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The Mind: From Cartesian Dualism to Piccinini's Computational Functionalism

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Abstract

The concept of the mind in philosophy encompasses a diverse range of theories and perspectives, examining its immaterial nature, unitary function, self-activity, self-consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes. This paper explores the attributes of the mind, addressing classical materialism, dualism, and behaviorism, along with contemporary theories like functionalism and computational functionalism. Key philosophical debates include the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological and conceptual challenges in understanding other minds. Contrasting views from Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, and modern philosophers like U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam are analyzed. The paper also discusses the implications of these theories on our understanding of mental phenomena, consciousness, and the nature of human experience.

Keywords: Mind; Philosophy of Mind; Dualism; Materialism; Functionalism; Mental Phenomena

Introduction

The mind is an entity that thinks, feels and wills, which has five key attributes - it is immaterial, unitary, self-active, self-conscious, and abiding. The mind remains constant despite changes in the body, emphasizing its immortality. The mind is immaterial in the sense that it is not physical matter, it has no weight, does not follow gravitational laws, and is unaffected by physical forces or objects. It is unitary in the sense that the same mind performs the functions of thinking, feeling and willing, rather than multiple minds. The mind is self-active, can change its behavior and initiate or discontinue activities independently. It is self-conscious, aware of itself and capable of introspection, allowing it to say, "I think," "I feel," and "I will."

Everyday people accomplish a wide range of mental tasks: solving problems at their work or school, making decisions about their personal life, explaining the actions of other people they know. Understanding the nature of the mind is important for many practical activities. Educators need to know the nature of students' thinking to devise better ways of teaching them. Engineers and other designers need to know what potential users of their products are likely to be thinking when they use their products effectively or ineffectively. Computers can be made more intelligent by reflecting on what makes people intelligent [1]. Lastly, the mind is abiding, retaining its identity throughout the life's changes, unlike matter, which loses its identity when modified. While the body's cells constantly change, the "I" remains constant throughout life. The sense of self persists regardless of bodily changes, mutilations, or even death. Since the mind retains its identity even when modified, therefore early impressions significantly shape the development of the mind. Negative early experiences, such as extreme punishment, can result in lasting trauma. While positive experiences, like support and encouragement, foster healthy, socially adjusted, and happy individuals. Therefore,

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the quality of early impressions is crucial in determining the direction in which a child's mind stabilizes as it grows into adulthood [1]. A balanced individual engages equally in the three realms of knowledge, appreciation and conduct. An imbalance occurs when one realm is prioritized at the expense of the others, leading to a one-sided and incomplete mental development [2]. For example, an overly intellectual person might neglect emotional appreciation, becoming an "intellectual freak," while an artist may neglect intellectual and behavioural development, excused as having an "artistic temperament." Likewise, an individual dominated by his will may act acts impulsively without thought or emotional consideration [1].

Mind is the name of a thing or substance. The question of what it is to have a mind becomes one of what kind of substance it is, what this thing called "mind" is made of. It can be seen as a unique kind of thing, utterly different from anything material or physical, or it can be regarded as a thing just like anything else, something which is part of the physical universe and governed by the laws of physical science, as in classical materialism [3]. It is I who has direct access to my own thoughts, feelings and desires (the mind), and no one from the outside can have direct access to my thoughts, feelings and perception. Even if some neurosurgeon would be to open my skull, then he would not be able to see any thoughts, feelings and perceptions within my skull. So, my thoughts are owned by me, and I can't have other person thoughts. This is called the 'subjectivity' of the mind. The operation of the mind-conscious and unconscious, free and unfree, in perception, action, and thought, in feeling, emotions, reflection, and memory, and in all its other features is not so much an aspect of our lives, but in a sense, it is our life. Attempts to understand the mind and its operation go back at least to the ancient Greeks, when philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle tried to explain the nature of human knowledge. Plato thought that the most important knowledge comes from concepts such as virtue that people know innately, independently of sense experience. Other philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz also believed that knowledge can be gained just by thinking and reasoning, a position known as rationalism [1].

