

What is Mind in Philosophy: An Introduction

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ABSTRACT: The exploration of the mind is a fundamental pursuit spanning philosophy and psychology, with implications reaching into diverse practical realms. This paper delves into the intricacies of mental states, examining historical perspectives from ancient philosophers to modern theorists. Philosophical inquiries into intentionality, consciousness, and the nature of mental phenomena are scrutinized, alongside empirical investigations by psychologists. The discourse navigates through contrasting theories such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism, shedding light on the challenges of reconciling subjective experiences with objective observations. The problem of other minds and the tension between internalism and externalism are dissected, revealing the complex interplay between individual cognition and external influences. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the intricate nature of philosophical inquiries into consciousness and the mind.

KEY WORDS: Mind, Consciousness, Philosophy of Mind, Mental States, Computational Theory of Mind.

INTRODUCTION:

Everyday people accomplish a wide range of mental tasks: solving problems at their work or school, making decisions about their personal life, explaining the actions of other people they know. Understanding the nature of the mind is important for many practical activities. Educators need to know the nature of students' thinking to devise better ways of teaching them. Engineers and other designers need to know what potential users of their products are likely to be thinking when they use their products effectively or ineffectively. Computers can be made more intelligent by reflecting on what makes people intelligent. Politicians and decision makers can become more successful if they understand the mental processes when they interact. Over the centuries, philosophers and psychologists have used a variety of metaphors for the mind, comparing it, for example, to a blank sheet on which impressions are made, to a hydraulic device with various forces operating in it, and to a telephone switchboard. There are two central aspects of mentality: intentionality and consciousness. Intentionality concerns the fact that mental states are about or directed towards things. For example, my belief that the moon was created by a collision between Earth and another planet is about the moon (and, of course, also about Earth). Consciousness concerns the experiential aspects of the mind. To be conscious is to have a subjective perspective on the world. To have a mind is for which things are a certain way: the way they are from the perspective of the subject that that possesses a mind. The difference between a subject which has a mind and another which doesn't possess one is a point of view on things, a perspective, a subject which has a mind has a world of its own. Having a world of its own is different from there being a world simply. It is true of the rock that it is part of the world; but it is not true that they have a world. A perspective is meant to be a condition for being in a state of mind. In a state of mind such as thought, experience, desire, something is presented,

there is something which the state of mind is directed at. In the perspective, the presentations are presentations of something and the presentations present things under a certain aspect. The first feature is called directedness, and the second feature is called aspectual shape. Presentations that form a perspective are not essentially visual, that is, the presentations can be visual, but it is not necessarily visual. Edmund Husserl thought that the way to study the mind was to bracket the reality outside the mind and investigate things only as they appear. Many philosophers reject the notion of perspective/directedness/intentionality as characteristics of the mental phenomena, because they point out that there obviously are states of mind involving no perspective. Some philosophers think that certain bodily sensations, like pains, involves no directness or aspectual shape. So, the essence of the idea of mind cannot be fully described by talking about the perspective or point of view of the subject in question. Internalism is so named because its advocates hold that an agent's mental states and capacities are fully determined by factors that are internal to them, whereas externalism is so named because externalists allow that facts about an agent's history and environment can play a fundamental role in determining their mental states and capacities.¹ Although certain kinds of mental states (such as emotions) are seen to exhibit both intentionality and consciousness, it was widely assumed that mental states could be sorted into two, relatively distinct, classes: those that were intentional (but not phenomenal), and those that were phenomenal (but not intentional). Beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes were placed in the first category, while perceptual experiences and bodily sensations were placed in the second category. Richard Rorty expressed this 'separatist' conception of mentality vividly: "The obvious objection to defining the mental as the intentional is that pains are not intentional – they do not represent, they are not about anything. The obvious objection to defining the mental as 'the phenomenal' is that beliefs don't feel like anything – they don't have phenomenal properties.

The philosopher seeks to discover a priori necessary truths about the phenomena of mind - truths that can be ascertained without empirical study of the mind and its operations, and truths that hold good for any conceivable exemplification of the mental phenomenon in question. And such truths are to be discovered precisely by elucidating the content of our mental concepts. So, the philosopher wishes to know, without being roused from his armchair, what is essential to the various mental phenomena; the psychologist's aim is at once more ambitious and more modest - he wants to discover by empirical means the actual workings of this or that creature's mind. Mental concepts are unique in that they are ascribed in two, seemingly very different, sorts of circumstances: we apply them to ourselves on the strength of our 'inner' awareness of our mental states, as when a person judges of himself that he has a headache; and we also apply them to others on the strength of their 'outer' manifestations in behaviour and speech. These two ways of ascribing mental concepts are referred to as first-person and third-person ascriptions, after the grammatical form of their typical expression. The special difficulty presented by these two modes of ascription is that it is clearly the same concepts that are ascribed in first- and third-person judgements, yet there is a strong and natural tendency to suppose that the content of mental concepts reflects their characteristic conditions of ascription. We thus appear forced to choose from among three unattractive positions as to the content of these concepts: either 1) we favour the first-person uses and so encounter difficulty in giving a satisfactory account of how mental concepts are applied to others; or 2) we favour third-person uses and so omit to register the special character of our first-person ascriptions; or 3) we try to combine both uses, thus producing a sort of hybrid or amalgam of two apparently unrelated elements.

The problem arises because we cannot plausibly sever the meaning of a mental word (content of a mental concept) from the conditions under which we know it to be satisfied, yet these seem utterly different in the first and third-person cases, and so the concepts are pulled in two directions at once. Historically, views of the mind can be classified according to which direction they have allowed themselves to be pulled in: either claiming the essential nature of mental phenomena to be revealed only from the perspective of the subject exemplifying them

¹ Tim Bayne, *Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction* (London: Routledge, 2021), 3.

