byed pa po dang 'bras bdag nyid¹²⁹ //
 smig rgyu rmi lam¹³⁰ ji bzhin te //
 dri za'i grong khyer nyid dang mtshungs //

yang gsungs pa /

lus dang longs spyod gnas dag dang //
 sa dang pha rol phyin pa dang //
 Sangs rgyas rdzu 'phrul cho 'phrul sogs //
 'khor dang mya ngan 'das pa dag //¹³¹
 de kun sgyu ma sprul pa [G 389a1]¹³² dang //
 skra shad¹³³ 'dzings pa lta bur snang //

yang gsungs pa /

dang po brgyad dang dgu nyon mongs //
 gnyis dang bcu pa las yin te //
 lhag ma bdun yang sdug bsngal yin //
 bcu gnyis chos ni gsum du 'dus //
 gsum¹³⁴ las gnyis 'byung gnyis [D 272a1] las kyang //
 bdun 'byung srid pa'i¹³⁵ 'khor lo ni //
 yang dang yang du 'jug par 'gyur //
 'gro kun rgyu dang 'bras bu ste //
 'di na sems can gzhan ci'ang med //
 stong pa kho na'i chos rnam [C 276b1] las //
 stong pa kho na 'byung bar 'gyur //
 kha ton me long mar me rgya //
 me shel skyur¹³⁶ dang sa bon sgras //

¹²⁷ N: 'jigs pa.

¹²⁸ N: bus.

¹²⁹ N: dag nyid.

¹³⁰ G: rmi lam.

¹³¹ C, D: one shad omitted.

¹³² G repeats pa in the following folio.

¹³³ N: sgra shad.

¹³⁴ G: gsum.

¹³⁵ N: sring pa'i.

¹³⁶ G: sgyur.

phung po nying mtshams sbyor ba¹³⁷ ni //
mi 'pho bar yang mkhas rtogs bya //

shin tu phra ba'i dngos la yang //
gang gis chad par rnam brtags pa //
rnam par mi mkhas de yis ni //
rkyen las byung ba'i don ma mthong¹³⁸ //

zhes gsungs te / phyi rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i tshul yang slob dpon
nyid kyis [N 315a1] mdzad pa'i 'PHags pa sā¹³⁹ lu ljang pa'i mdo'i 'grel
par blta bar bya'o //

[B.2. ULTIMATE TRUTH]

de la don dam pa'i bden pa ni yang slob dpon gyi zhal snaa nas /¹⁴⁰

gang gis rten cing 'brel bar 'byung //
'gag pa med pa skye med pa //
chad pa med pa rtag med pa //
tha dad don min don gcig min //

'ong ba med pa 'gro med pa //
spros pa nyer zhi ston pa //
rdzogs pa'i Sangs rgyas smra rnams kyi //
dam pa de la phyag 'tshal lo¹⁴¹ //

yang slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas¹⁴² /

rnam shes kyang ni 'od gsal dang //
mya ngan 'das dang¹⁴³ kun stong dang //
chos kyi skur yang bshad pa yin //

zhes gsungs pa dang / yang /¹⁴⁴

'di ni don dam bden pa ste //
sngang ba med [G 389b1] cing mtshan ma med //

¹³⁷ D: *nying mchams sbyor ba.*

¹³⁸ N: *ma mthod.*

¹³⁹ G, N: *'PHags pas.*

¹⁴⁰ G, N: *de la don dam pa ni yang slob dpon gyi zhal nas /*

¹⁴¹ G: *tshalo.*

¹⁴² G, N: *zhal nas.*

¹⁴³ G: *'das pa.*

¹⁴⁴ G, N: *shad omitted.*

don dam bden pa zhes bya ba //
De bzhin gshegs pa kun gyi gnas //

zhes gsungs so¹⁴⁵ // yang gzhan las /

SHA YI MIG GYI¹⁴⁶ DE LTA¹⁴⁷ MIN //
 LHA YI MIG GIS BLTA BYA MIN //
 RTOG BCAS RTOG PA MED PA YI //
 SHES PA YIS KYANG MTHONG MI 'GYUR //

zhes gsungs so¹⁴⁸ // rje btsun Ā rya be bas¹⁴⁹ kyang //

yod min med min yod med min //
 gnyi ga med pa ma yin la //
 mu bzhi las ni rnam grol ba //
 de nyid dBu ma pa yis rig //¹⁵⁰

rtag pa ma yin chad pa min //
 rtag dang chad pa¹⁵¹ gnyi ga min //
 mtha' bzhi las ni rnam grol ba //
 de don dBu ma pa yis rig //¹⁵²

ces gsungs so¹⁵³ // slob dpon zLa ba grags pa'i zhal snga nas¹⁵⁴ kyang /

zad dang chags bral mya ngan 'das //
 'gog dang stong pa nyid [D 272b1] zhi ba //
 de bzhin nyid kyi chos rnam kyi //
 rang gi ngo bo yin zhes bshad //

ces gsungs so¹⁵⁵ //

RTOG BCAS RTOG PA [C 277a1] MED PA YI //
 SHES PA GNYIS KYIS 'DI MI RTOGS //¹⁵⁶

¹⁴⁵ G: *gsungso*.

¹⁴⁶ D, G: *gyis*.

¹⁴⁷ N: *da lta*.

¹⁴⁸ G: *gsungso*.

¹⁴⁹ G: *Arya de bas*.

¹⁵⁰ C, D, N: one *shad* omitted.

¹⁵¹ G: *chad pa pa*.

¹⁵² C, D: one *shad* omitted.

¹⁵³ G: *gsungso*.

¹⁵⁴ G, N: *zhal nas*.

¹⁵⁵ G: *gsungso*.

¹⁵⁶ G, N: *mi rtog /*

sgra dang tshad ma'i tha snyad dag /
de don bsgom la dgos pa med //

pha rol rgol ba¹⁵⁷ bzlog pa dang //
bstan bcos chen po'i dus dag tu //
sngon gyi mkhas pas bkod pa bzhin //
sgra dang [N 315b1] tshad ma'ang smra bar bya //

long ba¹⁵⁸ rang dgar¹⁵⁹ ri bo la //
'dzegs pas¹⁶⁰ bde ba thob mi 'gyur //
RJES SU¹⁶¹ DPAG PA GTSOR 'DZIN RNAMS //
RNAM PAR LTUNG BAR¹⁶² DKA' MA YIN //

ji ltar mun pa'i nang gi rdzas //
'ol tshogs¹⁶³ dag tu tshol ba bzhin //
de bzhin rjes su¹⁶⁴ dpag pas kyang //
de bzhin don ni shes mi 'gyur //

LONG BAS RKANG PA'I TSHOD¹⁶⁵ DPAG GIS //
NYAM NGA'I LAM DU RGYUG PA¹⁶⁶ LTAR //
RJES SU¹⁶⁷ DPAG PA GTSOR 'DZIN RNAMS // [G 390a1]
RNAM PAR LTUNG BAR¹⁶⁸ DKA' MA YIN //

mgon po bDe ba chen pos kyang //

rang gi¹⁶⁹ rig pa de nyid ni //
gzhan gyis¹⁷⁰ bstan pas mi rtogs te //
gus par bsgom pas¹⁷¹ rtogs 'gyur gyi //
don de gzhan du rtogs mi 'gyur //

¹⁵⁷ N: *rgal ba*.

