**Deparochializing Political Theory and Beyond:**

**A Dialogue Approach to Comparative Political Thought**

**Introduction: Clarification**

The objective of this article is to deepen our understanding of transformative engagement in comparative and critical dialogues of comparative or transnational political thought. The objective is *not* to develop a ‘globalized discourse about moral standards for judging politics.’[[1]](#endnote-1) The first five sections discuss the challenges of dialogical comparative political thought. The following three sections discuss how a dialogue approach responds to these challenges and generates comparative and critical mutual understanding and mutual judgment. This objective is well expressed by Michel Foucault:[[2]](#endnote-2)

[W]hat is philosophy today—philosophical activity I mean — if it is not the critical work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already known? … [I]t is entitled to explore what might be changed, in its own thought, *through the practice of a knowledge that is foreign to it*. The ‘essay’ — which should be understood as the assay or test by which, in the game of truth, one undergoes changes, and not as the simplistic appropriation of others for the purpose of communication — is the living substance of philosophy, at least if we assume that philosophy is still what it was in times past, i.e., an ‘ascesis,’ *askesis*, an exercise on oneself in the activity of thought.

In addressing this objective I will also say something about another aim: what are the best methods for de-centring Western traditions? If we introduce our students to a global conversation or dialogue that is focused on the moral bases of political relationships, then we may inadvertently fail to de-centre Western traditions. A focus on moral principles that are said to provide the foundations of political relationships, like the earlier response to globalization of focusing on moral standards of political judgement, are both constitutive and orienting features of dominant Western theories. If we prescribe that the response to globalization has to be a conversation focused on these questions of moral principles, then we may well continue the dominance of this Western orientation to politics, rather than decentre it, and constrain students and participants from other traditions to formulate their engagement in these terms. It would then not be a genuine dialogue among traditions, but an assimilative monologue masquerading as a global dialogue. Much of the so-called cosmopolitan dialogue on globalization is monological in precisely this sense, as we all know.

Therefore, the first step in de-centring Western political traditions is to set aside the prescriptive search for moral standards of judgement or moral principles of political association as the telos of global dialogue. I am not against moral standards coming up in dialogues, and participants from some traditions proposing that they be the focus of the dialogue.[[3]](#endnote-3) I am just warning against it being prescribed as the focus.

**1. On Understanding Engagement in Genuine Dialogues Among Traditions**

If we wish to deepen our understanding of engagement in meaningful or genuine dialogue among and across different traditions of political thought then we should enquire into the conditions of meaningful or ‘genuine’ dialogue.[[4]](#endnote-4) These conditions include the ethical practices of openness and receptivity to the otherness of others that enable participants to understand one another in their own traditions (mutual understanding) and to appreciate the concerns of one another regarding globalization and the injustices and suffering it causes (mutual concern). The participants may discuss moral standards of judgment and moral bases of political relationship at times in the dialogue, but these are meaningless unless and until through deep listening each comes to understand and appreciate the concerns of others as they experience and articulate them in the terms of their own traditions without inclusion, assimilation or subordination.

The problem of the ‘meaninglessness’ of abstracted moral principles is even worse than this. Abstract moral principles can literally mean anything the user wishes them to mean unless they are grounded and articulated in relation to the experiential self-understanding of those to whom they are applied. Take these dominant moral standards as examples: treat each other as free and equal; as ends in themselves, never only as means; and the difference principle of organising politics to the benefit of the least well-off. These moral principles have been and continue to be used to justify the greatest inequalities in human history; modern wars of intervention, conquest, subjugation and modernization; environmental destruction and climate change. They also have been and continue to be used to criticise these injustices of globalization by equally elaborate and well-defended critiques of the dominant justificatory theories.

This is one of the contemporary problems to which the turn to the understanding of the grounded ethical practices of engagement in multi-tradition dialogue is the response. If we can explicate the conditions of genuine dialogues then the participants themselves will work out their understanding of and responses to globalization themselves. That is, a genuine dialogue is not prescriptive: the participants co-articulate their own scripts democratically.

**2. Six Obstacles to Deparochialization and Genuine Dialogue[[5]](#endnote-5)**

I propose that the project of deparochializing political theory can be seen as the work of creating genuine dialogues among and across traditions of political thought and practice. Engagement in genuine dialogues can accomplish much more than deparochializing political theory, as we will see, but it must achieve this first if the other benefits of genuine dialogue are to be achieved.

Deparochializing conversations are exceptionally difficult to engage in yet exceptionally rewarding if we do so.[[6]](#endnote-6) The conditions of a genuine conversation or dialogue are difficult to explicate because it is so easy to finesse the demands of such a dialogue: that is, to appear to engage in them while all the time remaining within one’s own tradition (as much of the global dialogue literature does today). Engagement in what we can call non-genuine or ‘false’ dialogues is as common as rain and it conceals the demanding conditions of genuine dialogue from view. Like Gadamer, I distinguish genuine dialogue (mutual or reciprocal understanding) from two main types of false dialogue that fail to live up to the demands of genuine dialogue: strategic-instrumental (strategic) and deliberative-imperative (legislative). Also like him, I discuss both face-to-face dialogues and dialogues between interpreter and the texts of other traditions of political thought, although I place more emphasis on the first.[[7]](#endnote-7) Allow me to mention six ways in which genuine dialogue is suppressed by false dialogue.

First, it is often simply a matter of a person or a dominant tradition being aware that they are pretending to engage in a genuine dialogue with people from other traditions, but continue to do so to get the upper hand (strategic dialogues). However, the problem of false dialogue is much deeper than this.

Second, in other cases, the individual or collective agents who engage in a false dialogue deceives themselves into believing that they are engaged in a genuine dialogue, so there is the psychological problem of self-deception to overcome. This problem is common in many of the participatory dialogues employed in the World Bank and IMF policies of democratization and transitional justice, and, indeed, it is seen by many as a deeply embedded feature of Western traditions of dialogue with non-Westerners, brought to awareness only in times of crises, such as after World War, Decolonization, 9/11 and the war on Iraq, and then quickly forgotten. Yet, the difficulty of false dialogue is more fundamental.

Third, the fundamental reason we get off on the wrong foot is that the very condition of being in a meaningful world with others in any tradition is that humans always and pre-emptively project over, interpret and try to understand the other in the terms and ways of their own tradition. This is an ontological condition of sense-making. Our living traditions disclose the world to us as an actually and potentially meaningful world. Unless there is some awareness that the horizon of understanding of one’s own tradition, which discloses the other and their way of life as meaningful in its terms, has to be called into question in the course of dialogue with others, who, as a matter of course, enter dialogue under the horizon of their tradition, then the dialogue, by definition, will remain a false dialogue in which each misunderstands the other and responds to this misunderstanding by re-imposing — often unconsciously —their traditional understanding over others. Unless there is a critical practice within a tradition or within the course of the dialogue that brings this problem to self-awareness and addresses it by bringing aspects of one’s background horizon of disclosure into the space of questions at the centre of the dialogue, genuine dialogue cannot begin.[[8]](#endnote-8)

In addition, this disclosure and projection of our form of pre-understanding over the world (and interpreting and acting under its sway) is not only true with respect to human beings but also over all living beings including the earth itself. We must somehow learn to listen to and understand the norms of self-organisation of all forms of life and of the animate earth as a whole if we are not to destroy it by disclosing and acting on them under our traditions that disclose them as externalities or resources for the use and abuse of one species.[[9]](#endnote-9)

Fourth, even when tradition-critical practices are present in traditions or dialogues among them, there is a multiplicity of factors that override or undermine them: psychological, military, economic, religious, rationalistic, political, face-saving and so on. Fifth, these weighty factors are in turn legitimated by a multiplicity of ‘secondary explanations’ that, as Franz Boas argued, every tradition gives to itself; such as the grand theories of civilization, modernization and globalization generated by the West over the last half millennium of global expansion.[[10]](#endnote-10) These are called ‘secondary’ explanations because they often redescribe and conceal what is really going on in false dialogues and the escalating struggles that result from them in the terms of acceptability and approval of that tradition; terms such as progress, modernization, liberty, necessary means to world peace and justice, and so on. For example, Rousseau pointed out that ‘slavery’ and ‘subordination’ are often redescribed as ‘liberty.’[[11]](#endnote-11) These secondary explanations give us a false picture of our histories of interactions with other traditions.

The demand that global dialogues follow certain allegedly universal rules and be oriented to allegedly universal ends is often said to be a kind of textbook example of this failure to see what one’s traditional form of representation conceals from view and of the failure to call the form of representation into the space of questions, even though it has a critical dimension within it. The reason this occurs is that the juridical language of representation of the tradition presents itself as meta-traditional from the outset, conceptually and historically, giving rise to ‘legislative’ rather than genuine dialogues.[[12]](#endnote-12)

As a result of these five factors (and a sixth below), a natural disposition to see the world in the terms of one’s own tradition in the first instance is continually finessed, rather than faced and addressed, at each stage of interaction, as false dialogues escalate to the submission of one participant to another, or to conflict. These escalating misunderstandings and conflicts in turn are then legitimated by the secondary explanations of modern politics: namely, that peace cannot be brought about by peaceful means and democracy cannot be brought about democratic means: both require violence and authoritarian rule to bring less-advanced others to see the superiority or universality of the particular form of peace and democracy on offer.