The philosopher seeks to discover a priori necessary truths about the phenomena of mind - truths that can be ascertained without empirical study of the mind and its operations, and truths that hold good for any conceivable exemplification of the mental phenomenon in question. And such truths are to be discovered precisely by elucidating the content of our mental concepts. So, the philosopher wishes to know, without being roused from his armchair, what is essential to the various mental phenomena; the psychologist's aim is at once more ambitious and more modest - he wants to discover by empirical means the actual workings of this or that creature's mind. Mental concepts are unique in that they are ascribed in two, seemingly very different, sorts of circumstances: we apply them to ourselves on the strength of our 'inner' awareness of our mental states, as when a person judges of himself that he has a headache; and we also apply them to others on the strength of their 'outer' manifestations in behaviour and speech [1]. There are two types of mental phenomena - propositional attitudes such as beliefs and conscious subjective experience or qualia or "what it is like to be" aspect of something. The propositional attitudes like beliefs have an object towards which they are directed, but the conscious subjective experience or feels doesn't have an object towards which they are directed. So, intentionality or directedness is not a necessary characteristic of the mind/mental phenomena as was stated by Brentano. Being in pain is a conscious state: if someone is in pain, they immediately know that they are in pain, but pains do not talk about some objects, they just are. There is a problem with the concept of subjectivity. The problem is that subjectivity involves the possibility of distinguishing my thoughts, wishes, desires and so on from others, which in turn requires that 'mine' and 'others' should be terms in a language we both share. Subjectivity becomes a problem because it can be the case that we have different meanings of the same term in our minds and that can lead to confusion and puzzlements in the realm of philosophy.

An interesting and puzzling problem have been raised by the philosophers of mind that as I have only direct access to my own thoughts and feelings and not have direct knowledge and access to the thoughts and feelings of others, so how can I be sure that other people have also got minds just like us? This is the problem of other minds. A statement of the argument from analogy in support for the existence of other minds can be found in the writing of John Stuart Mill. In reply to the question, by what evidence do I know, or by what considerations am I led to believe … that the walking and speaking figures which I see and hear, have sensations and thoughts, or in other words, possess Minds? Mill writes: First, they have bodies like me, which I know in my own case, to be the antecedent condition of feelings; and because, secondly, they exhibit the acts, and outward signs, which in my own case I know by experience to be caused by feelings. Thomas Nagel says that the interesting problem of other minds is not the epistemological problem, but rather it is the conceptual problem of how we can understand the attribution of mental states to others. Strawson, on the other hand said that the idea is to break down the gap between mind and behaviour and the trying to understand what one experiences when one sees another person's behaviour as itself requiring mental state attribution to the other [4]. But, the attribution of mental state to other person purely based on behaviour seems to be problematic.

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Animals also have minds but with less complexity than those of most normal adult human beings. It would be possible to speak of the mind of one kind of animal as having a greater or lesser degree of complexity than that of another. There is a radical difference between minds which involve powers of abstract reasoning and those which do not. A human being's mental life does not consist only of a sequence of passively experienced emotions, but also of reasonableness of the emotions experienced. To reject Cartesian dualism is to accept that the universe and everything in it, including us is made of only one kind of stuff, not two. The stuff in question may be either Descartes' mental substance or his material substance, or third thing which is neither or both the mind or the body, which is the position of neutral monists such as Bertrand Russell. If everything is made of mental stuff, we become philosophical 'idealists', like Berkeley or Hegel [3]. Having a mind is more than just having certain high-level intellectual abilities. It also involves having emotions, sensations, wishes, hopes and purposes of one's own. Even a high-level intellectual ability of the human mind cannot be understood apart from the other dimensions of human personality.