¹⁵⁸ G: *'ong ba*.

¹⁵⁹ G, N: *gar*.

¹⁶⁰ G: *'dzag pas*. N: *'dzeg pas*.

¹⁶¹ G: *rjesu*.

¹⁶² G, N: *ltung ba*.

¹⁶³ G, N: *tshoms*.

¹⁶⁴ G: *rjesu*.

¹⁶⁵ G: *tshong*.

¹⁶⁶ G, N: *rgyu pa*.

¹⁶⁷ G: *rjesu*.

¹⁶⁸ G: *rnam pa ltung ba*. N: *rnam par ltung ba*.

¹⁶⁹ G, N: *gis*.

¹⁷⁰ G, N: *gyi*.

¹⁷¹ N: *sgoms pas*.

zhes gsungs so¹⁷² // dpal Kam pa las kyang /

'di ni rang rig phra ba ste //
 phra ba rnams kyi spyod yul yin //
 bdag cag lta bur gyur pa yi //
 blo gros rtsing bas¹⁷³ mi shes so¹⁷⁴ //¹⁷⁵

zhes gsungs so¹⁷⁶ // slob dpon PHyogs kyi glang pos kyang /

'di na mya ngan 'das lam grong khyer du //¹⁷⁷
De bzhin gshegs pa'i gsungs¹⁷⁸ gi nyi ma'i 'od can gyis¹⁷⁹ //
 bdag med shes pa'i 'phags pa stong phrag 'jug //¹⁸⁰
 blo gros rtsing ba dag gi yul ma yin //

zhes gsungs so¹⁸¹ // rigs pa shes pa rnams kyi mchog rtog ge pa rnams
 kyi gtsug gi¹⁸² nor bur gyur pa¹⁸³ Dharma kī rtis¹⁸⁴ kyang /

de nyid don ni tshol 'dod pas //¹⁸⁵
 rjes dpag gtan tshigs bsten¹⁸⁶ mi bya //
 legs par bsgoms pas myong 'gyur gyi //
 de yis¹⁸⁷ rang rig rtogs pa min //

de nyid don gyi snying po ni //
 rjes dpag shes pas nyams myong min //
 bla ma bzang po bsten byas nas //
 bsgoms pas¹⁸⁸ nyams su¹⁸⁹ myong bar 'gyur //

¹⁷² G: *gsungso*.

¹⁷³ C: *rtsir bas*.

¹⁷⁴ G: *mi sheso*.

¹⁷⁵ G, N: both *shad* omitted.

¹⁷⁶ G: *gsungso*.

¹⁷⁷ C: one *shad* omitted.

¹⁷⁸ C: *gsung*.

¹⁷⁹ G, N: *gyi*.

¹⁸⁰ C, D: one *shad* omitted.

¹⁸¹ G: *gsungso*.

¹⁸² G: *gtsugi*.

¹⁸³ G, N: *shad* inserted.

¹⁸⁴ G: *Dharma ki rtis*.

¹⁸⁵ C: one *shad* omitted.

¹⁸⁶ G, N: *sten*.

¹⁸⁷ G, N: *yi*.

¹⁸⁸ G, N: *sbgom pas*.

¹⁸⁹ G: *nyamsu*.

bdag gzhan sde pa ma lus pa //
 log pa'i lam du zhugs mthong dang //
 de dag bdag [C 277b1] la'ang sdang bas na //
 rjes su¹⁹⁰ dpag pa'ang smra bar bya //¹⁹¹

thog ma med nas rmongs gyur pas //
 [D 273a1] dang po rig pas blo sbyang bya //
 de rjes bsgom par 'dod pa yis¹⁹² //
 rjes su¹⁹³ dpag pa¹⁹⁴ yid rton min //

zhes *De kho na nyid gsal ba las* [N 316a1] gsungs so ¹⁹⁵//

[B.3. CONCLUSION OF THE TEACHINGS ON THE TWO TRUTHS]

'di lta bu'i bden pa gnyis khong [G 390b1] du chud pa ni gzhan gyi sde pa dang / rang gi sde pa'i rgol ba dag la 'jigs pa¹⁹⁶ dang / bag tsha ba ni ci yang med de /

tshul gnyis shing rta zhon byas te //
 rigs pa'i srab kysis bsrabs¹⁹⁷ byas nas //
 lung gi lam du legs par zhugs //
 bla ma'i man ngag lcag gis gzhu¹⁹⁸ //

skye ba med pa ji lta ba bzhin du khong du chud pa'i mkhas pa rnam kyis kun rdzob pa'i dngos po gang la yang chags pa dang sdang ba dang rmongs pa med de / chos rnam kyis chos nyid dngos po'i¹⁹⁹ de kho na nyid shes pa'i phyir ro²⁰⁰ //

DE CI'I PHYIR ZHE NA / 'JIG RTEN PA'I RNAL 'BYOR PA NAM MKHA'²⁰¹ MTHA'
 YAS SKYE MCHED DANG /²⁰² RNAM SHES MTHA' YAS SKYE MCHED DANG / CI

¹⁹⁰ G: *rjesu*.

¹⁹¹ D: *rjes su dpag pa' bsmra (?) bar bya //*

¹⁹² G, N: *yi*.

¹⁹³ G: *rjesu*.

¹⁹⁴ G, N: *la*.

¹⁹⁵ G: *gsungso*.

¹⁹⁶ G: *'jig pa*.

¹⁹⁷ G: *srabs*.

¹⁹⁸ G: *bzhu*.

¹⁹⁹ G, N: *dngos po*.

²⁰⁰ G: *phyiro*.

²⁰¹ C: *rnal 'byor namkha'*; G: *namkha'*.

²⁰² G, N: *shad* omitted.