These secondary explanations and their effects in practice lend credence to a global norm of modern politics: in time of peace prepare for war. Once this becomes the norm, even those traditions that are disposed to peaceful means of dispute resolution through genuine dialogue see that it is strategically rational to prepare for war in response to the others who have already done so. This security dilemma at the centre of modern politics discredits genuine dialogue and undercuts the mutual trust on which it depends because it becomes rational to enter into dialogue in a distrustful way: that is, pretending to engage in genuine dialogue, in hopes it might work out, yet openly preparing for conflict if it does not. The dialogical effect of the open hand on the other—the nonviolent power of genuine dialogue—is undermined by the hidden fist in the background, affecting others to do the same in response. As Nietzsche argued in ‘The Means to Real Peace,’ and generations of IR scholars and game theorists ever since, this logic leads to the security dilemma and ever-escalating arms races, world without end.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Accordingly, it is not difficult to see that if the logic of finessing genuine dialogue by means of the secondary explanations that comprise the language of development and globalization is not confronted, it will lead to the destruction of billions of Homo sapiens and other forms of life on earth, as Hannah Arendt forewarned in the 1960s and many others have since substantiated.[[14]](#endnote-14)

Thus, in conclusion to this section, if this analysis is even partially accurate, there is no way to address the multiple crises of globalization that does not pass through engagement in genuine dialogues among and across the traditions of political thought present on this small planet.[[15]](#endnote-15) Moreover, as these five obstacles show, engagement in deparochializing dialogues is not a simple task that we can do in a year or two. Many have failed, not only for the five reasons given above, but also for the sixth reason. The long, slow, intergenerational crafts of teaching, acquiring and exercising the ethical practices of engagement in genuine, deparochializing dialogues have been ignored, and fast-time teaching, dialogues, negotiations, bargaining, and pre-scripted, transitional processes have proliferated.[[16]](#endnote-16)

Given these six obstacles, the cultivation of genuine conversations and dialogues is one of the most important yet difficult tasks in the world. It requires learning and acquiring the ethical practices of genuine dialogue in despite of our human, all-too-human, dispositions to overlook the requisite critical work on our self-understandings and the self-understandings of others, and on all the factors piled up to dispose us to finesse these ethical practices of mutual understanding and concern. But, if genuine dialogue were to succeed in some future generation of people educated and proficient in the requisite ethical practices of engagement (the students of our students’ students perhaps), then, in virtue of their sustained engagement in these dialogical relationships, they just might be able to bring into being another world of possible ways of living together peacefully and democratically that we can scarcely even imagine today. We can scarcely imagine these possibilities because our imaginations are constrained by the traditions and false dialogues we inhabit and the factors that hold them in place. Nevertheless, we can begin to explore some of the first steps of engagement, and teaching engagement in genuine dialogues of deparochializing, mutual understanding and concern, and critical comparison.[[17]](#endnote-17)

**3. Recognizing the Parochiality of Political Theory**

To begin these steps, I will clarify how I am using the term ‘deparochialize.’ The sense I wish to explicate consists of steps that bring us to recognize the parochial character of modern political theory*.* Deparochializing shares many similarities with projects to ‘decolonize,’ ‘provincialize’ and ‘de-imperialize’ political theory.[[18]](#endnote-18)

First, most political theories are written in ways that hide the spatial-temporal parochial contexts in which they are written and the locations of authors within them. This so-called ‘transitive’ or even ‘transcendental’ feature of political theory is a direct result of the grammar of the written phonetic language in which it is written. That is, a theory is standardly presented in general or universal terms and concepts that are presumed to apply across the range of parochial cases or instances to which the general concepts of the theory refer. The grammar generalizes local problems, arrangements, groupings, forms of speech, genres of reasoning, and senses of terms such as justice, freedom, citizen, oppression and so on. The contextual or parochial conditions of possibility of the theory are concealed by the transitive character of most written languages.

The abstraction and reification of written meaning (called ‘literal’ meaning) from the enveloping lifeworld of oral language usage and its meaning-in-use (practical meaning) began with the development of written alphabetical language in the West.[[19]](#endnote-19) The Platonic dialogues are written during the first generation of users of Greek as a written language. The prior generation of oral language users and many of Socrates’ interlocutors, especially Meletus in the *Apology*, connect the explication of terms like justice and courage to specific instances, places and stories when and where they are spoken by concrete individuals: that is, to events in specific circumstances. Meletus explains that (participatory) democracy consists in dialogues with fellow citizens over the differing senses of political concepts in differing circumstance, judging, agreeing and disagreeing in particular cases, while acting together.[[20]](#endnote-20) In contrast, Socrates asserts that, if they are to know what these terms mean they have go beyond giving examples and find a definition that transcends all its instances and contains within itself a set of criteria common to all uses. Once the few possess this general knowledge over, rather than within, the field of politics, Socrates immediately concludes, it legitimates the use of power-over the many, rather that participatory democratic power-with, like any other craft.[[21]](#endnote-21) With these two moves to knowledge-over and power-over, the dominant tradition of Western political theory (and practice) is founded and participatory knowledge-with and power-with eclipsed.[[22]](#endnote-22)

Accordingly the first step in deparochializing political theories is to ‘reparochialize’ them: to recontextualize their presumptively general or universal terms back into the parochial contexts in which they make sense. This is a step common to decolonization and provincialization as well. Moreover, it is also an insight of the tradition of philosophy of language initiated by Wittgenstein: sense-making is contextual. Here the aim is to bring us to see that the great political theories that presume to be general or universal rest on quite specific and limited senses of the terms in question; senses that in turn make sense given the circumstances in which they are normally used.[[23]](#endnote-23)

Second, some local theories are internally related to global power: that is, they are employed to describe, justify, legitimate or operate systems of power that modernize or globalize the world (politically, legally, militarily, economically, subjectively, etc.). In this sense, the generalisation of parochial institutions in these theories of modernization are made general *de facto* by the spread of these institutions and practices of western imperialism. At the same time, other traditions of political thought are changed by their interaction with the spread of this knowledge/power/subjectification ensemble: rendered marginal, lower, particular, primitive, exotic, assimilated and subordinated, etc., by processes of modernization. Accordingly, the second step in deparochializing political theories is the hard work of studying the complex relationships between political theories and forms of power.[[24]](#endnote-24)

These two steps show the sense in which political theories are parochial. What I mean by deparochializing is coming to realize that political theories, which are always presented in the language of abstraction and generalization (of not being parochial), are parochial: that is, partial and limited in their sense and reference. Once ‘we’ who take these steps become aware of the limited and partial scope of any political theory, we have deparochialized our understanding of it. We are now not so parochial as to presume our local theories are general or universal in either sense or reference. This difficult form of self-awareness is the first condition of opening oneself to genuine non-imperial dialogues among different traditions.[[25]](#endnote-25)

As a result of this parochial feature of modern political theory and our awareness of it, genuine dialogue among traditions of political thought becomes all the more important. Humans literally need dialogue with other limited traditions of political thought to see their own limitations and to see beyond them by means of the perspectives of others. Hence, it is dialogue itself that deparochializes, as I will argue below.

The third step is to realize that the genre of political theory in the West is only one species of the larger family of forms of political ‘thought.’ Political theory, as theory, is a quite peculiar way of reflecting on the world of politics. As Aristotle responded to Plato, the study of politics, which I will call political thought, cannot be theoretical in the sense Plato gave to it: that is, of universal validity. Political thought, in contrast, is practical, not theoretical,and it holds only for a limited number of cases and contexts. It holds ‘for the most part,’ as Aristotle put it, not for all time and place. If students of political theory are not to be parochial in the negative sense, then we need to study many other types of political reflection, not only the highly specialised and abstract academic genre called political theory. So, we should replace ‘political theory’ with the phrase ‘political thought,’ as the more general category, in which political theory is one species. If we fail to do this, then we are going to continue the dominance of one genre of political thought by only accepting types of political thought in other traditions that approximate the parochial features of western political theory.

The central distinction between political theory and political thought more generally is that political theory presupposes that its central terms are rigid designators; concepts that have necessary and sufficient conditions for their application in every case. If this were not the reigning presumption, then theorists would not build general theories in the sense that this term has come to have in the West over the last half millennium: that is, the theory sets out the necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of political concepts in every case.

Political thought makes no such presumption. It is based on the presumption that political vocabulary is composed of terms that have an indeterminate number of criteria of application, and thus of uses (sense, reference and evaluative force) and these are fought over and altered in the course of political struggles. They are modifiable ‘family resemblance’ terms, as Wittgenstein puts it, or, in the fields of rhetoric and discourse analysis, metaphors and cluster concepts. They have a range of senses and references and complex relationships among them, but no invariable set of properties in every instance. Accordingly, political judgment—the employment of these terms in actual cases—is akin to aesthetic judgement, not to the determinate judgment of theoretical reason that employs concepts with necessary and sufficient conditions for their application.[[26]](#endnote-26)

Political thought in this broad sense emerges everywhere and anywhere that people converse on the ways they govern and are governed in all their activities. It is not restricted to a type of theory or a particular place of composition, such as within the institutions of higher education, or to reflection on a canonical set of institutions. Political thought develops in countless conversations and contexts. A mantra of the World Social Forum captures this crucial point of genuine global dialogue: ‘there is no global justice without epistemic justice.’[[27]](#endnote-27) That is, wherever there are people involved in practices of governance of oneself and others—and this is in every form of society, small or large—there is political thought in and about those practices of governance. They are co-extensive. Communities are epistemic communities with distinctive forms of knowing. These take many forms: all forms of written reflection, oral traditions, music, art, theatre, direct action and inaction, private scripts, and so on can all be forms of political thought in this broad and ‘global’ sense, both historically and in the contemporary period. [[28]](#endnote-28)

It follows that the range of ‘texts’ that should be included in the study of transnational political thought must be much broader than the narrow range of texts that conform to the canons of western political theory.[[29]](#endnote-29) This is not only to de-centre Western political theory or any other form of official political theory in any other civilization. It is also to democratise local/global genuine dialogues among traditions of political thoughtby not privileging one authoritative type*.* And, it follows from this conclusion, that the form of genuine dialogue cannot be prescribed beforehand, because, to be true to these considerations of global justice, is to develop genuine dialogues from the ground up: from the dialogue-genres of the world’s communities of political thought.

**4. Political Thought *Takes Place* in Traditions**

The next feature is that comparative political thought should always place political texts in their background traditions in order to make sense of them. A genuine dialogue is a dialogue across and among the world’s traditions in which particular instances and genres of political thought have their homes. To ignore this and cherry-pick interesting ideas out of other peoples’ traditions is to commit an epistemic and social injustice.

