Knowing Disability, Differently

Knowing the apparatus of disability, conceptually

Rare exceptions notwithstanding, the apparatus (dispositif) of disability continues to be left out of feminist and other critical philosophical analyses produced across the sub-disciplines of ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of language, aesthetics, political philosophy, cognitive science, and epistemology (Tremain 2013a). Even feminist epistemologists and other philosophers who use the relatively recent and philosophically and politically important notions of epistemic injustice and epistemological ignorance do not consider how the apparatus of disability conditions their examination of phenomena, that is, do not consider how disability conditions what they examine, how they examine what they examine, nor why they examine what they examine. The failure of feminist and other philosophers to incorporate insights and arguments from philosophy of disability and disability studies into their work on epistemic injustice and epistemological ignorance is starkly evident in the abundance of ableist metaphors—such as “epistemic blindness,” “epistemic deafness,” “meta-blindness,” “gender-blind,” and “silenced”—that they invoke to bolster their claims, an abundance that attests to their lack of familiarity with or disregard for the arguments that feminist and other philosophers and theorists of disability have articulated in opposition to the use of these metaphors (for instance, see, Tremain 2011a; Tremain 2011b; Schalk 2013). In other words, discussions of epistemological ignorance themselves seem to (re)produce a form of epistemological ignorance. Indeed, perhaps the time has come to scrutinize the metaphorical role that the concept of ignorance itself plays in feminist and other critical philosophy and epistemology. Is the concept of epistemological ignorance itself a paradoxical and self-contradicting ableist metaphor? Do feminist and other philosophers inadvertently contribute to the harms perpetrated against certain group of disabled people when they invoke the concept of epistemological ignorance in their work?

The hypothesis that the concept of epistemological ignorance itself is an ableist metaphor suggests a number of ambitious avenues of inquiry to pursue in (feminist) philosophy and epistemology of disability. I set aside this hypothesis in what follows, however, in order to substantiate my earlier claims that feminist and other philosophers have consistently failed to incorporate critical understanding of the apparatus of disability into their philosophical analyses. I want to show that the failure of philosophers to attend to both (the apparatus of) disability and theoretical insights advanced about it comprises a form of epistemic injustice that distorts the ways in which discussions about (among other things) identity, oppression, and privilege are framed within the philosophical literature on epistemic injustice, as well as how the concept of epistemic injustice itself is construed within that body of work.

In order to make my case, I first examine Miranda Fricker’s discussion of the conditions that must prevail for a form of epistemic disadvantage to constitute epistemic injustice, that is, the necessary conditions for a form of hermeneutical disadvantage to count as hermeneutical injustice. I show that insofar as Fricker does not account for the apparatus of disability and its political character in the distinction that she draws between hermeneutical disadvantages that result from injustice and hermeneutical disadvantages that result from “bad luck,” the motivation for the distinction is unjustified and the distinction itself remains unsubstantiated. Once I have shown that Fricker does not appropriately account for the apparatus of disability in her discussion of
hermeneutical injustice, I turn to consider how disability has been left out of analyses of a now widely-used example of testimonial injustice that she introduced, namely, the trial of Tom Robinson in Harper Lee’s 1960 novel To Kill a Mockingbird. I focus in particular on claims that Fricker and José Medina advance about the ways in which the character of Robinson is racialized, gendered, and sexualized in the novel’s narrative. I am concerned to show that a more complex interpretation of the identities and events that unfold in Lee’s novel than these philosophers articulate would consider how the apparatus of disability contributes to the shape of the ways that Robinson is racialized, gendered, and sexualized in that drama, as well as to the ways that he is disabled therein. My identification of disability as an “apparatus” follows Michel Foucault who introduced the term apparatus to refer to a heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, and philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions that respond to an urgent need in a given historical moment (Foucault 1980: 194; Tremain 2015: 8). Foucault’s innovative idea of apparatus enables me to move away from dominant understandings of disability that variously construe it as a personal characteristic or attribute, a property of given individuals, an identity, or a form of social oppression. Furthermore, the idea of an apparatus enables an understanding of disability that is culturally relative, historicist, and more comprehensive than are the aforementioned understandings of it. As we shall see, in some respects, the conception of a disability apparatus resembles the notion of “social imaginary” (Medina 2011: 15, 24) that Medina employs in his writing on epistemic injustice.