YANG MED PA'I SKYE MCHED DANG / YOD MIN MED MIN SKYE MCHED BSGOMS
 PA²⁰³ DAG KYANG RE ZHIG GZUGS KYI 'DU SHES DANG / THOGS PA'I 'DU SHES
 RNAMS THAMS CAD DU NUB CING /²⁰⁴ DE BZHIN DU RNAM PAR THAR PA BRG-
 YAD DANG / ZIL GYIS GNON PA'I²⁰⁵ SKYE MCHED DANG / ZAD PAR GYI SKYE
 MCHED BSGOM PA GOMS PA'I 'JUG TU²⁰⁶ GZUGS KYI 'DU SHES SPONG BAR
 'GYUR NA THeg pa²⁰⁷ CHEN PO BLA NA MED PA'I RNAL 'BYOR PA BSKAL PA
 DPAG TU MED PA'I DNGOS PO'I NGO BO NYID MED PAR SHIN TU GOMS PA
 BSGOMS PA²⁰⁸ STONG PA NYID BCO BRGYAD DANG / RNAM PAR THAR PA'I SGO
 GSUM MTHAR PHYIN PA LA GNAS PA RNAMS GZUGS SU²⁰⁹ 'DZIN PAR 'GYUR
 BA LTA SMOS KYANG CI DGOS TE /

nam mkha'i dbus su²¹⁰ bdag med cing //
 chos kyi dbyings la thim pa ni //
 shes rab pha rol phyin pa ste //
 mthong bya mthong byed mthong ba med //

[C. THE OPPONENT'S EIGHT OBJECTIONS]

'dir rang gi sde pa [_{G 391a1}] dngos por 'dzin pa shas che ba dag ma bzod
 nas shin tu rngams nas rgol bar²¹¹ byed de /
 [1.] khyed dBu ma pa dag ni rang gi 'dod pa khas mi len cing gzhan sun
 'byin pas / co 'dri bar byed pas g.yo sgyu can yin pa dang /²¹²
 [2.] skye ba [_{C 278a1}] med pa²¹³ ni med pa nyid yin no²¹⁴ snyam nas / med
 pa nyid kho nar lta ba [_{N 316b1}] dang /
 [3.] rgyu dang / 'bras bu dang / bden pa dang / dkon mchog la sogs pa'i
 chos thams cad la skur ba btab pas chad [_{D 273b1}] par²¹⁵ smra ba yin
 pa dang /

²⁰³ G, N: *bsgom pa*.

²⁰⁴ G: one more *shad* inserted.

²⁰⁵ G: *mnon pa'i*. N: *non pa'i*.

²⁰⁶ C: *mjug tu*.

²⁰⁷ N: *thag pa*.

²⁰⁸ G, N: *shad* inserted.

²⁰⁹ G: *gzugsu*.

²¹⁰ G: *dbusu*.

²¹¹ N: *grol par*.

²¹² N: one more *shad* inserted.

²¹³ G: *skye med pa*.

²¹⁴ G: *med pa yino*; N: *med pa yin no*.

²¹⁵ G, N: *chad pa*.

- [4.] De bzhin gshegs pa'i lung la skur pa 'debs shing lung gyis khyed la gnod pa dang /
- [5.] mngon sum la skur pa btab cing mngon sum gyis khyed la gnod pa dang /
- [6.] rjes su²¹⁶ dpag pas gnod cing de la skur pa btab par 'gyur ba dang /
- [7.] grags pas gnod cing de la skur pa gdab pa²¹⁷ dang /
- [8.] khas blangs pas gnod pa de / bdag nyid kyang phung la gzhan mkhas pa dag kyang lam 'di la btsud pas phung par byed pas / gzhung lugs 'di gtang bar²¹⁸ bya'o zhes so²¹⁹ //

[D. INTRODUCTION TO MADHYAMAKA REPLIES 1–4]

de la 'dir brjod par bya ste /
 kye ma 'khor ba thog ma med pa nas / ma rig pa'i mig nad chen pos blo gros kyi mig bkab pas rang de las ma thar pa / zab mo'i tshul ston pa dag la²²⁰ dgrar 'du shes shing rna ba 'gebs par byed pa / De bzhin gshegs pa'i nges pa'i²²¹ don gyi lung ji lta ba bzhin du ma rtogs pa tshogs rnam pa gnyis ma bsags pas tshul 'di lta bu la mos pa dang / thos pa dang / 'jug pa'i skabs med pa dag nyon cig /

skye bo yi ni chos lugs dang //
 shing rta chen po'i [G 391b1] lam yin te //
 PHYOGS SU LHUNG BA'I DUG SPANGS NAS //
 gzu bo'i blo yis bshad par bya //

[D.1. REPLY TO THE FIRST OBJECTION]

[1.] khyed kyi rgol ba dang po'i skyon gyi dri ma med de / mthong ba med pa nyid de kho na nyid de mchog mthong ba'o²²² zhes gsungs pas mthong ba med pa'i don de la ji lta bu zhig yod na²²³ ji ltar khas blang bar²²⁴ bya ba /

²¹⁶ G: rjesu.

²¹⁷ G, N: skur pa btab pa.

²¹⁸ G, N: btang bar.

²¹⁹ G, N: zhe'o.

²²⁰ G, N: las.

²²¹ G: des pa'i.

²²² C, D: mthong ba med pa nyid de mchog mthong ba'o.

²²³ C, D: nas.

²²⁴ G, N: blangs par.

slob dpon nyid kyi zhal nas /

gal te dngos shig yod na ni //
 khas ni²²⁵ blang bar bya dgos na //
 dngos po skye ba med nyid la //
 khas blang ba ni ji ltar bya //

zhes gsungs so²²⁶ / bdag cag dBu ma pa la ni khas blang bar bya ba'i
 dngos po ni rdul phra rab 'bum du gshags pa'i tshad kyang bstan du med
 do²²⁷ //

khas blangs pa yi²²⁸ dngos po ni //
 phra rab tsam yang yod min te //
 gdod nas skye ba med pa'i phyir //
 mo gsham gyi ni [N 317a1] bu bzhin no //

dper na bud med mo gsham la // [C 278b1]
 khyod kyi bu ni gang yin dris //
 de la de ni yod min pas //
 smra bar nus pa ma yin no²²⁹ //

de bas na bdag cag dBu ma pa'i shes rab kyi mdun na yod pa dang med
 pa la sogs pa'i dngos po khyed kyi 'dod pa lta bu ci yang med de /²³⁰
 chos thams cad skye ba med cing brjod du med pa'i phyir ro²³¹ //

[D.2. REPLY TO THE SECOND OBJECTION]

[2.] rgol ba gnyis pa'i [D 274a1] skyon gyi dri ma yod pa ma yin te / 'di ltar
 yod pa ma yin pa de la dngos por 'dzin par byed pa de dag ni smad par
 'gyur te / *mDo sde las* /

bdag tu 'dzin pa ri rab tsam yang bla'i / stong pa nyid du lta ba ni de lta ma
 yin te / gsor mi rung ba'i lta ba'o //²³²

²²⁵ G: *khasni*.

²²⁶ G: *gsungso*

²²⁷ G: *medo*.

²²⁸ G, N: *pa'i*.

²²⁹ G: *ma yino*.

²³⁰ G: one more *shad* inserted.

²³¹ G: *phyiro*.

