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3 Relational Sufficientarianism and Basic Income

Justin Tosi

People are attracted to egalitarianism for many reasons. One popular reason for its appeal is that it expresses a strong concern for improving the material conditions of the least advantaged. For many egalitarians, that is also probably the most attractive feature of the view.

The topic of this volume, then, presents the class of egalitarian described with an interesting dilemma. Proposals for universal basic income policies have enjoyed a surprisingly broad base of support. Versions of an unconditional basic income have been endorsed by politicians in South Africa, Scotland, Finland, and Switzerland. And both private and public experiments with a basic income are underway. The idea has also drawn support from unexpected parts of the ideological spectrum. In this book, for instance, there are arguments supporting a basic income from the perspectives of both classical liberalism and anarchism.[1]

But what should egalitarians think of a universal basic income? On the one hand, a universal basic income policy would probably make the least advantaged members of society materially better off—perhaps even substantially so. But on the other hand, the adoption of such a policy would leave the distribution of goods (or welfare, or capabilities, or whatever one takes to be the correct currency of egalitarian justice) far short of the egalitarian ideal. The amounts of money typically proposed for a basic income are not so large that they would significantly reduce disparities in wealth. Perhaps some egalitarians would favor the adoption of a universal basic income, hoping that it would put us on the path to more ambitious redistributive policies. Others might be wary of such a policy, fearing that it would restrict the imaginations of policymakers so that they focus on minor issues around the basic income rather than on the possibility of more radical egalitarian measures. But let us set such strategic concerns aside and focus only on what sort of philosophical evaluation egalitarians should make of basic income policies.

Brian Barry considered precisely this question, and he concluded that egalitarians should oppose the basic income if they took any of three common foundations for their egalitarian commitments. Utilitarians could not accept an unconditional basic income, he argues, because whether a person should work depends on whether that person's doing so would

contribute to the maximization of utility. Luck egalitarians should oppose a basic income because such a policy would treat those who simply choose not to work similarly to those who, through no choice of their own, are unable to work. It would, therefore, fail to distinguish between cases of brute luck and option luck, as the former would enjoy greater life satisfaction than the latter. Finally, and most interesting for my purposes, Barry argues that those who are egalitarians for reasons of solidarity or fellowship should reject a basic income because it would create a two-class society of the employed and the unemployed:

> [I]f we take economic equality to be an equal material standard of living . . . a system of basic income would create a society that was markedly unequal because of the gap that would have to be created between those on the basic income and those in employment.[2]

I suppose many egalitarians would agree with Barry's assessment. But perhaps an egalitarian who remembers being drawn to her beliefs about distributive justice out of a concern for the least advantaged will recognize in his remarks the thinking of what Adam Smith terms the "man of system." Such a man "seems to imagine that he can arrange the different members of a great society with as much ease as the hand arranges the different pieces upon a chessboard," and "is often so enamored with the supposed beauty of his own ideal plan of government, that he cannot suffer the smallest deviation from any part of it."[3] If commitment to a theory of egalitarian justice would lead one to reject a universal basic income as unjust, then perhaps that is a strike against such a theory. For those who became egalitarians because they wanted to help the least advantaged, then this might be a good time to search for another theory. Alternatively, those who think basic income policies are an attractive idea might be on the lookout for a broader theory of justice that would endorse them.

This chapter develops a tentative sketch of such a theory. Basically, I will take it as a set point that a universal basic income is a just policy and search for an explanation of why that might be. If a basic income strikes us as a fair and just idea compatible with our vision of a good society, why is that so? The answer I defend below is that most recent theorizing about distributive justice and egalitarianism is wrong. A just society is not one in which people must enjoy equal holdings, equal welfare, equal capabilities, or even equal social status. It is, rather, one in which everyone enjoys sufficient social status. I call this view relational sufficientarianism.

Distributive Egalitarianism and Its Discontents

Much of the debate among egalitarians in the post-Theory of Justice era has been about the currency of distributive justice—or the "equality of

what" debate.[4] The idea unifying participants in this debate has been that there is some thing X that must be equalized across persons, and our task as moral and political philosophers is to figure out whether it is resources, welfare, capabilities, or something else. And once we have settled that crucial question, the correct public policy is the one that best approximates an equal distribution of that thing.