Mind and Body: Contrasting Dualism in Aristotle and Descartes

Psyche or 'soul' for the Greeks meant something that included 'mind' but extended beyond that. According to Aristotle, the intellectual capacity of the soul is called the mind, since it is the capacity to think and reason, to reflect and engage in abstract contemplation, to control one's passions and so on. Aristotle equated mind with part of the human soul. Aristotle believed the mind and the body cannot function without each other. In the activity of writing a book, the activity is neither of the "mind", nor of the "body" on its own. The activity of writing could not happen unless the person who is writing the book had both the thoughts to communicate and some physical way to express those thoughts. The mind and the body cannot exist separately, any more than any other 'form' and 'matter' which together constitute an individual thing as what it is [3]. Descartes', the father of modern philosophy stated that he could doubt everything, even the fact that he has a body, but the one thing which he cannot doubt is that he is a thing that thinks, he is a thinking thing (a mind). Certainly, there were philosophers of mind before Descartes, including such towering figures as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and William of Ockham, but Descartes' introduction of substance dualism is traditionally held to mark a decisive break from earlier theories of mentality [3]. Thinking is essential to our existence according to Rene Descartes'. A thinking thing can exist without occupying any space. It would be very weird to say that a thought is so-and-so centimeter long. Thinking is not extended, whereas the physical body is extended as it occupies space. The Cartesian mind is not to be equated with the brain which is a part of the body [3]. Bodies and minds can exist independently according to Descartes' Descartes' dualist view is a strong argument for religious belief in personal immortality of our mental life that doesn't depend on any physical processes and could go on even if we were no longer alive in a bodily sense. Both Descartes and Aristotle are of the viewpoint that the mind and the body are distinct, but for both the way in which the mind and the body is distinct are very different. For Aristotle, the independently existing thing was the human being, of which the mind was the form and the body 'matter'. Neither form nor matter could function independently of each other. But, for Descartes', mind and body are both substances and a human being is simply a composite of the two things. The Cartesian mind is to be conceived as pure intellect or reason [3]. Descartes gives an argument to support his dualistic view as follows - "Since we can conceive of the non-existence of our bodies but cannot conceive of our own non- existence as thinking things or minds, so the existence of ourselves as minds must be independent of that of our bodies or anything else which is material, that is, mind and matter are distinct substances. The theory of mind-body interaction held by Descartes' was challenged by Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia. Elisabeth stated that how can the soul of a human being (it being only a thinking substance) can determine the bodily spirits, to bring about voluntary actions? For it seems that all determination of movement happens through the impulsion of the thing moved, by the way it is pushed by that which moves it. The progress of science has not treated Descartes' dualism between the nonphysical mind and a physical body that well. First, computer science and neuroscience have made it seem less implausible that a physical system can cause all human behavior. The development of computers has shown that how sophisticated information-processing in physical systems can be. The development of neuroscience has revealed how complex and impressive the brain is an information processor [5].

Wittgenstein's Challenge to Descartes' Dualism

An argument of private language given by Wittgenstein could be used to challenge the argument presented by Descartes' for dualism - Descartes' after the end of questioning and doubting everything ends at the conclusion that he cannot doubt that he exists as a thinking thing, but to express this certainty of a thinking thing, he must have a language to express this certainty of a thinking thing, he must have a language to express this certainty and since he is at this stage doubting whether anything outside his own thoughts, including other people actually exists, this language must be purely private. Descartes' alone knows what he means by the words - 'mind', 'thought', 'world', 'God; and so on. But Wittgenstein argued that such a private language was impossible. Descartes' tries to solve the problem of

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interaction between the non- physical mind and a physical body by giving an account of the pineal gland which acts as a locus of interaction between the non-physical mind and the physical body. But as the pineal gland is part of the brain, and so is part of the physical world - and occupies space and cannot belong to the mental realm. So, the problem of interaction between the mind and body by giving an account of pineal gland is not solved.

U.T. Place's Challenge to Dualism: Classical Materialism

In contrast to the dualistic view, the view that the mental life of human beings is a physical process is called 'classical materialism' or 'classical physicalism'. U.T. Place sought to look for an alternative to the dualistic position of Rene Descartes' by saying that the postulation of a separate "mind" to explain the dynamics of human experience and behavior is not necessary. Many aspects of the human mental life can be explained even without accounting for the "mind" as a separate substance from the body. U.T. Place gives emphasis on the concept of behaviorism according to which statements about mental processes can be translated into dispositions to behave in certain ways; and so according to this behavioristic account, the mind is not a separate inner arena or substance but is rather a form of outer activity. But Place also recognizes the limitations of the behavioristic position by saying that the mentalistic concepts such as consciousness, experiences, sensation or mental imagery cannot be dealt in this behavioristic way [3]. For example - "When I feel pain, for instance, I may be so stoical that I do not express my pain in any form of outer behavior that others may see - I may not even say that I am in pain.