²³² C, D, N: both *shad* omitted.

zhes gsungs pa dang / 'PHags pa rgyan stug po las kyang /

ri rab ri bo tsam gyur ba'i //
 bdag ^[G 392a1] tu lta bas mi gnod kyi //
 stong nyid lta bas gnod pa ni //
 nga rgyal mi bden brtags pas so²³³ //

rnal 'byor spyod pas stong pa nyid //
 gnas min pa la sbyar mi bya //
 gal te gnas min sbyar gyur na²³⁴ //
 bdud rtsi dug tu 'gyur ba yin //

lta ba ji snyed gang yang rung //
 lus can mams la yod pa yi //
 lta ba rnam par spang ba'i phyir //
 stong pa nyid kyi tshul bstan to //

stong pa nyid kyi lta thos kyang //
 la la'i lta ba ma zhig na //
 gsor mi rung pa'i lta ba can //
 sman pas btang pa'i nad pa bzhin //

zhes gsungs so²³⁵ // bdag cag dBu ma pa ni de ltar 'dod pa ma yin te /²³⁶
 don 'di la dgongs nas / slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas²³⁷ kyang /

skye med ces dang stong zhes dang //
 bdag med ces pas stong pa nyid //
 dman pa bdag nyid gang smra ba //
 de ni 'di na bdag bsgom mo //

zhes gsungs pa yin no²³⁸ // bdag cag dBu ma pa ni de ltar 'dod pa ma yin
 te / don 'di la dgongs nas / slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas kyang /

skye med ces dang stong zhes dang //
 bdag med ces pas stong pa nyid //
 dman pa bdag nyid gang smra ba //
 de ni 'di na bdag bsgom mo //

²³³ G: *paso*.

²³⁴ C: *gang la gnas min sbyar gyur na*; D: *gang la gnas min sbyar bar na*.

²³⁵ G: *gsungso*.

²³⁶ G: *ma yino* //; N: *ma yin no* //

²³⁷ G, N: *zhal nas*.

²³⁸ G: *yino*.

zhes gsungs pa yin no //²³⁹ DES NA DNGOS PO YOD PA NYID BKAG NAS MED
PA'I NGO BO NYID DU 'DOD NA NI DE LTAR YANG 'GYUR BA ZHIG NA / GANG
GI PHYIR KHO BO MTHA' GNYIS SPANGS PAS / DBU MA'I LAM STON PA'I PHYIR
MED PA NYID KYANG 'GOG PAR BYED DE /

DNGOS RNAMS MED CES BYA BA'I BLO //
DON BZHIN YIN PAR MI [N 317b1] 'DOD DE //²⁴⁰
RTOG PA'I SGO NAS GRUB PA'I PHYIR //
MTHO YOR LA NI MI BLO BZHIN //

GANG DAG 'DI SKAD CES DNGOS PO RNAMS NI GCIG TU YOD PA NYID KYANG
MA YIN TE / RGYU'I SKAD CIG MA 'GAGS PA'I PHYIR RO²⁴¹ // GCIG TU MED
PA²⁴² YANG MA YIN TE / 'BRAS BU'I SKAD CIG [C 279a1] MA SKYES PA'I PHYIR
RO²⁴³ // DE'I BLO NI YOD MED KYI NGO [G 392b1] BO NYID KHO NA'O²⁴⁴ ZHES
ZER BA LA BSHAD PA /

YOD MED BLO NI RTOGS BYA BA //
BKAG PHYIR DE BZHIN MKHAS RNAMS KYI²⁴⁵ //
RNAM PAR MI RTOG²⁴⁶ BLO GROS NI //
SKYE BA MED PA'I TSHUL²⁴⁷ GYIS TE //

GANG PHYIR STONG NYID STONG SOGS KYI //
NGO BO STONG NYID DE YI PHYIR //
MKHAS PA STONG PA NYID LA YANG //
STONG PA NYID DU LTA MI 'GYUR //

[D 274b1] CHOS RNAMS KUN TU²⁴⁸ MA GRUB PHYIR //
GANG LA RNAM PAR MI RTOG PA'I //
BLO YANG SKYE BAR MI 'GYUR BA //
KĻU SGRUB DE LTAR BZHED PA²⁴⁹ YIN //

²³⁹ The passage *bdag cag dBu ma pa ni de ltar 'dod pa ma yin te... zhes gsungs pa yin no //*, is omitted in C and G.

²⁴⁰ G: one *shad* omitted.

²⁴¹ G: *phyiro*.

²⁴² G: *med pa'i*.

²⁴³ G: *phyiro*.

²⁴⁴ G, N: two *shad* inserted.

²⁴⁵ D: *kyis*.

²⁴⁶ G, N: *mi rtogs*.

²⁴⁷ G, N: *tshal*.

²⁴⁸ D, G, N: *kun du*.

²⁴⁹ N: *bzhad pa*.

de bas na slob dpon nyid kyi zhal snga nas²⁵⁰ /

gang blo yod dang med pa las //
 nam par 'das shing mi gnas pa //
 de dag zab mo dmigs med pa'i //
 rkyaen gyi don la nam par bsgom //²⁵¹

yang /

blo chung gang gis yod nyid dang //
 med nyid²⁵² du ni mthong ba dag //²⁵³
 de yi spros pa nyer zhi ba'i //
 sgom pa mthong ba ma yin no²⁵⁴ //

gang zhig bdag dngos gzhan dngos dang //
 dngos dang dngos med mthong lta ba²⁵⁵ //
 de yi Sangs rgyas bstan pa la //
 de nyid mthong pa ma yin no²⁵⁶ //

yang /

yod ces pa ni²⁵⁷ rtag par²⁵⁸ lta //
 med ces pa ni chad par lta //²⁵⁹

zhes bya ba la sogs pa²⁶⁰ rgyas par gsungs so²⁶¹ // slob dpon Ā rya de bas
 kyang /²⁶²

yod min med min yod med min //
 gnyi ga min pa²⁶³ ma yin te //

²⁵⁰ C: *zhal nas*.

²⁵¹ G: one *shad* omitted.

²⁵² G: *med pa nyid*.

²⁵³ C, D, G: one *shad* omitted.

²⁵⁴ G: *ma yino*.

²⁵⁵ G, N: *dngos po mthong ba lta ba dang*.

²⁵⁶ G: *ma yino*.

²⁵⁷ C, D: *yod ces bya ba*.

²⁵⁸ G: *brtag par*.

²⁵⁹ G, N: both *shad* omitted.

²⁶⁰ G, N: *zhes bya ba sogs pa*.

²⁶¹ G: *gsungs*.

²⁶² G: one more *shad* inserted.