I would like to discuss two popular views that arose, at least in their contemporary form, as reactions to this debate. The first view is called relational egalitarianism and has been defended most prominently by Elizabeth Anderson and Samuel Scheffler.[5] Relational egalitarians argue that egalitarianism is fundamentally about the elimination of social hierarchy, and the equality worth caring about is relational equality. Anderson in particular chides distributive egalitarians for missing this point by fixating on the distribution of goods at the exclusion of all else. Historically, she points out, egalitarian movements have been concerned with bringing about equality of social conditions, in which people interact with one another in a democratic society of persons with equal status. It is not clear what the distributive implications of this view are, and to my knowledge, no one has attempted to work them out.[6] But critically, equal social relations are not reached simply by distributing things—and certainly not by distribution of a single good.

Is relational egalitarianism any more friendly to basic income policies than are the forms of distributive egalitarianism considered earlier? The differences between employed and unemployed members of society in terms of material holdings, welfare, and so on are not as likely to offend relational egalitarians. It is not necessarily a problem for social relations among free and equal citizens if a basic income makes little headway in lessening the gap between most and least advantaged along whatever metric favored by distributive egalitarians.

But I think relational egalitarians' focus on equal status creates new problems. First is what we can call the jobs problem. Consider the differences in status that might emerge as a result of some having careers—some of which might even be enjoyable—and others being underemployed or even entirely dependent on the basic income. For better or worse, many peoples' self-esteem is bound up with their work. It is important to them that they be able to see themselves as productive members of society who support themselves and their families, and who make a positive contribution to their community through remunerative work.[7] Thus, if the basic income is supposed to address the issue of rising unemployment due to automation, it does not satisfy the primary concern of relational egalitarians. Simply giving people money does not make them feel like the social equal of their fellow citizens when what they really need is a job.[8]

For lack of a better term, we can call a second problem the problem of rubbing it in. A basic income would open up lucrative new frontiers

in conspicuous consumption. Most proposals for a basic income are universal, in the sense that everyone would get a basic income payment. Some with far greater sources of income would no doubt seek out opportunities to signal how unimportant their basic income is to them, and businesses would undoubtedly meet their demand with creative offers, all of which would cost exactly as much as the full basic income payout for individuals. Resorts would offer lavish "basic income weekend getaways." Michelin-starred restaurants would design a special "basic income menu." Even charities might get in on the act, offering convenient ways to brag to your friends that you had donated your entire basic income payout, since you certainly don't need it![9] The idea behind all offers would be to blow your entire basic income as frivolously and demonstrably as possible. Perhaps some people would choose an even simpler route, and share a video of themselves simply burning the money. In any case, enterprising minds would find ways to turn the amount of money representing a basic income into a symbol of the lower class and use it to create social distance between that class and themselves. A basic income could thus be used as a weapon against the possibility of a society of equals.

The other view that stands in opposition to distributive egalitarianism is sufficientarianism.[10] Sufficientarianism is also a doctrine about distributive justice, but it holds that equality is not the correct distributive ideal. Instead, what matters from the standpoint of justice is that people have enough. Harry Frankfurt summarizes the case for sufficientarianism as a reaction to distributive egalitarianism this way:

> What I believe [egalitarians] find intuitively to be morally objectionable, in the types of situations characteristically cited as instances of economic inequality, is not the fact that some of the individuals in those situations have *less* money than others but the fact that those with less have *too little*.[11]

As Frankfurt presents it, sufficientarianism is an error theory of egalitarianism. That is, it offers support for an alternative theory by identifying an understandable mistake that many egalitarians have made in their account of their intuitions.

This same type of move will make an appearance later in the chapter, so it is worth lingering for a moment to explain what I mean by this characterization of Frankfurt's argument. Here is an example of an error theory in a different context. When people look at a straw submerged in liquid, they sometimes think that the straw is bent. Their understandable mistake is a failure to consider that, by the principle of refraction, light waves change direction when they change speed. The different medium of the liquid causes the light waves to change speed, and thus direction, causing an optical illusion. When children hear this explanation, they often protest that it cannot be true. They are looking right at the straw, and they would not make such a stupid mistake. This is not a good objection to the principle of refraction, for the obvious reason that the principle undercuts the evidence on which the objection is based.