(‘Cartesians’); or claiming that the real nature of the mental is shown only in our judgements about the states of mind of others (‘behaviourism’). Both views give mental concepts a unitary content, but both seem irremediably partial in their account of that content. According to which perspective you take up in reflecting upon some mental phenomenon you arrive at a certain view about the very nature of that phenomenon. It would be fine if we could somehow, as theorists, prescind from both perspectives and just contemplate how mental phenomena are, soto say, in themselves; but this is precisely what seems conceptually unfeasible, because of the constitutive connections of mental concepts with the conditions under which they are known to be satisfied.² To avoid the three unattractive alternatives - Cartesians, behaviourism, an amalgam of the two – we seem to need the idea of a single mental reality somehow neutral between the first and third-person perspectives; the problem is that there does not: appear to be any such idea - we cannot first fashion a conception of the mind and then go on to specify the ways in which the mind is known. In a word, there is no epistemologically neutral conception of the mind: we cannot form an idea of what some mental phenomenon is without adopting one or other epistemological perspective on it. In this predicament the difficulty of doing justice to both aspects of mental concepts is inherent in the topic and is not to be dismissed as a mere confusion of thought. There is no very good reason to suppose that all mental concepts will have their primary content given from the same perspective: if mental phenomena are not uniform in nature, then it is possible that some will be better apprehended from the first-person perspective, some from the third person.³

HISTORICAL REVIEW:

Journey Through Mind: Ancient Wisdom to Modern Inquiry - The operation of the mind— conscious and unconscious, free and unfree, in perception, action, and thought, in feeling, emotions, reflection, and memory, and in all its other features is not so much an aspect of our lives, but in a sense, it is our life. Attempts to understand the mind and its operation go back at least to the ancient Greeks, when philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle tried to explain the nature of human knowledge. Plato thought that the most important knowledge comes from concepts such as virtue that people know innately, independently of sense experience. Other philosophers such as Descartes and Leibniz also believed that knowledge can be gained just by thinking and reasoning, a position known as rationalism. In contrast, Aristotle discussed knowledge in terms of rules such as All humans are mortal that are learned from experience. This philosophical position, defended by Locke, Hume, and others, is known as empiricism. In the eighteenth century, Kant attempted to combine rationalism and empiricism by arguing that human knowledge depends on both sense experience and the innate capacities of the mind.⁴ Anaxagoras (a Greek philosopher of the 5th century B.C.E) gave an account of a nous which he called a quasi-psyche or mind. Nous (mind/intellect) is pure, thin and unmixed entity which gives order to the entire cosmos, it is imperishable and diffused throughout the whole universe.⁵ But the philosophy of mind in the modern era effectively begins with the work of René Descartes (1596-1650). Descartes was not the first person to hold views of the kind he did, but his view of the mind was the most influential of the so-called modern philosophers. Many of his views are routinely expounded, and by people who cannot even pronounce his name.⁶ Descartes’ most famous doctrine is dualism, the idea that the world divides into two different kinds of substances or entities that can exist on their own. These are mental substances and physical substances. Descartes’ form of

² Colin McGinn, *The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (1998), 13-14.

³ McGinn, *The Character of Mind: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind*, 15.

⁴ Thagard, *Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science*, 18.

⁵ Y. Masih, *A Critical History of Western Philosophy: Greek, Medieval and Modern* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publ. 1999), 22.

⁶ J. R. Searle, *Mind: A brief introduction* (Oxford University Press, 2004), 24.

dualism is sometimes called “substance dualism”. The commonsense view of persons is that they consist of two components: a body and a mind. This view is called *dualism*, since it assumes that each of us consists of two fundamentally different substances, one physical and the other mental or spiritual. Anyone whose religious views imply that a person survives after death is a dualist, since the mind can survive the body’s demise only if it is something nonphysical. Physical states and events, on the one hand, and conscious states and events, on the other, possess quite a different range of attributes and properties. Physical states consist of arrangements of matter possessing electrical or chemical properties. They do not themselves seem to be any qualitative “feel”. No physical state is “bright” or “warm” or “piercing” in the senses in which a conscious state can be these things. If physical states and conscious states possess quite different kinds of properties, then they must themselves be different kinds of states.⁷ Although dualism is probably the most widely held view of mind, it is philosophically problematic. What evidence do we have that there is mind independent of body? If mind and body are two different substances, how do they interact? Dualist views come in two main varieties. Interactionism holds that the mental and physical are fundamentally distinct but interact in both directions: Physical states affect mental states, and mental states affect physical states. Epiphenomenalism holds that the mental and physical are fundamentally distinct and that physical states affect mental states but denies that mental states affect physical states.⁸ Conscious states aren’t physical states. In contrast to dualism, *materialism* claims that mind is not a different kind of substance from the physical matter that constitutes the body. Philosophers have defended several versions of materialism.

Reductive materialism claims that every mental state such as being conscious of the smell of donuts is a physical state of the brain. Thus, the mental can be reduced to the physical. More radically, *eliminative materialism* claims that we should not try to identify all the aspects of our mental experience with brain events, since our commonsense views of the mind may be fundamentally wrong. Instead, as neuroscience develops, we can hope to acquire a much richer theory of mind that may replace and eliminate commonsense notions such as consciousness and belief. Both reductive and eliminative materialism assume that understanding the mind depends fundamentally on understanding the brain. However, the computational approach to mind has frequently been associated with a different view called *functionalism*, according to which mental states are not necessarily brain states, but rather are physical states that are related to each other through causal relations that can hold among various kinds of matter. For example, an intelligent robot might be viewed as having mental states even though its thinking depends on silicon chips rather than on biological neurons. Similarly, we might encounter intelligent aliens from other planets whose mental abilities depend on very different biological structures than human brains. These four views—dualism, reductive materialism, eliminative materialism, and functionalism—have been the favourites in recent philosophy of mind. Another view, idealism, was popular in the nineteenth century. It holds that everything in the universe is mental, and nothing is material.⁹ By saying that the essence of the mind is consciousness, Descartes is claiming that we are the sort of beings we are because we are conscious, and that we are always in some conscious state or other and would cease to exist if we ceased to be in some conscious state. For example, right now my mind is concentrating consciously on writing this research paper, but whatever changes I go through when I stop writing and, for example, start eating dinner, I will continue to be in some conscious state or other.

The Mind-Body Puzzle: Philosophical Reflections on Consciousness and Others’ Minds - Bodies are infinitely divisible. That is, they can in principle be divided up indefinitely into smaller pieces, and in this sense each body can be destroyed, though matter in general cannot be destroyed. The amount of matter in the universe is

⁷ P. Carruthers, *The nature of the mind: An introduction* (Routledge, 2004), 36.

⁸ David J. Chalmers, *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 2021), 12.