Oral and written traditions, in my opinion, are the background ‘modes of disclosure’ of the world in which political thought emerges and takes place.[[30]](#endnote-30) There is a multiplicity of political thought within any tradition, given the indeterminacy of the vocabulary, the standpoints of individual political thinkers, the problems of the times, and so on. Traditions are ongoing dialogues among their members, who accept, question, negotiate and modify the aspects of their traditions as they carry them on. Thus, what functions as a ‘background’ shared intersubjective presupposition and what functions as a ‘foreground’ subject of discussion can vary over time. Members of traditions also engage, directly or indirectly, in dialogues with members of other traditions, exchange ideas and use them in novel ways. Traditions are rarely or ever completely closed by a frontier. This ‘diffusion thesis’ of the co-evolution of human traditions was advanced in nineteenth-century Berlin and substantiated by anthropologists in the twentieth.[[31]](#endnote-31)

Political theorizing and political thinking more generally thus take place seamlessly within broader traditions in this sense and are meaningful in virtue of so being. This is why transnational comparative political theory and thought has to be dialogues among and across traditions if it is to avoid false dialogues of pre-judging and interpreting the political thought of other traditions within the background of one’s own.[[32]](#endnote-32)

For a comparative dialogue across traditions to be genuine the participants have to be able to call into the space of questions of the dialogue (to foreground) constitutive background features of the traditions involved in the course of the dialogue.[[33]](#endnote-33) This is a condition of mutual understanding. These features are constitutive features of political thinking which members of traditions normally take for granted. Given the fact that traditions change, interact and learn from each other, we know that this practice of foregrounding and mutual understanding is not only possible but actual.[[34]](#endnote-34) However, we also know it is exceptionally difficult. As both Gadamer and Bohm underscore, calling into question a deep-seated prejudgment of one’s traditional horizon of understanding goes against that person in a demanding sense. It brings an aspect of her or his identity and tradition (their ‘world’ in Arendt’s sense) into question and opens it to testing for what it both reveals and conceals. Initial reactions are often defensiveness, resentment, aggressive response or finesse.[[35]](#endnote-35) It requires the virtue of the courage of truthfulness for the participants to open themselves to each other in this self-critical and often self-transformative experience.[[36]](#endnote-36)

Moreover, traditions of political thought, and members within them, are radically differently situated in relation to each other under the long and complex historical processes of globalization.[[37]](#endnote-37) These massive inequalities along many axes would seem to make genuine dialogue across traditions impossible. However, the resiliency of traditions and the practices in which they are lived enables humans to continue to inhabit the processes of globalization differently.[[38]](#endnote-38) It is not the case that globalization constructs the identities of individuals and groups all the way down, as early post-structuralism presumed. Rather, the relations between processes of globalization and their hegemonic forms of political thinking and the diverse traditions in which people live are immensely complex and irreducible to simple generalisations, as contextual studies of communities of non-assimilation show. Global inequalities and injustices make genuine dialogue and the exercise of the virtue of courage reciprocally across traditions exceptionally difficult, and the pretence of inclusion and dialogue is often simply the assimilating and subordinating ruse of the hegemonic partner.[[39]](#endnote-39) Nevertheless, these conditions do not render genuine dialogue impossible or fruitless. As I will argue in the following sections, as difficult as it is, it is the only way that global injustices can be brought to light from the perspectives of the lived experience of the people who suffer them, and, reciprocally, call into question the deeply entrenched constitutive features of the hegemonic traditions and their secondary explanations that legitimate these injustices.[[40]](#endnote-40)

**5. Traditions are Grounded in Practices and Places**

One of the reasons traditions are resilient and billions of people are able to live diversely in the contemporary world, despite all the grand theories of convergence, is that traditions are grounded in practices. These practices include: first, everyday practices of the embodied, sensuous, emotional, reasonable and unreasonable human beings in dialogical relationships to themselves, each other, the living earth and the spiritual realm (practices of the self); and, second, the larger practices or forms of organisation, interaction, and conflict resolution in which these self-practices are exercised. Furthermore, practices are grounded in places: in the ecosystems in which humans live. Thus, political theory makes sense in light of the conventions of political thought in which it is grounded, political thought in light of the traditions in which it is spoken and written, traditions in light of the practices in which they are embedded, and practices in the places in which they ‘take place.’

It is not that these ‘circumstances’ or ‘contexts,’ or some subset of them, determine political thought causally. Phenomenologically, the lived experience and lived meaning of political thought makes sense in light of embodied human interaction with tradition, practice and place: the ‘lifeworld.’ On this view, humans are always already in a ‘perceptual dialogue’ with the living earth that surrounds them by means of all their senses. ‘This perceptual reciprocity between our sensing bodies and the animate, expressive landscape both engenders and supports our more conscious, linguistic reciprocity with others.’[[41]](#endnote-41) If, in contrast, persons take the meaning of political thought to be a function of an autonomous system of signs, it can mean anything or nothing. They then give an abstracted spoken or written text of political thought meaning by placing and interpreting it in their background traditions, practices and places without noticing they do so.

The striking consequence of this phenomenological view of meaning for genuine dialogue is the following. Not only do participants in a genuine dialogue have to enter into the dialogue with this practice-based and place-based view of the scope of the meaning of their own and others’ political thought. The dialogue itself also should take place, as much as is humanly possible, where the interlocutors’ utterances have their meaning in this worldly sense: that is, in each other’s traditions, practices and places if they are to achieve mutual understanding. If they meet only at conferences, public spheres, the United Nations, universities, or on skype, their dialogues will be abstract, manipulative and false. Thus ‘back to the rough ground’ of meaning-in-use in traditions, practices and places if we wish to understand one another.[[42]](#endnote-42)

Despite the growing evidence for this view of meaning-in-use, the vast majority of global dialogue literature continues to take the model of an abstract, official public sphere as the appropriate site for global dialogues. In the exchange of disembodied speech-acts over presumptively tradition-transcendent norms in these empty spaces, each pre-interprets others in the terms of their background, and, while they appear to agree or disagree earnestly, simply agree or disagree with the proposed norm as they understand it within their tradition. They thus bypass the mutual understanding of the very differences the dialogue is supposed to clarify and reconcile. If there is apparent agreement, the underlying differences reappear when the norm is applied differently in practice, and then each accuses the other of not following the norm as they agreed in the exchange.[[43]](#endnote-43)

Locating dialogues of comparative political thought in the places where they are practised, especially for the less-powerful, is not only an issue of epistemic justice. It also gives oppressed minorities confidence and courage to speak truthfully to the powerful in their own languages and ways. This enactment in turn is empowering for younger members of the community who witness it. Taking the class out of the class room, community-based and land-based course-work and workshop dialogues, study abroad and exchange programs are examples of meeting this condition.[[44]](#endnote-44)

When such dialogue options are unavailable, it is the role of scholars of comparative political thought to simulate them, as much as possible, in their scholarship and teaching. This is done by situating texts in their contexts (traditions, practices and places) in edited editions and in lectures. Publications, lectures, assignments, and class presentations are often in dialogical form among texts from different traditions in order to deparochialize Western political theory and initiate cross-tradition understanding. Scholars of comparative political thought are either from the traditions they study and teach or spend years engaged in dialogues with members of the traditions and dialogues with the texts of the traditions (in Gadamer’s sense). Comparative political thought draws on dialogue methods in contextual history of political thought, anthropology, comparative philosophy, linguistics, hermeneutics, postcolonial studies, gender studies, Indigenous studies, and community-based research, as well as developing new methods.[[45]](#endnote-45)

Therefore, in these ways and others, the research and teaching of comparative political thought is dialogical all the way down in order to meet the challenges surveyed in the first five sections and generate meaningful knowledge. The following sections discuss ways that participation in genuine dialogues brings about comparative political knowledge.

**6. Deep Listening and Non-Attachment**

How does participation in genuine multi-tradition dialogues of comparative political thought overcome the six obstacles to deparochialization, bring to awareness the parochiality of political thought, take into account the four contexts of sense-making, enable practices of openness and courage of truthfulness, bring about mutual understanding and mutual concern, and enable comparative and critical political judgments? This is the work of the next three sections. If participation is successful, it lays the intersubjective groundwork not only for thinking together across traditions but also for living together and conciliating disputes together nonviolently.[[46]](#endnote-46)

To bring out the *way* that participation in these genuine dialogues bring about the transformative self-understanding of the participants I prefer the phrase dialogues of ‘reciprocal elucidation.’ It brings into focus the central feature of interdependency. The participants co-depend upon the reciprocal speech acts of listening and responding with each other to free themselves from their habitual mode of disclosure, to move around and see the field of the political from other limited disclosures, and thus to see the limits of their own in comparison and contrast. The intersubjective relationships of listening and responding in turn are gift-gratitude-reciprocity relationships, and, when successful, virtuous cycles of reciprocal elucidation and enlightenment that the participants bring into being and co-sustain by the ways they exchange speech acts of various kinds.[[47]](#endnote-47)

A preparatory exercise is to become aware of and reflect on the problems with Western political theory and the difficulties they create for understanding other traditions canvassed in the previous sections. The first participatory step is to practice the art of ‘deep listening’ to the political thought of other traditions.[[48]](#endnote-48) This involves cultivating an ethos of openness and receptivity to others.[[49]](#endnote-49) One of the best ways of doing this is to disclose the dialogue, not initially as a comparative or critical question and answer game, but as an exchange of story-telling and narratives in which the participants say or perform where they are coming from and why they are here so they come to know each other, the ways they are comfortable talking to each other, the languages they prefer to use, and so on.[[50]](#endnote-50) Deep listening also attends to the embodied and place-based dimensions of dialogue: being response to where the dialogue takes place, the setting, and the linguistic and non-linguistic interactions that make the participants feel comfortable with each other.[[51]](#endnote-51) For example, when Indigenous people meet with other tribes or with settler governments in North America, practices of reciprocal deep listening and storytelling often lay the groundwork of relationships of peace and friendship before the contentious dialogue begins.[[52]](#endnote-52)

