

# Wisdom as Knowing How to Live Well: An Epistemological Exploration \*

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## Abstract

What is the nature and structure of phronesis or practical wisdom? According to the view widely held by philosophers and psychologists, a person  $S$  is wise if and only if  $S$  knows how to live well. Given this view of practical wisdom, the guiding question is this: What exactly is “knowing how to live well”? It seems that no one has a clear idea of how to answer this simple but fundamental question. This paper explores knowing how to live well (or “life know-how”) by showing how its nature and structure can be understood through contemporary epistemology of knowledge-how. I will achieve this by doing the following. In Section I, I highlight the two as-yet unanswered “integration questions” about life know-how. In Section II, I explain why the epistemology of knowledge-how has good potential to address the integration questions. In Sections III and IV, I construct two positions—intellectualism and anti-intellectualism—for the epistemology of life know-how and show how they address the two integration questions. In Section V, I show how the epistemology of life know-how established in the previous sections can be used in the philosophy of wisdom and the psychology of wisdom.

**Keywords:** wisdom, knowing how, intellectualism, anti-intellectualism

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## I. Introduction

What is the nature and structure of phronesis or practical wisdom?<sup>1</sup> According to the view held by philosophers (Nozick, 1989; Tiberius, 2008; Grimm, 2015; Stichter, 2016; Tsai, 2023) and psychologists (Baltes & Staudinger, 2000; Sternberg, 2001), a person *S* is wise if and only if *S* knows how to live well. This view highlights two features of wisdom: first, wisdom is concerned with well-being; second, practical wisdom is a kind of knowledge-how. Given this view of wisdom, the guiding question is this: What exactly is “knowing how to live well”? When the idea of knowing how embedded in the locution “knowing how to live well” is taken seriously, the epistemology of knowledge-how enters into the investigation of wisdom. The issues surrounding the guiding question may include but are not limited to the following: Is knowing how to live well (or “life know-how” for short) propositional? Or, is life know-how merely practical in a sense opposed to propositional? Can life know-how be learned? If it is learnable, do we learn it as we learn a true proposition, or as we learn to ride a bicycle?

There are two reasons for taking seriously the idea of knowing how embedded in “knowing how to live well”—one is defensive and the other is constructive. First, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson commented that “philosophers have made many uses of the thesis that knowledge-how is not a species of knowledge-that”, whereas “reliance on the alleged distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that is fatal to the thesis advanced” (Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 441). They think that David Lewis’s account of Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument, according to which “Mary does not gain new knowledge-that when she leaves her black and white room, but only knowledge-how”, is incorrect because “[k]nowing how to imagine red and knowing how to recognize red are both examples of knowledge-that”. They suggest that “Lewis can simply give up this locution [i.e., knowledge-how] and recast his account purely in terms of

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<sup>1</sup> In the rest of the paper, “wisdom” always refers to practical wisdom unless otherwise specified.

abilities” (Stanley & Williamson, 2001: 442).<sup>2</sup> I am not suggesting that Stanley and Williamson’s own account of knowledge-how is necessarily correct. Rather, I suggest that a proponent of the view that wisdom is knowing how to live well can prevent the aforementioned type of criticism if the proponent makes explicit what epistemology of knowing how he or she endorses.

Second, the epistemology of life know-how can be a constructive and fruitful part of the interdisciplinary study of wisdom. Psychologists Sternberg and Glück say that “it would be a serious mistake to leave the study of wisdom exclusively to philosophers (and in fact, even fewer philosophers than psychologists actually study wisdom nowadays!)”. However, they also think that “[p]sychology as well as philosophy has a great deal to contribute to the study of wisdom. The philosophical and psychological approaches are complementary, with each providing insights that the other would be likely to miss” (Sternberg & Glück, 2019: 787). Sternberg and Glück do not say what it is that is missing from psychology. But philosopher John Kekes does say something about this. Regarding the implicit-theoretical approach to wisdom, which searches for and studies laypersons’ conceptions of wisdom, Kekes complains, “no scientists, jurists, or historians would dream of answering difficult questions in their field by asking randomly selected people... People who know take it for granted that difficult questions have difficult answers and that randomly selected people lack the knowledge even to understand the difficulties involved in the questions let alone give reasonable answers to them. But psychologists assume that randomly selected people can tell what wisdom is. In nothing I have read is this assumption stated or justified” (Kekes, 2020: 50). Swartwood and Tiberius would agree with Kekes since they claim that “implicit theories of wisdom on their own will not provide us with a plausible account of wisdom” (Swartwood & Tiberius, 2019: 20).<sup>3</sup> That said,

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<sup>2</sup> Lewis may or may not accept this suggestion; it depends on what notion of knowledge-how he adopts. If Lewis embraces an anti-intellectualist notion of knowledge-how, then there is no necessity for him to abandon the term “knowledge-how” as it can be used interchangeably with “abilities”.

<sup>3</sup> The reason they give is similar to Kekes’s: “Lay people’s views of physical laws may be unlikely to be entirely wrong, and a physical theory that was totally inconsistent with them

Swartwood and Tiberius do not think that implicit theories are completely worthless. They suggest, “we need to subject the implicit theories to scrutiny to see if the elements in them are worth aspiring to and *hang together in a consistent way*”, and we can have “a plausible view of wisdom by articulating the *central elements of wisdom* as identified in implicit theories, and then working back and forth between these elements and relevant empirical and philosophical theories” (Swartwood & Tiberius, 2019: 20; emphases mine).<sup>4</sup> The epistemology of life know-how can be part of the interdisciplinary study of wisdom for it can explain the elements of wisdom into a related whole rather than a set of discrete elements (as I will show later in this paper).

The present paper is based on a conditional: If wisdom is knowing how to live well and “knowing how to live well” is treated as a genuine kind of knowledge, then the nature of knowing how to live well can and should be spelled out. At this crux, the epistemology of knowledge-how, which has been developed in the last two decades (see Bengson & Moffett, 2011a; Czarnecki, 2016; Carter & Poston, 2018), can contribute to the investigation of knowing how to live well and, accordingly, to that of wisdom. What contribution can we expect? In this regard, what comes to the mind is that *intellectualism* would claim that knowing how to live well is a kind of propositional knowledge, and that *anti-intellectualism* would claim that knowing how to live well is not propositional but practical knowledge. The contemporary epistemology of knowledge-how can tell us the nature of knowing how to live well by what *kind* of knowledge it is. However, such a quick and easy application of the epistemology of knowledge-how is deficient because it does not delve into the true nature of knowing how to live well, nor does it show the distinct features of the epistemology of knowledge-how in investigating various kinds of knowledge-how. To go beyond these deficiencies, this paper focuses on two questions of wisdom *qua* life know-how, both of which are implicitly posed by Nozick in his *Examined Life* (Nozick, 1989).

