HERODOTUS ON HUMAN NATURE

Studies in Herodotean Thought, Method and Exposition.

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Herodotus on Human Nature: INTRODUCTION.

The broad aim of this inquiry is to explore Herodotus' interest in 'human nature' (to anthrōpinon), in other words to measure him by the standard offered us by the contemoporary sophistic movement and by his immediate successor, Thucydides, whose chief preoccupation this is. I take 'human nature', in the sense which Thucydides and the sophists seem to have given it, to include human psychology at all levels from individuals, through the polis, to nations and empires. I shall be asking to what extent Herodotus is sensitive to the psychological complexities of individuals, in particular to the contradictions and paradoxes in their behaviour, to what extent he is interested in the mechanisms of human social and political life, and whether in his interest in the phenomenon of empire he shares with Thucydides a concern with its psychological motivation. I suggest that in asking these questions we are doing no more than Herodotus' contemporaries would have been inclined to do (cf. Ch.III, Introd.), so that the exercise would be instructive even if the results turned out to be entirely negative.

In looking at Herodotus from this angle, I deliberately avoid two traditional lines of inquiry. I do not attend to the question of metaphysical causation in Herodotus - not because it is a question that can be left out of any complete picture of the work, but because it seems to me that undue emphasis on this issue has obscured much of importance. There is a great deal to be gained from exploring naturalistic explanation in Herodotus, even if the only result were that we were driven back again to metaphysics. I believe however that the result need not be so negative, and that it may well be possible to account for the basic conception of the work in naturalistic terms and accept that metaphysical explanation works on a different level, not fundamentally interfering with human choice and the workings of human psychology, while nevertheless forming an indispensable part of the work's background.

The other approach I intend to avoid is that of asking to what extent and in what manner Herodotus is or is not a historian - a question appropriate enough for students of the history of historiography but one that must be asked with extreme circumspection by those attempting to explain what makes Herodotus work precisely what it is and no different. That Herodotus did not call himself a historian, that he could hardly even have thought of doing so, is self-evident: we may easily be applying false standards if we try to understand his intentions in those terms - even if we are agreed, as many are not, as to what exactly makes a historian anyway! I would not deny that the work does possess certain characteristics which may cautiously be called 'historical', notably its appreciation of the problems of evidence, reconstruction, verification; but I would argue that if we content ourselves with identifying them as the first blooms of a new 'historical sensibility' we are foresaking the chance of understanding their true nature. I suggest that Herodotus' appreciation of these methods is something he owes to his contact with the sophistic movement, which is the first known context for the more or less systematic discussion of the use of evidence. It is important to note, moreover, that Herodotus' grasp of the problems of evidence and reconstruction is not confined to the historical past, but may be equally impressively evidenced in his treatment of problems of ethnography or even geography - which may well indicate that it was not his concern with the historical past alone, or even in the first place, which gave Herodotus these 'historian's skills', as is usually supposed. That Herodotus' history is to some extent sophistic in inspiration is another hypothesis I shall explore in what follows.

Although my main theme is Herodotus' study of human nature, the inquiry breaks down into a number of smaller discussions. Ch.I.i offers an exploration of what I take to be Herodotus' interest in instructive paradox. It has often been thought that there are 'inconsistencies' in Herodotus' presentation of character which show the influence of his sources: it is argued that in the case of many of his protagonists he has not adequately synthesized discrepant reports and that this has left his accounts uneven and contradictory. I argue that this is to misunderstand Herodotus' methods and interests. There are clear cases where he seems to have introduced a 'contradiction' on his own initiative, when there was very likely none in his source(s), and others where the contradictions offered by his material have been played up by him for particular effect. This suggests a keen interest in paradoxes of motivation and behaviour, as well as an insight into the relativity of our judgements of men's actions and characters. There begins to emerge a picture of a subtle and sophisticated Herodotus with a taste for paradox and equivocation and an interest in the complexities of human psychology and the uncertainties of moral judgement. Ch.I.ii shows how such an understanding of Herodotus can illuminate the extended and seemingly confused narrative of a complex character like Cleomenes.

Ch.II, which forms the central core of this study, is devoted to the theme of freedom in its various aspects within the work. I should emphasize that I have not principally set out to show that freedom is a central theme for Herodotus; rather I have taken as a focus for the study of Herodotus' interests and methods a motif which, whether deliberately or not, Herodotus has recurred to throughout the work. I believe it will emerge that Herodotus' thinking on the subject of freedom is consistent wherever it is introduced, that in a number of places the theme dominates the narrative and that those places are usually moments of key importance in the work's design; it is of no great consequence for my argument, however, whether we decide that this makes freedom a central theme of the whole work.

Ch.II.i argues that the histories of Median and Persian liberation (cf. (B).1 and 2) and empire are constructed in accordance with a historical model (cf. (A).1): this happens in these two cases, as in that of Athens (cf. Ch.II.ii.A, etc.), to involve freedom (liberation), but in its simplest form, as illustrated by the case of post-Lycurgan Sparta (cf. (A).2), it is merely an observation of the psychology of any form of political success. In applying the term 'model' to Herodotus' accounts here I am indicating what I take to be the source of his method, namely the political and sociological theorizing of the sophists (cf. (A).1). The Spartan case (cf. (A).2) offers an opportunity for detecting Herodotus in a wilful distortion of the evidence to illustrate a particular historical process.

Ch.II.ii illustrates the application of the same model in the case of Athens' liberation from the tyranny of the Peisistratids. The main emphasis of this section, however, shifts to the discussion of Herodotus' attitude to the Athenian democracy as revealed in the narrative of the liberation and its consequences. I deal here in some detail with the problem of Herodotus' supposed 'Alcmeonid source' (cf. ii.B-C), which I take to be a hindrance to a proper understanding of this narrative. I also examine what Herodotus' narrative of the early years of the democracy implies about his attitude to the democracy of his own day, and whether it is meant to imply anything to the reader (cf. ii.D-H).

Ch.II.iii. treats the narrative of the Persian Wars (the liberation of Greece), exploring what seems to be Herodotus' equivocal attitude to Greek heroism and idealism in the pursuit of freedom. Here again particular attention is given to the question of Herodotus' sources in an attempt both to understand the originality of his interpretation of those events and to question traditional assumptions as to his dependence on the prejudices of his informants. I look at the possible importance of Herodotus' contemporary perspective, that is, how and to what extent his account is written in the light of the experience of the Pentekontaetia and the outbreak of war between Athens and Sparta. Important here too is his attitude to Athens as revealed in the narrative and his brief comments on it (cf. 7.139 and 8.3): is the narrative an objective, dispassionate account, or an apology for and/or encomium of Athens, or a critique of the city's record - or something between any of these?

Ch.III re-examines the question of Herodotus' relation to the sophistic movement and argues that his dependence on Ionian intellectual traditions has been exaggerated and his nearness to the sophists unrealistically minimized. I argue that the influence of the sophists is one of the most important ingredients in the conception of the work, in terms both of its interests and its methods.

The appendices deal with problems of Milesian political history arising from the argument of Ch.II.i.A; with the relative importance of priestly and family traditions and of polis-traditions in Herodotus' source material; with the case for Herodotus' source-fictions (see below); and with the 'composition problem' (see below).

The brunt of this inquiry is the detailed analysis of extended contexts, especially in the long central chapter (II). I would suggest that if Herodotean criticism is to progress, more and more attention needs to be given to exploring how large sections of text are put together, with consideration not merely of the structure and literary presentation but also Herodotus' use of his sources; how, if at all, he wants the reader to interpret the implications of particular passages; and whether those interpretations link them with other passages. We need to employ a regular questionnaire in dealing with any passage or context. Why did Herodotus say it this way? Could he have said it any differently? Does he have reasons of his own for putting it this way, i.e. can we understand the passage with reference to some method we have found him employing elsewhere or some theme he explores elsewhere? To what extent are we forced to explain what he has said in terms of his sources, i.e. is he speaking or interpreting for himself, or has he, whether voluntarily or not, reproduced what his sources told him? It is not always clear how to answer such questions and in many cases there may be no way of knowing any more than the fact that we do not know the answers. Nevertheless by this method we may often be able at the very least to rule out certain possibilities and clear away false assumptions. For example, if we consistently discover that Herodotus does not seem constrained by his sources, as I shall argue we discover even in those places where such a view has previously been most strongly advocated, we may at the very least require that 'source-explanations' be invoked only where all other options have been ruled out. It is my contention, however, that it is occasionally possible to return much more positive answers, and to see quite clearly what options were available to Herodotus, how he chose between them, what use he made of his chosen material and why he should have chosen to shape that material in the way that he has. Even if complete certainty is not possible we may well find that certain types of hypothesis fit the evidence comfortably time after time, and it is from these that we can begin to build up a clearer picture of Herodotus' methods and interests.

I have not, of course, conducted this inquiry without critical preconceptions, and to some degree I have used the analysis of contexts to argue for a new hypothesis of Herodotus' methods and interests. My fundamental hypothesis is that Herodotus shows a sophisticated literary technique (esp. e.g. in his taste for paradox, or his manner of involving the reader in the inquiry) and a reasonable critical acumen in his use of sources, so that he uses his material much more than his material uses him. Both these claims have been defended throughout Ch.s I and II. The additional assumption that Herodotus owes his sophistication in part at least to the sophists is argued for in Ch.III. I trust that I have kept a satisfactory balance between using the evidence to show the correctness of these assumptions and using the assumptions to explain the evidence; the latter procedure, though of less obvious heuristic value to begin with, acquires greater justification the more it is discovered that the hypothesis successfully accounts for the evidence and the more the various supposed objections to the hypothesis are shown to be unfounded.

I have left out of account the supposed 'composition problem', which might be thought to have a major bearing on any attempt at contextual analysis: if the work is not a single original conception but a composite of several different layers conceived at different times and for different purposes, are we not in continual danger of bringing together contexts which were never conceived as belonging together? The simple answer to this is that it is hardly possible to use with any profit a hypothesis over whose reality there is such serious doubt and within which so much disagreement over detail is possible (cf. App.IV). If, however, having ignored the 'developmental' hypothesis, we discover that detailed and extended analysis offers positive signs of a unified conception, we have gone a long way towards proving that we were right to ignore it. At any rate, I would suggest that Ch.II provides clear evidence that the Median and Persian histories of Book One, the Athenian and Spartan histories of Books One and Five, and the Greek narrative of Books Six to Nine all share the same basic assumptions and have every appearance of having been conceived as organic parts of the work they now occupy. As I shall argue in App.IV, however, I believe more positive arguments against the developmental hypothesis will emerge once Herodotus' position in relation to the sophists and his Ionian 'predecessors' has been re-assessed, as I shall begin to do in Ch.III.

It may be useful briefly to set out where my assessment of Herodotus stands in relation to the modern literature, both where it overlaps with what others have said and where I have fundamental disagreements with certain other major critical approaches.

In assessing Herodotus' techniques of equivocation and allusive exposition, as well as his attitudes to the Alcmeonids and Periclean Athens, I owe most to a remarkable article by H. Strasburger (1965) (cf. Bibliography for the works cited here), which from a narrow starting-point contrives to say a great deal of fundamental importance for the reading of Herodotus. Strasburger himself borrowed much from an excellent monograph by F. Focke (1927), at least in relation to things Athenian in Herodotus; and both these authors were followed by C.W. Fornara (1971) in an impressively argued essay, which further illuminated the way in which Herodotus' historical narrative could be said to offer a commentary on the events of his own lifetime. The theme of Herodotean equivocation, which all these writers share, is most amply documented by T. Spath (1968) in a dissertation devoted to 'double illumination' in Herodotus, which has much in common with the argument of my Ch.I - though it came to my notice too late for me to discuss adequately there (cf. Ch.I, Endnote). This work is, to my mind, vitiated considerably by its failure to treat contexts in any detail, merely listing passages rather than explaining how they are meant to be read. Another study which owes much to Strasburger's approach, that of H.-F. Bornitz (1968), avoids this failing and shows well the value of close contextual analysis (one of the few systematic attempts at this approach!), as well as offering some acute arguments on the issue of Herodotus' sources (esp. the supposed influence of Philaids and Alcmeonids in the Athenian history). I should add here that I believe there is much to be gained for an understanding of the character of Herodotus' literary judgements, both explicit and implied, from a little regarded ancient critical work, namely Plutarch's De Malignitate Herodoti (cf. now G.B. Philipp, Gymnasium 89 (1982) 67ff, for a new estimate of the value of this work as historical criticism)[1]. Plutarch, I would suggest, is an invaluable test of how Herodotus' work sounds to a Greek ear - not a contemporary ear, to be sure, but one much better attuned to Greek literature and culture than ours can hope to be; in addition, Plutarch is often a shrewd critic of Herodotean distortion and bias. Plutarch's opinion that Herodotus is frequently malicious, and malicious on his own initiative, is one that it is well worth taking seriously, as I hope to show.

The importance of naturalistic explanation in Herodotus is well explored in a dissertation of L. Huber (1963), who rightly stresses that divine causation is not such as to preclude a developed interest in human choice or in the political interpretation of history. Huber does not, however, make anything of the sophistic connexion, any more than does V. Hunter (1982), in a lengthy comparison of the historical methods of Herodotus and Thucydides. Hunter rightly stresses the many things these two have in common but scarcely, if at all, hints at a sophistic common denominator. The theme of Herodotus' relationship to the sophists is very poorly served in the modern literature and even the treatments of the question by W. Nestle (1908), W. Aly (1921) and A. Dihle (1962) fall far short of what I take to be the correct balance.

By far the most exciting contribution to the study of Herodotus' methods is D. Fehling's controversial discussion (1971) of his use of source-citations (contrast H. Verdin (1971), for a pedestrian traditional treatment). Fehling's work is in my view of such importance for the understanding of Herodotus that it requires rather more detailed discussion here (cf. also App.III, for an illustration of the strength of Fehling's case). It is not surprising that his radical thesis has not been readily accepted, but I see no indication that its almost complete neglect in the literature has been warranted by anything approaching a satisfactory counter-argument (see Bibliography for reviews). Fehling argues that Herodotus' source-citations are from first to last a conscious fiction, that is an affectation of methods and principles, and that this fiction follows certain regular and clearly observable rules. I doubt whether the fiction is as generalizable as Fehling suggests, but it seems to me that he has proved beyond doubt its widespread occurrence and its 'regularity'.

Fehling himself concludes that his discovery shows Herodotus not to be the historian he is traditionally supposed to be, but rather an ancient equivalent of a Boccaccio or a Chaucer, an accomplished story-teller, with a stock repertoire of devices to give his narratives circumstantial authority, to distance the teller from the incredible tale, and the like. I would suggest a different interpretation of the phenomenon: Herodotus' affectation of method is meant as an advertisement of his intellectual rigour, his appreciation of the problems of evidence and oral reporting, the same affirmation of method that we find in Thucydides (at 1.20-2). I would argue that this interest in method is a facet of both authors' involvement with the sophistic movement (cf. Ch.III), which could be said to have pioneered the systematic assessment of evidence and the uses to which it could be put - although it should be conceded that Pindar, for example, shows more than a rudimentary appreciation of the problems of oral tradition in the First Olympian! However this may be, Fehling's demonstration could lead us to a new estimate of Herodotus' use of oral traditions: if he is as aware as Fehling has shown him to be of the problems of using such material (cf. e.g. 2.3.1, for the technique of cross-checking independent witnesses; with App.III), and, in particular in his construction of source-fictions, of how it is that partisan bias operates (cf. e.g. the fictional bias introduced into foreign versions of Greek stories at 1.1-5 and 2.112-20, etc.), it makes much less sense to follow the traditional critics in supposing that Herodotus is habitually the puppet of transparently prejudiced informants. In other words, Fehling's arguments can be used to show that Herodotus has a sophisticated awareness of the pitfalls of oral reporting, so that we should be much more cautious than critics have been in the past about explaining any and every 'aberration' or 'contradiction' in the work as being due to his inadequate defence against the distortions of his sources.

Moreover, Fehling's picture of a wilfully dissimulating Herodotus need by no means be confined to the source-citations - though it may be felt that Fehling himself has allowed himself too free a rein in generalizing the hypothesis. At any rate, we need no longer be constrained in the interpretation of Herodotus' text by the dogma that he never wrote anything he did not himself believe to be true - or at least nothing he had not heard someone represent to him as being true. I shall be arguing that there are places, besides the source-fictions, where Herodotus indulges in wilful dissimulation, i.e. where he tries to persuade the reader of the truth of something he knows to be false (cf. esp. Ch.I.ii.4; II.i.A.2; II.ii.A; and App.I). It remains true, however, that this is not a type of explanation that one should have recourse to lightly and without sound argument: Herodotus is clearly aware that the truth is in principle something that deserves to be told, even if it is not always convenient to him to tell it.

It will be apparent that I am out of sympathy on several counts with those interpretations of Herodotus which pre-suppose that he must be judged as a historian: such an assumption leads, I believe, to a misunderstanding of the design of the work (more than half the content is not history at all!), of Herodotus' methods and the inspiration for those methods (i.e. their possible sophistic origin: see above), of his attachment to historical truth. It is not that I consider the label entirely inappropriate, merely that many important discussions seem to me to have been led into error by taking that label as their starting-point, without being sufficiently aware of the ways in which it may be misleading. Chief among such studies is that of F. Jacoby (1913), which purports to concern itself with the whole of Herodotus, but which shows a negligent impatience with all those many aspects of the work which cannot be thought deserving of the name history. The same criticism applies to a lesser extent to the otherwise illuminating discussions of e.g. O. Regenbogen (1930), M. Pohlenz (1937) and K. von Fritz (1967), to name only the main adherents of this approach, the first two 'unitarians' and the last an 'analyst'[2].

Even less do I sympathize with those critics who insist that Herodotus can only be understood as an 'archaic' writer, a naive Ionian story-teller with an incurable weakness for digressions. Such critics (e.g. Fränkel (1960), Howald (1923) and (1944), and more recently Drexler (1972); and to some extent also Focke) argue that the work is essentially without unity, and that its digressive style, which allows any 'main thread' to become temporarily quite forgotten, can only be interpreted as primitive and archaic, and far removed from the 'classical' standards of a writer like Thucydides (but cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.128-38; 2.96-7; 6.1-5; 6.54-9). Not only does such a view fail to do justice to the complexity of Herodotus' writing as revealed by almost any close analysis of contexts, it also greatly overplays the largely chimerical notion of 'Ionian naiveté': there is almost no evidence that earlier Ionian prose literature had the qualities which this theory presupposes for it, and there is good evidence to suppose that the very qualities that have been classed as Ionian in Herodotus may in fact be sophistic (cf. Ch.III)!

A more recent extension of Fränkel's observations on the style of Herodotus is to be found in the work of H. Immerwahr (1966), which argues the importance of 'structure' for the understanding of Herodotus (cf. also, in a different way, the eccentric theories of Myres (1953)). It is suggested that we need to anatomize the work into its supposedly constituent logoi (rigidly marked off, we are told, by the device of ring-composition; for which cf. van Otterlo (1944) and now Beck (1971)), in order in some obscure way to appreciate its thought. I can only say that I find such emphasis on structural division at the expense of the continuum of sense to obscure a great deal more than the little, if anything, that it illuminates. There seems to me little evidence that we need to gain access to any kind of alien aesthetic before being able to read Herodotus.

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I have not thought it necessary in what follows to cite exhaustively from the massive secondary literature on Herodotus, nor to engage in detailed discussion of approaches radically different from my own, except insofar as such discussion helps to focus my own argument. Apart from this I have merely indicated where I am in general agreement with others, leaving room to discuss the ancient evidence, and above all the text of Herodotus, as fully as possible.

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NOTES.

(1) Cf. also J.W. Boake, Plutarch's historical judgement, with special reference to the De Herodoti Malignitate, Diss. Toronto (1975).

(2) For the dangers of this anachronistic assumption, cf. the polemical Forschungsbericht of F. Hampl, Grazer Beiträge 4 (1975) 97-136, who finds fault with most modern approaches for failing to beware of them.

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following may need further clarification:

AE	cf. Meiggs (1972).
ANET	cf. Pritchard (1969).
APF	cf. Davies (1971).
ATL	cf. Meritt, Wade-Gery, MacGregor (1950).
FGH	cf. Jacoby (1923-58).
GGS	cf. von Fritz (1967).
GHI	cf. Tod (1946-8).
GPM	cf. Dover (1974).
HCT	cf. Gomme (1945-81).
Hdt WdF	cf. Marg (1965).
HGP	cf. Guthrie (1962-9).
OCT	cf. Hude (1927).
OPW	cf. de Ste Croix (1972).
Plataa	cf. L. Solmsen in Marg (1965).
RE art.	cf. Jacoby (1913).
XIG	cf. Hignett (1963).

Plutarch's *De Malignitate Herodoti* is abbreviated as *MH*.

*

CHAPTER ONE

HERODOTUS ON HUMAN NATURE

Herodotus on Human Nature, Part i

1. The dedications made by Croesus to sanctuaries other than Delphi and the shrine of Amphiaraos were made, says Herodotus, from the property of an enemy of the Lydian king, who before Croesus' accession plotted to secure the kingdom for Pantaleon (1.92.2f). When finally Croesus secured the kingdom through his father's gift, he took revenge on the anonymous agitator by torturing him to death: the instrument of torture was a knaphos, a sort of wheel with spikes[1]. Even before that, adds Herodotus, Croesus had appropriated the man's property and dedicated it. And that, he says, concludes the account of Croesus' dedications: we pass immediately to the Lydian ethnography (1.93.1ff).

The story has a remarkable impact: to hear so casually and as it were parenthetically of this incident from Croesus' past gives the reader a most unexpected jolt. How are we to understand that the man whose piety to the gods has just been so painstakingly described, whose piety indeed Apollo himself appears to have rewarded, not only by saving him from the pyre, but also by delaying as far as he could the year of Croesus' doom - how are we to understand that this man could indulge in an act of such horrifying cruelty? Herodotus may indeed have known or might have been able to discover an alternative version of this story. Nicolaus of Damascus seems to preserve for us, presumably from Xanthus[2], a parallel version of this episode (Nic.Dam.FGH 90F65, with Jacoby, Komm.), in which Croesus, while not yet king, tries without alerting his father's suspicions to raise a large sum of money, and approaches a wealthy merchant by the name of Sadyattes. This latter hesitates to provide the loan and points out that Alyattes has many sons from whom Croesus might obtain money if he asked. There and then Croesus makes a vow to Artemis that, if he becomes king, he will appropriate Sadyattes property and dedicate it to the goddess; and this in time he duly does, in fulfilment of his vow. The story looks outwardly so different that it might well be unconnected with Herodotus' own; but if the stories are the same, and we could assume that Herodotus has access to the alternative version, he has chosen the version far less creditable to Croesus and less obviously in harmony with his own portrait elsewhere. There is rather more of piety in the Croesus who confiscates the man's property in fulfilment of a vow, however petty the cause, than there is in the Croesus who for revenge on a political enemy not merely confiscates his property but tortures him to death in barbaric fashion. We cannot do more than guess here; but if we are right, Herodotus' inconsistency seems perverse indeed.

The story has attracted surprisingly little critical attention[3], but How and Wells offer a fairly predictable view of the matter, and one with which most traditional commentators would be likely to agree: "This chapter shows Croesus in a new light, as a cruel Oriental prince ... It clearly comes from another source. As it is not likely to be a later addition, it is probably a fragment of Herodotus' original material, which he has not worked in harmony with his narrative".

If How and Wells are right, then Herodotus has not been at all careful in assembling his material, and he has very little desire to make coherent sense of it: he merely records what was told him, without discrimination, without selection, without manipulation[4]. Can we infer from this story that this is so? Is Herodotus impervious to the inconsistency which the reader senses so strongly between the Croesus of this story and the Croesus of all that has gone before? Or should we not believe that the opposite is true, that so far from being an unfortunate accident, the episode has a carefully calculated purpose? Consider again its position: Herodotus is bringing to a close the first major narrative section of the work and is about to begin his brief Lydian ethnography, non-narrative and cooling the emotional temperature. The catalogue of Croesus' dedications seems to be winding down the narrative interest, so that the Sadyattes-story, coming right at the close, has the effect of a dramatic and unexpected climax. Followed by nothing further of narrative interest for a while, it stays in our minds, working its disturbing effect. If this is an inept parenthesis, it is very inept; if it is calculated, it is very finely calculated.

We have seen Croesus in success (e.g. the Solon conversation at 1.30-3) and disaster (e.g. the death of Atys at 1.34-45; and defeat by Cyrus at 1.86-91), and we have observed closely his reactions to both. We think we know Croesus' character: brashly self-confident (1.34.1) ambitious for empire, and at times cynically ambitious (1.26.3) but able to moderate his ambition in response to good advice (1.27.5); immoderate in his grief for his son (1.46.1), but stoically philosophical at his own fate (1.86.3); incautiously testing the oracles and provoking disaster (1.46.2ff, 53.1ff, and 85.1ff); unable to comprehend what he sees as Apollo's ungratefulness (1.90.4), but, when the god explains, prepared to admit his error (1.91.6); a man who learns from his disaster and offers far-sighted advice to his recent adversary, solicitous to the last for his country's welfare (1.88.2ff). With the exception of his somewhat sudden access of wisdom[5], there is nothing in the character of Croesus up to this point that we cannot readily understand; the righteous Croesus of Bacchylides and Pindar[6] has become a character of some depth and complexity, while remaining essentially sympathetic. The ambition and folly we have seen him display do not as yet alienate our sympathy[7]. In the debacle between Croesus and the unfamiliar Cyrus, our affections are with the man we already know and in whose fall we are made to share. It has served Herodotus' purpose to present an attractive Croesus[8] with whose tragedy we can identify - but he will not leave it at that. Into an apparently dry and impassive catalogue of Croesus' offerings, Herodotus insinuates a narrative detail which abruptly undercuts the idea we have formed of his character so far. Herodotus reminds us that this man is as typical as any of the type of implacable Oriental despot: we are not talking here about Greeks, he implies, but about barbarians. The surface appearance (in which the Greekness of Croesus has seemed to be emphasized) hides that horrific propensity to cruelty which all barbarian autocrats seem to share. Suddenly and unexpectedly his immoderation comes into sharp focus: his cynical ambition, his boastful self-confidence, even his excessive grief, and later perhaps the barbarity of the plan he suggests to Cyrus in the war with Tomyris (1.207.6: even as sage adviser his barbarian cruelty intrudes itself). The horror of oriental barbarity, which is one of the work's most insistent themes[9], surfaces here with disturbing effect: and the shock has been most carefully engineered.

The effect of the passage can be compared to that which Herodotus contrives for the end of the work, when he brings to an end the narrative of Xerxes' doings with the gruesome story of Amestris' revenge (9.108-13), which some commentators have felt to be in disharmony with the substantially sympathetic treatment of Xerxes in the rest of the work[10] - although it should be added that Xerxes here merely connives at Amestris' barbarity, so that the story does show him to be characteristically weak. This final reminder of the alien character of oriental manners achieves on a larger scale what the story of Pantaleon does here[11].

This story is a useful test-case: either we are meant to be shocked by it or it is an accidental oversight. If it is an accident, then Herodotus is a mere collator of stories with no very serious pretensions: he will have formed no clear conception for himself of Croesus' character and will have simply been guided by the bias of his sources, as he moves from anecdote to anecdote. If we have been satisfied with the portrait so far, then we have been satisfied with an illusion. We can be thankful for this uncritical reporting of conflicting traditions regardless of consistency, because this will confirm for us the reality of Herodotus' historiē: the existence of discrepant, inconsistent accounts could be taken as evidence that he did indeed seek out the oral traditions he claims to have consulted[12]. What we cannot admire however is his intelligence as a reporter - and we cannot be happy to call the result history. We are told to expect of a historian that he will gather facts in support of a coherent model, modifying the model as he goes along in the light of new facts, but always with coherence as a touchstone[13]. This is something that, on the traditional view, Herodotus will have signally failed to manage.

If however we take the other option, a number of important results follow. If the supposed inconsistencies in Herodotus' reporting turn out to be deliberate and designed effects, we no longer have the same justification for supposing that he is capable of being muddled by conflicting stories. Indeed this traditional view of Herodotus should seem a lot less tempting, if we accept the arguments of Fehling[14] on his use of source-citations: if Herodotus knows as much about bias and distortion as he can be seen to do in the construction of his source-fictions (see Introduction), he must have been alert to the distortions in genuine oral traditions and is less likely to have been their unwitting dupe. What is involved here is the question of the kind of reporter we want to suppose him to be: how dependent is he on the limitations and distortions of his evidence, and how much editorial control is he capable of imposing?

This chapter examines the ways in which Herodotus manipulates inconsistencies in human behaviour in the interests of instructive paradox. We will see that he uses paradox to teach us about human nature, about the way we judge motives and actions, about the relativity of moral judgements. To a certain extent this aspect of the work has been touched on by other commentators. Strasburger, in his important article on Herodotus and Periclean Athens[15], argues against the view that he shows partisanship for any particular individual or state (in particular neither to the Alcmeonids nor to Athens), pointing out that he is careful to take a balanced view of human life, setting the good against the bad and giving equal weight to them both[16]. In another direction, studies of characterization in Herodotus have noticed that there are certain figures in whom contradictory qualities are consciously combined. For example, Reinhardt saw Xerxes as actually characterized by weakness and vacillation: the inconsistencies of his behaviour show us the sort of king he is meant to be[17]. The case to be argued here, however, differs from both these approaches: it will be suggested that Herodotus is neither interested in distributing praise and blame even-handedly - indeed, it is wrong to think he is at all anxious to be 'fair' - nor concerned only with particular problems of characterization, and only a few cases at that. Rather, he establishes certain general rules about human nature, some of which apply to all men, others only to men who are prosperous and successful above the common rank, notably kings and tyrants. Human nature, he suggests, is itself paradoxical - as a general rule - and people behave in ways which seem and sometimes are contradictory. Matters are complicated still further, however, by the nature of human judgement: we judge the behaviour of our fellow men differently at different times, according to the 'perspective' we ourselves adopt. What follows is the discussion of a number of passages which in different ways throw light on this problem. I will treat first of all some passages which have a 'programmatic' character for this question, to establish that there is indeed a case to answer. These are followed by three further extended examples, the narratives of Maiandrios, Deioces, and the Spartan heralds at the court of Xerxes, and the first part of the chapter ends by applying the conclusions reached to the treatments of Miltiades and Themistocles, with an attempt to assess the traditions available to Herodotus here; and finally the second part of the chapter does the same service for Cleomenes.

2. Consider first Herodotus' treatment of the bravery of Telines, a distant ancestor of the tyrant Gelon (7.153). This man was reported to have resorted to Gela a displaced faction, relying on no human agency, but on nothing more than a collection of sacred objects. Herodotus expresses surprise (θῶμά μοι ὦν καὶ τοῦτο γέγονε ...)[18], not least because, he says, one would have expected such an action to be the work of a stout heart and courageous disposition (153.4): ὁ δὲ λέγεται πρὸς τῆς Σικελίης τῶν οἰκητόρων τὰ ὑπεναντία τούτων πεφυκέναι θηλυδρίης τε καὶ μαλακώτερος ἀνήρ. Herodotus seems to be making surprisingly heavy weather of this - until we realize that human nature and its paradoxical manifestations are an abiding interest of the work. Telines' behaviour in this instance seems to belie his nature as otherwise observed by the Sicilians. Herodotus draws our attention to the paradox, but offers no solution of it. But the implicit moral is clear: we should be cautious about assuming we can predict with any accuracy what a particular individual is and is not capable of, merely by reference to his perceived character. Human beings have resources for good and bad, strong and weak actions[19], which in our usual hasty judgements of character we are inclined to ignore. Human nature is such that it can always surprise us both favourably and unfavourably. We cannot confidently decide which actions in a man's life are truly 'characteristic' of him, nor indeed whether we have always understood the real nature of his actions.

Herodotus is however infuriatingly undogmatic about the reasons for the paradoxes of human nature. It is left quite unclear how he would want to interpret the conduct of Telines here, whether we are to understand that the Sicilians had misjudged his true nature, or whether there is some mysterious reason (e.g. divine assistance?) for his otherwise unaccountable bravery. He leaves us to judge the paradox for ourselves. Herodotus likes to affect 'dispassionate observation', apparently leaving the record to speak for itself without commentary from him. It is significant that he never goes in for the detailed descriptions of character that we find in, for example, Thucydides' character-analyses of Themistocles or Pericles[20]. His relative reticence is likely to be a borrowing from Homer, who avoids extended authorial commentary and allows character to emerge through speech and action[21]. The few scant judgements on character that we do find in Herodotus, moreover, seldom turn out to be as simple or naive as they at first appear. We can be told that a man 'behaves justly' or that he 'has a reputation for just behaviour', only to discover on the very next page some action that flatly contradicts that assessment. Herodotus is virtually never tempted to comment explicitly on the resulting paradox; Telines is only a partial exception since the author offers no 'solution' to the paradox. Often he will obstinately comment instead on some detail which seems to us to require least attention, affecting unconcern with the problem that seems to us most to cry out for attention[22].

We look next at an episode which revolves intricately around the paradox that a man can behave 'justly' one moment and 'unjustly' the next, without necessarily changing his character in anything but a superficial sense. After the death of Cleomenes (6.85.1ff), an embassy of the Aeginetans comes to Sparta to tax Leotychidas with his failure to return the hostages held in Athens. A Spartan jury decides that Leotychidas has done wrong and allows him to be taken away by the

Aeginetans as surety against the return of the hostages. Before they leave, however, a Spartan named Theasides speaks up to warn them that the Spartans have acted in the heat of the moment (*orgēī*), and the Aeginetans must be on their guard lest they change their minds at some later time and decide to visit dire destruction on the islanders. The Aeginetans see the logic of this and agree on a compromise: Leotychidas is to come with them to Athens and try to arrange the release of the hostages. The Athenians, however, put forward excuses why they should not give them up: the hostages were entrusted to them by both Spartan kings, and they cannot be returned at the request of only one of them. Accordingly Leotychidas sets about persuading them of the injustice of their refusal - and he does so by means of an anecdote apparently current at Sparta[23]. The story runs as follows (6.86a.2ff): a Spartan named Glaucus, son of Epikydes, three generations before Leotychidas' time, had a great reputation for virtue: τά τε ἄλλα πάντα περιήκειν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ δὴ καὶ ἀκούειν ἄριστα δικαιοσύνης πέρι πάντων ὅσοι τὴν Λακεδαίμονα τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον οἴκεον· It chanced that a man from Miletus, hearing of his reputation, decided to deposit half his fortune with him for safe-keeping. Time went by and the children of the Milesian came and presented their tokens and asked that the money be returned. Glaucus now, however, denied all knowledge of the deposit, and, feigning fairness, sent them away with the promise that he would give the matter thought and if he remembered return the money; if not, he would observe the custom among the Greeks in such matters[24]. He then approached the Pythia and asked whether he might perjure himself and keep the money; predictably the oracle warned him against setting short-term advantage above long-term consequences: the sin would be visited on his children. When he asked the god's pardon, he was told that to seek his approval of a sin came to the same thing as committing it[25]. Although Glaucus returned the money, the consequences of his action speak for themselves: Sparta now knows no descendants of Glaucus, no hearth that bears his name, he and his family have been wiped out root and branch. The moral, says Leotychidas, is that one should return what is entrusted to one for safe-keeping, and not to hesitate, even in thought, to make a proper restitution. The Athenians listen to his story, but send him away empty-handed.

Herodotus' use of this story has not appealed to the critics (e.g. How and Wells ad loc.): "the beautiful tale of Glaucus, with its high moral, is strangely placed in the mouth of a man who had reached the throne by corruption of the Pythia (cf.6.66.2f), and who was himself corrupt (cf.72.1f). Neither this nor the inexactitude of the parallel between Glaucus and the Athenians induces Herodotus to sacrifice so good a story"[26]. On the contrary it is hard to believe that the story does not ideally suit its context[27]: it is relevant to more than just the Athenian case. The miscalculation of putting the narrative into the mouth of Leotychidas is in fact a significant irony: unexpectedly we discover a man whose almost every action so far has involved deception and fraud delivering a sermon on the virtues of honesty. It is by a false oath (cf.6.65.3) that Leotychidas hopes to oust his rival Demaratus from the kingship; the bribery of the Pythia which secures his claim is undertaken by Cleomenes (66.2), but is connived at by Leotychidas himself[28]. Moreover his deception does him no good: Herodotus goes out of his way to tell us the fate of Leotychidas and his family, and does so in pointed terms (71.1f). His son, Zeuxidamus, never came to be king of Sparta: he died before his father did - though he left a son, Archidamus. Leothychidas then took a second wife who bore him no male offspring, but only a daughter, Lampito, whom Leotychidas married off to Archidamus. This is perhaps not quite the complete extinction of his family that Glaucus suffered, but no first generation male heir survives to take over the kingship from his father. Herodotus could not deny that Archidamus succeeded his grandfather - but he does not mention the fact! Indeed, says Herodotus (72.1), not even Leotychidas was to live out his life in Sparta, but he payed the retribution that was owing to Demaratus: caught accepting bribes from the Thessalians, he was exiled from Sparta and his house raised to the ground (6.72.2) - a familiar enough punishment for such offenders[29], but one distinctly reminiscent of the fate of Glaucus' hearth at Sparta.

The unexpectedness of the erstwhile villain delivering a moral lecture which so closely applies to his own case is itself paralleled in an unexpected twist in the narrative itself. We are introduced to Glaucus as a man with a reputation (the narrator vouches for no more than his reputation) for honesty (dikaiosynē), an honesty indeed that not only distinguishes him among his fellow-Spartans but which attracts the notice of a man as far away as Ionia. Such pronounced emphasis on Glaucus' virtue is not altogether dramatically necessary: the story works just as well without our needing to know so very much about his moral probity. Clearly the shock of discovering that Glaucus' deception so belies what has been expected of his character must be something that Herodotus considers important. There is obviously a sense in which the Athenians, like Glaucus, have tarnished the reputation they seem to have won, when in the name of Greek freedom they denounced the medism of Aegina to the Spartans (6.49.2, κατηγόρεον τῶν Αἰγινητέων τὰ πεποιήκοιεν προδόντες τὴν Ἑλλάδα): their present conduct is quite without honour. But the Spartans too are here suspected of a preparedness to renege on an agreement, which is much closer to that of Glaucus. Certainly they respond with what seems like complete fairness, when they bring Leotychidas before their courts and find him guilty of hybris: but Theasides comes forward to remind us that the decision has been taken in the heat of the moment and the time may come when Sparta will decide differently and bring down destruction on Aegina. It is a hazardous business to argue from past behaviour to future behaviour: people after all change, and, like Glaucus, can in time come to make a nonsense of their reputation for virtue.

Change is clearly a leitmotiv of Herodotus' entire work. "Cities once great have become small and the small great, and human fortune never continues always in one stay" (1.5.4). So too, "every human affair should be judged for the way it turns out in the end" (1.32.9: σκοπέειν δὲ χρὴ παντὸς χρήματος τὴν τελευτὴν κῆι ἀποβήσεται). Hasty judgements of a man's life, Solon reminds us, can always be confounded in time. The Athenians make a similar point in their speech claiming priority over the Tegeans at Plataea (9.27.4). "There is no point in bringing up ancient history", they say: καὶ γὰρ ἂν χρηστοὶ τότε ἐόντες ὡὖτοὶ νῦν ἂν εἶεν φλαυρότεροι καὶ τότε ἐόντες φλαῦροι νῦν ἂν εἶεν ἀμείνονες[30]. These words, with their similar antithetical phrasing, clearly echo the sentiment at 1.5.4, and are surely a reminder of Herodotus' programme: not only does history bring about reversals in the fates of men and cities, but time itself also causes their characters to change, both for the worse and the better, and the work is full of examples of such change, as we shall see. And yet as far as character is concerned Herodotus is cautious about invoking change as a regular explanation of paradox and inconsistency: to a great degree men behave differently at different times because they have always had it in them to do so, and they merely allow certain of their natural attributes to influence them at the expense of others.

3. So far we have examined the importance of paradox as it is related to the generality of men. There is however a further programmatic

passage we must consider, which shows us how we are to take the paradoxical behaviour of men in power, the tyrants and the despots. Such men are for Herodotus in a sense merely ordinary humanity writ large, beings in whom the peculiarities of human nature can be the more easily discerned because of their eminence[31]. However as Artabanus observes to Xerxes (7.16a.1) the king is subject to unusual pressures which cause him to behave in ways that he might otherwise not. Artabanus likens the king to the sea, which, though it is thought to be the most providential to men (*khresimotaten*), when a squall blows up is caused to forget its own nature (πνεύματά φασι ἀνέμων ἐμπίπτοντα οὐ περιορᾶν φύσι τῆι ἑωυτῆς χρᾶσθαι)[32]. Artabanus is warning against the unthinking acceptance of bad advice: the king who is badly advised is as dangerous as the sea in storms, he implies. But the image also suggests other things about the way Herodotus understands the characters of monarchs. Like the sea they have as great a potential for good as for harm, indeed, like the sea, their very greatness means that the good and the harm they do is capable of being equally extreme. Like the sea, too, not only are their moods unpredictable, but in either extreme unrecognizable as manifestations of the same nature. True, this is to extrapolate far beyond what Artabanus intends, but we may justifiably use the image as a key to Herodotus' way of thinking.

A few pages after this, we are presented with a most vivid and alarming demonstration of the unpredictability implied by the sea-image. When Xerxes is encamped at Kelainai in Phrygia, he and all his army are entertained by a Lydian named Pythios (7.27.1ff), who offers his entire fortune to the king[33]. Xerxes is pleased (*hestheis*, 7.28.3), and instead of accepting the gift, offers Pythios enough money to bring his fortune up to a round total. "Neither now nor in the future will you regret what you have done", he says[34]. A few pages later, however, we come across Pythios again (7.38.1ff), this time frightened at the portents for the expedition, and asking Xerxes a favour, a small favour to the king but great to him. The king promises him he will help; but when Pythios reveals that he wants to withdraw the eldest of his five sons from the expedition, Xerxes is incensed (ethymōthē, 7.39.1). "When I myself am taking part in the expedition against Greece together with my own sons and brother and relatives and friends, how dare you, my slave, speak to me of your son? Know that a man's thymos is lodged in his ears, and that when it hears things it likes it fills his whole body with delight, but when it does not it becomes inflamed[35]. When you did good and promised more, then you could not boast yourself more generous than me; now you have turned to shameful thoughts, even so you will suffer less than you deserve." Xerxes orders that Pythios' eldest son be cut in half: through the two halves of his body the army is to march on its way[36].

The barbarity of Xerxes' anger is the diametric opposite of his generosity and goodwill. Not only are the two balanced halves of Herodotus' narrative designed to bring this out, but the king's own speech (39.1f) draws attention to the contrast. Xerxes of course affects to see his punishment of Pythios as magnanimously lenient, but that is the irony of his position: the reader is left in no doubt that his anger was as immoderate as his benevolence. Clearly there is no contradiction here[37]: Herodotus has deliberately confronted us with these two extremes of Xerxes' character and invited us to make of them what we may. If we know how to look, we can indeed see them as manifestations of the same essential nature. Like the sea, the king may be as bountiful as he may be destructive, and the greater and more powerful he is, the more overwhelming will be both his generosity and his anger[38].

The observation of these extremes of autocratic behaviour takes a number of different forms. Xerxes in particular exhibits a curious and unsettling combination of piety and impiety in his attitude to the divine. Having, for example, destroyed the Athenian Acropolis (8.53.2), he orders a sacrifice 'after the Athenian custom' on the same spot on the very next day (8.54). Herodotus speculates whether Xerxes had been commanded to do this in a dream or whether his conscience pricked him for having destroyed the shrine (εἴτε καὶ ἐνθύμιόν οἱ ἐγένετο ἐμπρήσαντι τὸ ἱρόν). Herodotus offers us the same dubitatio in describing the offering Xerxes made when he crossed the Hellespont (7.54.2f), when he dedicated the cup, krater and sword to the sea: he cannot say for certain whether this was a dedication made to the sun, or whether Xerxes repented of his action in whipping the Hellespont (οὔτε εἰ μετεμέλησέ οἱ τὸν Ἑλλήσποντον μαστιγώσαντι). Herodotus typically is frustratingly vague about how he wants to interpret both these actions, whether or not he wants to invoke 'conscience' to explain the paradoxical behaviour which they seem to involve. The tyrant's change of heart is something we keep meeting in Herodotus[39]: the most elaborate and impressive example is Cyrus' decision to rescue Croesus from the pyre (1.86.6), on realising "that he was destroying another man like himself, a man who had but recently been blessed with good fortune like his own, and also fearing retribution for his act and calling to mind that nothing in human affairs is secure against change"[40]. Cyrus' change of heart is symptomatic of the tyrant's condition. Whatever his reasons for the original decision to burn Croesus - and Herodotus offers us several[41], his change of heart implies that what he has done is wrong and ill-considered. The cruelty of the tyrant presupposes that he is somehow set apart from other men and that the ordinary rules do not apply to him: accordingly he acts on whim rather than on principle. Only sometimes do conscience and scruple set in and he remembers that he is indeed a man like other men[42], that maybe he will suffer at some other hands what his victims suffer at his. It is clear from this passage that Herodotus is indeed interested in the psychology of tyrannical excess, although he is sufficiently cautious about the hazards of judging human nature to avoid being dogmatic about the reasons for particular actions. The same is likely to be true about the passages above: the reasons Herodotus is really interested in are the psychological ones, the promptings of conscience, but for caution's sake he hedges his bets. In both cases his very hesitation is meant to suggest to us something about human nature and our appreciation of it: he invites us to consider whether we can tell if the apparent change in Xerxes was a matter of externals, or a real change of heart, prompted by conscience. Like the case of Telines, the behaviour of Xerxes on these two occasions may or may not be a paradox of character: the solution is left to the reader's own judgement.

4. Whether or not men like Xerxes and his fellow-tyrants and despots can change for the better is a question that Herodotus leaves undecided[43]. What he does want us to observe, however, is the corrupting influence of absolute power itself. Otanes, in the constitution-debate[44], is made to utter another programmatic commentary on the 'inconsistencies' of autocrats, or at least a democrat's reflexions on the matter. Otanes argues that tyranny is such that even the most virtuous man finding himself there will no longer behave as he used to[45] (3.80.3): καὶ γὰρ ἂν τὸν ἄριστον ἀνδρῶν πάντων στάντα ἐς ταύτην τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐκτὸς τῶν ἐωθότων νοημάτων στήσειε. ἐγγίνεται μὲν γάρ οἱ ὕβρις ὑπὸ τῶν παρεόντων ἀγαθῶν, φθόνος δὲ ἀρχῆθεν ἐμφύεται ἀνθρώπωι. You would expect a man who had everything to behave ungrudgingly, but he does not. The tyrant is envious towards the good and delights in the bad: he is impossible to strike the right note with (ἀναρμοστότατον δὲ πάντων,

80.5) in that if you praise him in moderation, he grudges that it is not enough, but if you praise him too fulsomely, he grudges that he is being flattered. Otanes' analysis is subtle and well-observed: it is in the nature of tyranny to induce irrational, contradictory behaviour, and it will corrupt even those whose habitual disposition is to respect virtue; but at the same time this irrationality has its roots in a passion which is common to all men by nature, namely phthonos, the envy which inspires the doubt that one is not respected by other men as one would like to be. In other words, tyranny itself is an institution which if properly studied can actually tell us something about the general human condition, inasmuch as it contributes to an aggravation of the passions which we all in different degrees share. On this interpretation Herodotus' interest in tyrants and despots takes on a new importance: they become exemplars of the extremes of behaviour of which all human beings are ultimately capable, extremes of cruelty and injustice as well as of magnanimity and virtue[46]. Certainly tyrants by the nature of their positions come to think differently, to conceive themselves elevated above the common rank of humanity; but this psychological change only exacerbates in them the contradictory impulses to which all human nature is prey.

The corruption of success, the way power, prosperity, even freedom, can affect human nature for the worse - these are themes which give Herodotus' work an essential unity, as we shall see in the central chapter. We may turn next to two striking examples of the pattern of corruption outlined by Otanes, in which Herodotus is careful to keep before us the paradoxes involved in and occasioned by the pursuit and acquisition of absolute power. On the death of Polycrates (3.142.1ff), the rule of Samos devolved upon Maiandrios, who had been put in charge during the tyrant's absence. What Maiandrios did on finding himself in this position, Herodotus wants us to note carefully, as is clear from his striking introduction. "When he learned of Polycrates' death, he would have liked, had he been allowed, to behave with exemplary regard for justice and the public interest" (τῶι δικαιοτάτωι ἀνδρῶν βουλομένωι γενέσθαι οὐκ ἐξεγένετο)[47]. Maiandrios attempts without success to resign the tyranny. His first action was to set up an altar of Zeus Eleutherios; and he then assembled all the people of Samos, and reminded them that Polycrates' power had devolved upon him and that he was now in a position to rule over them. "But I will do my best not to do what I find fault with in another (cf.n.66). It did not please me when Polycrates lorded it over men who were his equals[48], nor could I approve such behaviour in any man. He has now played out the fate appointed for him, but I now hand over the rule of Samos to the people[49] and declare the rule of equality (*isonomiē*[50]). All I claim for myself is the sum of six talents from Polycrates' treasury and the priesthood of Zeus Eleutherios" (3.142.4). The speech leaves us with an impression of a man attached to the ideals of equality, restraint, piety, and prepared to give up a golden opportunity for private advantage in order to uphold those ideals.

But at once a Samian named Telesarchus stood up, and accused him of not being worthy to rule over them anyway, and demanded that he give an account of the money he had already appropriated. Maiandrios' response is recorded by Herodotus without any hint of surprise. He realizes that if he lets go of power, someone else will set himself up as a tyrant in his stead; and, deciding not to abdicate, he summons the Samians one by one on the pretext of giving an account of his financial dealings, and forthwith arrests and imprisons them. From that point on things go from bad to worse[51], and when Maiandrios falls ill his brother Lykaretos, ambitious himself for power, puts all the prisoners to death (3.143.2): οὐ γὰρ δή, ὡς οὔκασι, ἐβούλοντο εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι, comments Herodotus laconically. When Syloson comes with the Persians, Maiandrios and his party agree to hand over the island and withdraw into exile. He is then, however, persuaded by his mad brother Charileos[52] to change his mind and allow Charileos to take revenge on the Persians, while he escapes to safety. Maiandrios agrees, says Herodotus (3.146.1), not because he was so foolish (οὐκ ἐς τοῦτο ἀφροσύνης ἀπικόμενος) as to believe his forces could get the better of the King's: ἀλλὰ φθονήσας μᾶλλον Συλοσῶντι εἰ ἀπονητὶ ἔμελλε ἀπολάμψεσθαι ἀκέραιον τὴν πόλιν. By provoking the Persians he wished to render Samos as weak as possible and in that condition give it over to Syloson, well aware that if the Persians suffered harm they would become more hostile (προσεμπικρανέεσθαι) towards the Samians, and confident that he had for himself a safe escape-route from the island, by way of a secret tunnel he had had built from the citadel to the sea. There follow scenes of destruction as terrible as anything in Herodotus: Otanes deliberately forgets Darius' instructions and orders his troops to kill both man and child (3.147.1f), and half the army lays siege to the citadel, while the other half slaughters anyone that comes in its way, both inside and outside sacred places (an emphatic way of underlining the horror). The Persians finally destroy the island and hand it over to Syloson without inhabitants, a terrible fate for a Greek city. The gods however take note (or seem to): for, later, Otanes populates the island again, when apparently prompted to it by heaven (3.149).

Herodotus proceeds by implication only, but it is clear enough what he intends: Maiandrios' decision to renounce his democratic intentions and keep the tyranny in his own hands may have been reasonably motivated in the first place, but once the decision had been made, even Maiandrios, "who wanted to become the most just of men", found himself involved in betrayal and injustice - just as Otanes predicted such a man would end up. First we see him deceiving the first citizens of Samos into giving themselves into his hands - a typical tyrannical deception[53] - then handing over Samos to Syloson and the Persians, the very tyranny from which he had attempted to free the island when he took over power from Syloson's brother, Polycrates. Finally, on bad advice, he decides to allow Charileos to incite the Persians to retaliation in the full knowledge that this would be disastrous for the island, so that it should be left an empty prize for his rival.

It might be argued that Maiandrios' 'double character' is a result of Herodotus cobbling together, whether consciously or not, a tradition favourable to the tyrant with one hostile to him. This approach has not, however, been favoured by commentators; indeed a recent study of Herodotus' Samian sources[54] seems unaware of any problem here, when it concludes that "Herodotus aristocratic source must have been favourable to Maiandrios or we cannot explain the attribution of high motives to him". But such a view is both discouraged by the evidence - the greater part of the account, from the denunciation by Telesarchos onwards, is in material detail most unflattering to Maiandrios - and methodologically flawed, since we must surely allow for the possibility that Herodotus has a free hand in the attribution of motive. The more natural explanation is that his source was hostile to the tyrannical usurper, Maiandrios, and that Herodotus himself has supplied the motive (τῶι δικαιοτάτωι ἀνδρῶν βουλομένωι γενέσθαι οὐκ ἐξεγένετο) which causes his account to be paradoxical.

Certainly there may have been at Samos a sanctuary of Zeus Eleutherios, and it may conceivably have been set up by Maiandrios; but even this need not imply that the historical Maiandrios actually intended resigning the tyranny, but merely that he meant to contrast his own administration with that of Polycrates[55]. At any rate we cannot conclude from the existence of such a cult that the Samians in Herodotus' day continued to think kindly towards its initiator. We can more easily imagine that Herodotus' Samian (?) informants represented Maiandrios' attempted resignation as a mere pretence - a reasonable inference from his subsequent atrocious behaviour - and that Herodotus decided on his own initiative that matters were (or ought to be!) more complicated. Moreover for him the Samians are not coerced by an aggressive tyrant, but rather pathetically throw away the chance of 'freedom'[56], a point which he underlines in another authorial inference (3.143.2): οὐ γὰρ δή, ὡς οἴκασι, ἐβούλοντο εἶναι ἐλεύθεροι. In other words, by the use of inferences as to motives, Herodotus steers an independent course through the currents of his source-material. He accepts the facts which the Samian polis tradition, with its anti-tyrannical bias, offers him, but interprets them in his own way: Maiandrios' freedom speech and his motives are Herodotean free invention; and at the same time he inserts a counterweight to the bias of his source: the Samians were wrong to denounce Maiandrios, having failed as they did to recognize freedom when it was offered them.

It is reasonable then to suppose that this is yet another example of the model we are studying and that the 'paradox' of Maiandrios' behaviour has been deliberately contrived. Herodotus characteristically leaves the inconsistency to speak for itself, but comments at some length on an aspect of Maiandrios' motivation which does not immediately strike us as requiring detailed explanation. What we most expect some comment on is Maiandrios' spite, his determination to do Samos the most harm he can, which strikes us so forcibly after Herodotus' explicit observation that he wanted to behave most justly. Herodotus, however, avoids this topic and remarks instead on the practical reasoning behind his betrayal of the Samians, even to the bathos of explaining in detail about his escape tunnel. The words οὐκ ἐς τοῦτο ἀφροσύνης ἀπικόμενος at first sight seem to be about to introduce a comment on Maiandrios' lack of *sōphrosynē*, but instead turn into an observation about his level-headed and cynical calculation of the chances of escape; there seems to be a deliberate play on the ambiguity of the word *aphrosynē* here[57].

There is something of a parallel to the behaviour of Maiandrios in the story of Deioces (1.96-101), a story generally agreed to be the product of literary imagination rather than oral tradition, at the very least in its detailed design[58]; and certainly its essential coherence can hardly be doubted, so that here we have an example of Herodotean paradox which cannot easily be argued away in terms of the influence of conflicting sources. Indeed in this case the paradox is indisputably an integral part of the story.

Deioces was a clever man, begins Herodotus (1.96.1ff), who conceived a desire for tyranny over the Medes, and devised the following plan. Even before, he had been highly regarded in his village, but now he began to practise justice with even greater zeal and application; and this he did although there was much lawlessness throughout Media, and knowing that injustice is a foe to justice (ὅτι τῶι δικαίωι τὸ ἄδικον πολέμιόν ἐστι)[59]. We then trace the rise of Deioces through his magistracies, in which he is upright and just "since he is wooing absolute power" (96.2, οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχήν), through his abdication of responsibility at the moment when he sees his victims are properly ensnared (97.1f), through the resumption of *anomia* (97.2), to the assembly of the Medes at which, as Herodotus guesses, it is the friends of Deioces who are the loudest in their denunciation of the times and their clamour for a king (97.3). Deioces is put forward and praised by many (98.1) and finally chosen king. Then Herodotus describes at some length (98.2-99.1) how Deioces had built for himself the city of Ecbatana and the further precautions by which he kept himself at a distance from his subjects[60], so that his contemporaries, those who had been brought up with him and came from no less distinguished families and were not inferior to him in nobility, should not see him, envy him and plot against him, but so that he should appear to them different. Maiandrios' observation on the injustice of tyranny which presumes to elevate the tyrant artificially above men who are his equals (3.142.3, above), offers a striking commentary on the significance of these details for Herodotus. Once in power Deioces was severe in the administration of justice (100.1, ἦν τὸ δίκαιον φυλάσσων χαλεπός), dealing with suits by means of written petitions and replies; amd if he found anyone guilty of wrongdoing, he would punish him according to his deserts (100.2, κατ’ αξίην ἐκάστου ἀδικήματος ἐδικαίευ), and he had spies and informers through the length and breadth of his kingdom.

Deioces' case is similar to that of Maiandrios in that both make an effort to behave justly and both end up behaving tyranically; but Deioces' practice of justice is self-interested and directed almost from the start, paradoxically, to the pursuit of absolute power, and hence it seems no more than a pretence. Yet though Herodotus stresses that Deioces behaves throughout with ulterior motives, the matter is not as simple as that. Even before the awakening of his ambition Deioces had had a good reputation (96.2, ἐὼν καὶ πρότερον δόκιμος), so that his behaviour poses a tricky conundrum: he is apparently a just man who decides to make use of justice for an unjust purpose. Deioces practises justice "knowing that injustice is its foe", which, difficult though it is to interpret (cf.n.59), must imply that he actually believes in the importance of justice for its own sake. Once in power, he becomes even more meticulous than ever in the administration of justice: normally autocrats are found to 'take justice into their own hands' and hence pervert it (cf.3.80.3-5), but Deioces surprisingly avoids doing so. Instead of the usual arbitrary despotic punishments, which bear no relation to the gravity of the crime[61], he imposes penalties 'precisely in accordance with guilt'. His administration of justice may seem insufferable and a denial of freedom (especially his 'secret police'), but it is still justice fairly dealt. There are two clear paradoxes here: the paradox of Deioces' just behaviour for unjust ends, and the paradox of a tyrant meticulously devoted to the preservation of justice[62]. We think we know what Deioces is like, when Herodotus tells us so explicitly that all he does is undertaken with absolute power in view; and yet there are elements in his behaviour which confuse and provoke. Herodotus seems to be letting us in on Deioces' motivation, but when we look closer we see much that still calls for explanation. Herodotus keeps his character at a certain distance and challenges us to make sense of him, if we can[63]. The man who has the ambition to gain the tyranny of the Medes is also the man who is strong enough to be able to impose justice in the interests of social order (see further Ch.II.i.B below).

5. We should turn next to a slightly different type of paradox, the paradox brought about through 'perspective' or the manipulation of context. A particular individual, or a particular quality or action of an individual, can be made to take on a quite different appearance according to its context. By this means Herodotus can illustrate the 'relativity' of our judgements of human nature itself.

The embassy of the heralds Sperchias and Bulis to the court of Xerxes (7.134ff) well exemplifies these confusing changes of aspect. The daring[64] of the two heralds (says Herodotus) was something to wonder at (7.135.1, θώματος ἀξίη), as were their words. For on their way to Susa they were met by Hydarnes, the satrap of the Asian seaboard: Hydarnes offered them his hospitality and asked them why they did not become friends of the king. "Consider how the king rewards good men: look at me and my position. You too if you gave yourselves to the king's service (for he holds you to be good men) might each rule over Greece with the king's dispensation". The heralds reply that Hydarnes' advice does not take account of their condition, which is so different from his: he has full knowledge of what it is to be a slave, but no experience of freedom, and cannot tell whether it is sweet or not[65]. If he did know freedom he would recommend they fight to defend it not with spears but with axes (i.e. to the last gasp). At Susa and before the king they refuse to be cajoled or pushed into the required proskynesis: it is not customary (ἐν νόμωι) for them as Greeks to offer obeisance to a mere mortal and that is not why they have come. They explain to Xerxes (136.2) that they have been sent by the Spartans to pay the penalty for the Persian heralds killed as Sparta. To which Xerxes replies that he will not behave like the Spartans: they confounded the laws (nomina) which are binding for all men, when they murdered the heralds; but he himself will not do what he has blamed them for doing[66], nor, by killing them in return, free the Spartans from their guilt.