⁹ Thagard, *Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science*, 154-155.

constant. Minds, on the other hand, are indivisible, that is, they cannot be divided into smaller pieces, and thus they cannot be destroyed in the way that bodies can. Each mind is an immortal soul. Bodies, as physical entities, are determined by the laws of physics; but minds have free will. Each of us as a self is identical with his or her mind.¹⁰ Descartes' goes on to say: "I cannot be mistaken about the existence of my own consciousness, hence I cannot be mistaken about my own existence, because it is my essence to be a conscious (that is, thinking) being, a mind. Nor can I be mistaken about the contents of my mind. If it seems to me, for example, that I have a pain, then I do have a pain". But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and imagines and has sensory perceptions.¹¹ But, it seems impossible that there should be causal relations between two completely different metaphysical realms, the physical realm of extended material objects and the mental or spiritual realm of minds or souls. How does anything in the body cause anything in the mind? How does anything in the mind cause anything in the body? Yet it seems we know that there are causal relations. We know that if somebody steps on my toe, I feel a pain even though his stepping on my toe is just a physical event in the physical world, and my feeling of pain is a mental event that occurs inside my soul. How can such things happen?¹² How can anything physical produce an effect inside my soul, which is nonphysical, and how can events in my soul affect the physical world. In the past century and a half, the first of these questions has been transformed in a way that Descartes would not have accepted. In its modern version, the question is, how can brain processes produce mental phenomena at all? How can brains cause minds? Descartes did not think such a thing was possible, because on his account minds have an existence completely independent of the brain.

How can I know that other people have minds? What makes me confident, when, for example, I meet you, that you have a mind? After all, all I can observe is your body, including its physical movements and the sounds that come out of its mouth that I interpret as words. But how do I know that there is anything behind all these physical phenomena? How do I know that you have a mind when the only mind that I have direct knowledge of is my own mind? We might think that I can infer the existence of mental states in you by analogy with myself. Just as I observe in my own case a correlation between input stimulus, inner mental state, and output behaviour, so in your case, because I can observe the input stimulus and the output behaviour, I infer by analogy that you must have an inner mental state corresponding to mine. Thus, if I hit my thumb with a hammer, the input stimulus causes me to feel a pain, which in turn causes me to cry out. In your case, so the story goes, I observe the input stimulus and the crying out, and I simply plug in the gap by making an analogy between you and me.¹³ This is a famous argument, called the "argument from analogy." But it doesn't work. In general, it is a requirement on inferential knowledge that if the knowledge claim is to be valid, there must be, in principle, some independent or non-inferential way to check the inference. Thus, if I think that there is someone in the next room by inferring her presence from sounds that I hear, I can always go in the next room and check on this inference to see if there really is someone in the next room causing the sounds. But if I make an inference from your stimulus and your behaviour to your mental state, how can I ever check the inference? How can I ever see that I am correctly inferring and not just making a wild guess? If I take it to be a kind of scientific hypothesis that we test by scientific methods, whether or not you have mental states corresponding to your observable stimulus and response patterns, in the same way that I have mental states corresponding to my stimulus and response patterns, then it seems that what the argument proves is that I am the only person in the world that has any mental states at all. Thus, for example, if I ask everybody in the room to put their thumbs on a desk and I go

¹⁰ Searle, *Mind: A brief introduction*, 26.

¹¹ René Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy* (2000),

¹² Descartes, *Meditations on First Philosophy*, 29.

¹³ Searle, *Mind: A brief introduction*, 29-30.

around pounding each thumb with a hammer to see which ones, if any, hurt; it turns out that as far as I can observe there is only one thumb that hurts: this one, the one I call mine. But when I hit the other thumbs, there is no feeling at all. The view that I am the only person who has mental states is called “solipsism.” Solipsism comes in at least three different grades. One, the most extreme form: I am the only person in the world who has mental states; and indeed, in some forms, nothing exists in the world except my mental states. Two, epistemic solipsism: maybe other people have mental states, but I can never know for sure. It is quite possible that they do but I have no way of finding out, because all I can observe is their external behaviour.¹⁴ And three: Other people do have mental states, but I can never be sure that they are like mine.

Neutral Monism: William James’ Reconciliation of Mind and Matter –William James argues that the traditional view that there is a fundamental distinction between “mind” and “matter” is a mistake; instead, James suggests, the concepts of mind and matter should be regarded as different, but not incompatible, conceptualizations of aspects of something that is, neutral as between them—hence the name for this position: “neutral monism.” James called this neutral substance “experience”; although Russell remarks that this is not the best word for a supposedly neutral substance because of its idealist connections, he himself regards the neutral substance as “sensations,” and maintains that the physical world itself, as known, is infected through and through with subjectivity.¹⁵

Russell’s Theory of Mind and Critique of Meinong’s Theory of Objects – In the *Analysis of Matter* by Bertrand Russell, Russell seeks to combine his *ontological* monism with a *nomological* dualism: he maintains that although material objects are just constructions from suitable series of sensations, the laws of physics are irreducible to the laws of psychology. For the laws of physics deal with causal relationships between these series, whereas the laws of psychology require us to break into these series and consider the causal relationships between sensations.¹⁶ Russell believed the conception of ‘mental states’ can be called as believing and desiring. He tried to reject the notion that everything mental is a certain quite peculiar something called consciousness by giving two reasons – direct reasons, derived from analysis and its difficulties and indirect reasons, derived from direct observation of animals and of the insane and the hysterics. “Thought” in the narrower sense is that form of consciousness which consists in “ideas” as opposed to impressions or mere memories.¹⁷ Belief is a way of being conscious which is either true or false. Russell also says that besides being ways of being conscious which may be called ‘mental states’ like pleasure, desire, pain and experience.

There is one element which seems obviously in common among the different ways of being conscious, and that is that they are all directed to objects. We are conscious “of” something. The consciousness, it seems, is one thing, and that of which we are conscious is another thing. All the different ways of being conscious has a common element of being directed towards something. For example, if we are in a mental state of desiring then that desire cannot exist without an object of desire, that is, without an object towards the desire is directed towards. In every mental state, there is something towards which that state is directed towards which is called the intentionality of mental states. Brentano in his work “Psychology from the Empirical Standpoint” says that “Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we, although with not quite unambiguous expressions, would call relation to a content, direction towards an object (which is not here to be understood as a reality), or immanent objectivity. Each contains something as an object, though not each in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in love something is loved, in hatred hated, in desire desired, and so on. This intentional inexistence is exclusively peculiar to psychical phenomena. No

¹⁴ Searle, *Mind: A brief introduction*, 31.