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would probably be hard to defend, but that doesn't do much to show that physicists should start their research by surveying lay views”. (Swartwood & Tiberius, 2019: 19)

<sup>4</sup> Part of the above paragraph is sourced from Tsai (2022, 2023).

Nozick thinks that “[w]isdom is not just one type of knowledge, but diverse”;<sup>5</sup> but he conjectures that “[p]erhaps the diversity of wisdom is only apparent and it all can flow from some one central understanding” (Nozick, 1989: 269). However, he immediately cautions that this conjecture “should not be assumed or stipulated at the outset” (Nozick, 1989: 269). In fact, Nozick confesses, “I do not know of any one integrated structure that illuminatingly includes all the pieces of wisdom” (Nozick, 1989: 270). Therefore, an as-yet unanswered question remains:

**The Integration Question 1** (the IQ1): How are various pieces of knowledge that constitute wisdom integrated, if they are integrated? Or, what is the integrated structure, if there is any, of wisdom?

Nozick also thinks that “[a] wise person knows these diverse things and lives them”, or, to put it more explicitly, “[s]omeone who only knew them, who offered good advice to others yet who live foolishly himself, would not be termed wise” (Nozick, 1989: 270). That is, for Nozick, practical wisdom is *practical* in the sense that the one who possesses it must actually put it into practice rather than merely into words. Regardless of whether this “must” is too demanding, the question is as follows:

**The Integration Question 2** (the IQ2): How are *knowledge* that constitutes wisdom and *action* that manifests wisdom integrated? Or, how are the *theoreticality* and the *practicality* of wisdom integrated?<sup>6</sup>

Unlike the IQ1, which is concerned with how diverse pieces of knowledge are integrated, the IQ2 is concerned with how the knowledge (that constitute wisdom) and action (that manifests wisdom) are integrated. Nozick denies a kind of answer to the IQ2; that is, “in addition to her understanding and know-how the wise person must possess *something else* that in combination with these then applies the understanding to produce a life in accordance with it” (Nozick, 1989: 270; emphasis mine). Instead, Nozick suggests, “Perhaps being wise just is living a certain way *because* of

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<sup>5</sup> Regarding what such various pieces of knowledge are, see the discussion in Section II.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. “To understand wisdom, we have to understand its connection with knowledge, action, and judgment”. (Kekes, 1983: 277)

the understanding and know-how one has; there need be no additional *third* factor that both is part of wisdom and gets from the understanding and know-how to the living of it” (Nozick, 1989: 270; emphases original). That is, for Nozick, practical wisdom is *practical in itself* and needs no further factor to be put into practice. Why and how is practicality a constitutive component of wisdom? Nozick does not explain.

The aim of this paper is twofold: first, to spell out the epistemic nature of knowing how to live well; second, to show how the epistemology of knowledge-how can inform our understanding of knowing how to live well and thus of wisdom. In Section II, I explain why the epistemology of knowledge-how has good potential to address the IQ1 and IQ2. In Sections III and IV, I construct two positions for the epistemology of life know-how and consider how they address the IQ1 and the IQ2. In Section V, I apply the results in the previous sections to the philosophy of wisdom and the psychology of wisdom.

## II. Preliminaries to the Epistemology of Life Know-How

Philosophers think that there is such a thing as knowledge of well-being or knowledge of how to live well. For example, Stephen Grimm argues that knowledge of how to live well is constituted by three kinds of knowledge:

On my view knowledge of how to live well is a complex state that can be broken down into various components. In particular, knowing how to live well is constituted by the following further types of knowledge, all of which, I believe, are individually necessary for wisdom: (1) Knowledge of what is good or important for well-being. (2) Knowledge of one’s standing relative to what is good or important for well-being. (3) Knowledge of a strategy for obtaining what is good or important for well-being. (Grimm, 2015: 139-140)

Prior to Grimm, Nozick made a similar claim that one’s wisdom is composed of various kinds of knowledge and understanding:

What a wise person needs to know and understand constitutes a varied list: the most important goals and values of life—the ultimate goal, if there is one; what means will reach these goals without too great a cost; what kinds of dangers threaten the achieving of these goals; how to recognize and avoid or minimize these dangers; what different types of human beings are like in their actions and motives (as this presents dangers or opportunities); what is not possible or feasible to achieve (or avoid); how to tell what is appropriate when; knowing when certain goals are sufficiently achieved; what limitations are unavoidable and how to accept them; how to improve oneself and one’s relationships with others or society; knowing what the true and unapparent value of various things is; when to take a long-term view; knowing the variety and obduracy of facts, institutions, and human nature; understanding what one’s real motives are; how to cope and deal with the major tragedies and dilemmas of life, and with the major good things too. (Nozick, 1989: 269)

Grimm lists three types of knowledge, and Nozick lists fifteen items of knowledge and understanding. Regardless of how many types/items of knowledge/understanding<sup>7</sup> constitute wisdom/knowing how to live well, they are all epistemic.<sup>8</sup> Once they are epistemic, epistemology enters; in our present case, it is the epistemology of well-being. The epistemology of well-being is a part of the philosophy of well-being. However, as Raffaele Rodogno points out, “[o]ne of the most neglected areas in the philosophy of well-being is its epistemology: how do we know that something is good or bad for an individual or that a life is a good life for the individual whose life it is?” (Rodogno, 2014: 441). So, from an epistemologist’s point of view,

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<sup>7</sup> Here I leave aside the issue of whether wisdom consists of rational beliefs (Sharon Ryan [2012, 2017] argues that it is; for criticism, see Fileva and Tresan [2013]), knowledge (Whitcomb, 2011; Grimm, 2015), or understanding (Shane Ryan, 2016). See Tsai (2023: 28) for a brief discussion.

<sup>8</sup> The concept of “epistemic” is broad and not limited to propositional knowledge. Linda Zagzebski thinks that “knowledge, understanding, certainty, reasonableness, and intellectual virtue” are all epistemic goods. (cf. Zagzebski, 2009: 9)

Grimm and Nozick must address *epistemological* questions of the following forms: What does a wise person *know*? How does one know that such and such is his most important goal and value of his life? How does one know that such and such is the best means for him to achieve the goal? How does one know that such and such is a danger that threatens the achievement of the goal?<sup>9</sup> These epistemological questions can be addressed individually.