Paula Casal offers the following objection to Frankfurt's argument: "The claim that all egalitarians, including some of the most sophisticated philosophers, believe that equality matters only because they confuse 'being poorer than others' and 'being poor' is rather implausible."[12] There are two obvious instances of equivocation in this objection. Frankfurt is not accusing *all* egalitarians of making this mistake, nor does he suggest that this is the *only* reason anyone is an egalitarian. Rather, he is picking the most plausible reason for a non-instrumental concern for distributive equality and showing that even it is not a good reason.[13] There are, undoubtedly, distributive egalitarians who base their beliefs on still worse mistakes. (For instance, John Rawls associates some forms of egalitarianism with envy.)

Frankfurt's argument is attractive in part because of the prevalence in ordinary political discourse of the mistake he identifies. Defenders of equality often cite a concern for poor people as the first and strongest reason in favor of redistribution. Rightly so. Surely it is not implausible that many of those who are convinced by these popular appeals come to believe that a concern for the poor is the most compelling basis for egalitarianism. Nor is it implausible that a philosopher's intuition could be, in some sense, rooted in this belief. So there is reason to be suspicious of an intuition that equality is intrinsically valuable, even if that intuition belongs to a sophisticated philosopher.[14] Thus, it is a mistake to dismiss sufficientarianism in much the same way that children dismiss the principle of refraction.

According to sufficientarians like Frankfurt, a society's distribution of goods is just when everyone meets a threshold of sufficiency. If that condition is met, then it does not matter if some have more than others. Thus, unless the currency of distributive justice is jobs, sufficientarians will not have the same objection to basic income policies as relational egalitarians. And as long as the basic income is high enough to meet the threshold of sufficiency, it would seem that sufficientarians would endorse such a policy.

I suppose our search could end here, as we have identified a view of distributive justice that endorses the basic income.[15] But I think there is an important grain of truth in relational egalitarianism. What is the point of isolating the question of what justice demands in the distribution of goods from the question of what justice demands of social relations more generally? We might not like what relational egalitarianism has to say about basic income policies institutionalizing unacceptable social relations, but that does not mean we should expel all relational considerations from our theorizing. Instead, I suggest we explore a theory that combines

what is good about sufficientarianism with what is good about relational egalitarianism. The resulting view is relational sufficientarianism.

Relational Sufficientarianism: The Basic Idea

Relational sufficientarianism applies the requirement of sufficiency to social relations rather than distributions. Unlike distributive sufficientarianism, this view does not demand that people *have* enough—or at least that is not its fundamental demand. Like its egalitarian counterpart, relational sufficientarianism does not concern itself directly with the distribution of goods. Instead, it says that society should aim at bringing about sufficiently decent relations and any intervention in the distribution of goods should serve that fundamental aim. The basic demand of the view, then, is that everyone should have social status that is sufficient for decent relations, or those in which everyone is treated with sufficient respect. What are sufficiently decent relations? I do not have a full theory addressing that question to present here, but I take it that at minimum they would include everyone's rights being respected, social mobility (i.e., absence of rigid hierarchical structures), and access to important goods.[16] Notably, they do not include equal social status. They might, however, require equal status in some domains, as sufficient status might sometimes just be equal status. One obvious candidate is equality before the law.

Like its distributive counterpart, relational sufficientarianism can fruitfully be understood as an error theory, but this time of relational egalitarianism. Relational sufficientarianism says that proponents of relational egalitarianism confuse a concern that relations be decent for a concern that they be equal. Again, the error theory interpretation of relational egalitarianism is supported by the cases people appeal to in support of the view—that is, ones in which people are treated horribly. Here is how one relational egalitarian, Carina Fourie, begins a paper on equal social status:

> In the US, black people were often expected to step off the pavement to get out of the way of approaching whites. In apartheid South Africa, black people were expected to call white men "Baas", which means "Boss" in Afrikaans, and white women, "Madam". Although typically this is what black people would call their white employers, they were often expected to call any white people, including strangers, "Baas" or "Madam". White people, on the other hand, would often refer to adult blacks as "boy" or "girl". These are examples of what can be called social inequality.[17]

We hardly need any assistance from relational egalitarianism to see that the treatment described in these cases is morally repugnant. The people in these cases do not need equal social status across the board to have their

situations remedied. They do not need a workplace without hierarchical management, for instance, or the elimination of other voluntary associations that admit of distinctions of status. They need to have their rights respected and not to be treated as absolute subordinates in all things. In other words, there is an awful lot of space between apartheid and a society in which all have equal social status. Relational sufficientarians reject arrangements like the former while denying that a just society requires anything as extreme as the latter.