¹⁵ William James, *Essays in Radical Empiricism* (Vancouver: Read Books, 2013), 230.

¹⁶ Bertrand Russell, *Analysis of Mind* (London: Routledge, 2005), 1.

¹⁷ Russell, *Analysis of Mind*, 4.

physical phenomenon shows anything similar. And we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are phenomena which intentionally contain an object in themselves.”¹⁸ Brentano’s view is incapable of maintaining itself either against an analytic scrutiny or against a host of facts in psychoanalysis and animal psychology. This view of Brentano is developed by Meinong who says that there are three elements involved in the thought of the object - These three are the act, the content and the object. The act is the same in any two cases of the same kind of consciousness; for instance, if I think of Smith or think of Brown, the act of thinking, is exactly similar on both occasions. But the content of my thought, the event that is happening in my mind, is different when I think of Smith and when I think of Brown. The content, Meinong argues, must not be confounded with the object, since the content must exist in my mind now when I have the thought, whereas the object need not do so. The object may be something past or future; it maybe physical, not mental; it may be something abstract, like equality for example, it may be something imaginary, like a golden mountain or it may even be something self-contradictory, like a round square. But in all these cases, so he contends, the content exists when the thought exists, and is what distinguishes it, as an occurrence, from other thoughts.¹⁹ To illustrate this theory, let's imagine we are contemplating St. Paul's Cathedral. According to Meinong, we need to discern three essential components that converge to form this singular thought. Firstly, there's the act of cognition itself, which remains constant regardless of the subject. Then there's the distinct quality that defines the thought, setting it apart from others; this is the content. Finally, there's St. Paul's Cathedral, the focal point of our contemplation. It's crucial to recognize a distinction between the content of a thought and its object, as thoughts exist in the present moment while their objects may not. Therefore, it's evident that the thought is not identical to St. Paul's Cathedral. This suggests a necessity to differentiate between content and object. However, according to Meinong, a thought cannot exist without an object; thus, the linkage between the two is essential. The object might exist without the thought, but not the thought without the object: the three elements of act, content and object are all required to constitute the one single occurrence called “thinking of St. Paul’s.”

Russell criticizes the above viewpoint of Meinong by saying the act seems unnecessary and fictitious. The occurrence of the content of a thought constitutes the occurrence of the thought. Empirically, I cannot discover anything corresponding to the supposed act; and theoretically I cannot see that it is indispensable. What Meinong calls the act in thinking is not empirically discoverable, or logically deducible from what we can observe. The reference of thoughts to objects is not the simple direct essential thing that Brentano and Meinong represent it as being. It seems to me to be derivative, and to consist largely in beliefs: beliefs that what constitutes the thought relates to various other elements which together make up the object. You have, say, an image of St. Paul’s, or merely the word “St. Paul’s” in your head. You believe, however vaguely and dimly, that this relates to what you would see if you went to St. Paul’s, or what you would feel if you touched its walls; it is further connected with what other people see and feel, with services and the Dean and Chapter and Sir Christopher Wren. These things are not mere thoughts of yours, but your thought stands in a relation to them of which you are aware. The awareness of this relation is a further thought and constitutes your feeling that the original thought had an “object.” But in pure imagination you can get very similar thoughts without these accompanying beliefs; and in this case your thoughts do not have objects or seem to have them. In such instances you have content without object. On the other hand, in seeing or hearing it would be less misleading to say that you have object without content, since what you see or hear is part of the physical world, though not matter in the sense of physics. The whole question of the relation of mental occurrences to objects grows very complicated and cannot be settled by regarding the reference to objects as of the essence of thoughts.²⁰

¹⁸ Franz Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (London: Routledge, 2012), 115.

¹⁹ Brentano, *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, 7.

²⁰ Russell, *Analysis of Mind*, 10.

William James and Bertrand Russell's Perspectives on Mind and Matter - William James says that thoughts do exist, but he says that thoughts don't refer to any entity as such but refers to function. There is no aboriginal stuff or quality out of which the material world is made, out of which our thoughts are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform. James's view is that the raw material out of which the world is built up is not of two sorts, one matter and the other mind, but that it is arranged in different patterns by its inter-relations, and that some arrangements may be called mental, while others may be called physical.²¹ He says that if we start with the supposition that there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call the stuff 'pure experience', then knowing can easily be explained as a particular sort of relation towards one another into which portions of pure experience may enter. Further, James goes on to say that experience, he believes, has no such inner duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, not by way of subtraction but by way of addition.²⁶ He illustrates this by giving an example of paint and how it appears in a paint-shop and as it appears in a picture: in the one case it is just functioning as a saleable material, while in the other it performs a spiritual function. In the same way, a given undivided experience, taken in one context of associates, plays the role of a knower, of a state of mind and consciousness, while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective content.

According to Russell, matter is not so material and mind not so mental as is generally supposed. Our world is to be constructed out of what the American realists call "neutral" entities, which have neither the hardness and indestructibility of matter, nor the reference to objects which is supposed to characterize mind. Mind and matter alike are seen to be constructed out of a neutral stuff, whose causal laws have no such duality as that of psychology but form the basis upon which both physics and psychology are built.²² The possibility of action with reference to what is not sensibly present is one of the things that might be held to characterize mind. Suppose we are in a familiar room at night, and suddenly the light goes out. We will be able to find our way to the door without much difficulty by means of the picture of the room which we have in our mind. In this case visual images serve, somewhat imperfectly it is true, the purpose which visual sensations would otherwise serve. Mind is a matter of degree, chiefly exemplified in number and complexity of habits.