²⁶³ G: *min par*.

mtha' bzhi las ni rnam grol ba //
de nyid dBu ma pa yis²⁶⁴ rig //²⁶⁵

ces gsungs pa'i rigs pa dang /²⁶⁶ lung gi khungs kyang 'PHags pa shes
rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa las /

gang zhig yod pa ma yin de ni med ces bya //
yod dang med pa 'di gnyis med pa'i chos yin te //
byis pa rnam kyis de brtags yod dang med par byed [G 393a1] //²⁶⁷

ces gsungs so²⁶⁸ // yang bCom ldan 'das kyis /

yod dang med pa 'di gnyis mtha' yin te //
dag dang ma [N 318a1] dag 'di yang mtha' nyid yin //
de bas mtha' gnyis²⁶⁹ rnam par spangs nas su²⁷⁰ //
mkhas pas dbus la'ang gnas par mi byed do²⁷¹ //

zhes gsungs so²⁷² //

[D.3. REPLY TO THE THIRD OBJECTION]

[3.] rgol ba gsum pa'i [C 279b1] skyon gyi dri ma yang med de²⁷³ phyi rol
pa dag ni 'di skad du /

bzang mo legs par²⁷⁴ g.yos la zo //
shi nas spyang ki'i²⁷⁵ rjes dang 'dra //

ma shi bar du bde bar 'tsho //
shi nas de yi spyod yul med //
lus kyang thal ba bzhin song nas //
slar skye ba dang²⁷⁶ ga la 'gyur //

²⁶⁴ C: *bu yis*.

²⁶⁵ C, D: one *shad* omitted.

²⁶⁶ G, N: one more *shad* inserted.

²⁶⁷ N: both *shad* omitted.

²⁶⁸ G: *gsungso*.

²⁶⁹ G: *gnyis*.

²⁷⁰ C: *nasu*.

²⁷¹ G: *gnas parmi byedo*.

²⁷² G: *gsungso*.

²⁷³ G, N: one *shad* inserted.

²⁷⁴ C: *logs par*.

²⁷⁵ G, N: *spyad ki'i*.

²⁷⁶ G: *skye bar yang*; N: *skye bay yang*.

de phyir snga phyi yod pa min //
 tshe 'di nyid la bde ba'i phyir //
 lha mchod 'dre srin mnan byas nas //
 btsan phyug mthu stobs 'grub par 'gyur //

zhes zer te / de lta bu'i chad par smra ba dang / bdag cag dBu ma pa lta
 ba ga la gcig ^{/277} de dag ni rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba dang / rgyu dang
 'bras bu dang / bden pa dang / dkon mchog la sogs [D 275a1] pa la skur pa
 'debs pas²⁷⁸ chad par smra ba yin no²⁷⁹ // bdag cag dBu ma pa ni bden
 pa gnyis kyī tshul la gnas pas chad par smra bar mi 'gyur te / ji lta²⁸⁰ zhe
 na / 'di ltar kun rdzob kyī tshul gyis kyang chad par smra ba ma yin te /
slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas /

ma rig dang po rga shi mtha' //
 rten 'brel bcu gnyis ga la yod //
 sgyu ma rmi lam 'dra ba ru //
 rten 'brel bcu gnyis nged 'dir 'dod //²⁸¹

ces nang²⁸² rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba gsungs so²⁸³ // phyi rten cing
 'brel par 'byung ba yang rigs pa shes pa'i mchog [G 393b1] Dharma kī rtis
 ji skad du /

myu gu sogs dang sngon po sogs //²⁸⁴
 nus mthong²⁸⁵ kun rdzob 'dod ce na //
 de skad zer na de ltar zad //²⁸⁶

ces gsungs so²⁸⁷ // *Lung* gi khungs kyang ji skad du ^{/288}

dge²⁸⁹ dang mi dge gang phyir dngos med kyang //
 de lta'ang dge ba nyid kyang mi dge min //

²⁷⁷ D: one more *shad* inserted.

²⁷⁸ G, N: one *shad* inserted.

²⁷⁹ G: *yino*.

²⁸⁰ G, N: *ji ltar*.

²⁸¹ G, N: both *shad* omitted.

²⁸² G, N: *ce na*.

²⁸³ G: *gsungso*.

²⁸⁴ G: one *shad* omitted.

²⁸⁵ D: *mtho*.

²⁸⁶ G, N: both *shad* omitted.

²⁸⁷ G: *gsungso*.

²⁸⁸ G: one more *shad* inserted.

²⁸⁹ G: *dge ba*.

'jig rten kun rdzob chu yi zla 'dra bas //
dge ba yid 'ong sdug bsngal rtag mi bde²⁹⁰ //

zhes gsungs so²⁹¹ // de bzhin du dkon mchog gsum la'ang skur pa btab
pa ma [N 318b1] yin te / 'di ltar dkon mchog gsum ni bdag cag dBu ma pa'i
rnal 'byor bsgom pa²⁹² las 'byung ba yin la / de yang kun rdzob tu yin te
/ bCom ldan 'das kyis ji skad du /

dngos grub mams kyang kun rdzob pa //
Sangs rgyas rdo rje sems dpa' nyid //
kun rdzob nyid [C 280a1] du rab grub 'gyur //

zhes gsungs pa dang / B COM LDAN 'DAS KYIS KYANG /²⁹³

NGA NI THOB PA MED PA KHO NAR BYANG CHUB KYI SNYING POR LANGS SO²⁹⁴
ZHES GSUNGS SO²⁹⁵ // DE BZHIN DU TSHE DANG LDAN PA ŚĀ RI'I BU / THOB PA
YANG YOD²⁹⁶ // MNGON PAR RTOGS PA YANG YOD DE / DE NI 'JIG RTEN GYI THA
SNYAD KYIS GNYIS SU²⁹⁷ BRJOD PAR ZAD KYI /²⁹⁸ DON DAM PAR NI YOD PA MA
YIN NO²⁹⁹

ZHES BYA BA LA SOGS PA GSUNGS PA LTA BU'O // de bas na thob pa dang /
mngon par rtoḡs pa dang³⁰⁰ 'bras bu ni kun rdzob tu yin no³⁰¹ //
gzhan yang snying rje chen po las byung ba'i byang chub kyis sems dang
ldan pa'i byang chub sems dpa' gang 'di snyam du don dam par ni chos
thams cad gdod ma nas³⁰² skye ba med kyang / kun rdzob tu 'gro ba lnga
po'i sems can³⁰³ 'di dag [G 394a1] sdug bsngal gyi chu bo³⁰⁴ las ji ltar bsgral
bar bya / bsdu ba'i dngos po bzhi la sogḡs pa'i thabs dam pa mams kyis

²⁹⁰ D: *mi bden*; G, N: *mi dben*.

²⁹¹ G: *gsungso*.

²⁹² G, N: *bsgoms pa*.

²⁹³ G: one more *shad* inserted.

²⁹⁴ G: *langso*; G, N: two *shad* inserted.

²⁹⁵ G: *gsungso*.

²⁹⁶ G, N: *yod de*.

²⁹⁷ G: *gnyisu*.