All the genres of speech-acts in genuine dialogues of reciprocal elucidation share one feature with exchanging stories. They are nonviolent forms of conversation. They are ‘invitations’ or ‘proposals’ to the listeners to consider the issue at hand this way rather than that, and request their thoughtful response; trying again in another way if listeners do not understand, and so on. Imperatives (commands), strategic manipulation and coercive threats have no place in genuine dialogue because they are modes of false dialogue (legislative and strategic). These relationships treat dialogue partners as means, rather than as reciprocally respect worthy ethical beings, and they lead to victory, defeat or compromise, not to mutual understanding.[[53]](#endnote-53)

Ethical practices of deep listening, of openness and receptivity, are partly but not fully cultivated through participation in dialogue. They also require preliminary practices of the self that prepare the participants for engagement. These are meditative practices on the importance of the dialogue for oneself and others, how its success depends on how one attends to what others say or do, controls one’s emotions, and conducts oneself. The initial rounds of getting to know one another eases novitiates into the exercise of these dispositions because challenging questions are not raised.[[54]](#endnote-54)

Finally, the practice of deep listening cultivates one of the most important dispositions of dialogue: non-attachment. As we have seen, humans are deeply attached to their background view of the world and the assumptions that compose it. It appears not as *a* view but *the* comprehensive view. It is attached not just to ways of thinking, but also to feelings, emotions and the body.[[55]](#endnote-55) When it is challenged, the immediate impulse or charge is anger and defensiveness or aggressiveness, and the depth of attachment can be seen in body-language. This is ‘attachment.’ Pema Chodron explains its importance:[[56]](#endnote-56)

[*Shenpa*], the Tibetan word for ‘attachment] points to a familiar experience that is at the root of all conflict, cruelty, oppression, and greed. I think of *shenpa* as ‘getting hooked.’ Another definition is […] the ‘charge’—the charge behind our thoughts and words and actions, the charge behind ‘like and don’t like’… [For example] Someone criticizes you […] or says a harsh word and immediately you feel a shift. There’s a tightening that rapidly spirals into mentally blaming this person, or wanting revenge, or blaming yourself. Then you speak and act. The charge behind the tightening, behind the urge, behind the story line or action is *shenpa*.

Attachment forecloses genuine dialogue. The antidote is to cultivate the counter-disposition of non-attachment or ‘suspension’ by means of ethical practices of meditation, patience and deep listening. This is not to abandon one’s own views or embrace relativism. It is simply to suspend one’s attachment to them so one can listen deeply to others and enter into dialogue with them without prejudging what they say. Meditation, deep listening and initial story-telling cultivate and strengthen non-attachment for the agonistic dialogue to come.

**7. Empathy and Interdependency**

Non-attachment, deep listening, openness, and receptivity create the pre-conditions for empathy; the intersubjective ground of comparative dialogues of genuine mutual understanding. Empathy is generated and sustained by participation in dialogues of reciprocal elucidation, but, there usually has to be beforehand a certain awareness of the need for empathy and a willingness to take the risks and exercise the courage it involves. If not, attachment and its vicious cycles of defensive-aggressive and counter defensive-aggressive misunderstanding and distrust hold sway. No one has given a better explanation of the need for empathy to open oneself to the difficult transformative experience of genuine dialogue than Franz Boas, the founder of dialogical anthropology in Germany, Canada and the United States:[[57]](#endnote-57)

[T]he activities of the human mind exhibit an infinite variety of form among the peoples of the world. In order to understand these clearly, the student must endeavor to divest himself entirely of opinions and emotions based upon the peculiar social environment into which he is born. He must adapt his own mind, so far as feasible, to that of the people whom he is studying. The more successful he is in freeing himself from the bias based on the group of ideas that constitute the civilization in which he lives, the more successful he will be in interpreting the beliefs and actions of man. He must follow lines of thought that are new to him. He must participate in new emotions, and understand how, under unwonted conditions, both lead to action.

There are four more or less sequentially learned modes of empathy in dialogical interactions: (1) the coupling or pairing of one’s living body with others’ living body in perception and interaction in the course of dialogue (affective and sensorimotor coupling); (2) the imaginary movement of transposition of oneself into the places of other partners in dialogue (imaginary transposition); (3) the perspectival understanding of dialogue partners as others to oneself, and of oneself as another to them (mutual self- and other-understanding); (4) the ethical realization of the partners as ethical beings, similar in this regard to oneself (ethical awareness). [[58]](#endnote-58)

The reciprocal logic of deep listening and responding moves the partners through these steps of imaginary transposition. They come to imagine and understand the experiences of each other to a considerable extent so that each participates in a new, intersubjective viewpoint that deparochializes their own first-person singular experience and places it in the field with others (modes 2 & 3). The fourth mode is the ethical perception of the other as a living being who deserves reciprocal concern and respect (manifested in deep listening). This concern is not abstract and general but an embodied and emplaced capacity of concern in response to the understanding of the lived experience (of modes 2 & 3). Mutual understanding and concern come together (in 3 and 4).

There are two distinct ways in which the movement of imaginary transposition, of putting oneself in the shoes of another, is understood.[[59]](#endnote-59) In the first, ‘false’ empathy, a person imagines herself or himself in the shoes of another, but does not change their self-understanding. This move displaces the other and discloses the other’s situation through their own, transposed, parochial worldview, masquerading as universal, thereby bypassing deparochialization. In the second, genuine, Boasian empathy, through participation in genuine dialogue, partners are mutually drawn out, and draw themselves out, of their prejudgments, and drawn, and draws themselves, imaginatively into the lived experiences and lifeworlds of each other, as much as is humanly possible. This empathetic experience is imaginary transposition into another mode of being in the world with others. It is a ‘limit experience’ in the double sense of neither complete departure from the limits of one’s own lifeworld nor complete assimilation into the lifeworld of other partners, but a kind of intermediacy: being-with (*Mitsein*).[[60]](#endnote-60)

The first point of empathetic imaginary transposition for comparative political thought is that it is not possible to know (or even to imagine) how to treat another concrete human being as an ethical human being unless we come to understand their suffering and well-being as they experience and articulate them in their traditional ways—in comparison with others. The ethical norms of ‘treating each other as ends rather than means’ or ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ either hang in the air as vague, universal pronouncements or they are operationalised by linking them to the background prejudgements of the theorist, policy specialist or activist.[[61]](#endnote-61) Non-attachment and empathy deparochialize this imperious disposition and enable the mutual understanding that is the basis of appropriate ethical and political action.

It may seem that empathy is necessary in practical dialogues but inappropriate for dialogues with theoretical texts and traditions of political thought. I demur. Quentin Skinner and Sheldon Wolin have shown in different ways that political theories are written by living authors deeply engaged in responding to problems of injustice (suffering) and justice (well-being) of their times. Understanding texts in the ways that they were understood at the time, or in different contexts, requires explicating the problems and their contexts and enabling readers to imaginatively transpose themselves imaginatively into them. This differs in degree but not in kind from real-time dialogues.[[62]](#endnote-62)

Empathetic imaginary transposition is not only the basis of reciprocal understanding. Meditation on the experience in dialogue of the lived experience of other ways of being begins to bring to awareness the interconnectedness and interdependency of all the participants and, by extension, all human beings. This is the infinite variety of forms of being human Boas mentions above. Ways of life of humans are seen perspectivally, as one moves around; neither as independent, all the same, nor antagonistic; but, rather, interconnected and interdependent by infinitely complex webs of similarities and dissimilarities expressed in the languages of the world. This is the participatory experience of diversity awareness, of the lifeworld as a multiverse rather than universe, and of being-human *as* both being-there (*Dasein*) and being-with (*Mitsein*). This experience is expressed in different ways in many traditions.[[63]](#endnote-63) For example, Thich Nhat Hahn refers to this experience as ‘interbeing,’ his translation of *Tiep Hien*. He too argues that it comes to awareness through meditation, deep listening, empathy and mutual understanding.[[64]](#endnote-64)

As ecologists and political ecologists argue, imaginary transposition can be extended through dialogues with non-human lifeforms: animals, plants, ecosystems, and the living earth as a whole (Gaia). These are participatory dialogues within and with the places in which political thought, traditions and practices take place and on which they depend for their well-being. With deep listening, we too can imaginatively ‘think like a mountain,’ as Aldo Leopold argued we must do to save the planet, as Indigenous peoples have been doing for over thousands of years, and as teachers and students are learning to do today.[[65]](#endnote-65)

This experience of interconnectedness and interdependency calls into the space of questions the presupposition of much of modern Western political thought that human are basically independent and antagonistic. From the empathetic dialogue perspective, this presupposition appears to be the manifestation of an underlying attachment (*shenpa*) to the modern Western worldview as a whole; an aggressive refusal of non-attachment, openness, empathetic dialogue, and so of deparochialization.[[66]](#endnote-66)

It is important not to conflate empathy and compassion. Empathy enables mutual understanding and awareness of interdependency through dialogue. However, it does not provide motivation for acting together in response to the sufferings and injustices that empathetic dialogue discloses: that is, for ethical and political action. This requires the further step of compassion. Compassion is cognitive, sensible and emotional repertoire of dispositional capacities that moves human from mutual understanding of concrete situations of suffering to appropriate forms of mutual action in response.[[67]](#endnote-67) ‘Com-passion’ (*Mitleiden*) means sharing the passions of suffering and well-being (*Mitfreude*) with others, not only imaginatively, as with empathy, but actually, in modes of acting ethically and politically together. It comes into praxis through empathy and dialogues of reciprocal elucidation.[[68]](#endnote-68)

In summary, deep listening and empathetic dialogue bring forth the dawning awareness of an ethical attitude or orientation among participants of being members in a world of human diversity and biodiversity. In contrast, as we have seen, the dominant tradition of modern moral and political theory from Socrates to Habermas, in contrast, discloses the world from a basically legislative stance over the moral and political world and nature. As a result, dialogue takes place within this juridical orientation, universalization, obligation and coercion displace empathetic dialogue, reciprocal elucidation and compassion. Both Peter Kropotkin and Albert Schweitzer argued that the modern ethical orientation of being-in-the-world-with diverse others developed in response to the parochialism and resulting injustices of the legislative orientation, and many have followed in their footsteps.[[69]](#endnote-69)