The Nature of Mind: Armstrong's Materialist Perspective and Ryle's Behaviourism - In the essay "The Nature of Mind" by David M. Armstrong, Armstrong gives a philosophical account of mind that is compatible with the materialist scientific view of the mind. Descartes' thought of mind as a spiritual substance and this conception of mind as a spiritual substance was attacked by Gilbert Ryle in his book – "The Concept of Mind". Ryle thinks that dualism arises from confusion about concepts. Dualism comes from a misunderstanding of the concept of mind and that this misunderstanding can be removed by clarifying what we mean when we use words that refer to the mind. In Philosophy, concepts are understood to be general ideas, or categories, that we must help us understand to be general ideas, or categories, that we must help us understand the world. We need to clarify our concepts, so that once we are clear that the concept of "mind" is not a concept of anything that is an actual object, we will no longer be tempted to accept dualism. He ridiculed the Cartesian view as the dogma of the ghost in the machine - He said that the mind is not something behind the behaviour of the body, it was simply part of that physical behaviour. Armstrong gives a theory of central-state materialism – a synthesis between Descartes' dualism and Gilbert Ryle's dispositional behaviourism. He suggests that modern science may be the best tool to understand the nature of the mind.²³ Armstrong considers that Behaviourism (mind is not something behind the behaviour of the body) fits nicely with a Materialist view of the mind, but it has significant flaws – it is

²¹ William James, *Does "consciousness" Exist?* (1904), 3-4.

²² Russell, *Analysis of Mind*, 244.

²³ David M. Armstrong, *The Nature of Mind* (1981), 1.

possible to feel or think something without acting on this feeling or thought. He also questions whether Gilbert Ryle's Dispositional Behaviourism ("To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change when a particular change is realized."²⁴) successfully deals with the objection that one can feel or think one thing and do another thing or not? Armstrong says that dispositional behaviourism doesn't quite successfully deal with the objection that one can or think one thing and do another thing. He further points out that it seems obvious as anything is obvious that there is something going on in me that constitutes my thought.²⁵ Ryle's Dispositional Behaviourism denies this claim, and so Armstrong declares it to be an "unsatisfactory theory of mind."

Though Armstrong rejects Behaviourism, he suggests that it is useful to say that the "mind and mental states are logically tied to behaviour." Thought is not speech under suitable circumstances, rather it is something withing the person that in suitable circumstances, brings about speech. Armstrong believed this view is compatible with a materialist view of the mind, though it is also compatible with non-materialist views of the mind. Armstrong modifies Ryle's Dispositional Behaviourism by suggesting that the mind's disposition may be explainable by science in materialist terms, in the same way that glass brittleness can be explained in terms of molecular structure.²⁶ Armstrong brings together two conclusions – 1] Mind is that which states behind and brings about complex behaviour. 2] Behavioural disposition are states that underlie behaviour and under certain circumstances bring about behaviour. From these two conclusions, he reaches "a conception of a mental state as a state of the person apt for producing certain ranges of behaviour. A concept of a mental state is nothing but the cause of certain sorts of behaviour, then we can identify these mental states with purely physical states of the central nervous system. Human thought often moves in a dialectical way, from thesis to antithesis and then to synthesis. Classical philosophy tended to think of the mind as an inner arena of some sort. This can be called the

thesis. Behaviourism moved to the other extreme: the mind was seen as outward behaviour. This is the antithesis. And so the synthesis will be that the mind is properly conceived as an inner principle, but a principle that is identified in terms of the outward behaviour it is apt for bringing about.²⁷ A concept of a mental state is nothing but the cause of certain sorts of behaviour, if we accept this then we can identify these mental states with purely physical states of the central nervous system according to David M. Armstrong. Mind is an inner arena; it is not an outward act. Behaviourism may be a satisfactory account of mind from another person point of view, but it will not be that satisfactory as a theory of mind when it comes to the first-person account. In our encounters with other people, all we observe is their behaviour, and so, if we simply consider other people, Behaviourism might seem to do full justice to the facts. But the trouble about behaviourism is that it seems so unsatisfactory applied to our own case. In our own case (first-person point of view), we seem to be aware of so much than mere behaviour.

ARGUMENTS AND DISCUSSION

Exploring Mind: From Other Minds to Internal-External Conceptions - There have been many arguments presented by various philosophers of mind in support of or in refutation of the different theories related to the mind in philosophy. This section of the research paper will analyze and contemplate on these arguments. The problem of other minds has been an interesting problem related to how can we be sure that other people also have mental states just like ours even though we have no way of accessing their direct conscious experience as such. The argument giving rise to the problem of other minds might be summarized as follows –

²⁴ Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 43.

²⁵ Armstrong, *The Nature of Mind*, 3.

²⁶ Armstrong, *The Nature of Mind*, 5.

²⁷ Armstrong, *The Nature of Mind*, 6.

- 1] It is impossible to have direct awareness of the mental states of another human being.
- 2] So, our knowledge of such states must be based upon inference from observable physical or behavioural states.
- 3] Because of the ever-present possibility of pretence and/or because of the conceivability of zombies, no such inference can ever be valid.
- 4] So, from 2] and 4] it cannot be reasonable to believe in the mental states of other human beings.

Premise 1 must be/or seems to be true as I cannot investigate other people's minds, I cannot experience other person experience. I can only be aware of my own thoughts and feelings through introspection. And further, no number of behavioural responses of other human beings can prove that they too have conscious experiences just like us, there are possible circumstances in which they can exhibit such behaviour without possessing any conscious experiences. There is at least one case, if not many, where I have direct access to both behavioural and mental states and that is my own, and so I can discover the empirical correlations in my own case first, and then reason outwards to the case of other people. This would be a form of inductive argument as opposed to deductive argument. Although an argument from descriptions of behaviour to descriptions of behaviour of mental states may not be deductively valid, it may nevertheless be a reasonable inductive step, founded upon my knowledge of the empirical correlations which exist in my own case.³³

Physical states and events, on the one hand, and conscious states and events, on the other, possess quite a different range of attributes and properties. Physical states consist of arrangements of matter possessing electrical or chemical properties. They do not themselves seem to be any qualitative "feel". No physical state is "bright", "warm", or "piercing" in the senses in which a conscious state can be these things. If physical states and conscious states possess quite different kinds of properties, then they must themselves be different kinds of states.³⁴ Conscious states aren't physical states. Anything which isn't the sort of thing to have a spatial position must be a non-physical entity. My own mental states are quite unlike anything else that I know of in the world, and no argument by analogy can be successful. No argument from the behaviour of other people to their states of mind can be apparently valid. Neither inductive nor deductive arguments can give us reason to believe in the existence of other minds.