²⁹⁸ G, N: one more *shad* inserted.

²⁹⁹ G: *yino*; G, N: two *shad* inserted.

³⁰⁰ G, N: one *shad* inserted.

³⁰¹ G: *yino*.

³⁰² G: *gdod nas*.

³⁰³ G: *lnga po'i sen*.

³⁰⁴ N: *sdug bsngal byi chu bo*.

'di dag [D 275b1] thams cad gcig kyang ma lus par rdzogs pa'i byang chub
 chen po la 'god par bya'o // nam zhig na bdag mngon par rdzogs par
 sangs rgyas pa'i Sangs rgyas kyi zhing der nyan thos dang / rang sangs
 rgyas dang / sems can dang / sdug bsngal ba zhes bya ba'i ming yang
 grag par³⁰⁵ ma gyur cig³⁰⁶ snyam du sems pa'i sems can chen po³⁰⁷ la
 chad par smra ba ga la yod /³⁰⁸
slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas kyang /

rang lus sbyin par btang ba ni //
 ngo mtshar che ba ma yin gyi //
 chos 'di stong par shes nas su //
 las kyi 'bras bu sten byed pa //
 ngo mtshar las kyang de ngo mtshar //
 rmad byung las kyang de rmad byung //³⁰⁹

yang /

stong nyid lta bas lta byed cing //
 rtag tu lus ngag³¹⁰ yid [N 319a1] dag gis //
 'di ltar sems can don byed la //
 chad par smra ba ga la yod //

ces gsungs so³¹¹ // *Lung* gi khungs kyang '*PHags pa* 'od srungs kyiis *zhus*
pa las /

chos thams cad skye ba med pa nyid du³¹² shes kyang / las kyi rnam par
 smin pa la yid ches pa dang / chos thams cad bdag med pa nyid du³¹³ khong
 du chud kyang sems can thams cad la snying rje [C 280b1] chen po skyed pa³¹⁴
 dang / sbyin pa rgya chen po btang³¹⁵ yang rnam par smin pa la mi re ba
 dang / sbyor ba khams gsum na byed kyang bsam pa mya ngan las 'das pa'o
 //³¹⁶

³⁰⁵ G: *grags par*.

³⁰⁶ G, N: one *shad* inserted.

³⁰⁷ G: *sen chen po*.

³⁰⁸ G: one more *shad* inserted.

³⁰⁹ G: both *shad* omitted.

³¹⁰ C: *rag*; N: *dag*.

³¹¹ G: *gsungso*.

³¹² C: one *shad* inserted. G: *med pa med pa nyid*; G, N: *du* omitted.

³¹³ G: *du* omitted.

³¹⁴ C: *skyod pa*.

³¹⁵ G: *gtong*; N: *gtog*.

³¹⁶ C, D: both *shad* omitted.

zhes gsungs so³¹⁷ // don dam pa'i tshul gyis kyang chad par smra ba ma
 yin te / 'di ltar mi ngas kyis³¹⁸ skye bo bsad pa dang / tho bas bum pa
 bcom pa'am / mes shing [G 394b1] bsregs pa ltar dngos po don dam par
 grub pa yod pa ma yin no³¹⁹ zhes zer na chad par smra ba yin pa las /
 chos rnams kyi chos nyid Sangs rgyas 'jig rten du byung yang rung ma
 byung yang rung gdod³²⁰ ma nas skye ba dang bral ba yin pas / slob dpon
zLa ba grags pa'i zhal nas /

zad dang chags bral mya ngan 'das //
 'gog dang stong pa zhi ba nyid //
 de bzhin nyid kyang chos rnams kyi //
 rang gi ngo bo yin zhes bshad //

ces gsungs so /³²¹

skye ba med ces bstan pa ni //
 dngos por 'dzin pa rnams phyir yin //
 chos rnams ye nas skye med la //
 skye med tha snyad sgro btags tsam //

dngos med nyid kyang ma grub na //
 der ni dngos po ga la zhig /
 dngos po gdod³²² nas med nyid la //
 chad ces pa de rigs pa min //

bdag [D 276a1] cag la chad par smra ba'i dri ma med de /
slob dpon gyi zhal snga nas /

dngos por khas len yod na ni //
 de la chad sogs 'jigs pa 'byung //
 dngos por khas len med rnams la //
 chad sogs 'jigs pa ga la 'byung //

gal te dngos shig³²³ yod na ni //
 de la 'jig rten mtha' yod³²⁴ [N 319b1] dang //
 mtha' med la sogs par yang 'gyur //

³¹⁷ G: *gsungso*.

³¹⁸ G, N: *kyi*.

³¹⁹ G: *yino*; G, N: two *shad* inserted.

³²⁰ N: *gdong*.

³²¹ G: *gsungso* //

³²² N: *gdong*.

³²³ G, N: *dngos gi*.

³²⁴ N: *yad*.

zhes bya ba la sogs pa'i bar du gsungs so³²⁵ // dper na skyes bu zhig 'di
skad du / nam mkha' ni³²⁶ med do³²⁷ // nam mkha'i aut pa la dang / padma
ni med do zhes zer na / chad par smra ba yin nam / 'dir *Lung* gi khungs
kyang '*PHags pa shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa chen mo* las kyang³²⁸ /

Rab 'byor gzugs dngos por³²⁹ grub pa yod pa zhig na ni stong pa³³⁰ dang /
mi stong pa³³¹ dang / dben pa³³² dang / mi dben pa³³³ dang / bde ba dang /
mi bde ba dang / zhi ba dang / mi zhi ba la sogs par _[G 395a1] 'gyur ba zhig
na / gzugs dngos por grub pa med

ces bya ba la sogs pa gsungs nas rnam pa thams _[C 281a1] cad mkhyen pa'i
bar du rgyas par gsungs so³³⁴ //

[D.4. REPLY TO THE FOURTH OBJECTION]

[4.] rgol ba bzhi pa'i skyon gyis kyang gos par mi 'gyur te / ji lta³³⁵ zhe
na / ji lta³³⁶ khyed³³⁷ NYan thos dang / rNal 'byor spyod pa'i khungs
kyi lung thams cad ni drang ba'i don no³³⁸ zhes sngar³³⁹ rgyas par bshad
zin pas de³⁴⁰ dag la yang nged dBu ma pa skur pa 'debs par mi byed de
/ de dag rim gyis 'dren par byed pa'i thabs yin te / dgongs pa bzhi dang
/ ldem por³⁴¹ dgongs pa bzhi bzhin no³⁴² //
lung gis gnod pa yang de ni 'di lta / *CHos chen po*'i me long gi mdo las
gsungs pa'i lta ba ngan pa³⁴³ bco brgyad po de dag gis gnod do zhe na /

³²⁵ G: *gsungso*.

³²⁶ D: *ni* omitted.

³²⁷ G: *medo*.

³²⁸ G, N: *kyang* omitted.