The story affects us unexpectedly, and it does so by a manipulation of perspective. The device of reflexion (cf. Ch.III n.105) is used three times in succession: the Spartans point out to Hydarnes that, not being free, he cannot appreciate what freedom means to them; and at Susa they reflect on how *proskynesis* looks to them as Greeks - a matter of Greek *nomos*; Xerxes reflects back to the Spartans how their murder of the Persian heralds looks to him - once more a matter of *nomos*, but a more compelling and serious one this time, in that the *nomos* in question is binding for all men equally. The Spartans may have scored two points, but Xerxes scores the last one, and it seems to count at least double, if not more. The moral advantage is all his: men have a moral duty to behave justly, but they have no moral duty to be free. Freedom is something that is morally neutral in Herodotus: fine as it may be, it is in essence no more than an expression of self-interest (see Ch.II.passim). It is the brash and selfish arrogance of free men that the Spartans - for all their daring - stand for, when made to face the just reproof of Xerxes.

Unexpectedly Xerxes here stands for wisdom and justice: for all his own barbarous injustices, he can justly throw the wrongdoing of the Greeks in their faces. This is not however some puppet Xerxes, dressed up to serve a purely dramatic purpose. We must ask what is meant by his *megalophrosynē*? The only other place where Herodotus uses this word[67] is in the description of Xerxes' excavation of the Athos peninsula, undertaken (7.24): μεγαλοφροσύνης εἵνεκεν ... ἐθέλων τε δύναμιν ἀποδείκνυσθαι καὶ μνημόσυνα λιπέσθαι, for Herodotus an act of the same symbolic significance as the bridging of Hellespont.

Arrogant, hybristic pride and self-glorification are the faults of Xerxes at the one extreme; but the same word may express the same characteristics in completely different guise[68]. What is excessive and immoderate in his behaviour over Athos becomes restrained and sober in conversation with the Spartan heralds: in the same man is the capacity for both extremes of behaviour and by a startling pun Herodotus contrives to express them both with the same word[69]. That this is a reasonable interpretation of the passage is shown both by Critias' use of the word *megalophrosynē* as an admirable quality of Cimon (DK 88B8.1), illustrating that the word is inherently ambiguous, and by a story told of the younger Cyrus in Xenophon (Anab.1.4.8). Cyrus allows two men who have wronged him to go free, even though their families are in his power: "Let them go", he says, "εἰδότες ὅτι κακίους εἰσι περὶ ἡμᾶς ἢ ἡμεῖς περὶ ἐκείνους ". Obviously here Cyrus' magnanimity is a paradigm of upright behaviour, and this confirms our interpretation of Xerxes' *megalophrosynē* in the case of the heralds as magnanimity rather than boastfulness. Needless to say, what is in Xenophon the virtuous clemency of a uniformly 'good king', is not such a simple matter in the case of Herodotus' Xerxes, whose barbarous and despotic side is otherwise much more prominent.

The passage as a whole then offers a characteristic inversion through 'perspective'. Our appreciation of the Greek attitude to freedom changes from admiration to something more qualified, when it is brought up against the (itself unexpected) 'justice' of Xerxes. Or in other words, we see Greek freedom 'in perspective' through seeing it in a different, unusual context[70]. As for Xerxes himself, the paradox of his *megalophrosynē* has to do with another sort of perspective: in different contexts we see different aspects of the same qualities in his nature.

6. This latter type of paradox is one we also meet in our last two examples in this section, Miltiades and Themistocles. On these two heroes of the Persian wars success confers something like the same exaggerated pre-eminence as attaches to Herodotus' tyrants and despots, and there is clearly a sense in which their good fortune 'goes to their heads' and turns them from heroes into scoundrels. But here too, especially in the case of Themistocles, change is in some ways not really change at all, but the emergence of the same qualities in a different guise.

Miltiades, the hero of the hour at Marathon, is suddenly seen in quite a different light in the aftermath of the Greek victory[71]. We have approved, or thought we approved, his appeal to Callimachus on Athenian freedom (6.109), but our sympathies are at once alientated, when, after the battle, he turns his attention to the reduction of Paros (6.132)[72]. Herodotus here underlines the ambiguity of Miltiades' position, when he says that "even before, Miltiades was highly regarded, and now he went from strength to strength" (καὶ πρότερον εὐδοκιμέων ... τότε μᾶλλον αὔξετο). The word auxanesthai has consistently ambiguous overtones in Herodotus, since when an individual rises to a certain eminence, or when a people grows to a certain strength, almost invariably he or it start to overstep the limits of moderation. Empires grow at the expense of the liberties of others, and when individuals rise to positions of power and influence they abuse the trust of others, just as we saw Deioces, for example, do in Media (cf. Ch.II.i.B). There is an instructive parallel here with the rise of Peisistratus to the tyranny (1.59.4f): having formerly won acclaim (πρότερον εὐδοκιμήσας) for his generalship in the war with Megara, he managed to deceive the people into giving him the bodyguard with which he eventually came to power (cf. Ch.II. ii.A). In the same way Miltiades uses this opportunity to 'deceive' the Athenian people (see below), whose acclaim he has won for his past record and for his recent achievement at Marathon. Thus paradoxically he wins their trust through an admirable euergesia, and at once shamefully abuses that trust in pursuit of his own interests. The words τότε μᾶλλον αὔξετο encapsulate the essence of this paradox.

And yet Herodotus is also concerned to point out that the Athenians are content with being deceived, and this stretch of narrative is an interesting reflexion on their aspirations in the aftermath of Marathon, quite as much as those of Miltiades. He told them that he would lead them to a place where they could without effort procure gold in abundance. The process of persuasion and the nature of the expedition clearly have something in common with the episode of Aristagoras' embassy at the time of the Ionian revolt (5.97). The Athenians, for all that they are 'lovers of freedom', are most interested in easy profit for themselves: they withdraw from the Ionian revolt, as soon as they see Aristagoras' promises will not come true so easily; and they soon turn their freedom-fight at Marathon into an excuse for private gain. The expedition against Paros has indeed an ostensible justification[73], that the Parians had sent a trireme in the service of the Persians to Marathon (6.133.1); but when Herodotus tells us later that Miltiades on his return was prosecuted for 'apate' (136.1), the reason we naturally infer is that he failed either to bring back any money or to capture the island (135.1, οὔτε χρήματα Ἀθηναίοισι ἄγων οὔτε Πάρον προσκτησάμενος). Moreover we are also told that Miltiades failed to tell the people where he meant to sail to (6.132, οὐ φράσας σφι ἐπ' ἣν ἐπιστρατεύσεται χώρην, ἀλλὰ φὰς αὐτοὺς καταπλουτιεῖν ἤν οἱ ἕπωνται)[74], and moreover that he had a private grievance against one of the Parians who had slandered him to Hydarnes (διαβαλόντα). It is significant that Herodotus has here dredged up a grievance from Miltiades' past[75] which reminds us that the champion of Athenian freedom at Marathon had previously been tyrant in the Chersonese and in league with Persia, at least until the incident at the Danube bridge, and probably even after (see below). Herodotus has not chosen to disguise the ambiguities in the character of the historical Miltiades, but presents them in their most disturbing form.

He has moreover framed[76] the heroism of Miltiades at Marathon with his treason trials at Athens, the first (6.104.2) in which he is called to account for his tyranny in the Chersonese[77], and the second (6.136.1f) brought by Xanthippus after the Parian expedition, for betraying the Athenian people (*apatē*). The first trial brings home the paradox of his flight from the Chersonese to become the hero of Athenian freedom *after his tyranny*, and reminds us that if Miltiades' enemies had had their way, Athens would have lost her champion, and herself succumbed to the 'tyranny' of Persian rule. Earlier Herodotus had told us how Miltiades was sent to the Chersonese by the Peisistratids, by whom he was well treated, despite what they had done to his father (6.39.1), reflecting the fact that he and his family were indeed at this stage hand-in-glove with the tyrants[78]. The irony of the second trial is underlined by Herodotus in his 'report' of the apology spoken for Miltiades by his friends (136.2), who appealed to his services at Marathon (πολλὰ ἐπιμεμνημένοι), and also to his capture of Lemnos and punishment of the Pelasgians. Herodotus' reconstruction of the trial here is as likely to be his own work as that of a source: there is nothing unusual or particularly memorable about such a defence by appeal to past services, indeed we would have been surprised if such a defence had not been invoked. The point of this reconstruction is, however, easy to appreciate: to contrast the two sides of Miltiades' life, his services to the Athenian people and his deception of them over the affair of Paros[79].

The Parian affair reflects no credit on either Miltiades or the Athenians; both show a decidedly unattractive appetite for profit (*pleonexia*), which distinctly upsets the glorious effect of Marathon. And yet it is clear that Herodotus means to prefigure this development in Miltiades' brave words to Callimachus even before the battle. If we turn back to this speech (6.109.3ff), we can see, in retrospect at least, that fine a thing though freedom is, it has nothing very much to do with morality and a great deal to do with self-interest and the appeal of profit. "If you do what I say", says Miltiades (6.109.3), "and Athens survives, it is possible for her to become the leading city in Greece" (οἵη τέ ἐστι πρώτη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολίων γενέσθαι). And it is the same message with which the speech closes (6.109.5): "if you do what I say, your fatherland will be both free and the first city in Greece (- a prediction now, merely a possibility! -); but if you do what the others say, you will have the opposite of all the good things (*agatha*) which I have mentioned". Miltiades' ambition for the future of Athens is what dominates the speech, and that ambition is something that the reader of Herodotus can only view with alarm: he cannot forget how Miltiades' prophecy came true and by what process the Delian League was transformed into the Athenian empire[80]. The promise of becoming the 'first city in Greece' is only comprehensible as a promise about power, just as the 'good things' mentioned by Miltiades are clearly the prizes of empire. Thus the future of Athens after Marathon is a mirror of what happens to Miltiades: the power and influence they win from their heroic fight for freedom leads them to a much more ominous and sinister role, and from the freedom-fighters they turn into imperialists. The Parian affair is just the the beginning of this much greater development. Miltiades is at once the spokesman for the admirable determination of the Athenians to resist enslavement and for their ambition for power and profit; and in a sense both he and the Athenians are paradoxically fighting for both things at the same time. It is no mistake that this is Miltiades the tyrant speaking: the ambiguity of his character is the same ambiguity that attaches to the Athenians with their democracy-tyranny (see Ch.II passim).

The question of what source-materials Herodotus used for his Miltiades-narrative, is more complicated than it has sometimes been made to seem. Certainly the hypothesis that Herodotus follows a Philaid source for whatever in the story is complimentary to Miltiades, is wholly unnecessary[81]. We know from the Attic comedy, for example, that in Herodotus' day Miltiades was popularly remembered as one of the old, illustrious, but dependable, democratic heroes, as evidenced in particular in his resurrection, along with Aristides, Pericles and others, in Eupolis' Demoi, to help restore the city to rights[82]. Thus we need invoke no esoteric family source to explain the parts of Herodotus' narrative which are complimentary to him: there can have been few to question that he was indeed the hero of Marathon and Athenian freedom.

In particular there is no reason to accept the traditional view that Herodotus' account of Miltiades' speech at the Danube bridge in favour of liberating Ionia by withdrawing the support of the Ionian tyrants from Darius, is in any sense Philaid fiction, designed to provide an apology for Miltiades' tyrannical past[83]. He is depicted by Herodotus as merely lending his voice to the plan presented by the Scythians, not, as we would expect if this were indeed an apologetic fiction, calling for the liberation of Ionia on his own initiative.

Miltiades remains for Herodotus a tyrant who owes his position to Persian support[84]. Thus Darius later takes no reprisals against his son, Metiochus, when the Phoenicians capture him and bring him to court, but rather treats him with honour (6.41.4: cf. his equally misguided treatment of the twofold traitor, to Greece and to the king, Histiaos: 6.30.2). Though Miltiades is indeed hounded out of the Chersonese by the Phoenician fleet (6.41.1ff and 104.1), we are not told the reason. On the contrary Herodotus, as some commentators have found curious[85], surprisingly fails to mention any involvement of Miltiades with the Ionian revolt, which he may well in reality have assisted. Indeed, as we saw, Herodotus seems to want to imply by his mention of the grievance of Miltiades against Lysagoras of Paros, for having 'denounced' him to Hydarnes, that he had until recently kept up 'friendship' with Persia, even if only duplicitously[86].

It follows from this that we cannot expect to be able to extract a Philaid apology for Miltiades out of Herodotus' narrative of his life. We should not however pretend on the other hand that the 'contradictions' of his career are an original insight of Herodotus. Miltiades was indisputably a tyrant in the Chersonese, and he was indisputably prosecuted in the Athenian courts after the Parian expedition, and those things are likely to have been well known[87]. What is important here however is Herodotus' emphasis: he need not have so sharply juxtaposed the shadier sides of Miltiades' life with his glorious achievement at Marathon. Nor, more particularly, did he need in describing the Parian expedition to insist on Miltiades' deception of the demos (i.e. not explaining the target of the expedition), or on his squalid appeal to their instinct for quick and easy profit. These are interpretative details supported by Herodotus on his own initiative. The story of Lysagoras on the other hand is unlikely to have been 'imagined' by Herodotus. although the malicious interpretation of it here may be his own work. By making this a secret grudge, Herodotus implies that Miltiades had reason to feel guilty about his relations with Persia: moreover the story transmitted to him may have made more of the service to Greece involved in his treachery to the Great King, which Herodotus' version has entirely disguised.

Herodotus' Miltiades is clearly not the straightforward, old-fashioned Athenian hero, whom Aristophanes and Eupolis bracket with Aristides, whose statue stood at Delphi beside Apollo and Athene together with the heroes of the Athenian tribes[88], or with Themistocles in the Theatre at Athens[89], or who was seen leading the Athenians to victory in the Stoa Poikile. Herodotus was, like Aristophanes and Eupolis, sufficiently distant from the events of 490 and before, to be able to see Miltiades' career in simple heroic terms; but it is just this simple picture that he has gone out of his way to complicate with shadow and perspective. The material was no doubt there to assist him in this - but he surely had to work to uncover it.

7. The case of Themistocles is similar, if somewhat more complicated[90]. In both cases Herodotus shows no concern to play down the contrast between the glamour of their defence of Greek freedom and the squalor of the ambitions to which their success encourages them. Insofar as we can recover it, the popular memory of Themistocles in Herodotus' day resembled somewhat that of Miltiades, although the negative sides of his life had not been forgotten, neither his cupidity nor his eventual flight to Persia. Although Themistocles does not merit resurrection in Eupolis' Demoi along with the other worthies of old, perhaps because 'though a wise man, his fingers were too itchy for gold'[91], he receives a remarkable laudation from the sausage-seller in Aristophanes'

Knights[92]. The Paphlagonian has just tried to claim that he has done more for the city than ever Themistocles did, at which his opponent protests that Themistocles filled the city full of good things, 'kneading it into one with the Peiraeus', that is building the Long Walls[93]. "You dare to compare yourself to Themistocles", he ends up: κἀκεῖνος μὲν φεύγει τὴν γῆν, σὺ δ' Ἀχιλλείων ἀπομάττει . This reference to Themistocles' 'bad end' ought not to be perjorative if the contrast between the old hero of the democracy and the new grasping demagogue is to be consistent; and this may indicate the beginnings of an apologetic tradition for Themistocles' career, in which his disgrace came to be blamed on the phthonos of the democracy. In Plato's Gorgias[94], Socrates argues (unexpectedly) against the 'popular' view advanced by Gorgias and the Callicles that men like Themistocles were indeed heroes of the democracy (e.g. 503C: Callicles speaking): τί δέ; Θεμιστοκλέα οὐκ ἀκούεις ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γεγονότα καὶ Κίμωνα καὶ Μιλτιάδην καὶ Περικλέα τουτονὶ τὸν νεωστὶ τετελευτηκότα οὗ καὶ σὺ ἀκήκοας; Lysias lists Solon, Themistocles and Pericles as men whom the ancients chose as lawgivers, in the belief that their laws would match their characters[95]. In the philosophical schools indeed Themistocles came to be adopted as a paradigm of the wise statesman[96]. All this certainly, does not imply anything like a univocal tradition favourable to Themistocles in the late 5th and early 4th centuries, nor would it be reasonable to expect such a tradition for any historical figure of the Persian Wars generation, least of all one whose career was as obviously flawed as that of Themistocles. It does however suggest that by Herodotus' day Themistocles had become sufficiently remote in the popular memory to be remembered with more indulgence than animosity. Indeed there was an obvious and simple reason why this should have been: the Athens of the radical democracy, with its abrasive, ambitious demagogues, clearly came to be contrasted with the Athens of the generation that won the war against Persia and achieved the earliest successes of the empire, the contrast, in short, which we observe in the passage of Aristophanes discussed above.

The Herodotean picture of Themistocles however has received varied and somewhat contradictory critical comment. Podlecki(p.68) speaks the majority opinion when he treats Herodotus' portrait as essentially unsympathetic: "Where Herodotus (or his informants) stood emerges ... from the insinuation and damaging innuendo with which he tells his version of the story. He lines up squarely on the side of those[97] ... who, although they could not ignore Themistocles in the events of 480, nevertheless did all they could to belittle his contribution and besmirch his name"[98]. Podlecki argues that it was this Herodotean malice that Thucydides' study of Themistocles was meant to answer[99]. On the other hand, Fornara argues the opposite view that there is nothing malicious about Herodotus' treatment of the hero of Salamis, but that it is rather uniformly balanced and sympathetic (p.69): "The challenge to his skill was to create a believable character who was capable of being at once the saviour of the Greeks in Xerxes' War and the presumed traitor of not very long after". The present discussion shares the opinion of Fornara that the portrait is complex and coherently conceived, while differing on some details and on a general principle: for me the measured polarities of Herodotus' account of Themistocles are a part of a much wider picture, the picture of the contradictions in all human behaviour, which find their most exaggerated expression in the lives of great influential men.

Before we illustrate this aspect of Herodotus' portrait, it will be worth examining two well-known problems of the account, which have led many commentators to the conclusion that he has been confused by a source hostile to Themistocles.

The problem of his introduction of Themistocles at 7.143.1 as a man ἐς πρώτους νεωστὶ παρίων calls for some comment here. It is traditionally supposed that this 'understatement', the absence of a fanfare for the hero of Salamis, shows the influence of a tradition hostile to Themistocles[100]. Certainly it contradicts somewhat Herodotus' own notice shortly after to the effect that Themistocles had already initiated an important policy decision in having the silver of Laurium used to build up the fleet for the war against Aegina (7.144.1f), as well as the external evidence which suggests he held the archonship in 493-2[101], and the unequivocal testimony of the ostraka, which show that he was already a 'candidate' for ostracism in the same year as Megacles (i.e. 487-6), as well as in the year of Aristides' ostracism (484-3 or better 483-2)[102]. Indeed Herodotus' own narrative later also shows us that he knew the confrontation between Themistocles and Aristides which resulted in the latter's ostracism, to be an important element in Athenian politics of before the war (8.79.1ff). Attempts to resolve the difficulty by arguing for example that the archonship was at this stage an office of youth[103], whether or not they are historically sound, hardly counterbalance the evidence of the ostraka and Herodotus' own evidence for the conflict with Aristides. We can however provide an account of Herodotus' literary intentions here which will resolve the difficulty. In the first place, we should remember that Herodotus' general rule, borrowed from Homer (see above), is to avoid character judgements, except where they are to serve a precise narrative function[104]. Hence he is deliberately reticent here, perhaps even provocatively so. The paradoxes of Themistocles' character and life are to emerge through action. On the other hand, we should ask if Herodotus has a particular purpose in disguising the extent of

Themistocles' earlier political career at this point, when other references show that he is not ignorant of it. The answer seems to be that we are invited to note the fortuitousness of Themistocles' *akmē* coinciding with the moment of Athens' and Greece's greatest need. In the same sort of way, Herodotus seems to remind us of the lucky chance of Miltiades' emergence as the hero of Marathon, when he might have succumbed to the plotting of his political enemies (see above); so too he will later point out the good fortune of Leonidas' emergence as the hero of Thermopylae (7.204-205.1), when he might never have been king at all (κτησάμενος τὴν βασιληίην ἐν Σπάρτηι ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου). In other words, Herodotus has knowingly distorted the shape of Themistocles' career to make a particular dramatic effect. At any rate, even if this line of interpretation is rejected, it does not mean the 'source-explanation' is the right one. It is hard to see that there is anything malicious about this introduction (cf. n.100), nor has Herodotus glossed over Themistocles' earlier (fortuitous!) political triumph over the fleet for Aegina (7.144.1, ἑτέρη τε Θεμιστοκλέϊ γνώμη ἔμπροσθε ταύτης ἐς καιρὸν ἠρίστευσε), so that he is clear in his own mind that Themistocles had already made at least one valuable contribution to the political welfare of Athens before the crisis of 480. We cannot be happy to argue that in one and the same passage Herodotus is both misled and not misled by a source hostile to Themistocles.

The other controversial problem of Herodotus' account of Themistocles is the part played by Mnesiphilos, the man who gives the advice that battle must be joined at Salamis or Greece will be lost, advice which the Athenian general appropriates without a word (8.58.1, οὐδὲν πρὸς ταῦτα ἀμειψάμενος) and proceeds to put before Euribiadas as his own, though with many additions (58.2, ἑωυτοῦ ποιεύμενος, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ προστιθείς). This episode, and Herodotus' treatment of it, have been thought to represent a deliberate slur on Themistocles, an attempt to deprive him of the glory of having saved the day at Salamis[105]. As we shall see later, Herodotus does intend the story to qualify the part played by Themistocles here, but it is quite clear that qualification is the most it can achieve. Even if the story detracts from the originality of Themistocles' planning, Herodotus by his subsequent elaborate dramatization leaves us in no doubt as to the remarkable abilities of Themistocles in carrying through his intentions in the assembly of the allies at Salamis, and in decisive action when the time came when words alone would no longer suffice. Thus if he lacks the same quality of foresight, in its widest sense, which Thucydides so much admires in him (1.138.3), he nonetheless possesses - through Herodotus' explicit characterization, we must observe - the ability which Thucydides is most emphatic about commending: καὶ τὸ ξύμπαν εἰπεῖν, φύσεως μὲν δυνάμει, μελέτης δὲ βραχύτητι κράτιστος δὴ οὗτος αὐτοσχεδιάζειν τὰ δέοντα ἐγένετο. This summation of his character could well describe the brilliant intellectual manoeuvring by which, with every twist and turn of events, Themistocles in Herodotus' account finds a new way of carrying with him the fearful and indecisive assembly at Salamis (see Ch.II.iii, for a detailed analysis).

For this side of Themistocles' character we are wholly dependent on the elaborate speeches which Herodotus has improvised to illustrate the vacillations of the Greeks before Salamis. Only on the unrealistic view that these speeches were dictated to him by some source favourable to Themistocles, can we avoid the conclusion that Herodotus' ambivalence towards the hero of Salamis involves an element of paradox. (And see especially on 8.110.1 below).

This element of paradox emerges most clearly from the narrative of the immediate sequel to Salamis. On the day after the battle, the Greeks pursue the Persian fleet as far as Andros, where they pause to debate their strategy. Themistocles (8.108.2) argues at first that they should sail by way of the islands and pursue the fleet to the Hellespont, where they should destroy the bridges. Eurybiadas argues the opposite, and points to the danger of trapping the Persian army in Europe (108.2ff), and the rest of the Peloponnesian generals agree. Themistocles however then does a complete volte-face (109.1ff) and, turning to the Athenians, starts arguing Eurybiadas' case to them. "In addition", he says, "our victory was a lucky chance: let us not pursue the Persians further. It is not we who have defeated them but the gods and heroes who begrudged that one man should rule both Asia and Europe, a man both impious and wicked, who treated holy things and profane with the same contempt, burning and overturning the images of the gods, who even whipped the sea and sent down shackles into its depths. Let us stay in Greece and restore our homes and our crops, and when the spring comes, let us sail to Ionia and the Hellespont". And this Themistocles argued, says Herodotus (109.5), because he wished to lay up credit with the Mede, so that should any misfortune befall him at Athens, he might have a refuge: 'which indeed came to pass'. In saying this, Themistocles deceived the Athenians (110.1), having in the past had a reputation for wisdom[106] and having been shown to be truly wise and of good counsel (καὶ πρότερον δεδογμένος εἶναι σοφὸς ἐφάνη ἐὼν ἀληθέως σοφός τε καὶ εὔβουλος), so that they were now prepared to listen to what he had to say. Herodotus then describes how he sent Sikinnos and others secretly to the king to explain that he had done him a service (110.3) by preventing the Greeks from destroying the bridges.

There is a very obvious structural parallelism in the story here: the original mission to Xerxes before the battle, in which Themistocles had feigned treason towards the Greeks (8.75.1ff), is balanced by a second mission (with the same messenger, cf. 8.110.2, τῶν καὶ Σίκιννος ὁ οἰκέτης αὖτις ἐγένετο) after the battle, in which he claims both to have acted in the interests of the king (and has not) and to be acting treasonably towards the Greeks (and is). Moreover the second embassy clearly cannot be historical: Themistocles can hardly have hoped to deceive the Great King again so soon, to mention not the least of the possible objections[107]. How much of this contrasting parallelism is due to Herodotus and how much to the tradition before him? Clearly we cannot talk of outright Herodotean invention, since Thucydides, Ktesias and (more obviously independent) Aeschines of Sphettos provide us with early testimonies to the prevalence of the tradition outside Herodotus [108]. And yet we should not be too hasty here. For Ktesias, the second embassy is only a device of Themistocles' (with Aristides!) to secure Xerxes' flight from Europe (καὶ φεύγει Ξέρξης βουλῆι πάλιν καὶ τέχνηι Ἀριστείδου καὶ Θεμιστοκλέους). In Aeschines the Socratic, Themistocles is said to have been unable to persuade the Athenians (sic) to dismantle the bridges, but then to have sent the message to Xerxes pretending he had saved him. Similarly in Thucydides (1.137.4), Themistocles writes to Artaxerxes that he has done ' most harm to the king's house of all the Hellenes, but also still greater good', a claim he supports with reference possibly to the mission to Xerxes at Salamis (προάγγελσιν τῆς ἀναχωρήσεως) and clearly to the second mission (τὴν τῶν γεφυρῶν, ἣν ψευδῶς προσεποιήσατο, τότε δι' αὐτὸν οὐ διάλυσιν). Are we obliged to conclude that the Ktesias-version is the apologetic answer to an invention of the tradition hostile to Themistocles, the latter independently finding its way into Herodotus, Thucydides and Aeshines? Or could we not say that Herodotus initiated the malicious interpretation of an originally favourable story (as preserved by Ktesias) and that his account influenced (directly or indirectly) those of Thucydides and Aeschines[109]?

Even if we do not accept that it was Herodotus' idea to make of the second mission not a bland doublet of the first but a pointed contrast, we are obliged to note the extraordinarily detailed dramatization of this episode. We are given a full account of this debate at Andros, with a lengthy report of Eurybiadas' speech against the proposal of Themistocles (8.108.2-4); a description of the state of mind of the Athenians (109.1), followed by Themistocles' speech to them, again at length (109.2-4); an account of their reasons for trusting his advice (110.1); and finally a paragraph on the mission to Xerxes (110.2-3), together with the speech of Sikinnos (cf. 8.75.2). All this dramatization, speeches, inferences as to motive and disposition, is surely free invention by Herodotus; the fullness of the account indeed lends support to the view that it had sufficient authority to influence the tradition followed by Thucydides and Aeschines. On any explanation of the origins of this version of the story, however, Herodotus is clearly concerned to point up in the greatest detail the twists and turns of Themistocles' career. For Herodotus, no less than for Thucydides, Themistocles is the man who both saved the Greeks at Salamis and betrayed them when he subsequently went over to Artaxerxes: this story, with its explicit reminder of Themistocles' medism (τά περ ὦν καὶ ἐγένετο), forms the bridge between these two sides of his life. Moreover it underlines that Themistocles is indeed the same man all through: on both occasions that he uses the diplomacy of Sikinnos (and indeed on a third as well, cf. 8.112.1) he is exhibiting the same opportunism. The same quality that won the victory for the Greeks at Salamis is used with equal foresight to provide himself with a retreat from the disfavour of his countrymen. Those who argue that Herodotus has been blinkered here against an appreciation of Themistocles' virtues by a hostile source, must face the paradox that at the very moment of describing his deception of the Athenians he goes out of his way to remind us of, and commend in his own person, that genuine wisdom and foresight which had won him their trust (8.110.1, ἐφάνη ἐὼν ἀληθέως σοφός τε καὶ εὔβουλος).

Herodotus moreover offers us an impressive and characteristic irony here, when he puts into Themistocles' speech to deceive the Athenians an interpretation of the Greek victory which shows humility, insight, piety and restraint. The Greeks, he argues, should see their achievemnt in perspective; the lesson is clearly a Herodotean one[110]. Needless to say, however, Themistocles is one of the people least appropriate as the mouthpiece of such sentiments, and least of all Herodotus' Themistocles. The immediate context, the second mission of Sikinnos to Xerxes, forcibly reminds us that this Themistocles is duplicitous, ambitious, rash and treacherous: even these very words of piety are meant to deceive. We have in short little choice but to accept the irony of this speech as Herodotean. His source at the most can have told him no more than that Themistocles deceived the Athenians into refraining from destroying the bridges[111]: the rest, with its lesson of piety and restraint, is surely Herodotus' own elaboration.

8. We are now in a position to see that this sort of paradox is a deliberate and characteristic device. Herodotus makes a habit of having the 'wrong' people say the 'right' things. A character can be made to deliver an opinion that is penetratingly true or strikingly upright, whose behaviour otherwise speaks only of blind misjudgement

or a complete disregard for truth. We have already met two examples of this, in Leotychidas' lesson on honesty delivered to the Athenians (6.86), and in Xerxes' lesson on justice to the Spartan heralds (7.136). Indeed the work's final chapter is a variation of the same device (9.122): Cyrus, the founder of the Persian empire, the man who initiated the nomos of Persian expansion (cf. 7.8a.1), himself warns the Persians against the dangers of that expansion[112]. The particular examples which most closely parallel this speech of Themistocles, are the various anecdotes of Pausanias' conduct after Plataea, whose ironies were well observed by Fornara[113]. In the story of the concubine of Pharandates (9.76), of the interview with Lampon of Aegina (9.78-9), and of the luxury of Mardonius (9.82), Pausanias is made to speak for Hellenic piety and restraint in opposition to Persian excess - the same man, who, as all Herodotus' generation will have known, so soon after succumbed to all the temptations of Oriental despotism (cf. Thucydides 1.130.1f, with Herodotus 5.32; see further Ch.II.iii)[113a].

Before drawing conclusions about the nature and variety of the paradoxes used by Herodotus in his treatment of character and action, I wish to look at one more example, on a larger scale, which will show the techniques operating on a broader canvas, that is between episodes rather more than within them.

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Herodotus on Human Nature, Part ii: Cleomenes.

1. Herodotus' narrative of the doings of Cleomenes is commonly criticized as being the confused synthesis of discrepant materials. Jeffery, for example, has this to say of Cleomenes[114]:

> "Nearly all our knowledge of his reign comes from Herodotus, and (inevitably in a non-consecutive narrative covering so wide a range in space and time) the account is disjointed, one piece apparently from a favourable source, another from an unfavourable. The most hostile sources would be the true queen's Agid next-of-kin, and the family of the Eurypontid king Damaratos[115] ... the most favourable, his mother's family and the Eurypontid next-of-kin of Latychidas ...".

At first sight this is a reasonable attempt to explain Herodotus' text, but it is a kind of interpretation which offers little credit to his intelligence. It assumes that despite the importance, both literary and historical, which he clearly attaches to Cleomenes, he has been unable to form any coherent model for his character to help him in selecting and presenting his material, and instead has botched it together in desperation at the complexity of the task. It is true that the scissors-and-paste theory does have a superficial attraction in this case, because of the apparently confusing way Herodotus has laid out the story, scattered about in some disorder and without a simple connecting narrative chain. To say that the presentation of Cleomenes is 'disjointed', however, will not do if it means anything more than that chronological order is disturbed and that the narrative comes in the form of episodes[116]. Stylistically and aesthetically the Cleomenes stories do have a considerable coherence; indeed it is clear that Herodotus has gone out of his way to elaborate the part played by Cleomenes to give a focus to long stretches of Greek history (5.39-76 and 6.50-84)[117].

In this respect Cleomenes can be said to do for Herodotus' Greek history what his Persian or Lydian kings do for his oriental history[118]. The story of Cleomenes indeed uses certain themes from the narratives of Herodotus' oriental kings. As we shall see, for example, Cleomenes' encounter with the river Erasinos (6.76.1f) has an obvious similarity with the irreverent treatment of rivers by eastern imperialists, and in particular there are important correspondences with Cambyses. Both are suspected of madness (Herodotus uses the same word hypomargoteros of each: 3.29.1, with 6.75.1), both die from self-inflicted wounds[119], and the madness of both, as well as their violent and premature deaths are traceable to acts of sacrilege (see below). These correspondences of detail suggest strongly that it was indeed Herodotus' intention to make a coherent unity of the Cleomenes story, to be comparable with the tragedies of his oriental dynasts.

In Books Five and Six, the various strands of Greek history in the two or three decades before the Persian Wars have been worked into a complex and impressionistic embroidery. The narrative is discontinuous, selective, chronologically disjointed - but we emerge knowing all we really need to know. The danger of this whole fabric falling apart is, in part at least, avoided by Herodotus' deployment of the figure of Cleomenes. The one character bestrides several key areas of Greek history at this period: the emergence of Athens from tyranny and her growing dominance over her neighbours, the medizing of Aegina, the crushing defeat of Argos, and less specifically, the continuing and growing tension between Sparta and the rest of the Greek world, both her enemies and her allies, as well as Sparta's changed position in international affairs, as reflected in her response to overtures from Ionia (Maiandrios, Aristagoras). All this is essential for our understanding of the background to the events of the Persian Wars themselves and the dispositions of the protagonists on the Greek side. In this Cleomenes is made to stand for the Spartan body politic: the inscrutable machinery of the Spartan state has deliberately been given a human face by Herodotus to simplify and clarify the exposition.

2. Moreover the narrative of Cleomenes' doings is itself held together by a strong element of patterning. The main pattern is the recurrence of the motif of 'intervention', diplomatic and military interference in the affairs of other states by Cleomenes and the Spartans: (a) the two expeditions to remove the Peisistratids at Athens (5.62.2ff); (b) the intervention at the instigation of Isagoras to remove Cleisthenes and his party from Athens (5.70.1ff); (c) the abortive invasion mounted by Cleomenes to punish the Athenians for their treatment of him on his previous 'visit' (5.74.1ff); (d) a further abortive mission against a free Athens which interrupts the war with Aegina, an attempt to restore Hippias (5.90.1ff: not explicitly described as being led by Cleomenes); (e) then Cleomenes' first abortive expedition to Aegina (6.50); (f) the second successful mission with Leotychidas (6.73.1ff); (g) and finally the invasion of the Argolid (6.76.1ff). Herodotus shows us that he is indeed thinking in terms of patterns here, when he says of Cleomenes' unsuccessful expedition against Athens (5.76 = (c) above) that this was the fourth time that the Dorians had come to Attica, twice in war (δὶς ἐπὶ πολέμωι) and twice with friendly purposes (καὶ δὶς ἐπ' ἀγαθῶι): the settlement of Megara in the time of Codrus, the two times that they came to drive out the Peisistratids (the first under Ankhimolios had been a failure; 5.62.2ff), and now Cleomenes' invasion of Eleusis[120]. We are entitled to infer that he sees the same contrasts and comparisons in the rest of the sequence. Herodotus uses the theme of intervention as the basis for variations: success and failure, goodwill and aggression, just and unjust causes,

pure and impure motive.

The expedition to remove the Peisistratids is in outward appearance commendably motivated and carried off without abuse. The Spartans could be justly proud of their reputation for ridding the Greek states of tyranny (cf. 5.92a.1), and, as we have just seen, Herodotus himself describes the expedition (in contrast with the later full-scale invasion) as undertaken for the good of the Athenians (ἐπ’ ἀγαθῶι, 5.76). But Herodotus has of course let it be known that the Spartans had been encouraged by a false oracle from Delphi[121], and that in marching on Athens they were disregarding their ties of guest-friendship with the Peisistratids (5.63.2). In other words, even at this stage Herodotus has introduced disturbing cross-currents into the narrative of the liberation (see further Ch.II.ii). The superficial impression however is that Cleomenes is indeed acting here in the best interests of the Athenians[122]. And yet the very same Cleomenes responds but a few chapters later to a call from Isagoras to help expel Cleisthenes and set up a narrow oligarchy (5.70.1ff).

Herodotus introduces this episode by mentioning two seemingly gratuitous details, which however turn out to have particular point for the interpretation of the narrative: (i) that Isagoras had become friends with Cleomenes from the siege of the Peisistratids, and (ii) that rumour had it that Cleomenes slept with Isagoras' wife. By mentioning the circumstances under which Cleomenes and Isagoras had become friends, Herodotus means to draw our attention to the way that the present enterprise contrasts with the liberation of Athens from tyranny, in which both of them had played a part. By mentioning the rumour of Cleomenes' adultery, Herodotus casts a smear over both the adulterer and the cuckold, and we are invited to connect private with public morality:

just as Isagoras lets another man into his bed, so he gives another man responsibility in the private affairs of his city[123]. Further Cleomenes' conduct of the mission, especially by comparison with the previous one, is excessive and harsh. Having secured the removal of Cleisthenes and his family by dredging up the Cylonian curse, as instructed by Isagoras (5.70.2), he nonetheless (οὐδὲν ἧσσον) makes his way to Athens (72.1), and drives out 700 other families as guilty of the curse, under instructions from Isagoras. He then sets about removing the boulē and putting the constitution into the hands of 300 of Isagoras' stasiōtai. But the attempt is resisted and Cleomenes and Isagoras having siezed the Acropolis are besieged and then forced to surrender[124].

Cleomenes' third expedition to Attica (5.74.1ff) is motivated, so Herodotus tells us, by nothing more than private enmity: ἐπιστάμενος περιυβρίσθαι ἔπεσι καὶ ἔργοισι ὑπ' Ἀθηναίων. We are told indeed that he did not explain to the Peloponnesians why he was assembling them (οὐ φράζων ἐς τὸ συλλέγει), but that his intention was to punish the Athenian demos and set up Isagoras as tyrant. There is an instructive parallel here with the behaviour of Miltiades after Marathon, where Herodotus again shows us a general with a private grudge who witholds his true intentions from the army (cf. 6.132, οὐ φράσας σφι ἐπ' ἣν ἐπιστρατεύσεται χώρην)[125]. The same Cleomenes who in the first expedition had freed Athens from the tyrants, in the second had supported an oligarchic, anti-democratic faction, in this third attempt at intervention plans to restore the very condition of tyranny he had, with such apparent justice, helped to remove. As it happens Cleomenes is faced with a revolt at Eleusis, when the Corinthians change their minds and decide that what they are doing is wrong (ὡς οὐ ποιοῖεν τὰ δίκαια); and they are followed by Demaratus (75.1), whom we judge also to be acting on right principle, since Herodotus goes out of his way to tell us that he had previously held no grudge against Cleomenes (οὐκ ἐὼν διάφορος ἐν τῶι πρόσθε χρόνωι). The alienation of sympathy for Cleomenes is something that Herodotus is careful to chart: in the first expedition he had acted with the support of both the Spartans (στρατηγὸν ... ἀποδέξαντες) and the majority of the Athenian people; in the second he appears to be acting unofficially (οὐ σὺν μεγάληι χειρί) and without the support of the body of the Athenians; in the third (οὐ φράζων ἐς τὸ συλλέγει) he loses the support even of the Peloponnesian allies and of his fellow-king, Demaratus. He is no longer a disinterested champion of freedom but rather a self-willed and despotic leader, acting on nothing better than private animosity. The parallel with Miltiades is clear: both men are paradoxically inconsistent in their championship of the ideal of freedom, both seem to deteriorate in the same way.

That Herodotus is sensitive to the paradox of Cleomenes first championing Athenian freedom, then plotting to re-impose the tyranny, can be inferred from what he has Socles of Corinth say when the Spartans as a whole try to undo the work of the liberation (5.92a.1). "Surely the heavens will change places with the earth, and men take to living in the sea and fishes on the land, now that the Spartans, of all people, are destroying 'isocracies' and preparing to set up tyrannies" (see Ch.II.ii). It may be true that the Spartans were cheated by the Alcmeonids into betraying their friends the Peisistratids (see above), but Herodotus does not let us forget that they claimed credit for their action, and thus fully deserved the charge of inconsistency.

The same kind of reversal marks Cleomenes' behaviour over Aegina: in the first expedition to the island Cleomenes appears to be acting in the best interests of Greece in attempting to punish the medizers among the Aeginetans (6.50), and indeed Herodotus explicitly says later that his action is commendable at this moment (6.61.1): ἐόντα ἐν τῆι Αἰγίνηι καὶ κοινὰ τῆι Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον ...[126]. He is indeed accused by Krios of acting on bribery (50.2): "he is acting without the authority of the Spartan assembly, bribed by Athenian money; if not, he would have come to arrest them in company with the other king". But (adds Herodotus) Krios said all this on instructions from Demaratus[127] - who was plotting meanwhile against Cleomenes at Sparta, as we are told soon after (6.51; cf. 6.61.1). On a first impression the accusation of bribery seems unfounded, and Cleomenes seems indeed to be acting on good principle for the safety of Greece; but neither Cleomenes nor Herodotus attempts to refute the charge, and nothing that is otherwise said implies that it is not true. Though we do not perhaps suspect duplicity of motive on a first reading, we might well reconsider when we are told later about Cleomenes' bribery of the Pythia. Herodotus has merely planted the doubt: he puts the burden of interpretation on the reader.

Cleomenes' settlement of the Aegina question is then interrupted by his own plot to depose Demaratus (6.51-72), in the course of which narrative we come to change our minds about his motives towards Aegina. At 6.51 we hear that Demaratus was plotting against Cleomenes at Sparta while the latter was in Aegina; at which point we are inclined, since we have not yet heard enough about Demaratus' grievance[128], to sympathize with Cleomenes, who after all seems to be acting altruistically and in a good cause. After a digression on the origins of the Spartan dual kingship, we hear again (6.61.1)[129] that Demaratus was plotting against his fellow-king while the latter was in Aegina: only this time we are told explicitly what we had suspected before; that Cleomenes was occupied with the common interests of Greece (see above) and that Demaratus was motivated not so much by sympathy for the Aeginetans as by envy and jealousy (οὐκ Αἰγινητέων οὕτω κηδόμενος ὡς φθόνωι καὶ ἄγηι χρεώμενος)[130]. It is interesting however that Herodotus should put it this way, allowing that perhaps the Aeginetans did deserve sympathy. No doubt Cleomenes was acting in the common interest of Greece, but his action was certainly an infringement of the liberties of another Greek state, and perhaps not even a Spartan satellite (cf. n.133). We are beginning to see that Cleomenes' action is less simple than it at first appeared. Indeed it is from this point that things start to change, as we find out that, on his return from Aegina, Cleomenes sets about trying to depose Demaratus (in turn as it were): there is no explanation here of his motives, and we plunge straight into a discussion of his pretext, with a digression on the amours of Ariston (6.61-4). When that is over, Herodotus tells us (6.64) that it seemed fated for Ariston's indiscretion to come to light and deprive Demaratus of the kingship, and that Demaratus had on this account violently fallen out with Cleomenes (Κλεομενέϊ διεβλήθη μεγάλως) even before, when he had led the army back from Eleusis (cf. 5.75.1 above), and especially now that Cleomenes had sailed against the Aeginetans. We cannot tell whether this connexion between Demaratus' behaviour at Eleusis and the beginnings of his quarrel was actually made by Herodotus' source or whether it was his own inference[131]. Either way he has carefully chosen his moment to bring it to our attention, since it now clearly makes a difference to our appreciation of the quarrel between the two kings. At Eleusis Demaratus had gone against Cleomenes "not from any previous grudge", as Herodotus had made clear at the time, but following the lead of the Corinthians who realised that "what they were doing was not just". By making this connexion here and not earlier as he might have done, Herodotus makes us begin to see Demaratus' quarrel with Cleomenes in a different light: opposing Cleomenes at Eleusis had been a just thing for him to do and did not deserve the hostility of Cleomenes. There is then a symmetry in Herodotus' juxtaposition here: Demaratus' good deed at Eleusis is balanced by Cleomenes' good deed at Aegina, so that just as Demaratus seems to be wrong to use the occasion of Aegina to plot against Cleomenes, so Cleomenes seems to be wrong when he dates his hostility to Demaratus from the occasion of Eleusis. Herodotus goes on to say next that it was Cleomenes' desire to pay back Demaratus (65.1, ὁρμηθεὶς ὧν ἀποτίνυσθαι) that decided him to band together with Leotychidas; and he does so on the understanding that Leotychidas will follow him against the Aeginetans (ἐπ' ὧι τε ... ἕψεταί οἱ ἐπ' Αἰγινήτας). By now this sounds much more sinister than it did a couple of pages before (6.61.1). It is not only that the means (the treacherous deposition of Demaratus) affect our approval of the end (the 'deserved' punishment of the Aeginetans), but the end itself begins to seem not quite the same. This suspicion is confirmed when we learn next (6.73.1) that when Cleomenes had succeeded against Demaratus, he at once took Leotychidas to Aegina, smarting with anger at the insult he had received from the islanders: δεινόν τινά σφι ἔγκοτον διὰ τὸν προπηλακισμὸν ἔχων [132]. Cleomenes is either not after all or not any more acting on principle, but on private animosity. There is an obvious parallel with his expeditions to Athens: in both cases he starts with an apparently good cause (freedom at Athens, the common good of Greece at Aegina) and ends doing no more than settling a private score; in both cases he feels he has been personally insulted (*perihybristhai* at Athens, *propēlakismos* at Aegina).

Once the Aeginetans have been forced into handing over the hostages (73.2)[133], Herodotus tells us that Cleomenes and Leotychidas deposited them with the Athenians, or rather "with the people most hostile to the Aeginetans, the Athenians": (ἐς τοὺς ἐχθίστους Αἰγινήτηισι Ἀθηναίους). In other words, this was no true *parathēkē*, but one which had the interests of the 'deposit' least at heart: the Spartans hoped (Herodotus surely implies) that the hostages would get a rough time. If we have not already guessed that this was a vicious act, we realize as much when (6.85.1f) after the death of Cleomenes the Spartans put Leotychidas on trial, at the instigation of the Aeginetans, and find him guilty of criminal brutality (*perihybristhai*). And this is where for the Spartans at least Cleomenes' intervention in Aegina "in the common interest of Greece" has its ignominious end, with Leotychidas forced to argue for what is effectively a reversal of the whole enterprise.

If this is the right way to read Herodotus' portrait of Cleomenes, then we have much less reason to look for contradictions in his account as evidence for the influence of rival sources. When at 6.61.1 Herodotus delivers an obviously favourable commentary on Cleomenes' action in Aegina, when he was "acting in the common interests of Greece" (κοινὰ τῆι Ἑλλάδι ἀγαθὰ προεργαζόμενον), he is clearly exercising his own editorial voice, rather than borrowing the judgement of a source. If indeed a source had supplied him with such a judgement, and he felt it to be inconsistent with his own model of Cleomenes' character, he could just as easily have left it out altogether, and at the most have said nothing more than he did at 6.51, a passage which the present one recapitulates in amplified form (cf. n.129). Indeed the judgement at 6.61 is structurally quite independent of the two narrative panels of Cleomenes' activities in Aegina (at 6.50 and 6.73), and itself merely forms a part of a link-passage, bringing Cleomenes back to Sparta for his contest with Demaratus, after the digression of the Spartan dual kingship (6.51-60). We can hardly go so far in source-analysis as to postulate that even Herodotus' link-passages depend for their sentiments on the prejudices of his informants. The conclusion that Herodotus himself has intruded this surprising commendation of Cleomenes action is irresistible.

This passage can help to explain the other favourable impressions of Cleomenes. Its principal effect is one of perspective, of contrast between the ignobility of Demaratus' plotting and the desirability (to put it no stronger) of Cleomenes' action on behalf of Greece: seen against the background of the threat from Demaratus, Cleomenes' action appears admirable and uncomplicated. But the effect is certainly one of perspective only: it is not that Cleomenes becomes a different sort of person, but that in the right context his actions can take on a surprising aspect; indeed it is Herodotus' point that an unexpected variety of behaviour can come from the same character, without his necessarily ever changing.

3. Herodotus adopts the same sort of trick of presentation for his first introduction of Cleomenes. When Maiandrios flees from Samos and the Persians, he comes to Sparta to get help (3.148.1f). He has his gold and silver goblets polished and displayed, and invites Cleomenes son of Anaxandridas, king of Sparta, to his house. Cleomenes wonders at the goblets (ἀπεϑώμαζέ τε ϰαὶ ἐξεπλήσσετο) and Maiandrios tells him to take as many as he would like. But though Maiandrios twice and three times repeated his invitation, Cleomenes behaved most justly (3.148.2, διϰαιότατος ἀνδρῶν γίνεται), in that he did not think it right (οὐϰ ἐδιϰαίου) to take what was offered him[134]. Realizing that if Maiandrios approached others of the Spartans, he would succeed in getting help against the Persians, he went to the ephors and said that it would be best if the Samian stranger left the Peloponnese, lest he persuade either himself (Cleomenes) or any other of the Spartans to do wrong (ϰαϰὸν γενέσϑαι). The ephors agree to his request and order Maiandrios out of Sparta.

Clearly much of the force of this story is in the contrast between Maiandrios and the Spartan king. Cleomenes' behaviour elicits from Herodotus the comment that he acted most justly (δικαιότατος ἀνδρῶν γίνεται), and the words remind us of what he said of Maiandrios himself only a few pages before (3.142.1), that Maiandrios wanted to behave most justly but was prevented from doing so (τῶι δικαιοτάτωι ἀνδρῶν βουλομένωι γενέσθαι οὐκ ἐξεγένετο ; cf. Ch.I.i). There is an unmistakable irony here which the echo (guaranteed by the proximity of the two passages) underlines: we are encouraged to reflect how far Maiandrios has come from *his* starting-point and to wonder whether Cleomenes is not going to go the same way. The irony for Cleomenes is that though he rejects bribery here, he ends up using bribery himself in the most shameful of circumstances (6.66.2), corrupting the *promantis* at Delphi to secure the removal of Demaratus. Herodotus possibly knew that he could count on his reader's familiarity, at least in vague terms, with the corruptibility of Cleomenes, so that there is meant to be a surprise effect in this first introduction.

4. We next meet Cleomenes when Herodotus reports the arrival of another ambassador to Sparta (5.39.1ff)[135]. It is clear that the interview with Aristagoras (5.49.1ff) is in narrative terms an elaboration or amplification of the interview with Maiandrios: the same ingredients are common to both scenes - the Ionian ambassador with shady motives, suing for Spartan assistance against Persia, but with an ambition to restore himself to power in his own city; the offering of temptation, in Maiandrios' case gold and silver, in Aristagoras' case the riches of all Asia, which despite the insistence of the ambassador is resisted by the Spartan king[136]. As an elaboration, however, the Aristagoras scene is both more involved and more closely observed than its model.

Herodotus at first delays the report of the interview itself, so that it comes a number of pages after the first mention of Aristagoras' arrival (5.39.1 with 49.1, a sort of ring). In the course of these pages Herodotus has been building up a negative picture of Cleomenes: he becomes thereby the unworthy successor to Anaxandridas, who by contrast with the relatively uncomplicated hero Dorieus cuts a poor figure. Again the trick of perspective is characteristically Herodotean: the object of our attention changes before our eyes as the field of vision shifts to take in a different set of relations. Thus Cleomenes is re-introduced at 5.39.1 as the successor to Anaxandridas, οὐ κατ' ἀνδραγαθίην σχὼν (sc. τὴν βασιληίην) ἀλλὰ κατὰ γένος. Herodotus then plunges straight into the digression on Anaxandridas' bigamy

(5.39.2-41.3), with its bizarre consequences for Cleomenes' parentage. The king's second wife is the first to bear child (Cleomenes), while the first wife, hitherto barren, immediately after, 'as it so happened', bears three children in succession, Dorieus, Leonidas and Kleombrotos, and the second wife bears no more children after Cleomenes. Herodotus strains after paradox and irony here. He tells us that Anaxandridas' bigamy was 'wholly un-Spartan' (cf. 5.40.2), so that although Cleomenes succeeded by right of primogeniture, as was the custom (cf. 5.42.2, with 6.52.3), Herodotus seems to imply that if his father had observed Spartan custom he would never have been born in the first place and Dorieus would have been king instead. Herodotus is particularly interested in the confusions and contradictions of royal succession, and especially at Sparta[137]: such confusions suggest to him that kingship itself is arbitrary and that it is by no natural right that one man becomes king rather than any other. This is especially evident in the case of Dorieus and Cleomenes. Herodotus returns to the subject of Anaxandridas' successor (5.42.1) by observing that "Cleomenes, as they say, was half-mad" (see below), while "Dorieus was the best of his contemporaries and knew that by rights he should have been king" (εὖ τε ἠπίστατο κατ' ἀνδραγαθίην αὐτὸς σχήσων τὴν βασιληίην; cf. 5.39.1). In other words, despite his natural advantage Dorieus is overlooked in favour of Cleomenes, who is by contrast an unworthy successor to the kingship[138].

After a digression on the adventures of Dorieus after leaving Sparta (5.42.2-47.2), Herodotus returns to Cleomenes yet again, once more contrasting him with his half-brother (5.48): "if Dorieus had put up with being ruled by Cleomenes and had remained at home, he would have been king of Sparta; for Cleomenes ruled no great length of time, but died childless except for one daughter, Gorgo" (οὐ γάρ τινα πολλὸν χρόνον ἦρξε ὁ Κλεομένης, ἀλλ' ἀπέθανε ἄπαις, θυγατέρα μούνην λιπών). These words have caused considerable difficulty: it has seemed that Herodotus has been misled by the hostility of his source(s) towards Cleomenes into saying something not only historically inaccurate[139] but which seems even to overlook the importance of Cleomenes in his own narrative[140]. There are however clear objections to this interpretation, besides the obvious one that it credits Herodotus with the most extreme short-sightedness. First an *ad hominem* argument: the inaccuracy of Herodotus' historical claim may not on his terms be as glaring as it seems to us. We cannot know how long he actually believed Cleomenes' reign to have been, and he may have been relying here on an imprecise calculation of the chronology of the reign[141]. Accordingly he may have been influenced into believing the reign to have been a short one by the consideration that when Cleomenes died, his *brother* Leonidas was still young enough to succeed him - and even in the prime of life, to judge from Thermopylae - just as Dorieus might have done[142]. Clearly however the point is not so much that the reign was short in terms of years[143], and Herodotus does not attempt to give the length of it in years. Indeed this absence of a precise measurement may well be the clue to the understanding of what Herodotus is doing here. If he had actually been told by his source that Cleomenes' reign was short, but without a figure, we should have expected him to have tried to test the statememt against his own facts and supply the length of the reign from his own calculations. It is hard to see how he can have been happy to accept such a report without question, when on his own evidence Cleomenes' reign covers such a wide range. The answer seems rather to be that he avoids giving a precise figure, because he is aware that to do so would spoil the effect he is trying to produce. Indeed we may infer that he is being deliberately evasive from the form of words he has chosen at this point: οὐ γάρ *τινα* πολλὸν χρόνον looks very much like hedging. The effect of the *tis*[144] is to intensify the adjective, so that we should translate "not a *very* long time", with a stress on the 'very'. In other words Herodotus seems to be admitting that the reign was indeed *relatively* long (for his purposes!), though not of the longest; but for the enclitic, however, he would be saying something much less defensible.

What effects Herodotus means to secure by this sleight of hand can be seen if we compare how he reports the death of Cambyses (3.66.2), "who ruled in all for 7 years and 5 months, and died childless, with neither male nor female issue" (βασιλεύσαντα μὲν τὰ πάντα ἐπτὰ ἔτεα καὶ πέντε μῆνας, ἄπαιδα δὲ τὸ παράπαν ἐόντα ἔρσενος καὶ θήλεος γόνου). The similarity with Cleomenes is obvious - except that in Cambyses' case Herodotus is not constrained to gloss over the exact length of the reign in years. Both kings reign for only a short time and die without male issue: Herodotus could not of course dispose of Gorgo, although he pointedly emphasizes that she is his only child, and female at that (cf. 5.48, with 51.1). Cambyses and Cleomenes, as we said earlier, complement each other in Herodotus' account - and we can now see that that includes the significance of their premature and childless deaths, both paying a fitting retribution for their crimes against gods and men. We can compare also the fate of Leotychidas, Cleomenes' partner in crime: as we have seen, Herodotus goes out of his way to report how Leotychidas failed to live out his life as king at Sparta (6.72.1, οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ Λευτυχίδης κατεγήρα ἐν Σπάρτηι) and how he left no male heir, (6.71.2, Leotychidas' second wife bore him no male heir: ἐκ τῆς οἱ ἔρσεν μὲν γίνεται οὐδέν, θυγάτηρ δὲ Λαμπιτώ). There is an obvious parallelism in the falls of Cleomenes and Leotychidas in Herodotus' account; and of course both suffer for the same crimes, both in Herodotus' judgement paying retribution for the wrong they did Demaratus[145].

Herodotus' "surprising inaccuracy" is thus not surprising, if we appreciate his use of perspective here [146], both in the anticipation of Cleomenes' crimes and the appropriateness of his violent and premature death, and in the contrast between Cleomenes, the man who is king by virtue of his birth but deserves not to be, and Dorieus, the man who was never king but deserved to be by merit. Herodotus invites us to compare the reign of Cleomenes with what Dorieus might have achieved had he been king, indeed with what his true brother, Leonidas, actually did achieve when Cleomenes died (cf. 7.205.1). From this point of view the reign of Cleomenes was no more than an inglorious interlude: the glamorous adventures of Dorieus in Libya and Sicily (disastrous though they are: 5.42-7) serve in part at least to elaborate this comparison.

5. When, immediately after, we turn back again to Cleomenes, resuming the story of his reception of Aristagoras (5.49.1 with 39.1), we are disposed to him quite differently from but a few pages before. We are no longer in a position to accept him as the uncomplicated hero of the Maiandrios-story: we have been reminded of the tradition of his madness, and that in point of virtue (andragathiē) he is deficient in the qualities of the good king. The comparison with Dorieus has made us see him as weak. Aristagoras' temptation speech turns out to be a test of that weakness - although not altogether straightforwardly.

The speech itself (5.49.2-8) introduces into the Greek history an opportunity for comparing the different attitudes of Greeks and orientals to conquest. It is a clear variation on the familiar pattern of the warning speech as delivered to eastern kings[147] but a temptation to territorial ambition rather than a warning against it. As many 'warners' do (cf. esp. Sandanis at 1.71.2ff), Aristagoras supports his argument with a sort of Hecataean ethnographic description of the enemy. He observes that the Persians are an easy prey (49.3), since they fight with bows and short spears and go into battle wearing trousers (anaxyridas; cf. 1.71.2: a detail also highlighted by Sandanis) and oriental headdresses: οὕτω εὐπετέες χειρωθῆναί εἰσι. He goes on to describe in some detail the riches of all the different peoples of the Persian empire, and uses his map as an aid to exposition (49.5): δεικνὺς δὲ ἔλεγε ταῦτα ἐς τῆς γῆς τὴν περίοδον. We are obviously reminded at this point of Hecataeus, and not only Hecataeus the author. Only a few chapters earlier, Herodotus reported how the great geographer had addressed the Ionian confederates to argue the folly of revolt from Persia (5.36.2): καταλέγων τά τε ἔθνεα πάντα τῶν ἦρχε Δαρεῖος καὶ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτοῦ. It is clear that Herodotus wants to show Aristagoras turning Hecataeus' warning on its head: both use the same evidence to argue quite opposite points of view. Men like Aristagoras, implies Herodotus, see only what they want to see - and more dangerous still try to persuade others to see things the same way. There is of course something a little artificial in Herodotus' putting Cleomenes here in the position of an oriental king, tempted to engage in territorial ambition on this scale[148]. To envisage a Spartan king at this moment in history as a potential conqueror of the entire kingdom of Asia is an improbable conceit, even for an Aristagoras, and especially when we realize that all Aristagoras can really be asking for is that Sparta help liberate Ionia[149]. But the work as Herodotus has conceived it invites such comparisons; and besides we are here also looking beyond Cleomenes and Sparta at the Athenians and Athenian democracy, which the comparison much better suits (cf. Ch.II.ii).