So relational sufficientarianism differs from relational egalitarianism in its view of the demands of justice concerning social status. It too focuses on promoting a certain kind of relations, but it denies that we should aim for equal status and the elimination of social hierarchy. Instead, we should aim for relations in which everyone has sufficient status and so is treated well enough in interpersonal relations. To paraphrase one of Harry Frankfurt's slogans for distributive sufficientarianism, if everyone were treated well enough, it would be of no moral consequence whether some were treated better than others.

There could be more or less fine-grained approaches to relational sufficiency. The coarsest possible view would hold that in some overall summary sense, there should be no social class (or set of persons) whose status is so low that they are not treated sufficiently well. At the other end of the spectrum, one could hold that no one should be subject to insufficiently decent treatment in any of the various spheres of life, however one divvies those up. I find the latter option more plausible and illuminating, but I will not attempt to work the view out here.

Status Relations in a Just Society

Let us now turn to a more detailed comparison of the case these two relational views offer for their accounts of status relations in a just society. Again, relational egalitarians argue that social hierarchy should be eliminated, whereas relational sufficientarians hold that hierarchy is unproblematic so long as everyone is treated with sufficient respect. Samuel Scheffler offers the clearest rejection of hierarchy. Scheffler writes that social equality matters to us "because we believe that there is something valuable about human relationships that are, in certain crucial respects at least, unstructured by differences of rank, power, or status." But, he admits, "differences of rank, power, and status are endemic to human social life."[18] So how can we explain our toleration of hierarchy? Scheffler says that tolerable hierarchies are either instrumentally valuable, "or else it is not necessary, in order for a relationship to qualify as having an egalitarian character, that it should be altogether unmarked by distinctions of rank or status."[19]

I think that this is simply not true of all tolerable hierarchies, unless we interpret "egalitarian character" so broadly that it has nothing to do

with social equality. Here is a story in which hierarchy is not instrumentally valuable and still unproblematic. A philosopher was seated at a conference dinner next to John Rawls sometime after the publication of *A Theory of Justice*. Apparently during his military service, Rawls contracted trench foot, and it bothered him for the rest of his life, making it uncomfortable to wear dress shoes. Rawls explained this situation to his dining companion and asked permission to take off his shoes. The man replied, "You're John Rawls. You can do whatever you want!" Now, unless this person went around screaming at graduate students who made similar requests, it would be ridiculous to classify anything about this story as a social injustice. And if he did respond that way to requests from lesser philosophers, it would be unjust only because of his failure to treat another person with respect, not because of his special deference to Rawls. That is because what matters is that we treat such requests with sufficient understanding, even if we're more understanding for people of a certain social status than others. It seems to me that nothing valuable is promoted by this deference to philosophical royalty that would excuse the presence of social hierarchy.

But perhaps Scheffler's other condition is active in this case, and this is a relationship of egalitarian character that happens to include a limited distinction of rank. Those of us who have worked in political philosophy for a while have all met people who knew Rawls and speak of him with such reverence that no impartial observer could describe their relationship as "having an egalitarian character" with a straight face. To outsiders, these encomia to Rawls are sometimes a bit weird, but there is nothing wrong with the relationships described therein.

We can find a less personal example in which hierarchy is clearly appropriate by considering the workplace. There some people have more power in their firm in virtue of their position. It could be objected that hierarchies within firms are acceptable only because they are instrumentally valuable. I do not doubt that company hierarchies are effective means of, for example, increasing productivity, but the fact that they are so effective does not entail that they are justified only because of their instrumental value. Hierarchy within a firm need not be in competition with justice, as it might be a result of justice. Suppose a principle of desert is true and people should be rewarded with increased status in the spheres of life in which they invest their efforts effectively. That people get deserved promotions is unproblematic (and even laudable) so long as other people are not denied access to important goods as a result.