However, the epistemological questions of well-being can be approached individually or collectively. Let us call the former approach *individual* and the latter *integrative*. The two approaches are not exclusive, but it is the integrative epistemology of well-being that interests Nozick (at least in the present context). Nozick wants to know, as mentioned above, how various epistemic items that constitute wisdom *qua* life know-how are integrated, and how *knowledge* that constitutes life know-how and *action* that manifests life know-how are integrated. However, Nozick might not be aware that the epistemology of knowledge-how can help address the integration questions of life know-how. After all, the epistemology of knowledge-how has only gradually matured in the last two decades. In the rest of this section, I explain why the epistemology of knowledge-how has good potential to address the integration questions.

Contemporary epistemology of knowledge-how, for the two most prominent figures in this field, i.e., Gilbert Ryle (1949) and Jason Stanley (2011), is not an isolated study of the nature of knowing how to do something but part of the study of the nature of intelligent or skilled action. Instead of merely completing the formula, say, “S knows how to  $\varphi$  if and only if ...”, epistemologists of knowledge-how pursue the completion of the formula embedded in a much broader framework, say, “If S  $\varphi$ s intelligently, then (S knows how to  $\varphi$  if and only if ...)”. It is against this background (which can be expressed as the idea that “a theory of knowledge-how is a theory of intelligence”) that we can best make sense of Stanley’s claim that “knowing how to do something is a kind of propositional knowledge, a kind of propositional knowledge that guides skilled actions” (Stanley, 2011: 150) and Ryle’s claim that “Champions of [the intellectualist] legend are apt to try to re-assimilate knowing *how* to

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<sup>9</sup> I have addressed some of these questions elsewhere. See Tsai (2020, 2022).



knowing *that* by arguing that intelligent performance involves the observance of rules” (Ryle, 1949: 29). Both Stanley and Ryle relate knowledge-how to intelligent/skilled action or performance. In contrast, some philosophers ignore the aforementioned background when addressing the concept of knowledge-how and thus allow the case in which one’s knowledge-how separates from intelligent action. This ignorance is unfortunate because the value of knowledge-how lies in its practicality.<sup>10</sup> At any rate, the kind of knowledge-how with which the present paper is concerned is the one that is related to intelligence and intelligent action.

In line with the above, the two major camps in the epistemology of knowledge-how, intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, are fundamentally about the nature of intelligence and intelligent action. They agree that an action is intelligent by virtue of the agent’s knowing how to perform the action. However, they disagree on how best to explain knowledge-how embedded in intelligent action. Intellectualism claims that, generally speaking, S’s knowing how to  $\varphi$  is or consists in S’s knowing that such and such is a way for S to  $\varphi$ , whereas anti-intellectualism denies this<sup>11</sup> and claims that, generally speaking, S’s knowing how to  $\varphi$  is or consists in S’s ability to  $\varphi$  or skill in  $\varphi$ -ing. Regardless of their disagreement, there are two common focuses of the debate between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. First, the debate does not lie in whether propositional knowledge (knowledge-that) or practical knowledge (ability) can be an element in performing an intelligent action; rather, it lies in which element contributes to or explains intelligent action *qua intelligent* action. Thus, to a certain extent, both camps must address *how various elements that constitute a particular knowledge-how are integrated* from the perspective of intelligence, that is, in light of the contribution an element of that particular knowledge-how can make to *intelligent* action that manifests that knowledge-how (call this

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<sup>10</sup> The issue of the value of knowledge-how is still under discussion. See, e.g., Markie (2019).

<sup>11</sup> Here, we should note that there are varieties of intellectualism (and thus varieties of anti-intellectualism) due to the diversity of the notion of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that can be the following: first, it can be *explicit* in the sense that an agent who knows a proposition  $p$  can consciously express  $p$ ; second, it can be *implicit* in the sense that the agent who knows  $p$  is not aware of  $p$  when he acts on  $p$  but can retrieve  $p$  when asked or needed; third, it can be *tacit* in the sense that the agent who knows  $p$  cannot be aware of  $p$  in any case.

the General Integration Question 1; the GIQ1). Second, since the kind of knowledge-how is embedded in or related to intelligent *action*, both camps must address *how elements that constitute a particular knowledge-how and action that manifests that knowledge-how are integrated or related* (call this the General Integration Question 2; the GIQ2). The two focuses of the debate explain why the epistemology of knowledge-how has good potential to address the IQ1 and the IQ2: first, the epistemology of knowledge-how has the theoretical resources to tackle GIQ1 and GIQ2; and second, IQ1 and IQ2 are simply the subclasses of the GIQ1 and the GIQ2, respectively.

### III. Intellectualism about Life Know-How and the Integration Questions

In this section, I shall construct a version of intellectualism about life know-how and consider how it addresses the IQ1 and the IQ2. I shall proceed by frequently referencing Stanley's intellectualism.

#### A. Intellectualism about Life Know-How

Stanley thinks that "knowing how to do something is a kind of propositional knowledge, a kind of propositional knowledge that guides skilled actions" (Stanley, 2011: 150); or, to put it slightly differently: "skilled action is action guided by knowledge how, and that knowing how to do something amounts to knowing a fact" (Stanley, 2011: 175). Stanley's argument for intellectualism is based on his consideration of the syntax and semantics of the sentence form "S knows how to  $\varphi$ " in which the embedded how-question "how to  $\varphi$ " is involved. Since an embedded how-question is interpreted as denoting the set of its true propositions that answer the question, knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.<sup>12</sup> Regardless of whether we agree with this strategy, Stanley's intellectualism can be formulated briefly as follows: S's skilled action of  $\varphi$ -ing requires S's knowing how to  $\varphi$ , which consists in S's propositional knowledge regarding  $\varphi$ .<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> For a more detailed argument on Stanley's intellectualism, see Stanley and Williamson (2001).

<sup>13</sup> This formulation is preliminary because the notion of knowledge-that can be understood diversely, such as explicit/conscious or tacit/unconscious. Stanley does not think that

Applying Stanley's intellectualism to the field of knowing how to live well, a version of intellectualism about life know-how emerges. It holds the view that S's knowing how to live well consists in S's propositional knowledge regarding his own well-being. However, the view so formulated might be too brief. For example, we would like to know more about what propositions S knows. In fact, Nozick suggests a list, as seen in Section I. The propositions that S knows can be schematically described as follows:  $G_1$  is the most important goal of his life;  $M_1$  is the means for S to achieve  $G_1$ ;  $D_1$  is a danger that threatens the achievement of  $G_1$ ;  $M_2$  is the means to minimize  $D_1$ ; and so on. Thus, intellectualism about life know-how can be further characterized, though schematically, as holding the view that S's knowing how to live well consists in S's knowing that  $G_1$  is the most important goal of his life, that  $M_1$  is the most effective means for S to achieve  $G_1$ , that  $D_1$  is a threat to the achievement of  $G_1$ , that  $M_2$  is the means to minimize  $D_1$ , and so on.