Knowing (the apparatus of) disability, politically

In Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing (2007), she argues that the capacity of relatively powerless social groups to adequately and appropriately understand the world is jeopardized if dominant groups disproportionately influence the interpretive resources available at any given time. Fricker thinks that dominant groups should be seen to inflict a form of epistemic injustice when they enjoy such unfair hermeneutical advantages. Thus, she refers to this form of unfair hermeneutical advantage as “hermeneutical injustice” (Fricker 2007: 146-48). Asymmetrical relations of social power, she explains, can skew shared hermeneutical resources in ways that both enable members of powerful social groups to understand their social experiences and prevent members of relatively disempowered social groups from understanding their own experiences. The mid-twentieth-century feminist consciousness-raising groups, in which women publicly articulated and exchanged experiences that had previously been systematically obscured and routinely privatized were, she remarks, a direct response to the fact that such epistemological resources had hitherto been rendered unavailable to women. Within these groups, she notes, women collectively realized resources for meaning and understanding that had previously been only implicit in the social interpretive practices of that historical context (Fricker 2007: 148). In order to illustrate these claims, Fricker quotes an excerpt from Susan Brownmiller’s memoir in which Brownmiller (1990: 182) wrote about one woman’s revelatory introduction to feminist consciousness-raising in a group that embarked on a discussion about postpartum depression. In the quoted passage, Brownmiller described how, over the course of the forty-five minute discussion, this woman came to realize that the depression that she had experienced—and for which both she and her husband had blamed her—was not a “personal deficiency” at all, but rather “a combination of physiological things and a real societal thing, isolation” (Brownmiller 1990: 182).
As Fricker explains it, the lack of understanding with which the woman had lived up until that life-altering discussion constituted a harm inflicted upon her in her capacity as a knower, that is, constituted a specific sort of epistemic injustice, namely, a hermeneutical injustice.

Fricker is concerned to point out that not all hermeneutical disadvantages constitute hermeneutical injustice. Thus, she aims to identify the features that distinguish hermeneutical disadvantages that inflict epistemic injustice from hermeneutical disadvantages that do not involve injustice. Drawing upon the distinction between justice and luck that is a mainstay of mid-twentieth-century analytic political philosophy and ethics, she remarks that some hermeneutical disadvantages derive from “bad luck,” rather than from injustice, a difference that she asserts can be easily recognized (Fricker 2007: 149, 152). In order to illustrate this distinction, she offers the following description as an example of a hermeneutical disadvantage that does not inflict epistemic injustice:

If, for instance, someone has a medical condition affecting their social behaviour at a historical moment at which that condition is still misunderstood and largely undiagnosed, then they may suffer from a hermeneutical disadvantage that is, while collective, especially damaging to them in particular. They are unable to render their experiences intelligible by reference to the idea that they have a disorder, and so they are personally in the dark, and may also suffer seriously negative consequences from others’ non-comprehension of their condition. But they are not subject to hermeneutical injustice; rather, theirs is a poignant case of circumstantial bad luck.

What, to me, is striking about Fricker’s sketch of a hermeneutical disadvantage that derives from circumstantial bad luck, rather than from injustice, is how aptly it describes the hermeneutical disadvantage that only three pages earlier in her book she had associated with a paradigm case of epistemic injustice, that is, the lack of hermeneutical resources that in the not-so-distant past had been unavailable to women who experienced postpartum depression. Fricker argues, however, that the salient difference with respect to epistemic injustice between the situation of women with postpartum depression and the situation of the hypothetical subject in the cited example is that in the former case, but not the latter, “background social conditions” prevailed “that were conducive to the relevant hermeneutical lacuna” (Fricker: 152). She explains that revelations about postpartum depression emerged in feminist consciousness-raising groups during a historical moment in which women were still markedly powerless in relation to men. This powerlessness, Fricker points out, entailed that women had unequal hermeneutical participation, which “sort of inequality provides the crucial background conditions for hermeneutical injustice” (Fricker: 152). She notes, furthermore, that when this kind of unequal hermeneutical participation exists with respect to some area of social experience, members of the relevant disadvantaged group are likely “hermeneutically marginalized” (153).