To throw light on the question of whether mind is confined in the head or extends in the environment, we must analyze and examine the arguments and discussions that have been done on the internalist and externalist conceptions of mind. According to content externalism, an individual's ability to entertain a specific content, such as a belief or thought, hinges on their environment. Without the necessary elements in the environment, like objects, properties, or events, the individual cannot entertain that content. Two primary arguments support content externalism: Putnam's Twin Earth Experiment and Burge's "Arthritis" Thought Experiment. Putnam's scenario involves imagining a twin planet, identical to Earth except for the composition of its water. Despite the physical resemblance, the substance on Twin Earth isn't water but behaves identically. If I say, "Water is wet," and my twin counterpart says the same, according to Putnam, our sentences don't share the same meaning. This illustrates that meaning is tied to worldly correlates. The experiment underscores that identical mental states in identical individuals can yield different thoughts due to environmental variations, challenging the idea that mental states depend solely on internal factors. In essence, even if our internal mental states remain unchanged, altering the environment can lead to changes in our mental content. Thus, what happens in our minds isn't solely determined by internal factors but also by external surroundings. This argument reshapes how we understand the relationship between mind and environment, emphasizing the role of external factors in shaping cognition. Burge's "Arthritis" Thought Experiment challenges notions of belief and linguistic community. Larry's belief that he has arthritis in his thigh is deemed false as arthritis is strictly a joint affliction. However, his belief is valid within his linguistic community's usage of "arthritis". In a counterfactual scenario where the term's usage is broader, Larry would possess a true belief about his thigh condition, but it wouldn't qualify as an arthritis-belief; rather, it would be about a distinct condition, "tharthritis". This highlights how beliefs vary based on linguistic

communities. Burge's argument parallels Putnam's thought experiment but focuses on linguistic practice instead of natural environment. Externalism, endorsed by Burge, extends to propositional attitudes, posing challenges to introspective knowledge of mental states. While externalism suggests our thoughts' content is influenced by the environment, self-knowledge isn't empirically derived, posing a conundrum: either we lack true understanding of our thoughts or externalism is invalid. Questioning the legitimacy of the internalism-externalism debate has been raised, with Gertler contending that the distinction between internal and external properties, including intrinsic and extrinsic properties, fails to properly categorize views as externalist or internalist. If Gertler's argument holds, the common understanding of internalism, where content supervenes on intrinsic properties, becomes untenable, leading to a lack of genuine dispute in the internalism-externalism debate. An alternative version of externalism, termed "active externalism" or "extended mind" by Clark and Chalmers, posits that not all mental states or acts reside exclusively within individuals, suggesting some are partly constituted by factors outside biological boundaries. This challenges the notion that all vehicles of content are solely internal. The extended mind concept can be approached in two ways: a state-oriented version, viewing vehicles of content as states, or a process-oriented alternative, viewing them as acts. Clark and Chalmers present a scenario involving Otto, who, in the early stages of Alzheimer's, relies on a notebook for information. They argue that sentences in Otto's notebook should be considered his beliefs since they serve a functional role akin to beliefs in unimpaired individuals. This aligns with a form of state-oriented extended mind, where a mental state (belief) is identified with an external structure. An objection to state-oriented extended mind arises regarding why sentences in Otto's notebook qualify as beliefs while others in an encyclopaedia or online do not. Clark and Chalmers address this by stipulating that the subject must consciously endorse the information at some point. They argue that the extended mind hypothesis suggests content vehicles are embedded or coupled with the environment rather than being extended or constituted by it. The original intentionality objection challenges the extended mind hypothesis by distinguishing between original and derived intentionality.

Original intentionality refers to intentionality not derived from mental activity, while derived intentionality stems from mental activity, often influenced by social conventions. The sentence "The Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street" exemplifies derived intentionality, requiring interpretation to convey meaning. Beliefs, as mental entities, are typically associated with original intentionality. Therefore, the objection suggests that since the sentence in Otto's notebook exhibits derived intentionality, it cannot be considered a belief, as beliefs are inherently mental. Both externalists and internalist agree that representational states and processes, such as memories and beliefs, are crucial for cognition. Their disagreement lies in where these representational states and processes are located.²⁸

Debating Dualism: Exploring the Nature of Mind - Are we non-physical – or “spiritual”- beings, which are linked causally with a particular body during life, but which could possibly survive the destruction of that body? Or are we just living physical organisms of a special sort? Rene Descartes’ argued for the truth of dualism by presenting the following argument –

1] I can doubt whether my body and brain exist. 2] I cannot doubt whether I exist.

3] Therefore, I am not my body and/or brain – I am a non-physical thing.

The conceivability of disembodied thought and experience gives a sense of logical possibility of there being the existence of a non-physical mind that can exist apart from the body. I can imagine dropping dead in the middle of a train. I can imagine a sequence of experiences which do not in any way involve the experience of having a

²⁸ Rowlands, Mark, Joe Lau, and Max Deutsch, “Externalism About the Mind”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2020 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),

URL = < <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2020/entries/content> - externalism/>

body. All of this seems sufficient to establish that it is logically possible for there to occur thoughts and experiences which are not the things or experiences of any physical organism. There are possible worlds in which any conscious states occur in the absence of any physical subject of these states.

An argument can be formed as follows –

Premise 1 – It is logically possible that thinking (or experiencing) should occur while no physical thinker exists.

Premise 2 – It isn't logically possible that thinking (or experiencing) should occur while no thinking thing exists.

Conclusion – So, it is logically possible that thinking things aren't physical things.

From the above argument, it has not yet been established that I am not in fact, a physical thing.²⁹ From the fact that I am not essentially a physical thing, it doesn't follow that I am not in fact physical. But, if the above argument is as convincing as it appears, then we have proved that it is logically possible for dualism to be true.

A full version of the reconstructed argument runs as follows –

Premise 1 – It is logically possible that thinking (or experiencing) should occur while no physical thinker exists.

Premise 2 – It isn't logically possible that thinking (or experiencing) should occur while no thinking exists.

Conclusion 1 – So, it is logically possible that thinking things aren't physical things.

Premise 3 – All physical things are such that their physicality is a biologically necessary attribute of them.