But, it might be objected, what about workplace tyranny? Some employers use company hierarchy to dominate their employees. They make them take drug tests without any occupational justification for doing so. They place unreasonable restrictions on dress, what can be done during breaks, and so on. It is not hard to find accounts of people making justified complaints of lousy, arbitrary treatment from a boss who has been corrupted by power. But none of this provides a case for workplace democracy, or the elimination of hierarchy within firms. It just suggests that some employers don't treat their workers sufficiently well. But once again, there is a lot of space between sufficiently decent treatment and equal status within the firm.

Finally, someone might object that I have been unfair to relational egalitarians. A society of equals is not as demanding as I am making it out to be. Perhaps there is a place for earned and forfeited status in such a society. Here is Scheffler again, on the limits of hierarchy under conditions of social equality:

> [T]he participants in putatively egalitarian relationships must work out the terms of those relationships for themselves. . . . They must establish for themselves the divisions of authority and labor and the patterns of mutual dependence that will characterize their dealings with each other, and they must determine what kinds of role differentiation their relationship can sustain while remaining a relationship of equals.[20]

It is fair to withhold judgment about the specifics of what character relationships can take on while remaining egalitarian, as reasoning in the abstract cannot possibly account for all the potential complications. But it also seems fair to insist that relational egalitarianism can allow only so much hierarchy before it is no longer requiring that we treat one another as social equals, but merely as moral equals. And if all the view says is that we should treat one another as moral equals (i.e., with sufficient respect), and in some special cases that requires social equality, then I have a more accurate name for it: relational sufficientarianism.

The Threshold of Sufficiency

There is one final reason worth considering here to favor relational sufficientarianism to distributive sufficientarianism. The latter view has always faced what I will call the threshold problem: What counts as enough? Distributive sufficientarians have tried to solve this problem by specifying two kinds of thresholds, both of which face enduring objections. Some have offered absolute thresholds. Frankfurt says that we will have reached the point of sufficiency when we have no significant additional desires that would be satisfied with further resources.[21] Roger Crisp says that sufficiency requires enough to support 80 years of high-quality life—an account he proposes as adequate for all possible beings.[22] Basic questions of plausibility aside, absolute thresholds generally seem either too low for developed societies, or too high for developing ones.

The second strategy is to propose a relative threshold, according to which what counts as enough depends on how much some relevant class

of others have. This would solve the problem just noted for absolute thresholds, as the demands of sufficiency would vary by a society's stage of economic development. As critics have pointed out, however, this method of specifying a threshold conflicts with Frankfurt's claims about well-being that motivate sufficientarianism in the first place.[23] Frankfurt rejects egalitarianism in part because he says what others have should make no difference to your well-being. But of course if this is true, what counts as enough resources for a person should not depend on what others have, either.

Relational sufficientarianism is better equipped to address the threshold problem. What it means to treat people with respect varies by circumstance. One variable determining what decent social relations require is plausibly the level of economic development and wealth of a society. The resource requirements of relational sufficiency can thus vary depending on facts about a society that impact how its members relate to one another. Rousseau expressed something like the view I have in mind when he wrote that "no citizen should be so rich as to be capable of buying another citizen, and none so poor that he is forced to sell himself."[24] The amount of wealth required to satisfy that criterion would vary according to social and economic conditions. Relational sufficientarianism thus does not restrict itself to absolute thresholds of distributive sufficiency. And it is consistent with Frankfurt's claim that well-being is non-comparative, as the reason for varying the threshold does not depend on the mere fact of others' high well-being. Instead, relational sufficientarianism holds that what counts as enough resources will depend on what is necessary to bring about sufficiently decent relations in a particular society.

It is worth emphasizing one more nice result that falls out of this view. In some political circles, it has lately been a depressingly popular talking point to disparage the less advantaged members of developed societies who complain that they are living in relative poverty. "How can anyone complain about poverty when they have access to a refrigerator, something their ancestors would never have even dreamed of?" is a common instance of the move I have in mind. For relational sufficientarians, this is an easy claim to put to rest. They can complain because what it means for a preindustrial society to show sufficient concern for the well-being of its members bears little relation to what it means for us to do so.

Conclusion

It is time now to deliver on the promise I made at the outset of a view that can embrace a basic income policy. I have worked out only the bare bones of relational sufficientarianism, but I hope it is clear enough that it is better suited than the other views to serve as a theoretical backing for a basic income. For one thing, relational sufficientarianism can endorse a basic income that ensures everyone has enough. And it can tolerate differences

in the payment amount for societies at different stages of development. More critically, it can avoid the jobs problem faced by relational egalitarianism, as the view endorses only limited concern for differences in social status brought about by employment status. And it is unconcerned with the problem of rubbing it in that relational egalitarians might bristle at. So unless a lack of employment options causes social relations to become indecent despite a basic income, relational sufficientarians could endorse such a policy.