³²⁹ D: *dngos po*.

³³⁰ N: *stod pa*.

³³¹ N: *mi stod pa*.

³³² C: *dben pa*.

³³³ C: *mi dben pa*.

³³⁴ G: *gsungso*.

³³⁵ G, N: *ji lta*.

³³⁶ G, N: *'di lta*.

³³⁷ C: *khyod*.

³³⁸ G, N: two *shad* inserted.

³³⁹ D: *sdang*.

³⁴⁰ G: *des*.

³⁴¹ G: *ldems por*.

³⁴² G: *bzhino*.

³⁴³ G: *don pa*. N: *dan pa*.

dBu ma pa la ni de dag gis³⁴⁴ gnod pa med de / de dag ni bden pa gnyis
 kyi tshul spangs nas / 'di skad du / gang med pa'i don de ni de³⁴⁵ kho na
 nyid yin te / ci yang³⁴⁶ med de /³⁴⁷ thams cad rang bzhin gyis mnam par
 dag pa'o //
 yang³⁴⁸ kun rdzob kyi dngos po ni kun rdzob tu med do³⁴⁹ zhes zer ba de
 lta bu'i log par lta ba 'dzin pa ni tshar bcad pa'i 'os yin pas / rgyang
 bsrings te bshad par bya'o //

[E. INTRODUCTION TO MADHYAMAKA REPLIES 5–8]

rgol ba lnga pa dang /³⁵⁰ drug pa dang / bdun pa dang / brgyad pa'i skyon
 gi³⁵¹ dri mas kyang gos par mi 'gyur te / kun rdzob kyi bden par [D 276b1]
 snang ba'i phreng ba 'di dag³⁵² thams cad khas [N 320a1] blangs pas de dag
 la skur ba btab pa yang ma yin no³⁵³ // yang³⁵⁴ don dam par zhes dam
 bcas pa /³⁵⁵ de dag gis gnod par yang mi 'gyur te³⁵⁶ /

[E.1. REPLY TO THE FIFTH OBJECTION]

[5.] 'DI LTAR MNGON [G 395b1] SUM GYIS KYANG MI GNOD DO³⁵⁷ // YUL
 RNAMS LOG PA YIN PA'I PHYIR DANG / DBANG PO RNAMS BLUN PA'I PHYIR
 DANG / MTHONG BA LA SOGS PA'I NUS PA MED BZHIN DU RAB RIB CAN LA
 SKRA DANG / SBRANG BU DANG / KHAB 'DZAG PA LA SOGS PA SNANG BA
 LTA BU DANG / BRAG CA LA SOGS PA GRAG PA LTAR MNGON SUM YANG
 MNGON PA'I NGA RGYAL YIN PAS DE'I PHYIR GANG LA CI ZHIG MNGON SUM

³⁴⁴ G, N: *gis* omitted.

³⁴⁵ G: *de* omitted.

³⁴⁶ G, N: *ci'ang*.

³⁴⁷ G, N: *shad* omitted.

³⁴⁸ G, N: one *shad* inserted.

³⁴⁹ G, N: two *shad* inserted.

³⁵⁰ C, D: *shad* omitted.

³⁵¹ G: *gyi*.

³⁵² G: *dag* omitted; N: *phreng bar ni* (reading uncertain).

³⁵³ G: *yino*.

³⁵⁴ N: one *shad* inserted.

³⁵⁵ N: *shad* omitted.

³⁵⁶ N: *gnod par mi 'gyur te*.

³⁵⁷ N: *mi gnong de*.

DU GYUR NAS DE'I³⁵⁸ GNOD PAR 'GYUR / de bas na mngon sum gyi gnod
pa³⁵⁹ med do³⁶⁰ //

[E.2. REPLY TO THE SIXTH OBJECTION]

[6.] rjes su dpag pas kyang gnod pa med do³⁶¹ // don dam par 'ga' yang
grub pa med pas so³⁶² //

[E.3. REPLY TO THE SEVENTH OBJECTION]

[7.] GRAGS PAS [C 281b1] KYANG GNOD PA MED DE / GANG GI PHYIR 'JIG RTEN
NI MI SHES PA'I LING THOG GIS MDONGS PA³⁶³ YIN PAS DON DAM PA DPYAD
PA'I SKABS SU³⁶⁴ DE NI³⁶⁵ NOR BU RIN PO CHE BRTAG PA'I³⁶⁶ SKABS SU³⁶⁷
DMUS LONG MA GTOGS PA BZHIN DU 'JIG RTEN PA SKABS 'DIR MI GTOGS PAS
GRAGS PA'I GNOD PA MED DO³⁶⁸ //

[E.4. REPLY TO THE EIGHTH OBJECTION]

[8.] bden pa gnyis kyi tshul la gnas pas khas blangs pa'i gnod pa yang
med do³⁶⁹ //

[F. CLOSING STANZAS]

tshul gnyis shing rtar zhugs byas nas //
rigs pa'i kha lo legs bsgyur te //
lung gi lam du zhugs³⁷⁰ byas nas //
lam log par ni 'gro mi 'gyur //

³⁵⁸ C, G, N: *des*.

³⁵⁹ N: *gnong pa*.

³⁶⁰ G: *medo*.

³⁶¹ G, N: *de*.

³⁶² G: *medo*; N: *med do*.

³⁶³ G, N: *ldongs pa*.

³⁶⁴ G: *skabsu*.

³⁶⁵ D: *da ni*.

³⁶⁶ G: *brtags pa'i*.

³⁶⁷ G: *skabsu*.

³⁶⁸ G: *medo*.

³⁶⁹ G: *medo*.

³⁷⁰ G: *bzhugs*.

ji ltar 'dab gshog³⁷¹ ma nyams bya //
 bar snang gcod pa thogs pa³⁷² med //
 de bzhin tshul gnyis ldan pa yang //
 chos rams kun la thogs pa med //

ji ltar seng ge'i nga ro yis //
 gcan gzan thams cad skrag cing 'jigs /
 de bzhin stong nyid seng ge'i sgras //
 rgol ba thams cad 'jigs shing skrag /

dngos po med la dbang thob pas //
 de phyir dngos po [G 396a1] kun bdag nyid //
 rang gzhan sde pa thams cad la //
 seng ge'i nga ro smra ba yin //

nges pa'i don [N 320b1] gyi yang dag pa'i kun rdzob kyi skabs rdzogs so³⁷³ //

Abbreviations

MHK	<i>Madhyamakahrdayakārikā</i>
MMK	<i>Mūlamadhyamakakārikā</i>
MRP	<i>Madhyamakaratnapradīpa</i>
TJ	<i>Tarkajvālā</i>

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*'PHags pa 'jam dpal gyi mtshan yang dag par brjod pa'i 'grel pa snying
 po mngan par rtogs pa*. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, rGyud, TSHi, 95a1–129a7.
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- Advayavajra, *Mahāyānaviṃśikā*: See Mathes 2015: 193–197 (English translation)
 and 465–471 (Sanskrit and Tibetan texts).
- Advayavajra, *Tattvaratnāvalī*: See Uī Hakuju 1963 and Mathes 2015: 59–94
 (English translation) and 341–369 (Sanskrit and Tibetan texts).