## B. The IQ1

How would intellectualism about life know-how address the IQ1? To answer this question, let me explain how Stanley's intellectualism would address the GIQ1. First of all, Stanley holds the view that knowledge-that that constitutes a particular know-how is *not single*. Consider how Stanley explains an outfielder's knowledge of how to field a fly ball:

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knowing a proposition amounts to considering, contemplating, or self-avowing the proposition. He calls his intellectualism "reasonable" in the sense that "The reasonable intellectualist about intelligent action will hold that an action is intelligent in virtue of being guided by propositional knowledge, but deny that this entails that intelligent action requires a prior act of self-avowing the propositional knowledge that guides one's actions" (Stanley, 2011: 14). Why accept this denial? According to Stanley, "if someone can act on their knowledge how, without a prior act of considering a proposition, then someone can act on their propositional knowledge, without a prior act of considering that proposition" (Stanley, 2011: 15). Again, why accept this conditional? Here, Stanley asserts, following Carl Ginet's (1975) point and example, that "there is *no intuitive phenomenological difference* ... between manifesting one's knowledge of how to open the door and manifesting one's knowledge that one can open the door by turning the knob" (Stanley, 2011: 16-17; emphasis mine). Regardless of whether this argumentation is accepted, this issue will not affect my discussion.

[W]hen we say that a skilled outfielder knows how to field a fly ball, we do not mean that he knows, of at least one way to field a fly ball, that it gives him counterfactual success in fielding fly balls. That is, we do not intend the *mention-some* reading of the embedded question, “how to field a fly ball”. Rather, in such a case, we mean the mention-all reading of the embedded question. What we assert when we assert of a skilled outfielder that he knows how to field fly balls is that he knows *all* of a range of relevant ways that give him counterfactual success in fielding fly balls. Hence, to say of an outfielder in baseball that he knows how to catch a fly ball is to impart to him knowledge of *many* propositions of the form ‘w is a way for him to field a fly ball’. (Stanley, 2011: 183)

This passage suggests two features of knowledge-that that constitutes a particular knowledge-how. First, the knowledge-that is multiple in content. As an intellectualist, Stanley must think that a skilled outfielder’s knowledge-how consists in his knowledge-that. However, such knowledge-that cannot be *single* in the sense that the outfielder knows only one way to field a fly ball regardless of how complicated that way is, because “[a] mark of expertise is the ability to respond efficiently to novel situations” (Stanley, 2011: 181). Therefore, the skilled outfielder must know “*all* of a range of relevant ways that give him counterfactual success in fielding fly balls” (Stanley, 2011: 183). Second, the knowledge-that is identical in form; that is, although the outfielder’s knowledge-that is multiple, what the outfielder knows that constitutes his expertise in question must be of the form “w is a way for him to field a fly ball”. To generalize what is said about the outfielder to all kinds of experts: for any expert S, S’s knowledge-that that constitutes his knowledge-how of, or expertise in,  $\varphi$ -ing is multiple in content and identical in form. To put it another way, S knows how to  $\varphi$  if and only if (S knows that  $w_1$  is a way for him to  $\varphi$ ) & (S knows that  $w_2$  is a way for him to  $\varphi$ ) & (S knows that  $w_3$  is a way for him to  $\varphi$ ) & so on. Let us call the right-hand side of the biconditional the *multiple means-end knowledge-that* of a particular kind. For intellectualism, the multiple means-end knowledge-that is the quintessence of intelligence, and it is such knowledge that makes intelligent action

possible and explainable; neither *single* knowledge-that nor *non-means-end* knowledge-that can do the trick.

We can now return to the GIQ1. For intellectualism, intelligence matters first. Thus, for intellectualism, various pieces of knowledge-that are, and must be, integrated by virtue of their connection to the quintessence of intelligence, i.e., the multiple means-end knowledge-that. If a piece of knowledge-that is of the form that “S knows that  $w$  is a way for him to  $\varphi$ ”, then it is classified as a member of the *core* of S’s knowledge-how with regard to  $\varphi$ , the core that is directly responsible for reliable success in achieving  $\varphi$ . If a piece of knowledge-that (say, “S knows that such and such is a state that represents  $\varphi$ ”) is not of the aforementioned form but can contribute to the core of know-how, then it is classified as the *supplementary part* of S’s knowledge-how with regard to  $\varphi$ .

Let us now turn to the IQ1. For intellectualism about life know-how, the core of S’s life know-how is constituted by S’s knowledge-that, which has the form “S knows that  $w$  is a way for him to live a good life”. So construed, the core of S’s life know-how would look like this: (S knows that  $w_1$  is a way for him to live a good life) & (S knows that  $w_2$  is a way for him to live a good life) & so on. Other pieces of S’s knowledge-that, such as “S knows that  $G_1$  is the good life for him to pursue”, “S knows that  $D_1$  is a danger that threatens the pursuit of  $G_1$ ”, and “S knows that  $M_2$  is the means to minimize  $D_1$ ”, are the supplementary part of S’s life know-how.

### C. The IQ2

To answer how intellectualism about life know-how would address the IQ2, let us similarly consider how Stanley’s intellectualism would address the GIQ2. As stated in Section II, knowledge-that that constitutes a particular knowledge-how must be related to action because knowledge-how is embedded in or related to intelligent *action*. Stanley clearly claims that “one must recognize that propositional knowledge of maxims or rules is not ... ‘detached’ from behavior” (Stanley, 2011: 182). How are knowledge-that and action integratively related? Stanley offers two cases, both of which explore the relation between knowledge-that and action. The first case is of a novice:

The novice who is just acquiring a skill learns a method by which she can accomplish that skill—this involves the acquisition of propositional knowledge. But in the novice, the automatic mechanisms that apply the propositional knowledge to specific situations are not in place. The novice must repeatedly engage in distinct actions of “consulting” the propositional knowledge she has acquired in performing. (Stanley, 2011: 183-184)

Although the case of the novice is not our focus of inquiry (because the novice does not possess the know-how or skill at a mature level), the case is helpful because it shows a possible route from knowledge to action: from “(acquired) propositional knowledge” to “a mental act of consulting a proposition”, and then to “performed actions”. Some might think that when the novice becomes an expert, the automatic mechanisms will take over not only the consulting processes but also propositional knowledge. However, this thought is not Stanley’s.

Let us consider the second case.