Conclusion 2 – So, from conclusion 1 and premise 3, thinking things aren't physical things. Premise 4 – Every kind of thing must possess some essential (logically necessary) attributes. Conclusion 3 – So, from conclusion 2 and premise 4, thinking things are essentially thinking, or conscious, non-physical entities. That" is to say: souls exist, and persons are souls.³⁰

Premise 1 is established by the conceivability of disembodied thought and experience. Premise 2 appears intuitively obvious: how could there be thoughts which aren't entertained by any thinker, or experiences which aren't experienced by any experiencer? But a fallacy is committed in the above argument when we move from the premise 3 to the conclusion 2. This fallacy is called by philosophers as "a modal shift" (Modal terms are terms such as "necessary", "possible", and "impossible". The above argument appears to be invalid because the necessity in conclusion 1 is wide-scope and the necessity in premise 3 is narrow-scope. The strong dualist can reply by saying that the arguments given in support of conclusion 1 could well have been used to support a narrow-scope version of it: - "The things which are, in the actual world, the thinking things, are non-physical in some possible worlds in which they occur". This can be put together with - "All things which are in fact physical in the actual world, are physical in all other possible worlds in which they exist".³¹ We seem to be able to show that I (the thinker) cannot really be a body or a brain (nor indeed any other physical thing). For, it is conceivable that I might continue to exist without being physical; but it is surely inconceivable that a particular brain might continue to exist without being physical. Then if we have our premise that it is impossible for thoughts and experiences to occur in the absence of some thinking experiencing thing, then it follows that I am myself a non-physical thing. The argument for strong dualism can thus go without committing any modal fallacy.

David Hume presents an argument against Descartes' position that there is a thinker (subject) that thinks by saying that at the most we have reason to believe on introspection that there is an existence of the stream of consciousness itself. We have no reason to believe in any underlying subject or self in which, or to which, the stream occurs. On the contrary, the mind is to be compared to a thunderstorm. Here is an immensely

²⁹ Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 52-54.

³⁰ Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 57.

³¹ Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 60.

complicated sequence of events and states: the clouds and the gathering darkness; the rain and the hail; the rolls of thunder and the flashes of lightning. These stand in many complex relations to one another: some occur simultaneously, some at different times; some are near to one another in space, some further apart; some are causes or effects of one another, others are causally independent. But there is no substantial subject, no individual thing in which or to which the thunderstorm occurs. A thunderstorm doesn't have a subject. All that exists is a particular bundle of meteorological states and events. Similarly, then, the mind is simply a collection of conscious states and events.³² This is sometimes called the no-self view of the mind, or simply the bundle theory.

Mind-Brain Connection: Physicalism vs. Identity Theory - According to physicalism, at least some mental states are identical with certain physical states. Some physicalists have urged that, just as science has revealed to us that water is simply H₂O and that heat in a gas is simply the mean kinetic energy of its constituent molecules, so neuroscience will one day reveal to us that pain, is simply a certain neural state, such as the stimulation of C-fibers. These physicalists believe that the discovery that pain is identical with a certain neural state will be an empirical or a posteriori one, resembling discoveries that science has already made in many other fields of inquiry.³³ The mind-brain identity theory is a version of physicalism which holds that all mental states and events are in fact physical events and states. One of the main objections to dualism has been the difficulty of making sense of causal connections between the mind and brain. An inductive argument for the mind-brain identity theory (mental processes are somehow constituted by processes in the brain) can be summarized as follows –
Premise 1 – It is a successful methodological assumption of science that non-physical events cannot cause physical ones.

Premise 2 – It is a successful methodological assumption of science that higher-level events and processes must be realized in lower level (ultimately physical processes).

Conclusion – So, we have reason to think that mental events must be realized in physical ones, probably in physical events in the brain.³⁴ But as the argument is based on assumptions, so the argument doesn't have a solid and a foundational ground to stand on. We can only hold onto the belief that it is unnecessary to appeal to anything other than physical events in providing causal explanations of brain events – is by believing that some mental events are brain events. The argument for the general truth of the mind-brain identity thesis may be summarized as follows –

Premise 1 – Some mental states and events are causally necessary for the occurrence of some physical ones.

Premise 2 – In a completely neuro-physiological science, there will be no need to refer to anything other than physical-physical causality in the brain.

Conclusion – So some mental states and events are identical with physical brain states and events.

Although the above argument's conclusion only claims that some mental states are physical, but it can easily be developed in such a way to lead to the entailment that all mental states are brain states. The main argument for the thesis of mind-brain identity theory can be presented as follows –

Premise 1 – Our bodily movements are caused by brain-events. Premise 2 – Each event in the brain has a sufficient physical cause.

Premise 3 – Our decisions are sometimes necessary conditions for some of our movements.

Conclusion – So, decisions are brain-events.

Premise 1 and 2 are intended to rule out classic interactive dualism, premise 3 rejects causal overdetermination and premise 4 rules out epiphenomenalism – thus leaving physicalism as the only remaining possibility. Premise 1 seems undeniable in the light of modern scientific knowledge. Premise 2 also seems sufficiently well-supported given what is known about causal processes in the brain. Premise 3 and 4 form an

³² Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 72-73.

³³ E. J. Lowe, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 35.

³⁴ Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 164.

important part of our common-sense view ourselves and the world. The argument seems rationally convincing in the absence of evidence to the contrary.³⁵ There are two types of mind-brain identity theory.

Token identity and type-identity. The thesis of the mind-brain type-identity holds that each general type of brain-state is identical with some general type of mental state. The thesis of mind-brain token identity is that each particular occurrence of a mental state will be identical with some particular occurrence of a brain-state, but there may be no general identities between types of mental state and types of brain-state. The thesis of mind-brain token identity is a much better theory than the mind-brain identity theory as there are many creatures besides human beings that can possess mental states. If not only mammals, birds and reptiles, but perhaps also non-biological systems such as robot-computers can possess mental states, then it is obviously false that there will always be the same type of physical state in existence whenever there exists a given type of mental state. An argument can be raised against the mind-brain identity theory as follows –

Premise 1 – I may be completely certain of my own experiences when I have them.

Premise 2 – I cannot have the same degree of certainty about the existence of any physical state, including my own brain-states.

Conclusion – So (by Leibnitz’s Law), my conscious experiences aren’t in fact identical to brain states. Although both the premises in this argument are true, the argument commits a fallacy and is invalid. Leibnitz Law of the identity of indiscernibles only operates in contexts which aren’t intentional and in premise 1, the context created by the phrase “I may be completely certain..... when I have them” is an intentional one. Further, from the fact that I have complete certainty about my own conscious states without having certainty about my brain state, doesn’t provide a reason to say that my conscious states aren’t brain states. One and the same brain-state may be presented to us under different aspects: in a third-person way (as a brain-state), and via the qualitative feel of what it is like to be in that state.³⁶

Another argument raised against mind-brain identity theory is as follows – Premise 1 – All experiences have distinctive felt qualities.