This ethical orientation to comparative political thought is a manifestation of an ethical maxim common to many ethical and spiritual traditions: ‘do unto others as you would have them do unto you.’ As we have seen, there are two ways to interpret this norm. The first is the false—imperial colonizing or parochial—way of transposing yourself and your traditional worldview into the shoes of the other and thus arguing that others and their institutions should be made over in the image of yours, for this is what you would want. This is the standard modernist moral justification of both imperial globalization and violent resistances to it.[[70]](#endnote-70) The second is the genuine way deep listening and empathetic dialogue. It assumes that what human beings would want to have done to them is for others not to impose their ways on them, but, rather to listen carefully to their own understanding of the situation they inhabit, in their own ways and traditions, until they imaginatively understand it as much as is humanly possible, then, in reciprocity, enter into a dialogue of comparison and contrast with other similar and dissimilar situations to work up good responses. In addition to enacting this famous maxim, the ethical orientation lays the indispensable groundwork for one of the oldest political norms in the Western tradition, ‘what touches all must be agreed to by all,’ as well as for the newest, ‘all affected by any exercise of power should have a say (and often a hand) in the exercise of power.’[[71]](#endnote-71) As Schweitzer argued, it brings into being a basic ‘reverence for all forms of life.’[[72]](#endnote-72)

**8. Reciprocal Elucidation and Transformation**

All concepts in which an entire process is semiotically concentrated elude definition: only that which has not history is definable.

 Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*

The previous sections survey the complex conditions or stage-setting of the central activity of dialogical comparative political thought: translation. Translation brings with it an additional set of conditions that need to be borne in mind by participants along with the previous ones. Translators today are situated in the dense relationships of translation constituted by the last five hundred years of translation across traditions among translators from hegemonic societies and the counter-translations of translators from subalternized societies (‘writing-back’). That is, relationships of translation and counter-translation are located within the larger global ‘contrapuntal ensemble,’ as Edward Said called it, surveyed in Sections 2 and 3.[[73]](#endnote-73)

These are not simple self/other relationships of translation. Translators are situated within an ensemble of different ways of using the language of political thought in their own societies along intersectional lines of inequality and difference: class, gender, ethnicity, race, region, language, sexual orientation, settler-indigeneity, and, as the same time, they are translating spoken and written texts from similarly complex societies.[[74]](#endnote-74) These inequalities and differences are now so great that there is often little communication or understanding across them. The interweaving of political thought and traditions is yet more complex, due to the vast increase in ‘diffusion’ since Boas and brought about by immigration from former colonies to metropole societies under postcolonial conditions, and *vice versa*, and the deeper penetration of settler-colonial societies, such as Canada and the United States, into the still colonized Indigenous Fourth World. Furthermore, the networkization of global communication; the global spread of capitalist modes of production, commodification, strategic-instrumental forms of thought, subjectivity and dialogue; the rise of institutions of global governance; the spread of international law and its presumptively universal language of commerce, human rights, and the good life; and the militarization of conflict and conflict resolution all bring with them complex relationships of communication.[[75]](#endnote-75)

The great dangers in this situation are not only incomprehension and misunderstanding due to inequality and difference. They also include the ever present danger of the reign of a global network Esperanto that brings about, at best, a fast-time listening and superficial communication, but not understanding. Interlocutors often use the same words, and so presume they understand each other, but, as we have seen, they understand the words differently because they interpret them in light of their own background form, or forms, of life. Or, they can barely cling to a meaningful form of life, as in the massive cases of impoverishment, forced migration, war refugees, climate refugees and genocide.[[76]](#endnote-76) In addition to the proliferation of strategic-instrumental and legislative dialogues, another danger is what might be called the dialogue of hegemonic ventriloquism in which the more powerful partners consult with and listen to the less-powerful others and then translate what they hear into the presumptively universal or higher language of their hegemonic discourses.[[77]](#endnote-77) Yet another danger is the influence neo-liberal universities that promote many of these trends have on academic research.[[78]](#endnote-78)

Bearing all these conditions and dangers of translation in mind, what are the distinctive features of translation dialogues of transformative reciprocal elucidation?

First, participation in translation dialogues of reciprocal elucidation ‘elucidates’ or clarifies texts being translated in light of their contexts. In so doing, participants ‘enlighten’ or bring enlightenment to each other.[[79]](#endnote-79) This is a transformative experience consisting of the following six steps. Through dialogue they: (1) free each other partially from deep attachment to their worldviews; (2) move each other around to see the phenomenon (text) in question from each other’s’ perspectives as much as humanly possible; (3) from these other perspectives each sees their own and others’ perspectives as limited perspectives (mutual deparochialization); (4) through further dialogue they come to see similarities or commonalities, as well as dissimilarities, in the different ways they disclose the phenomenon from different perspectives; (5) they then go on to exchange critical and comparative judgments, and to see if these too share commonalities through negotiation or deliberation; and (6) thus, participation in this dialogical work of translation transforms and transposes the participants into its nonviolent, conciliatory mode of being-in-the-world-with-others and, *eo ipso*, into the pluriverse that participation both brings to light and teaches them how to be its enlightened citizens. This is the dialogical deparochialization of, and alternative to, the monological tradition of enlightenment and cosmopolitanism.[[80]](#endnote-80)

The most important set of capabilities that participants acquire through participation—in addition to deep listening, empathy and, eventually, compassion—is called the intersubjective virtue of the courage of truthfulness: *parrhesia* and *satyagraha.[[81]](#endnote-81)* The first and best known feature is the disciplined capacity to speak as truthfully as possible to others in the dialogue. This is not to speak ‘the truth,’ as it is commonly translated, for the obvious reason that participation in dialogue teaches the partners that no one person or tradition knows the whole truth, but only a limited perspective on it. Each participant *needs* the participation of all others, also speaking truthfully, to get as close to the truth as is humanly possible by sharing perspectives. They are interdependent in this radical sense. The second, less-known yet equally crucial, reciprocal feature is the courage to listen truthfully to what the others are saying no matter how difficult this is: that is, deeply and openly by means of non-attachment. When speakers and listeners exercise these reciprocal kinds of courage of truthfulness in taking turns, a third feature comes into being: a ‘parrhesiastic pact.’[[82]](#endnote-82) This is just the term for a genuine dialogical relationship among them. Being reciprocally truthful binds the parrhesiastic partners together in the search for truth. Each dialogue with others who see the situation differently is an ‘experiment in truth’ in Gandhi’s famous phrase.[[83]](#endnote-83)

Next, how do truth-seeking participants proceed to bring about mutual understanding? The translating participants elucidate the phenomena (texts) in question (Q) by drawing analogies and dis-analogies to other phenomena with which the listeners are already familiar (F). They suggest, for example, that Q is similar to F in their tradition in the following aspects, yet dissimilar in other aspects. The two phenomena Q and F share what Wittgenstein calls one or more ‘family resemblances,’ just as members of families share different characteristics, but none is common to all members. A similarity is a criterion, or set of criteria, for identifying Q and F among the whole cluster of contestable criteria used to identify Q and F.

The dialogue continues with other analogies and dis-analogies, similarities and dissimilarities, with different phenomena of comparison and contrast, until a whole web of criss-crossing and overlapping similarities and dissimilarities between Q and series of Fs comes to light. Each similarity and dissimilarity forms an ‘intermediate step’ that enables listeners and questioners to begin to get a sense of the meaning of Q in its traditional contexts relative to their own. These intermediate steps enable these partners to ‘see connections’ between the phenomenon in question and the phenomena invoked in comparison and contrast. That is, they begin to see how Q is used in various contexts and shades of meaning, and so begin to acquire the ability to use the concept themselves: that is, to understand it in its context. These are steps one and two in reciprocal elucidation.

The reason why participants are able to acquire this kind of participatory ability and mutual understanding of other texts and traditions of political thought is that, *mutatis mutandis*, this is how humans acquire the ability to use and understand language in general. According to this view, humans acquire these abilities through examples and practice, not through the acquisition of a rule stating the necessary and sufficient criteria for the application of the concept in every case, because there is no such essential set of criteria. Wittgenstein illustrates this thesis by taking his readers through various examples of games, showing that there is no one criterion common to all of them, but similar and dissimilar criteria are invoked in different instances of games. He concludes: ‘we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.’ He then goes on to show how participants learn meaning-in-use through examples and practice. They not only learn how concepts are used in different contexts by invoking criss-crossing and overlapping criteria. They also go on to learn how to give contextual reasons to contest habitual uses and to present novel uses. The dialogical work of translation is the extension of this ability to learn meaning-in-use by means of examples and practice in different traditions of political thought and to present translations of them that bring understanding to others. Wittgenstein calls such a translation a ‘surveyable representation (*uebersichtliche Darstellung*) that brings understanding in the sense of ‘diversity-awareness’ or ‘seeing-as.’[[84]](#endnote-84)

As we have seen, interpretation and translation of particular ‘texts’ has to include interpretation and translation of the contexts in which they make sense. This is especially important in comparative political thought. Political contests over the practices of politics are always also over the languages of political thought that are used to describe, evaluate, defend and contest these practices. Although the contests of political theories appear more abstract, they are responses to them, and contributions that enter into the history of the languages of political thought. This ongoing contestedness of political concepts explains why Nietzsche says they have histories, not definitions.[[85]](#endnote-85) Translation dialogues of reciprocal elucidation are no exception. They too are in these relations of contestation, of agreement and disagreement, of understanding and misunderstanding, of the languages of politics.[[86]](#endnote-86) They bring to this field a distinctive nonviolent *way* of contestation.