In the expert agent, by contrast, the automatic mechanisms that, as Fodor (1983: 9) puts it, “bring the organization of behavior into conformity with the propositional structures that are cognized” are smoothly functioning. The expert does not need to “tell herself” things. She does not need to engage in distinct actions of consulting the propositional knowledge that guides her in acting. She just *implements* that knowledge in her actions. Practice has allowed the automatic mechanisms that are responsible for executing epistemic states (whether dispositional or not) to take over. (Stanley, 2011: 184)

The case of expertise shows another route from knowledge to action: from “(acquired) propositional knowledge” to “automatic mechanisms”, and then to “performed actions”. The expert does not need to “consult”, explicitly or implicitly, his propositional knowledge. However, this does not mean that the expert’s propositional knowledge is thus evaporated.<sup>14</sup> As stated above,

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<sup>14</sup> To respond to this possible anti-intellectualist response, intellectualism of a kind that defines its key notion “intellect” in terms of mental representation would say that one’s explicit

Stanley accepts the notion of *tacit* propositional knowledge. With this picture of at hand, intellectualism would integrate *knowledge-that* that constitutes a particular knowledge-how with *actions* that manifest that knowledge-how by automatic mechanisms. By the same token, intellectualism about life know-how would integrate *knowledge-that* that constitutes life know-how (particularly the multiple means-end knowledge-that) with *actions* that manifest life know-how by automatic mechanisms.

Thus far, I have constructed a version of intellectualism about life know-how based on Stanley's intellectualism about know-how in general and answered the IQ1 and the IQ2 by referencing answers to the GIQ1 and the GIQ2. In the next section, I shall construct a *Rylean* version of anti-intellectualism about life know-how and consider how it addresses the IQ1 and the IQ2. Two notes. First, the version I will construct is Rylean because it is based on *Rylean* anti-intellectualism about know-how. Second, the Rylean account of know-how can accommodate the intellectual element of intellectualism without adopting intellectualism, which I have developed in detail elsewhere (Tsai, 2011, 2014, 2016). Here I will just apply the Rylean account without repeating the arguments.

## IV. Anti-Intellectualism about Life Know-How and the Integration Questions

### A. Anti-Intellectualism about Life Know-How

Ryle's anti-intellectualism<sup>15</sup> contains two main theses: the negative

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knowledge of regulative propositions does not evaporate but becomes *unconscious* mental representations. Hubert Dreyfus once made a parody of such intellectualism: "since beginning bicycle riders can only stay upright by using training wheels, when they finally manage to ride without training wheels, we should conclude they must then be using invisible ones". (Dreyfus, 2002: 416)

<sup>15</sup> Although the term "anti-intellectualism" is negative in its form, associated with a negative view that knowing-how is not a species of knowing-that, Ryle's "anti-intellectualism" is usually associated with an additional positive view according to which knowing-how is a skill. With this reminder, I think there is no need to invent another term for his positive view.

thesis claims that knowledge-how (or intelligence) is not knowledge-that (or intellect, or acts of considering regulative propositions); the positive thesis claims that knowledge-how is a skill (or capacity, or multi-track disposition). Let me elaborate a bit more on these two theses.

Ryle offers several different formulations of intellectualism. For example, he formulates intellectualism as a doctrine “which tries to define intelligence in terms of the apprehension of truth” (Ryle, 1949: 27), as an assertion “that all intelligent performance requires to be prefaced by the consideration of appropriate propositions” (Ryle, 1949: 29), or as an assumption “that a performance of any sort inherits all its title to intelligence from some anterior internal operation of planning what to do” (Ryle, 1949: 31). Regardless of which formulation is used,<sup>16</sup> for Ryle, “‘Intelligent’ cannot be defined in terms of ‘intellectual’ or ‘knowing *how*’ in terms of ‘knowing *that*’” (Ryle, 1949: 32). His regress argument against intellectualism is straightforward: “The crucial objection to the intellectualist legend is this. The consideration of propositions is itself an operation the execution of which can be more or less intelligent, less or more stupid. But if, for any operation to be intelligently executed, a prior theoretical operation had first to be performed and performed intelligently, it would be a logical impossibility for anyone ever to break into the circle” (Ryle, 1949: 30). Briefly, one cannot explain in what an intelligent action consists by virtue of an intelligent action, because this leads either to an infinite regress or to a vicious circle.

If knowledge-how (intelligence) is not knowledge-that (intellect), then what is it? Ryle tells us what it is that we should seek: “In judging that someone’s performance is or is not intelligent, we have ... to look beyond the performance itself. ... We are considering his abilities and propensities of which this performance was an actualization. Our inquiry is not into cause ..., but into capacities, skills, habits, liabilities and bents” (Ryle, 1949:

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<sup>16</sup> Here, we should note that there are varieties of intellectualism (and thus varieties of anti-intellectualism) due to the diversity of the notion of knowledge-that. Knowledge-that can be the following: first, it can be *explicit* in the sense that an agent who knows a proposition *p* can consciously express *p*; second, it can be *implicit* in the sense that the agent who knows that *p* is not aware of *p* when he acts on *p* but can retrieve *p* when asked or needed; third, it can be *tacit* in the sense that the agent who knows that *p* cannot be aware of *p* in any case.



45). Here, capacities, skills, habits, liabilities and bents are *dispositions*, but only the first two can be candidates for intelligence. Ryle reminds us that it is “tempting to argue that competences and skills are just habits. They are certainly second natures or acquired dispositions, but it does not follow from this that they are mere habits. Habits are one sort, but not the only sort, of second nature” (Ryle, 1949: 42). For Ryle, “Knowing *how* ... is a disposition, but not a single-track disposition like ... a habit” (Ryle, 1949: 46); to put it positively, knowing how is “dispositions the exercises of which are indefinitely heterogeneous” (Ryle, 1949: 44) or simply a multi-track disposition. Based on what is said above, Ryle’s anti-intellectualism can be formulated as the view that S’s skilled action of  $\varphi$ -ing requires S’s knowing how to  $\varphi$ , which consists in S’s multi-track disposition to  $\varphi$ . Applying Ryle’s anti-intellectualism to the field of knowing how to live well, we get a version of anti-intellectualism about life know-how, according to which S’s knowing how to live well consists in S’s multi-track disposition to live well.

Before proceeding to the anti-intellectualist answers to the IQ1 and the IQ2, I want to make it clear that the version of anti-intellectualism below is Rylean, which is an upgraded or reinterpreted version of Ryle’s anti-intellectualism. According to the Rylean account, know-how, or expertise, is a hybrid skill system, which is a combination of a first-order practical skill and a second-order intellectual skill. The Rylean account does not disregard the importance of propositional knowledge in a particular know-how, which can be used to explain the normative and agential characters of intelligent action. However, the Rylean account does not treat propositional knowledge as intelligence *per se*, but as the *product* of exercising (second-order intellectual) intelligence. So construed, the Rylean account of know-how, which accommodates the intellectual element of intellectualism, remains anti-intellectualist.