The first thing Cleomenes does on hearing Aristagoras' speech is to put him off for three days (49.9)[150], rather than rejecting or accepting the proposition at once. When the time comes for him to give his decision, he asks Aristagoras how far Susa is from the sea (50.1): and Aristagoras makes a surprising blunder (τἆλλα ἐὼν σοφὸς καὶ διαβάλλων ἐκεῖνον εὖ): he should not have told the truth if he wished to lead the Spartans into Asia, but he did, explaining that the journey took three months. Before Aristagoras could describe the journey, Cleomenes ordered him to leave Sparta before sunset: "you are saying something the Spartans will not hear of (οὐδένα γὰρ λόγον εὐεπέα λέγεις Λακεδαιμονίοισι), asking to lead them three months' journey from the sea". The abruptness of Cleomenes' interruption (ὑπαρπάσας τὸν ... λόγον) and the firmness of his dismissal (πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου) show not that he is doubtful whether the Spartans will agree[151] but that he himself as a Spartan will not hear of it, any more than any Spartan would. What Herodotus appears to be making him say is that there is a Spartan tradition which nothing will make them break, which would hold them back from any enterprise of this kind. Aristagoras should have known, "if he wanted to lead the Spartans into Asia", that he should have made the expedition sound no different from a march into Tegea or Messenia[152]. The same attitude of mind causes the Spartans to delay at the time of Marathon (6.106.3, ἀδύνατα δέ σφι ἦν τὸ παραυτίκα ποιέειν ταῦτα οὐ βουλομένοισι λύειν τὸν νόμον). It is also the attitude of mind which distinguishes the Spartans from the Athenians, for whom Susa is not too distant a goal even now, even if only in their imagination (cf. Ch.II.ii, on 5.97.1-3). It is also the attitude of mind which distinguishes the Spartans from the Persians, for whom it is the never-relenting drive to extend their empire which has the force of tradition, as Xerxes reminds them at 7.8a.1: οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς κατηγήσομαι νόμον τόνδε ἐν ὑμῖν τιθεὶς παραδεξάμενός τε αὐτῶι χρήσομαι. The natural drive of successful people to extend themselves is not absent in Sparta by any means[153], nor indeed in Cleomenes of all people. But the Spartans are not the people to overreach themselves in the way the Persians or the

Athenians seem to be. After Cleomenes' rejection of Aristagoras' proposition, the Athenians' acceptance comes to seem all the more significant[154].

Cleomenes thus far stands for the Spartans as a whole: the picture of the limitations of Spartan ambition that emerges from this scene is clearly of importance for our understanding of their conduct during the Persian Wars. We see the Spartan character from a different aspect from that afforded us in Book One, where they seemed prepared to assist Croesus against the Persians.

So far then we have seen Cleomenes tempted, and tempted all but successfully by the promise of an easy conquest of the Persian empire; but we have seen him hold back, as he remembers that he is after all a Spartan, bound by Spartan tradition. But Herodotus does not leave it at that. The second interview closes with Cleomenes retiring to his house, but Aristagoras follows him there, and asks to be heard as a suppliant, and tries to get Cleomenes to send away his daughter, Gorgo ("his only child and aged between eight and nine", Herodotus reminds us). Cleomenes, however, bids him speak as he wants and not to hold back on the child's account. Aristagoras then offers the king money if he will oblige him, starting at 10 talents; and as Cleomenes repeatedly nods his refusal, he keeps raising the sum, until at the moment when he promises 50 talents[155], the little girl cries out, "Father, the stranger will ruin you, unless you get up and go!". Cleomenes is pleased with her advice and retires to another room, while Aristagoras leaves Sparta for good[156].

We need to approach this scene with careful attention to the tone: after the hyperbole of Aristagoras' proposition (nothing short of the conquest of all Asia), the bathos of Gorgo's childish interruption. That it takes a warning from his eight year old daughter (not even a son) to make Cleomenes realize the danger of his position, is an effect both piquant and a little humorous: it is amusingly incongruous that so momentous a decision should be taken on the advice of a child. And yet it is also ominous. Herodotus, to be sure, does not say of Cleomenes that he was ready to accept Aristagoras' 50 talents; yet that he does not retire until warned by Gorgo, clearly tells us something about his character. Fascinated by the temptation of so much money, he loses sight of what it is he should be doing. In this scene we detect something we did not notice in the interview with Maiandrios, where we saw only the positive side of Cleomenes' choice: his resistance to temptation seemed the action of an upright man, and Herodotus told us so; we were not encouraged to dwell on the possibility of his dishonesty. In the present scene the negative side predominates : here we see the resistance to temptation not so much as an act of virtue, but as a decision which very nearly turned out otherwise. After this scene we are much better prepared to see Cleomenes faltering and making the wrong decisions. Thus the final interview, by contrast with the previous two, tells us something about Cleomenes himself as a man, rather than merely as a Spartan[157].

The episode as a whole involves a near paradox: Cleomenes very nearly goes back on his previous decision, which seemed so firm and resolute. Herodotus here invites us to observe the contrast between Cleomenes as king of Sparta with public responsibilities and Cleomenes the private individual with ambitions of his own. Just as in the Athenian and Aeginetan episodes discussed above, here too we see a conflict between Cleomenes as a responsible monarch, acting in the best interests of others (the Athenians, the Greeks as a whole, the Spartans), and Cleomenes as a man with all too obvious weaknesses, The blood runs to his head and he ends up thinking only of himself, of private revenge or private profit[158].

Cleomenes' decision will later be seen in the perspective of the Athenian decision to succumb to Aristagoras. When Herodotus comes to report that decision (5.97.2), he comments that it appears to be easier to deceive the many than to deceive one man (πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα), inasmuch as Aristagoras was unable to deceive Cleomenes, but was successful with the 30,000 Athenians. Herodotus implies here that kingship may possess an advantage over democracy: it may happen that a king is more proof against deception or temptation than a democratic assembly. Darius observes (3.82.2), in similarly apologetic terms, that if the monarch is the best man, his judgement will be best and he will be blameless in his control of the people (γνώμηι γὰρ τοιαύτηι (sc.ἀρίστηι) χρεώμενος ἐπιτροπεύοι ἂν ἀμωμήτως τοῦ πλήθεος); while under such a man secret plans would have the best chance of keeping out of the reach of public enemies (σιγῷτό τε ἂν βουλεύματα ἐπὶ δυσμενέας ἄνδρας οὕτω μάλιστα). Cleomenes' action appears to fit Darius' general description, exemplifying the 'efficiency' of monarchy as a form of administration (it is an advantage of sorts that the 'secret' negotiations with Aristagoras go no further than the king; cf. Maiandrios, 3.148.2) and Herodotus acutely observes its apologetic potential: if you want to justify kingship against democracy, here is a good opportunity, he implies. And yet when we pause for thought his example starts to look curiously unsatisfactory: we have seen Cleomenes' decision at close-quarters, and from that standpoint the taking of it had seemed much less straightforward - indeed it might easily have gone the other way. What Darius' arguments ignore is the question of what happens if the king is not the best man. Although the Cleomenes episode seems to show that even a king not renowned for excellence can come to the right decisions, it also makes us see that it will not always be so[159].

6. We turn finally to the episode in Cleomenes' life which Herodotus places last in sequence and out of chronological order[160], the Argos-expedition (6.76.1-84.1). Herodotus is not of course principally concerned to give an account of Cleomenes; his main task is to outline the course of Spartan and Athenian history in the years before the Persian Wars, and from that point of view Cleomenes is only of incidental interest. And yet, as we have seen, the character of Cleomenes does also seem to be a focus of interest in its own right, so that the Argos-episode deserves its importance because Cleomenes has become intrinsically interesting, and it deserves to stand where it does because it forms a fitting climax to the 'Cleomenes-story'. The narrative has the character of a miniature oriental campaign-narrative of the unsuccessful kind (cf. e.g. Croesus' campaign against the Persians, Cyrus' against the Massagetai, Cambyses against the Aethiopians, etc.). For example the expedition is undertaken because of an oracle which promises Cleomenes the capture of Argos (6.76.1), an oracle which however proves misleading in that the grove not the city was meant (6.80 and 82.1f). We may compare, for example, the great expedition of Croesus against Persia with its famous misleading oracle (1.53.3), that to march against Persia would mean the destruction of a great empire (cf. 1.91.4)[161]. Herodotus thus rounds off his account of Cleomenes with a story which brings together elements of the tragic stories of the oriental kings. This is not the place to give a detailed account of the Argive episode, except insofar as it illustrates the paradoxical oppositions of Cleomenes' character.

Another motif of the oriental campaign-narratives crops up in Cleomenes' encounter with the Erasinos (6.76.1f). Reaching the river with his army, he sacrifices to it; but when the omens will not allow him to cross, he declares that he respects the Erasinos for not betraying its people, but that the Argives will even so not escape him: ἄγασθαι μὲν ἔφη τοῦ Ερασίνου οὐ προδιδόντος τοὺς πολιήτας, Ἀργείους μέντοι οὐδ' ὣς χαιρήσειν (cf. 1.128.1, the threat to Cyrus of the impious Astyages). Cleomenes' address to the river parallels, in particular, Xerxes' address to the Hellespont, when it destroys his bridge in a storm (7.35.2). Though Cleomenes commits no outrage against the Erasinos to compare with Xerxes' flogging of the Hellespont, and though he respects the sanctity of the river even to the extent of marching round it (76.2) rather than crossing it[162], even so like his oriental counterparts he refuses to observe the spirit of the game. As has often been recognized Herodotus treats rivers as limits of spheres of authority and the crossing of rivers for aggressive reasons as having symbolic importance: those who disobey the rules and encroach into areas where they do not belong are playing a dangerous game[163]. In speaking to the Erasinos as he does, Cleomenes reveals that he will let nothing stand in his way; and yet, unlike Xerxes, he tempers his arrogance with superstition and will not actually cross the river at all. The difference is revealing: Cleomenes' character (far more than Xerxes' own: see above) is a paradoxical mixture of the blasphemous and the superstitious.

Consider his behaviour at the Argive Heraion (6.81): informed by the priest that he may not as a stranger sacrifice there (οὐκ ὅσιον εἶναι ξείνωι αὐτόθι θύειν), he gets his helots to lead the priest from the altar and flog him, before entering the temple and performing the sacrifice. The action seems at first sight to be that of a Cambyses: we remember that the Persian king had forced entry into the temple of the Kabeiroi (3.37.3):ἐς τὸ οὐ θεμιτόν ἐστι ἐσιέναι ἄλλον γε ἢ τὸν ἱρέα But whereas Cambyses entered the temple to burn the images and revile what he found there (πολλὰ κατασκώψας), Cleomenes at least appears to have entered the Heraion for devotional reasons[164]. Defending himself in the Spartan courts shortly after, he gives his own account of this episode, which Herodotus is in doubt as to how to interpret (82.1): οὔτε εἰ ψευδόμενος οὔτε εἰ ἀληθέα λέγων, ἔχω σαφηνέως εἶπαι, ἔλεξε δ' ὦν... He believed that by taking the grove he had fulfilled the oracle, and did not think fit to make an attempt on the city until he had sacrificed and learnt whether the god meant to deliver the city to him or stand in his way. The omen he received in the Heraion, a flame shooting from the breast of the goddess, he interpreted as meaning the god was against him: had the flame come from the head it would have meant that he should take the city citadel and all, but the omen from the breast meant that all the god wished had already been accomplished. So saying, he persuaded the Spartans: πιστά τε καὶ οἰκότα ἐδόκεε ... λέγειν καὶ ἀπέφυγε πολλὸν τοὺς διώκοντας. Cleomenes' defence (Herodotus implies) may, for all we know, have been mere sophistry and his enemies' charge of bribery (cf. Krios at Aegina, 6.50.2) may have been the real reason why he did not take the city (82.1): Herodotus affects to leave the matter open. Yet, as so often, the slant of his narrative suggests that he has a particular interpretation in mind[165]. The unexplained entry into the Heraion becomes comprehensible only when supplemented by Cleomenes' account of its purpose: by mentioning it at all (he could easily have left it out in the first place) and by explicitly telling us in the narrative that his purpose was to perform a sacrifice Herodotus has predisposed us to accept Cleomenes' explanation. Moreover his elaborately pious observances here seem to accord with what we have been told of his behaviour at the Erasinos: his superstitious exactitude is brought out in his precision of detail over the interpretation of the portent. Moreover by drawing our attention to the possibility that Cleomenes' defence was not the whole story, Herodotus in fact contrives to draw our attention to something else, the irony that Cleomenes should invoke the will of the gods in relation to his horrendous impiety at the grove (6.80), which he had set alight with the Argives trapped inside in full knowledge of its sanctity, and the irony that his pious desire to discover the will of the god should involve him in an outrage against the priest of Hera.

It may have been that the historical Cleomenes was a man of such contradictions, with a superstitious nature, but given to acts of senseless outrage against gods and men; but Herodotus has his own purpose in so depicting him[166]. He has after all gone out of his way in recounting Cleomenes' defence to the Spartan courts in such detail (can we credit his sources with such elaboration?) and we are entitled to ask why that detail is so important - especially when the trial came to nothing! The best explanation is that it illustrates not Cleomenes' ready duplicity, but rather the complexity of his superstitious nature. Herodotus is interested to show us something of Cleomenes' psychology - if only darkly and by implication. For us the omen he witnesses in the Heraion seems to have an ominous and sinister meaning (e.g. the displeasure of the god at the burning of the grove), but for Cleomenes, blind as he is to his own inconsistency, it seems something quite different. All the same, Herodotus is careful not to force this explanation on the reader: he cannot say for certain whether Cleomenes' account of his behaviour at the Heraion was truthful or not. As so often, the paradox may have either a simple or a complicated explanation: Cleomenes may after all be nothing but a rogue, but it remains possible that the apparent contradictions of his character have a deep psychological cause.

7. Does this mean that Herodotus does not really know how he wants to understand Cleomenes? It has been thought, for example that he has in particular not firmly decided on whether Cleomenes was in all respects

and at all times mentally deranged[167]. At 5.42.1, for the purposes of contrasting him with Dorieus (see above), he reports the view that Cleomenes was indeed insane (ὁ μὲν δὴ Κλεομένής, ὡς λέγεται, ἦν τε οὐ φρενήρης ἀκρομανής τε, ὁ δὲ Δωριεὺς ἦν τῶν ἡλίκων πάντων πρῶτος), but he is obviously wary of committing himself to that view. In reporting the way in which Cleomenes 'went mad' on his return to Sparta just before his death, he admits that the king had already shown signs of insanity (6.75.1): κατελθόντα δὲ αὐτίκα ὑπέλαβε μανίη νοῦσος, ἐόντα καὶ πρότερον ὑπομαργότερον (cf. 3.29.1 and 145.1). However it is clear that here too Herodotus is concerned to avoid saying that Cleomenes was wholly mad from the beginning: the word *hypomargoteros* means only 'half-insane', and Herodotus is not going to tell us which of the actions we have seen Cleomenes perform showed him to be mad and which not[168]. There is no question of Herodotus being unsure about how to judge Cleomenes and so dodging the responsibility of deciding; he is rather indulging in his customary evasiveness in such matters, and refraining from a simple, all-inclusive character judgement. 'Madness' is no more a complete explanation of Cleomenes' character than was the *dikaiosynē* which he showed in the interview with Maiandrios.

We should draw a distinction between Herodotus' not having been able or sharp enough to make up his mind on the issue of Cleomenes' madness, or any other aspect of his character, and his deliberate reticence. The preceding analysis has made it clear that he is unlikely to have been intellectually incompetent in this regard. Rather, as we observed in the first part of this chapter (cf. e.g. Telines), he seems deliberately to cultivate the impression that he is not the sort of person to commit himself unwarily to such judgements about character. Possibly he is even sceptical as to whether it is sensible to talk in such terms. Hence it is not that he is unclear about how to interpret his own characters, but rather that he deliberately avoids simplifying. It is his conscious choice to offer us only the external evidence, a man's actions at any one time, and to show how difficult it is to make simple inferences about what is hidden.

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8. The paradoxes treated in this chapter have been of various kinds, but not so various that they cannot be subsumed under a common formula. They all in different ways explain themselves in terms of an interest in human nature or our appreciation of it - a formula which is in fact less open-ended that it sounds.

The image of the sea, which we saw Artananus apply specifically to Xerxes and to other tyrants, is appropriate in different degrees to all men: a man's nature (physis) is often prevented from showing through, sometimes for the better, usually for the worse, by external influences, and his behaviour, like that of the sea, is frequently inconstant and unpredictable as a result. It follows that a man's actions (and a king's par excellence) taken individually are not always a sure guide to his nature: we need to take a long view of human life, to see individual actions in the widest possible perspective, not to judge until we know all. Often however, such broad knowledge is inaccessible to our intelligence, and the contradictions and paradoxes are all we have. At other times we do begin to see behind the paradoxes and discover that apparently contradictory actions are merely manifestations of the same essential nature.

We saw moreover that Herodotus often seemed to be creating paradoxes on his own initiative(cf. esp. Maiandrios, Cleomenes), and often also doing his best to bring them out where they already existed in the tradition (cf. e.g. Miltiades, Themistocles), whether through the imputation of motive or the interpretation of action. In other words the perplexity is not his but rather one he is trying to instil in the reader. Moreover his inferences and interpretations almost always involved either surprising charity or distinct malice, and in neither case is it enough to argue that his brief is to be even-handed. Indeed as far as malicious inferences are concerned there is much more to be said for the view advanced by Plutarch in De Malignitate Herodoti that he uncharitably makes the most of faults and weaknesses by any device he can; and indeed we shall have a number of further occasions to appeal to this judgement of Plutarch's. It is clear, however, that Herodotus makes an equal effort in the opposite direction, to bring out as sharply as possible whatever he can that is admirable even in such evident rogues as Cleomenes. In thus accentuating with equal determination both light and shade, and often in contriving to set them in the most glaring opposition, Herodotus is not indulging a taste for balance, but rather striving after paradox and surprise.

It is also clear that Herodotus is less concerned with explaining the reasons for these paradoxes than with showing that they are everywhere in human experience. Certainly he does occasionally offer or suggest reasons, change of heart, psychological deterioration or improvement, the pressure of individual circumstances; but more often he simply challenges us with the inadequacy of our own appreciation of human nature.

We should conclude, however, by observing that Herodotus is only really interested in paradoxes of a certain kind, not all the trivial inconsistencies of human behaviour. They have to do with moral and political problems, problems of an ethical nature, in particular problems of power and success, and the contrary pull of justice and profit. This observation leads us conveniently to the next chapter, a discussion of Herodotus' equivocal attitudes to freedom and its consequences.

It may be useful, finally, to set out some of the critical principles which have emerged from this chapter.

(1) Herodotus has in principle a free hand in the composition of speeches[169], and even more important in the ascription of motive[170] and the judgement of character and action.

(2) Accordingly, apparent 'inconsistencies' between a person's words, ascribed motives, or Herodotus' judgement of his actions or character and the actions reported of him ought in principle to be paradoxes of Herodotus' own devising, and are unlikely to reflect merely - if at all- contradictions in his source material.

(3) The same principle should further be applied to passages which are thought to reflect the prejudices of Herodotus' informants but which do not show 'contradictions'. We should hesitate before assuming that Herodotus is reproducing the prejudices of a source in those places where the only evidence for that assumption is a speech or an ascribed motive or a Herodotean judgement of action or character. This application of the principle will become important in what follows, especially in the argument of Ch.II.iii.

(4) We should be wary of mistaking Herodotean irony and understatement for confusion on his part[171]. Herodotus deliberately involves the reader in the interpretation of character and action by leaving or introducing contradictions or paradoxes unresolved, by expressing uncertainty as to the understanding of motive[172], by limiting commentary to externals or superficial details and thus provoking the reader to question what he has left out.

(5) We have also seen that Herodotus is often concerned with 'dramatic' effects, effects which depend on the manipulation of context, on an appreciation of how the reader is likely to react to hearing certain things at certain moments and not others. We have chiefly been occupied with surprises or paradoxes in this chapter, but we have also noticed the influence of 'perspective' in the setting of context against context. A consequence of this 'dramatic' technique is that the critic must be careful not to disturb contexts, not to invoke sharp structural divisions at the expense of the continuum of sense, and not to bring together at random elements which Herodotus has presented in a carefully chosen order and at carefully chosen moments. It is this principle of attending to contexts and the order of exposition which justifies the extended and somewhat minute contextual analyses which follow in Ch.II. The temptation to extrapolate 'Herodotus' thought' by merely collating passages is considerable - and I have succumbed to it in some degree in Ch.III; but it is important to bear in mind the limitations, and even the hazards of such an approach.

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CHAPTER TWO

FREEDOM

Freedom: Introduction

Herodotus' work takes as its starting-point (1.5.3) the moment when the Greeks were first 'enslaved' (1.6.3): πρὸ δὲ τῆς Κροίσου ἀρχῆς πάντες Ἕλληνες ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι , and reaches its climax in the 'liberation' of Greece in the Persian Wars. *Eleutheriē* thus forms the basis of the narrative arch which spans from Croesus to the defeat of Xerxes, and indeed it is *eleutheriē* which at least on one level defines the limits of Herodotus' narrative. All that came before Croesus falls outside Herodotus' sphere of interest, as he himself tells us, because until his reign the *freedom* of the Greeks remained untouched, while from that moment on the work plots in an unbroken series the successful and attempted enslavements, liberations, re-enslavements, not only of the Greeks but of almost all the peoples of the known world. From this point of view, a notorious problem of the Croesus-narrative comes to seem less acute, namely why it is that Croesus is explicitly singled out as the first man to wrong the Greeks" (1.5.3, πρῶτος ὑπάρξας ἀδίκων ἔργων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας), when Herodotus can go on to recount acts of aggression against the Ionians by all his predecessors after Gyges (1.14-25)[1]. The problem disappears if we appreciate that Croesus' *adikia*, in which he is distinguished from his predecessors, is that he *enslaved* the Greeks, while the others merely fought against them in an unsystematic way, without the determination to enslave them, or at least without that consequence. What Herodotus is interested in is not mere aggression but rather systematic subjugation (*katastrephesthai*), involving the removal of liberty, often symbolised in the imposition of tribute on the vanquished. The *adikia* of 1.5.3 is explained in Herodotus' amplification at 1.6.2-3: οὗτος ὁ Κροῖσος βαρβάρων πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν τοὺς μὲν κατεστρέψατο Ἑλλήνων ἐς φόρου ἀπαγωγήν ... πρὸ δὲ τῆς Κροίσου ἀρχῆς πάντες Ἕλληνες ἦσαν ἐλεύθεροι.

Indeed the work might crudely be described as a catalogue of enslavements and liberations both successful and unsuccessful. We are continually reminded of how the catalogue is proceeding by the use of explicit sign-posts: e.g. 1.169.2, οὕτω δὴ τὸ δεύτερον Ἰωνίη ἐδεδούλωτο; 1.191.6, καὶ Βαβυλὼν μὲν οὕτω τότε πρῶτον ἀραίρητο ; 3.159.1, Βαβυλὼν μέν νυν οὕτω τὸ δεύτερον αἱρέθη ; 5.116, Κύπριοι ...ἐνιαυτὸν ἐλεύθεροι γενόμενοι αὖτις ἐκ νέης κατεδεδούλωντο ; 6.32, οὕτω δὴ τὸ τρίτον Ἴωνες κατεδουλώθησαν ; 7.7 (Xerxes), Αἴγυπτον πᾶσαν πολλὸν δουλοτέρην ποιήσας ἢ ἐπὶ Δαρείου ἦν; 9.105, οὕτω δὴ τὸ δεύτερον Ἰωνίη ἀπὸ Περσέων ἀπέστη; and compare 2.182.2 (Amasis), εἷλε δὲ Κύπρον πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων καὶ κατεστρέψατο ἐς φόρου ἀπαγωγήν, an action which is significant in the same way that Croesus' subjugation of the Greeks of Ionia is significant, that is as an act of imperialism, involving the denial of liberty.

We may consider briefly an entry in the catalogue which receives the most frequent and insistent mention, namely Ionia. By drawing such explicit attention to the progress of the series Herodotus invites us to take note of a pattern, and to read as a coherent sequence the enslavement of Ionia by Croesus, its re-enslavement by Cyrus, its attempted liberation in the Ionian revolt, its re-enslavement by Darius, and its liberation after Mykale[2]. The Leitmotiv of an enslaved Ionia provides Herodotus with one of the subsidiary themes of the expedition of Xerxes: how do these Ionians, whom we have followed from their first enslavement by Croesus, think and act when, as 'slaves' of the Persian king[3], they are called upon to join in the enslavement of their fellow-Greeks (cf. e.g. Artabanus at 7.51.2)? Already in the Scythian expedition of Darius Herodotus has considered at length (4.133-42) how the same Ionians reacted when offered their freedom by the Scythians (cf. esp. the Scyths' derisive estimate of their will to freedom at 4.142); while in Book One he again concentrates on the lack of resolve of the Ionians when faced with the threats and promises of Cyrus (cf. e.g. 1.141.1ff and 170.1ff).

As we can see from this example eletheriē is much more than a mere connecting thread in the narrative: it is a theme for discussion and reflexion. Why is it, Herodotus asks, that for some people freedom is more important than for others? Why do some people value freedom differently at different times? What does the pursuit of freedom involve and where does it lead? What is the mentality which distinguished the free from the enslaved and how is it produced?

It would be wrong to suggest that these interests dominate everywhere, or that they assume an equal importance wherever they do appear; but it could be claimed that in some small degree it is the issue of freedom which links Herodotus' narrative with his ethnographic interests. In some notable cases Herodotus seems to suggest that the answer to why certain peoples are more strongly motivated to secure or preserve their freedom lies in their culture[4]. Thus, for example, he has the Scyths resist enslavement by Darius in the name of their culture (4.127.4): δεσπότας δὲ ἐμοὺς ἐγὼ Δία τε νομίζω τὸν ἐμὸν πρόγονον καὶ Ἱστίην τὴν Σκυθέων βασίλειαν μούνους εἶναι. Their success in resisting Darius is ascribed by Herodotus explicitly to their primitive nomadic life, which - a possible pun - he calls their aporiē (cf. 4.46.3, κῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴησαν οὗτοι ἄμαχοί τε καὶ ἄποροι προσμίσγειν; cf. 4.83.1 and 134.2)[5]. In a different way, Croesus advises Cyrus to turn the Lydians into musicians and shopkeepers (1.155.4): καὶ ταχέως σφέας, ὦ βασιλεῦ, γυναῖκας ἀντ᾽ ἀνδρῶν ὄψεαι γεγονότας, ὥστε οὐδὲν δεινοί τοι ἔσονται μὴ ἀποστέωσι. With a change in their culture they will put aside thoughts of trying to recapture their freedom and become docile and submissive. If we read the ethnographies exclusively as a catalogue of the growth of Persian might[6], we will not fully explain their purpose; indeed the Massagetai and the Scyths, for example, do not in fact become subjects of Persia at all, so that on this explanation their respective ethnographies are out of place. A better general description of the ethnographies might thus be a catalogue of which nations respond in which ways to threats to their freedom. There are indications that this is indeed the way Herodotus is thinking from his occasional asides. Thus we hear of the Carians (1.174.1) that "they submitted to Harpagus without performing any brilliant exploits, nor did any of the Greeks who dwelt in Caria behave with any greater gallantry". The Perinthians (5.2.1) succumbed to Megabazus "after a brave struggle for freedom"; but the Thracian Satrai, "so far as our knowledge goes, have never yet been brought under by anyone, but continue to this day a free and unconquered people, unlike the other Thracians" (7.111.1).

I have no wish to exaggerate here; there are many other themes in Herodotus besides freedom, and even in places where it is at issue, it may often be only of subsidiary interest. There is, however, no other theme which so clearly dominates the major narrative episodes of the work, which is the subject of so many debates and speeches in all parts of the work[7]. From the enslavement of Ionia in Book One to the liberation of Greece in the last three books, the issue of imperial subjugation and domination is the work's central narrative concern (cf. Ch.II.i.B and iii); while the related theme of the internal domination of a people by a group or individual (that is tyranny) contributes to the major narrative role given to Athens' emergence from tyranny to democracy in Books Five and Six (cf. Ch.II.ii), balancing the interest of the eastern narratives in the phenomenon of despotism (cf. Ch.II.i.B).

The present chapter is devoted not so much to an illustration of the thematic importance of freedom, however, though this will emerge from the range of examples discussed. I shall concentrate rather on showing the complexity of Herodotus' handling of the theme, both in his analysis of the psychological, social and political effects of freedom, and in his ethical evaluation of the means to liberation and its consequences. In the latter case we shall see that he exploits the same techniques of paradox and equivocation as we found in his treatment of character in

Chapter One. The relevance of this discussion to our central theme of Herodotus' study of human nature is this: having observed Herodotus' inquiries into the psychology of individuals, it is now necessary for us to see him at work in analysing the psychology of groups, of states and of nations.

To ask why Herodotus should have given the them of freedom such a prominent place in his work might be thought superfluous: the 'theme' is after all given him by his choice of subjects(s), the Persian empire and its antecedents, and its attempts to enslave the Greeks. As we have suggested, however, he is perhaps more than incidentally interested in freedom, so that it might well be that an interest in the theme helped guide his choice of subject(s) in the first place. Thus it is worth inquiring whether in this interest he was influenced by the experiences of his own lifetime. To judge from Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War was fought above all, at least in terms of propaganda, over the issue of freedom, the Spartans and their allies claiming that they were 'liberating' the Greeks from 'enslavement' to the imperial power of Athens, the tyrannos that was threatening to subject the whole of Greece to itself. Thus, for example, the Corinthians stir up the Spartans in just these terms (Thucyd.1.124.3):

> καὶ τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῆι Ἑλλάδι τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἤδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι, παραστησώμεθα ἐπελθόντες, καὶ αὐτοί τε ἀκινδύνως τὸ λοιπὸν οἰκῶμεν καὶ τοὺς νῦν δεδουλωμένους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσωμεν[8].

We may thus suggest that Herodotus' interest in the growth of eastern empires is in some measure to be explained in terms of his experience of the Athenian empire[9]. It is as though he is trying to understand the phenomenon of empire, which so influenced the affairs of Greece in his lifetime, through an analysis of these eastern models (cf. Ch.II.i.B.3)[10].

Reflexion on what freedom had come to mean in his own lifetime may also have led Herodotus to an ironic disenchantment. On the one hand there was the Athenian empire-democracy (cf. Ch.II.i.B.3), paradoxically at the same time the embodiment of political freedom and the tyrant that was enslaving the rest of the Greek world. On the other hand there was Sparta with her Peloponnesian allies who professed themselves liberators, committed to freeing the Greek states from the tyranny of Athens (cf. n.8 above), but at the same time enemies of political freedom and supporters of oligarchy (cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.19). It may be these factors that contributed to Herodotus' disenchantment, but whether or not this was so, his equivocal attitude to freedom is clear: he is aware that the word eleutheriē will have a strongly emotive sound, one to which his audience would be expected to respond wholly favourably[10a]; but his brief, as we shall see, is not to give unthinking praise to every expression of the will to freedom, but rather to explore on the one hand the weaknesses of certain forms of freedom and on the other the ominous strengths of other varieties, and in both cases to lay stress on the undesirable consequences of the condition. The traditional view that Herodotus is in all things a passionate devotee of 'the ideal of freedom'[11] will not at any rate stand close examination: it will emerge that he is much more concerned that people should conduct themselves 'justly' than that they should chase freedom and its consequences at any cost. Freedom turns out to be an expression of self-interest (cf. esp. 5.78, with Ch.II.ii.E, below), and self-interest and 'justice' often enough run counter to one another[12]. To allow one's appetites free rein, which is what freedom for Herodotus usually leads to, is to involve oneself in ambitions which wrong others, and if only for that reason Herodotus' enthusiasm for freedom is significantly qualified.

The present chapter falls into four parts: the first (II.i.A) discussing (1) the theories of society, politics and psychology which are the basis for Herodotus' analysis of the workings of freedom, with (2) a detailed treatment of his narrative of the Lycurgan reforms at Sparta; the second part (II.i.B) treats the examples of (1) Media and (2) Persia to illustrate

Herodotus' model of liberation from imperial domination; the third analyses the model of liberation from political domination (II.ii), with reference to the example of the liberation of Athens from the tyranny of the Peisistratids, illustrating the equivocation of Herodotus' account and questioning the case for the Alcmeonid source in relation to these events; the final part (II.iii) treats the narrative of the liberation of Greece, with particular attention to the shortcomings of Greek freedom.

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Freedom, Part i.A: The Psychology of Success.

(1) The Model.

In the closing chapter of the work Herodotus has Artembares urge the Persians to expand and to claim for themselves a new homeland to suit their new destiny (9.122.2): οἰκὸς δὲ ἄνδρας ἄρχοντας τοιαῦτα ποιέειν· κότε γὰρ δὴ καὶ παρέξει κάλλιον ἢ ὅτε γε ἀνθρώπων τε πολλῶν ἄρχομεν πάσης τε τῆς Ἀσίης. Herodotus has here taken us back to the moment when the Persians have elevated themselves from poverty and enslavement to power and riches (cf. 1.89.2): the change has inspired in them confidence, ambition, presumption. They now think themselves superior enough to spread themselves yet further, beyond the confines of Persia: it is reasonable (oikos) that they should do so, now that they have reached this plateau of success. Artembares' words recall Atossa's incitement to Darius to extend the empire (3.134.2f):

> οἰκὸς δέ ἐστι ἄνδρα καὶ νέον καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων δεσπότην φαίνεσθαί τι ἀποδεικνύμενον ... νῦν γὰρ ἄν τι καὶ ἀποδέξαιο ἔργον, ἕως νέος εἶς ἡλικίην· αὐξανομένωι γὰρ τῶι σώματι συναύξονται καὶ αἱ φρένες, γηράσκοντι δὲ συγγηράσκουσι, καὶ ἐς τὰ πρήγματα πάντα ἀπαμβλύνονται[13].

There is an obvious and most likely intentional parallelism here between the respective conditions of Darius at this moment and Persia at the stage when Artembares gave his advice: both have reached their akmē, the moment when their powers are at the full, and it follows, seemingly by a natural law, that such moments can be expected to be turning-points. We may assume that cities and peoples, like men, at the moment when their growth is assured will feel the encouragement of ambition, the encouragement to throw their weight about and to encroach on the liberties of others.

These two passages are a useful introduction to a pervasive Herodotean pattern, a pattern we must explore before turning to our main theme of freedom. As we shall see, Herodotus' narrative seems to observe that freedom under the right circumstances will bring about an access of confidence, a presumption of superiority, which leads peoples and states to throw off old limitations and to begin to encroach on the freedom of others. This is however to look at the problem too narrowly: the same psychological change can also be induced by different kinds of stabilizing political or social success, and indeed, as we shall see, freedom on its own is not always sufficient to set these consequences in train, although it is often an essential contributory cause. So, for example, in the case of Media, freedom on its own does not at once stimulate growth; it needs first the stability engendered by a major political change brought about by the tyranny of Deioces (cf. Ch.II.i.B.1). Herodotus thus looks out for moments of change which induce political or social well-being after periods of disorder, oppression, poverty or weakness, changes which lead to a new psychological disposition, to growth, expansion, ambition, aggression. The acquisition of freedom is merely a special case of this more general rule, a particular type of successful change, which in the right combination with other factors produces the same results of a growth in confidence and ambition. We need to understand the general rule before the special case.

The existence of such a pattern in Herodotus has been recognized often enough before[14], but only as a sort of metaphysical process, something divinely ordered, to do with the cycle koros-hybris-atē, with the envy of the gods towards those who are outstandingly prosperous. I believe however, that this is to misconceive Herodotus' thought quite seriously; I would suggest rather that his primary concern in the pattern under discussion is with its implications for human nature. In the first place Herodotus hardly ever, if at all, explains historical processes in terms of metaphysical patterns[14a]. Certainly there is talk, significantly confined to speeches, of the envy of the gods which cuts short human prosperity (cf. e.g. 1.32.1; 3.40.3; 7.10e, 46.4), of the incontrovertible necessity of the fate ordered by the gods (cf. 9.16.4), and even of the 'cycle of human affairs' which will not allow the same men to prosper indefinitely (cf. 1.207.2). Herodotus indeed echoes this last sentiment in his preface (cf. 1.5.4, τὴν ἀνθρωπηίην ὦν ἐπιστάμενος εὐδαιμονίην οὐδαμὰ ἐν τὠυτῶι μένουσαν ...), though without explicitly claiming a metaphysical validity for it and only advancing it as a personal intuition of the way the world is. Certainly he does voice in his own person views about divine causation, but they are limited to observations about particular acts of intervention in particular situations: the gods arrange that particular impieties shall be punished (cf. e.g. 1.34.1; 2.120.5; 6.84.3; 7.137.1 and 2; cf. 9.65.2), they give notice of how some particular event is to turn out (cf. e.g. 1.210.1; 6.27.3, 98.1; 9.100.2), or, as in their destruction of the Persian fleet by storm off Euboea (cf. 8.13), they assist human endeavours by levelling the odds as particular crisis points - this last a clear sign that divine intervention is in many respects merely partial, leaving room for freedom of choice in men (see below). In addition he may speak of how 'such and such a man was destined to end badly', or the like (cf. e.g. 1.8.2; 2.161.3; 4.79.1; 9.109.2; cf. 5.92d.1; 6.64; 8.53.1; with e.g. 5.33.2, a passage which suggests that the formula may be to some extent merely a façon de parler - "Naxos was not after all to be destroyed" - rather than a revelation about the workings of fate): but in such cases he offers no explanation of the logic of fate, merely stating that this was how things were, or seemed[14b]. Thus it is wrong to assume of any pattern in Herodotus that it is necessarily metaphysical: moreover, even the 'cycle of human affairs', which is not, however, a pattern that Herodotus advances in his own voice, is a decidedly vague process, at best an observation of the instability of human prosperity not an explanation of that instability[15]. Nowhere does Herodotus give any clear suggestion that he believes in metaphysical *laws* determining the course of human history; on the contrary, he confines divine intervention to particulars, never allowing it to explain patterns or processes (cf. further Ch.III.F).

Returning to the pattern under discussion, it is clear that if any divine intervention is involved, it operates only at a late stage in the process, if at all: the gods will perhaps punish those who become too prosperous, as Herodotus' speakers explain (not necessarily on his behalf), through envy of their prosperity. Thus there are some signs that the gods mean the Persians to learn a lesson at the hands of the Greeks: they have been too successful, too ambitious, too impious and unjust[16]. Herodotus' pattern, however, is not so much concerned with the catastrophe which sometimes brings such prosperity to an end, and indeed two of the main illustrations of the pattern, Athens and Sparta (below), suffer no such reversal, at least within Herodotus' narrative: he is rather concerned with how states achieve prosperity and what are the immediate psychological consequences of that prosperity, areas in which he observes no metaphysical pattern but only the workings of human nature. Only once is it suggested that the gods have anything to do with the ambition attendant on prosperity, and the suggestion comes from Xerxes, talking of the *nomos* of Persian expansion (7.8a.1): ἀλλὰ θεός τε οὕτω ἄγει καὶ αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν πολλὰ ἐπέπουσι συμφέρεται ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον. It is surprising, if Herodotus assumes this divine elment to be of primary importance for the understanding of his pattern, that he leaves it until now to mention it, and that he merely gives it to one of his characters to speak. More important, however, is that even this formulation allows that divine guidance is only part of the explanation, and that the Persians 'have themselves had to attend to many things to assist the process', a clear indication that if there is a divine element in Herodotus' understanding of the process of Persian growth, it operates at the level of 'over-determination'[17], with the result that men are free to choose, and it is human nature which regulates how they choose (cf. 7.139.5). It may then be that Herodotus' pattern interlocks to some extent with the old pattern of koros-hybris-atē; perhaps indeed he is, in part at least, exploring the psychological implications of that pattern, long familiar in Greek thought but not until this period treated systematically and reductively for what it could show about human nature (see below). But, as we shall see, the pattern is wholly comprehensible without the divine and without metaphysics, and in every case that is how Herodotus sets it out: a wholly naturalistic explanation of the historical process.

Accordingly in describing this Herodotean explanation I propose not to use the word pattern, which sometimes has metaphysical overtones, but rather the expression 'historical model', which has what I think are much more appropriate overtones, appropriate because of the influence on Herodotus of sophistic thought (cf. Ch.III.B, for a full defence of this position). The sophists, I would argue, were the first Greek thinkers to approach systematically the study of human nature, heretofore left largely to the poets, and hence the first to inquire seriously into the nature of human society, the political and social life of man. A new confidence in handling ideas of human psychology and the laws of probability led the sophists to attempt constructs of the way human society worked, 'models' of the mechanics of social change, from experiments in reconstructing the early social life and development of man to abstract theories of political change (cf. the metabolē politeiōn; with Ch.III.H). It is appropriate to speak of 'models' here, in the sense in which social scientists and historians nowadays use the term, to describe provisional theoretical constructs which reduce and simplify complex processes and systems and so assist in the ordering and interpreting of otherwise intractable data[18]. Before considering how this applies to Herodotus, let us make a comparison with Thucydides' Archaeology, which both has clear points of contact with Herodotus' thought and where it is reasonable to suppose that sophistic influence is at work[19].

The idea that stability is a necessary precondition of growth is the principal Leitmotiv of the Archaeology. The theme is stated at the outset (1.2.1):

> φαίνεται γὰρ ἡ νῦν Ἑλλὰς καλουμένη οὐ πάλαι βεβαίως οἰκουμένη, ἀλλὰ μεταναστάσεις τε οὖσαι τὰ πρότερα καὶ ῥαιδίως ἕκαστοι τὴν ἑαυτῶν ἀπολείποντες βιαζόμενοι ὑπό τινων αἰεὶ πλειόνων.

The shape of the excursus depends on the idea that Greece advanced from its primitive beginnings through successive stages of political and social consolidation to ever-increasing prosperity and military capacity, or put another way, that various political and social hindrances had to be overcome before each advance could be achieved.

> First comes Minos (1.4ff), like Herodotus' Polycrates an imperialist thalassocrat, whose achievement is the suppression of piracy, which had prevented the growth of stable communities; then comes the growth of maritime cities (1.7ff), which build themselves walled towns, and like Agamemnon (1.9ff) take it upon themselves to assert their hegemony over the weaker states (cf. 1.8.3): οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες προσεποιεῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις. But even after the Trojan Wars there were still disturbances (staseis) harmful to growth (1.12.1, ὥστε μὴ ἡσυχάσασαν αὐξηθῆναι); but when these died down (1.12.4, μόλις τε ἐν πολλῶι χρόνωι ἡσυχάσασα ἡ Ἑλλὰς καὶ οὐκέτι ἀνισταμένη; cf. 1.2.1, above), there came colonies; and then with the advent of greater wealth (1.13.1, δυνατωτέρας δὲ γιγνομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιουμένης) began the age of tyrannies. Cities like Corinth began to acquire fleets in the true sense (1.13.2ff) and there occurred the first sea-battles (1.13.4); Corinth too became powerful and rich through trade (1.13.5). Cities with fleets began to extend their sway over others (1.15.1, ἰσχὺν δὲ περιεποιήσαντο ὅμως οὐκ ἐλαχίστην οἱ προσσχόντες αὐτοῖς χρημάτων τε προσόδωι καὶ ἄλλων ἀρχῆι), but still there were few important confrontations by land (1.15.2f). Moreover there were further hindrances to growth (1.16, ἐπεγένετο δὲ ἄλλοις τε ἄλλοθι κωλύματα μὴ αὐξηθῆναι), in Ionia the Persian conquest, elsewhere the repressive and unambitious character of tyrannies (1.17), although Sparta exceptionally was always free from tyrants, despite an early period of stasis, and helped to remove them in other cities (1.18.1). The Persian Wars saw the two greatest powers of Greece come together on the same side (1.18.2); but the sequel saw them draw apart and grow independently greater, until they came to confront one another, with Athens developing through her allied fleet and her tribute the greatest military capability yet seen (1.19, καὶ ἐγένετο αὐτοῖς ἐς τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ἡ ἰδία παρασκευὴ μείζων ἢ ὡς τὰ κράτιστά ποτε μετὰ ἀκραιφνοῦς τῆς ξυμμαχίης ἤνθησαν[20].

The Archaeology is something of a maze, with a number of different routes leading through it, and a greater number of blind alleys; but the central pattern of change bringing stability and so inducing growth and ambition is clear enough to follow[21]. Clear too is that Thucydides is here indulging in theoretical construction: his 'model' tells him how the historical process ought to work and he sets about assembling the right material to illustrate it, and indeed interpreting the available material to accomodate it. Hence, for example, because the process of development ought to be rectilinear according to his model, without major events duplicating themselves (see below), he is compelled to argue away the evidence of Homer for the scale of the Trojan expedition, and even to reduce the importance of the Persian Wars. Such a model is unmistakably sophistic by influence: the curious assumption that important events in human history tend to occur once and for all is one that clearly dominates sophistic reconstructions of the early history of man, which oddly presuppose that cultural inventions are by and large made in only one place and at only one time. The simplification of human history involved here, which reduces the random stuff of human experience to processes which are readily comprehensible, if somewhat at the expense of truth, clearly reflects a perception of the usefulness of theoretical constructs.

My contention is that Thucydides' Archaeology shares with Herodotus the stimulus of this new way of thinking. What both have in common is the perception that the social and political life of man is something that lends itself to rational analysis, that certain critical events in the life-cycles of states and nations precipitate certain other predictable consequences, that there can be such a thing as an elementary science of social change, built on the study of probability and human nature. In addition Thucydides' model here clearly corresponds quite closely with our Herodotean model, notably in its appreciation of the psychology of social and political stability. That Thucydides is not, for example, 'borrowing' from Herodotus here, can be inferred from a comparison of the

Anonymus Iamblichi, a sophistic text of the late 5thc, which incorporates an analysis, simplistic it may be, of the positive social effects of eunomia and the ill-effects of anomia (Anon.Iamb.7 = DK II.403-4), displaying obvious points of contact with the Herodotean model, though clearly independent. No doubt there is a danger of exaggerating the amount of system and intellectual discipline involved in these texts, but it is surely right to insist on the extent to which Herodotus, in company with Thucydides and the sophists, has progressed in the rational analysis of human nature and human institutions, and the extent to which they all conduct their inquiries along parallel lines, exploring the same themes and constructing similar models for the purposes of interpretation (cf. Ch.III.B, for the argument of this paragraph).

The overlaps between the Archaeology and the Herodotean model are not hard to detect; in particular, besides a common interest in how societies evolve and grow through processes of successful change, both see the same result to the expansion of cities and states, namely aggression against others. This appears in a number of places in the Archaeology (cf. e.g. 1.8.3 and 1.15.1, above), where the states which are the most successful in achieving stability and prosperity are the first to dominate others[22], but it also emerges from the final direction taken by the excursus. Thucydides concludes by setting out the process by which, at the end of his sequence of the advance of the Greek states, Athens and Sparta emerged as the two most powerful forces and came to confront one another in the greatest of all wars[23]. As he says later (the arcanum of his history of the war) it is Athenian growth which at last inevitably forces Sparta into war (1.23.6): τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γεγενημένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν (cf. 1.88). This is precisely the pattern which Herodotus observes in the case of both Persia and Athens in the work. Croesus is roused from his mourning over Atys by the threat of Persian expansion, inasmuch as it is a threat to his own empire which he must if possible stifle (1.46.1): εἴ κως δύναιτο, πρὶν μεγάλους γενέσθαι τοὺς Πέρσας, καταλαβεῖν αὐτῶν αὐξανομένην τὴν δύναμιν. So too the Spartans have reason to fear the rise of Athens (5.91.1): τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ὥρων αὐξανομένους καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἑτοίμους ἐόντας πείθεσθαι σφίσι ... (see Ch.II.ii.D, below)[24]. Or again Nitocris faced with the threat of Media realizes that its empire is at once 'great' and restless (1.185.1): τὴν Μήδων ὁρῶσα ἀρχὴν μεγάλην τε καὶ οὐκ ἀτρεμίζουσαν. Herodotus almost invariably associates the process of *megas ginesthai* or *auxanesthai* with aggressive expansion. A state or nation may be or become *megalē* or *eudaimōn* in a more or less neutral sense, that is in terms of its material prosperity alone (cf. e.g. 1.5.3?), but this simple connotation is surprisingly rare in Herodotus[25]. Bias promises the Ionians that removed to Sardinia they will have the chance to prosper (1.170.2): ἀπαλλαχθέντας σφέας δουλοσύνης εὐδαιμονήσειν, νήσων τε ἁπασέων μεγίστην νεμομένους καὶ ἄρχοντας ἄλλων . The Ionians are to escape slavery and achieve prosperity in a material sense, as owning a vast territory, but also in an 'imperial' sense, by extending their authority over others. Typically the 'prosperity' or 'greatness' of a state is seen as a threat to the security of others. The equation is particularly clear in the case of Polycrates, whose 'growth' is measured in terms of his aggression and imperialism (3.39.3):

> χρόνωι δὲ ὀλίγωι αὐτίκα τοῦ Πολυκράτεος τὰ πρήγματα ηὔξετο καὶ ἦν βεβωμένα ἀνά τε Ἰωνίην καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα· ὅκου γὰρ ἰθύσειε στρατεύεσθαι, πάντα οἱ ἐχώρεε εὐτυχέως[26].

Growth, prosperity, success of any kind, almost invariably for Herodotus involve people in ambition, in the desire for gain (*pleonexia*), or at the very least the desire to interfere with or impose upon neighbouring states. This is an observation of the *psychology of success*, as emerges clearly from the example of the Aeginetans who are encouraged by their prosperity to wrong the Athenians (5.81.2): Αἰγινῆται δὲ εὐδαιμονίηι μεγάληι ἐπαρθέντες[27] ... πόλεμον ἀκήρυκτον Ἀθηναίοισι ἐπέφερον.
There is an analogy here between the psychology of groups and the psychology

of individuals[28]. Having arrived in his narrative at the climax of Cyrus' imperial career, just before his final, fateful expedition against the Massagetai (1.201.ff), Herodotus pauses to consider the psychology of his ambition (1.204.2):

> πολλά τε γάρ μιν καὶ μεγάλα τὰ ἐπαείροντα καὶ ἐποτρύνοντα ἦν , πρῶτον μὲν ἡ γένεσις, τὸ δοκέειν πλέον τι εἶναι ἀνθρώπου[29], δεύτερα δὲ ἡ εὐτυχίη ἡ κατὰ τοὺς πολέμους γενομένη· ὅκηι γὰρ ἰθύσειε στρατεύεσθαι ὁ Κῦρος, ἀμήχανον ἦν ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἔθνος διαφυγεῖν (cf. Polycrates at 3.39.3, above).

Among the many reasons inciting him to further conquest (and note that Herodotus is aware here that motivation is apt to be complex: cf. Ch.I.i and ii), Herodotus singles out (a) Cyrus' presumption that he is a man above other men, and (b) the encouragement of eutykhia. These two reasons are to some extent parallel: the presumption of superiority is, as we have seen (Ch.I.i), for Herodotus characteristic of all tyrants and men of outstanding eminence, who presume or pretend that they are different from others - although, of course, the peculiar circumstances of Cyrus' birth and childhood encourage this presumption in him more than in most others of his kind (cf. 1.126.6, with 122.3). The second explanation is thus in part a corollary of the first: Cyrus assumes that his good fortune will never leave him, in that he is (so he thinks) a man specially favoured by heaven or fate, and this encourages him (as it does the Aeginetans, above) to 'push his luck' even further. Herodotus supports his own psychological analysis here with the speech he gives the barbarian queen Tomyris shortly after (1.206.1ff). Tomyris calls upon Cyrus to "stop pursuing your present course, for you cannot know whether it will turn out favourably for you. Stop and rule what you have and be content to let us rule what we have". But she knows her advice will not prevail: οὐκ ὦν ἐθελήσεις ὑποθήκηισι τηισίδε χρᾶσθαι ἀλλὰ πάντως μᾶλλον ἢ δι' ἡσυχίης εἶναι [30]. Herodotus suggests that Cyrus is so blinded by his own success that he will no longer reflect on whether his ambition is prudent, will no longer listen to cautionary advice: he is not content to let his neighbours live in peace, and nothing will stop him in his restless pursuit of further gain. The aggressive confidence inspired by success is almost inevitable, human nature being what it is[31].

This idea of the cumulative effect of *eutykhia* is something which much concerns Thucydides, as for example in his comments on the Athenian ambition in Sicily (4.65.4):

> οὕτω τῆι παρούσηι εὐτυχίαι χρώμενοι ἠξίουν σφίσι μηδὲν ἐναντιοῦσθαι (cf. Hdt 1.204.2, above) ... αἰτία δ' ἦν ἡ παρὰ λόγον τῶν πλεόνων εὐπραγία αὐτοῖς ὑποτιθεῖσα ἰσχὺν τῆς ἐλπίδος.

Thucydides could almost be describing the Persian appetite for conquest as represented by Herodotus! What Thucydides describes here is the same process that the Spartans had earlier warned the Athenians against in urging them to make peace at the time of Pylos (4.17.4):

> ὑμῖν γὰρ εὐτυχίαν τὴν παροῦσαν ἔξεστι καλῶς θέσθαι, ... καὶ μὴ παθεῖν ὅπερ οἱ ἀήθως τι ἀγαθὸν λαμβάνοντες τῶν ἀνθρώπων· αἰεὶ γὰρ τοῦ πλέονος ἐλπίδι ὀρέγονται διὰ τὸ τὰ παρόντα εὐτυχῆσαι.

Again there is a clear similarity with the advice given by Tomyris to Cyrus: in both cases the advice goes unheeded because of that quality in human nature which causes one to be carried away by any initial success and to hope that one's winning streak will continue indefinitely. It is the same warning again as Artabanus voices to Xerxes at 7.49.4: εὐπρηξίης δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ἀνθρώποισι οὐδεμία πληθώρη ("for who is ever sated with success?")[32]. This further correspondence between Herodotus and Thucydides suggests that we have to do here with a modern psychological rationalization of a traditional idea. There is no doubt that both authors were long anticipated by the poets (cf. e.g. Solon F13.72f West: οἳ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλεῖστον ἔχουσι βίον,/ διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;), who well knew that the ambition for profit, once set in motion, gathered an inexorable momentum which carried its victim on to disaster. But there is surely something new in the precise observation of the psychology of the process, of the nature of the connnexion between *eutykhia* and *elpis*. If Herodotus and Thucydides are in a sense only making explicit something that the Greek poets had long understood, that is still surely a significant advance. Herodotus' account of Cyrus' motivation at 1.204.2 and 206.1ff above shows the sort of psychological precision which was not usual until the sophistic movement brought its techniques of reductive analysis to the study of human nature. If this seems exaggerated it is worth reflecting that such analysis is still evidently something of a novelty for Thucydides and Euripides: to be explicit about the workings of human nature, even if the insights themselves are such as the poets had sensed as far back as Homer, had just now become an excitingly new intellectual challenge. Phaedra's ruminations on the psychology of aidōs in Euripides' Hippolytos (373ff), to take an extreme example, could hardly have been written by any earlier poet (cf. Ch.III.G, for the argument of this paragraph).

This brings us back to an earlier point: in some degree Herodotus' and Thucydides' model of the psychology of prosperity is merely a restatement of the koros-hybris-atē cycle, making explicit what had always been felt but never quite so clearly expressed about the role of human nature in that scheme. In the clear articulation of such things lies the novelty of their thought.

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(2) The case of Sparta.

The clearest and most elaborate example of Herodotus' model of the tendency of successful change, not linked to freedom, to lead to prosperity and stability and thence to expansion and aggression is the case of 'post-Lycurgan Sparta'. It is clearly intended to have a programmatic quality: it forms part of a sequence of examples which are set out early in the work to introduce the reader to the model in its various possible applications. The Spartan example belongs together with the case of Peisistratid Athens which precedes it, as we can see from Herodotus' linking of the two at 1.65.1 (see below), where Croesus' envoy discovers "the Athenians repressed and divided by the tyranny of Peisistratus (cf. 1.59.1), whereas the Spartans had just escaped from great evils, in the form of extreme political division". In other words Herodotus sets out first the negative side of his model, showing the way in which a repressive political regime will inhibit growth and stifle ambition: Peisistratid Athens is no fit candidate for an alliance with Lydia (cf. Ch.II.ii.A); in Sparta by contrast we are offered the positive side of the model in its clearest form. Later in Book One Herodotus is to set out the joint model, with the added factor of successful change stimulated or accompanied by the acquisition of freedom: again he unfolds the theme in a twofold exposition, first Media, then Persia, with the advantage that he can explore both the example of the joint model (success-plus-freedom) which has the most important consequences for the ensuing course of the work (Persia: liberation leading to empire), and the complications of the joint model which show up the weaknesses of unqualified freedom (Media: before and after Deioces). I shall offer a brief discussion of these two examples in the second part of this section (Ch.II.i.B), since both are important for Herodotus as analogues of Greek affairs later, most particularly of democratic Athens. The case of Sparta deserves detailed attention here, since it is Herodotus' own introduction to the full version of the basic model of successful change leading to prosperity and thence to aggression. I believe it can be shown that Herodotus has in this instance been over-enthusiastic in his application of the model and is distinctly more concerned to accomodate the facts to his theoretical construct than to modify or jettison the model in the interest of the facts. If such a hypothesis is correct, it would suggest that for the purposes of his exposition Herodotus has press-ganged Sparta into serving as an example of the model, despite a certain unsuitability for the role. I suggest also that Herodotus' consciously cavalier proceeding here is responsible for a notorious chronological puzzle in the account.

He begins by contrasting Sparta with the Athens of the tyranny which he has been describing immediately before (1.65.1):

> τοὺς μέν νυν ʼΑθηναίους τοιαῦτα τõν χρόνον τοῦτον ... κατέχοντα,
> τοὺς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐκ κακῶν μεγάλων πεφευγότας καὶ ἐόντας ἤδη
> τῶι πολέμωι κατυπερτέρους Τεγεητέων.

The parallelism seems to suggest that the great evils which the Spartans have escaped are similar to those which are still besetting Athens, that is *political* troubles. It might be objected that Herodotus is thinking merely of the tribulations following the defeat by Tegea (1.66.4) and that ἐκ κακῶν μεγάλων πεφευγότας is amplified by τῶι πολέμωι κατυπερτέρους (cf. 1.67.1, κατὰ μὲν δὴ τὸν πρότερον πόλεμον συνεχέως αἰεὶ κακῶς ἀέθλεον πρὸς τοὺς Τεγεήτας); but Herodotus does not seem otherwise to think the 'disaster' quite so serious: it is after all only a 'defeat away from home' and more of an injury to Spartan pride than a danger to the state. The next sentence seems to confirm this:

> ἐπὶ γὰρ Λέοντος βασιλεύοντος καὶ Ἡγησικλέος ἐν Σπάρτηι τοὺς ἄλλους
> πολέμους εὐτυχέοντες οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς Τεγεήτας μούνους
> προσέπταιον (n.b. note the imperfect here).

It does not seem consistent with a condition of *kaka megala* that the Spartans should be at the same time (as the imperfect shows) successful (*eutykheontes*) in all their other wars and only unable to make headway in one war of aggression. In other words we should accept that Herodotus' programmatic opening somewhat confusingly proposes two separate things about the Sparta of the mid-6thc: (i) that she had (recently?) escaped some unspecified trouble (the parallel with Athens suggests political trouble); and (ii) that she had subsequently after a brief series of setbacks achieved success in her war with Tegea. As we read on, the words ἐπὶ γὰρ Λέοντος ... and the rest turn out to be an explanatory parenthesis clarifying, briefly for the moment, the sense of τῶι πολέμωι κατυπερτέρους, while Herodotus first of all sets himself to expand on the first limb of his programme (i.e. ἐκ κακῶν μεγάλων πεφευγότας) at 1.65.2:

> τὸ δὲ ἔτι πρότερον τούτων καὶ κακονομώτατοι ἦσαν σχεδὸν πάντων Ἑλλήνων κατά τε σφέας αὐτοὺς καὶ ξείνοισι ἀπρόσμεικτοι. μετέβαλον δὲ ὧδε ἐς εὐνομίην.

It is most natural to assume that the κακονομώτατοι κτλ. picks up the κακὰ μεγάλα of the opening sentence. The complex interlacing of this paragraph is clearly not best designed to help the reader find his feet, something to which the disagreements of modern commentators bear witness. On the other hand Herodotus himself is demonstrably not confused, and, as we shall see, it seems likely that he has deliberately engineered this effect to prevent the reader asking awkward question. . The precise relation between the two escapes (from anomia and from the Tegean troubles) is easy to miss.