Ryle's Dispositional Behaviourism, Mind-Body Debate and Armstrong's Materialist Perspective

Gilbert Ryle in his book "The Concept of Mind" gave an alternative version of behaviorism known as dispositional behaviorism in which it is not necessary that any mental processes are expressed outwardly as behavior, but rather even if an entity has a disposition to behave in a certain way, even though it may not act in that way, so the entity is said to be in a particular mental state if it has a disposition in it to behave in accordance with that particular mental state. In the essay "The Nature of Mind" by David M. Armstrong, Armstrong gives a philosophical account of mind that is compatible with the materialist scientific view of the mind. Descartes' thought of mind as a spiritual substance and this conception of mind as a spiritual substance was attacked by Gilbert Ryle in his book - "The Concept of Mind". Ryle thinks that dualism arises from confusion about concepts. Dualism comes from a misunderstanding of the concept of mind and that this misunderstanding can be removed by clarifying what we mean when we use words that refer to the mind. In Philosophy, concepts are understood to be general ideas, or categories, that we must help us understand to be general ideas, or categories, that we must help us understand the world [1]. We need to clarify our concepts, so that once we are clear that the concept of "mind" is not a concept of anything that is an actual object, we will no longer be tempted to accept dualism. He ridiculed the Cartesian view as the dogma of the ghost in the machine - He said that the mind is not something behind the behaviour of the body, it was simply part of that physical behaviour. Armstrong gives a theory of central-state materialism- a synthesis between Descartes' dualism and Gilbert Ryle's dispositional behaviourism.

Though Armstrong rejects Behaviourism, he suggests that it is useful to say that the "mind and mental states are logically tied to behaviour." Thought is not speech under suitable circumstances, rather it is something withing the person that in suitable circumstances, brings about speech. Armstrong believed this view is compatible with a materialist view of the mind, though it is also compatible with non-materialist views of the mind. Armstrong modifies Ryle's Dispositional Behaviourism by suggesting that the mind's disposition may be explainable by science in materialist terms, in the same way that glass brittleness can be explained in terms of molecular structure. Ryle rejected the Cartesian notion of the mind as an inner substance, but rather stated that the mind is an outer activity, it is a disposition to behave in a certain way. Some philosophers like Bertrand Russell said that there is only one substance which accounts for both the mind and the body and is different from both. The identity thesis that the mental processes are identical with the brain processes is a reductionist theory which attempts to show that the study of mental life can ultimately be seen as a branch of neurophysiology; that is, the laws of psychology can be explained in terms of the laws of neurophysiology, or thoughts can be translated into statements about processes going on in our brain without loss of meaning. If thoughts and feelings have properties of subjectivity and intentionality and brain processes don't, then it is very difficult to see how thoughts, feelings and sensations can be identified with the brain-processes (identity thesis of materialism). And if sensations have subjectivity when brain-processes don't, then pains and neuron-firings cannot be identical. There is a difference of kind between the intrinsic properties of thoughts and brain-processes, So the identity of both is incompatible [3]. According to Ryle's view, when we say that someone is playing tennis intelligently, not when we think that they are performing certain 'mental' actions first before moving their arms and legs, but when we see them moving their arms and legs in certain ways - skillfully, so as to hit the ball at the right angle and with the right degree of force in the right direction. What we mean by intelligence, according to Ryle is not a combination of two actions, but one action

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performed in a certain way. The main contention of Gilbert Ryle was that the intelligence displayed in an action is not something separate from the physical movements going on, as it were, behind the scenes, but something to be observed in the style or manner of the physical movements themselves [3]. According to Ryle, the dualist's account of choosing to do something implies the logical impossibility that an infinite number of acts of choosing to choose to choose from, must be completed before one can freely perform an action. Therefore, the dualist account must be false. Ryle believed it is the "ism" or the different theories of the mind which confuses us, he says that instead of proposing general theories of the mind, we should simply look at the kind of things we say about human beings: if we do that, then we shall find that they do not fall within two neatly categories - 'mental' things and 'physical' things. Instead of asking metaphysical questions about minds, we should rather ask what kinds of features of human beings lead us to say that they have "minds".