## B. The IQ1

When S exercises his multi-track disposition to live well, is S required to know the propositions such as that  $G_1$  is the most important goal of his life, that  $M_1$  is the means for him to achieve  $G_1$ , that  $D_1$  is a danger that threatens the achievement of  $G_1$ , that  $M_2$  is the means to minimize  $D_1$ , and

so on (that is, is S required to know the propositions that intellectualists would attribute to S)? For Rylean anti-intellectualism, S is required to know these propositions, but these pieces of knowledge—that are the products of exercising (second-order intellectual) intelligence, rather than intelligence itself. Anti-intellectualism about life know-how would answer the IQ1 by saying that, among various pieces of epistemic items that are related to S’s life know-how, the (first-order practical) multi-track disposition to live well constitutes the core of S’s life know-how. Beyond that, all other multi-track dispositions and their manifestations constitute the supplementary part of S’s life know-how—“supplementary” in the sense that they help *acquire* and *improve* the core of S’s life know-how (i.e., they help establish the [first-order and core] multi-track disposition from scratch, and they help to extend the [first-order and core] multi-track disposition to more situations). Thus, for the Rylean, the intellectual element of Stanley’s intellectualism is important because it is conducive to establishing and improving one’s life know-how.

Anti-intellectualism about life know-how would address the IQ1 in the way I have shown above. I think that this way of addressing can be supported by seeing how anti-intellectualism in general would address the GIQ1, especially by seeing how Ryle would deal with knowledge-that which is related to a particular know-how. Ryle does not “deny or depreciate the value of intellectual operations, but only to deny that the execution of intelligent performances entails the additional execution of intellectual operations” (Ryle, 1949: 49). If so, what is the relation between intellectual operations (or “intellectual capacity” or “propositional competence”) and know-how? According to Ryle,

[T]he learning of all but the most unsophisticated knacks requires some intellectual capacity. The ability to do things in accordance with instructions necessitates understanding those instructions. So some propositional competence is a condition of acquiring any of these competences. But it does not follow that exercises of these competences require to be accompanied by exercises of propositional competences. I could not have learned to swim the breast stroke, if I had not been able to understand the lessons given

me in that stroke; but I do not have to recite those lessons, when I now swim the breast stroke. (Ryle, 1949: 49)

Ryle does not deny that some propositional competence is a condition of *acquiring* a practical competence. However, he denies that a propositional competence is a condition of *exercising* the practical competence. Further, even if a propositional competence is exercised not for acquiring but for exercising a practical competence, the *intelligent* character of exercising the very practical competence is not defined in terms of the propositional competence, as Ryle says: “The surgeon must indeed have learned from instruction ... [but even] where efficient practice is the deliberate application of considered prescriptions, the intelligence involved in putting the prescriptions into practice is not identical with that involved in intellectually grasping the prescriptions” (Ryle, 1949: 49). Thus, anti-intellectualism would answer the GIQ1 by saying that, among various pieces of epistemic items<sup>17</sup> that are related to S’s knowing how to  $\varphi$ , *the* multi-track disposition to  $\varphi$  is the quintessence of intelligence that constitutes the core of S’s knowing how to  $\varphi$ . All the other epistemic items are either used to acquire or establish S’s multi-track disposition to  $\varphi$  or used to explain certain features, except the intelligent one, of exercising S’s multi-track disposition to  $\varphi$ .

### C. The IQ2

Consider the GIQ2 first. How is a multi-track disposition that constitutes a particular knowledge-how integrated with performances that manifest that knowledge-how? For anti-intellectualism, the answer is not to search for an additional third factor beyond dispositions and their manifestations because a disposition is defined in terms of its and stimulus

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<sup>17</sup> By the term “epistemic items”, I mean items such as (sub-)skills and understanding. Ryle might accept the view that know-how is composed of (sub-)skills and understanding. He clearly claims that “[u]nderstanding is a part of knowing *how*” (Ryle, 1949: 54; here, I will set aside Ryle’s argument for the claim); he also claims that “[m]arksmanship is a complex of skills” (Ryle, 1949: 45; here, “marksmanship” is a particular know-how). I will set aside the question of why skill and understanding are “epistemic”, the question that I think that virtue epistemology has resources to address.

conditions and manifestations. For Ryle, “Overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of minds; they are those workings” (Ryle, 1949: 58). Applying the above view, Ryle states the following:

To decide whether [a soldier’s] bull’s eye was a fluke or a good shot, we need and he himself might need to take into account more than this one success. ... There is no one signal of a man’s knowing how to shoot, but a modest assemblage of heterogeneous performances generally suffices to establish beyond reasonable doubt whether he knows how to shoot or not. (Ryle, 1949: 45-46)

If performances are constitutive of a multi-track disposition *qua* intelligence, then to know whether one has a particular know-how is to consider his performances that manifest that know-how.

With the above anti-intellectualist answer to the GIQ2 at hand, anti-intellectualism about life know-how would say that the multi-track disposition that constitutes life know-how and performances that manifest life know-how are integrated into the multi-track dispositions to live well because the performances are constitutive of the multi-track disposition to live well. Anti-intellectualism about life know-how would echo Nozick’s suggestion mentioned in Section I: “A wise person knows these diverse things and lives them. Someone who only knew them, who offered good advice to others yet who live foolishly himself, would not be termed wise” (Nozick, 1989: 270). Nozick, however, does not explain why a wise person must also *live* wisely himself. For anti-intellectualism about life know-how, the reason is straightforward: no manifestation of living well, no disposition to live well. When anti-intellectualists ascribe life know-how to an agent, they take into account a certain significant amount of the agent’s life history.