The manner of this first escape (μετέβαλον δὲ ὧδε ἐς εὐνομίην)[33] is then described. 'There was a man called Lycurgus, who enjoyed high repute among the Spartans' (1.65.2, τῶν Σπαρτιητέων δοκίμου ἀνδρός) - we are told here nothing more than this about him, neither when he lived, nor whether he held any prominent position in the state. Lycurgus went to Delphi (we are not told why), where he was addressed in extravagant terms by the Pythia (65.3) as beloved of the gods and almost a god himself: Herodotus quotes a full four lines (or possibly all) of the oracle[34]. Only then, and then only indirectly, does he explain the connexion between Lycurgus and the 'change' at Sparta (65.4):

> some say that besides this the Pythia gave Lycurgus the 'constitution' which the Spartans now observe, but the Spartans themselves say: Λυκοῦργον επιτροπεύσαντα Λεωβώτεω, ἀδελφιδέου μὲν ἑωυτοῦ, βασιλεύοντος δὲ Σπαρτιητέων, ἐκ Κρήτης ἀγαγέσθαι ταῦτα[35].

And he concludes (1.65.5-66.1):

> ὡς γὰρ ἐπετρόπευσε τάχιστα[36], μετέστησε τὰ νόμιμα πάντα καὶ ἐφύλαξε ταῦτα μὴ παραβαίνειν[37] [...]. οὕτω μὲν μεταβαλόντες εὐνομήθησαν. (with which he finally picks up the allusive μετέβαλον δὲ ὧδε ἐς εὐνομίην of the opening.

Herodotus' reluctance to identify Lycurgus or to explain outright that he was the author of Spartan *eunomia* (this last is almost hidden behind the citation of sources) is not the least of the curiosities of this elusive exposition. It is clear, however, that Herodotus wants principally to create the impression that Lycurgus' reforms, through which Sparta achieved *eunomia*, took place at some time unspecified but not too distant before Sparta's conflict with Tegea, an intention which finally becomes clear (or seems to) as he now at last draws the threads together (1.66.1):

> οὕτω μὲν μεταβαλόντες εὐνομήθησαν, τῶι δὲ Λυκούργωι τελευτήσαντι ἱρὸν εἱσάνενοι σέβονται μεγάλως. οἷα δὲ ἔν τε χώρηι ἀγαθῆι καὶ πλήθεϊ οὐκ ὀλίγων ἀνδρῶν, ἀνά τε ἔδραμον αὐτίκα καὶ εὐθενήθησαν. καὶ δή σφι οὐκέτι ἀπέχρα ἡσυχίην ἄγειν, ἀλλὰ καταφρονήσαντες Ἀρκάδων κρέσσονες εἶναι... ; and there follows the Tegean narrative.

Soon (*autika*) after the reforms, we understand, Sparta shot up and flourished and no longer as before (*ouketi*) abstained from aggression towards her neighbours. The pattern, and in particular the rapidity of this Spartan growth, is a familiar one (cf. Polycrates at 3.39.3, χρόνωι δὲ ὀλίγωι αὐτίκα ... τὰ πρήγματα ηὔξετο, κτλ.; and with the wording of the present passage cf. esp. Gelon's Syracuse at 7.156, αἱ δὲ παραυτίκα ἀνά τε ἔδραμον καὶ ἔβλαστον). It is clear that this element of *rapid growth* after the consolidation is important to Herodotus' model, almost certainly on the analogy of the growth of plants and animals. The metaphor in *anadramein* is clearly that of plant growth, a metaphor assisted by the hint of "good soil" in *khōrei agathēi*[38]: thus the thought behind the model is presumably that we may compare societies which have just undergone important change to young plants and animals, whose most extensive growth occurs in their earliest years (cf. Pl.Legg.788D, ὡς ἡ πρώτη βλάστη παντὸς ζώιου πολὺ μεγίστη καὶ πλείστη φύεται). The analogy works on the same principle as Atossa's observation to Darius at 3.134 (above): Herodotus infers that just as a man has his most ambitious thoughts when his physical body is young and strong, so too a society can be expected to be most ambitious at a stage when it has only recently undergone a successful change, as it were recreating a new life itself. However, it is Herodotus' very insistence on rapid growth here which seems to be responsible for the passage's apparent chronological contradiction. The trouble over Tegea with which Herodotus began (1.65.1) was meant to occupy the reigns of Leon and Agasikles, that is the generation before Anaxandrias and Ariston and the embassy of Croesus (c.550), which is Herodotus' point of entry into Spartan history. And yet Herodotus' date for Lycurgus is on his own evidence elsewhere by no means shortly before Leon and Agasikles: Leobotes, his ward, belongs on the evidence of Herodotus' own list of Agid kings (7.204) to the 8th generation after Heracles and the 10th generation before Leon[39].

Andrewes[40] tries to solve the problem by explaining it as a false combination of two discrepant stories:

> "When he asked the cause of the existing *eunomia* of Sparta, the Spartans replied in all sincerity that it was due to the workings of the Lycurgan system. They did not insist on the fact that this system had not always worked harmoniously and it is likely that he heard elsewhere the story of the 7thc troubles of Sparta. In Sparta he could find no other news of their cure than that the Spartan *eunomia* was due to Lycurgus. So he jumped to the conclusion that these disorders had preceded Lycurgus, and that it was the institution of the Lycurgan system that had put down the *kakonomia*".

While this ingenious answer is the only one that comes near to both accepting the intentions of Herodotus' Greek and reconciling it with possible historical fact, it will not do. Herodotus' own list of Agid kings shows us that he knew when Leobotes lived; and even if he had forgotten the fact at this point, or had not yet learnt it, we are forced to assume on this view that he here parrotted the name of Leobotes from his (Spartan?) source without once stopping to think what it meant for his chronology, let alone trying to check the datum. In principle we would expect Herodotus to have further identified Leobotes, for example as the son of Ekhestratos, or somehow to have placed him in time. If he did not know anything about him, his lack of inquisitiveness is surely reprehensible and certainly surprising; but if he did know (and it seems he did), his reticence, as we shall see, becomes quite understandable. Moreover Herodotus gives no indication that he is thinking of a 7thc stasis such as this theory supposes his non-Spartan sources must have described to him[41]. It seems on balance that we must face the paradox that he is aware of what he is saying.

From what we have said so far it should already be clear where the answer lies: Herodotus is in fact smoothing over an unavoidable complication of chronology in the interests of his theoretical model of Spartan growth. He must make it seem as though the interval between Lycurgus and Tegea is not as large as he knows (or rather believes) it to be, because he wants to make Sparta's Arcadian imperialism appear the result of her rapid growth, a growth brought about by the change to political stability (from kakonomōtatoi to eunomia). Faced with what he evidently takes to be the unescapable 'fact' that Lycurgus, the regent of Leobotes, belongs some 400 years before his point of departure (the reigns of Leon and Agasikles), he must minimize the interval. He is guilty of contriving the impression of a close relation in time, and hence a cause-and-effect relation, between Lycurgus and Tegea. As we have noticed, he omits any explicit mention of when Lycurgus lived in relation to his starting-point and delays the mention of Leobotes as long as possible. Indeed given that the rapidity of Spartan growth consequent on her acquisition of eunomia is obviously so important to Herodotus' model, the absence of any explicit mention of how long this process took in terms of years is surely significant. His uneasiness is evidently betrayed in the words (1.65.2): τὸ δὲ ἔτι πρότερον τούτων καὶ κακονομώτατοι ἦσαν. On the present analysis, Sparta's change of constitution is dragged into Herodotus' account by the scruff of its neck, since its relation in time to the early 6thc can be for him no excuse for its inclusion: the only reason for its mention, given Herodotus' knowledge of the date of Leobotes, is the illustration of his theoretical model. "Even before this" is a distinctly cagey introduction, and surely calculatedly inexplicit, even though the reader requires to know what precise relation in time exists between Lycurgus' reforms and the reigns of Leon and Agasikles in order to be able to assess the relevance of the excursus. Herodotus can by contrast get away with the word *autika* later on (1.66.1), where the range of meaning of 'soon' can be much freer, where indeed the word can be excused as a 'relative' measurement of time: how quickly do we expect states to grow? At this earlier point however any more precise detail as to the degree of the interval (e.g. χρόνωι ὀλίγωι / οὐ πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι πρότερον τούτων) would be an outrageous deception, and perhaps specific enough to give away the sleight-of-hand.

It is a necessary corollary of this interpretation that Herodotus cannot know anything of a 7thc (or even a 6thc) Spartan constitutional re-organization. If he had known (say) that Sparta escaped political disaster sometime before 650 under the auspices of Theopompus and Polydorus through constitutional reforms preserved for us in Plutarch's Great Rhetra and reflected in the poetry of Tyrtaeus (cf. n.41, above) - if he had known all this, he would most certainly have made use of it; but as it is he surely knows nothing of the kind. Obviously such a report would have suited his purposes ideally, providing him with a delightfully short interval between a successful constitutional change and the Tegean conflict - and he need never have bothered with Lycurgus and Leobotes.

This interpretation of the crux at least does justice to Herodotus' common sense, whereas any other approach inevitably ends up accusing him of faulty joinery and a confused inability to make coherent sense of his source material. Moreover we can understand precisely why the exposition unfolds as it does: the obscurity of the passage is calculated rather than accidental.

It seems likely that Herodotus' decision to break into Spartan history at the time of Croesus' embassy (i.e. c.550) has involved him in difficulties. His model of Spartan growth will not comfortably fit the facts he has. Most surprising indeeed is that he does not here mention either of the Messenian Wars (of the 8thc and 7thc) nor Sparta's imperialism in the creation and subjugation of the Helot serf population. Herodotus, interested as he is in enslavement and serfdom, ought, we would think, to have treated this most striking example and taken some side in what was surely a current debate among those concerned with the problems of slavery[42]. His silence here is certainly not due to ignorance (cf. e.g. 3.47.1, the Samian exiles claim the Spartans owe them a favour: ὅτι σφι πρότεροι αὐτοὶ νηυσὶ ἐβοήϑησαν ἐπὶ Μεσσηνίους [43]. With his date for Lycurgus we might have expected to have heard of the successful conquest of Messenia instead of the considerably less notable success over Tegea (see below). Indeed it is possible that the words τοὺς ἄλλους πολέμους εὐτυχέοντες at 1.65.1[44] are a desultory acknowledgement of this greatest feat of Spartan militarism (and cf. below on the use of the word *katestrammenē* at 1.68.6). Herodotus evidently does not feel at liberty to stretch himself thus far: Lycurgus and Tegea must be telescoped and the remarkable events of the Messenian conquest squeezed out of the picture. The reason for this reticence may well be that he suspects his readers will be more certain that they know when the Messenian Wars took place and how long a period that conflict lasted, than they would be of the antiquity of Lycurgus; so that had he mentioned Messenia in its proper relation to Lycurgus as he saw it, he would have risked showing them that his interval between the reforms and the reigns of Leon and Agasikles was much greater than he is trying to pretend.

His choice of Tegea in particular as the turning-point in Sparta's imperial destiny may have been based on a number of considerations: he may, for example, have been attracted by the element of peripeteia in the story, which the Messenian Wars lacked. There is also the parallel with Athens to be considered: the Athenians have the confidence to accept the overtures of Aristagoras and commit themselves to an eastern adventure partly as a result of a political change (the democracy of Cleisthenes) and partly as a result of a recent victory in a local war, that against the Boeotians and the Euboeans (cf. 5.78, in Ch.II.ii.E); Herodotus may have chosen Tegea as similarly a recent local war, which the Messenian Wars could not have been. He may also have wanted to show the impetuosity of the new Spartans, suddenly embarking on an ambitious project, which initially turns against them, but which before long they conclude in their favour; again the long drawn out war of attrition against the Messenians fits this psychological model less well.

Messenia is a lost opportunity in another sense. Herodotus' model requires Sparta to have grown into an imperialist power with aggressive designs: Messenia was the best possible example of such a development, but Herodotus has had to abandon it and make do with the Tegean Wars, which are far less satisfactory for his purposes[45]. The climax of the Spartan history here is nonetheless a picture of Spartan imperialism, with Tegea in the foreground (1.68.6):

> καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τοῦ χρόνου, ὅκως πειρώιατο ἀλλήλων, πολλῶι κατυπέρτεροι τῶι πολεμῶι[46] ἐγίνοντο οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι· ἤδη δέ σφι καὶ ἡ πολλὴ τῆς Πελοποννήσου ἦν κατεστραμμένη.

This last sentence provides the appropriate climax for Herodotus' account: Sparta has conquered herself an empire in the Peloponnese. But as a historical fact, and even perhaps as a summary of what he has told us, this is a dishonest exaggeration. It would be proper no doubt to describe the Messenians as katestrammenoi (but Herodotus has failed to mention them), but not Sparta's other Peloponnesian neighbours and allies, and least of all, even on Herodotus' own evidence, the Tegeans. The word can only mean 'reduced by conquest to subject status', scarcely limited even to 'defeated in war', and most emphatically not 'subsumed into their alliance', as modern historian have hoped it might. It is the word to describe the imperial conquests of Lydia (e.g. Croesus' empire at 1.28, κατεστραμμένων σχεδὸν πάντων τῶν ἐντὸς Ἅλυος ποταμοῦ οἰκημένων) or Persia (e.g. the Perinthians reduced by Megabazos at 5.1.1, οὐ βουλομένους ὑπηκόους εἶναι Δαρείου κατεστρέψαντο); and indeed at 6.44.1 Herodotus varies the verb katestrepsanto with the periphrasis πρὸς τοῖσι ὑπάρχουσι δούλους προσεκτήσαντο. It is what Athens did to her allies in revolt (cf. Thucyd. 1.75.4, καί τινων καὶ ἤδη ἀποστάντων κατεστραμμένων) but it could not describe merely Athenian or Spartan hegemony in their respective Leagues. But in the case of Tegea[47] it seems clear that Sparta's victory was in historical fact more negotiated than imposed[48]. Whatever we are to make of Herodotus' account of the Bones of Orestes, it seems probable that what lies behind it is a shift in Spartan policy "from aggression to peaceful co-existence, and from 'Helotization' to diplomatic subordination" (cf. Cartledge p.139), with a new appreciation of the need for propaganda to replace coercion[49]. For Sparta's other main neighbours 'subjugation' seems equally improbable at this time. Corinth is perhaps brought into an alliance; but the defeat of Argos in the battle for the Thyreatis is on Herodotus' own evidence later[50]; while the deposition of Aeschines of Sicyon is possibly not so early[51],and only by a strenuous effort of the imagination can it be considered an act of 'conquest'. Indeed there is general agreement that the Peloponnesian League was the creation of diplomacy rather than military subordination[52]: its members were 'allies' of Sparta, even though they may after a certain date (but not perhaps as early as this?) have promised to 'follow wherever the Spartans led them'[53]. In short it seems that Herodotus has chosen his vocabulary to suggest the growth of a Spartan imperialism which in the terms envisaged and for the time in question was, as he himself surely knew, a plain travesty of the truth. Indeed the very absence from his account of any realistic supporting evidence for such an ambitious claim is the best proof of its audacity[54].

Sparta's change from *anomia* to *eunomia* brings an access of confidence, which lead her to prosperity, to a new openness towards the outside world, and to an ambition for conquest. Previously the Spartans had been κακονομώτατοι ... σχεδὸν πάντων Ἑλλήνων κατά τε σφέας αὐτοὺς καὶ ξείνοισι ἀπρόσμεικτοι, that is internally divided and hostile or wary towards the outside world. Whether or not this model of change is either historically accurate or authentically reported, we are hardly in a position to judge[54a]. The suspicion that Herodotus is not telling the whole truth, or at least not the Spartan version of the truth, is encouraged by the consideration that his model evidently owes much to contemporary political theory. Ryffel has well observed the appearance of *metabolē*-theory in this account of a transition from *anomia* to *eunomia*[55], with Lycurgus as the benevolent *epitropos* who restores the essential components of a stable social life, the same theoretical pattern that inspires Herodotus' narrative of Deioces in Media (cf. Ch.II.i.B.1), and which he shares with the Anonymus Iamblichi (Anon.Iamb.7.14).

Comparison with Thucydides, moreover, reveals a possible theoretical background to Herodotus' conjunction of *kakonomia*[56] and *ameixia*. Thucydides describes the early weakness of the Greek world as both caused by and manifested in its inability first to form stable communities, through the aggregation of neighbours with common interests of security or profit, and later to contract alliances with other states, and consequently its inability to mount 'international enterprises', especially wars of any scale (cf. e.g. 1.2.2, οὐδ’ ἐπιμειγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις, etc.; see above)[57]. Herodotus' Sparta clearly follows the same pattern: her early *ameixia* (what evidence did he have for it?) contrasts with her disposition after the reforms, in her readiness both to exert her authority in the Peloponnese and to contract an alliance with Croesus and Lydia[58] (1.69.3): ἥσθησαν τε τῆι ἀπίξι τῶν Λυδῶν καὶ ἐποιήσαντο ὅρκια ξεινίης πέρι καὶ συμμαχίης (cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.18.2; with Agamemnon's symmachy which he led against Troy at 1.9.1ff). Sparta has begun to have the self-confidence, the belief in her own importance in the world, which was the inevitable result of her political consolidation, and which led her to become the foremost state in the Greek world.

Herodotus' account of early Sparta then is in large part constructed in accordance with a particular theory of social change, and it is meant to stand as an exemplum for that theory, a key instance of the historical model which influences much of importance in the rest of the work. In an appendix I shall be considering how the same model has radically influenced the narrative of Milesian politics in the years leading up to the Ionian revolt (5.28ff), involving Herodotus in the same kind of distortion as we observed in his treatment of Lycurgus here (cf. Appendix I). If my interpretation of these two passages is right, it has important consequences for Herodotus as 'historian'. He appears in these instances to be more interested in offering models of human behaviour than in diligently and faithfully recording 'the facts' as near as he can divine them. This is not, of course, to say that he has no antiquarian interests, no desire to get at the facts for their own sake, only that in a contest between historical reporting and his desire to 'make sense' of human nature it is historical reporting that will lose out. There is a sort of 'truth' in both activities, to be sure, but Herodotus' making sense of human nature, to judge from these examples, is not historical truth, an essential honesty to what actually happened. There is perhaps an analogy with, say, Plato's reading of Greek and Persian history in Laws III, where the facts are of distinctly less importance than the lessons to be drawn from them, lessons about society and human nature[58a]; but the closest analogy, as we have seen, is undoubtedly with Thucydides' Archaeology, which uses and to some extent abuses the materials of history in pursuit of a theory of growth and power.

We turn now to a consideration of how Herodotus' model works in the cases of Media and Persia, where an added ingredient is the acquisition of freedom. We should add that the absence of freedom from the Spartan exemplum is not a significant absence: the model in its basic form merely concerns itself with the psychology of success, and includes any form of successful political change. The addition of freedom is an embellishment of this basic model: a successful liberation is itself a form of successful change which, with the right political advantages (eunomia), produces an even more dramatic restlessness and ambition, given the confident psychological disposition of free men.

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Freedom, Part i.B: Imperial Domination.

(1) Media.

The liberation of the Persians from servitude to the Medes marks a turning-point not only in their own fortunes but also of all the other peoples of the known world. To explain the process of Persian growth requires Herodotus to go back a long way, not merely to the beginnings of their empire, but back beyond that to the time when the Persians were subject to Media, and even earlier. Having concluded his description of Cyrus' conquest of Lydia (cf. 1.94.7, Λυδοὶ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ Πέρσηισι ἐδεδούλωντο), Herodotus tells us that we have up to now been looking at the phenomenon of Persian empire too narrowly (1.95.1ff):

> ἐπιδίζηται δὲ δὴ τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τόν τε Κῦρον ὅστις ἐὼν τὴν Κροίσου ἀρχὴν κατεῖλε, καὶ τοὺς Πέρσας ὅτεωι τρόπωι ἡγήσαντο τῆς 'Ασίης ... (Herodotus' version of the Cyrus-story is one which avoids excessive glorification) ... 'Ασσυρίων ἀρχόντων τῆς ἄνω 'Ασίης ἐπ' ἔτεα εἴκοσι καὶ πεντηκόσια, πρῶτοι ἀπ' αὐτῶν Μῆδοι ἤρξαντο ἀπίστασθαι· καί κως οὗτοι περὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίης μαχεσάμενοι τοῖσι 'Ασσυρίοισι ἐγένοντο ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ καὶ ἀπωσάμενοι τὴν δουλοσύνην ἐλευθερώθησαν. μετὰ δὲ τούτους καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἔθνεα ἐποίεε τὠυτὸ τοῖσι Μήδοισι. ἐόντων δὲ αὐτονόμων πάντων ἀνὰ τὴν ἤπειρον ὧδε αὖτις ἐς τυραννίδας περιῆλθον. ἀνὴρ ἐν τοῖσι Μήδοισι ἐγένετο σοφός ... (and Herodotus plunges straight into the narrative of Deioces).

This passage is surprisingly compressed and elliptical: we have scarcely adjusted to one programme before another establishes itself, and then another (see below). Initially we expect simply to be retracing the story of the Persian empire and its origins under Cyrus; but that story is deferred until later, and emerges only out of the narrative of the Median empire (1.117ff). We do not, of course, know that this will happen as we read the present passage. Possibly, if Aeschylus knew or believed in a continuity between the empires of Media and Persia (cf. Pers.765ff), Herodotus is not asking too much of his readers to appreciate the logic of this step; he does not, however, assist that connexion of thought by any very obvious means here. Instead we are suddenly plunged back to the time of the Assyrian empire and the liberation of the Medes from that empire: in other words Herodotus begins not with the beginnings of the Median empire, which are deferred until after the narrative of Deioces (cf. 1.101ff), but with a moment of liberation. The asyndeton ’Ασσυρίων ἀρχόντων κτλ. is made perplexingly abrupt by the absence of any clear anticipation that this is to be Herodotus' direction. I would suggest that Herodotus is doing more here than simply 'telling the story from the beginning', retracing his steps to a more or less arbitrary starting-point: rather by carrying us back in this enormous stride to the Median liberation he is compelling us to take note of a continuously recurring process, inviting us to see that empires grow out of other empires, the new growth precipitated by moments of liberation. We go back not, as we had expected, to the origins of Cyrus and the Persian empire but to a much earlier point in the sequence that led to that moment: to understand the continuity of the process of imperial growth we need to see how it originates, where the turning-points come that decide which people will give the process new direction - and these turning-points are marked by successful liberations, by the choice of *eleutheria* on the part of a formerly subject people.

In reality the liberation of Media was clearly a long drawn out process, to judge from the Assyrian records, and was undoubtedly accompanied rather than followed by the revolts of other subject peoples: there was a sequence of risings by various peoples over many generations, risings frequently quelled and reviving[59]. The simplification may be that of Herodotus' sources[60] rather than his own, but it clearly serves the purposes of his 'model' here to have a Median liberation taking place once and for all and to have the Medes take the initiative in freeing themselves, the first of all the subject peoples of Assyria to do so. Nor can we mistake his emphasis here: the sentence καί κως-ἐλευθερώθησαν[61] is both a redundant elaboration of ἤρξαντο ἀπίστασθαι in the previous sentence and redundantly emphatic in itself, making absolutely clear by gratuitous repetition that the revolt involved the Medes 'fighting for their freedom'[62], 'fighting bravely for that freedom'[63], 'throwing off their enslavement', and 'achieving their freedom'. It is true that beyond this opening paragraph Herodotus never again uses the word eleutheria in connexion with the Medes; but I find it hard to believe that he should have laid such heavy stress on a motif which was to have no further significance in their story. In a sense it is self-evident that the story of Median empire cannot begin while the Medes are still enslaved to Assyria[63a]; but for that purpose the colourless apistasthai would presumably have been enough. Herodotus' emphasis here surely implies that their freedom is more than a mere precondition of that future growth. I suggest we are meant to see something of a causal connexion between the Medes' heroic initiative and their future empire, which is after all the focal point of Herodotus' narrative here, the reason for his having come back this far. The logic of that connexion is presumably this: in being the first to see freedom as their goal and showing the fortitude to achieve it the Medes displayed the beginnings of a psychological disposition which marked them out from the other subjects of Assyria, a presumption of their own worth which stamped them as empire-builders in their own right. As we shall see, this connexion between the disposition to freedom and to empire emerges much more clearly in the case of Persia, which Herodotus is surely in some sense anticipating here.

It is worth noting that for Herodotus to lay such stress on the freedom of the Medes here as of the Persians later is not an immediately obvious thing for him to have dome. There is no indication that the Greeks were at all conscious of the freedom of these peoples, at least not before Herodotus, although the freedom of Persia does figure in philosophical texts later (see (B).2, below). For Hippocrates, for example, Asia is clearly the archetype of a land without freedom, where the inhabitants

(with the exception of the Ionian Greeks) are all *tyranneuomenoi* (cf. Airs 16.16ff, etc.). It is a common Greek presumption reflected, for example, in Herodotus' account of what the Spartan heralds said to Hydarnes (7.135.3): unlike themselves he has no experience of freedom, whether or not it is sweet. Euripides has Iphigeneia give the sentiment an outrageously chauvinistic expression at IA 1400-1: βαρβάρων δ' Ἕλληνας ἄρχειν εἰκός, ἀλλ' οὐ βαρβάρους,/ μῆτερ, Ἑλλήνων· τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλον, οἱ δ' ἐλεύθεροι. It is worth noting too that in Aeschylus' potted history of these two peoples there is no suggestion that either one of them was ever in any sense free (Pers.765ff). Indeed it is hard to imagine in what context the Greeks might have been moved to express such an idea before Herodotus, In other words his model of Median and Persian empire by no means takes the line of least resistance, but rather involves a surprising insistence on the element of freedom.

That Herodotus *has* laid such stress on Median freedom here makes the interpretation of the sentence ἐόντων δὲ αὐτονόμων-περιῆλθον all the more difficult. If we look back at this sentence from the immediately ensuing narrative of Deioces, it seems reasonable to suppose that the 'tyranny' which is 'returned to' is his tyranny over the Medes, and for this reason Stein emended the MSS text *tyrannidas* to *tyrannida* here: in other words Herodotus is turning from the Asians as a whole to the Medes who alone are the subject of *periēlthon*. However if we read merely the sequence that Herodotus has set out, the most natural interpretation of this sentence is rather different: the immediate context encourages us to understand here some programmatic statement about empire. The Assyrian empire is disintegrating, there is 'autonomy' throughout Asia, and this is how they (sc. the peoples of Asia) returned to tyrannies, lost their freedom again through empire: the peoples of Asia came to be ruled once more by 'tyrannies' (we may keep the plural of the MSS) in the sense that Herodotus is about to explain, that there arose in Media a dynasty of tyrants who led the Medes to re-enslave the former subjects of Assyria. The genitive absolute which becomes the subject of the main verb is a common enough idiom[64]; the subject of the plural verb *periēlthon* is simply *hoi ana tēn ēpeiron*. However we read the sentence it involves a certain sleight-of-hand: this is obviously a transition to the narrative of Deioces' *tyrannis*, the internal domination of the Medes by a man who did not himself build an empire (cf. 1.101); but that tyranny is not wholly equivalent to the condition which it is supposed to replicate, the external imperial domination of the peoples of Asia by the Assyrians, which is only a *tyrannis* in an extended sense. The logic of Herodotus' proceeding here takes some time to become apparent, but it is clear that what he is doing is once again re-adjusting his immediate programme: instead of hearing at once how the peoples of Asia lost their freedom to the Median empire we hear how the Median tyranny which was to produce that empire itself originates. Herodotus expects us to see that eastern empire is a function of eastern despotism, the ambitions and appetites of the imperial people finding their expression through the person of their *tyrannos*.

It might nevertheless be objected that Deioces does establish a tyranny first of all over the Medes themselves, and that in that sense he must be depriving them of the freedom they earlier won in their fight against Assyria. That being so there would be no question of their empire being in any sense a function of their freedom, as I suggested earlier that it was meant to be. I believe, however, that Herodotus positively discourages such a reductive extrapolation. In the first place we would still be left with his forceful emphasis on the element of freedom in the Median revolt, where no such emphasis was necessary in purely narrative terms; the only way round this would be to suggest that there is an irony in the Medes once again losing their freedom so promptly, but Herodotus does anything but encourage us to see such an irony. As we saw, the natural implication of the sentence ἐόντων δὲ αὐτονόμων-περιῆλθον is that the peoples of Asia as a whole came to be ruled by tyrants through the establishment of a Median dynasty under Deioces: this does not exclude the idea that the Medes lost their own freedom in the process, but it certainly does not invite us to focus on that idea. In the narrative that follows we hear how by various means Deioces compelled the Medes to achieve unity, to respect justice, and indeed to show deference to him as a *tyrannos* - but nowhere is there the slightest reminder that this meant the loss of their freedom; this is logically entailed, to be sure, but Herodotus in no way brings it out. That silence is not, I think, accidental: the theme of the Deioces-episode is how the Medes achieved political stability, the stability that gave them a firm base for empire (see below), and Herodotus would like if possible to leave us with the impression that they achieved this on top of their freedom from Assyria, not at the expense of that freedom.

Where the Medes as a people stand under the dynasty founded by Deioces is shown by what Herodotus makes the magi say to Astyages about the consequences for the Medes if Cyrus were to emerge as king. They have, they say, a vested interest in ensuring the preservation of Astyages' rule (1.120.5):

> ϰείνως μὲν γὰρ ἀλλοτριοῦται ἐς τὸν παῖδα τοῦτον περιιοῦσα ἐόντα Πέρσην, ϰαὶ ἡμεῖς ἐόντες Μῆδοι δουλούμεθά τε ϰαὶ λόγου οὐδενὸς γινόμεθα πρὸς Περσέων, ἐόντες ξεῖνοι· σέο δ' ἐνεστεῶτος βασιλέος, ἐόντος πολιήτεω, ϰαὶ ἄρχομεν τὸ μέρος ϰαὶ τιμὰς πρὸς σέο μεγάλας ἔχομεν.

To be sure, Herodotus does not have them claim that the Medes enjoy freedom: to be able to do that he would have needed a hard struggle against the evidence and the prejudices of his Greek readers (see above). But he has them be wholly explicit about the *participation* of the Medes in the *arkhē* of their own *tyrannos*: they enjoy a position quite different from that which would be imposed upon them by a Persian king (but cf. (B).2, below), when they would indeed be slaves rather than masters (*doulosynē* as opposed to *arkhē*). If we may accept what the magi say as a rational analysis of the Medes' status (cf. also Astyages' rebuke to Harpagus at 1.129.4, νῦν δὲ Μήδους μέν ... δούλους ἀντὶ δεσποτέων γεγονέναι, Πέρσας δὲ δούλους ἐόντας τὸ πρὶν Μήδων νῦν γεγονέναι δεσπότας), rather than merely flattery of a king who was hated and feared (contrast 1.123.2 and 130.1), it is clear that Herodotus means to differentiate the condition of the Medes under the Median empire from the condition of its subjects proper. They are not enslaved in the same way: they have as much interest as the king in the prizes of empire.

Thus if pressed as to his meaning in 1.96ff Herodotus would presumably say that whereas the Medes did in one respect lose their freedom under Deioces, they retained their freedom in another respect; they lost their internal freedom but retained their freedom from imperial domination, a freedom which meant they shared in the *arkhē* established by the Median tyrants. It may well be, however, that Herodotus is not happy to be so pressed, but would rather like us to take without too much question the conjunction of freedom from Assyrian domination and political stability as provided by Deioces and not observe too closely that Deioces' tyranny took away the political freedom of the Medes.

If on the other hand Herodotus would like us to understand that the Medes lost their freedom to a certain degree, that would not be inconsistent with a pattern he observes elsewhere, and although it is not an interpretation he seems to encourage, it does give an added point to what he goes on to tell us. We may invoke here the analogy of Athenian freedom: as Herodotus is to show, the immediate consequence of liberation form the Peisistratid tyranny is for the Athenians to return to the condition of *stasis* (Isagoras, Cleisthenes) which had likewise prevailed (Megakles, Lykurgus, Peisistratus) before Peisistratus deprived them of their freedom (cf. 1.62.1). The Athenians do not achieve the necessary stimulus to grow until they acquire a new form of constitution under Cleisthenes (*isēgoriē*), which enables each citizen to identify the common interest of the state with his own, if we may so extrapolate from Herodotus' commentary at 5.78 (cf. further in Ch.II.ii.E). It is *isēgoriē* which is apparently the cause of Athens' new-found confidence, which has her defeat the Boeotians and Chalcidians and soon leads her on to more ambitious projects. It seems, despite our earlier reservations, that there may be a sense in which in Media too freedom on its own is insufficient to promote growth but is rather a cause of her *anomia*, just as Athenian freedom led initially to *stasis* and only after a political settlement to growth. The idea that an excess of freedom can lead to *anarkhia* (cf. Pl.Rep.560E, on democratic freedom; and Legg.694A, for Persia's 'moderated freedom', below) may perhaps be in Herodotus' mind here. It is not, however, necessary to force this connexion of thought[64a].

Whether or not we take the view that Deioces' tyranny represents a limitation of the anarchic freedom of the Medes, it remains of interest here to follow the further course of Herodotus' narrative, since it so clearly offers another illustration of the model of the psychology of political stability which Herodotus was at such pains to set out in his Spartan narrative earlier (cf. (A).2).

The tyranny of Deioces arises out of the *anomia* which exists throughout Media, apparently in the aftermath of the liberation (1.96.2): ἐούσης ἀνομίης πολλῆς ἀνὰ τὴν Μηδικήν. As is clear from the nature of Deioces' solution, this *anomia* is reflected in two different problems. Deioces first of all brings a stable system of *dikai* to replace the *adikiai* (a pun here?) of the Medes towards one another (cf. Ch.I.i.4), that is he combats the lawlessness of the Medes which is destructive of social life. Let us appoint a king, say the Medes (1.97.3): καὶ οὕτω ἥ τε χώρη εὐνομήσεται καὶ αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἔργα τρεψόμεθα οὐδὲ ὑπ’ ἀνομίης ἀνάστατοι ἐσόμεθα . The other aspect of Deioces' solution is the unification of the Medes (cf. 1.101, *synestrepse*: below), a sort of synoecism which replaces the fragmented community life of the Medes up to this point. Herodotus has made it clear that the Medes live in villages, apparently with no common organization (96.2, κατοικημένων κατὰ κώμας ; cf. 97.2, ἀνὰ τὰς κώμας).

In reconstructing the problems of Media before Deioces, Herodotus is clearly drawing on ideas generated in the later 5thc by sophistic speculation, ideas of how human society looked before the advent of social and political order[65]. Media's anarchic autonomy has obvious points of contact with the disordered and self-destructive life of primitive man as conceived in these sophistic reconstruction, in the fragmentation of the community into small, disunited settlements (cf. 1.96.2, κατοικημένων κατὰ κώμας)[66], in the instability caused by mutual distrust (cf. 1.97.3, ὑπ' ἀνομίης ἀνάστατοι)[67], and in the threat to prosperity (ibid., οὐ γὰρ τρόπωι τῶι παρεόντι χρεώμενοι δυνατοί εἰμεν οἰκέειν τὴν χώρην)[68]. Again too the disadvantages of *anomia* here are the same as those listed by the Anonymus Iamblichi (cf. Ch.II.i.A), in particular the debilitating effects of mutual distrust within the community (cf. Anon.Iambl. 7.8, with 7.2). It is obvious that Deioces performs the same service for Media in saving her from lawlessness and rapine as Minos, in Thucydides' Archaeology, does for early Greece in ridding the seas of pirates, both promoting stability and strength for future growth: the common theoretical preconceptions are hard to miss (cf. (A).1, on the Archaeology).

It is not, of course, clear whether Herodotus invites us to make a connexion between Media's liberation from Assyria and a return to the social conditions of primitive times[69], or whether we must suppose the Medes had been subject to such lawlessness and disunity even before that liberation. Given that a crisis develops (cf. 1.97.2) which precipitates the solution of Deioces, it seems more acceptable to suppose the former, that the complete freedom of the Medes following the liberation is what provoked the condition of *anomia*; but it must be admitted that this is at best an elliptical suggestion on Herodotus' part.

It is, however, instructive for our purposes, whether or not we continue to invoke the motif of freedom, that Herodotus is working here with ideas from contemporary theoretical reconstructions of the origins of human society: this is clear confirmation that his model is indeed a construct derived from reflexion on modern theories of the mechanisms of human society (cf. (B).3, below). He is also drawing here on the theory of the *metabolē politeiōn*, whose influence we detected less clearly in his narrative of the reforms of Lycurgus (cf. Ch.II.i.A.2), and which is further reflected in the Anonymus Iamblichi[70]. Deioces, like Lycurgus, and even more like Peisistratus, as we shall see (Ch.II.ii.A), takes power into his own hands and rescues his people from the perils of *anomia*; all three in different degrees manage to bring about the desirable condition of *eunomia* (cf. 1.97.3), the condition of the society in which the people obey the laws[71], and which brings with it the consequences of mutual trust and peaceful and profitable co-existence. As the Anonymus sets out the theory, the emergence of a *tyrannos* or *epitropos* is the only possible release from the condition of *anomia*, in which there is no respect for the laws or for justice (cf. 7.14): ὅταν οὖν ταῦτα τὰ δύο ἐκ τοῦ πλήθους ἐκλίπηι, ὅ τε νόμος καὶ ἡ δίκη, τότε ἤδη εἰς ἕνα ἀποχωρεῖν τὴν ἐπιτροπείαν τούτων καὶ φυλακήν [72]. "Men cannot live without *nomoi* and *dikē*", says this writer[73]; and Herodotus' account of Median *anomia* makes the same point, describing as it does the breakdown of all social order prior to the tyranny, and for Herodotus too tyranny is paradoxically a satisfactory solution. Yet it is clear that he does not mean to approve it unequivocally for that. The debate on the evils of *anomia* (1.97.2f), in which, as

Herodotus surmises, the friends of Deioces were the principal speakers, leads to the Medes 'persuading themselves to be ruled by a king' (ταῦτά κηι λέγοντες πείθουσι ἑωυτοὺς βασιλεύεσθαι). But Herodotus does not say that they arrived at the only possible solution - and indeed they do not get what they expect, for although they speak of *basileus*, it is clear from Herodotus' vocabulary throughout the passage that what they get is a *tyrannos*.

'Protagoras', in Plato's myth of the origins of human society, saw men escaping their early asocial lawlessness through the 'discovery' of *dikē* and *aidōs*, in other words (if we may so interpret the parable) through an understanding of the need for a social contract or consensus, with the citizens respecting each other and the community (cf. Pl.Protag. 322BE)[74]. Herodotus' model as applied to Median *anomia* offers a much less optimistic solution: the social contract is bypassed by the ambitions of one strong and determined individual, who may after all assist the common good, but who does so for the wrong reasons (cf. Ch.I.i.4, for the paradox of Deioces' *euergesia*). Herodotus would clearly not rule out the Protagorean solution as a possible variant of his model: at Sparta, for example, the abuse of tyranny is avoided through the benevolent actions of an *epitropos*, who is, however, a man preternaturally upright, who is even honoured like a god for his disinterested safe-guarding of the state (cf. 1.65.3 and 66.1; with (A).2). In general, however, Herodotus seems to believe, with Thucydides and certain of the sophists, that human nature being what it is there will almost always be strong individuals within states and powerful states in the wider world who will aspire to rule for themselves, in despite of justice, wherever and whenever they are given the opportunity[75]. Again it is instructive that we can interpret Herodotus' model with reference to contemporary theories of the political process and of human nature.

Deioces' unification of Media (cf. 1.101, συνέστρεψε)[76] both seems to involve another contemporary political theory,and clearly ties in with other observations in the work on the importance of *unity* as an ingredient of political strength contributory to prosperity, and indeed prosperous freedom. Thucydides' account of Theseus' synoecism of Attica has very striking points of contact with Herodotus in these passages (2.15.2):

> ἐπειδὴ δὲ Θησεὺς ἐβασίλευσε, γενόμενος μετὰ τοῦ ξυνετοῦ καὶ δυνατὸς
> τά τε ἄλλα διεκόσμησε τὴν χώραν καὶ καταλύσας τῶν ἄλλων πόλεων τά
> τε βουλευτήρια καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐς τὴν νῦν πόλιν οὖσαν, ἓν βουλευτήριον
> ἀποδείξας καὶ πρυτανεῖον, ξυνῴκισε πάντας, καὶ νεμομένους τὰ αὑτῶν
> ἑκάστους ἅπερ καὶ πρὸ τοῦ ἠνάγκασε μιᾶι πόλει ταύτηι χρᾶσθαι,
> ἣ ἁπάντων ἤδη ξυντελούντων ἐς αὐτὴν μεγάλη γενομένη παρεδόθη ὑπὸ
> Θησέως τοῖς ἔπειτα.

Both Theseus and Deioces, like Minos (above), are wise and powerful dictators: both contrive to produce a unified state with a new potential for growth. It is tempting to suppose that though Theseus' synoecism was an old story, it was given a new theoretical currency in sophistic speculation of the later 5thc, presumably in discussions of the political strengths of monarchy[77]. Deioces compels the Medes to build a single citadel (1.98.3): ἠνάγκασε ἓν πόλισμα ποιήσασθαι καὶ τοῦτο περιστέλλοντας τῶν ἄλλων ἧσσον ἐπιμέλεσθαι. In other words the Medes are to give up their dispersed villages and focus all their attention of Ecbatana, with its many concentric walls a graphic symbol of unity and strenth. We may compare especially the advice of Bias to the Ionians that they should sail to Sardinia (1.170.2) and found 'one city of all the Ionians' (πόλιν μίαν κτίζειν πάντων Ἰώνων), and closer still the advice of Thales to the Ionians to set up a single council-chamber (1.170.3, ἓν βουλευτήριον)[77a] at Teos: τὰς ἄλλας πόλιας οἰκεομένας μηδὲν ἧσσον κατά περ εἰ δῆμοι εἶεν. The Ionians were searching for the best way of coping with their 'freedom', that is trying to avoid disunity in the hope of resisting enslavement by Persia. We may perhaps invoke this analogy to suggest that unification in Media too was a solution to the problems of freedom: the Medes are required to sacrifice their regional independence[78], which had apparently been a contributory cause of their anarchy (above). At any rate it is again striking that Herodotus' model can be found drawing on what seems like a current political theory: the importance of geographical unity as providing political unity and the strength needed for the state to grow and prosper.

The clearest commentary on the present passage is, however, Herodotus' remark on the disunity of the Thracians (5.3.1):

> εἰ δὲ ὑπ' ἑνὸς ἄρχοιτο (sc. τὸ ἔθνος) ἢ φρόνεοι κατὰ τὠυτό,
> ἄμαχόν τε ἂν εἴη καὶ πολλῶι κράτιστον πάντων ἐθνέων κατὰ γνώμην
> τὴν ἐμήν, ἀλλὰ γὰρ τοῦτο ἄπορόν σφι καὶ ἀμήχανον μή κοτε ἐγγένηται·
> εἰσὶ δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀσθενέες.

What the Thracians lack is unity, either the unity that comes from autocratic rule, the rule of one man like Deioces, or the unity that comes from consensus; accordingly they end up weak and are overwhelmed by the Persians, whereas if unified they might have been stronger than any other nation on earth. Theoretical speculation about the Thracians illustrates what happens to the Medes in practice: originally weakened by disunity (whether or not that was a function of their 'excessive freedom') they had a choice of finding a consensus or appointing a king; and once Deioces had brought them unity, they began to emerge as an imperial power, 'invincible and by far the strongest nation' at least in Asia.

The next stage in Media's growth is the ambition for empire, where the correspondence with the Spartan version of the model is particularly evident. When Deioces is succeeded, as Herodotus has it (in defiance of history?)[78a], by his son Phraortes, the Median arkhē is pushed forward, ironically claiming as its first victims the Persians, who will themselves later bring about the overthrow of the Medes (1.102.1):

> παραδεξάμενος δὲ (sc. τὴν ἀρχήν) οὐκ ἀπεχρᾶτο μούνων Μήδων
> ἄρχειν, ἀλλὰ στρατευσάμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς Πέρσας πρώτοισί τε τούτοισι
> ἐπεθήκατο καὶ πρώτους Μήδων ὑπηκόους ἐποίησε.

Phraortes is "not satisfied with ruling over only the Medes" and so begins his imperial expansion. The expression is of course closely paralleled in the words which we saw Herodotus use earlier of the Spartans, after the reforms of Lycurgus had brought them prosperity (1.66.1): καὶ δή σφι οὐκέτι ἀπέχρα ἡσυχίην ἄγειν, describing the restlessness which led them to attempt the conquest of Tegea, which stood in Herodotus' account for the 'imperialism' by which they came to subdue 'the greater part of the Peloponnese' (cf. 1.68.6, with Ch.II.i.A.2). In both cases Herodotus observes that same psychology: the confidence inspired by a political success bringing stability and unity, leads to the ambition for territorial expansion, the presumption of superiority over neighbours (cf. Nitocris' perception at 1.185.1, τὴν Μήδων ὁρῶσα ἀρχὴν μεγάλην τε καὶ οὐκ ἀτρεμίζουσαν.

From this beginning[79] Phraortes goes on to extend the empire over the whole of Asia (1.102.2):

> ἀπ’ ἄλλου ἐπ’ ἄλλο ἰὼν ἔθνος, ἐς ὃ στρατευσάμενος ἐπὶ τοὺς
> Ἀσσυρίους καὶ Ἀσσυρίων τούτους οἳ Νίνον εἶχον καὶ ἦρχον πρότερον
> πάντων, τότε δὲ ἦσαν μεμουνωμένοι μὲν συμμάχων ἅτε ἀπεστεώτων,
> ἄλλως μέντοι ἑωυτῶν εὖ ἥκοντες ...

In the generation after Deioces, Media has become confident, powerful and ambitious enough to march against its erstwhile master, Assyria, a fact which Herodotus' fulness here is calculated to emphasize. Phraortes himself is killed in trying to capture Nineveh, but his son, Kyaxares, who was "said to have been more warlike than his predecessors" (1.103.1; i.e. the ambition for empire gaining momentum from generation to generation; cf. 7.8a.1, on Persian expansion), is successful after an interruption from the Scyths (cf. 1.104.2).

Media's attack on the ancient empire of Assyria is clearly an important turning-point in Herodotus' narative. His model of imperial growth (cf. 1.95.1ff, above) seems to require that new empires grow at the expense of those which had formerly infringed upon their liberties. The thought behind this seems to be that the energetic liberation of the future imperial power encourages the disintegration of the old empire through the secession of its subjects and allies, who, seeing it weakened by the original act of liberation, no longer see the same reason for loyalty (cf. e.g. Aesch. Pers.584ff); meanwhile, the new power grows at the expense of the old and lays claim to the empire which has been there for the taking since its liberation.

If it is right to see freedom (the result of liberation) as an important ingredient in Median growth, we should observe a parallel with the analysis of the psychological advantages of free men in the Hippocratic 'Airs, Waters, Places' - and assuming that Herodotus does also intend the tyranny of Deioces to be seen as a qualification of Median freedom, we may point to an important contrast. Hippocrates supposes that freedom alone (besides climate and environment, of course) is what contributes to the strength of the peoples of Europe and tyranny to the weakness of those of Asia (cf. Airs 16.16ff, 23.30ff; with 24.19ff), and sees no need to qualify his remarks. In this entirely positive estimate of the potential of freedom Hippocrates is surely nearer to the beliefs of most ordinary Greeks[80]. Herodotus by contrast, though clearly accepting the premiss that free men are psychologically better disposed to be warlike than men demoralized by enslavement (perhaps a 'sophistic theory' in this clearly articulated form? cf. Ch.III.C), as shown by his remarks of the freedom of the Athenians (cf. esp. 5.78, with Ch.II.ii.E), is nevertheless concerned to observe (if we may so extrapolate) that men who are free without qualification (cf. Xerxes' expression at 7.103.4: ἀνειμένοι ἐς τὸ ἐλεύθερον , below) are weaker still than those who, though they are free in one respect, have accepted a limitation of their freedom. As we shall see, this perception of the weakness of a people who will make no concessions in their freedom is one of the main themes of the last three books, the narrative of the Greek defence against Persia: Xerxes' criticism of Greek freedom in the Demaratus-dialogue (cf. Ch.II. iii.D) turns out to be not wholly without point.

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(2) Persia.

If Herodotus was less than explicit about the importance of freedom to his model of Median growth, it plays a much more prominent role in his account of the Persian empire and its origins. Let us consider first an anecdote (a Herodotean invention?) which offers an important insight into what it is the Persians are doing when they choose freedom. Cyrus stimulates their appetite for rebellion by an experiment (1.125-6): on one day he has them labour at clearing a large piece of scrubland, and on the next entertains them to a lavish banquet. He then puts a choice to them (1.126.5f):

> βουλομένοισι μὲν ἐμέο πείθεσθαι ἔστι τάδε τε καὶ ἄλλα μυρία
> ἀγαθά, οὐδένα πόνον δουλοπρεπέα ἔχουσι· μὴ βουλομένοισι δὲ ἐμέο
> πείθεσθαι εἰσὶ ὑμῖν πόνοι τῶι χθιζῶι παραπλήσιοι ἀναρίθμητοι.
> νῦν ὦν ἐμέο πειθόμενοι γίνεσθε ἐλεύθεροι.

On the one hand Cyrus excites their sense of the ignominy of their 'enslavement' to the Medes: they, the Persian nobility (cf. 1.125.3), are suffering the indignities of slaves - metaphorically, at least. On the other hand, and much more obviously, he is tempting them with the promise of 'good things'. If all Cyrus is doing is 'persuading the Persians to revolt' (cf. 1.124.2 and 125.1), it is sufficient that he should point out to them the undesirability of their present condition (cf. 1.127.1, ἄσμενοι ἐλευθεροῦντο, καὶ πάλαι δεινὸν ποιεύμενοι ὑπὸ Μήδων ἄρχεσθαι); he could have observed merely that they would be better off not being ruled by the Medes. Instead he makes a point of designating that condition as *eleutheria*, and in addition interpreting *eleutheria* in terms of material profit. In Herodotus the neuter plural adjective *agatha* consistently denotes the rewards of empire or of tyranny, the incitement of profit which leads men to aspire to rule over others[81]. In other words in choosing freedom the Persians choose to pursue the prizes of *arkhē*: there is no talk of the heroism of fighting for one's freedom here, and even the suggestion that their enslavement to Medes is a disgrace to them[82] is distinctly muted. Thus the Persian liberation means the beginnings of Persian empire: the Persians choose freedom because it promises them the luxuries of empire. As Harpagus had promised Cyrus only just before, in words which clearly anticipate this passage (1.124.2): σύ νυν, ἢν βούληι ἐμοὶ πείθεσθαι, τῆς περ 'Αστυάγης ἄρχει χώρης, ταύτης ἁπάσης ἄρξεις.

It may perhaps be that the Persian model necessarily differs from the Median example because Herodotus is unable to suggest that the Persians first freed themselves and then only gradually came round to becoming an imperial power: he was saddled with the fact, already well enough known to Aeschylus (Pers.765ff), that in defeating Astyages Cyrus at once became the heir to the Median empire. But it is clear that Herodotus does want to suggest how in making the choice for freedom the Persians are showing the beginnings of a psychological disposition which will carry them steadily on to a much bigger empire, and an empire which is truly of their own making.

In the first place it is repeatedly stressed that the original moment of their liberation marked the beginning of their imperial aspirations, even if the element of freedom is not always explicitly brought out. Croesus is the first to see the consequences of Persia's overthrow of Astyages (1.46.1): ἡ 'Αστυάγεος ... ἡγεμονίη καταιρεθεῖσα ... καὶ τὰ τῶν Περσέων πρήγματα αὐξανόμενα. He is concerned as to how he might "stop the growth of Persian power before it becomes (too) great". Herodotus clearly points out here that Persian empire grew by a process which began with the moment of liberation rather than being an instantaneous acquisition: the absence of any mention of freedom here is not an important omission, for this is too early for that idea to make any sense to us. The same sense of process is brought out much later by Xerxes, again with reference to the same point of departure (7.8a.1):

> ἄνδρες Πέρσαι, οὔτ' αὐτὸς κατηγήσομαι νόμον τόνδε ἐν ὑμῖν τιθεὶς παραδεξάμενός τε αὐτῶι χρήσομαι. ὡς γὰρ ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι τῶν πρεσβυτέρων, οὐδαμά κω ἠτρεμίσαμεν ἐπείτε παρελάβομεν τὴν ἡγεμονίην τήνδε παρὰ Μήδων, Κύρου κατελόντος Ἀστυάγεα (cf. 1.46.1).

Significantly perhaps , as we shall suggest, Xerxes too does not mention the word 'freedom' here, but the perception that the Persians have seen themselves as empire-builders, driven on by a restless ambition, ever since the defeat of Astyages by Cyrus is an important ingredient in Herodotus' account of the rise of Persia. It was that moment which gave the Persians their empire: Xerxes has forgotten, perhaps, that that moment also have the Persians their freedom. Finally Herodotus reiterates the significance of this moment at the very end of the work, which returns us to an early but unspecified stage in Persia's imperial history. Artembares argues that the same moment of the overthrow of Astyages (9.122.2, ἐπεὶ Ζεὺς Πέρσῃσι ἡγεμονίην διδοῖ, ἀνδρῶν δὲ σοί, Κῦρε, κατελὼν Ἀστυάγεα) set the Persians on the path to empire: they must now change their place of habitation to one better suited to their imperial destiny as masters of all Asia; Cyrus, however, warns that to do so would be for the Persians to abandon the role of master and accept subject status once again (122.3): παρασκευάζεσθαι ὡς οὐκέτι ἄρξοντας ἀλλ' ἀρξομένους. The Persians appear to accept his advice (122.4): ἄρχειν τε εἵλοντο ... μᾶλλον ἢ ... ἄλλοισι δουλεύειν. They see their future as either a return to subject status or mastery over others: there is no middle course, and as a 'free' people (not subject) they will be an imperial people. In the three examples just quoted Herodotus does not talk explicitly of freedom, although in the last example it is natural enough to understand that the condition of 'not being ruled' entails being free. But these passages establish that here as much as in the case of Media Herodotus is thinking of empire as a process which has its beginning at a moment of successful change. That we are meant to think of freedom as an essential ingredient of that change is clear enough, and it is clear too that as in the Median case there is also an internal political ingredient to the success of that change.

Unlike the Medes, of course, the Persians acquire freedom and the political advantage of monarchy in reverse order, Cyrus already being their king before the liberation. Herodotus, however, actually seems to want to lessen that difference in that he has the Persians choose Cyrus as their *prostatēs* in order to gain their freedom, while we hear nothing of Cyrus' former kingship over them; so that we see them acquiring freedom and the key to political stability almost simultaneously (1.127.1): Πέρσαι μέν νυν προστάτεω ἐπιλαβόμενοι ἄσμενοι ἐλευθεροῦντο, καὶ πάλαι δεινὸν ποιεύμενοι ὑπὸ Μήδων ἄρχεσθαι [83]. There is no mistaking the nature of Cyrus' service to the Persians: he both gives them their freedom and puts in their hands the prizes of empire. This fact is not lost on the Persians; on the eve of Cyrus' fateful attack on the Massagetai, Hystaspes hails him as the champion not only of Persian liberation but of Persian empire as well (1.210.2): ὃς ἀντὶ μὲν δούλων ἐποίησας ἐλευθέρους Πέρσας εἶναι, ἀντὶ δὲ ἄρχεσθαι ὑπ' ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἁπάντων. Hystaspes the Persian knows that the Persians are masters because they are free, and that they are free because they acknowledge the rule of one man (ibid.): μὴ εἴη ἀνὴρ Πέρσης γεγονὼς ὅστις τοι ἐπιβουλεύσειε, a man who could think otherwise is no Persian (cf. 7.2.3, Xerxes' claim to succeed Darius is supported by the consideration that he is the grandson of Cyrus: καὶ ὅτι Κῦρος εἴη ὁ κτησάμενος τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι τὴν ἐλευθερίην). Darius, Hystaspes' son, makes the point rather more sharply in his defence of monarchy in the constitution-debate (3.82.5):

> κόθεν ἡμῖν ἡ ἐλευθερίη ἐγένετο καὶ τεῦ δόντος; ... ἔχω τοίνυν γνώμην ἡμέας ἐλευθερωθέντας διὰ ἕνα ἄνδρα τὸ τοιοῦτο περιστέλλειν.

Herodotus has particularly contrived that we reflect on the merits and demerits of Persian monarchy in this debate, which is made to focus around Otanes' proposal that they now abandon that constitution and give the people some form of political freedom (cf. 3.80.2, ἐς μέσον Πέρσηισι καταθεῖναι τὰ πρήγματα; for the meaning of the expression, cf. Maiandrios at 3.142.3); Otanes does not, however, speak of *eleutheria*, only of *isonomia*, perhaps because the trump card of freedom is being saved for Darius to play. Darius' reminder that the Persians acquired their freedom through 'one man', Cyrus, possibly has a certain paradoxical flavour in the context of the debate[84]: Otanes seems to be arguing that the Persians might be more genuinely free if they were to do away with the rule of one man. As we have seen, however, there is clearly more to Darius' claim than this: the Persians would indeed never have been free without Cyrus, and they have surely become great through the political strength given them by monarchy. Implicit in Darius' argument, and perhaps also in Herodotus' narrative, is the thought expressed by Isocrates in his defence of monarchy (Nicocl.23):

> τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὴν τῶν Περσῶν δύναμιν ἅπαντες ἴσμεν τηλικαύτην τὸ μέγεθος γεγενημένην οὐ διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀνδρῶν φρόνησιν, ἀλλ' ὅτι μᾶλλον τῶν ἄλλων τὴν βασιλείαν τιμῶσι.

It is one of Darius' themes that monarchy is the strongest and most efficient form of government (cf. 3.82.2 and 4), a contention apparently borne out in some degree by Herodotus' narrative of Deioces, whose monarchy resolved the problems of Median anarchy (freedom?) and clearly gave them the strength necessary for empire. Thus it may be that we are meant to understand that the success of Persian freedom too depended on its being moderated by the monarchy of Cyrus, who jointly gave the Persians freedom and the prizes of empire.

It may well be that Herodotus is here influenced in some degree by reflexions on the role of Cyrus the liberator in contemporary justifications of monarchy. Certainly Cyrus is familiar in this guise in the 4thc[85]: for example, Antisthenes (F19 Caizzi) compares him to Heracles as a *euergetēs* of his people, clearly as a bringer of freedom to them as Heracles was in a diffferent way to the Greeks; and closer still, Plato in the Laws commends the regime in Persia in the days of Cyrus (Legg.694A): Πέρσαι γάρ, ὅτε μὲν τὸ μέτριον μᾶλλον δουλείας τε καὶ ἐλευθερίας ἦγον ἐπὶ Κύρου, πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθεροι ἐγένοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται. Plato's sequence here, which very probably shows sophistic influence, could well help to explain Herodotus' account of Persian freedom and empire, if, as we suggested, the monarchy of Cyrus is meant to provide the Persians with a means for moderating and directing their freedom to a successful end, as indeed we also suggested Deioces' tyranny may have been for the Medes.

It is not clear whether Herodotus wants the reader to observe that though Cyrus did give the Persians their freedom in the sense that they were no longer subject to the Medes, this did not give them freedom in a political sense, so that their liberation meant only that they were now ruled by a Persian not by a Median king. It may rather be, as Plato has it (above), that we are meant to think that the Persians under Cyrus did enjoy some measure of political freedom, as for example the Athenians possibly do under the first tyranny of Peisistratus (cf. 1.59.6, with Ch.II.ii.A). But Cyrus, the 'father' of his people (cf. 3.89.3, he was so called, ὅτι ἤπιός τε (ἦν) καὶ ἀγαθά σφι πάντα ἐμηχανήσατο; cf. 1.126.5, above), was succeeded by Cambyses, a monarch who had a very different idea of his political role, and was truly a *despotēs* (cf. 3.89.3, he was so called, ὅτι χαλεπός τε ἦν καὶ ὀλίγωρος). Thus in the constitution-debate, while Darius appeals to the example of Cyrus who gave the Persians their freedom as a reason for continuing with the monarchy (3.82.5, χωρίς τε τούτου πατρίους νόμους μὴ λύειν ἔχοντας εὖ), he is offering no satisfactory answer to Otanes, who had appealed to their more recent experience of monarchy as a reason for putting an end to the institution (3.80.2, εἴδετε μὲν γὰρ τὴν Καμβύσεω ὕβριν ἐπ᾽ ὅσον ἐπεξῆλθε, μετεσχήκατε δὲ καὶ τῆς τοῦ μάγου ὕβριος). This suggests that after Cyrus' death the Persians came to be ruled by a *despotēs* rather than a *basileus*, and were thus robbed of any political freedom they might originally have had.

This, then, might explain the difference between Darius' respect for freedom and Xerxes' contempt for it. The conspirators are still near enough in time to Cyrus to appreciate that the Persians enjoyed a certain degree of political freedom under his rule; Xerxes is that much further away, and the monarchy has progressed that much further in the direction of despotism. In his conversation with Demaratus (cf. Ch.II.iii.D), he cannot appreciate that the freedom of the Greeks would not make them weak and degenerate (7.103.4):

> ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι (cf. 3.82.2 and 5; and 5.3.1, in (B).1, above) κατὰ τρόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον γενοίατ᾽ ἂν δειμαίνοντες τοῦτον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἑωυτῶν φύσιν ἀμείνονες καὶ ἴοιεν ἀναγκαζόμενοι μάστιγι ἐς πλεῦνας ἐλάσσονες ἐόντες· ἀνειμένοι δὲ ἐς τὸ ἐλεύθερον οὐκ ἂν ποιέοιεν τούτων οὐδέτερα.