Functionalism: Minds as Programs and the Challenge of Qualia

There is a third kind of materialists who are called as functionalists, who compared minds to computer programs. The software can be realized in any kind of stuff, so a mind can be realized in any kind of stuff. humans feel pain and have c-fibres. But other species, with different brain anatomies than ours, feel pain as well: some of these creatures might have no (or relevantly physiologically different) c-fibres. The standard philosopher's example, owing to an influential article by Hilary Putnam (The Nature of Mental States) (1967), is the octopus, since octopuses are intelligent creatures to which we are strongly inclined to attribute a conscious mental life, yet they are - along with slugs and bivalves - members of the phylum Mollusca and physiologically quite different from us mammals. And what about robots? Or aliens? Or angels? We can be quite sure that none of these three categories of being have c-fibres and yet, if they exist, it seems perfectly possible that they might feel pain. Functionalists believed we should not be concerned with what is an entity made up of, but what it does in contrast to the position of classical materialists and dualists according to whom, the stuff out of which a system is made of is more important than what role or function that system plays. What these kinds of examples - examples of a phenomenon called multiple realizability - seem to demonstrate is that pain cannot be the same thing as the firing of c-fibres, in the following sense: though c-fibre firing may be sufficient for pain (i.e. pain in humans might be nothing over and above c-fibre firings), it is not necessary for pain - pain in octopuses might not involve c-fibres at all, and in, say, aliens it might not even be realized by anything carbon based [6]. Talk about the mental states and processes implies nothing about what kind of stuff or kinds of stuff human beings are made of, or what is responsible for our thinking, feeling, wishing, intending and the rest. And the very fact, that our mental lives are so varied, and that it is hard sometimes to decide whether or to what extent the 'mind' is involved in what we do, suggests strongly that the 'mind' is not the name of some distinct part of ourselves, but a general term for referring to a loosely defined sort of human activities [3]. An argument has been raised against functionalism that it cannot account for the conscious subjective experience or qualia (what it is like) aspect of an experience. For example, two persons having the same functional roles and same outer expression may differ in their inner qualitative aspects of experience. A person may see green as I see red and another person may see red as I see green, but both persons have the same functional roles, causal roles, beliefs and behaviors. So, we can say that functionalism cannot account for the qualitative conscious and subjective experiences. No amount of detailed specification of functional relationships will ever make the jump from cognitive psychology to phenomenal consciousness - that the subjective sensation of pain, for example, has an intrinsic quality that is simply not reducible to any amount of physical structure and function [6]. Another argument given against functionalism and more particularly against physicalism (all mental states are physical states) is the knowledge argument given by Frank Jackson. In Knowledge Argument, in which we are asked to imagine someone who knows all the physical facts about colour experience, light and vision but has never seen colour, coming to see something red for the first time. The new physical state they come to be in on seeing red is nevertheless one that they knew all the physical facts about in advance. The intuition is supposed to be that, despite this, they come to know something new: what the experience of red is like, even though they could have - maybe did - predict in advance everything that they would say and do on having the experience. The reply typically is to deny that there any knowledge of that kind had to be coupled with some move to explain the intuitiveness of it: such as that there is some kind of non-propositional thing that one might call 'knowledge' which is indeed gained, but it is not knowledge of any fact [6].

Merleau-Ponty: Embodied Mind and Perception

According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty (an existentialist phenomenologist), the mind is essentially embodied. It is not some kind of a dimensionless ego, immaterial substance or spirit. According to Ponty, mental states are not something which lacks all bodily dimensions, but rather mental states involve the lived body of the perceiver [6]. Mental state is not a detached something, but rather the mental state is embodies in the body of the perceiver. Perception according to Merleau-Ponty is not a representation of the objects, but rather the perceived object is present in perception in full sense. The

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phenomenological reduction is not a reduction of reality per-se, but rather it is the reduction of our preconceptions of reality and all our habitual conceptualizations about reality.