Thus far, I have constructed Rylean anti-intellectualism about life know-how, which incorporates the intellectual element of intellectualism.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> According to Whitcomb, “Advice” is an adequacy condition on theories of wisdom, according to which “Theories of wisdom should explain why wise people tend to be able to give good advice” (Whitcomb, 2011: 102). Some might think that intellectualism is in a much better position to meet this condition than anti-intellectualism. However, anti-intellectualism

I advocate anti-intellectualism about life know-how, but I think that the intellectual element of intellectualism about life know-how cannot be ignored. At any rate, no matter which position we select, from the perspective of the epistemology of life know-how, life know-how has a core, and all other epistemic items are used to support the core. The core is the components that directly responsible for reliable success in achieving well-being. For intellectualism, the core is in the form of the multiple means-end knowledge-that, and for anti-intellectualism, the core is in the form of the (first-order) multi-track disposition.<sup>19</sup>

## V. The Epistemology of Life Know-How Encapsulated and Applied

The phrase “knowing how to live well” has been used in the philosophy literature; however, most of the time, the meaning of the phrase is either taken for granted or left unexplored. One reason for this might be that “giving an account of what it means to know how to live well may prove as difficult a topic as providing an account of wisdom” (Ryan, 2013). In the previous sections I have not only given accounts of what it means to know how to live well, but also pursued the answers to the Nozickian questions so as to uncover the structure of knowing how to live well.

What is emerging now is a new field of research, i.e., the epistemology of life know-how, which is concerned with the nature and structure of knowing how to live well.<sup>20</sup> The epistemology of life know-how in its currently established form contains:

- Two main positions: intellectualism about life know-how and

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constructed in the present paper has the same advantage due to its intellectual element. I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this point.

<sup>19</sup> The idea that knowing how to live well has a core can be used to respond to Christian Miller’s practical wisdom eliminativism (Miller, 2021). See also Kristjánsson and Fowers (2022), Vaccarezza, Kristjánsson, and Croce (2023) for discussion.

<sup>20</sup> In this paper, I address only the issues of the nature and structure of knowing how to live well. But I think that the concern of the epistemology of life know-how can be extended to include the issues of the acquisition and possibility of knowing how to live well.

anti-intellectualism about life know-how.<sup>21</sup>

- The Nozickian questions: the IQ1 and the IQ2.
- The intellectualist and anti-intellectualist answers to the Nozickian questions.

All of these surround the nature and structure of knowing how to live well. Intellectualism and anti-intellectualism about life know-how are two working theories about the nature of knowing how to live well. The Nozickian questions and the answers to them are concerned with the structure of knowing how to live well. While the two working theories in the epistemology of life know-how are competing, there are some general consensuses in the epistemology of life know-how:

- Knowing how to live well is diverse but *integrated*.
- Knowing how to live well is *practical* in the sense of being directed towards (intelligent) action.
- Knowing how to live well has a *core*, which is directly responsible for reliable success in achieving well-being.

In what follows I will advance the epistemology of life know-how by applying the above three features of knowing how to live well to the cases in which the notions of knowing how to live well and wisdom are used. I am not going to judge but instead open up new perspectives on the cases.

Case 1: “Knowing how to live well” is too general to be useful?

Richard Rorty does not engage in the debate about the *nature* of know-how, yet his view about know-how may be shared by some or even many. Rorty asserted, “My point is not simply that ‘knowing how to live well’ is a better description of what we get both from Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* and from James’ *The golden bowl* than ‘knowing what the good life for a human being is’.” It is that *neither* phrase is of much use. Both

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<sup>21</sup> Stanley’s position and Ryle’s position on know-how are *paradigmatic* cases of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, respectively. That said, there are variants of intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, such as John Bengson and Marc Moffett’s (2011b) objectualist intellectualism and Stephen Hetherington’s (2011) practicalism. I believe that the more versions of the know-how view of wisdom we substantively establish, the more nuances of practical wisdom we can grasp.

are too general—on a level with ‘knowing tea’” (Rorty, 2001: 256). So, for Rorty, “knowing how to live well” is too general to be useful. (Further, Rorty might not agree with KLW and KLS presented in Case 2 below.)

But what does Rorty mean by the phrase “too general”? Let us consider what he says about “knowing tea”:

We would usually say that the tea-taster’s ability at noticing is an example of “knowing how” rather than of knowing that certain propositions are true and some false. We can of course convert the former into the latter by saying that she knows many truths— e.g., “These tea leaves come from half way down the hill in Gopal Mukerji’s tea garden”— that the rest of us do not. But to know many such facts is not to have a theory about the nature of tea, nor about how to arrange teas in an hierarchical order. Similarly, to notice far more things about individual human beings than most people do is not to be able to contribute to an understanding of what it is to be a human being, nor to be able to say what sort of life is best for human beings as such. (Rorty, 2001: 255-256)

Rorty’s verdict on “knowing how to live well” is based upon his understanding of know-how in general and the tea-taster’s know-how in particular. It seems that for Rorty knowing how is knowing diverse things, and thus the phrase “too general” means roughly “too many things”.

However, Rorty’s characterization of the tea-taster’s know-how, from the perspective of the epistemology of knowledge-how, can be improved significantly. It may first identify the ultimate goal of the tea-taster’s know-how, and then classify various epistemic items in the tea-taster’s know-how into core and supplementary components due to their relation with the ultimate goal. With this picture in hand, we can ask: Is having a theory about the nature of tea a component of a tea-taster’s know-how? In what way does knowing that “these tea leaves come from half way down the hill in Gopal Mukerji’s tea garden” contribute to the tea-taster’s know-how? That is, the tea-taster’s know-how is not knowing diverse things in an isolated way but in an integrated manner. Knowing many things is not the goal but the means to the goal of a particular know-how.

Similarly, from the perspective of the epistemology of life know-how, “knowing how to live well” is neither “too general” nor *merely* knowing many things about human life. Knowing how to live well is indeed diverse, but more importantly, it is integrated.

Case 2. Knowing how to live well without living well?

In her seminal entry “Wisdom” in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Sharon Ryan examines several views of wisdom, one of which she formulates as follows (Ryan, 2013):<sup>22</sup>

**Wisdom as Knowing How to Live Well (KLW):**

*S* is wise iff *S* knows how to live well.

In criticizing (KLW), Ryan says, “Many philosophers ... think that wisdom is not restricted even to knowledge about how to live well. ... A person could satisfy the conditions of any of the principles we have considered thus far and nevertheless behave in a wildly reckless manner” (Ryan, 2013). Further, Ryan finds that “[p]hilosophers who are attracted to the idea that knowing how to live well is a necessary condition for wisdom might want to simply tack on a success condition to (KLW) to get around cases in which a person knows all about living well, yet fails to put this knowledge into practice” (Ryan, 2013). Ryan thus formulates the view of wisdom that these philosophers (such as, in Ryan’s view, Aristotle, Kekes [1983], Nozick [1989], Zagzebski [1996], Tiberius [2008]) adopt as follows:

**Wisdom as Knowing How to, and Succeeding at, Living Well (KLS):**

*S* is wise iff (i) *S* knows how to live well, and (ii) *S* is successful at living well.