Even Demaratus' account of Spartan freedom limited by *nomos*, which the Spartans fear even more than Xerxes' subjects do him (7.104.4), reduces the king to the same disbelieving laughter (cf.7.105). Like Darius, Xerxes identifies the 'rule of one man' as a Persian *nomos* (cf. κατὰ τρόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον), which in Darius' words 'has served them well in the past'(cf. 3.82.5, above); but Xerxes' way of looking at the institution has a very important difference. Darius, as we saw, argued that as monarchy had given the Persians their freedom it deserved their continued respect; but Xerxes argues almost the opposite: monarchy alone can produce strength and it does so because it does away with freedom. The freedom which Darius remembered as the great bounty bestowed on the Persians by Cyrus, and which Hystaspes recognized as the root of their imperial greatness, has become for Xerxes a dangerous cancer, inducing nothing but a debilitating feebleness.

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(3) Conclusion.

We must finally consider whether Herodotus had any contemporary inspiration to assist him in evolving this model of the consequences of freedom. It seems likely, in particular, that the example of the Athenian democracy came to give a new focus to the connexion between *eleutheria* and *arkhē*. The paradox that the democracy, the embodiment of political freedom, was at the same time through its empire a *tyrannis* was one that appears to have gained a strong hold[86]. We can see from Thucydides that Athens was at the time of the war commonly accused of being a *tyrannos* by her enemies (cf. e.g. 1.122.3 and 124.3), a charge admitted in the famous words of Pericles (2.63.2) that the empire was a *tyrannis* which she could no longer safely give up, and also echoed by Cleon in the Mytilene debate (3.37.2). In Aristophanes, moreover, the demos is a *tyrannos* both in relation to the outside world and within the state itself; thus the chorus of the Knights plays on the role of Demos as *tyrannos* (Eq.1111ff.): ὦ Δῆμε, καλήν γ' ἔχεις/ ἀρχήν, ὅτε πάντες ἄν/θρωποι δεδίασί σ', ὥσ/περ ἄνδρα τύραννον; and Bdelycleon in the *agon* of the Wasps (546ff) sets out to show thatthis father's claim that as a dikast he enjoys the powers and privileges of a king is misconceived both in relation to the influence he enjoys within the state and the profit he derives from the empire. There are less obvious parallels from Thucydides which perhaps point in the same direction[87]. Alcibiades (in words which could almost be an echo of Darius at 3.80.5) justifies to the Spartans his earlier support of the Athenian democracy (6.89.6): διακιοῦντες ἐν ὧι σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἐτύγχανε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασώιζειν. The same conjunction is perhaps made by Thucydides himself in his discussion of the difficulty experienced by Theramenes and his supporters, a hundred years after the fall of the tyrants, in abolishing the democracy (8.68.4):

χαλεπὸν γὰρ ἦν τὸν 'Αθηναίων δῆμον ... ἐλευθερίας παῦσαι, καὶ

> οὐ μόνον μὴ ὑπήκοον ὄντα, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἥμισυ τοῦ χρόνου
> αὐτὸν ἄλλων ἄρχειν εἰωθότα[88].

Thucydides seems to mean that it was the more difficult to separate the Athenians from their freedom because while free they had controlled an empire, which might entail the view that empire is an expected corollary of freedom. It may be, however, that there is little more here than a rhetorical play on the eleutheria-arkhē contrast, as also, for example, in Ps.-Xenoph.Athpol. I.8: ὁ γὰρ δῆμος βούλεται οὐκ εὐνομουμένης τῆς πόλεως αὐτὸς δουλεύειν, ἀλλ' ἐλεύθερος εἶναι καὶ ἄρχειν. Whatever the value of this latter group of examples, it seems probable that the model of the Athenian empire-democracy assisted the clearer articulation of the idea that it was in some sense a law of nature for free men to rule others and to want to rule others, as well as the related idea that arkhē was the supreme form of freedom[89].

There is also some indication that the idea acquired currency in sophistic circles in discussion of society's restraints on individual liberty. In Plato's Gorgias, for example the sophist is made to assert that the value of a rhetorical education such as he provides is that it both gives a man freedom and enables him (through the power of oratory) to rule over others in the state (Pl.Gorg.452D): αἴτιον ἅμα μὲν ἐλευθερίας αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἅμα δὲ τοῦ ἄλλων ἄρχειν ἐν τῆι αὐτοῦ πόλει. Gorgias here introduces into the dialogue the theme of power which will become the central issue in the second part: Callicles is to argue later that it is both natural and just that those who are in a position to do so should exercise, and even abuse their authority over others (cf. e.g. 491Dff). Callicles, it is true, does not, like Gorgias, explicitly speak of such people as 'free', but he comes very near to it in his simile likening the natural ruler to a lion (483E-484A), whom the society tries to bind with laws but who is able to break his bonds and show his true nature: ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξελάμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. The man who is by nature *eleutheros* will not put up with being ruled by others and will instead exert his right to rule over them[90].

Clearly the evidence does not go far enough to allow us to argue, what would seem plausible *a priori*, that Herodotus was in some degree assisted in the formulation of his joint model by contemporary discussions of the role of *eleutheria* in promoting a pre-disposition to *arkhē*. If this were so, however, it would be merely another indication of influences we have detected throughout in Herodotus' construction of his model and its various transformations. We notice that in treating both Lycurgan Sparta and the Media of Deioces Herodotus showed the influence of contemporary thinking on the social and political value of *eunomia* (cf. e.g. Anon. Iambl.), as well as some points of contact with the *metabolē politeiōn* theory, with regard to the means by which societies may escape the vicious effects of *anomia*. We also saw that Herodotus' reconstruction of the condition of Media before the tyranny of Deioces appeared to use an idea from sophistic discussions of the social life of early man. If we are right in detecting these influences, this has important consequences for our understanding of Herodotus' historical method, and we may use that evidence as justification for our use of the term 'model' to describe the patterns we have been analysing. It seems likely that reflexion on ideas of how societies function and evolve, which were very much in the air while Herodotus' work was in gestation, led him to approach the reconstruction of past events with a degree of system which he would not otherwise have attained. Apprised of the possibility that there were such things as laws of social evolution which could be learnt from the study of human nature, he could look at the diverse histories of Media, Persia, Athens, Sparta and the rest with a professional eye, conscious that there might be similar processes at work in those histories, underlying tendencies, sequences, that would roughly duplicate themselves at different times and in different places, given the constant of human nature (cf.Thucyd.1.22.4 and 3.82.2). However, his evidence will have been diffuse, confusing, contradictory and lacunose, given the remoteness in time, and often place, of the events he was studying. Accordingly, we may conjecture, he evolved an adaptable model with variants, which would help him in selecting, organizing, simplifying and interpreting, a model inspired by reflexion in part perhaps on his historical material for the rise of Persia (freedom from Media leading to empire), in part on his familiarity with theories of social evolution, and in part, surely, on his contemporary experience of how the state of Athens, having earlier undergone a liberation and successful political change (cf. Ch.II.ii), and having led the Greeks in a successful fight of liberation against Persia (cf. Ch.II.iii), had emerged in a remarkably short time as an imperial power. Having established the outlines of his model, he could use it to reconstruct such events as he had little or no evidence for, as he surely does with the Media of Deioces (see (B).1, above), and finally when he came to assemble his work to make sense to a reading public, he could, where necessary to his exposition, re-interpret certain historical sequences to turn them into better illustrations of the model itself, as he surely does with Sparta (cf. Ch.II.i.A.2), and also very probably Miletus (cf. Appendix I). We can imagine that Herodotus started out using his model as an aid to interpretation, and, having seen the attraction of bringing order to the confusion of the historical past, was soon carried away into wanting to prove the correctness of the model, even where this did violence to the facts at his disposal[91].

If we have correctly divined the origin of the model for Herodotus as being in part reflexion on the rise of the Athenian empire, we may have uncovered part of the reason for the equivocation in his evaluation of the theme of freedom (cf. Ch.II.ii and iii). In other words, having seen that Athens owed her rise both to a successful liberation from tyranny and to her role in the liberation of Greece from Persia, and that that rise had led seemingly inevitably to empire, he was encouraged to reflect that while attachment to the ideal of freedom was in some respects admirable, it could all too easily involve a pre-disposition to seek dominion over others, a paradox which could only logically be resolved on the assumption that the will to freedom is little more than an expression of self-interest, which was likely to lead sooner or later to injustice against others (cf. Ch.II.iii, for a fuller treatment of this in relation to the Persian Wars narrative).

We also tentatively suggested that Herodotus laid some stress in the cases of both Media and Persia on the equation "freedom-plus-tyranny equals empire", though comparison with what he says of the Thracians does reveal that he can accept an alternative route to (imperial?) strength through consensus (see (B).1, above). It may be that in the parallel between Athenian and eastern empire Herodotus would want to draw a distinction in the political sphere between the heavily qualified freedom of the latter and the complete or near complete freedom of the former. If, however, his model was indeed partly inspired by the history of Athens itself, might it not be that he saw the Athenian empire as itself the work of a 'tyranny' in some sense or other? There are indeed two possible ways in which he might have thought this, not necessarily unrelated. He may have accepted the view (a common one surely?) parodied in Aristophanes, as we saw above, that the demos itself was a tyrannos, wielding a form of corporate 'absolute power' through the assembly and the law-courts. We may note that the analogy between extreme democracy and tyranny is well established by the 4thc, as for example in Aristotle's Politics (esp. e.g.1313B32ff, et saepe). On the other hand, Herodotus may have felt, with Thucydides, that Pericles, working through and on behalf of the demos, was himself approaching the status of tyrant (cf. Thucyd.2.65.9, ἐγίγνετό τε λόγωι μὲν δημοκρατία, ἔργωι δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ πρώτου ἀνδρὸς ἀρχή), as indeed the comic poets exaggeratedly pictured him on occasion (cf. e.g. Cratinus F240K; with Ch.III, n.139); and clearly Pericles, in the second half of the 5thc at least, was to a great extent personally responsible for having turned the Delian League into an empire. Herodotus obviously tells us too little of his views on the empire-democracy to enable us to decide this question, and he may after all believe the Athenian version of freedom with empire was achieved through consensus not tyranny (cf. 5.78?): but does not his remark on the impressionability of the demos at 5.97.2, where paradoxically the assembly is made to seem more a creature of whim even than an autocrat (cf. Ch.II.ii), perhaps suggest that he accepts the demos-tyrannos analogue?

Finally, as we shall suggest (cf. Ch.II.iii.K), when Herodotus shows the sequence of empire succeeding empire to depend on moments of energetic liberation by the future imperial power, as in the way in which the Median empire succeeded the Assyrian empire, he may in some respect be influenced by his view that the liberation of Greece from Persian imperialism by the Athenians led to Athens herself 'succeeding' to Persian empire, seeking to exercise her hegemony over states once ruled or claimed by the Persian king. Of course, the influence may have worked in the opposite direction, but either way it is hard to feel we are pressing an analogy to which Herodotus himself was not sensitive. It is hardly likely that he would not have used his and every Greek's experience of the Athenian empire as a 'model' (in a less specialized sense) to help explain the empires of the east, or equally that study of those more distant examples would not have helped him to a better understanding of the disturbing and dramatic phenomenon of Athenian empire itself.

Freedom, Part ii: Political Domination (Athens).

Herodotus' treatment of the liberation of Athens from the tyranny of the Peisistratids, the work's central illustration of the theme of freedom from political domination, is prepared at some length in Book One (1.59-64) and spans a fair space at the centre of the work (5.55-97), including a paragraph of unusually explicit commentary on the significance of Athenian freedom (5.78), and culminating in an action which Herodotus singles out as a turning-point of great importance from the point of view of the work's design (5.97.3): αὗται δὲ αἱ νέες ἀρχὴ κακῶν ἐγένοντο Ἕλλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι. The Homeric echo here suggests that these ships have the grandest possible consequences, like the ships built for Paris by Meriones[1], which caused the most momentous of wars and thereby changed the world. Herodotus surely offers us here a pointer back to his original programme (Proem): τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δι' ἣν αἰτίην ἐπολέμησαν ἀλλήλοισι. Moreover as the sending of the ships is shown by Herodotus to be directly linked to Athens' acquisition of freedom from tyranny, we are obliged to conclude that without the liberation there would have been no incitement of Persia, no Marathon, no Salamis, none of the consequences immediate and remote of the Persian Wars. Thus the liberation of Athens, like the liberations of Media and Persia (cf. Ch.II.i.B), is a turning-point which produces important and disturbing consequences; and once again there is no question of Herodotus expressing or even implying anything like unequivocal enthusiasm for this glorious event and its concequences. As we shall see, there is no warrant for the orthodox view of the narrative of the liberation and its sequel as expressed for example by von Fritz[2]: "ein gewaltiges Crescendo des Preises der Freiheit und der Verurteilung jeder Unterdrückung". This view is encouraged by the hypothesis that Herodotus is an outright admirer of Athenian freedom and democracy, which does not square with this narrative and turns out to be too hasty an inference from 5.78 (cf. (E) below) and 7.139 (cf. Ch.II.iii.E). There is nothing new in questioning Herodotus' attachment to the democracy[3], but the liberation-narrative has not yet been systematically analysed for the light it throws on his equivocation. This chapter analyses the tyranny itself, the liberation and the rise of the democracy until the Ionian revolt, attending to (a) Herodotus' attitude to the democracy and (b) the problems of the supposed 'Alcmeonid-source' for the account.

(A) Peisistratus.

Our first encounter with Athens takes place early in the work, as befits the city which is to precipitate the confrontation between the Greeks of the mainland and the Persian empire which is the work's climax. Athens is introduced here (1.59.1) as a state important enough to be ranked alongside Sparta, as the foremost city of the Iōnikon genos (cf. 1.56.2, with 1.143.2), although at the time of this first encounter we find her temporarily weakened by the tyranny of Peisistratus. It is worth looking at this episode more closely, since it appears to combine two contrasting theories of tyranny in a surprisingly original interpretation of Peisistratus.

Croesus' envoys learn that, in contrast to the Spartans who had recently escaped from political difficulties and had begun to expand dramatically (1.66.1, with Ch.II.i.A.2), the Athenians were being prevented from growing by the oppression of the Peisistratid tyranny (cf. 1.65.1):

> τοὺς μέν νυν ’Αθηναίους τοιαῦτα τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον ... κατέχοντα, τοὺς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐκ κακῶν μεγάλων πεφευγότας (cf. 1.59.1, κατεχόμενόν τε καὶ διεσπασμένον ... ὑπὸ Πεισιστράτου ... τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον τυραννεύοντος ’Αθηναίων).

This picture of the Athenian tyranny has an obvious parallel in Thucydides' description of the age of tyranny in Greece in the Arcaheology (1.17):

> In the states that were governed by tyrants, the tyrant's first thought was always for himself, for his own personal safety, and for the advancement of his own family. Consequently security was the chief political principle in these governments, and no great action ever came out of them - except perhaps against their nearest neighbours ... οὕτω πανταχόθεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχετο μήτε κοινῆι φανερὸν μηδὲν κατεργάζεσθαι, κατὰ πόλεις τε ἀτολμοτέρα εἶναι.

Both accounts picture tyranny as a form of repression (*katekhomenon*/*kateikheto*)[4], which shows itself in a lack of adventurousness in military matters[5]. Herodotus implies here that it was due to the repression of the Peisistratid tyranny that Athens was unable or unwilling to assist Croesus, while later at 5.78 he describes how under the tyranny the Athenians had been "no better in war than any of their neighbours", but how, freed from the tyranny, "they became by far the foremost of them"; and indeed the sequence started there leads them first to seek friendship with Persia (5.73.1f) and finally to end up its enemy (5.96.2, see below).

But Herodotus characteristically has a surprise in store. Having begun the section by telling us of the harm done to Athens by the tyranny of Peisistratus (1.59.1, κατεχόμενόν τε καὶ διεσπασμένον), a sombre effect heightened by the ominous story of the prophecy of Chilon, warning Hippocrates against bringing up a son (1.59.1-3)[6], and having described the devious and then violent means by which he secured power for himself (1.59.4-6), Herodotus suddenly changes tack with an unexpected piece of commentary (1.59.6):

> ἔνθα δὴ ὁ Πεισίστρατος ἦρχε Ἀθηναίων, οὔτε τιμὰς τὰς ἐούσας συνταράξας οὔτε θέσμια μεταλλάξας, ἐπί τε τοῖσι κατεστεῶσι ἔνεμεν τὴν πόλιν κοσμέων καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ.

The effect is clearly one of deliberate paradox, of a kind with those we considered in Chapter One. Despite what we have heard to far, nothing of which has led us to expect anything of the sort, this first tyranny of Peisistratus turns out to be not only mild and constitutional, but even 'admirable' (cf. κοσμέων καλῶς τε καὶ εὖ). Not to change any of the established ordinances of the city, a point which Herodotus so firmly emphasizes, is contrary to all we expect of tyrants (cf. esp. 3.80.5, with e.g. 5.67-8 and 6.127.3, etc.).

Peisistratus emerges here as a guardian of the constitution, an upholder of order, even a saviour of Athens from the perils of *anomia*[7].

In this last detail it becomes clear that Herodotus is applying to his reconstruction of Peisistratus' first tyranny the same theory of political change that we discovered in his treatment of Deioces in Media[8]. Like the latter tyranny that of Peisistratus emerges as a solution to the problem of *anomia*, or rather, as it is in this case, *stasis*. The word *stasis* runs like a *Leitmotiv* through the account of the rise of Peisistratus[9] (1.59.3): στασιαζόντων τῶν παράλων καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεδίου Ἀθηναίων, καὶ τῶν μὲν προεστεῶτος Μεγακλέος ... τῶν δὲ Λυκούργου ..., καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα ἤγειρε τρίτην στάσιν ... Both this tyranny and that of Deioces later conform to the pattern set out by the Anonymus Iamblichi (7.12ff):

> γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἡ τυραννίς ... οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου τινὸς ἢ ἀνομίας. Some men think, wrongly, that tyranny arises in some other way, and that men are deprived of their liberty through no fault of their own, but because the tyrant forces himself upon them, but they are mistaken ... For when these two things depart from the citizen body, namely 'law' and 'justice':(ὅ τε νόμος καὶ ἡ δίκη), then the guardianship of these will revert to one man.

Society cannot long survive without these safeguards, the author argues, and the inevitable solution to the disaster of lawlessness is 'tyranny' or the rule of one man. Thus though tyranny is an indubitable evil, at the same time, paradoxically, it can serve a vital purpose in safeguarding social justice when all else has failed. Both Deioces and Peisistratus clearly perform this function, Deioces in his precise attention to the administration of justice (cf. e.g. 1.100.1, ἦν τὸ δίκαιον φυλάσσων χαλεπός, with Ch.I.i), Peisistratus in ensuring the stability of the constitution in a time of grave political unrest.

Both tyrants, however, share other characteristics; both begin with good reputations (cf. 1.59.4, πρότερον εὐδοκιμήσας ἐν τῆι πρὸς Μεγαρέας γενομένηι στρατηγίηι ... ; with 1.96.2, ἐν τῆι ἑωυτοῦ καὶ πρότερον δόκιμος), and both make unscrupulous use of their reputations to win the people's trust, employing deceitful stratagems to secure power. Peisistratus persuades the people that he has been attacked and wounded by his enemies, and on the basis of his reputation they are deceived (ἐξαπατηθεὶς) into giving him a bodyguard (1.59.4-5), while, as we saw earlier, Deioces persuades the Medes that they cannot do without him as a guardian of justice. In both cases the aspiring tyrant finds a way to bring home to the people the perils of *anomia*/*stasis*; but in both cases too, though the people bring tyranny on themselves by showing particular favour to one man, they get more than they had bargained for, inasmuch as the tyrant is a man with a burning ambition for personal power (cf. 1.59.3, καταφρονήσας τὴν τυραννίδα; with 1.96.2, ἐρασθεὶς τυραννίδος), a man who will do anything to win his prize. In both cases Herodotus carefully balances the paradox that though the 'tyrant' solves the problems of anarchy, he is at the same time a 'tyrant', with all the unscrupulous ambition that that implies.

Herodotus' treatment of Peisistratus, however, differs from that of Deioces in that there is more than one tyranny involved; and this enables him to oppose the two sides of the problem more sharply[10]. The first stage of the tyranny is the one which draws the favourable judgement, but this comes to an end when the *stasiōtai* of Megakles and Lykourgos join together to drive him out (1.60.1): οὕτω μὲν Πεισίστρατος ἔσχε τὸ πρῶτον 'Αθήνας καὶ τὴν τυραννίδα οὔ κω κάρτα ἐρριζωμένην ἔχων ἀπέβαλε, οἱ δὲ ἐξελάσαντες Πεισίστρατον αὖτις ἐκ νέης ἐπ' ἀλλήλοισι ἐστασίασαν. It appears from this that the golden age of Peisistratus' tyranny was nothing but a brief interlude, a period when the tyranny had not yet taken root, a period which Herodotus contrasts sharply with the third and final stage (1.64.1): οὕτω δὴ Πεισίστρατος τὸ τρίτον σχὼν 'Αθήνας ἐρρίζωσε τὴν τυραννίδα ...[11]. The unrooted tyranny was a desirable condition for Athens, we infer, since it brought a temporary respite from *stasis*[12], but also just because it was 'unrooted', not yet a real threat to freedom, as it later became.

It thus seems that Herodotus applauds the first stage of tyranny as a compromise between the anarchy of *stasis* (unqualified freedom) and the repression of full autocracy.

After an account of the second tyranny, whose main interest in Herodotus' narrative is to show the pattern of shifting allegiances and enmities between Peisistratus and the other two parties to Athenian *stasis* (cf. n.12), we come to the third tyranny, and we are left in no doubt how things have changed for the worse. Whereas Peisistratus seized power the first time by means of an internal coup, supported by one faction from within the city and with a bodyguard of the citizens, the third attempt is an act of military aggression mounted from outside with foreign troops (mercenaries, and allies from Thebes and elsewhere), a calculated attempt to deprive the Athenians of their freedom. Indeed Herodotus seems to observe a distinction between the first and third tyrannies which Aristotle in the Politics was to draw between the good and bad forms of monarchy, namely that a 'king' has a bodyguard of the citizens but a tyrant a bodyguard of foreign troops[13]. "Kings rule according to law and over a willing people, but tyrants over unwilling subjects; and so the former are protected by their subjects, the latter against them". The first tyranny of Peisistratus was supported by a bodyguard of Athenians chosen from the citizen body and willingly conferred by them (cf. 1.59.5, ὁ δὲ δῆμος ... ἔδωκέ οἱ τῶν ἀστῶν καταλέξας ἄνδρας), but the third tyranny is both established and maintained by assistance from foreign mercenaries (cf. 1.61.4 and 64.1)[14]. The distinction is not made in Aristotle's account of Peisistratus in the *Athēnaiōn Politeia*, so that the Politics passage may well not be meant to refer to Peisistratus at all: it is thus possible that Herodotus is here drawing on a sophistic theory of tyranny-kingship which also influenced Aristotle in the Politics.

Herodotus differs from the *Athēnaiōn Politeia* in other details of

Peisistratus' administration. For Herodotus the tyranny was set on a firm footing (rooted) both by the use of mercenary troops and by the organization of revenues (1.64.1): ἐρρίζωσε τὴν τυραννίδα ἐπικούροισί τε πολλοῖσι καὶ χρημάτων συνόδοισι, τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρυμόνος ποταμοῦ συνιόντων. The local source of revenue here (τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν ...) seems to be the land tax of 10 per-cent mentioned in the Athpol. (16.4-5) in an anecdote to illustrate the *mildness* of Peisistratus' rule[15]. Herodotus, however, must intend quite the opposite effect when he mentions taxation alongside mercenaries as a bulwark of the tyranny, without any hint of the 'mildness' of Peisistratus' exactions.

Similarly where the Athpol. concentrates on the creative achievements of the reign, Herodotus has nothing of the kind. We are told instead how Peisistratus took hostages from among the children of the Athenians who remained rather than going into exile at once[16]; and Herodotus ends the episode with the striking summation (1.64.3): καὶ Πεισίστρατος μὲν *ἐτυράννευε* 'Αθηνέων, 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ οἱ μὲν ἐν τῆι μάχηι ἐπεπτώκεσαν, οἱ δὲ αὐτῶν μετ' 'Αλκμεωνιδέων ἔφευγον ἐκ τῆς οἰκηίης. There is a deliberate variation on his summary of the first tyranny here (cf. 1.59.6, ἔνθα δὴ ὁ Πεισίστρατος ἦρχε 'Αθηναίων): this is no longer a 'reign' (as of a *basileus*) but a 'tyranny' proper, with all the pejorative overtones of the word[17]. Moreover the last words on the tyranny are 'death and exile'[18], an unnecessarily melodramatic conclusion (as if all the Athenians suffered death or exile!) but unmistakable in its effect. We could have inferred without Herodotus' help that some Athenians must have fallen at Pallene, but his reminder of this and of the exile of the remainder is a determined effort to bring home to us the cost of the tyranny. Now, finally, we see what he had meant by describing Athens under the tyranny as κατεχόμενόν τε καὶ διεσπασμένον at the time of Croesus' embassy: the words apply only to the third tyranny, when Athens was held down by mercenary troops and repressive taxation, and torn apart by a murderous civil war that brought death to some, for others exile, for others the capture of their families for hostages.

The shape of Herodotus' account of the Peisistratid tyranny as a whole, however, differs in an important respect both from what our other two main witnesses, Thucydides and Aristotle, describe, and from what our other evidence suggests was the shape of the tradition accessible to him. While it shares the common view that the tyranny degenerated from good beginnings, it disagrees significantly as to the moment of change. Thucydides and Aristotle are in no doubt that the change took place with the murder of Hipparchus[19], not before; on the contrary they appear to agree that the entire reign of Peisistratus, as well as the early part of Hippias' tyranny, had been a 'golden age'. And though there is some disagreement in the other sources as to whether the murder of Hipparchus or the death of Peisistratus was the more important turning-point, there is no version which follows Herodotus in putting the moment of change as early as the lifetime of Peisistratus and between his first and third tyrannies.

Indeed there is good reason to suppose that Herodotus' account of Peisistratus is quite idiosyncratic in this respect, and the other evidence seems to be unanimous in its favourable estimate of the founder of the dynasty, if not so uniformly well-disposed towards his sons. Two pieces of evidence call for special attention here; the first is that Peisistratus appears among the ancient worthies of Athens recalled from the dead in Eupolis' Demoi[20], an unequivocal testimony to the affection with which his reign was regarded in the second half of the 5thc; and the second is Aristotle's observation that the tyranny of Peisistratus was proverbially a golden age (Athpol.16.7): διὸ καὶ πολλάκ[ις ἐ]θρ[ύλλο]υν ὡς [ἡ] Πεισιστράτου τυραννὶς ὁ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βίος εἴη (Thalheim's text). The same judgement is to be found in the Ps.-Platonic Hipparchus, where however it is applied to the years before the murder of Hipparchus (229B):

> πάντων ἂν τῶν παλαιῶν ἤκουσας ὅτι ταῦτα μόνον τὰ ἔτη (sc. the three years after the murder) τυραννὶς ἐγένετο ἐν Ἀθήναις, τὸν δ' ἄλλον χρόνον ἐγγύς τι ἔζων Ἀθηναῖοι ὥσπερ ἐπὶ Κρόνου βασιλεύοντος.

Wilamowitz argued[21] that while the discrepancy between these two texts shows their independence, they nonetheless have a common source: Aristotle remembered, or rather misremembered, the phrase from the teachings of the Academy, where the memory of the Peisistratids was re-established in discussions of the ideal monarchy[22]. But this seems not to be justified by either passage. Despite the dilapidation of the text of Aristotle at this point (cf. Rhodes (1981), ad loc.), it remains clear that he is referring to a popular memory of the Athenians, an old proverbial saying of the people[23]; and in this he is supported by Ps.-Plato, who has Socrates speak of the golden age of Hipparchus' reign as a tradition he has heard from ancient authorities. Unless both authors are dressing up a scholarly fiction as a popular tradition, we are justified in claiming that there was an early, proverbial tradition that the reign of Peisistratus was an 'age of Kronos', which Ps.-Plato has (for his own purposes) consciously misapplied to his idealised Hipparchus. Accordingly there is nothing new or artificial in the enthusiasm of the 4thc sources for the reign of Peisistratus, and it is not the product merely of a scholarly re-habilitation[24]. Peisistratus' name is never mentioned in Aristophanes, who only ever uses the name of Hippias to express his character's proper democratic horror of tyranny[25]. In the orators too, with only one exception, attacks on the tyrants are directed exclusively at the 'Peisistratids', that is the sons of Peisistratus, rather than Peisistratus himself[26]. Thus the extra-Herodotean tradition offers a surprisingly unanimous verdict on Peisistratus, and nowhere is there any indication that any other cource made the distinction between the tyrannies of Peisistratus himself that Herodotus makes here[26a].

It is unlikely that Herodotus is following a source unfavourable to the tyrant, and indeed, as we have seen, he allows himself an ungrudgingly favourable judgement of Peisistratus, which almost outdoes Aristotles in its enthusiasm - except that he restricts its application to the first tyranny only. Moreover the way he differentiates the third tyranny is not so much by reporting different facts from those in Aristotle, but for the most part simply by the use of different emphases and his own inference. Thus he highlights the sinister after-effects of Pallene, drawing out the details which are not excluded by Aristotle's account but which are not there brought to the fore: the taking of hostages, the flight and exile of the defeated party, even the losses in battle (see above). Similarly, as we saw, where Aristotle and Thucydides mention taxation to illustrate the mildness of the regime, Herodotus uses the same fact to illustrate its repressive character as a means of consolidating the tyranny. The contrast between Peisistratus' original citizen-bodyguard and his later mercenary bodyguard may, as we suggested, be imported by Herodotus not from the tradition - it is absent in the Athpol. - but from sophistic theory: a theoretical notion of the difference between tyranny and monarchy contributing to Herodotus' reconstruction. What makes Herodotus' account different is 'interpretation'; indeed the subtlety of what he has done seems to have eluded both Thucydides and Aristotle, who though both to some extent dependent on his account, seem unaware that they are diverging from it, or rather simplifying it - although Thucydides may perhaps be consciously eschewing that part of Herodotus' account which he knew to be divergent from the prevailing tradition, which he himself found no reason to doubt.

A good deal depends on whether Herodotus has re-interpreted the tradition here: if it were not that he described the third tyranny as repressive, there would be no ground for introducing the Athenian excursus in the way that he does. If he had accepted in full what seems to have been the unanimous judgement of the tradition, namely that the entire reign of Peisistratus was a golden age, he would have had no occasion to describe Athens at the time of Croesus' embassy (c.550) as oppressed, weakened and divided, nor to contrast its condition with that of Sparta, a state that was weak and divided with one that had but recently found *eunomia* and strength. Herodotus clearly wanted to contrast an Athens under the tyrants which was weak and oppressed with an Athens liberated from the tyrants which was suddenly strong and flourishing. Since, however, he had chosen to introduce his first Greek narrative, and hence his first account of Athens, as early as the fall of Croesus, he was faced with a problem. His first excursus on Athens would have to deal with the reign of Peisistratus, who unlike his sons, especially Hippias, was credited in the tradition with an almost unassailable reputation for mildness and openness. How was he then to elaborate the contrast he wished to make? The answer appears to be that he modified his account of Peisistratus accordingly, retaining the tradition's favourable judgement, but restricting its application to the first tyranny only, and then describing the final stage of the tyranny in such a way as to make it seem truly repressive and debilitating. Only by this means could he retain his model and accomodate the main demands of his evidence.

Having done this, he need no longer concern himself with the ill-effects of the tyranny when he returns to it in Book Five; and indeed his description of the last years of Hippias is confined to a word or two, and he makes no use of the contrast between Peisistratus and his sons which so much occupies the attentions of the other sources. We hear that the murder of Hipparchus did nothing towards ending the tyranny (5.55): μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτυραννεύοντο Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα τέσσερα οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸ τοῦ; and we hear that it was the Alcmeonids who initiated the real liberation (5.62.2): Ἱππίεω τυραννεύοντος καὶ ἐμπικραινομένου Ἀθηναίοισι. And that is all: Herodotus is here concerned to get on with the task of describing the liberation, not the evils of the tyranny, which he has already worked out in Book One[27].

This interpretation depends on whether or not it seems likely that the difference between the first and third tyrannies is Herodotus' own contrivance. If we assume that his information comes from a non-esoteric source, that it merely reflects the prevailing Athenian polis-tradition of the late 5thc (cf. Appendix II), such a Herodotean re-interpretation seems plausible, given the evidence for that tradition. It could, however, be objected that Herodotus is reproducing the interpretation of an esoteric source, that is a family whose ancestors co-operated with Peisistratus in the first and/or second tyrannies and not the third. If such were the case, however, we would rather expect to see the family in question figure in the narrative, unless we believe that Herodotus borrowed such a family's apology but happened to discard any mention of the members of the family it was designed to vindicate. Unless we do adopt this somewhat improbable alternative, there remains only one suitable candidate here, namely the Alcmeonids, who indeed collaborated in the second tyranny, and, as Herodotus explicitly mentions (cf. 1.64.3, above; with 6.123.1), were in exile during at least the third tyranny[27a]. There are, however, clear objections to this identification of Herodotus' source: the tyranny whose mildness Herodotus commends is the first, set up in opposition to Megakles and Lycurgus, not the second in which Megakles collaborates; Megakles' collaboration is distinctly unattractive (cf. n.12), and it is hard to detect any note of apology in Herodotus' account of his dealings with Peisistratus; finally, it seems curious that Herodotus should have relied exclusively on one source, and one so obviously likely to be partisan, for a narrative of such central importance to the work's design. As we shall see later (cf. (B) and (C) below), the hypothesis of an Alcmeonid source for Herodotus' Athenian history is very hard to reconcile with his narrative as it stands. Thus the balance of probability favours the view that Herodotus' account of Peisisrtatus is idiosyncratic in relation to the prevailing Athenian polis-tradition because it has been 'reconstructed' by him out of that tradition for the purposes of accomodating his model of Athens under the tyranny to the demands of chronology[28].

(B) The Liberation.

The account of the liberation with which Herodotus resumes his Athenian history in Book Five (5.55ff) is a lengthy and involved piece of exposition, which moreover studiously avoids any straightforward glorification. This reticence is not usually noticed for what it is, but it both poses considerable difficulties for some of the main critical orthodoxies and suggests that what we said about Herodotus' attitude to freedom and liberation in the last section (Ch.II.i.B) applies here too, namely that he is very far from evincing the uncomplicated enthusiasm with which he is so often credited.

The first unusual thing about Herodotus' account is that his treatment of the tyrannicides, Harmodios and Aristogeiton, is clearly in some sense a polemic against a popularly held view, in much the same way that Thucydides' treatment of the same question undoubtedly is, although the latter does not quite address itself to the same misconceptions. Thucydides observes (cf. 1.20.2, and 6.54.1) that "even the Athenians do not have reliable traditions about their own tyrants" (οὔτε αὐτοὺς ’Αθηναίους περὶ τῶν σφετέρων τυράννων οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας), which Dover and Andrewes are surely right to take as meaning not that they mistakenly supposed the tyrannicides to have actually ended the tyranny at once by their murder of Hipparchus, but rather that Thucydides has certain points of disagreement about the precise details and circumstances of the murder of Hipparchus[29]. Indeed that the memory of the liberation by Cleomenes and the Spartans was alive in some form in the Athens of the late 5thc, is clear from Aristophanes who refers allusively to those events in the Lysistrata (1150-6) as a matter of common knowledge[30]. On the other hand it is apparent that the tyrannicide 'myth', the belief that it was the heroism of Harmodios and Aristogeiton which, if not immediately, then at least eventually 'liberated' Athens, was assiduously nourished by the democracy, almost as it were as a 'charter myth', a story told and retold to perpetuate the democracy's sense of its own corporate identity. Indeed the state puts public money into sustaining the 'myth': the statue-group of the tyrannicides sculpted by Antenor, possibly as early as 509[31], replaced by the work of Kritios and Nesiotes in 477-6 (Marm.Par.), bears an inscription recording that Harmodios and Aristogeiton "brought a great light to the Athenians, when they killed Hipparchus ... and set their fatherland [free]"[32]; an inscription of the 430's records a decree for the maintenance in the prytaneion at public expense of the descendants of the tyrannicides[33]. In addition the heroism of the tyrannicides was remembered in a series of *skolia*, which, despite the aristocratic associations of the genre, had by the end of the 5thc clearly become the property of the democracy, as we can see, for example, from the way Aristophanes in the Lysistrata has his chorus of tyrant-fearing *gerontes* (good democrats all, fearful of revolution and Sparta) echo them (632f, ϰαὶ φορήσω τὸ ξίφος τὸ λοιπὸν ἐν μύρτου ϰλαδί,/ ἀγοράσω τ' ἐν τοῖς ὅπλοις ἐξῆς 'Αριστογείτονι)[34]. Herodotus is aware of the power of the 'myth' at Athens, as we can see from his having Miltiades promise Callimachus at Marathon that if he follows his advice, he can win for himself a memory "more glorious than ever Harmodios and Aristogeiton left behind them" (6.109.3)[35].

We shall have more to say on the history of the 'myth' in a moment;

we must look first at Herodotus' treatment of it. He begins with a nicely contrived surprise (5.55):

> When Harmodios and Aristogeiton killed Hipparchus, the brother of the tyrant Hippias, μετὰ ταῦτα ἐτυραννεύοντο Ἀθηναῖοι ἐπ᾽ ἔτεα τέσσερα οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὸ τοῦ.

The structure of the sentence with its opening epei-clause leads us to expect that Herodotus is going to go straight on to the liberation: after μετὰ ταῦτα we anticipate for example ἐλευθερώθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι to answer γενομένας τυράννων ὧδε ἐλευθέρας in the previous sentence, and the continuation ἐτυραννεύοντο οὐδὲν ἧσσον falls on the ear with distinct bathos. Then after briefly describing the dream of Hipparchus and his murder (5.56.1-2) and digressing on the origins of the Gephyraioi (see below), Herodotus recurs to his original subject with the dismissive resumption (5.62.1): δεῖ δὲ πρὸς τούτοισι ἔτι ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς ἤια λέξων λόγον, ὡς τυράννων ἐλευθερώθησαν Ἀθηναῖοι. Emphatically he points out to us that the business of Hipparchus' murder and murderers has been a red-herring: these questions bear no relation to the real business of the liberation, indeed the murder only aggravated the tyranny of Hippias without bringing its end any nearer (cf. 5.62.2, above)[36]. In the light of the importance attached by the democracy to the 'myth' of the tyrannicides, and the belief that it was their action which 'really' brought down the tyranny, Herodotus' dismissive attitude to the whole question is surely deliberately deflationary.

Moreover not only does he deny all importance to the action of the tyrannicides, he also appears to be making a pointed observation about their family in the accompanying digression (5.57-61). Though the Gephyraioi themselves (5.57.1, ὡς μὲν αὐτοὶ λέγουσι) claim to come from Eretria originally, Herodotus tells us that his independent research has shown him that they are in fact Phoenicians who came over with Cadmus, were twice expelled from Boeotia (57.2), first by the Argives and then by the Boeotians, and only then settled in Athens. The Athenians accepted them as citizens, ἐπὶ ῥητοῖσι ... ⟨οὐ⟩ πολλῶν τεων καὶ οὐκ ἀξιαπηγήτων ἐπιτάξαντες ἔργεσθαι[37]. After digressing further on the Phoenicians' introduction of the alphabet to Greece (58.1-61.2), Herodotus returns to the Gephyraioi (61.2):

> "and they have temples set apart for their own special use in Athens, which the other Athenians are forbidden to enter, including a temple of Demeter Achaia, in which secret rites are performed".

Why should Herodotus be concerned to make so much of the Phoenician origin of the Gephyraioi and their alien, or non-Athenian status? Whether or not it is as he says, he at least claims to have done independent research (ὡς δὲ ἐγὼ ἀναπυνθανόμενος εὑρίκω) with the purpose of correcting the family's own account of its origins[38], and evidently he wants the information he has 'unearthed' to seem more than incidentally significant. The explanation that most readily occurs is that he is further discounting the claims of the tyrannicides to be Athenian national heroes: the Athenians, he implies, have in their folly elevated to this rank two men whose heroism was merely a wasted effort, and who are scarcely even citizens of Athens in the first place, not even Greeks but Phoenicians, immigrants (*epēlydes*) with no settled home, least of all in Athens. The malicious implication of the passage is well noticed by Plutarch (MH 23.860DE): Ἀριστογείτονα μέντοι οὐκέτι κύκλωι καὶ κακῶς, ἀλλ' ἄντικρυς διὰ πυλῶν εἰς Φοινίκην ἐξελαύνει, Γεφυραῖον γεγονέναι ἀνέκαθεν. Plutarch's sensitivity as a Greek to this slight on an Athenian hero of the first rank is instructive[39].

But is Herodotus thinking for himself, or does he rather have the story of Harmodios and Aristogeiton from a source determined to discredit the tyrannicide 'myth' and advance a different interpretation? The orthodox answer to this question is unequivocal: his source is the Alcmeonid family, who had their own reasons to want to depreciate the claims of the tyrannicides and to establish their own claim to have been, with the help of Delphi and Sparta, the saviours of Athens[40]. This explanation, so widely and unquestioningly credited, deserves close examination, since it implies a view of Herodotus quite opposed to the one advanced here. Whether or not we hold that he was a puppet of the Alcmeonids, that he should have depended as uncritically on the information they fed him as the theory demands, presupposes the lack of any guiding intelligence: he is merely concerned to present the facts, or rather some facts, without any serious attempt to accomodate them to his own interpretative models. The Alcmeonid-source theory is a hindrance to a proper understanding of what Herodotus is doing in his account of the liberation.

The theory involves some quite surprising and unnecessary contradictions, and it is clear that it is not because of its value for explaining Herodotus' text that it has remained so widely held. Even external considerations tell emphatically against it. Certainly there is a superficial plausibility in the Alcmeonids having had an interest in reminding the world through Herodotus of their part in the liberation, since the family is clearly in pronounced political decline throughout the 5thc from the Persian Wars onwards, with no member of the main branch holding any major office in the period[41]. And yet the theory is clearly not held in relation to the Alcmeonids in general, but really only one member of the family, and only a member on the distaff side at that, namely Pericles[42]. The attraction of the theory, apart from the supposed evidence of the Alcmeonid excursus (cf. Ch.III.E), is the view that Herodotus had some kind of contact with the 'Periclean circle' and perhaps with Pericles himself, and hence contact with Alcmeonid traditions. Since however the question facing the critic of Herodotus then becomes 'what traditions is Pericles, who is incidentally an Alcmeonid, likely to have sponsored?', the problem takes on quite a different aspect. While it is comprehensible that a disenchanted, politically impoverished Alcmeonid might have had an interest in undermining the tyrannicide 'myth' and asserting the dubious claims of his own family to have liberated Athens, the same cannot be true of Pericles, who throughout his political career is without doubt a democrat, hated and feared by the aristocrats and oligarchs (like Thucydides, son of Melesias, of course), who could see that it was his influence which was systematically destroying their traditional power and prestige within the state. True, Thucydides suggests that Pericles was rather more the leader of the demos than he was led by it (cf. 2.65.8-9), but he does so in the same breath as observing that his leadership was extraordinarily altruistic; we need only turn to the two great speeches of Pericles in Thucydides' Book Two (2.35-46 and 60-4) to see that the essential characteristic of the man for Thucydides was his attachment to the democracy above all interest of private profit (cf. also 2.13.1), an attitude he hoped all Athenians would share with him. Indeed it is surely significant for his lack of interest in bolstering the claims of his Alcmeonid cousins that, as we have said, no other Alcmeonid appears in any prominent political position in the period of his ascendancy.

In other words if we merely confine our attention to the Alcmeonids as disgruntled aristocrats, it seems natural for our 'Alcmeonid source' to be hostile to the traditions of the democracy and the tyrannicides in particular; but when we realize that the theory of the 'Alcmeonid source' is held in the first place largely because of Herodotus' supposed relations with Pericles, we are faced with the dilemma that Herodotus' account attacks one of the central traditions of Pericles' own democracy. Thus we may conclude that the 'Alcmeonid source' theory can only stand satisfactorily if we treat the Alcmeonids as separate from Pericles himself, and there will be many who will feel that that leaves the theory unacceptably impoverished.

We are perhaps not entitled to bring into the argument the problem of the tyrannicide skolia (PMG 893 and 896) which hail the tyrannicides as bringers of isonomia to Athens (τὸν τύραννον κτανέτην / ἰσονόμους τ' Ἀθήνας ἐποιησάτην). An attractive theory of Ehrenberg (with help from Vlastos) argues that the songs originated in the propaganda of Cleisthenes, who coined the word isonomia as the watchword of the new democracy of 507[43]; the theory, if correct, would lead to the conclusion that the tyrannicide 'myth' was originally at least assisted by the Alcmeonids themselves, something which may be reflected in the early erection of the Antenor statue-group[44]. Even if this is right, however, it remains possible that the Alcmeonids came to regret their championship of the tyrannicides, at a time when their own political decline had set in after the disgrace of Marathon[45]. On the other hand if that did lead them to argue the line adopted by Herodotus,we still surely need to assume that they did so in opposition to Pericles, both in rejecting the tyrannicide 'myth' and also in insisting on a version of the liberation which gave a prominent part to both Sparta and Delphi, two parties with whom Pericles was little in sympathy[46].

Allowing that an 'Alcmeonid source' for the narrative of the liberation is still possible on external grounds, with the limitation that it would almost certainly have to be anti-Periclean, we may proceed to Herodotus' treatment of the liberation itself, before attempting a final resolution of the question[47].

After the murder of Hipparchus the tyranny of Hippias continued as before (5.62.2):

> Ἱππίεω τυραννεύοντος καὶ ἐμπικραινομένου Ἀθηναίοισι διὰ τὸν Ἱππάρχου θάνατον Ἀλκμεωνίδαι γένος ἐόντες Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ φεύγοντες Πεισιστρατίδας, ἐπείτε σφι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἀθηναίων φυγάσι πειρωμένοισι κατὰ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐ προεχώρεε, ἀλλὰ προσέπταιον μεγάλως πειρώμενοι κατιέναι τε καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν τὰς Ἀθήνας, Λειψύδριον τὸ ὑπὲρ Παιονίης τειχίσαντες, ἐνθαῦτα οἱ Ἀλκμεωνίδαι πᾶν ἐπὶ τοῖσι Πεισιστρατίδῃσι μηχανώμενοι παρ' Ἀμφικτυόνων τὸν νηὸν μισθοῦνται τὸν ἐν Δελφοῖσι, τὸν νῦν ἐόντα, τότε δὲ οὔκω, τοῦτον ἐξοικοδομῆσαι, οἷα δὲ χρημάτων εὖ ἥκοντες καὶ ἐόντες ἄνδρες δόκιμοι ἀνέκαθεν ἔτι, τὸν νηὸν ἐξεργάσαντο τοῦ παραδείγματος

> κάλλιον, τά τε ἄλλα καὶ συγκειμένου σφι πωρίνου λίθου ποιέειν τὸν νηόν, Παρίου τὰ ἔμπροσθε αὐτοῦ ἐξεποίησαν. ὡς ὦν δὴ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι λέγουσι, οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἐν Δελφοῖσι κατήμενοι ἀνέπειθον τὴν Πυθίην χρήμασι, ὅκως ἔλθοιεν Σπαρτιητέων ἄνδρες εἴτε ἰδίωι στόλωι εἴτε δημοσίωι στόλωι χρησόμενοι, προφέρειν σφι τὰς Ἀθήνας ἐλευθεροῦν.

It is important to see this passage as a single whole to be able to unravel its train of thought, over which there is no little disagreement. The structure of the long first sentence of this paragraph (Ἱππίεω - ἐξοικοδομῆσαι) gives some important clues as to how Herodotus wants to be understood. The Alcemonids first of all attempt, in concert with the other exiles[48], to return to Athens by means of force (κατὰ τὸ ἰσχυρόν); but this combined military effort meets with disaster, at which point the Alcmeonids, keeping up the struggle on their own by any means they can, accept the contract to build the temple at Delphi[49]. The run of the sentence suggests that in taking on the contract the Alcmeonids are acting alone and using guile (*mēkhanōmenoi*)[50]. There are several possible antitheses here: the Alcmeonids working (a) in concert with the other exiles, and (b) on their own, to secure their return (a) by force and (b) by guile; possibly too we should contrast their efforts (a) as 'liberators' (πειρώμενοι κατιέναι τε καὶ ἐλευθεροῦν τὰς Ἀθήνας) and (b) as mere rivals of the Peisistratids, trying to gain a political advantage by whatever means they can (πᾶν ἐπὶ τοῖσι Πεισιστρατίδῃσι μηχανώμενοι)[51].

It is not absolutely clear what precise function Herodotus ascribes to the temple-building, although there can be no doubt, as we have just said, that it does form some part of the 'plot' of the Alcmeonids to get the better of the Peisistratids[52]. Herodotus' reference back to this passage in the Alcmeonid excursus (as also at 5.66.1)[53] tells us that the family's claim to have liberated Athens depends on their having been the ones who 'persuaded' the Pythia (6.123.2): εἰ δὴ οὗτοί γε ἀληθέως ἦσαν οἱ τὴν Πυθίην ἀναπείσαντες, ὥς μοι πρότερον δεδήλωται. This does not take us much further, although it leaves us in no doubt that Herodotus believes he has proved that the Alcmeonids achieved their end by some form of persuasion of the Pythia, which resulted in her giving an artificial or contrived response to the Spartans. Indeed Herodotus' own narrative later has the Spartans discover that they had been tricked or cheated by the Alcmeonids into betraying their friends the Peisistratids (cf. 5.90.1, τὰ ἐκ τῶν 'Αλκμεωνιδέων ἐς τὴν Πυθίην μεμηχανωμένα), and his form of words there shows that he understands that there was in fact something for the Spartans to find out,something which gave them legitimate cause for their grievance. It has been felt, however, that Herodotus is here offering us two alternative versions of how the Alcmeonids brought their influence to bear at Delphi. It is argued that he presents first the version that it was by their lavish temple-building, the fact that they completed the work with Parian marble rather than tufa as arranged, that secured them the support they wanted, and secondly a contrasting 'Athenian version' which has them bribe the Pythia with money. The first version is thus that of the Alcmeonid source itself, and the second the malicious rejoinder of the Athenians[54].

Even if this were correct, it would still leave us with a wholly unsatisfactory case for the Alcmeonid source, as we shall see in a moment; but there are good reasons for rejecting this interpretation. The most conclusive objection is a linguistic one: the connexion at 5.63.1, ὡς ὦν δὴ 'Αθηναῖοι λέγουσι is progressive, not adversative[55], and a progressive connector of this sort could not introduce a variant version, especially in view of Herodotus' taste for marking variants by pronounced oppositions[55a]. The source-citation is used here only for emphasis, to mark the climax; the Athenians are cited as the source because this is an Athenian narrative[56], and the one source is surely meant to cover the whole narrative, not merely this one detail[57]. Powell (s.v. ὦν II.2) classes the present example of the particle group under the heading "resuming after a digression", and this is no doubt right; the digression concerned is the information (5.62.3) that the Alcmeonids built the temple more magnificently than was required of them, and the ὧν δή picks up the μηχανώμενοι of the previous sentence. On this view Herodotus' account implies that the Alcmeonids' acceptance of the temple-contract was part of a plan to get a foothold at Delphi, but only part: it was while they were at Delphi engaged in this work (cf. ἐν Δελφοῖσι κατήμενοι) that they had the opportunity to bribe the Pythia, something that they had hoped to be able to do from the first. The alternative interpretation mentioned above is on the other hand open to further objections than simply its failure to make sense of Herodotus' Greek. It also requires us to make a connexion which Herodotus in no way assists, namely that it was sufficient for the Alcmeonids to make a charitable display of their wealth in order for the Delphic administration to take the hint and arrange for the Pythia to give a certain response to the Spartans. This leap of the imagination passes over far too much: did the Alcemonids intimate what they would like Delphi to do for them, or did the official divine the best way of helping them of their own accord? If there is really an 'Alcmeonid self-justification' here, it is absurdly mealy-mouthed.

As we said, however, it actually makes no great difference if we do accept this supposed 'Alcmeonid version' or not; the case against the 'Alcmeonid source' thereby loses no great force. On either view that theory offers us the unpalatable conclusion that the way the Alcmeonids of Herodotus' day chose to reassert their claim as the true liberators of Athens was by bringing down on their own heads the charge of having corrupted the Pythia, whether straightforwardly by money or indirectly through the temple-building, either way a μηχάνημα resulting in 'persuasion' (ἀναπείσαντες). Plutarch (MH 23.680CD), commenting on 5.66.1, is quick to notice the unflattering implication of Herodotus' narrative: καλλίστωι μὲν ἔργωι καὶ δικαιοτάτωι (sc. the liberation) προσάπτων ἀσεβήματος διαβολὴν τηλικούτου καὶ ῥαιδιουργήματος. Indeed we need only

Herodotus himself to remind us that the merest attempt to corrupt the Pythia was the most serious of religious crimes: for example, it was thought by many Greeks (6.75.3) that Cleomenes met his gruesome end because of his corruption of the Pythia to secure the deposition of Demaratus (cf. 6.66.2f)[58]. Whatever form of persuasion the Alcmeonids are to be thought of as having used, Plutarch's observation still stands; indeed, on the analogy of Glaucus (cf. 6.86g.2, with Ch.I.i.2), the very act of thinking of trying to influence the Pythia, whether by money or not, was enough to incur divine displeasure.

It is worth remembering that there was another way for the Alcmeonids to have lodged their claim without bringing this charge of 'impiety' on their own heads. It is probable that the 4thc witnesses to the tradition of the liberation preserve nothing of the historical truth and much anachronistic construction[59], but it is instructive to note how it is handled in Isocrates and Demosthenes, both of whom are genuinely protective of the Alcmeonids to the extent of elevating them to the rank of heroes of the democracy. In the Antidosis (232) Isocrates has Cleisthenes borrow money from Delphi to effect the triumphant return of the exiles (λόγωι πείσας τοὺς ᾿Αμφικτύονας δανεῖσαι τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ χρημάτων αὐτῶι), and the story is the same in Demosthenes (21.144). It may well have been an anachronism for a 6thc political faction to secure its return to power by hiring mercenaries[60], but we can readily imagine that this story, fiction or not, was in circulation at the time of Herodotus' inquiries - and such a story was very probably initiated by the Alcmeonids themselves (in self-justification?), if in the 4thc it was the version told in their favour. If we need to ask what the Alcmeonids might have told Herodotus if he had spoken to them, it is surely more likely to have been this story of borrowed money than any of the shady dealings of Herodotus' own account. As for the temple-building, moreover, we have the evidence of Pindar's encomium of the

Alcmeonids in his *epinikion* for Megakles (Py.7.7ff)[61]:

> For in all the cities of Greece the fame is bruited of those citizens of Erechtheus, who in divine Pytho made thy temple, Apollo, a marvel to behold.

Pindar, prompted by considerations of what his dedicatee would like to hear, makes no attempt to confuse this act of magnificent charity of the Alcmeonids with any corruption of the Pythia or with an effort at securing the removal of the tyranny at Athens. It could be that he is observing a judicious silence on a delicate matter - but even that is surely a reflexion of the wishes of the commissioning family. Are we to believe that in Herodotus' day the Alcmeonids were happy to complicate the magnificence of this act of charity by an admission that it was not disinterested and was directed at trying to influence the Pythia? It is possible indeed that Herodotus' tradition represents a slander of the Alcmeonids, possibly not yet current in Pindar's day, to which the 4thc version preserved in Isocrates and Demosthenes might be an apologetic answer. However, I can see no means of arriving at the truth of how historically the Alcmeonids actually liberated Athens (if they did at all?) or of what they originally said of their part in those events. All that is clear is that they can hardly have claimed at any stage the role Herodotus ascribes to them here.

Significantly the part played by the Alcmeonids is restricted almost entirely to their act of corruption - although Herodotus perhaps characteristically plays up the paradox that this corruption also involved an act of magnificent 'piety'[62]. At any rate there is no celebration of anything approaching bravery or heroism on their part. Leipshydrion is mentioned only as the scene of repeated military disasters, and Herodotus offers no commentary on the heroic sacrifices of the liberators. By contrast the Alcmeonids and the other exiles made much of their own heroism, to judge from two famous *skolia*, the one celebrating the sacrifice at Leipshydrion (PMG 907: αἰαῖ Λειψύδριον προδωσέταιρον, / οἵους ἄνδρας ἀπώλεσας, μάχεσθαι / ἀγαθούς τε καὶ εὐπατρίδας, / οἳ τότ' ἔδειξαν οἵων πατέρων ἔσαν)[63], the other the particular bravery of a certain Kedon who may or may not have been an Alcmeonid (cf. Ar.Athpol.20.5 = PMG 906: ἔγχει καὶ Κήδωνι, διάκονε, μηδ' ἐπιλήθου, / εἰ χρὴ τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν οἰνοχοεῖν)[64]. What Herodotus advertizes instead are the Alcmeonids' machinations, intrigues, deceptions - and there is nothing that is intrinsically glamorous in the role of agent provocateur. They merely set in train the events which lead to the liberation: their participation is important as a beginning, but the liberation itself is the work of Sparta (see below). Indeed after the bribery of the Pythia they disappear from the scene until after the liberation: Cleomenes enters the city at 5.64.2, ἅμα Ἀθηναίων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι, an expression which does not explicitly exclude the Alcmeonids, though it hardly includes them with any emphasis.

It has been worth labouring this discussion at such length, since it has important consequences for the way we think about Herodotus. The 'Alcmeonid source' theory has had considerable influence on the orthodox reading of Herodotus: he has been thought whether wittingly or unwittingly to be reproducing substantially the judgements and interpretations of a source, without making any serious effort at interpreting the material for himself, let alone getting clear in his mind why the version he has chosen is preferable to any other which he might have known or been able to discover. However since this key passage for the 'Alcmeonid source' has turned out so positively against its influence, we may begin to doubt whether it is ever likely to be a satisfactory hypothesis (cf. Appendix II, against the widespread use of esoteric sources in Herodotus). What his actual sources may be and what exactly they told him are in my view problems which do not lend themselves to such simple resolution: Herodotus' freedom of choice and interpretation, both factors ignored to a large extent by the traditional source-criticism, makes it hard to identify any consistent bias, let alone determine where it derives from. I take it, however, that Herodotus derives his information, though not, of course his interpretation, from the 'source' he in fact names, that is the 'Athenians', the aggregate of Athenian opinion (Cf. also Appendix II, on Athenian polis-traditions): there are no facts here that an Aristophanic audience or a typical jury would not have known in some form, to judge from the historical knowledge presupposed in comedy and oratory.

We have seen Herodotus deflate the 'myth' of the tyrannicides and then adopt a thoroughly equivocal line towards the part the Alcmeonids had to play in the affair; and what of Sparta's role in the liberation? The first we hear is that the Spartans decided to obey the repeated instructions of the Pythia and send an army against the Peisistratids (5.63.2): ὅμως καὶ ξείνους σφι ἐόντας τὰ μάλιστα· τὰ γὰρ τοῦ θεοῦ πρεσβύτερα ἐποιεῦντο ἢ τὰ τῶν ἀνδρῶν[65]. Herodotus need not have added the explanatory tail to this sentence, but he does so to underline an unfortunate irony. The Spartans' treachery to their friends seems to them necessary because the god wills it - and yet, of course, we know their mistake, that they have been deceived into doing wrong by the scheming of the Alcmeonids. In other words Herodotus here too insists on the negative side of a positive action: the Spartans do not consciously do a right action in liberating Athens, except insofar as they grudgingly obey the will of the god as they see it - indeed he is far from suggesting that they are motivated by any sort of idealism, or even altruism - but rather they are seen as unconsciously doing a wrong action in betraying their friends[66].

Nor is the liberation itself described as a glamorous victory. Indeed we hear first of all at some length (5.63.3-4) of the disastrous failure of Anchimolius, and even the successful expedition of Cleomenes is treated with reserve. The siege of the Peisistratids proves an unforeseen setback (5.65.1): "and the Spartans might not have removed the tyrants at all, but would have perservered with the siege for only a few days and then retired home". Only a chance occurrence (*syntykhiē*; cf. Ch.I, n.122) gives them the opportunity to enforce submission: the children of the Peisistratids, who were being sent outside the city for safe-keeping, fell into the hands of the besiegers. Herodotus is not prepared to describe the triumph of freedom as a glorious victory: the whole business ends in a miserable and undignified capitulation. By contrast the Spartan liberation is an affair for much tub-thumping in Aristophanes' Lysistrata (1150ff.), the same events acquiring a completely different emphasis. On any account we miss any clear note of celebration in Herodotus' exposition, however restrained.