Causal Role of Mental States: Lewis and Armstrong

The resolution of David Lewis and David Armstrong was to synthesize the claim that mental states are internal with the claim that mental states are detectable by perception and other methods central to the natural sciences. There is a conceptual connection between mental states and causing of a behaviour even though each mental state only contingently causes the state that it does. The mental state is a mental state only in virtue of what it causes and if it didn't play any causal role, then it wouldn't be a mental state. David Lewis says that the states that play certain causal roles are mental states and material are those states, so mental states are material states. David Armstrong also said that mental states as a matter of fact are material [6].

Computational Functionalism: Putnam's and Piccinini's view on the Mind

Hilary Putnam is the father of computational functionalism. Computational Functionalism is the view that mental states and events - pains, beliefs and desires - are computational states of the brain and are defined in terms of "computational parameters plus relations to biologically characterized inputs and outputs." The nature of the mind is independent of the physical making of the brain. What matters is the functional organization, the way in which mental states are causally related to each other - to sensory inputs and motor outputs. Stones and tress do not possess a mind, not because of the reason that they are not made of the right kind of material, but rather with the reason that they don't have the right kind of functional organization or complex structures to possess a mind [7]. Computational Functionalism presented an alternative to the two dominant theories of classical materialism (mental states are brain states) and of behaviourism (mental states are behaviour-dispositions). There have been three main versions of this theory:

- The classical theory associated with Jerry Fodor
- F.P. Ramsey's view that beliefs are maps by which we steer which emphasizes the role in reasoning of maps and mental and mental imagery
- Connectionism which denies that there are any structured representations at all: the mind/brain consists of a vast network of nodes whose different and variable excitation levels explain intelligent learning [8].

According to Hilary Putnam, there is a striking analogy between humans and machines - The internal makeup and the behaviour of a machine and a human - can both be described in terms of physical states governed by physical laws and in terms of logical states in case of machines and mental states governed by reasoning in the case of human beings [7]. Gualtiero Piccinini (The Associate Director of the Center of Neurodynamics at UMSL) also holds the view that the mind is a functional system, it is a system of structures that perform functions. Piccinini's view of the mind is that the mind is a complex system in which all the levels of the mind are aspects of the same portion of reality. All levels of the mind are equally real, and no level is more fundamental than others. This view of Piccinini contrasts with the metaphysicians which hold that there is a hierarchy among the different levels [9]. An argument against computational functionalism of the limits of computational modelling can be described as follows - "Intuitive, creative, or skilful human activity may seem to resist formularization by a computer program." A computer cannot compose the Eroica symphony, nor it can discover the theory of general relativity and neither it can replicate a child's effortless ability to perceive the environment and discern the emotions of others. These types of activities can only be performed through the intuitive and creative abilities of a human being. An argument of "embodied cognition" has been also given against the theory of computational functionalism according to which the computational functionalist approach treats the mental activity as static symbol manipulation detached from the embedding environment. Computational functionalists approach also neglects the myriad complex ways the environment causally or constitutively shapes mental activity. According to the theory of embodies cognition, computational functionalist approach or the computational theory of mind should be replaced with a new model of reality which emphasizes continuous links between the mind, body and the environment. It is not the internal computation which plays the role of understanding cognition, but rather it is agent-environment dynamics which considers the continuous link between mind, body and cognition which can hold an important key to understanding the different aspects of cognition [10].

Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind

Embodied cognition is a growing research program in cognitive science that emphasizes the formative role the environment plays in the development of cognitive processes. The general theory contends that cognitive processes develop when a tightly coupled system emerges from real-time, goal- directed interactions between organisms and their environment; the nature of these interactions influences the formation and further specifies the nature of the cognitive capacities. Theoretical assumptions most held by the embodies models of cognition are as follows:

- The primacy of goal directed action

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- Embodiment determining the cognition
- Cognition is constructive
- Faculty psychology is questioned and
- A traditional classicist account of representation is denied and viewed as not being the only representational model [6].