(KLW) and (KLS) are not Ryan’s own view of wisdom, so my comments on (KLW) and (KLS) do not apply to her. For (KLW) and (KLS), knowing how to live well without living well is possible. It seems that both (KLW) and (KLS) presuppose a particular view of know-how, i.e., knowing how to  $\varphi$  is knowledge *about* how to  $\varphi$ ; let us call it the naive view

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<sup>22</sup> See also Ryan (1996, 1999, 2012), from which the entry is evolved.



of know-how. It is not clear whether the naive view of know-how is intellectualist or anti-intellectualist. Even intellectualists acknowledge that know-how is *practical*, treating practice or action as a crucial element of know-how. Stanley and Williamson's account of know-how appeals to the idea of a "practical mode of presentation" (Stanley & Williamson, 2001) to accommodate this element. Stanley further attempts to integrate knowledge-that that constitutes a particular know-how with actions that manifest that know-how by automatic mechanisms. The naive view of know-how, however, seems simply to exclude action as a constitutive element of know-how. In such an understanding, the naive view of "know-how" is *in name only*, since it does not refer to knowledge-how, which is practical in nature. For the epistemology of knowledge-how presented in this paper, there is no need to tack on a success condition to know-how, because it is the default condition of know-how (recall that intelligent action is the fundamental explanandum in the epistemology of knowledge-how).<sup>23</sup> The epistemology of life know-how is built upon the epistemology of know-how; and what follows is that there is no knowing how to live well without living well.

### Case 3. The Psychology of Wisdom

There are two psychological approaches to wisdom: the implicit-theoretical approach, which aims to study laypeople's conceptions of wisdom or describe how laypeople think about wisdom, and the explicit-theoretical approach, which aims to develop expert or explicit theories of wisdom "based on a review of the wisdom literature rather than lay people's conception of wisdom" (Ardelt, Pridgen, & Nutter-Pridgen, 2019: 146).<sup>24</sup> Some philosophers have expressed worries about the methodologies involved in psychological approaches to wisdom (Zagzebski,

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<sup>23</sup> The preceding discussion does not suggest that the view according to which wisdom does not entail living well (see, e.g., Whitcomb [2011], and Ryan [2016]) is false, but that one who holds such a view should not characterize wisdom in terms of knowledge-how. Instead, he or she can characterize wisdom as (propositional) knowledge *about* how to live well, or knowing *what* it is to live well.

<sup>24</sup> But for some psychologists, "These two approaches are not independent sub-fields of wisdom research: in fact, many expert wisdom theories were based on earlier investigations of people's conceptions". (Weststrate, Bluck, & Glück, 2019: 98)

2017: 92-94; Swartwood & Tiberius, 2019: 18-20; Kekes, 2020: 48-51), as mentioned in Section I.

Here I do not intend to give a detailed examination and a final verdict on the issue but rather to provide the perspective from the epistemology of life know-how on the possibility of an interdisciplinary study of wisdom. Before that, let us consider Linda Zagzebski's suggestion that "[w]e ought to keep this distinction [i.e., the distinction between superficial qualities and deep properties] in mind in looking at empirical research on wisdom and wise persons" (Zagzebski, 2017: 91):

Water has superficial qualities of taste and appearance that we use in identifying water ... [T]hese superficial qualities do not make water *water*, and they do not constitute a descriptive meaning of the word "water." We identify water by its superficial qualities, but what makes water water is that it is H<sub>2</sub>O. Similarly, we need to have easily identifiable qualities of wise persons that enable us to fix the reference of "wise person" so that we can undertake an investigation of the features of them that make them wise. The deep properties of wisdom should explain the superficial properties that fix the reference of "wise person" in the same way that being H<sub>2</sub>O explains the properties of being a colorless, tasteless, liquid. (Zagzebski, 2017: 91)

Zagzebski's worry is that "the wisdom scale [proposed by psychologists] conflates the superficial properties we use in identifying wise persons with the components of wisdom" (Zagzebski, 2017: 93). But this does not mean that we need to abandon the psychology of wisdom. What we need to do, Zagzebski suggests, is to "distinguish two levels of properties of wise persons for the purpose of empirical investigation of them: (1) We need properties that make them easily identifiable, and (2) we need to find out by further study of them what it is about them that makes them wise" (Zagzebski, 2017: 91). Although Zagzebski's aim is to develop her exemplarist moral theory, I think her suggestion is instructive for an interdisciplinary study of wisdom.

For the epistemology of (life) know-how, multiplicity and success are

crucial to *intelligent action*. So, from the perspective of the epistemology of life know-how, there is no need to exclude laypeople's conceptions of wisdom at the beginning, because some of them might have the potential to contribute to the establishment of the *multiple* means-end knowledge-that, or the first-order *multi-track* disposition. But the alleged properties (or criteria) of wisdom, either superficial or deep, should be tested or categorized by their actual contribution to the core of knowing how to live well, that is, by *whether* and *how* they are directly responsible for *reliable success* in achieving well-being. If wisdom is knowing how to live well, then wisdom is goal-oriented and success-conducive. Both features are objective to a certain extent. Based on the above (meta-)criterion, some properties identified by psychologists would be counted as essential to the core of knowing how to live well, some would be counted as supplementary, and some could be found as spurious. So construed, the epistemology of life know-how can provide a litmus test for laypeople's conceptions of wisdom collected in the psychology of wisdom.

## VI. Conclusion

The guiding question of this paper is simple but fundamental: If wisdom is knowing how to live well, what exactly is knowing how to live well? This paper explains why and demonstrates how to take seriously the idea of knowing how to live well. In Sections I and V, I explain why philosophers and psychologists should take seriously the idea of knowing how to live well. In Sections II, III, and IV, I demonstrate how to take the very idea seriously by consulting the epistemology of knowledge-how, and I also develop a Rylean view of life know-how. We now have a better understanding of the nature and structure of knowing how to live well and thus of wisdom.

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# 智慧作為知道如何過得好：一個知識論探索

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## 摘要

實踐智慧的本質與結構為何？根據哲學家和心理學家普遍持有的觀點，S 是智慧的，若且唯若，S 知道如何過得好。但究竟什麼是「知道如何過得好」呢？似乎沒人明白怎麼著手回答這個簡單卻又根本的問題。本文透過「知道如何」知識論來探索這問題。第一節指出有兩個關於「知道如何過得好」的「整合問題」尚未被回答。第二節說明為何「知道如何」知識論有助回答整合問題。第三節和第四節分別建構出智識主義與反智識主義，以及它們對於整合問題的回答。第五節展示如何將前述建構出的「知道如何過得好」知識論運用至智慧哲學和智慧心理學之中。

關鍵詞：智慧、知道如何、智識主義、反智識主義

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