Notes

1. See essays by Zwolinski and Flanigan.
2. Brian Barry, "Equality Yes, Basic Income No," in *Arguing for Basic Income: Ethical Foundations for a Radical Reform*, ed. Philippe Van Parijs (London: Verso, 1992), 140.
3. Adam Smith, *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc., 1985), 233–234.
4. G.A. Cohen, "On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice," *Ethics* 99, no. 4 (1989): 906–944; Amartya Sen, "Equality of What?" in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, ed. Sterling McMurrin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 196–220.
5. See, for example, Elizabeth S. Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" *Ethics* 109, no. 2 (1999): 287–337; Samuel Scheffler, *Equality and Tradition: Questions of Value in Moral and Political Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).
6. Though at least one person has argued that someone should. See Christian Schemmel, "Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care About Distributions," *Social Theory and Practice* 37, no. 3 (2011): 365–390.
7. Robert Nozick famously poses the experience machine thought experiment, in which he asks whether you would plug into a machine for life that provides you with any subjective experience you want, though you are essentially dead for purposes of the external world. Anyone who teaches this thought experiment has likely seen in many students a powerful revulsion at the thought of plugging in and making no contribution to society. I suspect that similar thinking is behind the negative reaction some have to the admittedly far less extreme idea of a basic income as a replacement for the loss of opportunities to work. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 42–45.
8. Michael Cholbi has argued elsewhere, however, that the stated desire to work is an adaptive preference. See his "The Desire for Work as an Adaptive Preference," *Autonomy* 4 (2018): 1–17.
9. Cf. Justin Tosi and Brandon Warmke, "Moral Grandstanding," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 44, no. 3 (2016): 197–217.
10. For a recent and thorough defense of distributive sufficientarianism, see Liam Shields, *Just Enough: Sufficiency as a Demand of Justice* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2018).
11. Harry Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," *Ethics* 98, no. 1 (1987): 32.
12. Paula Casal, "Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough," *Ethics* 117, no. 2 (2007): 305.
13. Given that philosophers have had such difficulty finding a basis for equality, this might well be the most plausible reason. For one such discouraging search, see Richard J. Arneson, "What, If Anything, Renders All Humans

Morally Equal?" *Peter Singer and His Critics*, ed. Dale Jamieson (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), 103–128.

14. For another example, Ronald Dworkin writes: "It is, I think, apparent that the United States falls far short now [of the ideal of equality]. A substantial minority of Americans are chronically unemployed or earn wages below any realistic 'poverty line' or are handicapped in various ways or burdened with special needs; and most of these people would do the work necessary to earn a decent living if they had the opportunity and capacity." Ronald M. Dworkin, *A Matter of Principle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985), 208.
15. As we will see, though, sufficientarianism as described so far might have trouble specifying a society-specific basic income level.
16. Because I will not be giving a full account of what kind of relations are sufficiently decent, and this view is new and the general idea unfamiliar, it would be understandable if one felt uneasy about it. For instance, readers might worry that some nasty conceptions of sufficient relations are in this family of views. But that is true of relational egalitarianism, too, before one narrows down the set to what is reasonable. So to provide some reassurance, I take it that any satisfactory account of decent relations would rule out historical caste societies, slave societies, and societies in which women are second-class citizens.
17. Carina Fourie, "What Is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal," *Res Publica* 18, no. 2 (2012): 107–108.
18. Scheffler, *Equality and Tradition*, 225.
19. Scheffler, *Equality and Tradition*, 226.
20. Scheffler, *Equality and Tradition*, 226.
21. Frankfurt, "Equality as a Moral Ideal," 37–38.
22. Roger Crisp, "Equality, Priority, and Compassion," *Ethics* 113, no. 4 (2003): 762.
23. Casal, "Why Sufficiency Is Not Enough," 301.
24. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Basic Political Writings*, 1st ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), 170. Rousseau's statement may have implications for a ceiling on permissible holdings, as might my own view. But I will leave that issue aside for purposes of this chapter.

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