What more than anything undercuts the glory of Sparta's achievement, however, is her almost immediate, and by degrees increasingly aggressive renunciation of it. We have already said something about this in connexion with Cleomenes (cf. Ch.I.ii.2), and we shall consider this change of heart in more detail in a moment. We may observe here that nowhere in the whole account of the liberation itself does Herodotus show any clear enthusiasm for the means by which the 'glorious end' of Athenian democracy was achieved. No single party involved emerges with straightforward honour from this narrative, not the tyrannicides, not the Alcmeonid, not the Spartans.

(C) Cleisthenes.

First we must look at the immediate consequences of the liberation (5.66.1): Ἀθῆναι, ἐοῦσαι καὶ πρὶν μεγάλαι, τότε ἀπαλλαχθεῖσαι τυράννων ἐγένοντο μέζονες· Quite how Herodotus wants us to understand this programmatic opening remains for a long while obscure. Indeed the immediately ensuing narrative of the political troubles (stasis) which followed the liberation does little to confirm the view of Athens' greatness, however that is to be interpreted[67]. Herodotus in fact seems to be playing a trick on the reader: alerted to expect signs of growing prosperity or strength, we hear of nothing but civil strife, plots, factions, exiles, coups, the very opposite of prosperity.

Freedom is no immediate solution to Athens' problems, indeed it looks at first sight distinctly like a retrograde step. We are introduced first of all (5.66.1) to the warring of two new dynasts, Cleisthenes and Isagoras, Cleisthenes, the Alcmeonid, whom we are told was the one who bribed the Pythia (ὅς περ δὴ λόγον ἔχει τὴν Πυθίην ἀναπεῖσαι). The reminder[68] is well-timed and most unflattering: this man whose contribution to the liberation of Athens was decisive turns out after all not to have been a liberator through altruism[68a], but in order that he might win power for himself. He and Isagoras are linked in a struggle for power (5.66.2): οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἐστασίασαν περὶ δυνάμιος, ἑσσούμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται[69]. With these words we find ourselves as it were back in the time before the tyranny, when again there was stasis, between Megakles (the unscrupulous Alcmeonid!) and Lykurgus, and a third party, Peisistratus, who like Cleisthenes now was not content to play the game by the rules (cf. 1.59.3): συλλέξας δὲ στασιώτας καὶ τῶι λόγωι τῶν ὑπερακρίων προστάς. Cleisthenes and Peisistratus have in common that in championing their respective 'factions' both are making use of an expedient to suit their private ends. Herodotus unmistakably makes Cleisthenes' championship of the demos an afterthought, a stratagem to get the better of his aristocratic opponent. So far as the comparison with Peisistratus extends it is hardly flattering to Cleisthenes, the democrat.

Whatever we think of the historical importance of Cleisthenes' championship of the demos[70], there is little doubt that Herodotus' reporting of it is decidedly uncharitable. It is perhaps the most outstanding weakness of the 'Alcmeonid source' theory that it cannot hope to explain this attitude of Herodotus to the joint hero of the Alcmeonid house and the Athenian democracy, whose claims the family must have been concerned to advance with all the persuasiveness at their disposal. Indeed this is surely a powerful argument against the theory: if the Alcmeonids could not influence Herodotus in this, they could not influence him in anything. This is not, however, an argument against Herodotus' use of the traditions of the Athenian demos (cf. Appendix II), for his malicious interpretation of Cleisthenes is, as we shall see, clearly his own work. The facts are surely such as any Athenian might have been able to remember, but they have been transformed by Herodotus' jaundiced inferences as to the motives of Cleisthenes and his avowedly personal interpretation of the 'true character' of the reforms (cf. 5.67.1 and 69.1, below). Logically, it is true, Herodotus could have applied such techniques to a version of the story told him by the Alcmeonids, but it is surely perverse to press that logic: if he had heard an Alcmeonid version he did not like, he would surely have turned to another source to correct it; but there is clearly no good reason to invoke any esoteric source here.

Not only does Herodotus advance a malicious interpretation of Cleisthenes' struggle with Isagoras, he is also unwilling to give due credit to the reforms. Although he has singled out the central work of the reforms in the re-organization of the tribes, he has done so for reasons not wholly connected with historical truth, as we shall see; and at the same time he has failed either to mention anything else (5.66.2 and 69.2) or in any way to interpret the re-organization politically. The reader is given no assistance in working out the relation between Cleisthenes' championship of the demos and his re-organization of the tribes, although Herodotus offers a great deal of help in interpreting the 'character' of the reforms (see below). We may advance various trivial explanations for this reticence, such as that the complexity of the constitutional details baffled him, or that their seriousness had been misrepresented to him by a source hostile to Cleisthenes. And yet Herodotus is clearly in no real doubt that the reforms did represent the beginnings of the democracy, as he makes clear, for example, at 6.131.1: (Κλεισθένης) ὃ τὰς φυλὰς καὶ τὴν δημοκρατίην Ἀθηναίοισι καταστήσας[70a]. Indeed the narrative makes it clear that it is Cleisthenes' activity which sets the democracy in motion, whether by conscious design or not.

The answer lies in Herodotus' own interpretation and the deliberate idiosyncracy of his exposition. As we saw, the championship of the demos is made to seem nothing but a stratagem to outstrip his rival, Isagoras (cf. 5.69.2, ἑσσούμενος δέ ... τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται), and it may even be that Herodotus' decision to record the reforms as taking place before the exile of Cleisthenes, rather than after, as Aristotle has it[71], may be influenced by a desire to interpret them as nothing but a weapon in the struggle against Isagoras[72]. The most remarkable indication of Herodotus' intentions, however, is his lengthy comparison between Cleisthenes and his homonymous maternal grandfather, the tyrant of Sicyon (5.67.1):

> ταῦτα δὲ δοκέειν ἐμοὶ ἐμιμέετο ὁ Κλεισθένης οὗτος τὸν ἑωυτοῦ μητροπάτορα Κλεισθένεα τὸν Σικυῶνος τύραννον; and cf. 5.69.1, ὁ δὲ δὴ Ἀθηναῖος Κλεισθένης ... δοκέειν ἐμοὶ καὶ οὗτος ὑπεριδὼν Ἴωνας, ἵνα μὴ σφίσι αἱ αὐταὶ ἔωσι φυλαὶ καὶ Ἴωσι, τὸν ὁμώνυμον Κλεισθένεα ἐμιμήσατο.

In both the introduction and the conclusion to the excursus Herodotus makes clear that he is advancing his own interpretation, namely that the Athenian Cleisthenes had the same motives as his grandfather and that he consciously copied him in his reforms. However while both 'reformers' can at a pinch be seen to have the racial motives Herodotus ascribes to them, the tyrant is anti-Dorian but the grandson anti-Ionian, so that the resemblance or imitation is only superficial at best. True, Herodotus seems to be elaborating in the Athenian case a point he made in dealing with the Ionians in the excursus of Book One (143.3):

> The other Ionians, besides those in the twelve cities, including the Athenians took a dislike to the name 'Ionian' - and even to this day I believe that most of them are ashamed of it.

The reasons why he should want to raise this point here is perhaps the paradox that though the Athenians now despise the Ionians, they are ready almost at once to conclude an alliance with them on the basis of consanguinity (cf. 5.97.2)[73].

The general improbability of the imitation is, however, perhaps a clue to Herodotus' intentions[74]: he is forcing the comparison for the light it throws on the 'character' of the Athenian reforms and the 'motives' of the Athenian reformer, or rather the light that it can be made to throw by association. He does not in any way stress the paradox of being able to compare the Athenian democratic reformer with his tyrant grandfather: on the contrary, the tyrant's arrogant behaviour is set on a level with his grandson's, to the discredit of the latter. Indeed it is the very machinery of the democracy, the tribe reforms (cf. 6.131.1), which Herodotus singles out as the 'imitation'[75], so that we might almost say that he concentrates on this detail of the Athenian reforms at the expense of all others in order to focus the comparison as sharply as possible. The result is a trivialization of whatever it was that Cleisthenes did: he shares the same blood with the tyrant who gave the Sicyonians the abusive tribe-names, Hyatai, Oneatai and Khoireatai (5.68.1)[76]. Herodotus does not perhaps find the same arrogant disregard of things human and divine in the Athenian as in the tyrant (cf. e.g. the Pythia's judgement at 5.67.2), though it may be significant that he is shortly to recount the affair of Cylon in such a way as to suggest the same characteristics of high-handedness in his Alcmeonid family (5.71)[77]; he has, however, thrown enough mud merely by inviting the comparison, and Cleisthenes does not escape unbesmirched[78].

It is thus surely probable that Herodotus has deliberately avoided any detailed discussion of how the democracy came about (see above), anything about the politics of the demes, the powers of the new *boule*, the dissolution of the old aristocratic monopoly of the state. This is perhaps to expect too modern an awareness from him, but it remains that he misses out much that he might, even on his own terms, have said, given his interest in such matters elsewhere (cf. e.g. 1.65, Lycurgus at Sparta; 4.161, Demonax at Cyrene; or the Parians at Miletus, 5.28-9). Instead he approaches his subject from an unexpected angle. Cleisthenes on Herodotus' eccentric interpretation was not a disinterested reformer, but a self-interested dynast playing at reform in the interests of factional advantage. He arrives at this interpretation, moreover, by avoiding narrative exposition as far as possible: he wants to avoid allowing the facts to tell their own story. Instead of hearing what it was that Cleisthenes actually did to establish democracy and political freedom at Athens[79], we are told that (5.69.2), τὸν 'Αθηναίων δῆμον πρότερον ἀπωσμένον τότε πάντως πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μοῖραν προσεθήκατο[80]. Cleisthenes was a haughty aristocrat, who previously had scorned all contact with the common man, but was prepared to admit the demos into his faction when he could see no other path to advancement (cf. n.69, above). Herodotus' loaded inferences are designed to point the paradox of the aristocrat turning democrat. The piquancy of the account would have been lost if he had descended to mere narrative! Indeed it is perhaps this same desire to avoid heroizing Cleisthenes which leads Herodotus to drop his name so suddenly from his narrative as soon as this eccentric account of the reforms is over. His responsibility for the democracy is made to seem largely accidental and unintentional (here at least; contrast 6.131.1, above), whereas any reasonably objective account of the reforms would have to admit that their complexity and elaboration shows long-term constitutional planning, and even perhaps a genuine desire to promote greater political equality, whether or not minor advantages for the Alcmeonids were built into the tribal re-organization (cf. n.70, above).

Looking back over the narrative of the liberation and of Cleisthenes' setting up of the democracy it is possible to see a consistent line of interpretation: Herodotus, with his insistent talk of Athenian eleutheria (cf. 5.55, 62.1, 62.2, 63.1, 64.2, 65.5; and also 5.78, 91.1 and 91.2), is not concerned to paint a straightforward picture of heroic liberators or the glorious effects of freedom; rather there is a certain paradoxical tension between the abstract desirability of freedom as a goal and the complications in the way in which this particular case it is actually achieved and in what it leads to. As we saw (in (B) above), Herodotus' interpretation leads us to a picture in which none of the candidates for the title of liberator emerges wholly attractively either in their motives or their actions. Similarly the immediate effect of freedom for Athens is a recurrence of factional struggle (cf. stasis at 5.66.2, 69.2, etc.), which it apparently takes the political reforms of Cleisthenes to quell. In this role Cleisthenes performs a similar function to that of Peisistratus in his original tyranny (cf. (A) above), or that of Deioces in Media (cf. Ch.II.i.B.1); and he is no different from these two in providing Athens with political stability for motives of personal advantage - Herodotus is unable to show what advantage Cleisthenes actually secured in the long-term, but that does not prevent him denying any altruism to his championship of the demos. To the extent that this is meant to be a narrative about eleutheria (and that claim could, of course, be contested, given Herodotus' lack of explicit commentary), Herodotus' message is this: the motives of liberators are not necessarily altruistic and much more likely to be those of self-interest; and the mere fact of liberation, given such considerations, is more likely to pose new problems than to effect an immediate recovery in the state concerned.

(D) Persia and Sparta.

The first action of the new democracy is its resistance to the attempts of Cleomenes and Isagoras to take away its freedom (cf. 5.72.2): ἀντισταθείσης δὲ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ οὐ βουλομένης πείθεσθαι. It is surely right to understand that, whether mistakenly or not[81], Herodotus sees the boulē here as the organ set up anew by Cleisthenes, although he does not bring this out. There may even be a pun here in βουλῆς/βουλομένης, the boulē standing for the determination to resist re-enslavement. Like the Milesians faced with the return of Histiaos after the fall of Aristagoras (cf. 6.5.1), the Athenians are unwilling to resign what they have won, οἷά τε ἐλευθερίης γευσάμενοι.

The recall of the exiles coincides with the decision to send ambasssadors to Sardis (5.73.1) "in the hope of concluding an alliance with Persia, since they well knew that they had incurred the settled enmity (ἐκπεπολεμῶσθαι) of Cleomenes and Sparta". Artaphrenes, however, responds to these overtures with the same aloofness (and almost the same words) that Cyrus had used to the Spartans in Book One, when they had sent an embassy to him to demand that the king harm no city of the Greeks on pain of their displeasure. Artaphrenes demands (5.73.2) "who these Athenians are that they seek an alliance with Persia, and where in the world they live"; Cyrus had asked (1.153.1) "who these Spartans were, and what their numbers were that they were sending him such a command"[82]. The parallelism is very likely deliberate: the presumption of the Athenians here following their successful liberation directly corresponds to that of the Spartans after the political settlement which had given them the leadership of the Peloponnese and led them to contract an alliance with Croesus (cf. Ch.II.i.A.2). In both cases, however, this presumption is abruptly put into perspective by Persia. Artaphrenes, moreover, demands earth and water of the Athenian envoys, who are rash enough to agree and who suffer disgrace for this mistake when they arrive back in Athens (5.73.3, αἰτίας μεγάλας εἶχον)[83].

This is not the end of the matter, however, for just before reporting the arrival of Aristagoras at Athens Herodotus tells us of another embassy to Sardis, in which the Athenians demand of Artaphrenes that he pay no attention to Hippias and the Athenian exiles (cf. 5.96.1f, οὐκ ἐῶντες τοὺς Πέρσας πείθεσθαι Ἀθηναίων τοῖσι φυγάσι)[84]. This time Artaphrenes is even less receptive and tells them that "if they want to be safe, they should receive Hippias back". The Athenians are not prepared to accept these terms: οὐκ ἐνδεκομένοισι δέ σφι ἐδέδοκτο ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ τοῖσι Πέρσηισι πολεμίους εἶναι. We have arrived in these words at the decision on which the whole of the rest of the work turns: the conflict with Persia has at last been set in train. Herodotus is clearly concerned to emphasize here that the conflict between Athens and Persia is precipitated by the democracy: it is the democracy which first provokes the attention of Persia (cf. 5.73.1ff), and it now finds that it has woken its natural enemy, the natural ally of the exiled tyrants.

The picture of the Athenian democracy which emerges from these two episodes is a somewhat disquieting one: Herodotus does nothing to encourage us to take its provocation of Persia as an act of admirable self-confidence, and from what he does tell us we could as well interpret it as mere folly.

Indeed we are later told that the democracy was responsible in sending ships to Asia for bringing great misfortune to Greece, if we may so unravel the implications of 5.97.3 (below). We should not indeed exaggerate the effect of this account - it is at most a matter of emphasis and omission - but in showing the democracy perform such a complete _volte-face_ towards Persia Herodotus is surely aiming at a disconcerting irony. We do not expect the same emphasis on Athens' preparedness to ally herself with Persia (against Sparta?) as on her decision to make an enemy of the barbarian: indeed an account truly sympathetic to Athens might have taken care to pass over the original embassy, with its possible implications of treachery to Greece. The inconsistency of Athens' attitude to Persia thus highlighted does not redound to her credit.

Athens' new identity also brings her into conflict with other states in the Greek world, and most notably with Sparta. The conflict with Sparta was singled out as the reason for her turning in the first place to Persia: ἠπιστέατο γὰρ σφίσι Λακεδαιμονίους τε καὶ Κλεομένεα ἐκπεπολεμῶσθαι (see above). The Peisistratids had been close friends of Sparta (cf. 5.63.2, 90.1 and 91.2, above), and besides the new democracy had already made an enemy of Cleomenes by expelling him from Attica. Herodotus is at pains throughout this episode to show that the hostility between Sparta and Athens which was to dominate the affairs of Greece in his own day had its origins in the establishment of the democracy, whose growth the Spartans had paradoxically assisted by helping to overthrow the tyranny. Herodotus observes in detail how the Spartans gradually realize the folly of their original intervention at Athens (cf. e.g. 5.91.2, συγγινώσκομεν αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν οὐ ποιήσασι ὀρθῶς) and how their mood changes from anger and injured pride to fear and open hostility.

Almost immediately before the arrival of Aristagoras, Herodotus introduces an episode directed in part at least at showing us the implications of Athenian freedom and growth through Spartan eyes. The Athenians are interrupted in their cold war with Aegina by the news that the Spartans are about to act against them (5.90.1). The Spartans, Herodotus explains, have discovered that they have been tricked by the Alcmeonids and the Pythia, and they now regret what they have done: ὅτι τε ἄνδρας ξείνους σφίσι ἐόντας ἐξεληλάκεσαν ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ποιήσασι χάρις οὐδεμία ἐφαίνετο πρὸς 'Αθηναίων (cf. 91.2, δήμωι ἀχαρίστωι παρεδώκαμεν τὴν πόλιν). In addition they are encouraged to act by the oracles brought from Athens by Cleomenes (5.90.2): λεγόντες πολλά τε καὶ ἀνάρσια ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖσι ἐξ 'Αθηναίων (cf. (H) below). Herodotus then continues (5.91.1):

> then, when they saw that the Athenians were growing in strength (αὐξανομένους) and were no longer minded to be subservient to Sparta (καὶ οὐδαμῶς ἑτοίμους ἐόντας πείθεσθαι σφίσι), and realizing that a free Athens would be likely to become equal in power to them (ὡς ἐλεύθερον μὲν ἐόν ... ἰσόρροπον τῶι ἑωυτῶν ἂν γίνοιτο), but that in the grip of a tyranny it would be weak and ready to submit to their authority (κατεχόμενον δὲ ὑπὸ τυραννίδος ἀσθενὲς καὶ πειθαρχέεσθαι ἕτοιμον), they sent for Hippias.

The speech to the assembly of the allies which follows immediately puts a rather different complexion on the matter (5.91.2):

> δήμωι ἀχαρίστωι παρεδώκαμεν τὴν πόλιν, ὃς ἐπείτε δι' ἡμέας ἐλευθερωθεὶς ἀνέκυψε, ἡμέας μὲν καὶ τὸν βασιλέα ἡμέων περιυβρίσας ἐξέβαλε, δόξαν δὲ φύσας αὐξάνεται, ὥστε ἐκμεμαθήκασι μάλιστα μὲν οἱ περίοικοι αὐτῶν Βοιωτοὶ καὶ Χαλκιδέες, τάχα δέ τις καὶ ἄλλος ἐκμαθήσεται ἁμαρτών.

The Spartans pretend to the allies that they have acted throughout in the best interests of the Athenians, and that in return they have met with nothing but ungrateful and contumacious obstinacy: the demos is incapable of manifesting kharis, in this the Spartans are in accord with Gelon of Syracuse (cf. 7.156.3, νομίσας δῆμον εἶναι συνοίκημα ἀχαριτώτατον)[85]. And yet of course Herodotus' own narrative shows the Spartan account to be in some measure a misrepresentation of the facts: they exaggerate their responsibility for the democracy (δήμωι παρεδώκαμεν τὴν πόλιν), which even Herodotus admits was the work of Cleisthenes, and their assistance of its growth (δι’ ἡμέας ἀνέκυψε), which Cleomenes did his best to prevent, while passing over the true circumstances of Cleomenes' intervention, which was more of a wrong done by the Spartans to Athens than the other way around (cf. Ch.I.ii.2). Thus Herodotus here contrasts their public and private reasoning: in reality they fear the growth of Athens as a threat to their own power, but in public they speak only of wrongs done them by the democracy. This contrast tells us something about the Spartans and their role as 'liberators'. They presume the right to hegemony over the Greeks without regard for the autonomy of other states, and they are cynically prepared to use any means available to maintain or regain influence over an independent state. Most serious of all, they are here prepared to restore a tyranny to Athens, the very tyranny they had helped to remove, something which the speech of Socles reminds us is not only wrong in principle[86] but which involves the Spartans in the betrayal of an ideal they have always stood for in the past (cf. 5.92a.1). "The heavens will change places with the earth", says Socles, "if the Spartans are now going to dissolve free constitutions and set up tyrannies, than which man has devised nothing more unjust or bloody". The Spartans' attachment to the ideal of freedom, so Herodotus is at pains to underline, is not all it seems. Though they pride themselves on having liberated Athens, we see now that they did so involuntarily and against their better interests, and that they repented of it as soon as they realised that a free Athens was much more of a threat to them than an Athens under tyranny.

The passage also contributes to the story of the Athenian liberation. The Spartans reveal, through the motivation ascribed to them by Herodotus, that they have hitherto regarded Athens as something of a dependent state, whose destiny they themselves could control through the Peisistratids. The outcome of the debate is that they now lose all such power over the Athenians, and Athenian freedom becomes that much more complete. If we compare here Herodotus' model of the growth of the eastern empires (cf. Ch.II.i.B), the consequences of such a 'liberation' become clear: just as Media started to pose a threat to Assyria after having thrown off her vassalage to the old empire, so Athens becomes a threat to Sparta once she is no longer dependent upon her (cf. Aegina and Epidaurus at 5.83.1f, below) - and, though Herodotus does not follow through that conclusion here (see below), like Media, Athens goes on to win an empire of her own at the expense of Sparta and her hegemony.

Herodotus does not draw out the full implications of the model here (and cf. 5.78, below), and even the interpretation of Athenian growth which he gives here to the Spartans, while it stresses the ominous consequences of the liberation of Athens, stops short of looking forward to an Athenian empire; it does, however, have obvious points of contact with the eastern model. The Spartans confirm what Herodotus had promised when introducing this section (5.66.1), that "Athens freed from the tyrants grew greater". Under the tyranny the Athenians were repressed (*katekhein*) and submissive (πειϑαρχέεσϑαι ἕτοιμον), and thus no threat to Sparta or anyone else; but the liberation and the democracy changed all that. Athens' 'greatness', like the 'greatness' of any state or nation in Herodotus (cf. Ch.II.i.A.1), involves a threat of expansion, of encroachment on the liberties of neighbouring states or nations. The Athenians, so the Spartans have it, are putting on airs and throwing their weight around (δόξαν δὲ φύσας αὐξάνεται), that is they are acquiring the presumption, natural in free men, that they are better than their neighbours and deserve to dictate to them. The Spartans give particular weight to the example of what has just happened to the Boeotians and Chalcidians, an example which should be a warning to others. There is no reason to suppose that Herodotus means this observation to be an empty and meaningless attempt by the Spartans to rouse the allies to panic. Although Herodotus' narrative clearly condemns what the Spartans claim about their own behaviour, it by no means contradicts their interpretation of the character of the Athenian democracy. Is Herodotus aware of the psychological impact this will have on the reader, and does he consciously avoid offering any corrective to these Spartan criticisms of Athens?

I would suggest that Herodotus' proceeding here is complicated by a desire to avoid direct commentary on the vices and virtues of the Athenian democracy, something which he sensitively avoids throughout the work for reasons I shall be advancing later (cf. Ch.II.iii.L). This whole passage on the rise of the democracy (5.66-97) does in some respects contain elements which suggest a positive estimate of the new Athens: an inattentive Athenian reader, convinced of the rightness of his city's destiny from this period to the present, might well have seen nothing wrong here; but there are enough hints to alert one less partisan: the courage and decisiveness of the new democracy is merely the positive side of a character whose darker aspects are the aggressiveness and presumption of superiority which turned the city into an empire. These hints are, to be sure, given only indirectly - through such things as oracles (cf. 5.90.2 and 93.1-2 in (H) below; with e.g. 8.141.1, in Ch.II.iii.I), through speeches such as that of the Spartans here, through analogies (the model of freedom leading to empire; and Aegina, see (F) below), through omissions (cf. esp. on 5.78, below). These things taken together leave little doubt that a close reading of the text is meant to reveal a critique of Athenian democracy, its aggressiveness and presumption - but that critique is far from forthright. In certain respects and from a certain perspective indeed Herodotus is conceding positive qualities to the democracy: judged merely from the Athenian point of view, freedom is a thing to be prized beyond measure - but Herodotus is not content with that point of view only, but is concerned rather to reflect how that freedom looks for the rest of Greece - and that yields a very different answer. He is thus applying here the same techniques of perspective and equivocation that we discovered in Chapter One.

(E) Boeotia and Chalcis.

This element of equivocation is clearly seen in his treatment of the Athenian double victory over Boeotia and Chalcis which so worries Sparta in this debate, a narrative sequence on which Herodotus hangs his own commentary on the significance of Athenian *isēgoriē* at 5.78. Cleomenes, in his campaign of revenge against the dmeos, has the Boeotians attack Oenoe and Hysiae and the Chalcidians ravage Attica, while the Spartans themselves march on Eleusis (5.74.2). The Athenians are not overawed by the acute danger that faces them (καίπερ ἀμφιβολίηι ἐχόμενοι)[87], and instead of losing their heads they act decisively and, as events prove, successfully; moreover even in this hour of danger they show a strong determination for revenge on their enemies (Βοιωτῶν μὲν καὶ Χαλκιδέων ἐσύστερον ἔμελλον μνήμην ποιέεσθαι). As soon as the Spartan expedition is ignominiously broken up (5.77.1), the Athenians do indeed turn to thoughts of revenge (τίνυσθαι βουλόμενοι), and they march against the Chalcidians. When the Boeotians rally against them, they are ready to change their plan and attack the Boeotians instead; and they win a notable victory, slaughtering many of the enemy (φονεύσαντες) and taking 700 hostages. And not content with that, they cross the same day to Euboea[88] and join battle with the Chalcidians "with the like success; whereupon they left four thousand cleruchs upon the lands of the Hippobotai" (cf. 6.100.1)[89].

Herodotus ends his account of the two battles by describing how the prisoners were ransomed (77.3), how their fetters were dedicated on the acropolis and how a tenth of the ransom went towards the dedication of a bronze chariot (77.4), whose proud inscription he records. We happen to have fragments of the base Herodotus must have seen (Meiggs/ Lewis no.15B), as well as part of a much earlier base (Meiggs/Lewis no.15A) which it is clear must have been destroyed or removed by the Persians in 480. Evidently a replica was set up later at a time when the earlier victory seemed once more topical, either after the crushing of the Euboean revolt, or more probably after Oinophyta (c.457), that is before Coronea could take the lustre off a victory over the Boeotians.[90] At any rate we can assume that this double-victory was a glorious memory retold as an early anticipation of the illustrious successes of the Pentekontaetia. In recording these dedications then Herodotus would seem to be echoing Athenian propaganda, with the Athenians, as the inscription has it, "quenching the hybris of their proud enemies". Certainly he comes here very close to an opposite estimate of these events to that which he gives the Spartans, and it is widely thought that the remarkable paragraph which follows at 5.78 reinforces this interpretation.

Herodotus chooses just this moment to introduce his most explicit commentary on the consequences of Athens' new-found freedom, and to explain the significance of the victories over Boeotia and Chalcis (5.78):

> ᾽Αθηναῖοι μέν νυν ηὔξηντο· δηλοῖ δὲ οὐ κατ᾽ ἓν μοῦνον ἀλλὰ πανταχῆι ἡ ἰσηγορίη ὡς ἐστὶ χρῆμα σπουδαῖον, εἰ καὶ ᾽Αθηναῖοι τυραννευόμενοι μὲν οὐδαμῶν τῶν σφέας περιοικεόντων ἦσαν τὰ πολέμια ἀμείνους, ἀπαλλαχθέντες δὲ τυράννων μακρῶι πρῶτοι ἐγένοντο. δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα ὅτι κατεχόμενοι μὲν ἐθελοκάκεον ὡς δεσπότηι ἐργαζόμενοι, ἐλευθερωθέντων δὲ αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἑωυτῶι προεθυμέετο κατεργάζεσθαι.

Herodotus is rarely so forthcoming in his appraisal of action, and he picks his moments carefully; moreover he is above all very precise about what he wants to say and not to say. Most commentators, however, assume without argument that he is here expressing enthusiasm for democracy - whatever he may be given to say or imply elsewhere[91]. But without doubt such an interpretation rests on a misunderstanding of the Greek: in saying that *isēgoriē* is proved to be a *khrēma spoudaion* Herodotus is emphatically not saying that it is "a good thing", whatever complexion we give to that expression. Certainly the word *spoudaios* can in certain contexts mean 'excellent', though not clearly 'excellent' in a moral sense. Thus Xerxes is pleased with Artemisia's advice and deems her *spoudaiē*, that is a good or useful adviser (8.69.2); the bald Scyths live in a place where the pastures are not *spoudaiai*, that is fertile for crops (4.23.4, with 4.198.1); the most expensive and prized method of mummification is described as the most *spoudaios* (2.86.2; cf. 86.3, ὧδε τὰ σπουδαιότατα ταριχεύουσι). The reference in all these cases is clearly to values quite distinct from moral ones, although 'prized' would perhaps suit all the contexts. There is however, another sense of *spoudaios* to refer to something of importance or moment: thus Candaules entrusts Gyges with his confidence in τὰ σπουδαιέστερα τῶν πρηγμάτων (1.8.1); the Persians debate τὰ σπουδαιέστατα τῶν πρηγμάτων whilst drunk (1.133.3). In both cases Herodotus means "matters of importance or moment", and in neither case does excellence of any sort enter into it. The present example (5.78) moreover clearly belongs to this second class: *khrēma* / *prēgma spoudaion* is an expression for "a thing that deserves careful and serious attention", "sobriety", one might almost say, hence the paradox of 1.133.3. The expression can be paralleled in the Ionic of Theognis' elegies, where its character as a formula of popular speech emerges clearly:

> e.g. Theog. 64-5, χρῆμα δὲ συμμείξηις μηδενὶ μηδ᾽ ὁτιοῦν / σπουδαῖον; or 69-70, μήποτε, Κύρνε, κακῶι πίσυνος βούλευε σὺν ἀνδρί,/ εὖτ᾽ ἂν σπουδαῖον πρῆγμ᾽ ἐθέληις τελέσαι ; and cf. 642-3 and 644-5, πολλοὶ πὰρ κρητῆρι φίλοι γίνονται ἑταῖροι,/ ἐν δὲ σπουδαίωι πρήγματι παυρότεροι (with which cf. again Hdt 1.133.3, for the contrast of sobriety and drunkenness).

Democracy then is "a thing to be taken seriously "; so far from expressing enthusiasm, Herodotus is showing palpable reserve[92].

His proof that democracy is to be taken seriously consists in the events just narrated, the victory of the Athenians over their 'neighbours', the very same evidence the Spartans are later to advance to illustrate the danger that Athens now poses for the rest of Greece (5.91.2, above). Under the tyrants the Athenians were no better than their neighbours in war, but once freed from the tyranny they became by far the foremost among them (μακρῶι πρῶτοι). Becoming *prōtos* is no doubt a desirable condition for the Athenians, but it is a matter of grave concern to others.

It may be instructive here to contrast Herodotus' equivocal account of the liberation and its consequences with a parallel account from Isocrates (De Bigis 27). The context is a panegyric of the Alcmeonids, who were responsible, Isocrates says, for expelling the tyrants:

> "and they set up that famous democracy, which trained the citizens to such a pitch of bravery that they defeated single-handed the barbarians who came to enslave the whole of Greece, which enabled them to win such a reputation for justice that the Greeks willingly put into their hands the hegemony of the sea; in short they made the city so great both in military might and in other respects that those who called Athens the 'capital of Hellas' and who were accustomed to make other such extravagant claims seemed to be telling no less than the truth".

We cannot, of course, directly compare Isocrates and Herodotus, the effusive flourishes of an orator and the reserved manner natural to the 'historian'; but a number of important questions suggest themselves. Why does Herodotus not take the obvious course and illustrate the 'bravery' of the democracy, like Isocrates, with reference to the Persian Wars? Why does he choose rather the example of a double-victory gained over fellow-Greeks? There was nothing to stop him delaying this exceptional commentary until his account of the Persian Wars - he might, for instance, have incorporated it at 7.139 (cf. Ch.II.iii.E.2) - and nothing to stop him looking forward to Athens' role in those events in the present commentary. Why, finally, if he is genuinely enthusiastic about the democracy can he find no word to say, here or anywhere, of its qualities of 'bravery' (not even in 7.139!), 'justice', and devotion to the cause of freedom on behalf of others[92a]? Herodotus is arguing an almost identical case to that of Isocrates, that Athens owes her 'greatness' to democracy (*isēgoriē*), but in his version everything is distinctly cool and dispassionate.

The contrast between Herodotus and Isocrates is of more than incidental interest, since it is clear that Isocrates' speech contains elements of an *epainos* of Athens and her constitution which must have been familiar to many 5thc Greeks[93]. Thucydides' Periclean Funeral Oration, for example, sets itself the task of describing (2.36.4): ἀπὸ δὲ οἵας τε ἐπιτηδεύσεως ἤλθομεν ἐπ᾽ αὐτά (sc. the empire) καὶ μεθ᾽ οἵας πολιτείας καὶ τρόπων ἐξ οἵων μεγάλα ἐγένετο . Pericles is made to extol the freedom enshrined in the democratic constitution and pervading all aspects of Athenian life, the freedom that entitles the city to be called the *paideusis Hellados*[94]. There is certainly much in this speech that is Thucydidean and much that we might think ought to belong is excluded[95]; and yet in historical reality Pericles, as one of the founders of the radical democracy, must have had an interest in keeping before the *demos* the virtues, advantages and successes of the Athenian constitution (cf. Aristoph.Hipp.732ff and 1340ff, with Thucyd.2.43.1). Plato's Menexenus (238Bff) illustrates that the praise of the *politeia* was indeed a traditional element of the Funeral Oration at Athens[96]: οἱ τῶνδε πρόγονοι ὤικουν πολιτείαν κατασκευασάμενοι, ἧς ὀρθῶς ἔχει διὰ βραχέων ἐπιμνησθῆναι – even though in this 'parody' the democracy is unexpectedly praised as an *aristokratia*. Aspasia, like Isocrates, also makes a connexion between the freedom enjoyed by the Athenians in their constitution (cf. Thucyd. 2.37.2) and the city's defence of Greek freedom in the mythical and historical past (239AB): ἐν πάσηι ἐλευθερίαι τεθραμμένοι ... οἰόμενοι δεῖν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευθερίας καὶ Ἕλλησιν ὑπὲρ Ἑλλήνων μάχεσθαι καὶ βαρβάροις ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων [97]. These texts suggest that the Athenians, and others accustomed to their state rhetoric, were familiar with hearing the praises of their free democratic constitution, which gave their political life a noble liberality (cf. esp. Thucydides, above)[98], and which encouraged them to champion freedoms of others wherever they were threatened.

At any rate we may reasonably assume that Herodotus will have been familiar with such panegyrics of the Athenian democracy, and more important that he could have assumed an even better acquaintance in an Athenian audience[99]. What he leaves out is likely to have been observed: it will have been seen by the attentive reader that he singles out as the sole achievement of Athenian democracy its brute power[100]. All the attractive associations of Athenian eleutheria as celebrated in Athenian oratory have been purposely discarded: Herodotus tells us nothing of the nobility and justice of a free constitution. And not only does he avoid this in the present passage: nowhere in the work either in narrative or speeches does he allow himself to break silence, beyond perhaps Otanes' lonely words of praise for isonomia in the abstract (3.80.6; but cf. n.134, below). On the contrary, as we have seen, we are soon to be presented in a speech of the Spartans (5.91) with a harsh denunciation of Athenian democracy, its arrogance, pride and aggression, and shortly after that (5.97.2) with an explicit reservation expressed in Herodotus' own person (see below).

The second half of Herodotus' pronouncement in 5.78 (δηλοῖ ὦν ταῦτα ...) concerns the psychology of freedom: "under the tyranny the Athenians played the coward[101], since they were labouring on behalf of a master, but once free each man was eager to prosecute his own interests". The argument implied here corresponds closely, as has been widely recognized, with the account of the psychology of freedom given in the Hippocratic 'Airs, Waters, Places' (23.34ff):

> αἱ γὰρ ψυχαὶ (sc. τῶν τυραννευομένων) δεδούλωνται καὶ οὐ βούλονται παρακινδυνεύειν ἑκόντες εἰκῆι ὑπὲρ ἀλλοτρίης δυνάμιος. ὅσοι δὲ αὐτόνομοι - ὑπὲρ ἑωυτῶν γὰρ τοὺς κινδύνους αἱρεῦνται καὶ οὐκ ἄλλων - προθυμεῦνται ἑκόντες καὶ ἐς τὸ δεινὸν ἔρχονται.

What the author of that treatise is really referring to is unmistakable if not stated, as his pointed opposition of Europeans and Asiatics makes clear: this is an argument about the Persian Wars[102]. The Greeks defeated the Persians at Salamis, Plataea, Eurymedon and the rest, because they were free (autonomoi), while the Persians were ruled by despots[103]. Indeed it is clear that wherever and whenever the theory precisely originates (cf. Ch.III.C) its original inspiration must have been this victory of Greek freedom over Persian despotism, and it is reasonable to assume that Herodotus' readers will have been familiar with it in some form. Herodotus, however, has transferred it out of its original context to apply not to the freedom of the Greeks as a whole which gave them victory over Persia, but to the particular freedom of Athens liberated from tyranny. Once more we must observe that Herodotus has palpably 'misplaced' this paragraph: the argument would have fitted naturally into the narrative of Marathon or Salamis, but instead he has made the surprising choice of introducing it here, and here only, to apply to the narrative of a Greek civil war.

In Airs, Waters, Places, of course, we can readily approve what it is that free men strive so heroically to achieve, since it is clear that what they are fighting for is either the defence or the attainment of liberty, liberty from Persian domination. In Herodotus, however, things are quite different: what the Athenians now labour to achieve (katergazesthai: used absolutely, but implying some object?) is not freedom, for he has deliberately avoided all connexion with the struggle against Persia, but something it is much less easy to admire objectively. The context is, of course, a victory of the Athenians in a war against fellow-Greeks - and there is no indication that any 'enthusiasm' for Athenian democracy on Herodotus' part overrides his distaste for such wars. The work as a whole shows him to consider the enmities of the Greek states to be a great evil, productive of the most foul hatreds, the most shameful injustices, the most horrifying cruelties (cf. e.g. 8.27-33, with Ch.II.iii.A.1). His view of Greek civil war appears to be given in the generalization at 8.3.1, if we may so render it: "for civil war is worse that concerted war in the same degree that war itself is worse than peace" (στάσις γὰρ ἔμφυλος πολέμου ὁμοφρονέοντος τοσούτωι κάκιόν ἐστι ὅσωι πόλεμος εἰρήνης; with Ch.II.iii.G.1, and Pl.Rep.470B)[103a]. We must not, however, exaggerate here: the Athenian victory is after all a question of self-defence not unprovoked aggression (although the Spartans later affect to see it rather differently at 5.91.1), even though it is a war carried into Boeotia and Chalcis, and in the latter case involving a somewhat 'imperialist' act in the imposition of a cleruchy on the defeated enemy (cf. n.89 above). From that point of view at least it is perhaps not a matter for censure; on the other hand it is not a matter for praise, unless we are meant to see things exclusively through Athenian eyes - and Herodotus does not encourage that. His perspective is rather that of to Hellēnikon (cf. 7.139.5, 145.2 and 8.144.2; with 7.9b.1f, in Ch.II.iii.D.1), which shows any hostility between Greek and Greek to be a misfortune (cf. e.g. 6.98.2, with Ch.II.iii.C.1).

It remains to be said, however, that this 'message' is hardly made explicit here: indeed it seems that Herodotus almost comes close to accepting the Athenians' own view of the victory over Boeotia and Chalcis. It is only by the 'misplacement' of his commentary and the omission of any clear moral approval for the Athenian action that we can be expected to see anything wrong here. As we shall see later (cf. Ch.II.iii.L), this reticence is not 'a historian's objectivity', but rather a subtle calculation of his audience's responses: the true balance of his account is only meant to become clear to the attentive reader, who takes the trouble to reflect on his emphases and omissions.

(F) Aegina.

The episode which immediately follows this commentary and which leads right up to the account of Sparta's planned intervention (5.90.1, above), describes how Athens came to be involved in hostilities with Aegina (5.79-89)[104]. The Thebans want revenge on Athens for their humiliation, and on advice from Delphi they send for help from Aegina. The Aeginetans are ready to help (5.81.2): εὐδαιμονίηι τε μεγάληι ἐπαρθέντες καὶ ἔχθρης παλαιῆς ἀναμνησθέντες ἐχούσης ἐς ’Αθηναίους, and they launch an *akērytos polemos*[105] against the Athenians, making raids along the coast of Attica to coincide with Boeotian offensives by land (5.81.3). The remainder of the episode is not, however, taken up with a narrative of these present hostilities, and any Athenian reaction is forestalled first by an oracle from Delphi (cf. 5.89.2f)[106] and then the threat of a Spartan offensive against them (5.90.1ff)[107]; Herodotus rather embarks on a piece of ancient history, the origins of the *ekhthrē palaiē* between Athens and Aegina (5.82.1ff, with 89.1)[108]. The story of hostilities between Aegina and the Athenian democracy, however, is to be resumed later in Book Six, with the affair of Aegina's medism, Cleomenes' intervention, the issue of the hostages (cf. Ch.I.ii.2), Aeginetan reprisals against Athens (6.87), Athens' unsuccessful attempt to stage a democratic coup in Aegina through the exile Nikodromos (6.88ff), and the beginnings of outright war.

The significance of this war between the Athenian democracy and Aegina is explained in part at least by Herodotus himself at the beginning of his narrative of the Greek defence against Xerxes (7.144.1ff). On the one hand it stands for the dissensions of the Greek states which the allies patch up hastily but uneasily in the face of the Persian threat (cf. 7.145.1, ἦσαν δὲ πρός τινας καὶ ἄλλους ἐγκεκρημένοι, ὁ δὲ ὦν μέγιστος Ἀθηναίοισί τε καὶ Αἰγινήτῃσι); in other words, it is one of the stories of Greek division and mutual hostility whose shadow hangs ominously over the narrative of the Greek defence (see Ch.II.iii). On the other hand, paradoxically, it is just this war between two Greek states which somewhat accidentally 'saves Greece in her hour of need'. Herodotus has just commmended Themistocles' suggestion that the silver from the mines of Laurium should be put to use to build ships for the war against Aegina, a policy which has a providential but unforeseen result (7.144.2): οὗτος γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος συστὰς ἔσωσε τότε τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἀναγκάσας θαλασσίους γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους [109]. For the ships were not used for the purpose which caused them to be built, ἐς δέον δὲ οὕτω τῆι Ἑλλάδι ἐγένοντο. It was the crisis of war with Aegina which turned Athens into a sea-power - and this in turn saved Greece in the war with Persia. At Salamis, for example, the two fleets which combined to inflict most harm on the Persians were those of Aegina and Athens, which also by common consent won the prize for valour in the battle (cf. 8.86 and 91-3, esp. 93.1).

However, the significance of the Aeginetan war in making a sea-power of Athens is perhaps not something that simply came to Herodotus as an afterthought when writing his narrative of the Greek defence against Persia but rather an idea that helps to give shape and purpose to the Aeginetan narrative from the beginning.

We learn for instance that when they were called in by Thebes against the Athenians, the Aeginetans managed to inflict much harm on the seaboard of Attica (5.81.3 and 89.2), thereby causing great trouble to the Athenians. Similarly in the narrative in Book Six, Aeginetan reprisals for the affair of the hostages take the form of maritime terrorism, the seizure of an Athenian theoric ship sailing off Cape Sunium (6.87). The attempted coup against the ruling oligarchy in Aegina comes to nothing when the Athenians fail to turn up on the appointed day with the necessary ships (6.89): οὐ γὰρ ἔτυχον ἐοῦσαι νέες σφι ἀξιόμαχοι τῇσι Αἰγινητέων συμβαλεῖν. Indeed the Athenians have to negotiate the purchase of 20 ships from Corinth before they can take the offensive. Even after the initial success against the islanders their inexperience in naval matters again catches them out (6.93): Αἰγινῆται δὲ ἐοῦσι ἀτάκτοισι Ἀθηναίοισι συμβαλόντες τῇσι νηυσὶ ἐνίκησαν[110]. In other words, the narrative of the war shows the Aeginetans giving the Athenians a lesson in the value of naval power. Herodotus presents his material in such a way as to bring out this issue, focussing on the deficiency of Athenian naval power at this period, a state of affairs so different from that which was later to obtain.

The episode is perhaps also meant to show us something about the nature of sea-power and what it does to the Aeginetans and the Athenians. The theme of sea-power in particular gives point to the parenthesis on the *ekhthrē palaiē*, with its account of how Aegina herself emerged as a thalassocracy at an earlier time. In the distant past the Aeginetans were subject to Epidaurus (5.83.1): Αἰγινῆται Ἐπιδαυρίων ἤκουον τά τε ἄλλα καὶ δίκας διαβαίνοντες ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον ἐδίδοσάν τε καὶ ἐλάμβανον παρ' ἀλλήλων οἱ Αἰγινῆται[111]. But the Aeginetans decided to revolt: τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦδε νέας τε πηξάμενοι καὶ ἀγνωμοσύνηι χρησάμενοι ἀπέστησαν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἐπιδαυρίων. Their fleet moreover gives them an advantage over the

Epidaurians[112] (5.83.2): ἅτε δὲ ἐόντες διάφοροι ἐδηλέοντο αὐτούς, ὥστε δὴ θαλασσοκράτορες ἐόντες ... The words *thalassokrateō*, *thalassokratia*, and the rest do not appear in any writers before Herodotus (cf. 3.122.2, with n.117), and the 'idea' of thalassocracy first receives clear expression towards the end of the 5thc[113]. It obsesses the Old Oligarch in his account of the Athenian empire-democracy (cf. Ps.-Xenoph.II.1-16, e.g. II.2, ἡ γὰρ θάλαττα ἐν τῶι μέσωι, οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες θαλασσοκράτορές εἰσιν), and it occupies an important place in Thucydides' Archaeology, as well as providing him with a major theme of the narrative of the Peloponnesian War itself (cf. e.g. Thucyd.2.60-4)[114]. As both these examples show and as all later discusisons appear to confirm[115], the idea of thalassocracy clearly took shape in direct response to the rise of the Athenian empire, a model which finally made sense of Minos, Polycrates, the Phoenicians and the rest[116]. Although Herodotus nowhere uses the words of the Athenians (contrast 7.144.2, *thalassious* not *thalassokratoras*), it is hardly likely that he can attend to the growth of Athenian naval power in the way that he does in the Aeginetan episode and not be interested, as the Old Oligarch and Thucydides are, in the significance of that naval power for the future rise of the empire[117]. Accordingly it seems probable that in discussing Aeginetan sea-power in the *ekhthrē palaiē* episode he is offering us a model for Athens' own development through sea-power: there is an analogy between Aegina freed from the imperial tyranny of Epidaurus (cf. n.111) and Athens freed from the tyranny of the Peisistratids, and perhaps Sparta (see above), both states aggressively asserting their independence. In other words, Herodotus has found another way of commenting indirectly on the implications of Athenian freedom.

If this is so, it becomes significant that what the Aeginetan fleet enables them to do it to inflict harm on other states with impunity (cf. 5.81.3 and 89.2), and the independence which their fleet gives them leads them to behave in a way that is arrogant and overweening. Their seizure of the statues of Damia and Auxesia from Epidaurus (cf. 5.83.2, with 6.87) and their rejection of the Athenian overtures to them are acts of arrogant provocation (cf. 5.84.2, ἔφασαν σφίσι τε καὶ 'Αθηναίοισι εἶναι οὐδὲν πρῆγμα; cf. Athens' own behaviour over the Aeginetan hostages at 6.86.1 and 86d). It is the same self-confidence that leads them to respond to Theban invitations and attack Athens (5.81.2): εὐδαιμονίηι τε μεγάληι ἐπαρθέντες. Perhaps it is this quality of arrogance that is meant by Herodotus' curious use of the word agnōmosynē to describe their attitude when, having built their fleet, they seceded from Epidaurus (5.83.2, above), the opposite of sōphrosynē, with all that implies of self-willed disregard for others[118]. If it is right to see the Aeginetan story as a paradigm (in miniature) of the rise of Athens after the liberation, we may be meant to mark the lesson that an independent thalassocracy feels at liberty to do what it pleases and is no respecter of the rights of others. In other words, Herodotus has in mind that Athenian thalassocracy was not merely something that saved Greece in the Persian Wars, but also what gave the democracy both the power and the presumption to impose its will on others. It is worth noting that Herodotus' paradox at 7.144.2 is clearly something he has strained to achieve: it is hard to believe that Themistocles' advice to build up the fleet had in reality nothing to do with the threat of Persia, which can hardly have been thought to have receded for good after Marathon. But Herodotus wants to suggest that the only object of building the fleet was to gain an advantage over a Greek neighbour, an inference which has an unattractive resonance for anyone aware of the advantage the fleet was to the empire as an instrument of repression (cf. also Ch.II.iii.H.1, on 8.61.2).

(G) The Ionian Revolt.

For Herodotus, Athens' participation in the Ionian revolt is a rather different illustration of the consequences of the liberation, but one which is no less equivocal. Plutarch was certainly right to object to the somewhat uncharitable tone of Herodotus' account, which is a far cry from Athenian propaganda[119], though clearly rather more subtly critical than Plutarch makes it (MH 24.861AB):

> "He does all he can to misrepresent and disparage the exploit; he has the impertinence to say that the ships which the Athenians sent to support the Ionians were 'the beginning of disaster' (ἀρχεκάκους τολμήσας προσειπεῖν), because they attempted to free all those great Greek cities from the barbarian"[120].

This reserve should not be put down to mere *kakoētheia*[121]. We have seen that democracy brought an astonishing access of confidence to the Athenians, without which they would never have responded to the overtures of Aristagoras as they did; but it is a confidence which has the direct result of endangering Greece. Admittedly Herodotus does not explicitly level such a criticism at the Athenians - and I would suggest that to do so would be to go against a principle he has set himself (cf. Ch.II.iii.L) - but by association at least their involvement in the revolt can be seen as a reprehensible folly. The ships they sent were the *arkhē kakōn* for the Greeks and the barbarians (5.97.3): that could be taken purely objectively as a statement of historical fact, but it is also possible, with Plutarch, to extrapolate an accusation of criminal responsibility. Moreover, we saw that Athens' original decision to make an enemy of Persia (cf. 5.96.2) had been preceded by an attempt to make an ally of her for protection against Sparta (cf. 5.73.1): and if we follow through the implications of that, it is not possible to see Athens' involvement in the revolt as a heroic defence of Greek liberties, but only as a further act of selfish opportunism (see below).

What Plutarch should even more have bridled at is Herodotus' account of Athens' withdrawal from the alliance (5.103.1): μετὰ δὲ Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν τὸ παράπαν ἀπολιπόντες τοὺς Ἴωνας ἐπικαλεομένου σφέας πολλὰ δι' ἀγγέλων Ἀρισταγόρεω οὐκ ἔφασαν τιμωρήσειν σφι. Athens' participation in the revolt is clearly devalued by this uncomfortably close scrutiny of her desertion of it. The Athenians simply get cold feet: they realize at last that their ambition has led them too far. No ties of blood, no claims of loyalty, no lure of profit even (cf. 5.97.1-2), can get them to stay now. Herodotus offers no explanation or exoneration of their behaviour, but his language is too forceful (τὸ παράπαν ἀπολιπόντες ... ἐπικαλεομένου σφέας πολλά) to count as detached and objective narrative. The completeness of their abandonment of the Ionian cause can only be assessed subjectively - and they may after all have had an acceptable reason for their 'desertion', which Herodotus does not have the patience to record. His words serve to sharpen our doubts about the expedition: what sort of decision was it in the first place that led the Athenians to send 20 ships to Asia, if they could so soon so completely abandon the enterprise, at the first sign of trouble?

Herodotus' commentary on the decision itself[122] shows that he considers it ill-considered and far from creditably motivated. Aristagoras' appeal succeeds at Athens, even though it failed at Sparta (5.97.2):

> πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα, εἰ Κλεομένεα μὲν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον μοῦνον οὐκ οἷός τε ἐγένετο διαβάλλειν, τρεῖς δὲ μυριάδας Ἀθηναίων ἐποίησε τοῦτο (cf. Ch.I.ii.5).

The 'corruptibility' of the multitude is a theme we encounter also in Megabyxos' attack on democracy (3.81.2): κῶς γὰρ ἂν γινώσκοι ὃς οὔτ' ἐδιδάχθη οὔτε εἶδε καλὸν οὐδὲν οἰκήιον, ὠθέει τε ἐμπεσὼν τὰ πρήγματα ἄνευ νόου, χειμάρρωι ποταμῶι ἴκελος; The demos which forces all before it like a stream in torrent might almost be a description of the Athenian democracy here (see below). An intsructive parallel can be made here with Aristotle (Pol.1286A31ff), who uses almost exactly the same terms to contrast the merits of constitutional 'democratic' government with the deficiencies of monarchy:

> "a large body of men is less easily corrupted than the few; in this respect it resembles a large volume of water, which is not so easily fouled as a small quantity. Whereas the judgement of a man in the throes of anger or some other passion is bound to be obscured, a great number of persons are most unlikely to be simultaneously led astray in this manner".[123]

Aristotle argues from common sense, and an imprecise analogy, that the judgement of one man is less reliable than that of a large assembly. Herodotus, by contrast, argues a less obvious position by appeal to 'history': the Athenians were persuaded where Cleomenes was not. It is possible that Herodotus is here offering a paradoxical reply to some such defence of democracy or criticism of monarchy as that voiced by Aristotle here. To some extent his 'criticism' of democracy here may be meant to substantiate the stern denunciation of Megabyxos, a view which laid stress of the irrational impressionability of the 'mass' in moments of political crisis[124]; but the passage could as well pass as a mere paradox, a lightly ironic observation that the way things turned out here seemed to go against common sense expectation. It is easy enough to extrapolate a criticism of the institution of democracy, and of the Athenian version in particular, and Herodotus is surely content that this should be so; but he has clearly held back from making such a criticism explicit.

Athenian propaganda will surely have made out that her participation in the Ionian revolt was a high-minded decision to defend Greek freedom, eclipsed only by her heroism in the Persian Wars[125]. And yet Herodotus distinctly avoids any such suggestion, and he even leaves any mention of freedom out of Aristagoras' speech (contrast 5.49.2-3). As we have seen earlier, it seems to have been a staple theme of Athenian oratory that the democracy was so attached to the ideal of freedom that she made allies of the weaker rather than the stronger, in despite of her own advantage, because of her hatred of oppression (cf. e.g. Isocr.Paneg.52-3, with

Pl.Menex.239AB). Thus an Athenian audience would not have been entirely happy to hear that the democracy was 'deceived' into the decision to help the Ionians against her better interests by the unscrupulous Aristagoras. His 'deception' of the Athenians is almost certainly a Herodotean inference rather than a reported fact, especially if his sources are Athenian here. Moreover it is on this inference that his commentary depends: the democracy is susceptible to gilded promises. Herodotus suggests that it is indeed profit rather than idealism which sways the assembly behind Aristagoras. Of the arguments he puts forward (5.97.1f), profit (περὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τῶν ἐν τῆι 'Ασίηι) and the ties of blood (ὡς οἱ Μιλήσιοι τῶν 'Αθηναίων εἰσὶ ἄποικοι καὶ οἰκός σφέας εἴη ῥύεσθαι δυναμένους μέγα), it is clearly the promise of profit which is the deciding factor: καὶ οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐκ ὑπίσχετο οἷα κάρτα δεόμενος, ἐς ὃ ἀνέπεισέ σφεας[126].

Herodotus' account of Athens' involvement in the revolt is the nearest he comes to showing his hand in relation to the Athenian democracy. His obvious reserve here shows that it was right to doubt that the real purpose of 5.78 was to express enthusiasm for Athenian democratic freedom; in particular 5.97.2 is a striking counter to whatever was conceded in that earlier passage. If democracy meant that "each man was eager to prosecute what he saw as his own interest" (5.78), the real implication of that becomes clear when we set Athens' activities in mainland Greece alongside her behaviour over the Ionian reovlt: the appetites of the democracy are in no sense admirable, and the Athenians are not motivated by a new love of freedom (except their own!) but rather by the ambition for power and profit. Indeed Herodotus surely intends a distasteful contrast between the enthusiasm and decisiveness with which they set about dominating their neighbours and the ignominious half-heartedness they show in helping their fellow-Ionians achieve freedom. At any rate, the present passage is surely an almost unsuperable obstacle for those who wish to see in Herodotus an out-and-out admirer of Athenian democracy - although here again we should be cautious about trying to see an explicit, full-frontal attack, and concede that whatever there is of criticism is only indirectly conveyed.

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(H) Conclusion.

On a close reading of this account of the rise of the democracy it is clear that Herodotus is throughout looking beyond the end of his own narrative to the experiences of his own lifetime. The democracy 'set up by Cleisthenes' is surely for him the same *politeia* which came to have such an influence on the rest of the Greek world in the period after the Persian Wars; for there is no indication that he wants us to remember that in historical reality the democracy was not created with a bang in 508-7 but evolved gradually over many years[127]: the constitution of Kleisthenes is ἡ δημοκρατίη (6.131.1), the democracy which the reader would know from his own day[128].

This sense of continuity is brought home by the two oracular pronouncements which frame the narrative of the Peloponnesian Congress. The Spartans are encouraged to act against the democracy by the oracles brought back from Athens by Cleomenes (5.90.2): λέγοντες πολλά τε καὶ ἀνάρσια ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖσι ἐξ Ἀθηναίων. It is not Herodotus' way, as a rule, to report oracles which will not be fulfilled, and it is clear in this instance that the reference must be to the events of the Pentekontaetia and Athens' attempts after the Persian Wars to wrest the hegemony of the Greeks from Sparta[129]. Herodotus allows the reader to infer that the Spartans were justified in anticipating that it would be the new democracy which would cause these oracles to come true. Clearer still is the effect of the prediction ascribed to Hippias at the end of the debate. Failing in his attempt to persuade the allies of Sparta to overthrow the democracy and restore his tyranny, he turns abruptly on Socles the Corinthian, whose denunciation of tyranny has just swayed the assembly (5.93.1): Ἱππίης δὲ αὐτὸν ἀμείβετο τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐπικαλέσας θεοὺς ἐκείνωι, ἦ μὲν Κορινθίους μάλιστα πάντων ἐπιποθήσειν Πεισιστρατίδας, ὅταν σφι ἥκωσι ἡμέραι αἱ κύριαι ἀνιᾶσθαι ὑπ᾽ Ἀθηναίων. Hippias knew what he was talking about, adds Herodotus, "inasmuch as he had unrivalled knowledge of the oracles" (5.93.2). This final observation shows that Herodotus means the prophecy to have come true[130], and intends the reader to recognize as much; it is a peculiar rider if the application of the oracle is uncertain. Moreover it had clearly 'come true' by the time Herodotus was writing, to the extent that the affairs of Corcyra and Potidaea, both of them clashes between Corinth and Athens, precipitated the Peloponnesian War. That Hippias is said to call on the same gods as Socles here is surely more than circumstantial realism. Socles had just called on the gods of the Greeks (5.92ē.5): ἐπιμαρτυρόμεθά τε ἐπικαλεόμενοι ὑμῖν θεοὺς τοὺς Ἑλληνίους[131] μὴ κατιστάναι τυραννίδας ἐς τὰς πόλις. And to call on the *theoi Hellenioi* is to invoke the unity of Hellas[132]: Socles is speaking in the name of the common Greek interest, the right of each state to its own freedom and independence. In calling the same gods to witness, however, Hippias counters with a more urgent appeal to the common interest of the Greeks: the course advised by Socles, that the Spartan should respect Athenian sovereignty, will in time come to endanger the whole of Greece[133]. The reference is obvious: the Athenian empire was a threat to the independence of all Greeks: Corinth will regret the loss of the Peisistratids "most of all", but that means that the rest will regret it too. In other words, we are made to see Athenian freedom (cf. Media and Persia, with Ch.II.i.B) as a threat to the freedom of others. The drama of the Congress illustrates a characteristic Herodotean dilemma: if we agree that freedom is a most desirable thing, then surely it is right to let Athens retain her independence; but if the consequences of Athenian freedom are unacceptable, as Herodotus clearly means to remind us they are, what then? Surely there is a sense in which Socles' fine words are seriously misguided?