My argument (contra Fricker) is that people with an “undiagnosed condition” whose social behavior is subject to “negative consequences” due to the ways in which others perceive them are also members of a hermeneutically marginalized group; that is, the detrimental consequences that accrue to these people are produced by precisely the sort of background conditions from which Fricker claims that a hermeneutical disadvantage must result in order to qualify as a form of hermeneutical injustice. Certain forms of unequal social power—that is, mechanisms of the disability apparatus—produce an array of disciplinary norms about proper social behavior and
interaction, modes of communication, rationality, emotional self-control, psychological resilience, and so on. These historically-specific forms of unequal power—that is, these “background conditions”—shape the public perceptions and authoritative epistemologies from which the negative social, political, interpersonal, and economic consequences of the sort to which Fricker refers accrue to some people, naturalizing, medicalizing, and depoliticizing these perceptions and epistemologies in ways that conceal their contingent and artefactual character. The medical and juridical classifications that emerge from these background conditions actually produce the kinds of subjects that they are claimed to (merely) identify and name or represent. As Foucault pointed out, people are not naturally—that is, universally and transhistorically—sorted into kinds in accordance with ontologically pre-existing categories such as sane and mad, healthy and sick, normal and pathological. Rather, kinds of people come into being because we make them that way, by and through the practices that we use to describe them and in which they are inserted. Ian Hacking has noted, furthermore, that the practices constitutive of the subject have “looping effects” (Hacking 1995, 351–383): people become aware of how they are perceived and classified, and this in turn changes their self-perceptions and self-understandings. Because the self-perceptions and self-understandings of people subjected to disciplinary classification change by virtue of that subjection, changes to the classifications themselves generally follow. In other words, as more and more people come to identify with a particular normalizing classification, they struggle to exert greater control over its usage and associated meanings.

Nevertheless, the performative and artefactual character of human classifications in general and psychiatric diagnoses in particular does not nullify their disciplinary and punitive effects. As philosophers and theorists of disability have repeatedly shown, people who, for any number of reasons, do not conform to highly-regulated standards of (for instance) social behavior and interaction—such as people who are classified as “mentally ill” or are perceived to be “insane”—are routinely discredited, ignored, vilified, and stigmatized. Until the relatively recent formation and rise of “the mad movement” and related social movements, the hermeneutical resources that such disabled people required in order to collectively understand the political character of their situation were unavailable to them. In short, these people have been, and indeed continue to be, habitually subjected to hermeneutical injustice. That Fricker, in her discussion of kinds of hermeneutical disadvantage, neither takes into account the arguments that philosophers and theorists of disability and disabled activists have articulated with respect to the political origins of the “negative consequences” that accrue to these disabled people, nor recognizes the unequal hermeneutical participation that produces these effects, seems itself to be an instance of the form of epistemic injustice that Fricker calls “testimonial injustice.” I turn now to more closely consider testimonial injustice in the following sections of this essay.

**Knowing Tom Robinson, differently**

In her book, Fricker offers the trial of Robinson in Lee’s novel as an “extreme example” (Fricker 2007: 26) of the kind of testimonial injustice that she aims to portray philosophically in the book. As she defines it, “a speaker sustains a testimonial injustice if and only if she receives a credibility deficit owing to identity prejudice in the hearer” (Fricker 2007: 28). Fricker wants to show that the events and outcome of the fictional 1935 trial of Robinson exemplify such credibility deficit due to racist prejudice. Fricker concentrates on one moment in Lee’s depiction of Robinson’s testimony to explicate her claims according to which, given particular social contexts
and circumstances, some people will invariably be regarded as less credible due to the identity prejudice against them that certain other people hold: the exchange between Robinson and the county prosecutor, Mr. Gilmer, about why Robinson ran out of and away from the Ewell house and why he was in the house in the first place. Fricker asserts that Lee’s depiction of this moment in the trial of Robinson vividly illustrates how testimonial injustices contribute to the production and reproduction of positions of social subordination and oppression (Fricker 2007: 23-29).