The acquisition of the abilities of mutual judgment is much the same as mutual understanding. Practitioners of languages of political thought are always already involved in judgments because political concepts are never purely descriptive. They are terms that describe and evaluate at the same time: they ‘characterize’ the phenomena. Think of ‘democracy,’ ‘freedom,’ ‘oppression,’ and so on. In addition, in learning how to use a concept in various contexts, they learn judgments of correct and incorrect uses, and how to give reasons to contest, criticize and legitimate dominate uses, as well as to extend the use of concepts in new ways and give reasons *pro* and *contra*.

Moreover, in dialogues of reciprocal elucidation, standards and ways of judging are placed in the intersubjective space of translation and compared and contrasted, as in mutual understanding. Standards and ways of judgment are judged and counter-judged, critiqued and counter-critiqued, from various perspectives, within this being second-order.[[87]](#endnote-87) Comparative insights and limits and strengths and weaknesses of various types are brought to light from various perspectives and the family resemblances and dissimilarities among them explored. When people learn a language or tradition of political thought they learn how to make judgments and counter-judgments, critique and counter-critique within a background structure of prejudgments that constitutes a worldview or form of representation.[[88]](#endnote-88) As participants move through the six steps of translation dialogues of reciprocal elucidation they free each other from their background prejudgments to varying degrees and draw them into the foreground of comparison and critique.

The revolutionary feature of mutual understanding and mutual judgment is that they are not oriented to transcending the multiplicity of traditions and languages of political thought in order to understand and judge them from a universal viewpoint. They aim to deparochialize and de-transcendentalize this imperious disposition and place it in the field where it belongs, with other limited viewpoints. They orient the participants to learn how to understand and judge multi-perspectivally from within the lifeworld of living theories, traditions, practices and places of comparative political thought by learning their way around within them, and with each other. It is the practice of a worldly, *immanent* critique.

The practice of translation dialogues of reciprocal elucidation can be illustrated by three examples. Boaventura de Sousa Santos sees the ‘work of translation’ as the disclosure of the political world as a pluriverse capable of being disclosed from multiple modes of disclosure in comparison with each other. He uses the example of the work of translating concerns over human dignity in terms of the western concept of human rights, the Islamic concept of *umma*, and the Hindu concept of *dharma*: [[89]](#endnote-89)

In this case, the work of translation will reveal the reciprocal shortcomings or weaknesses of each one of these conceptions of human dignity once viewed from the perspective of any other conception. Thereby, a space is open in the contact zone for dialogue, mutual understanding and for identification, over and above conceptual and terminological differences, of commonalities from which practical combinations for action can emerge.

The lifelong work of Dennis Dalton in translating Gandhi’s political thought is an exemplar of the reciprocal elucidation approach. He carefully situates Gandhi’s political thought and practice in the historical context of Indian traditions and shows what is traditional and novel. He then compares and contrasts these translations and interpretations of Gandhi’s thought and practice with equally careful, contextual interpretations of similar and dissimilar political thought and practice in the West. Readers are thus able to come to understand such complex concepts and practices as *swaraj* and *swadeshi* by way of their similarities and dissimilarities with freedom and economic self-reliance in Western traditions, and thus go on to make comparative judgments themselves.[[90]](#endnote-90) Last but not least, the most famous example of a decolonizing dialogue of reciprocal elucidation of comparative political thought is Gandhi’s *Hind Swaraj* of 1909.[[91]](#endnote-91)

In summary, mutual understanding and judgment that can be achieved in dialogues of reciprocal elucidation is neither a comprehensive view nor a consensus. It consists in bringing to light background forms and ways of thought and being from various traditions and becoming able to view and discuss them comparatively from different limited perspectives. They become meaningful for the participants. This is what Gadamer calls the ‘fusion of horizons’ and Bohm describes as exposing and sharing of tacit meanings in common in dialogue.[[92]](#endnote-92) The diverse forms and ways of thought and being are no longer isolated and foreign. They are *meaningful* precisely because the participants have elucidated the webs of similarities and dissimilarities (family resemblances) that connect them in their diversity.

To borrow a metaphor from Wittgenstein, the languages of comparative political thought compose a ‘labyrinth of paths. You approach from *one* side and know your way about; you approach the same place from another side and no longer know your way about.’[[93]](#endnote-93) The participants in a dialogue of reciprocal elucidation learn their way around the places and connecting paths and the labyrinth becomes full of meaning to them. Thus, a ‘genuine dialogue’ of reciprocal elucidation is meaningful in this sense.[[94]](#endnote-94) The ‘dia’ in ‘dialogue’ does not mean ‘two.’ It means to partake in and of *logos* (meaning) with others.[[95]](#endnote-95)

Dialogues of reciprocal enlightenment exist in many cultures and they too exhibit webs of family resemblances and dissimilarities.[[96]](#endnote-96) For example, in many Indigenous North American traditions, there are somewhat similar practices of dialogue that bring about similar transformative meaningfulness among participants. This is often called ‘being of one mind.’ To begin, they usually give thanks in reciprocity to Mother Earth for all the interdependent ecological relationships of gift-reciprocity (symbiosis) that sustain life.[[97]](#endnote-97) Then they listen carefully and quietly to each other’s stories of where they come from and how they see from their different perspectives the situation that has brought them together. They understand these dialogue relationships as gift-reciprocity relationships, derived from dialogues with the living earth. The Nootka word for participation in such dialogues on the Northwest coast is ‘*Pa-chitle*’ (tr. Potlatch), the verb ‘to give.’[[98]](#endnote-98) Moreover, within stories, there is usually a character, such as Raven on the North West Coast, who has the ability to transform him or herself in the ways of thought and being of other living beings, human and more-than-human. The gift exchange of stories and mask dances transform the listeners into the ways of life narrated in the stories. Through engagement in these dialogues they become able to understand and share all the different meanings of their situation in common. This is to be of one mind. It lays the groundwork for negotiating and acting together in response to the situation they share.[[99]](#endnote-99)

Finally, dialogues of reciprocal elucidation have a telos beyond mutual understanding and mutual judgment. First, the intersubjective world of shared meanings brings to light ways of thinking, judging, deliberating and acting together in response to the situation they share that were *unimaginable and unthinkable* prior to the dialogue. This is often the practical reason for the dialogue. According to Aeschylus and Protagoras, the democratic system of justice in the West was founded on this insight.[[100]](#endnote-100) Even more importantly, the complex repertoire of nonviolent, contestatory and conciliatory ways of being-with-each-other that the participants acquire in dialogue prefigure and dispose the participants to relate to others in similar ways when they respond to suffering, disagreement and conflict in the lifeworlds they inhabit. In taking this further, compassionate step, they become the change they experience in dialogue.[[101]](#endnote-101) They extend nonviolent practices of deparochializing political thought into the world of nonviolent practices of deparochializing and transforming unjust political action.[[102]](#endnote-102)