To understand its own basic skills, an organism has to control its movements and perform goal-directed actions. For example, when an infant must learn to walk properly, he must slow down and control his/her movements of the legs, so that he/she can learn to walk properly.

The way in which an organism perceives the world is based on its sensorimotor experiences and how it is embodies in a particular system according to the model of embodied cognition. The way in which an organism is embodies will determine the type of action that it performs. The way the world appears to us is not dependent on some observer independent reality, but rather it is dependent on the way an organism is embodied. There is a relation of mutual dependence between the organism and its environment. Clark and Chalmers claim that in certain systems, the environment features can partly determine an agent's beliefs so that the mind extends into the environment (the extended mind thesis). The extended mind can explain a lot of actions which cannot be easily explained by referring to the mind as something completely internal and limited to the boundary of the skin and the skull. The portability argument against the extended mind thesis claims that certain core abilities and operations of the mind are always available to the organism regardless of environmental changes, and so to say that the mind extends into the environment is problematic and if the mind extended into the environment instead of being confined inside the head, then any changes to the environment would cause changes in our cognitive capabilities and mechanism, but it is not so [6]. So, the extended mind thesis is untenable. But still the extended mind hypothesis is continuously debated with no resolution as to the proof and the final structure of the hypothesis/thesis. The investigation into the mind throughout the realm and the field of philosophy of mind is a journey of unyielding inquiry and reflection. From the ancient wisdom of Greek thinkers to the modern complexities of contemporary discourse, the pursuit of comprehending consciousness and mental phenomena has persisted. Descartes' proposition of dualism, materialism's rebuttal, and Hume's radical notions of selfhood have all contributed to this intricate tapestry of thought. Yet, even amidst the diversity of perspectives, persistent questions endure. And it is with the rise of these questions that the field of philosophy of mind becomes even more exciting and thrilling to explore [1].

Conclusion

This study delves into the philosophical concept of the mind, examining its attributes and the diverse range of theories and perspectives that have shaped our understanding. The exploration includes classical theories like materialism, dualism, and behaviourism, as well as contemporary approaches such as functionalism and computational functionalism. Key debates in philosophy of mind are scrutinized, including the mind-body problem, the subjectivity of mental states, and the epistemological challenges of understanding other minds. By analysing the contrasting views of Aristotle, Descartes, Wittgenstein, U.T. Place, Gilbert Ryle, and Hilary Putnam, the study reveals the multifaceted nature of mental phenomena, consciousness, and human experience. The mind's immateriality, unitary function, self-activity, self- consciousness, and persistence despite bodily changes are central themes. Classical materialism posits the mind as a physical entity, whereas dualism asserts its distinctness from the body. Behaviourism focuses on observable behaviour as an indicator of mental states, while functionalism likens the mind to a computer program, suggesting it can be realized in various forms. The study of the mind also involves examining propositional attitudes and qualia, highlighting the complexity of conscious subjective experiences.

A significant finding is the persistent challenge of subjectivity and the problem of other minds. Philosophers like Thomas Nagel and P.F. Strawson contribute to understanding how mental state attributions to others can be conceptually problematic. Furthermore, the study highlights the difficulty in reconciling the intrinsic properties of thoughts with brain processes, questioning the identity thesis of materialism. The discussion extends to the embodied mind theory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, emphasizing that mental states are inherently tied to the physical body. Additionally, the causal role of mental states, as proposed by David Lewis and David Armstrong, supports the notion that mental states are material but defined by their causal relationships. The findings underscore the ongoing debate in philosophy regarding the nature of the mind. Dualism and materialism offer contrasting views on the mind-body relationship, while functionalism and computational theories provide modern interpretations. The study concludes that understanding the mind requires considering its immaterial aspects, its interaction with the body, and the subjective experiences that define human consciousness. This comprehensive analysis contributes to the broader discourse on the philosophy of mind, offering insights into how mental phenomena shape our understanding of human nature and experience.

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