Premise 2 – Brain-states don’t have distinctive felt qualities.

Premise 3 – So (by Leibnitz Law) experiences aren’t in fact identical with brain states.

Some have claimed that the truth of physicalism requires that conscious states should be reductively explicable in physical terms. The argument can be made as follows –

Premise 1 – If the thesis of mind-brain identity theory were true, then it would have to be possible to explain the felt qualities of our experiences in physical terms.

Premise 2 – No such explanation is possible: there is an explanatory gap between physical and feeling facts.

Conclusion – So, the thesis of mind-brain identity isn’t true.³⁷

According to the knowledge argument given by Frank Jackson against physicalism, since knowledge of all physical and functional facts cannot give us knowledge of all facts, therefore Jackson argues that there are some facts about subjective experiences which cannot be explained in terms of physical processes in the brain. If there is information about the brain, the feelings cannot themselves be brain-states. The argument is as follows –Premise 1 – Even complete knowledge of physical states wouldn’t give someone the knowledge of what an experience feels like.

Premise 2 – But if experiences were physical states, then complete knowledge of the physical states would imply complete knowledge of experiences, including knowing what they feel like.

³⁵ Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 171.

³⁶ Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 164.

³⁷ Carruthers, *The Nature of the Mind: An Introduction*, 173.

Conclusion – So, experiences aren't physical states. Although this argument also involves an intentional term, but it doesn't commit a fallacy as in it the premises speak of complete knowledge, knowledge from all points of view.

Modern Perspectives in Philosophy of Mind: Behaviorism, Functionalism, and Computational Theory -

Behaviorism aims to solve the problem of other minds by providing an analysis – a definition, a translation – of all words referring to mental states in purely behavioral terms. According to behaviorists, there is nothing to our mental states over and above behavior and dispositions to behave. Behaviorism rejects any ontological dualism between non-physical minds and physical bodies. Our ordinary view is that mental states are the causes of our behavior and behavioral dispositions. Thus, when someone screams and groans in pain, we normally think that the pain itself isn't the behavior but is the cause of the behavior. When someone isn't exhibiting pain- behavior but is disposed to do so, then we don't think that the disposition is itself the pain. Rather: "I am in pain" if asked how he is feeling, then this is because he is in pain. So, mental states in general cannot be identified with behavioral states – whether actual or dispositional – since they are rather the causes of behavior.

According to functionalism, mental states are to be distinguished from one-another in virtue of their distinctive causal roles or functions. The guiding idea behind functionalism is that some concepts classify things by what they do and not the material stuff with which they are made of. For example, "transmitters transmit something, while aerials are objects positioned to receive air- borne signals. Indeed, practicing all artifact-concepts are functional, but so, too are many concepts applied to living things. Thus, wings are limbs for flying, with, eyes are light-sensitive organs for seeing with, so perhaps mental concepts are states or processes with a certain causal role or function. The introduction of functionalism as a doctrine has been made into recent philosophy of mind by American philosopher Hilary Putnam. A common argument against functionalism has been that it is incapable of capturing the felt nature of conscious experience. A conscious experience isn't merely an experience which is apt to cause me to believe that I am having that experience; a conscious experience will have a distinctive feel which one is aware of. Being aware of a pain isn't just a matter of believing myself to be in pain, as a functionalist would have it. Objectors have thus urged that one could know everything about the functional role of a mental state and yet still have no idea as to what it is like to be in that state – to be aware of its so-called quale (qualia).

In recent trends in the philosophy of mind, there is a position called Computational Theory of Mind according to which the mind has been seen as a software of the brain, which is its hardware, which is another way of saying that the mind is a computing system. Mind works by computing our representations of the body and environment. The mind is a complex system that can be described at many levels. Higher levels are aspects of their lower-level realizers, and all levels are just aspects of the same portion of reality. This is an egalitarian account of mind as it argues that all levels of mind are equally real, and no level is more fundamental than others.³⁸ Arguments against computational theory of mind can take one of two forms. According to the first objection, mental abilities are best explained non- computationally because minds are more powerful than computing systems, minds are embodied and environmentally embedded, or brain do not work like computers. According to the second class of objections, computational theory of mind is insufficient for explaining some properties of the mind, such as intentionality or consciousness. Challenges to the Computational theory of mind shows that minds are not only computing systems – but something else might be needed besides computation to explain some properties of minds and brains.³⁹

³⁸ "Gualtiero Piccinini," University of Missouri–St. Louis,

URL = <<https://www.umsl.edu/~philo/People/Faculty/piccinini/index.html>>

³⁹ Matteo Colombo and Gualtiero Piccinini, *The Computational Theory of Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 50.

CONCLUSION:

Lastly, it can be said that the investigation into the mind throughout the realm and the field of philosophy of mind is a journey of unyielding inquiry and reflection. From the ancient wisdom of Greek thinkers to the modern complexities of contemporary discourse, the pursuit of comprehending consciousness and mental phenomena has persisted. Descartes' proposition of dualism, materialism's rebuttal, and Hume's radical notions of selfhood have all contributed to this intricate tapestry of thought. Yet, even amidst the diversity of perspectives, persistent questions endure. And it is with the rise of these questions that the field of philosophy of mind more exciting and thrilling to explore.

Contemporary discussions, spanning physicalism, behaviorism, functionalism, and computational theories, offer varied lenses through which to view the mind. However, fundamental queries persist, such as the problem of other minds and the explanatory gap, underscoring the profound complexities inherent in understanding consciousness. Moreover, Ludwig Wittgenstein's insights regarding language usage illuminate how linguistic confusion often underpins philosophical conundrums, particularly in the realm of subjective experiences. By reevaluating traditional Cartesian dichotomies and embracing a nuanced understanding of the relationship between the mental and the physical, we may transcend the limitations of our current discourse. In essence, the exploration of the mind in philosophy is an ongoing exploration, marked by continual evolution and deep contemplation. As new theories arise and old ones adapt, the quest for a holistic understanding remains, offering both intellectual stimulation and profound philosophical insight.

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