³⁷¹ C, D: *bshog*.

³⁷² G, N: *thog pa*.

³⁷³ G: *rdzogs*.

Āryabrahmaviśeṣacintipariṣcchāsūtra:

'PHags pa tshangs pa khyad par sems kyis zhus pa. Lha-sa bKa'-'gyur, mDo-mang, Pa, 34b7–159a7.

Āryadeva, *Caryāmelāpakapradīpa*: See Wedemeyer 2007.

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Āryadeva, *Skhalitapramathanayuktihetusiddhi*:

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bDag byin gyis brlab pa'i rim pa rnam par dbye ba. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, rGyud, NGi, 112a3–114b1.

See also Pāṇḍeya 1990.

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See also Lindtner 2001.

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- Chapter 4 edited in Lindtner 1986b: 192–201 and translated in Lindtner 1986a: 246–254.
- Bhāviveka, *Prajñāpradīpavṛtti*:
dBu ma rtsa ba'i 'grel pa shes rab sgron ma. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, TSHa, 45b4–259b3.
- Bhāviveka, *Tarkajvālā*:
dBu ma'i snying po'i 'grel ba rtog ge 'bar ba. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, DZa, 40b7–329b4.
- See also Eckel 1992a and 2008b, Heitmann 2004, and Iida 1968.
- Candrakīrti, *Madhyamakāvatāra* and *Bhāṣya*: See Uryuzu Ryushin and Nakazawa Mitsuru 2012.
- Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā*: See MacDonald 2005.
- Candrakīrti, *Triśaraṇasaptati*: See Sørensen 1986.
- Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*: See Miyasaka 1971–1972.
- Dharmamitra, *Abhisamayālaṃkārikākārikāprajñāpāramitopadeśaśāstraṭīkā-prasūthapadā*:
SHes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa'i man ngag gi bstan bcos mngon par rtogs pa'i rgyan gyi tshig le'ur byas pa'i 'grel bshad tshig rab tu gsal ba. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, SHes-phyin, NYa, 1b1–110a3.
- Diñnaga, *Abhidharmakośavṛttimarmapradīpa*:
CHos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi 'grel pa gnad kyi sgron ma. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, mNGon-pa, NYu, 95b1–214a7.
- Jayānanda, *Madhyamakāvatāraṭīkā*:
dBu ma la 'jug pa'i 'grel bshad. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, Ra, 1b1–365a7.
- Jñānagarbha, *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti*: See Eckel 1992b.
- Kambala, *Ālokaṃāla*: See Lindtner 2003.
- Kāśyapaparivartasūtra*:
'PHags pa 'od srung gi le'u. Lha-sa bKa'-'gyur, dKon-brtsegs, CHa, 211a6–260b5.
- See also Vorobyova-Desyatovskaya 2002.
- Kuśalamūlasamparigraha*:
'PHags pa dge ba'i rtsa ba yongs su 'dzin pa. Lha-sa bKa'-'gyur, mDo-mang, NGa, 1b1–353b1.
- Laṅkāvatārasūtra*: See Vaidya 1963.

- Milindapañha*: See Trenckner 1997.
- Nāgārjuna, *Acintyastava*: See Lindtner 1987: 140–161 and Tola and Dragonetti 1995a.
- Nāgārjuna's *Bodhicittavivaraṇa*: Lindtner 1987: 180–217.
- Nāgārjuna, *Lokāṭīstava*:
See Nāgārjuna, *Acintyastava*.
- Nāgārjuna, *Mūlamadhyamakārikā*:
dBu ma rtsa ba'i tshig le'ur byas pa. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, TSa, 1b1–19a6.
See also de Jong 1977 and Yè Shǎoyǒng 2011.
- Nāgārjuna, *Pañcakrama*: See Isaacson 2007.
- Nāgārjuna, *Piṇḍīkṛtasādhana*: See Wright 2010.
- Nāgārjuna, *Praṭīyasamutpādaḥṛdayakārikā*: See Jamieson 2001.
- Nāgārjuna, *Ratnāvalī*: See Hahn 1982.
- Nāgārjuna, *Śālistambanāmamahāyanasūtraṭīkā*: See Schoening 1995.
- Nāgārjuna, *Vigrahavyāvartanī*: See Bhattacharya, Johnston and Kunst 1990.
- Nāgārjuna, *Yuktiṣaṣṭīkā*: See Tola and Dragonetti 1995b and Scherrer-Schaub 1991.
- gNYen dPal-dbyangs, *mTHa'i mun sel sgron ma*:
sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, sNa-tshogs, No, 384a7–384b7.
See also Karmay 2007: 80–83.
- Padmavajra, *Guhyasiddhi*:
rGyud ma lus pa'i don nges par skul bar byed pa dpal gsang ba grub pa.
sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, rGyud, Wi, 1b1–28b4.
See also Rinpoche 1987.
- Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikaprajñāpāramitāsūtra*:
SHes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa stong phrag nyi shu lnga pa. Lha-sa bKa'-
'gyur, NYi-khri, Ka, 1b1–558a6 (only).
See also Dutt 2000 and Kimura 1986.
- Ratnaguṇasaṃcayagāthā*: See Obermiller 1992.
- Samādhirājasūtra*: See Vaidya 1961.
- Śāntarakṣita, *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*: See Ichigō 1989.
- Śrīgupta, *Tattvāvatāravṛtti*:
De kho na la 'jug pa'i 'grel pa. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, dBu-ma, Ha, 39b4–43b5.
- Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*:
CHos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, mNGon-pa, Ku 26b1-KHu, 95a7.
See also Śāstrī 1998.
- Vasubandhu *Mahāyānasamgrahabhāṣya*:
THeg pa chen po bsdud pa'i 'grel pa. sDe-dge bsTan-'gyur, Sems-tsam, Ri, 121b1–190a7.
- Vasubandhu, *Viṃśatikārikā*: See Anacker 2002: 157–179 and 413–421.

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ABSTRACT

This article presents the first annotated English translation and edition of the Tibetan text of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, chapter 5, whose original Sanskrit is to be considered lost. The Introduction contains a primary analysis of contents and aims of the chapter, together with general observations on the epoch and compositional style of the *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*. It is suggested that the text is probably a 10th century explanatory handbook of Bhāviveka's *Tarkajvālā* for beginner students. Chapter 5, in particular, relying strongly upon the “two truths” dialectics, focuses on how students can consistently respond to the main objections opponents used to raise against the Madhyamaka standpoint.