Medina, who acknowledges the insightful character of Fricker’s arguments, has pointed out nevertheless that, contra Fricker, “a proportional, contextualized account” (Medina 2011: 15, 22-28) of epistemic injustice must also attend to the ways in which the credibility deficits that accrue to members of certain social groups due to identity prejudice are inextricably tied to correlative credibility excesses that accrue to members of other social groups due to their identity privilege (Medina 2011: 23, and passim). Thus, Medina asserts that, in order to fully capture and adequately understand these sorts of credibility differentials, we must go beyond Fricker’s almost-exclusive focus on the utterances of individual speakers to also consider the antecedent social imaginary in terms of which such utterances are produced, including the historical and extant discursive, cultural, political, and economic mechanisms and events that make the disparate interpretations and receptions of the utterances possible. In the context of Robinson’s trial, philosophical inquiry into epistemic injustice that incorporates analysis of how the social imaginary (to use Medina’s term) contributes to the production of utterances and the degree of credibility variously attributed to them would consider (for example) how the deeply-seated racist belief according to which all black men are potential rapists who have an uncontrollable desire for white women had already set in place the disparate credibility attributions that determined the inevitable outcome of the trial. As Medina explains it, a proportional, contextualized account of the epistemic injustice that shapes the proceedings and outcome of Robinson’s trial would take into account the credibility excesses conferred upon Ewell and her father, Bob Ewell—whose accusations initially led to the charges against Robinson—and the credibility excesses conferred upon both of the white attorneys involved in the trial, as well as the antecedent white supremacist social imaginary that (among other things) conditioned the perceptions and beliefs of the all-white male jury and white spectators in the courtroom even before the trial began. Medina thinks that this kind of proportional, contextualized account of epistemic injustice enables nuanced understanding of the ways in which shifting gradations of credibility attribution contribute to, collude with, and consolidate social and economic hierarchies.

Although Fricker and Medina may disagree about whether the utterances made in this moment of the fictional trial should be the central element in a philosophical analysis of how epistemic injustice is represented in Lee’s narrative, their analyses of this moment advance our understanding of how credibility attributions underwrite the constitution of race, gender, and sexuality, as well as, alternatively, how the complicated relations between these social categories influence the differential distribution of credibility attributions. Nevertheless, I want to argue that the analyses of these phenomena that Fricker and Medina have produced remain incomplete insofar as neither philosopher makes more than a passing reference to the fact that Lee’s character Tom Robinson is disabled. That Robinson is disabled seems to play no role, for Fricker or Medina, in the formation of identity categories within the narrative, nor, for them, does (the apparatus of) disability play a role in the events of the narrative, except to the extent that, and insofar as, Robinson’s arm and hand provide tangible evidence that he could not have committed the crime of which he was accused. Nor, furthermore, do there seem to be insights about disability that we can derive from the novel. For Fricker and Medina, that is, Robinson’s social positioning as
disabled is essentially no more than the rhetorical device that Lee uses to underscore the credibility deficit attributed to him when the guilty verdict is eventually pronounced.

I maintain that the analyses that Fricker and Medina offer with respect to the Robinson trial in *To Kill a Mockingbird* would have been more satisfactory had both philosophers incorporated insights from philosophy of disability into their claims about how gender, race, and sexuality and the credibility differentials incumbent upon these categories are represented through the events and outcome of the trial. An improved analysis of how social identity categories are produced in the narrative—that is, a more complex intersectional analysis than these philosophers offer—would consider: (1) how the constitution of elements of the apparatus of disability is inextricably interwoven with the constitution of social identities that other apparatuses of power produce and thus contributes to their constitution; (2) how the apparatus of disability is constituted by and through these other identities categories; and, in addition (3) how credibility assessments are conferred and withheld on the basis of the proximity of these identity categories to a conception of normality and hence contribute to the mechanism of normalization that the apparatus of disability produces. In order to indicate some of the insights about the apparatus of disability that would have been derived from such an expanded analysis, let me turn to consider the exchange between Robinson and Gilmer that pertains to why Robinson was on the Ewell property and went into their house. A portion of their exchange is especially relevant to my argument that Fricker and Medina overlook the precise nature of the way in which Robinson is racialized insofar as they fail to recognize the importance of disability to this exchange (and to the book’s narrative in general). This portion of the exchange immediately follows Robinson’s testimony that he entered the Ewell property in order to help Mayella Ewell with her chores:

Mr. Gilmer: “You’re a mighty good fellow, it seems—did all this for not one penny?”
Tom Robinson: “Yes, suh. I felt sorry for her, she seemed to try more ’n the rest of ’em“
Mr. Gilmer: “You felt sorry for her, you felt *sorry* for her?”
Mr. Gilmer seemed ready to rise to the ceiling.
The witness realized his mistake and shifted uncomfortably in the chair. But the damage had been done. Below us, nobody liked Tom Robinson’s answer. Mr. Gilmer paused a long time to let it sink in. (Lee 1960: 263-64)

Fricker writes that this portion of the exchange effectively destroys any epistemic trust that members of the white jury may have allowed themselves to feel for their fellow human being, the black man testifying, Robinson. “For *feeling* sorry for someone,” Fricker remarks, “is a taboo sentiment if you are black and the object of your sympathy is a white person.” (Fricker 2007: 24, emphasis in Fricker) Within the context of a white supremacist ideology, Fricker explains, “the fundamental ethical sentiment of plain human sympathy becomes disfigured in the eyes of whites so that it appears as little more than an indicator of self-perceived advantage on the part of the black subject.” (Fricker 2007: 24) Within the context of white supremacy, she notes, no black man is permitted to have feelings that imply an advantage, of any sort, relative to a white person, regardless of how difficult and desolate that white person’s life is. Agreeing with Fricker, Medina remarks that this moment of the trial throws into relief “[t]he comparative and contrastive nature of credibility assignments” (Medina 2011: 21) of the defendant (Robinson), on the one hand, and his interrogator (Gilmer), on the other. As Medina puts it, Robinson’s credibility “diminishes to the point of disappearance” (Medina 2011: 23) when his claim about “pity” meets with the mocking disbelief of a far more credible white man, whose powerful and authoritative echo of the
white social imaginary renders the plausibility of Robinson’s claim “almost unimaginable” (Medina 2011: 24) to the white jurors and spectators in the courtroom. In short, the trial is a zero-sum contest that pits trust in the word of a black man against trust in the word of a white woman, where the former sort of trust amounts to a psychological impossibility. The sense of superiority that Gilmer, the all-white jury, and the white spectators in the courtroom perceive to be at the root of Robinson’s expression of sympathy for Mayella Ewell serves to underscore that impossibility (Fricker 2007: 25).

Notice how Fricker and Medina respectively describe why Robinson’s explanation for his presence on the Ewell property meets with disdain from the white jurors and courtroom spectators. Fricker attributes their complete distrust and contempt for Robinson to the fact that he expressed “sympathy” for Mayella Ewell. In Medina’s terms, Fricker’s reference to this sympathy becomes “pity,” which is often associated with sympathy, but is not equivalent to it. In any case, both Fricker and Medina recognize that Robinson, as a black man, is not permitted to be an agent of sympathy or pity for a white woman. He is rather, for whites, the personification of a (to use Fricker’s unfortunate term) “disfigured” sympathy (pity).

I want to argue, however, that Fricker and Medina fail to recognize that Robinson, as a black man within the context of white supremacy, also is not entitled to be an object of sympathy or pity. That he cannot be an object of pity or sympathy, within white supremacy, subjects Robinson as a distinctly black disabled person, that is, distinguishes him as a black disabled person from white disabled people. If Robinson were a white disabled person and expressed sympathy or pity for Mayella Ewell, a nondisabled white woman, Gilmer’s surprise and amazement would have conveyed an entirely different meaning. Due to pervasive ableist prejudices and biases, white disabled people are widely perceived to deserve pity or sympathy by virtue of their very existence, that is, their disabled existence is taken to warrant pity or sympathy, they are perceived as the archetypal objects of pity and even tragedy (see Shapiro 1994; Stramondo 2010). By contrast, black disabled people are not readily identified as the recipients of such sympathy and pity. Had Robinson been a white disabled man who expressed sympathy or pity for a nondisabled white woman, his expression of sympathy or pity likely would have met with exaggerated patience, patronizing condescension, or even amusement. Because Robinson is a black disabled man, he instead confronts contempt when he expresses such sentiments for a white woman. In other words, that Robinson cannot himself be an object of pity or even sympathy racializes him with respect to disability. Within the racist terms of the disability apparatus, ableist pity (or sympathy) can be directed only at white disabled people. Insofar as, in the terms of white supremacist ableism, disabled people are the archetypal objects of pity and, given that black men cannot be the objects of pity, a black disabled man is, as Tommy Curry has argued, “a conceptual impossibility” (Curry 2015). “The disabled Black male,” Curry remarks, “is configured as a deformity at some distance from the racist stereotype of the Black male savage and, therefore, is unimaginable to most people” (Ibid.). Although within the system of white supremacy, white disabled people are generally regarded as helpless, genderless, and devoid of sexuality, black men are perceived as superhuman and hyper-masculine, are hyper-sexualized as rapists, and construed as black “bucks,” a term that in fact prosecutor Gilmer uses to describe Robinson during his interrogation of him (see Lee 1960: 265). In short, vulnerability, pity, sympathy, and asexuality are “compliments” that white supremacy pays to white (disabled) people only.