Certainly tyranny is a great evil, though perhaps for Herodotus not quite the unmitigated evil that it is for Socles (5.92a.1): τοῦ οὔτε ἀδικώτερόν ἐστι οὐδὲν κατ' ἀνθρώπους οὔτε μιαιφονώτερον. Moreover the abhorrence of tyranny is no sound argument in itself for democracy, which Megabyxos could argue was every bit as bad (3.81.1):

> ὁμίλου γὰρ ἀχρηίου οὐδέν ἐστι ἀξυνετότερον οὐδὲ ὑβριστότερον· καίτοι τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν ἐστὶ οὐδαμῶς ἀνασχετόν.

Of course Megabyxos' denunciation of the *akolasia* of the demos is no more a guide to Herodotus' own views of democracy than is Sparta's denunciation of the *hybris* of the Athenian demos (cf. 5.91.2, above). He can indeed make Otanes speak with equal vigour in favour of democracy, in that it bears "the finest name of all, *isonomia*"[134] (cf. 3.80.6). There are a number of ways of dealing with this apparent conflict of views, although trying to decide whether Herodotus himself was a democrat or an oligarch is not the best course. In particular we have noticed that he is capable of distinguishing different forms of the same constitution, at least in the case of tyranny (cf. (A) above, on Peisistratus). Accordingly if he shows reservations about particular forms of democracy, that shows nothing about his attitude to the principle of democratic *isonomia*. Thus we may suggest that Herodotus would distinguish between an ideal form of democratic *isonomia*[135] and the form that democracy tends to take in the real world. In the same way there is an ideal form of monarchy which has the interests of the state most at heart (cf. Peisistratus' first tyranny at 1.59.6; and the monarchy of Darius' description in 3.82), while in real life this tends to take the form of tyranny, which puts the interests of the ruler above all else (cf. Ar.Pol.1310B40ff, etc.). It may be that this Aristotelian type of classification is somewhat alien to Herodotus' thinking, although it could be suggested that the constitution-debate can argue for three different constitutions with equal force because each speaker is commending the ideal form of constitution and condemning its bad transformation.

Herodotus' attitude to the Athenian democracy is complicated by his appreciation that,though itself the embodiment of political freedom, it was responsible for the enslavement of other states (cf. Ch.II.i.B.3), that the democracy was itself a tyranny. There is, moreover, a characteristic equivocation in his treatment of the freedom represented by Athenian democracy. There is a certain attractiveness in the qualities of courage, confidence and self-assurance which seem to accrue to the Athenians after the liberation: their actions have a dignity which those of men ruled by tyrants could not have. It could be argued that this picture of the democracy is the dominant impression of the narrative of the affair of Boeotia and Chalcis (cf. (E), above) up to 5.77, and indeed Herodotus is there clearly conceding something at least to Athenian propaganda. But those same qualities have their darker sides, arrogance, presumption and aggressiveness, which Herodotus allows the Spartans to denounce without thereafter reminding us how the Athenian had earlier looked. Herodotus has left enough hints in this passage that the Athens which we now see liberated from tyranny is itself soon to become a tyrannos - and he offers no signs that he approves of that transformation.

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Freedom, Part iii: The Liberation of Greece.

(A) Introduction.

1. In the period between Artemisium and Salamis (8.27.1) Herodotus describes an embassy of the Thessalians to the Phocians, the former now enthusiastic medizers, the latter as yet still loyal to Greece. The motive of the Thessalians, says Herodotus, is a hostile one: ἅτε σφι ἐνέχοντες αἰεὶ χόλον, ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ ὑστάτου τρώματος καὶ τὸ κάρτα . This latest defeat is then forcefully described: the Thessalians had invaded Phocis with their whole army but had suffered a severe setback (ἑσσώθησαν ... καὶ περιέφθησαν τρηχέως ... ἐλυμήναντο ἀνηκέστως). The details of this grim internecine struggle are here set out at length (8.27.2-29.1). Herodotus then records the speech of the Thessalian envoys to Phocis in oratio recta (29.1f):

> Ὦ Φωκέες, ἤδη τι μᾶλλον γνωσιμαχέετε μὴ εἶναι ὅμοιοι ἡμῖν. πρόσθε τε γὰρ ἐν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, ὅσον χρόνον ἐκεῖνα ἡμῖν ἥνδανε, πλέον αἰεί κοτε ὑμέων ἐφερόμεθα, νῦν τε παρὰ τῶι βαρβάρωι τοσοῦτον δυνάμεθα ὥστε ἐπ’ ἡμῖν ἐστι τῆς γῆς ἐστερῆσθαι καὶ πρὸς ἠνδραποδίσασθαι ὑμέας;
> ἡμεῖς μέντοι τὸ πᾶν ἔχοντες οὐ μνησικακέομεν ...

What the Thessalians require in return for this 'kindness' is a gift from the Phocians of 50 talents, for which they will undertake to divert the Medes from Phocis. The Phocians, explains Herodotus, were alone of the peoples in this part of Greece not to medize (30.1f):

> κατ’ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν, ὡς ἐγὼ συμβαλλόμενος εὑρίσκω, κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἔχθος τῶν Θεσσαλῶν. εἰ δὲ Θεσσαλοὶ τὰ Ἑλλήνων ηὖξον, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν, ἐμήδιζον ἂν οἱ Φωκέες.

And the Phocians refuse to hand over any money:

> παρέχειν τέ σφι Θεσσαλοῖσι ὁμοίως μηδίζειν, εἰ ἄλλως βουλοίατο;
> ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔσεσθαι ἑκόντες εἶναι προδόται τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

At this self-righteous reply the Thessalians in anger lead the barbarian into Phocis (31 and 32. 2), so that the land is quite overrun, "for that was how the Thessalians led the army. Wherever they occupied, everything was put to fire and the sword, and they burnt both the cities and the shrines ... and some women were raped so many times that they died". Herodotus' fullness of detail leaves the reader in no doubt as to the ruthlessness, barbarity and horror of the Thessalians' revenge on their neighbours and fellow-Greeks.

Certainly it is necessary to the story of Xerxes' expedition to know that Phocis was overrun because of the Thessalians' hostility towards their neighbours, and the pre-history of their enmity is a helpful supplement[1]. But what an extraordinary parable Herodotus has made of this episode! Not only does he embellish the narrative with two highly charged speeches, but he also does a quite rare thing for him in contributing his own commentary on the episode. We have suggested earlier that Herodotus' judgements are in principle unlikely to be supplied him by his sources, and that where he intrudes them he is breaking a general rule of 'objectivity', presumably borrowed from the narrative style of epic which has no need for such devices. Indeed Herodotus is quite explicit in claiming the malicious interpretation for his own here, which indicates that the rule applies here too[2]. So what does he want us to understand from this episode?

Thessaly and Phocis are each jealous of the other's position (see 7.237.2, below) to the point of fanatical and obsessive hatred. Phocis' loyalty to the Greek cause, according to Herodotus' malicious interpretation, is motivated by nothing more than the perverse desire to do the opposite of her rival. When they speak of their unwillingness to betray the Greeks (ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔσεσθαι ἐκόντες εἶναι προδόται τῆς Ἑλλάδος), Herodotus has made sure that we know their fine words reflect nothing more noble than the desire to score points off the Thessalians. It is simply a sham idealism. The Thessalians, needless to say, with their hope of turning their medism (cf. 7.172.1ff) to private profit, and then their atrocities against the Phocians, come off even worse.

In the midst of an account of the liberation of Greece from Persian servitude[3] this story of Greek rivalry and the cynical motives of the loyalist state is not a little disturbing[4]. Not merely the inclusion of the episode, but its considerable length and elaboration, show clearly that Herodotus' narrative of the liberation is far from simply panegyric in intent. The loyalists may say they are fighting for the common interest of Hellas - but how often can we believe them? The simple fact of 'loyalty' to the Greek cause, Herodotus seems to imply, can disguise motives not remotely admirable: we should not be deceived by the glamorous sound of the word 'freedom' into thinking that its adherents will inevitably be spotless heroes. The analysis of freedom in Herodotus thus far has shown that we should not be surprised at this unsettling equivocation. The message of this episode is that the Greeks not only do not forget their mutual enmities in the face of the Persian invasion, but can even use the occasion to further those enmities and inflict as much harm as they know how on their fellow-Greeks. Perhaps the most prominent theme of the narrative of the liberation (after, if not actually alongside, the theme of Greek heroism!) is that of the rivalry between Greek and Greek. No doubt the antagonism of Thessaly and Phocis is an extreme example of this - though Herodotus has certainly made it seem as extreme as possible by the use of speeches and commentary; but, as we shall see, Herodotus misses few opportunities to illustrate the theme, even in dealing with the most heroic defenders of Greek liberty, the Spartans and the Athenians. Whatever evidence offers itself of Greek rivalry and disunity before, during or even after the invasion of Xerxes, Herodotus does his best to bring to the fore.

2. The reason for this jaundiced harping on a theme that runs so counter to the spirit of the liberation, is not far to seek. Herodotus was planning and writing his work at a time when the rivalries endemic to the Greek nation of city-states had blown up into the most suicidal confrontation that the Greeks had yet seen. Moreover some observers clearly felt that it was the very outcome of the heroic fight against Persia which had laid the foundations for that confrontation. The Athenians proudly defended their empire with the tale of their services to Greece in that earlier time, and themselves admitted, what their critics reflected most ruefully, that their inheritance of the hegemony after Mykale and their energetic campaigns of revenge on the Mede had put them in the position of power they now enjoyed (see below). With thoughts like these in the air, a man of Herodotus' thoughtful disposition could not have approached the subject of the Persian Wars with impartial equanimity, concerned merely to catalogue the heroic achievements of the defenders of Greek liberty, as it had much earlier been possible for Simonides and even Aeschylus to do. His perspective makes such a proceeding hardly credible: he is simply too far removed in time for such an uncomplicated attitude[5]. The Persian Wars and their consequences had become such powerful weapons of rhetoric and propaganda that scarcely any writer of the time, of whatever persuasion, could have resisted the desire to draw from those events some lesson either of justification or of censure; and there is no reason to suppose that Herodotus was any different.

Fornara has well shown that the traditional view of the matter, as argued most influentially by Jacoby, that the narrative of the Persian Wars is Herodotus' apology for Athens, the democracy and the empire, is most unsatisfactory. He suggests instead, as Focke and Strasburger had earlier agreed, that the narrative embodies a subtle and elusive criticism of Athens, and indeed of the Greeks as a whole, a criticism which took account of the divisions and enmities of that earlier period which had such disastrous consequences in the intervening years. Fornara does not, as we shall be doing, consider the part that Herodotus' habitual taste for paradox and equivocation has to play in all this[6], nor does he illustrate the way in which Herodotus is here bringing to a climax the theme of freedom which has played such an important part in the rest of the work. The importance of this theme in the last three books is, however, well discussed by von Fritz both in his article "Die gr.Eleutheria bei Herodot"[7] and less happily in his "Griechische Geschichtsschreibung". However his ideas about the development of Herodotus' thought and method and the various stages of this which he supposes have left their mark on the book we have, prevent him from seeing that the theme of freedom unites this climax of the work with all that has gone before. Furthermore I cannot wholly agree with von Fritz about how Herodotus actually came to treat the story of the liberation as he did. He rightly observes that the narrative is full of stories illustrating the limitations of Greek freedom, but he concludes that the character of Herodotus' account is simply a reflexion of the character of his material and the stories he was told (cf. art.cit.p.24):

> "ein Produkt kollektiver Selbsterkenntnis in dem Sinne, dass die Griechen nicht direkt, sondern vermittelst der Geschichten, welche sie von einander erzählten, sich ihre Schwächen gegenseitig vor Augen führten und dann in Gegengeschichten wiederum ihre eigenen Vorzüge herausstellten und den vermeintlichen oder wirklichen Schwächen gegenüberstellten".

Herodotus' part in all this is confined to gathering, selecting and imaginative arrangement: his theme, in other words, is entirely made for him by the character of his source-material.

There is certainly a prima facie case for supposing that the memory of the Persian Wars in the later 6thc was indeed in some circumstances coloured by the efforts at mutual recrimination and self-justification of the participants. Thucydides reminds us of what could be done. There is, for example, the defence of the Thebans against the charge of treachery levelled at them by the Plataeans (3.62.1ff):

ἐπειδὴ δὲ καὶ ὁ βάρβαρος ἦλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, φασὶ μόνοι
Βοιωτῶν οὐ μηδίσαι, καὶ τούτωι μάλιστα αὐτοί τε ἀγάλλονται, καὶ
ἡμᾶς λοιδοροῦσιν ... δῆλόν τε ἐποιήσατε οὐδὲ τότε τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἕνεκα
μόνοι οὐ μηδίσαντες, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐδ' Ἀθηναῖοι, ὑμεῖς δὲ τοῖς μὲν
ταὐτὰ βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν, τοῖς δὲ τάναντία[8].

The propaganda of the Persian Wars is, moreover, particularly prominent in discussions of Athens' position (see esp. 1.72ff, with 1.86.1, discussed below), as when Athenian speakers refer to the subject as a stock justification of the empire, with which they will not tax their audiences (cf. 5.89, from the Melian dialogue): ἡμεῖς τοίνυν οὔτε αὐτοὶ μετ' ὀνομάτων καλῶν ὡς ἢ δικαίως τὸν Μῆδον καταλύσαντες ἄρχομεν ἢ ἀδικούμενοι νῦν ἐπεξερχόμεθα; also 6.83.2 (Euphemos at Camarina): καὶ οὐ καλλιεπούμεθα ὡς ἢ τὸν βάρβαρον μόνοι καθελόντες εἰκότως ἄρχομεν ἢ ἐπ' ἐλευθερίαι τῆι τῶνδε μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ξυμπάντων τε καὶ τῆι ἡμετέραι αὐτῶν κινδυνεύσαντες. Such passages indeed suggest that we might know more of the propaganda of the Persian Wars in the debates of the period, if we did not have to rely so much on the wayward and eclectic reporting of Thucydides[9].

Herodotus, however, is drawing on a much wider range of memories than those so contentiously evoked in the jaundiced political rhetoric of his day; though, as we shall see, he sometimes chooses to recall the uses to which the Persian Wars were put in contemporary debate. There is indeed some reason to suppose that the dominant popular memory of the Persian Wars was of a glorious struggle of national unity, in which the Greeks rivalled one another only to see who could do the most good for Hellas (cf. Hdt 8.79.3, below; with Isocr.Paneg.85, περὶ μὲν τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας ὁμονοοῦντες, ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτης αἴτιοι γενήσονται, περὶ τούτου ποιεύμενοι τὴν ἅμιλλαν). It is worth, for instance, remembering the phrases that ring through the epigrams of the Persian Wars (see Page, Epigr.Gr. Simonides, no.s V-XXIV; and now Further Greek Epigrams, for full commentary). There it is the proud claim of each state that its sacrifice was undertaken 'on behalf of Hellas' (e.g.):

VIII.3f: Ἑλλάδι γὰρ σπεύδοντες ἐλευθερίην περιθεῖναι
κείμεθ᾽ ἀγηράντωι χρώμενοι εὐλογίηι.
XI.3f: ἐνθάδε Φοινίσσας νᾶας καὶ Πέρσας ἑλόντες
καὶ Μήδους ἱαρὰν Ἑλλάδα ῥυσάμεθα
(cf. Meiggs/Lewis no.24).
XVI.1f: Ἑλλάδι καὶ Μεγαρεῦσιν ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ ἀέξειν
ἱέμενοι θανάτου μοῖραν ἐδεξάμεθα.
XX(a).4: Ἑλλάδα μὴ πᾶσαν δούλιον ἦμαρ ἰδεῖν
(cf. Meiggs/Lewis no. 26).
XXI.1: Ἑλλήνων προμαχοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι Μαραθῶνι ...
XXIII.1: ... φθιμένους ὑπὲρ Ἑλλάδος ...

Aeschylus' version of the exhortatory shout of the Greeks at Salamis in the Persae has an even more pronounced appeal to national unity (402ff):

... ὦ παῖδες Ἑλλήνων, ἴτε
ἐλευθεροῦτε πατρίδ᾽, ἐλευθεροῦτε δὲ
παῖδας γυναῖκας θεῶν τε πατρώιων ἕδη
θήκας τε προγόνων· νῦν ὑπὲρ πάντων ἀγών.

The shrines of the ancestral gods and the graves of the ancestors are meant as a reminder that all the Greeks are fighting together as one people, united by common interests, common religion, history and culture[10]. In Aristophanes, besides the numerous references to Athens' unique achievement at Marathon[11], there are two revealing passages in the Lysistrata, which clearly appeal to the idea of Greek unity in and through the Persian Wars. The chorus of Spartan men celebrates the achievement of peace in the play and the union of Sparta and Athens by appeal to the old story (1247ff):

ὅρμαον
τὼς κυρσανίως ὦ Μναμοῦνα
τάν τ᾽ ἐμὰν Μῶαν, ἅτις
οἶδεν ἁμὲ τώς τ᾽ Ἀσαναίως,
ὅκα τοὶ μὲν ἐπ᾽ Ἀρταμιτίοι
πρώκροον σιοείκελοι
ποττὰ κᾶλα τὼς Μήδως τ᾽ ἐνίκων,
ἁμὲ δ᾽ αὖ Λεωνίδας
ἆγεν ἇιπερ τὼς κάπρως
θάγοντας οἰῶ τὸν ὀδόντα ...

The memory is appropriate because it represents a glorious common achievement: the community of purpose shown then, it is hoped, will now be revived, so that Spartans and Athenians may again live and work together at unity with one another as in those golden days. The same sentiment is surely expressed in a slightly different form earlier by Lysistrata, the reference being rather to war with Persia than to the Persian Wars themselves (1128ff):

λαβοῦσα δ᾽ ὑμᾶς λοιδορῆσαι βούλομαι
κοινῆι δικαίως, οἳ μιᾶς ἐκ χέρνιβος

βωμοὺς περιρραίνοντες ὥσπερ ξυγγενεῖς
'Ολυμπίασιν, ἐν Πύλαις, Πυθῶι, πόσους
εἴποιμ' ἂν ἄλλους, εἴ με μηκύνειν δέοι,
ἐχθρῶν παρόντων βαρβάρωι στρατεύματι
Ἕλληνας ἄνδρας καὶ πόλεις ἀπόλλυτε.

Lysistrata stresses the shaming contrast between the battles Sparta and Athens are now fighting against fellow-Greeks and the battles they might yet fight, united, as they once were, against the common enemy, Persia[12]. The implication here, as in the previous passage, is that the war with Persia was a triumph of the spirit of national unity, which all honest Greeks would wish might be retrieved today. The message is the same as that of, say, Isocrates' Panegyricus, only without the carping at Sparta's contribution which occasionally infiltrates 4thc Athenian rhetoric in its recreation of the Persian Wars.

We need not, however, rely solely on literary evidence. We may remember the dedications of the Greeks after the Wars (cf. Page, Simonides XV):

τόνδε ποθ' Ἕλληνες Νίκης κράτει, ἔργωι Ἄρηος,
...
Πέρσας ἐξελάσαντες ἐλευθέραι Ἑλλάδι κοινὸν
ἱδρύσαντο Διὸς βωμὸν Ἐλευθερίου,

and in particular the famous Serpent-Column at Delphi, with its proud record of the names of all those who had fought in the war[13]. We should remember too, if it is historical, Pericles' so-called 'Congress Decree' (Plut.Per.17)[14], in which the Greeks are called together to join in a programme of national unity, to discuss the problem of the Greek temples which the barbarians had burnt, the sacrifices which they still owed on behalf of Greece in fulfilment of the vows made to the gods when they fought the barbarians, and the sea, that all should sail in security and maintain the peace. perhaps the authenticity of the decree is too doubtful, but if we are to trust it, then we need not be too cynical about its interpretation: if it was to make any political sense and was not merely an empty gesture, its appeal to the Hellenic unity established in the war with Persia cannot have sounded impossibly anachronistic, even after peace had been concluded with the barbarian. The decree envisages that the Greeks are to pledge their unity in the same terms that they had used during the war[15], though presumably this time acknowledging the hegemony of Athens rather than Sparta[16].

In short the evidence could be taken to point to the existence of a myth of national unity in the war with Persia, which even the cynical politics of the later 5thc did not wholly eradicate[17]. Naturally generalization is foolhardy, but it seems reasonable to suggest that the popular memory of the Persian Wars in the late 5thc was still predominantly positive rather than negative. Indeed a view diametrically opposed to that of von Fritz is advanced by Murray (1980), whom it may be useful to quote, as much as a warning against over-simplification as a corrective to the opposite extreme (p.268):

> "The subject in Greek eyes was the most important event of their past, the vindication of the freedom of the city-state against oreintal despotism. Oral tradition preserved an account typical for successful war: it rightly glorified the protagonists, and emphasized the great odds against which they had fought; it presented a unified picture of an event which symbolized Greek unity; although Athenian, Spartan and Corinthian stories have their different slants, they do not seem to have contradicted each other, and there is no sign that Herodotus was forced to distort their versions in order to create a coherent account. Indeed there was every reason to remember the great event, for the participation of individual states in it became the basis of inter-Greek diplomacy for the next two centuries; constant reiteration might improve a city's record, but in the competitive world of Greek politics it could not seriously distort it: the factual record is in its essentials accurate" (my underlining).

Clearly the truth shares both these aspects, as we shall see in what follows[18].

Herodotus' account of the liberation of Greece is then a complex mixture, equivocal and ambivalent, consciously selecting from the recriminations and self-glorifications of the Greeks, and ungenerous towards Greek heroism, idealism and love of liberty. There are to be sure glorious events and heroes, the Athenians at Marathon, the Spartans at Thermopylae - but Herodotus is as much interested in the psychology of the medizers as of the loyalists, as much in what led up to and followed the moments of heroism as in the moments themselves, and he is much concerned to qualify both his praise (cf. e.g. 7.139, below) and his blame (cf. e.g. 7.152, below). This is not to say that he is concerned merely to be even-handed; indeed the example of Thessaly and Phocis which we considered at the start shows him to be quite capable of the most malicious inferences even about the Greek loyalists. Rather he is interested in pointing up as sharply as possible the ironies and paradoxes that surround the story of the liberation, in bringing home the moral uncertainties that underlie the contemporary Greeks' arguments about their own and each other's actions in that drama.

*

(B) The Ionian Revolt.

Herodotus' narrative of the Persian Wars has often been thought to be something of a separate entity, largely detachable from the rest of the work[19]. But this view misses much of importance, not least since the theme of freedom, here brought to a climax, has been prepared at length in the rest of the work, but also because there is clear prefiguring of the narrative in two major episodes of the previous books, namely Darius' Scythian expedition[20] and the Ionian Revolt. The Scythians share with the mainland Greeks the distinction of being the only major people (with the exception of the Massagetai, who are smaller meat) successfully to resist Persian enslavement, and the parallelism of the two 'liberations' is clearly brought out by Herodotus, through the construction of parallel episodes and motifs (cf. n.71 and 169 below). We will concentrate here on the Ionian Revolt, which raises problems of interpretation similar to those we shall encounter in the narrative of the liberation itself[21].

It is widely argued that Herodotus shows no signs of approving of the Ionian Revolt, that the entire account is essentially negative and unflattering. In particular it is claimed that he has been influenced by sources concerned to devalue the revolt as far as possible, for example, the Athenians, who supposedly wanted to excuse their own part in the proceedings and to argue that the Ionians were constitutionally weak and needed the protection of their empire, or the Samians, who for the most part betrayed the Ionian cause at Lade (see below) and wanted an excuse for their own treachery. I would suggest rather that Herodotus' account is equivocal, appreciating that it was at least potentially admirable for the Ionians to have tried to liberate themselves from Persia, but insisting that the weaknesses and vices of the individual participants led rather to a shameful exhibition of cowardice, self-interest, treachery, and above all disunity. I would also suggest that this interpretation reflects an attempt to fit the narrative of the revolt into the jig-saw of the work as a whole, and the narrative of Greek affairs in particular, thereby, of course, anticipating certain themes of the liberation of Greece itself: it is thus an interpretation arrived at in despite of the sources not imposed by them.

The self-interested motives of the instigators of the revolt, Aristagoras and Histiaios, do not need much illustration. Histiaios is for Herodotus so little a champion of Ionian freedom that he appears first of all among the Ionian tyrants at the Danube bridge arguing against accepting the Scythian invitation to liberate Ionia from Darius (4.137.2): "We tyrants owe our positions to Darius and his power; if it is destroyed, none of us will be able to retain his throne". It is by a calculated irony that Herodotus shows his decision to stir up the revolt to be motivated by the same self-interest (5.35.4): detained by Darius at Susa, he had high hopes of being sent home if a revolt were started: μὴ δὲ νεώτερόν τι ποιεύσης τῆς Ἑλλάδος οὐδαμὰ ἐς αὐτὴν ἥξειν ἔτι ἐλογίζετο. In Aristagoras' case it is the failure of the Naxian campaign, in which he has seen it as his interest to interfere on behalf of the Naxian exiles and to secure the assistance of Persia (5.30.3, ὁ δὲ ἐπιλεξάμενος ὡς, ἢν δι' αὐτοῦ κατέλθωσι ἐς τὴν πόλιν, ἄρξει τῆς Νάξου)[22], which determines him to end his agreement with Artaphrenes and start the revolt (5.35.1f): he was finding it hard to fulfil his promise to Artaphrenes and resented the expenditure to which he was committed over the expedition, and, having fallen out with Megabates, feared he might lose his position in Miletus; ἀρρωδέων τε τούτων ἕκαστα ἐβουλεύετο ἀπόστασιν. Hence the man whom Artaphrenes had warmly praised as a benefactor to the Persian king (5.31.4, σὺ ἐς οἶκον τὸν βασιλέος ἐσηγητὴς γυνέαι πρηγμάτων ἀγαθῶν), changes his mind completely and becomes a traitor to Persia. Herodotus observes the same irony in both his and Histiaios' positions: both are loyal to the Persian king and disloyal out of the same motive of self-interest. Moreover just as there is no virtue in their service to the Mede (Darius is pathetically mistaken at 6.30.1f; cf. Xerxes at 7.52.1), so there is nothing to admire in their decision to liberate Ionia. It is not hard to see the similarity with Herodotus' treatment of the Thessalians and Phocians, discussed above (cf. (A).1): in both cases, though more transparently so here, the choice for 'freedom' is made for entirely the wrong reasons.

However, that Herodotus at least potentially sees the revolt as an admirable expression of the will to freedom is suggested by his use of speeches, speeches which speak in lofty terms of the desirability of freedom, but are nevertheless undercut by the narrative which shows either that the speaker himself does not mean what he says or that the participants are unable to live up to the role for which they are cast. One such speech is that of Aristagoras to Cleomenes at Sparta, which opens with an impressive and emotive appeal to the twin causes of freedom and Hellenic brotherhood (5.49.2f):

> 'Ιώνων παῖδας δούλους εἶναι ἀντ' ἐλευθέρων ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον μὲν

> αὐτοῖσι ἡμῖν, ἔτι δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν ὑμῖν, ὅσωι προέστατε τῆς Ἑλλάδος·
> νῦν ὦν πρὸς θεῶν τῶν Ἑλληνίων ῥύσασθε Ἴωνας ἐκ δουλοσύνης.

But we know already that Aristagoras is not himself committed to those ideals but is acting merely in his own interests (above). Another such speech is that of Dionysios of Phocaea to the assembly of the Ionians before Lade, which appeals, with a grand Homeric echo (cf. Hom. Il.10.173f), to the Ionians to make themselves equal to this test of their freedom (6.11.2): ἐπὶ ξυροῦ γὰρ ἀκμῆς ἔχεται ἡμῖν τὰ πρήγματα ... ἢ εἶναι ἐλευθέροισι ἢ δούλοισι. The speech encourages the Ionians to undertake naval training, which they do - only to abandon their efforts after a week, finding themselves unused to such hard work in the heat of the sun. Dionysios' speech is balanced by the grumblings of the Ionians here (6.12.3): πρό τε τούτων τῶν κακῶν ἡμῖν γε κρέσσον καὶ ὅ τι ὦν ἄλλο παθεῖν ἐστι, ... μᾶλλον ἢ τῆι παρεούσηι συνέχεσθαι. The irony of this reversal is clear; these are the Ionians to whom, according to Aristagoras, it was an ὄνειδος καὶ ἄλγος μέγιστον to be slaves rather than free! Herodotus has contrived to illustrate the inconstancy of the Ionians' devotion to freedom as vividly as possible[23].

The speeches of Aristagoras and Dionysios both in their way suggest that, for all the cynicism of its initiators, we are to see the revolt as something potentially admirable. Both, of course, also show, given the narrative context, that the Ionians as a whole fall short of what is expected of them; but even so Herodotus' point is not simply that all the Ionians are equally inadequate and unheroic. Rather though the enterprise taken as a whole appears to be flawed both through the self-interest of the individuals and the failure of the Ionians' corporate commitment to the cause, there are nonetheless individual acts of heroism which can be admired for themselves, futile as they appear in the wider context.

This ambivalence is most clear in the narrative of Lade itself, prepared somewhat ingloriously in the episode described above, a narrative which brings us up against the question of Herodotus' sources and his reactions to them. He goes out of his way to mention that the participants' mutual recriminations make it impossible to form a clear impression of who fought bravely and who did not (6.14.1, τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως συγγράψαι οἵ τινες τῶν Ἰώνων ἐγένοντο ἄνδρες κακοὶ ἢ ἀγαθοὶ ἐν τῆι ναυμαχίηι ταύτηι· ἀλλήλους γὰρ καταιτιῶνται). The claim serves to illustrate a theme of the revolt in particular and of Herodotus' account of Greek affairs in general, both in Ionia and elsewhere: it is important here not as an indication of the difficulties he experienced in ascertaining the truth of what happened in the battle, but rather as an indication of the weakness of Greek relations, then as now. The mutual recriminations of his 'Ionian sources' are presented to us as a mirror of the divisions which helped the revolt itself to fail. His account indeed does not at all suggest that he was really unable to decide who were the heroes and who the traitors, as we shall now see.

The Samians come out as the representatives of those disloyal to the Greek cause, and the Chians of those who fought heroically despite impossible odds and the treachery of their comrades-in-arms, Herodotus has already told us that the Samians were ready to respond to the overtures which the other Ionians had disregarded (6.10): ἀγνωμοσύνηι τε διεχρέωντο καὶ οὐ προσίεντο τὴν προδοσίην, ἑωυτοῖσί τε ἕκαστοισι ἐδόκεον μούνοισι ταῦτα τοὺς Πέρσας ἐξαγγέλλεσθαι [24]. These overtures of Aiakes and the Persians (6.9.2f) the Samian generals take it upon themselves to accept (6.13.1f)

> ὁρῶντες ἅμα μὲν ἐοῦσαν ἀταξίην πολλὴν ἐκ τῶν Ἰώνων ... ἐδέκοντο τοὺς
> λόγους, ἅμα δὲ κατεφαίνετό σφι εἶναι ἀδύνατα τὰ βασιλέος πρήγματα
> ὑπερβαλέσθαι[25], ευ γε επισταμενοι[26] ὡς εἰ καὶ τὸ παρεὸν ναυτικὸν
> ὑπερβαλοίατο, ἄλλο σφι παρέσται πενταπλήσιον. προφάσιος ὦν
> ἐπιλαβόμενοι, ἐπείτε τάχιστα εἶδον τοὺς Ἴωνας ἀρνευμένους εἶναι
> χρηστούς, ἐν κέρδεϊ ἐποιεῦντο περιποιῆσαι τά τε ἱρὰ τὰ σφέτερα
> καὶ τὰ ἴδια.

It is worth looking at this passage closely since it is widely believed that a Samian source has coloured Herodotus' whole narrative of the battle of Lade, and even his entire account of the Ionian revolt, from which source it is thought to draw its unsympathetic character[27]. Yet an elementary consideration tells against this view: that Herodotus can say (whether or not he really means it!) that a reliable account was hard to produce, since all the Ionians indulge in recriminations against one another, clearly ought to show at the very least that he is alert to the problem of prejudice and, moreover, that he has cross-checked his account in using more than one source. That he should then have been happy to derive his account of the battle more or less exclusively from Samian sources, and those Samians whose one contribution to the battle was the treacherous betrayal of their fellow-Greeks, is hardly credible. Moreover the Samian traitors get an almost uniformly bad press. Certainly in the passage quoted above Herodotus gives a sympathetic (or rather empathetic) account of their motives for treachery, but this is certainly not meant as an apology for their actions. He goes out of his way to state that their military reasoning, the ataxia of the Ionians and the overwhelming superiority of the Persians, was no more than an excuse (προφάσιος), implying that their real reason was one of profit to themselves (kerdos), the preservation of their own shrines and property[28].

The true balance of Herodotus' narrative of Samian treachery is revealed in his treatment of the battle itself. The first action he records after the disclaimer is the withdrawal of the Samians (6.14.2): λέγονται δὲ Σάμιοι ἐνθαῦτα κατὰ τὰ συγκείμενα πρὸς τὸν Αἰάκεα ἀειράμενοι τὰ ἱστία ἀποπλῶσαι ἐκ τῆς τάξιος ἐς τὴν Σάμον, πλὴν ἕνδεκα νεῶν. The word legontai does not in any sense indicate a reluctance on Herodotus' part to credit this malicicous account of the Samian treachery, as emerges from what follows[29]. The eleven trierarchs who remain behind, do so in disobedience to their commanders (ἀνηκουστήσαντες), and Herodotus knows them to have been honoured in Samos for their loyalty (6.14.3): καί σφι τὸ κοινὸν τὸ Σαμίων ἔδωκε διὰ τοῦτο τὸ πρῆγμα ἐν στήλῃ ἀπογραφῆναι πατρόθεν ὡς ἀνδράσι ἀγαθοῖσι γενομένοισι, καὶ ἔστι αὕτη ἡ στήλη ἐν τῇ ἀγορῇ (i.e. for all to see: there can be no doubt, Herodotus implies, that the story of their disobedient loyalty and the others' treachery is the true one). The story as Herodotus tells it throws an invidious light on the treachery of those Samians who saw their best interests to lie in the betrayal of their fellows. Herodotus' attitude to this Greek fight of liberation is equivocal: even though the 'loyal' Samians were fighting for a lost cause, and the traitors' abandonment of that cause was occasioned by reasons of sound strategic sense, there is no getting away from admiration for the heroism of the former, disobedient in their loyalty and loyal despite their appreciation of the unequal odds.

That this is the right way of looking at the narrative of Lade is confirmed still further by Herodotus' treatment of the Chians. The rest of the Ionians, starting with the Lesbians, having seen the flight of the Samian traitors, take to their heels (6.14.3). But there remain others loyal to the last (6.15.1f):

> τῶν δὲ παραμεινάντων ἐν τῇ ναυμαχίῃ περιέφθησαν τρηχύτατα Χῖοι ὡς ἀποδεικνύμενοί τε ἔργα λαμπρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἐθελοκακέοντες ... ὁρέοντες δὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν συμμάχων προδιδόντας οὐκ ἐδικαίευν γενέσθαι τοῖσι κακοῖσι αὐτῶν ὅμοιοι, ἀλλὰ μετ' ὀλίγων συμμάχων μεμουνωμένοι διεκπλέοντες ἐναυμάχεον.

It is important to notice Herodotus' admiration for this action of the Chians, and in particular the form of words he chooses to express it: "they did not think fit to do as the traitors did ... but left to fight on their own ... ". The action anticipates what happens to the most loyal of the Greeks in the Persian Wars later, in particular the Spartans at Thermophylae (7.220.1f), and even more what Herodotus anticipates they might have done had the Athenians not remained loyal to Greece (7.139.3): μουνωθέντες δὲ ἂν καὶ ἀποδεξάμενοι ἔργα μεγάλα ἀπέθανον γενναίως (but cf. (E).2, below). Herodotus' admiration for Chian heroism here is unmistakable, whatever he may think of the Ionian revolt as a whole.

Finally, we should look at Herodotus' description of the provisions of Artaphrenes for Ionia after the revolt (6.42.1f): ἀλλὰ τάδε μὲν χρήσιμα κάρτα τοῖσι Ἴωσι ἐγένετο ... συνθήκας σφίσι αὐτοῖσι τοὺς Ἴωνας ἠνάγκασε ποιέεσθαι, ἵνα δωσίδικοι εἶεν καὶ μὴ ἀλλήλους φέροιέν τε καὶ ἄγοιεν (cf. 43.1, καί σφι ταῦτα μὲν εἰρηναῖα ἦν). The irony of this formulation is palpable: the Persian regulations, the provisions of the conquering empire, were helpful to the Ionians and contrived to bring peace to them. If it took a strong Persian hand to legislate for common justice among the Ionians, their earlier dealings, certainly during the years of the revolt and probably also before, must have been marked by an absence of common agreements, by mutual hostility and injustice. It is possible to see in this something of a retrospective comment on the revolt itself and the reasons for its failure, the inability of the Ionians effectively to make common cause (cf. also 1.170), their mutual suspicions (cf. e.g. 6.13.1, above), their treachery towards one another (cf. esp. Histiaios and the Lesbians at Chios: 6.27.3).

The reader of Herodotus' narrative of the revolt may well be left with the impression that the weaknesses and vices of the Ionians are specific to them, and that this episode will be a foil to the glorious climax of the liberation of Greece; and no doubt Herodotus intends such a reaction. But the differences between the two account are less obvious than the similarities. Herodotus takes a cynical view of the Ionian revolt as a fight for freedom, which is not to deny that he treats it as potentially, and in some few cases actually, something deserving our admiration. There is an uneasy (and perhaps uneven) balance between the squalid motives which brought it about and the shameful behaviour of many of the participants on the one hand, and on the other the admirable and heroic qualities which it evoked in some few others. The balance is not entirely the same as that which Herodotus aims at in the narrative of the liberation of Greece - and clearly there was more to be cynical about in the unsuccessful revolt than in the successful liberation - but both narratives have in common that the Ionians' and Greeks' love of freedom emerges far less straightforwardly than does the universal Greek failing of mutual distrust, recrimination, and hostility, as well as no small amount of self-seeking by individuals and groups; in both cases there are clear acts of heroism and self-sacrifice by individuals and groups, but these are set against a picture of the Ionian and Greek actions as a whole which emphasizes the inability of the cities to make common cause, their disunity and inconstancy. It seems to me that we should hesitate before ascribing the negative colour of Herodotus' account of the revolt simply to a dependence on sources interested to belittle and condemn the enterprise: no doubt such sources did play some part in shaping Herodotus' view of those events, but the major influence on his account is likely to have been his own interpretative imagination, working through inferences as to motive, through speeches, through emphasis and irony. These are points to bear in mind as we turn next to a consideration of the narrative of the Persian Wars themselves.

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(C) Marathon.

1. The first we hear of the threat to mainland Greece, after the disastrous expedition of Mardonius (6.43ff), is Darius' embassy demanding earth and water (6.49.1f): "many of the mainlanders responded as the Persian demanded, and all the islanders gave earth and water to Darius, including the Aeginetans". Any expectation that the resistance and will to freedom of the mainland Greeks would be substantially different to that of their Ionian compatriots is abruptly deflated here. The Aeginetans' medism moreover illustrates a familiar theme: ποιήσασι δέ σφι ταῦτα ἰθέως 'Αθηναίοι ἐπεκέατο, δοκέοντές τε ἐπὶ σφίσι ἔχοντας τοὺς Αἰγινήτας δεδωκέναι, ὡς ἅμα τῶι Πέρσηι ἐπὶ σφέας στρατεύωνται, καὶ ἄσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο ... The Athenians denouce the Aeginetans to Sparta, and there follows the long narrative of Cleomenes' intervention, Leotychidas' attempted

retrieval of the hostages, and the resumption of hostilities between Athens and Aegina (cf. Ch.I.ii.2 and Ch.II.ii.F). The emphasis is unmistakable: Herodotus pursues at such length the theme of Aeginetan-Athenian rivalry less because it is essential to his narrative of the Persian invasion, than for the light it throws on the background of Greek relations. The Athenians believe that the medism of the Aeginetans is directed against themselves, not, for example, that it is merely a response to obviously unfavourable odds; and what Herodotus in fact tells us about the behaviour of Aegina towards Athens confirms that they have grounds for their suspicions. But he adds that the Athenians eagerly seized upon their medism as an excuse (ἅσμενοι προφάσιος ἐπελάβοντο): in other words they too saw this as an opportunity to do some harm to their bitter enemy. Again Herodotus stresses the fanatical suspicions and base hatreds of these two neighbours, and shows that in a context where the interests of all Greece are at stake, they seem to be thinking only of their private quarrels. The example has an obvious resemblance to the Thessaly-Phocis quarrel discussed above, and undoubtedly Herodotus has written up this passage with the same cynical intent. In a sense Athens' denunciation of the Aeginetans is a service to Greece, if we are to infer from Herodotus' remarkable statement later that Cleomenes' first action against Aegina was in the interests of all the Greeks (6.61.1, cf. Ch.I.ii.2); but Herodotus has made it quite clear that the Athenians are not motivated here by ideals of national unity or by their love of freedom, but by something entirely less admirable.

In describing the earthquake which followed Datis' departure from Delos and the beginning of the first attempt on mainland Greece after the disastrous expedition of Mardonios (6.43ff), Herodotus indulges in a remarkable reflection, and the major events of his lifetime are brought into clear focus for the first and only time in the work (6.98.2):

> ἐπὶ γὰρ Δαρείου ... καὶ Ξέρξεω ... καὶ Ἀρτοξέρξεω ... ἐγένετο πλέω
> κακὰ τῆι Ἑλλάδι ἢ ἐπὶ εἴκοσι ἄλλας γενεὰς τὰς πρὸ Δαρείου γενομένας,

τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Περσέων αὐτῆι γενόμενα, τὰ δὲ ἀπ' αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων[30].

Herodotus invites us to take the period from Darius to Artaxerxes as a single unity: the conflicts of the Pentekontaetia between Greek and Greek, culminating in the war during which Herodotus was completing his book, are in some recognizable sense an extension of those earlier troubles. Here again Herodotus makes us see the harms inflicted by Greeks on each other as of at least the same order of gravity as the harms suffered at the hands of the Persians. No sooner did the Greeks ward off the threat of Persia than they turned once more to the task of fighting one another. The insight of the present passage is given a peculiar and disturbing dramatic prominence, coming as it does before we have yet been afforded any glimpse of the glorious aspects of the Greek defence of Hellenic liberty. There is no reason to suppose that this divination owes anything to anyone but Herodotus himself; hence we must ask why he should not interpret the portent much more simply, as heralding merely disaster for the Persians. The choice of referring it to Greeks only is surely a perverse one; the further choice of overlooking what most Greeks would have seen as the greatest good, namely the victory over Persia, is more provocative still. Herodotus' view, we can only conclude, is that though the gods did mean the Greeks to win against Persia (cf. e.g. 8.13), the victory was objectively not an agathon, since it led inexorably and directly to this greatest of all wars between Greeks[31].

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2. Euboea succumbs to Datis without much resistance. Carystus alone stands out against the Mede (6.99.2): οὔτε ἔφασαν ἐπὶ πόλιας ἀστυγείτονας στρατεύεσθαι, λέγοντες Ἐρέτριάν τε καὶ Ἀθήνας . The objection to being led in war against their fellow-Greeks is brought out by Herodotus, presumably because it provides him with a striking foil to the major theme of the Greeks' willingness to harm one another, whether forced to it by

Persia or not. But the Carystians eventually succumb to *force majeure*. Not so the Eretrians, however, in Herodotus' account (6.100.1f):

> τῶν δὲ Ἐρετριέων ἦν ἄρα οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς βούλευμα, οἳ μετεπέμποντο μὲν Ἀθηναίους, ἐφρόνεον δὲ διφασίας ἰδέας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἐβουλεύοντο ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν πόλιν ἐς τὰ ἄκρα τῆς Εὐβοίης, ἄλλοι δὲ αὐτῶν ἴδια κέρδεα προσδεκόμενοι παρὰ τοῦ Πέρσεω οἴσεσθαι προδοσίην ἐσκευάζοντο.

Herodotus ascribes to the best of the Eretrians an unwillingness to stand and face the Mede, to the worst of them a positive desire to profit by betrayal of their comrades: we remember how the Phocians (rightly or wrongly) charged the Thessalians with just such self-interested treachery. Again we are faced not with the judgement of a source, but with Herodotus' cynical inference (n.b. inferential *ara*, above), designed to point up his theme.

The Persian invasion of Attica is so described as to invite contrast and comparison with the account of affairs in Eretria[32]. The Persians (so Herodotus infers) expect to find things much the same here (6.102): δοκέοντες ταὐτὰ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ποιήσειν τὰ καὶ τοὺς Ἐρετριέας ἐποίησαν. So too Philippides' speech at Sparta, with great elevation, urges Athens' ally (6.106.2): μὴ περιιδεῖν πόλιν ἀρχαιοτάτην ἐν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι δουλοσύνῃ περιπεσοῦσαν πρὸς ἀνδρῶν βαρβάρων· καὶ γὰρ νῦν Ἐρέτριά τε ἠνδραπόδισται καὶ πόλι λογίμωι ἡ Ἑλλὰς γέγονε ἀσθενεστέρη. That being so we may note Herodotus' distinct emphasis on Athenian indecision before Marathon (cf. 6.109.1f, and esp. Miltiades' warning to Callimachus at 6.109.5):

> ἢν μέν νυν μὴ συμβάλωμεν, ἔλπομαί τινα στάσιν μεγάλην διασείσειν ἐμπεσοῦσαν τὰ Ἀθηναίων φρονήματα ὥστε μηδίσαι· ἢν δὲ συμβάλωμεν πρίν τι καὶ σαθρὸν Ἀθηναίων μετεξετέροισι ἐγγενέσθαι ...

The *sathron ti* which Miltiades here sees as threatening the Athenians surely recalls the *ouden hygies bouleuma* of the Eretrians: the presence of the Mede, suggests Herodotus repeatedly, exposes not only the divisions between Greek states, but also the political weaknesses within them[33].

In addition to his disturbing emphasis on Miltiades' suspicions, Herodotus makes a great deal of fuss over the display of the shield at Marathon, defending the Alcmeonids against the charge (6.124.2): ἀνεδέχθη μὲν γὰρ ἀσπίς, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἔστι ἄλλως εἰπεῖν· ἐγένετο γάρ· ὃς μέντοι ἦν ὁ ἀναδέξας, οὐκ ἔχω προσωτέρω εἰπεῖν τούτων . This curious insistence, and indeed the very inclusion of the Alcmeonid excursus, contrives to stress that an element in Athens did indeed see its interests as lying in a Persian victory: βουλομένους ὑπὸ βαρβάροισι τε εἶναι Ἀθηναίους καὶ ὑπὸ Ἱππίηι (6.121.1). This insistence, though it acts as a foil to the heroism of Marathon itself, nonetheless casts a disquieting shadow over the whole episode[34].

All this puts a particular emphasis on the part played by Miltiades: if it had not been for him, the medizing party in Athens, like its Eretrian counterpart, might have prevailed against the faint-hearted loyalists, and the Persian Wars would have taken a very different course. This is not to say that Herodotus witholds his admiration from the victors of Marathon, the ordinary hoplites who fought with such inspired determination, when the time came for them to show their mettle. Thus the Persians are said to have shown amazement (Herodotus' inference) at the headlong rush of the Athenian hoplites (6.112.2, μανίην τε τοῖσι Ἀθηναίοισι ἐπέφερον καὶ πάγχυ ὀλεθρίην), "seeing them, few as they were, advancing at a run, without cover from either cavalry or archers"[35]. Herodotus himself insists that the Athenians fought axiōs logou (112.3), a claim he reinforces in a rhetorical anaphora:

> πρῶτοι μὲν γὰρ Ἑλλήνων πάντων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν δρόμωι ἐς πολεμίους ἐχρησαντο, πρῶτοι δὲ ἀνέσχοντο ἐσθῆτά τε Μηδικὴν ὁρῶντες καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας ταύτην ἐσθημένους· τέως δὲ ἦν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι καὶ τὸ οὔνομα τὸ Μήδων φόβος ἀκοῦσαι.

And finally the Spartans arriving late desire to see the battlefield and offer their own words of praise (6.120): αἰνέοντες Ἀθηναίους καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν[36]. Thus there is no doubt that Marathon viewed merely as a battle, a display of courage and determination when they were needed, evokes a distinctly enthusiastic response; in the account of Marathon Herodotus comes his nearest to all-out admiration for Greek heroism in the defence of liberty. And yet Marathon is rather different from all the other battles of the Persian Wars, in that it is a battle fought almost exclusively by Athenians (with heroic assistance from Plataea, but nowhere else) in defence of Athenian liberty, not, as all the others are, a battle in which the Greek alliance is fighting together for the common interests of all Greece; and in that sense Herodotus is inviting us to note the contrast. It is a much easier thing for a Greek state to do to fight heroically in its own interests than to make common cause with other states in defence of the higher ideals of Hellenic freedom and unity. There is, for example, something of a deliberate contrast between Miltiades' simple persuasion of Callimachus to help prosecute the interests of Athenian freedom and Athenian greatness, and Themistocles' much less happy attempts at persuading Eurybiadas and the allies of the common interests of the Greeks at Salamis (see (H) below).

The part played by Miltiades at Marathon is most revealing. We have commented earlier (cf. Ch.I.i.6) on the equivocal aspect of Miltiades, the hero of Athenian freedom. We can recall briefly here that his heroism in this cause is framed in Herodotus' account by the reports of his two trials for treason at Athens, the first (6.104.2) in which he is called to account for his tyranny in the Chersonese, the second (6.136.1f), brought by Xanthippus after the Parian expedition, for betraying the Athenian people. Though at the Danube-bridge Miltiades had alone suggested to his fellow-tyrants that they might accept the offer made by the Scyths and liberate Ionia, the man who urges Callimachus to win himself greater honour even than the tyrannicides in liberating Athens from the Mede (6.109.3) all too clearly has tyrannical ambitions of his own, not to mention a tyrannical past. We have commented too on the implications of Miltiades' promise to Callimachus about the results of victory at Marathon

(6.109.3): ἢν δὲ περιγένηται αὕτη ἡ πόλις, οἵη τέ ἐστι πρώτη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολίων γενέσθαι ; and cf. 109.6, ἢν γὰρ σὺ γνώμηι τῆι ἐμῆι πρόσθῆι, ἔστι τοι πατρίς τε ἐλευθέρη καὶ πόλις πρώτη τῶν ἐν Ἑλλάδι. These words can only be meant to ring ominously true to the attentive reader: as we saw above, it was widely recognized (positively by the Athenians, negatively by her critics) that Athens' success in the Persian Wars had indeed laid the foundations of her later empire. It was men like Miltiades (and Themistocles, and later, of course, Pericles himself), whose private ambitions often overlapped with those of the city, whose ambitious foresight carried Athens through the Persian Wars and on into empire. The battle account is followed by a long treatment of the Parian expedition, whose motives of gain and imperialism Herodotus highlights at the expense of the ostensible justification (6.133.1, the Parians had sent a trireme to Marathon in the service of Persia), in order to show the familiar pattern of success leading to ambition (cf. Ch.II.i.A.1).

In other words, especially through the part played by Miltiades on the one hand, and the disturbing activities of the medizing party on the other, Herodotus contrives to put Marathon in a disillusioning perspective, while the battle itself, as we saw, is allowed to make an entirely favourable impression. And this is the paradox that runs through the entire narrative of the defence of Greece: there is no denying that each of the battles is conceived at least in some respects as a glorious achievement of Greek heroism, but throughout Herodotus exploits the contexts in which the battles are placed to undermine the simplicity of the interpretation.

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(D) The Persian Preparations for War

1. The narrative of the Persian Wars proper follows on seamlessly from all that has gone before: without Herodotus' careful preparation the climax would come over quite differently[37]. This is particularly true of the light and shade of the narrative of Greek affairs, as we shall see. The theme of despotism and slavery (the reverse side of freedom) is also brought to a climax in the narrative of Xerxes' invasion; but this is a separate theme with its own complexities, and it deserves to be treated not merely *en passant*. Hence we will concentrate principally on Greek freedom, and comment on the theme of despotism only in those places where Herodotus himself explicitly draws the contrast for what it shows about the Greeks.

There are in the course of the last three books a number of examples of Persian 'reflexion' on Greek freedom (cf. Ch.III, n.105), in which certainly we are made to see the barbarian, unaccustomed to anything but despotism, showing incomprehension of the character of free people. But we know Herodotus better by now than to suppose that things are ever quite as simple as that. The most striking example of such equivocation is to be found early in the great Persian debate at the start of Book Seven. Mardonios, whose judgement is possibly even more fallible than that of Xerxes, and who is constitutionally incapable of seeing his own faults, advances a remarkably trenchant critique of the Greek enemy (7.9a.1ff): the paradox is a familiar one (cf. Ch.I.i.8).In its first part this speech argues that the enemy is weak and easily overpowered, a misjudgement typical in Herodotus and reflecting of course on the character of the person who formulates it[38]. But Mardonios goes on to say something rather different about the Greeks, which deserves our particular attention because it is not really necessary for his argument (7.9b.1f)[39]:

καίτοι ἐώθασι Ἕλληνες, ὡς πυνθάνομαι, ἀβουλότατα πολέμους ἵστασθαι

> ὑπό τε ἀγνωμοσύνης καὶ σκαιότητος. ἐπεὰν γὰρ ἀλλήλοισι πόλεμον προείπωσι, ἐξευρόντες τὸ κάλλιστον χωρίον καὶ λειότατον, ἐς τοῦτο κατιόντες μάχονται, ὥστε σὺν κακῶι μεγάλωι οἱ νικῶντες ἀπαλλάσσονται. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἑσσουμένων οὐδὲ λέγω ἀρχήν, ἐξώλεες γὰρ δὴ γίνονται. τοὺς χρῆν, ἐόντας ὁμογλώσσους, κήρυξί τε διαχρεωμένους καὶ ἀγγέλοισι καταλαμβάνειν τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ παντὶ μᾶλλον ἢ μάχηισι· εἰ δὲ πάντως ἔδεε πολεμέειν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἐξευρίσκειν χρῆν τῆι ἑκάτεροί εἰσι δυσχειρότατοι καὶ ταύτηι πειρᾶν. τρόπωι τοίνυν οὐ χρηστῶι διαχρεώμενοι ἐμέο ἐλασάντος μέχρι Μακεδονίης οὐκ ἦλθον ἐς τούτου λόγον ὥστε μάχεσθαι.

This part of the speech is hardly invented to show Persian misjudgement, or to foreshadow anything that actually happens or even to recall anything that has happened - except in the last sentence quoted, which shows by its very lack of consequence how far we have strayed in the course of the paragraph. Herodotus has included this part of the speech simply in order to show us something about the Greeks; and the message is quite familiar by now. The Greeks despite their common interests as one nation (*eontas homōglossous*; cf. esp. 8.144.2 below) make no attempt to resolve their differences by agreement and compromise, but instead resort to a form of war between each other whose express purpose seems to be to inflict the greatest possible damage on both sides! The folly of Greek civil wars is sharply spelt out by an observer who stands aloof from the petty details of those internal squabbles. With compatriots such as they have, the Greeks have no need of foreign enemies: they are quite well enough skilled in their own bizarre rituals of self-destruction[40]. Mardonios' point may be dramatically merely a military one; but behind this is clearly Herodotus' voice making a moral point about the senselessness of Greek civil wars, no doubt inspired by the imminence of the greatest of all such conflicts. The forcefulness of Mardonios' rhetoric is no doubt appropriate to him, but it is also appropriate to Herodotus' passionate conviction about the folly of his countrymen.

A further remarkable example of Persian reflexion from this debate is Xerxes' apparently fanciful justification of his own initiative in attacking Athens (7.11.2f):

> εὖ ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι εἰ ἡμεῖς ἡσυχίην ἄξομεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλα στρατεύσονται ἐπὶ τὴν ἡμετέρην, εἰ χρὴ σταθμώσασθαι τοῖσι ὑπαργμένοισι ἐξ ἐκείνων, οἳ Σάρδις τε ἐνέπρησαν καὶ ἤλασαν ἐς τὴν Ἀσίην. οὐκ ὦν ἐξαναχωρέειν οὐδετέροισι δυνατῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ ποιέειν ἢ παθεῖν πρόκειται ἀγών, ἵνα ἢ τάδε πάντα ὑπὸ Ἕλλησι ἢ ἐκεῖνα πάντα ὑπὸ Πέρσῃσι γένηται· τὸ γὰρ μέσον οὐδὲν τῆς ἔχθρης ἐστί.

Quite obviously Herodotus knows better than Xerxes about the condition of Athens at this period: he would surely insist that the Athenians after the burning of Sardis would have been happy never to have heard of the Persians again (5.103.1, with Ch.II.ii.G), and he gives no indication that the Athenians intended to take any reprisals against Persia after Marathon (only against their fellow-Greeks!). Thus we are meant to take note of Xerxes' absurd misjudgement of his enemy. But it is hard to leave it at that. Xerxes has surely touched, in ignorance, on the characteristic of the Athenians that was most talked about in Herodotus' own day: their *polypragmosynē*, their constitutional inability to keep themselves to themselves, or ever to live in peace (ἡσυχίην ἄγειν)[41]. This is precisely the argument which the Corinthians in Thucydides advance so forcibly to persuade the Spartans to go to war with Athens (1.70.2ff; and esp. 70.9): ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῶι μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίην μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι. Indeed Xerxes' words would apply much better to Sparta's decision to go to war with Athens than they do to his own plans for the conquest of Greece (e.g. Thucyd.1.23.6): τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγοῦμαι μεγάλους γιγνομένους καὶ φόβον παρέχοντας τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεμεῖν. Herodotus wants the reader to bear in mind throughout the narrative of the liberation that the Athenians do indeed have plans for the future (cf. 8.3.2, below), in which their *polypragmosynē* will affect not so much Persia, as Xerxes fears, but rather the Greeks themselves.

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2. The first major commentary on Greek freedom in Book Seven, the Demaratus dialogue (7.101ff), is introduced before we have yet seen anything of the Greek preparations to resist Xerxes. This anticipation of the theme allows Herodotus to set the presuppositions of Xerxes and the presumptions of Demaratus in contrast with what the narrative itself is to tell us[42]. Asked whether the Greeks as a whole will be able to resist Xerxes' army, supposing them to be at odds with one another (7.101.2, οὐκ ἀξιόμαχοί εἰσι ἐμὲ ἐπιόντα ὑπομεῖναι, μὴ ἐόντες ἄρθμιοι)[43], Demaratus at first replies, not a little obscurely given the question, (7.102.1):

> τῆι Ἑλλάδι πενίη μὲν αἰεί κοτε σύντροφός ἐστι, ἀρετὴ δὲ ἔπακτός ἐστι, ἀπό τε σοφίης κατεργασμένη καὶ νόμου ἰσχυροῦ· τῆι διαχρεωμένηι ἡ Ἑλλὰς τήν τε πενίην ἀπαμύνεται καὶ τὴν δεσποσύνην.

This all sounds very admirable, and expressed as it is expressed, in such highly general and allusive terms, a lot of it seems to be true: all the Greeks could feel smug about their virtuous poverty and the hardihood it induced in them (cf. e.g. Aristoph.Plut.557ff); the Athenians could pride themselves on their *sophiē*, pointing in particular to the part played by Themistocles in the Persian Wars (see e.g. 8.124.2; also 9.62.3?); while the mention of *nomos*, as the ensuing discussion makes clear, is specifically a reference to Spartan valour (see below). But it is clear that all this needs qualifying; and Demaratus goes on at once to limit his answer (102.2):

> "I have respect for all those Greeks who live in the Dorian parts[44], but what I am about to say will not apply to all of them, but only to the Spartans. First then, they will not under any circumstances accept terms from you which would bring slavery to Greece; secondly, they will resist you in battle even if all the other Greeks submit to you"[45].

This limitation has a curious effect, for besides focussing the encomium of Spartan virtue more precisely, it incidentally suggests doubts about the other Greeks, their virtue, bravery and determination to resist enslavement. Certainly it is important that this speech is in character. This is after all a Spartan talking, a Spartan who despite his explicitly avowed hatred of his countrymen (cf. 7.104.1, καίτοι ὡς ἐγὼ τυγχάνω τά νυν τάδε ἐστοργὼς ἐκείνους, αὐτὸς μάλιστα ἐξεπιστέαι), is yet obviously proud of the untarnished reputation of Spartan virtue. Moreover, we are being prepared before all else for the encounter at Thermopylae, and hence it is on the Spartans that we are reasonably enough concentrating. But these dramatic grounds are not really enough by themselves to justify the qualification. Accordingly we are left with the implication that the rest of the Greeks will not prove to have the same determination to fight to the death as Demaratus claims for the Spartans: and indeed, as events prove, only to the Athenians does this seem to have been manifestly unfair.