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1. This article was originally presented at the conference on ‘De-Parochializing Political Theory: East Asian Perspectives on Politics; Advancing Research in Comparative Political Theory,’ University of Victoria, Victoria BC, Canada, August 2-4, 2012. The conference literature suggested the focus on ‘moral standards for judging politics’ that I decline in the opening sentence. I would like to thank Melissa Williams, Project Leader, East Asian Perspectives on Politics, and the main organiser of the conference for inviting me to participate and for her comments on my presentation. I would also like to thank Akeel Bilgrami, Paul Bramadat, Nikolas Kompridis, Anthony Laden, Andrew March, Tobold Rollo, Gina Starblanket, Heidi Stark, Yasuo Tsuji, and Feng Xu for their comments. I am also grateful to Monika Kirloskar-Steinbach and Jim Maffie for their editorial comments on the draft. I am deeply indebted to John Borrows, Aaron Mills and Joshua Nichols for discussions on all aspects of the article since 2012 and especially the sections on Indigenous peoples and their traditions of political thought and practice. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, Robert Hurley (transl.), 8-9 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1985) (my italics). For my interpretation of this aim, see James Tully, “To Think and Act Differently,” *Public Philosophy in a New Key*, Volume I, 71-132 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. See Section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. I borrow the term ‘genuine’ dialogue from the conference agenda. I mean by this term the type of dialogue I describe in this article. The participants engage in genuinely trying to understand each other and their concerns. I take this to mean what most people mean by a ‘meaningful’ dialogue. See Section 8 for this sense of ‘meaningful.’ [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. I discuss the points in this and the following section in more detail in James Tully, *Public Philosophy in a New Key*, 2 volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), and in dialogue in James Tully, *On Global Citizenship: James Tully in Dialogue* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), and ed. Robert Nichols and Jakeet Singh, *Freedom and Democracy in an Imperial Context* (New York: Routledge, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. I sometimes use ‘conversation’ and ‘dialogue’ interchangeably to emphasise that these conversations occur in everyday interactions. However, ‘conversation’ is the broader term, including everyday dialogues that include some but not all of the conditions of genuine dialogue, yet are the intersubjective ground of genuine dialogue. For this type of distinction, see Anthony Laden, *Reasoning: A Social Picture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (trans). (New York: Continuum , 1999), especially 341-80. For interpretations of Gadamer close to my own see Nicholas Davey, *Unquiet Understanding: Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006) and Bruce Benson, *The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue: A Phenomenology of Music* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. This is the central insight of Martin Heidegger’s early *Being and* *Time* and it became the starting point for Edmund Husserl, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and the field of phenomenology, as well as for Gadamer. Ludwig Wittgenstein states that it is the central problem he addresses in the *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, 109-15 (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2009). He uses the terms ‘picture’ and ‘form of representation’ for mode of disclosure. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Fritjof Capra and Pier L. Luisi, *The Systems View of Life* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), ed. Sean Esbjorn-Hargens and Michael E. Zimmerman, *Integral Ecology: Uniting Multiple Perspectives on the Natural World* (Boston: Integral Books, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Franz Boas, *The Mind of Primitive Man* (New York: Macmillian, 1911). In this classic text and his methodological articles he used the example of how the unjust treatment of Indigenous peoples of the Northwest coast of North America by Europeans was redescribed by them in ways that legitimated it to explain how secondary explanations function. See James Tully, “Rediscovering the World of Franz Boas: Anthropology, Equality/Diversity and World Peace,” in ed. Ned Blackhawk and Isaiah Wilner, *Indigenous Visions: Rediscovering the World of Franz Boas* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, Franklin Philip (transl.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. This is a central problem of the Kantian tradition. See Amy Allen, *The End of Progress: Decolonizing the Normative Foundations of Critical Theory* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Friedrich Nietzsche, “The Means to Real Peace,” in “The Wanderer and His Shadow,” *Human, All Too Human: A Book for Free Spirits,* trans. R. J. Hollingdale, remark 284, 380-81 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Hannah Arendt, *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt 1970). For a recent restatement, see Craig Dilworth, *Too Smart for Our Own Good: The Ecological Predicament of Humankind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. The anthropologist Wade Davis estimates that there are roughly 7000 traditions around the world: *The Wayfinders: Why Ancient Wisdom Matters in the Modern World* (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. See David Bohm, *On Dialogue* (London: Routledge , 2014) for this sixth, crucial feature, and Alison Mountz, Anne Bond, et al., “For Slow Scholarship: A Feminist politics of resistance through collective action in the neoliberal university,” *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies* 14, no. 4, (2015): 1235-1259. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. One of the best known examples of an attempt at dialogues across traditions as a worldwide educational project is the United Nation’s *Alliance of Civilizations*. It was set up by Turkey and Spain after 9/11/2001 to replace the military clash of civilizations with a dialogue of civilizations through cross-civilization education in dialogue from an early age. I was involved in the early drafting and I draw on this experience. See *United Nations Report on the High Level Group on The Alliance of Civilizations* (2006) at [www.unaoc.org](http://www.unaoc.org) (13 July 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, *Epistemologies of the South: Justice against Epistemicide* (London: Taylor and Francis 2015), Madina V. Tlostanova and Walter D. Mignolo, *Learning to Unlearn: Decolonial Reflections from Eurasia and the Americas* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2012); Allen (2016); Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) for provincialization; Tully (2008, Vol. I: 15-132, Vol. II: 125-222) for de-imperialization; and Robert Nichols, *The World of Freedom: Heidegger, Foucault, and the* *Politics of Historical Ontology* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014) for the problem of deparochialization of Western philosophy through Heidegger and Foucault. [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. David Abram, *The Spell of the Sensuous*, 93-136 (New York: Random House, 1996). [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* 175-206 (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1998). [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Plato, ‘The Apology’ in *The Trial and Death of Socrates*, trans. George M. A. Grube, 24b-25c (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1975). [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Socrates embodies the courage of truthfulness and the dialogical way of practicising it. He (or Plato) does not recognize the perspectival character of all individual practical knowledge claims (including his) and thus the need for the dialogical (democratic) negotiation of them to reach a truth acceptable to all, whereas Meletus and Protagoras (and the rhetorical tradition) do realize this. See Hannah Arendt, ‘Socrates,’ *The Promise of Politics*, ed. Jerome Kohn, 5-40 (New York: Schocken Books, 2005), Gadamer (1999: 355); and Quentin Skinner, *Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1996) on the rhetorical tradition that follows from Aristotle on practical knowledge (and Section 8). [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Michael Temelini, *Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015) presents a careful survey of this tradition. Wittgenstein cites Socrates for the craving for generality and disregard of particular cases in *The Blue and Brown Books*, 20, 26-7 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972). The later *Philosophical Investigations* is a dialogue with interlocutors who enact this craving for generality in different contexts. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. For an introduction to this scholarship, inspired by Edward Said and Michel Foucault among others, see Tully (2008, Vol. II), and Nichols and Singh (2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. In the modern period, Johann Herder was among the first to articulate this critical step in his response to the imperialism of Immanuel Kant’s political philosophy and European political theory more generally. See ed. Frederick M. Barnard, *Herder on Nationality, Humanity and History* (Montreal: MacGill Queen’s University Press: 2003). Kant’s replies are in Immanuel Kant, *Political Writings*, ed. Hans S. Reiss, 192-220 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. See Temelini (2015); Laden (2012); and Section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. See de Sousa Santos (2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. James Tully, ‘On the Global Multiplicity of Public Spheres,’ *Beyond Habermas: Democracy, Knowledge and the Public Sphere*, ed. Christian J. Emden and David Midgley, 169-204 (New York: Berghahn, 2013), Tully (2008, Vol. I, 291-316). [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. I will continue to use ‘text’ for the broad range of phenomena that are interpreted, translated and discussed in dialogues; such as political thought, speech, enactments, practices and activities, problems, traditions and places below. This is for the sake of simplicity; not to privilege written texts. [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. For ‘modes of disclosure’ see above at Section 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. Boas (1911: 155-91). The diffusion thesis is associated with Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859) and Adolf Bastian (1826-1905). These features of traditions are discussed by Wittgenstein in *On Certainty*, ed. G. E. M. Anscombe and G. H. von Wright (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). See Tully (2008, Vol. I: 39-70). [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. See section 2 for this problem. [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. This is the third obstacle to genuine dialogue introduced briefly in Section 2. [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. For a detailed examination of the possibility of foregrounding and mutual understanding in early modern treaty dialogues between Indigenous people and European settlers in North America, see Michael Asch, *On Being Here to Stay* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Gadamer (1999: 341-57); Bohm (2012: 70-95). They both argue that this kind of critical reflection cannot be carried out on one’s own, monologically, or in dialogues within a tradition. They also argue that it does not bring about definitive or universal knowledge but openness to the experience of unexpected experience (insight). For the importance of this for global mutual understanding see Section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. See Michel Foucault, *The Courage of Truth* (New York: Palgrave Macmillian, 2011) for the origins of this ethical virtue in the West. See Section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. See the second step in Section 3 for this feature. [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. David Scott, “Traditions of Historical Others,” *Symposia on Gender, Race and Philosophy* 8, no. 1, (Winter 2012), 1-8, [http://mit.edu/sgrp. See also Tully (2014](http://mit.edu/sgrp.%20See%20also%20Tully%20%282014): 33-84). [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. The liberal norm of inclusion and process of transitional justice often function in this way. See, for example, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, *International Law from Below: Development, Social Movements, and Third World Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), ed. Anver Emon, and J. Tully, “Pluralism, Constitutionalism, and Governance,” *Middle East Law and Governance* 4, nos. 2-3 (2012): 189-93. [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. This is one meaning of the mantra ‘there is no global justice without epistemic justice.’ [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. See Abram (1996: 89-90). He traces the development of this embodied, dialogical view of meaning from Edmund Husserl through Maurice Merleau-Ponty to eco-phenomenology. Wittgenstein refers to these four dimensions of meaningful human thought and action ‘forms of life.’ For substantiation of this view of meaning from other disciplines, see Evan Thompson, *Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology and the Sciences of Mind* (Cambridge MA: Belknap Press, 2007) and Capra (2014). Abram became aware of this view of meaning through his dialogues with Indigenous peoples in North America and Asia. [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Wittgenstein (2009: 107). I am indebted to Tobold Rollo for discussions of this issue. [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. For concrete examples of how this occurs in the European Union see Antje Wiener, *The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and International Encounters* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). She has gone on to develop a global research project on conditions of genuine dialogue. See Antje Wiener, *A Theory of Contestation* (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014). [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. For example, this is at the heart of community-based research and teaching with Indigenous peoples throughout Canada. The Faculty of Law and the Indigenous Governance Graduate Program at the University of Victoria have a number of exemplary programs: [www.uvic.ca/igov](http://www.uvic.ca/igov), [www.uvic.ca/law/ILRC](http://www.uvic.ca/law/ILRC). [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. For example, the Cambridge Texts in the History of Political thought series, under the editorship and methodology of Quentin Skinner, classifies the texts as ‘thought’ not theory, includes marginal texts and contextual introductions, and is expanding beyond the Western canon. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. This has been the aim of most dialogue approaches to world understanding and peace, as, for example, in the UN *Alliance of Civilizations* in the 2000s (see note 16). See Kenneth R. Melchin and Cheryl A. Picard, *Transforming Conflict Through Insight* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2008). [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. I borrowed the term ‘reciprocal elucidation’ from Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Politics and Problematizations,” *The Foucault Reader*, ed. Paul Rabinow, 381-90 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), and developed it in Tully *Strange Multiplicity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See Tully (2008, Vol. I: 15-38). [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. I discuss the features of dialogue primarily, but not exclusively, with reference to embodied linguistic dialogues. I believe most of these features apply with modification to reading dialogues with texts from other traditions and discussing them through writing and conversing with others (See Section 8). [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Nicholas Kompridis, “Receptivity, Possibility, and Democratic Politics,” *Ethics and Global Politics* 4, no. 4 (2011): 255-272. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. Listening to and telling stories and narratives often brings insight into the modes of disclosure and traditions of the participants more clearly and unguardedly than question and answer. More importantly, it enables each participant to bring forth the world of the dialogue in terms of their background understanding, and ‘own’ the space of dialogue when they speak, rather than being forced to speak within a set of prescribed norms. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. For an excellent survey of literature on these features of deep listening and her own examples, see Emily Beausoleil, “Responsibility as Responsiveness: Enacting a Dispositional Ethics of Encounter,” *Political Theory* (2016): 1-28. [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. See ed. Hester Lessard, Rebecca Johnston, Jeremy Webber, *Storied Communities: Narrative of Contact and Arrival in Constituting Political Community* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), Cary Miller, “Gifts as Treaties,” *American Indian Quarterly* 26, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 221-246, Taiaiake Alfred, *Wasase: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom,* 13-17 (Peterborough: University of Toronto Press, 2005). See further Section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. This is a fundamental feature of the analysis of conversational reasoning-together advanced by Laden (2012). See also Bohm (2012: 24-9). [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. For these practices of deep listening in the Engaged Buddhist tradition of conflict resolution and reconciliation, see Thich Nhat Hanh, *Interbeing: Fourteen Guidelines for Engaged Buddhism* (Berkeley: Parallax, 1993). [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. See Section 2. Attachment and non-attachment are studied under the terms subjectification (interpolation) and de-subjectification in Western social sciences. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Pema Chodron, *Practicing Peace in Times of War,* 55-56 (Boston: Shambala, 2007). Compare Bohm (2012: 27-9). Bohm’s conception of non-attachment (proprioception) includes the ability to reflect on one’s presuppositions and their roots. Since this complex ability requires comparative dialogue, I associate it with that later phase of dialogue (Section 8). [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Boas (1911 [1922]: 98). See James Tully, “Rediscovering the World of Franz Boas: Anthropology, Equality/Diversity and World Peace,” in Blackhawk, and Wilner (forthcoming 2016), and Isaiah Wilner, “A Global Potlatch: Identifying Indigenous Influence on Western Thought,” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* 37, (2013): 87-114. [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. For the neuroscience, phenomenological and ethical research that substantiates this account of empathy, see Thompson, (2007: 382-412), and M. Johnson, *Moral Imagination: Implications of Cognitive Science for Ethics* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996). Obviously, the first step does not apply in the dialogue with written texts, but, as we have seen, these are often based on embodied dialogues in the field (Section 5). [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. For a recent survey of the vast contemporary literature on these two senses of empathy, and the popularity of the false sense, to which I am indebted, see Rebeccah J. Nelems, “What is This Thing Called Empathy?” (forthcoming). [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. See further Section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. This is the main thesis of Johnson (1996). [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. Quentin Skinner, *Visions of Politics: Volume I: Regarding Method* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), Sheldon Wolin, *Politics and Vision* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2004). [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. See Temelini (2015) for a study of this experience in Wittgenstein. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. Thich Nhat Hahn (1987). See also Nelems (forthcoming); Thompson (2007), and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Donald A. Landes (London: Routledge 2012) for similar views. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. See: Also Leopold, *Sand County Almanac,* 137-41 (New York: Oxford University Press,1966), Stephan Harding, *Animate Earth: Science, Intuition and Gaia,* 35-62 (Cambridge MA: Green Books 2013), Abram (1996: 73-92). [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. Dialogues of reciprocal elucidation bring this deep attachment to light and subject it to critical scrutiny: See section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. See, for example, Dalai Lama, *Beyond Religion: Ethics for the Whole World* (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2012) for how compassion builds on empathy and goes beyond abstract justice to action. For the importance of compassion and the failure of legislative morality to understand it, see A. Schopenhauer, ‘On the Basis of Morals,’ in *Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics*, trans. David E. Cartwright and Edward E. Erdmann, 210-75 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. See Section 8. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Petr Kropotkin, *Ethics: Origin and Development* (London: George F. Harrap, 1924), Albert Schweitzer, *Civilization and Ethics* (London: A & C Black, 1946). For more recent work see references at notes 57-68, and for a comparative discussion, see Michael Lambeck, Veena Das, Didier Fassin, Webb Keane, *Four Lectures on Ethics: Anthropological Perspectives* (Chicago: Hau Books, 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. See, James Tully, “Rethinking Human Rights and Enlightenment,” ed. Kate E. Tunstall, *Self-Evident Truths? Human Rights and the Enlightenment,* 3-35 (London: Bloomsbury, 2012), James Tully (2008, Vol. II: 127-65), and Sections 2-3. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. The Latin is *Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus approbari debet.* Another touchstone that plays the same role of consulting ‘all those who are affected’ is *audi alteram partem*, always listen to the other side. [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Schweitzer (1946: 240-60). [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York: Knopf, 1993). [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. Rita Dhamoon, *Identity/Difference Politics: How Difference is Produced and Why It Matters* (Toronto: UBC Press, 2009), Eve Tuck and K. Wyane Yang, “Decolonization is not a Metaphor,” *Decolonization: Indigenity, Education, Society* (available at: <http://decoloniziation.org/index.php/des/article/view/18630>) (13 July 2016). [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. James Tully, “Communication and Imperialism,” ed. Arthur Kroker, and Marilouise Kroker, *Critical Digital Studies*, Second Edition, 257-82 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2013). [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. See Section 3 for this problem. [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. This is perhaps the most common form of colonizing translation, which includes only to subordinate and assimilate, while allowing a patina of multicultural differences to be recognized and celebrated. See Tully, (2008, Vol. I: 291-316). Media panels of talking heads after protests is are classic examples of this danger. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Mountz, and Bond et al. (2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. Enlightenment in French, L’*Éclaircissement*, has these two senses as well and Foucault probably had this in mind when he coined the phrase ‘reciprocal elucidation’ (Foucault 1986: 381-90). [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. See James Tully, “Diverse Enlightenments,” *Economy and Society* 32, no. 3 (2003): 485-505. For an influential articulation of a dialogue view of enlightenment, see Martin Buber, *I-Thou*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1970) and *Between Man and Man* (London: Routledge, 1993). [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. *Parrhesia* is the Greek term for this virtue. See Michel Foucault, *Fearless Speech* (Los Angeles: Semiotext, 2001); Foucault (2011); Marcel Hénaff, *The Price of Truth: Gift, Money, and Philosophy*, trans. Jean-Louis Morhange, 101-55 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010). *Satyagraha* is the term Gandhi invented to characterize holding on to and being moved by (*graha*) truthfulness (*satya*) in everything one says and does. See Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Satyagraha: Non-violent Resistance* (Boston: Shocken, 1961), Dennis Dalton, *Mahatma Gandhi: Nonviolent Power in Action*, 12-30 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. Foucault (2001: 11-20). [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *My Experiments With Truth* (London: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 2011) and note 102. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. Wittgenstein (2009: 65-8, 122). This is Wittgenstein’s knowing-with alternative to Socrates’ knowing-over in Section 3. In *Wittgenstein and the Study of Politics* Michael Temelini (2015) explicates Wittgenstein’s account and shows how Charles Taylor uses it to explain cross-cultural understanding and judgment and Quentin Skinner to contextualize the history of political thought. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. This internal relationship between political theory and political practice is the basis of the contextual schools of political thought since Nietzsche. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. See David Owen, “Reasons and Practices of Reasoning,” *European Journal of Political Theory* 15 (2016): 172-88. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. Wittgenstein compares this to the way orthographers deal with the word ‘orthography among others, without being second-order’: (Wittgenstein 2009: 121). [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Wittgenstein explores the learning and questioning of judgments in *On Certainty* (1974): remarks 104-152. ‘We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught *judgments* and their connexion with other judgments. A *totality* of judgments is made plausible to us’ (140). [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. Boaventura de Sousa Santos, “The Future of the World Social Forum: the Work of Translation,” *Development* 48, No. 2 (2005):, 15-22, 17). He suggests that this kind of translation dialogue takes place at the World Social Forum. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. See Rachel F. McDermott, Leonard A. Gordon, Ainslie T. Embree, Frances W. Pritchett, and Dennis Dalton, *Sources of Indian Traditions*, Volume 2, Third Edition, 183-452 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Dalton (2012); and Dennis Dalton, “Gandhi’s Significance at the Center of Indian Political Discourse,” Lecture given at the Gandhi Workshop, Reed College, Portland Oregon, April 16, 2016. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. Mohandas K. Gandhi, *Hind Swaraj and Other Writings*, ed. Anthony J. Parel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Gadamer (1999: 306-07; Bohm (2012: 29-31). For a careful analysis of this ‘limit experience’ in the case of Foucault (and Max Weber), see Arpad Szakolczai, *Max Weber and Michel Foucault: Parallel Life-Works* (London: Routledge, 1998). [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. Wittgenstein (2009: 203). [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. This answers the question at note 4 above. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)
95. Bohm (2012: 6-7). [↑](#endnote-ref-95)
96. As noted in Sections 6 and 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-96)
97. See, for example, the Rotinoshonni Thanksgiving Address of the Haudenosaunee in Alfred (2005: 13-7). [↑](#endnote-ref-97)
98. George Clutesi, *Potlatch,* 9-10 (Vancouver: Sidney, 1969). [↑](#endnote-ref-98)
99. See John Borrows (*Kegedonce*), *Drawing out Law: A Spirit’s Guide* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010); Robin W. Kimmerer, *Braiding Sweetgrass: Indigenous Wisdom, Scientific Knowledge, and the Teachings of Plants* (Minneapolis: Milkweed Editions, 2013); Richard Atleo Sr. (*Umeek*), *Tsawalk: A Nuu-chah-nulth Worldview* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1996); Wilner (2013);Valerie R. Napoleon, *Ayook: Gitksan Legal Order, Law and Legal Theory* (Ph.D. dissertation, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria, 2009); Vernon Wilson, *A Post-Delgamuukw Philosophical Feast: Feeding the Ancestral Desire for Peaceful Coexistence* (MA thesis, Trinity Western University, Langley BC, 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-99)
100. Athenians introduced the jury system when they realized that a single agent could not judge justly and devolved judgment to the *demos* in the form of juries. Aeschylus, ‘Eumenides,’ in *Oresteia* trans. Alan Sommerstein (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), and see Desmond Manderson, ‘Athena’s Way: The Oresteia and the Rule of Law,’ for this interpretation (forthcoming); Plato, *Protagoras,* ed. Gregory Vlastos (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1956). This background makes sense of Meletus’ disagreement with Socrates in the *Apology* (see Section 3). [↑](#endnote-ref-100)
101. For the role of compassion, see Section 7. [↑](#endnote-ref-101)
102. Gandhi’s nonviolent mode of contesting and transforming violent oppressors, *Satyagraha*, for example, is interpreted in this way by Gandhi’s good friend, Richard Gregg, *The Power of Nonviolence,* 43-65 (London: Routledge, 1935). For an enlightening example of how to take dialogues of reciprocal elucidation into the world of cooperative responses to neo-liberal globalization, see Pablo Ouziel, *Vamos Lentos Porque Vamos Lejos: Towards a Dialogical Understanding of Spain’s 15M* (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Victoria, Victoria BC, 2015). [↑](#endnote-ref-102)