The process through which Lee’s narrator Scout (Finch), Scout’s older brother Jem (Finch), and Mr. Underwood become aware of the white racist social imaginary that convicted Robinson coincides with a distinctive acknowledgement by each of them that Robinson is a disabled person;
that is, it is at this point in the narrative that a disabled black man becomes a conceptual possibility for them. Consider how each of them acknowledges that Robinson is disabled. For Jem—the novel’s vehicle for the articulation of ideals of justice, impartiality, and fairness, whose exclamation “Scout, look! Reverend, he’s crippled!” (Lee 1960: 248) reminds us of Frantz Fanon’s (1952) “Look, a Negro!—the wide-eyed recognition that Robinson is “crippled” paradoxically underscores the frustrated justice of the novel’s narrative according to which every person should be treated equally. By contrast, for Scout, who states that “If [Robinson] had been whole, he would have been a fine specimen of a man” (Lee 1960: 257), the recognition that Robinson is disabled renders him flawed, unfortunate, and tragic, de-masculinizes him and compromises his sexual desirability and prowess. For Underwood, who appeals to the belief according to which the wrongness of Robinson’s eventual killing was prior to, and more fundamental, or intuitive, than lofty talk about justice, killing cripples is always wrong, a sin. For Underwood, it seems, Robinson’s death is horrible—an act of “senseless slaughter” (Lee 1960: 323)—not simply because he committed no crime, but rather, because he committed no crime and he was a cripple. Cripples, Underwood wrote in his newspaper editorial, should be regarded like songbirds: like songbirds, cripples are poignant, helpless creatures subject to the mercy and benevolence of other, more powerful creatures, rather than fully-fledged human beings subject to the values and ideals of justice, fairness, and truth. In short, through their apparently distinct remarks, Scout, Jem, and Underwood variously reinforce their own identities as not crippled, as not disabled, as “able-bodied,” in addition to the ways in which they signify Robinson as disabled, that is, as “crippled.” Hence, each of these apparently distinct utterances from the characters of Scout, Jem, and Underwood serves to reconsolidate and reproduce the apparatus of disability within the context of Lee’s narrative and, in particular, reproduce the ideal of able-bodiedness that has emerged from within that apparatus of power.

Knowing the apparatus of disability, initially

In this essay, I demonstrated how consideration of disability—that is, consideration of the apparatus of disability—has been left out of analyses of epistemic justice, in particular, and social epistemology, in general. I showed that insofar as feminist and other philosophers have not taken disability into account in their analyses of epistemic injustice, they have circumscribed the political domain too narrowly, obscuring epistemological resources that they ought to acknowledge. When disability is factored into analyses of the epistemic injustice depicted in Lee’s novel *To Kill a Mockingbird*, for instance, more complex understandings of how both the apparatus of disability and the white supremacist social imaginary would have shaped dimensions of Lee’s characters become available. So long as philosophers of social epistemology continue to exclude consideration of the apparatus of disability from their work, the critical scope, political integrity, and transformative potential of this work will remain limited. That the ways in which the apparatus of disability operates in and through Lee’s narrative and, in particular, reproduce the ideal of able-bodiedness that has emerged from within that apparatus of power.
References


1 I would like to thank Tommy Curry for feedback on my argument in an earlier draft of this essay and John Drabinski for other advice about the essay. I am also grateful to the editors of this volume for their provocative comments and advice on an earlier draft of the essay.

2 See my remarks about the historical emergence of the “diagnostic style of reasoning” in Tremain 2010, 2013, and 2015.