Xerxes partly takes Demaratus' point about limiting his remarks to the Spartans (103.1, σέ γε τὸν κείνων βασιλέα) and partly not (he ends by speaking indiscriminately of the Hellenes, cf. 103.4f), so that when he makes the objection that free men have less chance of fighting resolutely than those ruled by despots (7.103.3f), he can be taken as referring not merely to the Spartans but to the Greeks as a whole:

> κῶς ἂν δυναίατο χίλιοι ἢ μύριοι ἢ πεντακισμύριοι, ἐόντες γε ἐλεύθεροι πάντες ὁμοίως καὶ μὴ ὑπ' ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι, στρατῶι τοσῶιδε ἀντιστῆναι; ... ὑπὸ μὲν γὰρ ἑνὸς ἀρχόμενοι κατὰ τρόπον τὸν ἡμέτερον γενοίατ' ἂν δειμαίνοντες τοῦτον καὶ παρὰ τὴν ἑωυτῶν φύσιν ἀμείνονες καὶ ἴοιεν ἀναγκαζόμενοι μάστιγι ἐς πλεῦνας ἐλάσσονες ἐόντες· ἀνειμένοι δὲ ἐς τὸ ἐλεύθερον οὐκ ἂν ποιέοιεν τούτων οὐδέτερα.

Obviously Xerxes again speaks in ignorance: he only has experience of despotism. And of course he has completely failed to understand the principles of 'political determinism' (cf. esp. Hippocrates, Airs Waters Places, with Ch.II.i.B.1, and Ch.III.C) according to which it is despotism that saps the will to fight manfully and autonomy which makes the fiercest warriors. But again there is surely meant to be some truth in his denunciation of freedom and free men: it is clear that, whatever is the case with Sparta, Herodotus means to show that the rest of Greece is indeed open to the charge laid against it by Xerxes here. With only a few but important exceptions, the Greeks behave in a way that shows their disunity: they behave as the Ionians did in Herodotus' account of the Ionian revolt. That the discussion here concerns principally military rather than political matters is no hindrance to this interpretation, since Xerxes' objection clearly anticipates the political answer of Demaratus, invoking Spartan nomos, which has at Sparta the force of despotism in Asia.

This answer of Demaratus' reminds the king once more that he meant only the Spartans, to whom special considerations apply (7.104.1); and he goes on to explain, as we have seen, that he has little enough reason to be unthinkingly loyal to them. He admits the force of the king's reductionism (104.3): ἐγὼ δὲ οὐκ ἂν δέκα ἀνδράσι ὑπίσχομαι οἷός τε ειναι μαχεσθαι ... εἰ δὲ ἀναγκαίη ἢ μεγάς τις ὁ ἐποτρύνων ἀγὼν εἴη, μαχοίμην ἄν ... Spartan valour then is not an automatic response to any situation, but only to those where the Spartan feels his self-preservation is directly at stake, or where the prize is sufficiently alluring - another explicit limitation. And he concludes by revealing what it is that distinguishes the Spartans (104.4):

> ὣς δὲ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι κατὰ μὲν ἕνα μαχόμενοι οὐδαμῶν εἰσι κακίονες ἀνδρῶν, ἀλέές δὲ ἄριστοι ἀνδρῶν ἁπάντων. ἐλεύθεροι γὰρ ἐόντες οὐ πάντα ἐλεύθεροί εἰσι· ἔπεστι γάρ σφι δεσπότης νόμος, τὸν ὑποδειμαίνουσι πολλῷι ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγηι· ἀνώγει δὲ τωὐτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῆι τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι.

One of the most remarkable things about this paragraph, so pregnant with allusions, is its failure to say anything about an instinctive defence of freedom: all we are told is that, faced with the challenge of proving their valour, the Spartans will rise to it. But this is really only an argument about how the Spartans behave on the battlefield, not about their moral resolution to fight for things they believe to be right, nothing about championing the common interest of the Greeks (contrast what Herodotus says about the Athenians, below), nothing even about defending the Spartan state. Even speaking for himself, as we saw, Demaratus was noticeably vague about the circumstances under which he would be prepared to show his valour: certainly the defence of freedom could be an agōn that would stir the heart of a Spartan[46], but the whole passage is clearly lacking in anything approaching explicit idealism. The omission should be put down to more than understatement. In addition there is an unmistakable harsh sound to Demaratus' claim for Spartan *nomos*. The explicit analogy with the rule of the despot is very striking, in particular the statement that the Spartans *fear* the compulsion of nomos *even more* than Xerxes' subjects fear him. This is not an attractive characteristic: it surely suggests what most Greeks felt about Sparta[47], that the strictly regimented *agōgē*, rigidly codified by law along with every aspect of the life of the Spartan citizen, was something harsh, oppressive and profoundly alien to the way most Greeks lived. There is nothing to suggest that Herodotus found this totalitarianism attractive in the way that Xenophon and many others later do[48]. This Spartan 'fear' is something quite other than the 'fear' which Athena in Aeschylus' Eumenides (681ff) proclaims that the Areopagus will guard, a 'fear' which guarantees that the citizens will live justly (cf. e.g. Eum.699: τίς γὰρ δεδοικὼς μηδὲν ἔνδικος βροτῶν;). There is a great difference between a fear which instils a *respect for justice* in a city, and the Spartan fear which, in Herodotus' formulation, does no more than command absolute and unquestioning obedience to the most harsh dictates, a fear that can be compared to that exercised by an oriental despot over his subjects. This paragraph is a typically Herodotean mixture of admiration and distaste[49].

What Demaratus has to say here is clearly provisional: both he and Xerxes advance arguments which Herodotus' narrative shows to be only partly true. Their preconceptions, the limitations of which are already partly visible, are to be put to the test in what follows[50]. We are left with a number of disturbing questions: if what Demaratus says is true about Sparta only, where does that leave the other Greeks? Do they behave more as Xerxes expects free people to behave? What about the Athenians, whose part in the defence of Greece we know to be at least comparable to that of Sparta? What about Spartan *aretē* itself? Does it not seem limited and limiting, lacking both idealism and indeed the true spirit of freedom? None of these questions receives an entirely positive answer. Greek freedom is in fact much more complicated than Demaratus makes out, and Xerxes' criticisms, ignorant as they are, strike at the roots of the problem. Indeed his original question is left unanswered by Demaratus: to what extent will the Greeks be able to mount an effective resistance if they are disunited (μὴ ἐόντες ἄρθμιοι)?

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(E) The Greek Preparations for War

1. While Xerxes is halted in Pieria, messengers are sent to the Greek states demanding earth and water (7.131f), but not to Athens or to Sparta, on account of the treatment which Darius' heralds had formerly received there, when they were thrown into the _barathon_ and down a well respectively, and told to fetch earth and water from there (133.1). Herodotus strikingly does not see this action of Sparta and Athens as an admirable expression of the will to freedom, but rather as a crime against the gods that demands punishment, for he raises a most curious question (7.133.2): "what unwished-for consequence befell the Athenians for this treatment of the heralds, I cannot say, except that their lands and city were ravaged; but I do not believe it was for this fault that that happened". The retribution that the Athenians pay by having their lands and city ravaged is presumably for their impiety in having desecrated the Perisan shrines at Sardis (cf. e.g. 5.102.1); but whatever Herodotus imagines they may have suffered or may be about to suffer for this latest crime[51], his _dubitatio_ is clearly meant to draw our attention to the disconcerting idea that, at least in some degree, their own wrong-doings brought Persian retribution down upon them[52].

As for the Spartans, Herodotus narrates at length the story of the embassy of Sperchias and Bulis to the court of Xerxes, which is however merely a parenthesis before the disclosure of the fate of Nicolaos and Aneristos. We have already treated the former story (cf. Ch.I.i.5) and shown that the Spartan heralds' arrogant presumption of superiority before Hydarnes (7.135.3, τὸ μὲν γὰρ δοῦλος εἶναι ἐξεπίστεαι, ἐλευθερίης δὲ οὔκω ἐπειρήθης, οὔτ' εἰ ἔστι γλυκὺ οὔτ' εἰ μή), and their lofty vaunting of their experience of freedom there, is sharply qualified by the narrative of their interview with Xerxes, in which the irresponsibility and indeed criminality of their behaviour (or rather their state's behaviour) as free men is brought into clear focus (7.136.2): κείνους μὲν γὰρ συγχέαι τὰ πάντων ἀνθρώπων νόμιμα ἀποκτεινάντας κήρυκας, αὐτὸς δὲ τὰ ἐκείνοισι ἐπιπλήσσει ταῦτα οὐ ποιήσειν. We should not forget that though the story of the embassy may have been given him by the tradition, the essential interpretative ingredient, the content of the speeches and reported speeches must surely be something in which Herodotus has a free hand. While the Hydarnes-section of this episode is much cited for the light it is supposed to shed on the Greek will to freedom, little attention is ever paid to Xerxes' disturbing incrimination of the heralds[53]; but we can imagine that it is precisely this pendant which is the Herodotean elaboration.

We may comment here more fully on what in dramatic terms seems a mere appendix, but is arguably the focal point of the narrative, namely the embassy of Nicolaos and Aneristos, which Herodotus reveals to be the moment when the wrath of Talthybios, aroused by Sparta's treatment of the Persian heralds, finally worked itself out (7.137.1): χρόνωι δὲ μετέπειτα πολλῶι ἐπεγέρθη κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων πόλεμον, ὡς λέγουσι Λακεδαιμόνιοι. The two latter-day ambassadors were sent on quite a different mission from that entrusted to their fathers; for Nicolaos and Aneristos, as we know from Thucydides, and as Herodotus' readers would certainly have known, given the freshness of the news, were sent to Asia to secure an alliance with the Great King for the war against Athens (Thucyd.2.67.1ff): πορευόμενοι ἐς τὴν Ἀσίαν ὡς βασιλέα, εἴ πως πείσειαν αὐτὸν χρήματά τε παράσχεῖν καὶ ξυμπολεμεῖν. Herodotus of course mentions nothing about the purpose of their visit (7.137.3); he says merely that "they were sent by the Spartans as ambassadors to Asia, but were betrayed by Sitalkes and Nymphodorus, captured and taken back to Attica, where they were put to death by the Athenians, along with the Corinthian, Aristeas son of Adeimantos"[54]. By introducing the perspective of the later war Herodotus achieves a distancing effect similar to that produced at e.g. 6.98.2 above. Most important here is the contrast between the two embassies, the first one arrogantly informing the Great King that the Spartans bid him do his worst, they will not give up their freedom to him, and the second deviously seeking the King's money and arms to help in a war against their fellow-Greeks[55]. Herodotus' silence as to the purpose of the second embassy is clearly a deafening one: no contemporary reader would be in any doubt as to what he had left out, and even if we had to guess we would see at once from his hint that it took place "during the war between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians", that it was indeed an attempt to secure Persian help against the Athenian enemy. This is an irony that we are to meet again: the Greeks who fought so heroically in the Persian Wars to resist enslavement by the Great King and who claimed they would never submit to him, only a generation or two later were openly courting his support to help them in enslaving each other (cf. esp. on 7.151, in (E).3 below; with 8.141.1 and 144.1 in (I).1).

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2. After the narrative of these two embassies Herodotus returns to the subject of the Greek resistance (7.137.3, ταῦτα μέν νυν πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι ὕστερον ἐγένετο τοῦ βασιλέος στόλου). The Greeks, he says, perceived that the king's expedition, directed in name against the Athenians alone,

was in fact a threat to them all (7.138.1). "And though they discovered this in good time, they did not all act in concert[56]. Those that had given earth and water were confident that they would suffer nothing untoward from the barbarian; but the rest were greatly afeared, seeing that there were not enough battle-worthy ships in Greece to ward off the aggressor, and that besides most of the Greeks were unwilling to take part in the war, and were medizing with a will". Such is the forceful lead-in to the 'Encomium of Athens' (7.139): the question of who is to provide the ships, who is to make the stand that will unite the Greeks, is raised anxiously at this critical juncture - to be emphatically answered in the ensuing paragraph[57]. Certainly the prima facie reasons for thinking that what follows is an unequivocally enthusiastic expression of approval for Athens' contribution to the saving of Greece are hard to deny[58]. The other Greeks (and Herodotus does not exclude the Spartans) thought only of their own survival, the Athenians alone could see beyond the danger that threatened them privately to the desirability of a common effort (7.139.5):

> νῦν δὲ 'Αθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων σωτῆρας γενέσθαι τῆς 'Ελλάδος οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνοι τἀληθέος ... ἑλόμενοι δὲ τὴν 'Ελλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τὸ 'Ελληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπόν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπηγείραντες καὶ βασιλέα μετά γε θεοὺς ἀνωσάμενοι.

Surely this is unstinting praise for Athenian self-sacrifice and idealism?

But if all is as simple as that, then there is something seriously wrong, as we may credit Plutarch with having seen (MH 42.872A): πάλιν δὲ τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις οὐκ ἔχων ὅ τι χρήσαιτο, πότε μὲν αἴρει πότε δὲ καταβάλλει, τὴν πόλιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταφέρων[59]. For it is clear that elsewhere, as we shall discover, Herodotus is far from keeping up any such simple admiration, and at least on one occasion speaks (in his own voice again) with quite exceptional cynicism about Athens' motives for 'virtuous behaviour in the common interest' (cf. 8.3.2, below). Only the most blinkered devotee of the Athenian source can seriously claim that Herodotus' apparent enthusiasm here is entirely consistent with everything else he has to say about Athens. On the other hand, if what Herodotus says here is indeed unqualified, then this is a serious objection to the view of a thoughtfully equivocal account of the Persian Wars.

The traditional view of this passage has been assisted by a slight but significant misreading of Herodotus' Greek. The opening sentence has rightly been much discussed as indicating the standpoint from which Herodotus is to deliver his 'encomium', but its careful precision has been masked in most translations and paraphrases (7.139.1):

> ἐνθαῦτα ἀναγκαίηι ἐξέργομαι γνώμην ἀποδέξασθαι ἐπίφθονον μὲν πρὸς τῶν πλεόνων ανθρώπων, ὅμως δέ, τῆι γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, οὐκ ἐπισχήσω.

The words underlined are invariably rendered "since I believe it to be true", or the like (cf. e.g. Legrand, "comme elle (!) est à mes yeux conforme à la verité"; de Sélincourt, "as I believe it to be true"): Herodotus is taken to mean that 'the truth must be told'. that the truth in such matters is not to be witheld by an honest man. But it is quite wrong to translate the words τῆι γε as anything like 'because, since, inasmuch as', for they could never mean that. The usage can be paralleled, for example, in Herodotus' signing-off to his discussion of the tradition about Helen in Egypt at 2.120.5, καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τῆι ἐμοὶ δοκέει εἴρηται (cf. Soph.El.338-9, καίτοι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐχ ἧι 'γὼ λέγω, ἀλλ' ἧι σὺ κρίνεις ; Trach.1135, δεινοῦ λόγου κατῆρξας· εἰπὲ δ' ἧι νοεῖς), where the sense is clearly 'as I think the truth to be'[60]. In the present passage Herodotus has added the word gē, which may be either limitative ('at least what seems true to me'), or simply emphatic ('precisely what seems true to me')[61]. Needless to say, the subject of phainetai is not, as many translators think, the word gnōmē: the neuter adjective alēthes shows the verb to be impersonal. Thus Herodotus is not here vindicating the importance of the truth, as he is usually made to do (something which would indeed be a significant addition to the encomiastic tone of the passage), but rather inviting the reader to note that he is not speaking loosely in such a delicate area as this: he will speak the truth as it seems to him, no more and no less; what he is about to say will incur the *phthonos* of many, but we are to observe that his claim will not be extravagant or excessive but only the precise truth.

It is widely recognized that Herodotus' reference to the *phthonos* of his potential audience here has to do with the context of his writing, with an awareness that any expression of approval for Athens must face the hostility of critics of the empire and its abuses of Greek liberty. Hence we should compare the opinion expressed by the Athenian speaker in Thucyd.1.72ff. The speaker defends Athens against the charge of unjustly building her empire (1.73.1, ὡς οὔτε ἀπεικότως ἔχομεν ἃ κεκτήμεθα. He rehearses as a well-known theme the tale of Athens' services to Greece during the Persian Wars (1.73.2, εἰ καὶ δι' ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις, ἀνάγκη λέγειν), of Marathon and Salamis (1.73.4, φαμὲν γὰρ Μαραθῶνί τε μόνοι προκινδυνεῦσαι τῶι βαρβάρωι καὶ ὅτε τὸ ὕστερον ἦλθεν ... πανδημεὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ξυνναυμαχῆσαι), and how the fleet saved the Greeks (1.74.1, τρία τὰ ὠφελιμώτατα ἐς αὐτὸ παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμόν τε νεῶν πλεῖστον καὶ ἄνδρα στρατηγὸν ξυνετώτατον καὶ προθυμίαν ἀοκνοτάτην). Like Herodotus the Athenian speaker offers an argument (the same one!) about what might have happened had the Athenians not done as they did (1.74.4):

> εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν πρότερον τῶι Μήδωι δείσαντες, ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλοι,
> περὶ τῆι χώραι, ἢ μὴ ἐτολμήσαμεν ὕστερον ἐσβῆναι ἐς τὰς ναῦς ὡς
> διεφθαρμένοι, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει ἔτι ὑμᾶς μὴ ἔχοντας ναῦς ἱκανὰς
> ναυμαχεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἡσυχίαν ἂν αὐτῶι προυχώρησε τὰ πράγματα
> ἧι ἐβούλετο.

And he ends with the question to which all this has been leading (1.75.1):

> ἆρ' ἄξιοί ἐσμεν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε
> καὶ γνώμης ξυνέσεως ἀρχῆς γε ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως
> ἄγαν ἐπιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι;

A number of details (esp. the use of the word *epiphthonōs*) do suggest that Thucydides had been reading his Herodotus before writing this speech, but it would be wrong to suggest that these words are only comprehensible to a reader of Herodotus' narrative of the Persian Wars. Kierdorf has suggested plausibly that this catalogue of Athens' services to Greece[62] was a standard feature of Athenian diplomatic rhetoric from a time only shortly after the Persian Wars themselves. Hence the view that the Athenian empire could be justified in terms of her heroism in saving Greece in the Persian Wars would have been almost tiresomely familiar to Herodotus' readers (cf. εἰ ϰαὶ δι᾽ ὄχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις , above; with Thucyd.5.89 and 6.83.2). Consequently Herodotus must surely be contributing his own voice to the debate in some way here.

Jacoby, following Meyer, gave authority to the view that Herodotus is here, like the speaker in Thucydides, delivering an apology for the Athenian empire and all its works[63]. This simple answer has long been challenged, originally by Focke and later by Strasburger[64], but without complete conviction. It is clear that Herodotus is aware that the opinion he is to express in this paragraph, that the Athenians were the saviours of Greece, will sound to anyone hostile to the empire just like the view expressed so frequently by the Athenians themselves in justification of that empire - and for that reason it is likely to sound distasteful. I would suggest that this Athenian justification was so familiar to the Greeks of Herodotus' time that his failure to proceed from establishing the claim of Athens to have been the saviour of Greece to the claim that therefore she deserved her empire will have been recognizable as a significant silence. In other words, Herodotus is attempting a daring equivocation: he comes to the very brink of conceding the Athenians' own propaganda for their empire (cf. (L) below); but he resolutely avoids making the connexion which they themselves made in this matter, and expects the attentive reader to observe his omission. The Athenians may indeed have saved Greece in the Persian Wars, and "the man who says as much will be telling no less than the truth", and perhaps indeed in some respect they deserve praise for that achievement; but preen themselves over that achievement as they may, the justification they draw from it is not one that Herodotus will concede.

Significantly Herodotus nowhere in this whole paragraph praises Athenian virtue in this action, only (by somewhat indirect means) the simple fact that they performed it: they "chose that Greece should survive a free country" (cf. 7.139.5), but we are told nothing of their motives in making that choice, nothing of the kind of choice that actually was, nothing about their bravery (contrast their 'fearlessness' at 139.6), their self-sacrifice, their sense of honour, or idealism. Certainly these motives could be inferred from the actions Herodotus does actually record and even the way he records them, but his failure to make any of them explicit amounts to more than understatement (contrast the orators cited in n.185). I would suggest indeed that to some extent Herodotus has advertised his silence in the opening sentence of this paragraph discussed above: the words τῆι γέ μοι φαίνεται εἶναι ἀληθές, as we said, indicate a determination to speak precisely the truth as it seems to him, no more and no less. Herodotus' version of the truth does not include claims for Athenian virtue, and least of all any justification of Athens' behaviour since the date of this service to Greece.

To see further what is behind Herodotus here, we may compare another speech of Thucydides, namely Sthenelaidas' reply to the Athenian defence quoted above (1.86.1): καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δ' ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὅτι ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται. It is surely the case that Herodotus shares the cynicism of the Spartan ephor towards the Athenian defence, and that he does so will become obvious later. Even though, he seems to say, the Athenians may have been heroes then, apparently full of idealism for Greek freedom and Greek unity, that in no way excuses what they have done since. Indeed Herodotus seems to ask, on what view of human nature can we begin to explain such an abandonment of principles once apparently so firmly held?

It will clearly not do to argue that Herodotus is interested here only in the dispassionate statement of a historical fact[65], since he cannot but be aware that whatever he says on this subject will appear to have a moral colour. The comparison with Thucydides shows clearly that the issues concerned here were indeed emotive ones at the time of Herodotus' writing, and Herodotus' own observation that his claim will (by association, at least) arouse *phthonos* is a clear acknowledgement that more is at stake here than considerations of military history: he is well aware that any comment on this issue will be taken as a contribution to an ethical debate on the rights and wrongs of Athenian empire. And yet apart from the sentence already quoted at 7.139.5 (νῦν δὲ 'Αθηναίους ἄν τις λέγων ...), which whether deliberately or not[66] shifts the encomiastic responsibility to an imaginary second person, the burden of the paragraph is merely strategic argument, in particular as to the decisive importance of the fleet (7.139.2, ... κατὰ θάλασσαν οὐδαμοὶ ἂν ἐπειρῶντο ἀντιεύμενοι βασιλέϊ. εἰ τοίνυν κατὰ θάλασσαν μηδεὶς ἠντιοῦτο ...; and 139.3, ... κατὰ πόλις ἁλισκομένων ὑπὸ τοῦ ναυτικοῦ στρατοῦ τοῦ βαρβάρου). Herodotus indeed avoids in his own person giving voice to a single word of explicit praise for the Athenian achievement; and this is in surprising contrast to what he says of the Spartans.

Despite the Isthmus walls, the Spartans would have been betrayed by their allies, not willingly but of necessity, as each of them was cornered by the Persian fleet, and they would have been left alone (7.139.4f):

> μουνωθέντες δὲ ἂν καὶ ἀποδεξάμενοι ἔργα μεγάλα ἀπέθανον γενναίως.
> ἢ ταῦτα ἂν ἔπαθον, ἢ πρὸ τοῦ ὁρῶντες ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Ἕλληνας
> μηδίζοντας ὁμολογίῃ ἂν ἐχρήσαντο πρὸς Ξέρξην.

Valorous deeds and noble deaths are envisaged for the Spartans here clearly as a generous concession to their heroic qualities, clearly too, to some degree, in anticipation of their admirable actions at Thermopylae; and it is striking that while these hypothetical actions are warmly described, the Athenians' real achievement merits no comparably enthusiastic tribute: all Herodotus has to commend in their case is the fact that they acted as they did, not the way that they acted, as, for example, bravely, virtuously, selflessly. But even this apparent concession to Spartan valour is not so simple. For Herodotus immediately adds the possibility that his heroic scenario might after all have come to nothing, and the Spartans might have capitulated without honour but through necessity like the others. Plutarch's indignation is instructive here of how this sounds to a Greek ear (MH 29.864B): αὐτοὺς δὲ Λακεδαιμονίους ἐν ἀδήλωι θέμενος, ἐπηπόρησεν εἴτ' ἔπεσον ἂν μαχόμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις εἴτε παρέδωκαν ἑαυτούς, μικροῖς γε νὴ Δία τεκμηρίοις αὐτῶν ἀπιστήσας τοῖς περὶ Θερμοπύλας. The equivocation is one of the most startling in Herodotus: in one and the same moment he puts forward two wholly different impressions of Spartan valour. Only on the understanding that heroism is a mutable quality, subject to time and circumstance, can this disturbing volte-face make sense. Kleinknecht, moreover, points out plausibly that there is even a certain limitation in the wording of the first alternative: "*for all that* the Spartans would have performed deeds of valour, they would still have died, albeit nobly"[67]. Having written *kai apodexamenoi*, Herodotus must surely intend the participle to be concessive: glamorous as such Spartan sacrifice might have been, it would still have resulted only in death, a negative and pathetic conclusion. Herodotus can see that Spartan bravery has limitations: the Spartans have elevated self-sacrifice to the status of a despotic law (cf. Demaratus, above), which demands obedience whatever the cost. In the event the sacrifice Herodotus envisages would have done nothing for Greece: the Athenians at least saw what they were fighting for, but the Spartans lack constructive imagination, lack idealism even, except in the very narrow, almost futile sense here suggested. No less than in the Demaratus-dialogue the discussion of Spartan military *aretē* raises political and moral issues.

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Herodotus follows this analysis with the narrative of the Athenians' decision to adopt the advice of Thenistocles and not be dismayed by the oracles from Delphi (cf. 7.139.6); and he adds here a mention of an earlier inspired suggestion of Themistocles, which had encouraged the Athenians to spend the surplus silver from Laurium on building ships for the war against Aegina (7.144.2), "a war which as it happened saved Greece in its hour of need by turning the Athenians into sea-farers; for the ships were not used for the purpose for which they were made, but came to the service of Hellas when they were needed"[68]. We need here only recall our earlier discussion of this passage (cf. Ch.II.ii.F), where we observed Herodotus' paradox that Athens only accidentally acquired the means to save Greece through her prosecution of a war against a neighbouring Greek state, the theme of Greek mutual hostility again. This is a somewhat sour reminder of an unattractive episode in the recent history of the democracy (cf. (C).1 above), coming uncomfortably soon after the seemingly generous concessions of 7.139.

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3. Herodotus' transition to the next section, the embassies to Argos, Syracuse Corcyra and Crete, is by way of recapitulation of how the loyal Greeks are situated (7.145.1): "those who were loyal to Greece (τῶν περὶ τὴν ʽΕλλάδα τὰ ἀμεύνω φρονεόντων)[69] met for a conference and exchanged guarantees; and they decided that the first thing that should be done was to patch up their own quarrels and stop any wars that happened to be going on between them. And there were a number of such disputes at the time, but the most serious was that between Athens and Aegina". We have already commented (Ch.II.ii.F) on Herodotus' elaborate treatment of the conflict between Athens and Aegina as representatives of the warring Greeks of this period, and his reminder here is undoubtedly pointed. Moreover it makes a good introduction to the section that follows, the lengthy narrative of the embassies sent to Argos, Sicily, Corcyra and Crete, the net result of which is to bring not a single further ally into the cause. The gesture of unity in formally ending all internal wars is set against the discovery that the conflict of interests continues: rather than discussing how the loyalists themselves were gathered together,

Herodotus prefers to give only an analysis of how four potential allies are *not* brought in. In other words he chooses to elaborate the theme of division, rather than the more obvious and natural theme of unity[70]. Was there not a good story to be had here of heroic sacrifices, noble rhetoric and above all Hellenic solidarity?

Herodotus does indeed set out as though the latter subject is to be his message. The allies send the embassies in the name of Hellenic unity (7.145.2): φρονήσαντες εἴ κως ἔν τε γένοιτο τὸ ʽΕλληνικὸν καὶ εἰ συγκύψαντες τὠυτὸ πρήσσοιεν πάντες, ὡς δεινῶν ἐπιόντων ὁμοίως πᾶσι Ἕλλησι. This is a typical piece of Herodotean personation, which could easily go unnoticed - it is not of course a report of something told him by his source. The sentiments of Hellenic unity ascribed to the allies here undoubtedly sound most elevated: but of course they are merely, in the context given them by Herodotus, a foil to the account of the *failure* of those sentiments to produce a material result[71]. On the contrary the Greeks seem to be justifying Xerxes' criticisms as to their lack of unity (cf. 7.101.2, above).

Herodotus' account of the mission to Argos depends on a manipulation of sources. The main account is prefixed with the warning that it comes from the Argives themselves (7.148.2, 'Αργεῖοι δὲ λέγουσι τὰ κατ' ἑωυτοὺς γενέσθαι ὧδε), and the whole account is carefully kept in reported speech down to 7.149.3 (αὐτοὶ μὲν 'Αργεῖοι τοσαῦτα τούτων πέρι λέγουσι). According to their version of the matter, they had earlier sent to Delphi to discover what answer they should give to the Greeks when they came to ask for help (148.2): "for they had just had 6000 of the army killed by the Spartans under Cleomenes". The Pythia advises them to lie low, but when the ambassadors come the Argives reply (148.4) that they are ready to join the alliance, on condition that the Spartans conclude a 30-year peace with them, and that they are given the command of half the allied forces, "though by rights the hegemony should fall to them outright". And the council gave this reply, say the Argives, despite the discouragement of the oracle (149.1), their reasoning being that they very much wanted the 30-years' peace, "in order that their children might have a chance to grow to manhood", but if that did not work, ἐπιλέγεσθαι ἢν ἄρα σφέας ϰαταλάβηι πρὸς τῶι γεγονότι ϰαϰῶι ἄλλο πταῖσμα πρὸς τὸν Πέρσην, μὴ τὸ λοιπὸν ἔωσι Λαϰεδαιμονίων ὑπήϰοοι. Herodotus clearly reports this as the reasoning claimed for themselves by the Argives, but we should remember that in principle Herodotus (like Thucydides) uses a free hand in the description of motive (cf. Ch.I.ii.8); and in this case it is surely impossible to believe that the Argives would really have given voice to the cynical motives they claim here, in which the hatred of Sparta (cf. 7.149.3 and 152.3 below) triumphs over all other considerations, either of honour or of freedom itself. It is hard to resist the conclusion that Herodotus has let the mask slip here, in dogged pursuit of his theme, especially since otherwise the tone of the Argive account is so deliberately apologetic. The Spartan envoys replied that they would refer a decision on the peace to the assembly, but that as for the hegemony, they had authority to say that neither of the two Spartan kings could be relieved of his command, but that the Argive 'king' could by all means have an equal vote with them. The Argives bridle at this answer (149.3):

> οὕτω δὲ οἱ 'Αργεῖοί φασι οὐϰ ἀνασχέσθαι τῶν Σπαρτιητέων τὴν πλεονεξίην, ἀλλὰ ἑλέσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων ἄρχεσθαι ἤ τι ὑπεῖξαι Λαϰεδαιμονίοισι, προειπεῖν τε τοῖσι ἀγγέλοισι πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου ἀπαλλάσεσθαι ἐϰ τῆς 'Αργείων χώρης, εἰ δὲ μὴ περιέψεσθαι ὧς πὸλεμίους.

Clearly we are supposed to sense the intransigence and obstructiveness of the Argive position - even though the present narrative is supposed to be an Argive apology! The *pleonexia* of the Spartans seems merely a pretext of the Argives - although since the theme of the grasping cupidity of the self-appointed *hēgemones* is central to the embassy to Gelon (see below), Herodotus is clearly sowing the seeds of doubt here.

Herodotus then goes on to give a rival version (7.150.1, ἔστι δὲ ἄλλος λόγος λεγόμενος ἀνὰ τὴν 'Ελλάδα), namely that an envoy from Xerxes tempted the Argives (on the basis of their consanguinity with the Persians!) to remain at peace and do nothing, and that at first they made no promise or demands, but later when the Greeks tried to obtain their support, οὕτω δὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ὅτι οὐ μεταδώσουσι τῆς ἀρχῆς Λακεδαιμόνιοι μεταιτέειν, ἵνα ἐπὶ προφάσιος ἡσυχίην ἄγωσι. There can be little doubt what Herodotus wants us to understand: the rival version is not a true alternative to the Argive account but an elaboration and substantiation of it, giving as it does the real reason why the Argives behaved so strangely on their own report of the matter. The two stories are mutually complementary, the second exposing the distortions of the first[72]: the first is meant to be demonstrably unsatisfactory, and its special pleading transparently weak.

And there is a pendant (7.151): συμπεσεῖν δὲ τούτοισι καὶ τόνδε τὸν λόγον λέγουσί τινες Ἑλλήνων, πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι ὕστερον γενόμενον τούτων. This is the story that at the time when a certain Athenian embassy, led by Callias, son of Hipponikos, was visiting Susa on other business, there was also there an embassy of the Argives sent to enquire of Artaxerxes, εἴ σφι ἔτι ἐμμένει τὴν πρὸς Ξέρξην φιλίην συνεκεράσαντο, ἢ νομιζοίατο πρὸς αὐτοῦ εἶναι πολέμιοι. The king replied that the agreement certainly still stood and that he held no city higher in friendship than Argos. But at once Herodotus makes a tactical withdrawal (7.152.1):

> εἰ μέν νυν Ξέρξης τε ἀπέπεμψε ... καὶ Ἀργείων ἄγγελοι ἀναβάντες ἐς Σοῦσα ἐπειρώτων Ἀρτοξέρξην περὶ φιλίης, οὐκ ἔχω ἀτρεκέως εἰπεῖν, οὐδέ τινα γνώμην ἀποφαίνομαι περὶ αὐτῶν ἄλλην ἢ τήν περ αὐτοὶ Ἀργεῖοι λέγουσι.

This elaborate disclaimer is clearly meant to be read as a rhetorical foil to what follows (152.2f):

> ἐπίσταμαι δὲ τοσοῦτον ὅτι εἰ πάντες ἄνθρωποι τὰ οἰκήια κακὰ ἐς μέσον συνενείκαιεν ἀλλάξασθαι βουλόμενοι τοῖσι πλησίοισι, ἐγκύψαντες ἂν ἐς τὰ τῶν πέλας κακὰ ἀσπασίως ἕκαστοι αὐτῶν ἀποφεροίατο ὀπίσω τὰ ἐσηνείκαντο. οὕτω οὐδ' Ἀργείοισι αἴσχιστα πεποίηται. ἐγὼ δὲ ὀφείλω λέγειν τὰ λεγόμενα, πείθεσθαί γε μὲν οὐ παντάπασιν ὀφείλω, καί μοι τοῦτο τὸ ἔπος ἐχέτω ἐς πάντα λόγον, ἐπεὶ καὶ ταῦτα λέγεται, ὡς ἄρα Ἀργεῖοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπικαλεσάμενοι τὸν Πέρσην ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἐπειδή σφι πρὸς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους κακῶς ἡ αἰχμὴ ἑστήκεε, πᾶν δὴ βουλόμενοι σφίσι εἶναι πρὸ τῆς παρεούσης λύπης.

And so the section ends - on a slander more damning than any Herodotus has yet paraded before us! And yet does he not mean to reject it, given all that he has just said about his own objectivity?

That Herodotus does not in any way really want to exonerate the Argives is clear from the consistently malicious implications of all that he has reported of them here, even what they say about themselves. Herodotus' own narrative later shows clearly how he really conceives the Argive position. At the moment when the Spartans are reported as marching to Boeotia (9.12.1f), Herodotus reports that the Argives sent their best runner to Mardonios in Attica: πρότερον αὐτῶι Μαρδονίωι ὑποδεξάμενοι σχήσειν τὸν Σπαρτιήτην μὴ ἐξιέναι. The messenger delivers the following message (in direct speech for maximum impact!):

> Μαρδόνιε, ἔπεμψάν με Ἀργεῖοι φράσοντά τοι ὅτι ἐκ Λακεδαίμονος ἐξελήλυϑε ἡ νεότης, καὶ ὡς οὐ δυνατοὶ αὐτὴν ἴσχειν εἰσὶ Ἀργεῖοι μὴ οὐκ ἐξιέναι. πρὸς ταῦτα τύγχανε εὖ βουλόμενος.

Why should Herodotus go out of his way to devote not merely a mention but even a speech to this minor piece of Argive treachery, which has otherwise no significant effect except to speed Mardonios' departure from Attica (9.13.1)? It is highly improbable, whatever answer we give, that Herodotus is here merely parrotting his source, without realizing that he had earlier 'denied' the possibility of Argive treachery: the mere fact of his elaborating the present episode in a piece of direct speech surely rules this out, showing as it does that he has exercised more than a moment's thought on the matter. The conclusion can only be that we were right to doubt the truth of Herodotus' disclaimer in the earlier passage[73]. But how then are we to explain his most curious proceeding here?

The effect of the earlier passage as a piece of reporting is not lost on any critic: all are convinced that they can see through Herodotus' 'naive defence of Argos' to the self-evident truth of the matter, that the Argives did indeed engage in some form of treasonable dealing with Persia[74]. But as we have decided, the malicious implications of the whole report must be the work of Herodotus himself: all the details fit together to give a coherent picture of Argive treachery, in which the Argive 'apology' itself is no more than a substantiation of all our suspicions. That coherence is the sign of Herodotus' editorial hand: a genuinely objective report of the sources ought to have produced something much less cut-and-dried. But Herodotus ends up affecting a tone of pious goodwill: 'you may make of what I have reported what you will, it is not for me to pass malicious judgement, and that holds for everything I say'. Surely this is meant to thrust the responsibility for cynical inference on the reader, and to imply that Herodotus himself is far from ever introducing motives of treachery and division into his account of the Greek defence? Needless to say, the disclaimer is a fraudulent blind: this is not how Herodotus has in fact proceeded either here or elsewhere, and malice is frequently insinuated without warning[75].

But all is not even as simple as that. What is the point of the moral tale on the subject of *oikēia kaka*[76]? The meaning is that by comparison with certain others of the Greeks the Argives need by no means be so ashamed, even if they did come to an agreement with Persia (cf. Stein, ad loc.). So much is clear: but with whom are they being compared? Not surely with the other medizers, since Herodotus has not yet described any act of medism more shameful than this one, although what the Thebans eventually do is possibly worse (see below). The real criminals are possibly quite other. We need to retrace our steps to the Argive embassy to Artaxerxes (7.151), and remind ourselves that Herodotus has quite gratuitously provided us with a synchronism which tells us virtually nothing about the Argive embassy itself: we have no real need to know that the embassy took place at the same time as the embassy of of Callias, son of Hipponikos. The traditional view of this Athenian embassy is that it represents some stage of the negotiations for the Peace of Callias[77], and this remains the most appealing interpretation. In that case the *heteron prēgma* is calculatedly reticent: Herodotus trusts his readers to spot the allusion. However, the implied significance of the embassy is the same whatever its precise business. It must be taken as an indication of how in the period after the Persian Wars Athens came less and less to see the necessity for hostility towards Persia, and even in some way or another came to terms with the Great King in order to leave her hand free for aggression against other Greeks.

Certainly after the disputed Peace of Callias there is no unequivocal evidence of an Athenian treaty agreement with Persia until at the accession of Darius II in 424 the 'Peace of Epilykos' was contracted, presumably as a re-negotiation of the earlier peace with Artaxerxes[78]; indeed in the period between there are certain indications that Athenian relations with Persia were not altogether harmonious, with the Athenians throwing their weight about rather more than was consistent with the terms of the original treaty, and with the satrap Pissouthnes showing a certain willingness to favour Athens' enemies[79]. But Thucydides, who surprisingly mentions neither the Peace of Callias nor that of Epilykos for whatever reasons of his own[80], records how in the winter of 425-4 the Athenians had intercepted the Persian envoy Artaphernes who had been making his way to Sparta with letters from the king, and how the Athenians decided to send him back with messages of their own - only to discover that the king had just died (4.50.1ff). There can be little doubt that Thucydides is holding back other references to this sort of diplomatic activity, for Aristophanes' Acharnians, produced at the Lenaea of 425, shows at the very least that Athens had just seen the return of an embassy from Persia (cf. Ach.61ff, supposed to have been dispatched epi Euthymenous arkhontos, i.e. 437, but presumably this is comic exaggeration of the delay). A more natural view of the Acharnians-passage is that such embassies were a familiar occurrence at this time, for the reaction of the characters does not suggest that this is the first such occasion; indeed Dikaiopolis' grumble at 62-3, ἄχθομαι 'γὼ πρέσβεσιν / καὶ τοῖς ταῶσι τοῖς τ' ἀλαζονεύμασιν, implies rather the opposite. Dikaiopolis' peacocks are presumably gifts of the Persian king to the ambassadors, a luxury from the province of India, and this seems to tie in with a number of other pieces of evidence: Plato's reference in the Charmides (Pl.Charm.158A) to Pyrilampes, son of Antiphon (cf. PA 12493, with Davies, APF 8792.VIII), who was greatly honoured "whenever he went as an ambassador to the Great King or anyone else in Asia Minor"; Plutarch's mention of Pyrilampes, "a comrade of Pericles, accused of using his peacocks to bribe the women with whom Pericles consorted" (Per.13.15); and Athenaeus' reference to a speech of Antiphon (Athen.397CD = Antiphon F57 Blass), in which the orator mentioned that Pyrilampes' son Demos had a much-prized collection of peacocks - although the exhibition of these birds at Athens had been going on 30 years or more before the date of the speech (? 413 BC)[81]. Demos too seems to have been involved in diplomacy with the Persian king like his father, to judge from the gift of a gold cup mentioned by Lysias (19.25). This evidence suggests to me that men like Pyrilampes, and possibly also Diotimos son of Strombichos, mentioned by Strabo as having been an ambassador to Persia (Strabo 1.3.1 (p.47) = Damastes FGH 5F8; possibly the general of 432, cf. Thucyd. 1.45.2, with Davies, APF p.161), had been engaged in diplomacy with Persia fairly regularly before the date of the Acharnians. Pyrilampes could, of course, have been given his peacocks as a junior member of Callias' party, and Diotimos may possibly have been a member of the embassy parodied in the Acharnians, but such economy with the evidence is scarcely necessary. Did the Athenians, for example, not test out the support of Persia in anticipation of the outbreak of the war with Sparta? I find it hard to believe that, despite the continued popularity of the charge of medism at Athens[82], the state did not in fact keep up diplomatic contact with Persia, with families like those of Pyrilampes repeatedly called on to assist with the negotiations: was 449 the only year in which peacocks were brought back to Athens before the Peloponnesian War, or does Dikaiopolis' bored familiarity suggest otherwise?

Perhaps the precise details of diplomatic relations in the years after Callias' embassy do not radically affect the interpretation of Herodotus here, since his invidious contrast between the attitudes of the Persian Wars and those of the period that followed remains the same whether or not any Athenian ever spoke to the Great King after 449 and before Herodotus wrote this passage[83]. Implicit in any treaty with Persia was the suspicion that the party concerned was shamefully turning to the former enemy for assistance against its former friends, as indeed both Sparta and Athens were prepared to do in the Ionian War, and as Thucydides grudgingly acknowledges they were both contemplating as soon as the events at Plataea had formally begun the war (cf. 2.7.1, πρεσβείας τε μέλλοντες πέμπειν παρὰ βασιλέα καὶ ἄλλοσε πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, εἴ ποθέν τινα ὠφελίαν ἤλπιζον ἑκάτεροι προσλήψεσθαι). That this was indeed the way that Herodotus thought will be seen when we come to discuss the debate at Athens at the end of Book Eight, where the possibility of Athens "coming to terms with the Mede in order to enslave the rest of the Greeks" is voiced rather too pointedly for it not to strike some modern chord. It is enough to suggest here that the significance of the embassy of Callias at 7.151 (like the embassy of the Spartans at 7.137, above) is that it can be construed as a betrayal of all that the Persian Wars had meant; for Herodotus no doubt knew that a policy of peace with Persia by the Athenians went hand in hand with a policy of aggression towards Sparta and her allies, not to mention the conversion of the Delian League into an instrument for the enslavement of Athens' own allies[84]. At the very least such things must have been in the air at the time of Herodotus' writing, even if there were not suspicions, whether justified or not, that Athens was trying to secure influence with Persia in anticipation of the war with Sparta. If we follow Fornara's attractive dating of the completion of the work to the end of the Archidamian War (cf. Ch.III.Introd.), we could argue that Herodotus is actually encouraged to think this way on account of the recent re-negotiation of the terms of the earlier peace in the Peace of Epilykos (424-3 BC).

We have thus arrived at the possible reason for Herodotus wanting to contrast the behaviour of the Argives here with that of another party which has behaved more 'shamefully' still. While the Argives may indeed have medized out of self-interest, at least they are not guilty of the Athenians' later hypocrisy in accepting peace terms with Persia in the interests of aggression against those they had earlier called their allies. The Athenians are 'guilty' in precisely the way that Sthenelaidas accuses them of being: διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὅτι ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται (cf. Thucyd.1.86.1, above).

4. The embassy to Gelon (7.153ff) both contrasts and compares with the embassy to Argos, but the principal distinction can be simply stated: while it appeared obvious in the case of Argos that the Argives were not really interested in compromise of any sort, and that the allied overtures were unjustly rebuffed[85], the opposite seems to happen at Syracuse, and Gelon seems prepared to make the most generous concessions, while the intransigence of the allies is this time shown up most clearly[86]. The opening speech of the allies is typically full of fine sentiments (e.g. 7.157.2): ἢν δὲ ἡμέων οἱ μὲν καταπροδιδῶσι, οἱ δὲ μὴ θέλωσι τιμωρέειν, τὸ δὲ ὑγιαῖνον τῆς Ἑλλάδος [87] ἦι ὀλίγον, τοῦτο δὲ ἤδη δεινὸν γίνεται μὴ πέσηι πᾶσα ἡ Ἑλλάς. The loyal Greeks are interested in saving the whole of Greece: the moral tone is very high! Gelon's reaction at once strikes the reader as abrupt and unexpected, even, until we realize what he is talking about, unreasonable (7.158.1f): ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, λόγον ἔχοντες πλεονέκτην (cf. 7.149.3, above) ἐτολμήσατε ἐμὲ σύμμαχον ἐπὶ τὸν βάρβαρον παρακαλέσαντες ἐλθεῖν. When at another time I asked you for your help against a barbarian army, when my quarrel with the Carthaginians broke out, and I begged you to avenge upon the Egesteans their murder of Dorieus, and offered to help you free the ports which have been the source of such profit and advantage to you, you refused either to help me or avenge Dorieus - and for all you cared, this whole country might be subject to barbarian rule[88]. ἀλλὰ εὖ γὰρ ἡμῖν καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄμεινον κατέστη. νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ περιελήλυθε ὁ πόλεμος καὶ ἀπῖκται ἐς ὑμέας, οὕτω δὴ Γέλωνος μνῆστις γέγονε. Gelon then, unlike the Argives, has a genuine reason for calling the Greeks self-interested and grasping. Though they speak in lofty terms about the common interests of the Greeks, they can all too easily be

convicted of arrogance and disregard for those very same interests: they were not moved by appeals either of honour or material profit, let alone considerations of Hellenic unity, to assist Gelon against the Carthaginians. With a magnanimity designed to shame the ambassadors[89] Gelon claims he will help them (7.158.4): ἀτιμίης δὲ πρὸς ὑμέων κυρήσας οὐκ ὁμοιώσομαι ὑμῖν, ἀλλ’ ἕτοιμός εἰμι βοηθέειν . His promise of 200 triremes, 20,000 hoplites, 2,000 horses, 2,000 bowmen, 2,000 slingers, and 2,000 light infantry, together with grain to feed the entire Greek army as long as it is fighting the war, sounds magnificently generous[90]. But the promise is conditional (158.5): ἐπ’ ὧι τε στρατηγὸς ἔσομαι πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον, he continues to demand. At this the Spartan envoy, Syagros, replies in shocked disgust, and without any word of compromise (7.159): ἦ κε μέγ’ οἰμώξειε ὁ Πελοπίδης ’Αγαμέμνων ... ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν βούλεαι βοηθέειν τῆι ‘Ελλάδι, ἴσθι ἀρξόμενος ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ...
The Spartans assume without argument that their claim to the hegemony of the Greeks is the same as it was when 'Spartan' Agamemnon was king and led the Greeks to Troy, a presumption both arrogant and petty.

When Gelon reproves them for their insulting answer, we can see his point (7.160.1): ὀνείδεα κατιόντα ἀνθρώπωι φιλέει ἐπανάγειν τὸν θυμόν· σὺ μέντοι ἀποδεξάμενος ὑβρίσματα ἐν τῶι λόγωι οὔ με ἔπεισας ἀσχήμονα ἐν τῆι ἀμοιβῆι γενέσθαι. He continues to temper his indignation with compromise and makes a second offer (160.2, ἡμεῖς τι ὑπείξομεν τοῦ ἀρχαίου λόγου): he will lead either by sea or by land, depending on which the Spartans themselves choose. The offer, though still demanding, is, as Gelon himself points out, reasonable given that he is volunteering to provide not only the greatest land force but also the largest fleet. But before the Spartan envoy can answer the Athenian ambassador intervenes (7.161.1): ὦ βασιλεῦ Συρηκοσίων, οὐκ ἡγεμόνος δεομένη ἡ ‘Ελλὰς ἀπέπεμψε ἡμέας πρός σε, ἀλλὰ στρατιῆς.
"We made no fuss when you asked for the hegemony of the whole army; but now that you claim the leadership of the fleet, even if the Spartans give it to you, we will not stand by (161.3):

> μάτην γὰρ ἂν ὧδε πάραλον Ἑλλήνων στρατὸν πλεῖστον εἴημεν ἐκτημένοι, εἰ Συρηκοσίοισι εόντες Ἀθηναῖοι συγχωρήσομεν τῆς ἡγεμονίης, ἀρχαιότατον μὲν ἔθνος παρεχόμενοι, μοῦνοι δὲ ἐόντες οὐ μετανάσται Ἑλλήνων· τῶν καὶ Ὅμηρος ὁ ἐποποιὸς ἄνδρα ἄριστον ἔφησε ἐς Ἴλιον ἀπικέσθαι τάξαι τε καὶ διακοσμῆσαι στρατόν. οὕτω οὐκ ὄνειδός ἐστι οὐδὲν ἡμῖν λέγειν ταῦτα.

Once again, though here even more explicitly, the claim to the hegemony is based on remote claims about the mythical past, on the one hand the autochthonous antiquity of the Athenian people (a point of dubious relevance here, but something the Athenians always said[91], implies Herodotus), and on the other the heroic qualities of Homer's Menestheus (Il.2.552), not the most memorable of the poem's heroes! Gelon's final answer is even more justly scornful than anything he has yet said (7.162.1):

> ξεῖνε Ἀθηναῖε, ὑμεῖς οἴκατε τοὺς μὲν ἄρχοντας ἔχειν, τοὺς δὲ ἀρξομένους οὐκ ἕξειν. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὐδὲν ὑπιέντες ἔχειν τὸ πᾶν ἐθέλετε, οὐκ ἂν φθάνοιτε τὴν ταχίστην ὀπίσω ἀπαλλασσόμενοι[92] καὶ ἀγγέλλοντες τῆι Ἑλλάδι ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ τὸ ἔαρ ἐξαραίρηται[93].

The moral of this embassy is clear: the dispute over the hegemony is meant to show up the pleonexia[94] of the Greeks, and of the Spartans and Athenians in particular, and the fatuousness of their desire to lead rather than to be led. Particularly important is the tone of the dispute, ranging as it does from the pomposity of the Greeks' opening gambit to the petty and self-important bickering that ensues, with all its artificial arguments from the mythical past. Herodotus has disturbingly caught the mood of intransigence and divisiveness on both sides. What emerges is the disunity of the Greeks, the conflict between their avowed ideals of Hellenic unity and their actual response to the crisis[95]. In addition, the comparison of then and now once more rears its head: the conflict over the hegemony of the Greeks was the issue of Herodotus' lifetime, the issue which had already reached its crisis-point at the time he was writing[96]. The very same unwillingness to be led rather than to lead, justly rebuked by Gelon, the desire to have all and yield nothing, had emerged after the war in the ever-growing dispute between Athens and Sparta over the hegemony of the Greeks, culminating at last in the Peloponnesian War (cf. Herodotus' own description at 6.98.2, αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων).

The sequel to the account of the debate at Syracuse is puzzling, and deserves closer attention lest it should be thought that Herodotus is not really in control of his subject. After the departure of the Greek embassy Gelon considers his position (7.163.1):

> δείσας μὲν περὶ τοῖσι Ἕλλησι μὴ οὐ δύνωνται τὸν βάρβαρον ὑπερβαλέσθαι, δεινὸν δὲ καὶ οὐκ ἀνασχετὸν ποιησάμενος ἐλθὼν ἐς Πελοπόννησον ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἐὼν Σικελίης τύραννος.

Accordingly he sends Cadmus, son of Coes, to Delphi with a large sum of money, with which he is to make friendly overtures to Xerxes in the event of a Persian victory. Naturally this puts a rather different complexion on Gelon's former conduct and speeches: the difference lies in Herodotus' characteristic use of perspective. In the previous scene Gelon appeared as a foil to the Greek ambassadors and hence we were tempted to see him more as a shrewd and disinterested critic of Greek arrogance; now we are made to see what we have no doubt already suspected, that he spoke with tyrannical pride, prepared all the while to countenance the defeat of the Greeks if necessary, and come to terms with Xerxes, no less than the Argives in the previous episode. The reader begins to doubt whether he ever really meant to help the Greeks.

The next section, however, is more difficult. Herodotus introduces a supplementary Sicilian story, as it seems, an addition to what has already been related (7.165f): λέγεται δὲ καὶ τάδε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Σικελίηι οἰκημένων ὡς ὅμως καὶ μέλλων ἄρχεσθαι ὑπὸ Λακεδαιμονίων ὁ Γέλων ἐβοήθησε ἂν τοῖσι Ἕλλησι, εἰ μὴ ... : and there follows the story of Terillos' and Hamilcar's invasion. Only at the end does the crunch come:

> οὕτω δὴ οὐκ οἷόν τε γενόμενον βοηθέειν τὸν Γέλωνα τοῖσι Ἕλλησι ἀποπέμπειν ἐς Δελφοὺς τὰ χρήματα, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τάδε λέγουσι, ὡς συνέβη τῆς αὐτῆς ἡμέρης ἔν τε τῆι Σικελίηι Γέλωνα καὶ Θήρωνα νικᾶν Ἁμίλκαν τὸν Καρχηδόνιον καὶ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι τοὺς Ἕλληνας τὸν Πέρσην.

Surely this version, which Herodotus does nothing to refute, and even seems to accept as true[97], completely overturns the presuppositions of his lengthily reported Syracusan debate? If Gelon was indeed engaged in a war with Hamilcar and Carthage, there is no sense in his offers of help to the Greek allies. The simple answer would be to assume that Herodotus is not in control of his source-material, and has reported two conflicting stories without being aware that the second cancels out the first[98]. However, it is clear that Herodotus is not so confused, and that in retailing the second version he still has the first in mind. The story about Cadmus and the embassy to Delphi is firmly attached to the first version, since Herodotus clearly gives as its motive Gelon's reaction to the failure of his discussion with the allies (7.163.1 πρὸς ταῦτα (i.e. the debate) δείσας μὲν ...). And the second Sicilian version explicitly recalls the mission of Cadmus, in order to interpret it in a different way (7.165, οὕτω δὴ οὐκ οἷόν τε γενόμενον βοηθέειν ... ἀποπέμπειν ἐς Δελφοὺς τὰ χρήματα). Thus it is impossible to explain the contradiction in terms of Herodotus' blindness to the relation between the two stories. The 'Sicilian version' was, however, almost certainly the story that the Greeks knew best: Pindar's First Pythian[99] speaks of Himera as a subject of renown to equal that of Salamis or Thermophylae (Py.1.75ff):

> ... ἀρέομαι
> πὰρ μὲν Σαλαμῖνος Ἀθαναίων χάριν
> μισθόν, ἐν Σπάρται δ' ⟨ἆρα⟩ τᾶν πρὸ Κιθαιρῶνος μαχᾶν,
> ταῖσι Μήδειοι κάμον ἀγκυλότοξοι,
> παρὰ δὲ τὰν εὔυδρον ἀκτὰν
> Ἱμέρα παίδεσσιν ὕμνον Δεινομένεος τελέσαις,
> τὸν ἐδέξαντ' ἀμφ' ἀρετᾶι,
> πολεμίων ἀνδρῶν καμόντων.

Likewise the battle of Kyme, the final victory in the same Sicilian struggle, in which it could be claimed that the lord of Syracuse saved Greece from burdensome slavery (ibid.71ff, Ἑλλάδ' ἐξέλκων βαρείας δουλίας), could hardly be one whose fame had not spread beyond Sicily[100]. Thus not to have mentioned the war with Carthage would have laid Herodotus open to easy criticism. So, faced with the problem of wanting to retain both his Syracusan debate, the essential point of which was to show the allies not prepared to compromise in any way with a powerful and apparently willing friend, and the truth about Himera, Herodotus chose to advance the second story as an epichoric variant - although, of course, to ease the transition he begins by presenting it as a supplement, as we saw above, that is, not immediately facing the reader with the contradiction of the two accounts. It can only be that he thought he could get away with it! The probability is that though Herodotus was indeed told of an embassy of the confederates to Gelon, he had no particular information about why it failed to bring him into the alliance, and hence that the entire debate, with its illustration of the theme of Greek disunity and the conflict over the hegemony, is his own imaginative reconstruction[101]. This explanation avoids the necessity of supposing that Herodotus has been confused by an alternative chronology of Gelon's Carthaginian conflict, and that the tradition that Himera and Salamis took place on the same day (7.166, ascribed to the Sicilians) never had any warrant in historical reality[102].

5. The embassy to Corcyra deserves brief mention as once more illustrating quite clearly the conflict of fine words and shameful actions. The Corcyreans at once promise help to the Greeks (7.168.1), φράζοντες ὡς οὔ σφι περιοπτέη ἐστὶ ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἀπολλυμένη· ἢν γὰρ σφαλῆι, σφεῖς γε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δουλεύσουσι τῆι πρώτηι τῶν ἡμερέων· ἀλλὰ τιμωρητέον εἴη ἐς τὸ δυνατώτατον. The Corcyreans affect to identify entirely with the Greek cause: their interests are the interests of all free Greeks; it would be unthinkable for them to do other than to defend those interests. But Herodotus tells us exactly how to take this rhetoric (168.2):

> ὑπεκρίναντο μὲν οὕτω εὐπρόσωπα· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔδει βοηθέειν, ἄλλα νοεῦντες ἐπλήρωσαν νέας ἑξήκοντα, μόγις δὲ ἀναχθέντες προσέμειξαν τῆι Πελοποννήσωι ... καραδοκέοντες καὶ οὗτοι[103] τὸν πόλεμον τῆι πεσέεται, ἀελπτέοντες μὲν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὑπερβαλέεσθαι, δοκέοντες δὲ τὸν Πέρσην κατακρατήσαντα πολλὸν ἄρξειν τῆς Ἑλλάδος.

Herodotus moreover does not make do with this malicious inference about their motives, but goes on to elaborate their intended course of action, even to the extent of imagining what they meant to say to Xerxes (168.3f):

> ὦ βασιλεῦ, ἡμεῖς παραλαμβανόντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡμέας ...οὐκ ἐθελήσαμέν τοι ἀντιοῦσθαι οὐδέ τι ἀποθύμιον ποιῆσαι. τοιαῦτα λέγοντες ἤλπιζον πλέον τι τῶν ἄλλων οἴσεσθαι· τά περ ἂν καὶ ἐγένετο, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέει. πρὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἕλληνάς σφι σκῆψις ἐπεποίητο, τῆι περ δὴ καὶ ἐχρήσαντο.

To the Greeks they said that they had manned the 60 ships but had been unable to round Malea because of the Etesian gales and thus had failed to make it to

Salamis. Herodotus has of couse prejudged the issue, elaborating the duplicity of the Corcyreans by all the means at his disposal[104]. Indeed he charges them not merely with acting in the interests of self-preservation, but with actually anticipating profit from their 'assistance' to the Great King (*pleonexia*)[105]: he even ventures that their hopes would have been fulfilled, 'as it seems to him'. This is a particularly clear example of the use Herodotus can make of malicious inferences, where there is no reason for us to suppose he has been especially influenced by any source. It is all surely free dramatic elaboration - and it will be useful later to remember the techniques he employs in such a case.

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(F) Tempe to Thermopylae.

1. The first battle-front of the war is not Thermopylae, but Tempe, an inglorious fiasco, which Herodotus is not in any way concerned to play down. Thessaly is another state in which the advent of the Mede opens up the domestic rivalries of the different parties (cf. Eretria and Athens in (C).2 above). Herodotus had warned us earlier that Xerxes was mistaken in supposing that he had originally won the support of the whole population (7.130.3). Now he reminds us that Thessaly's medism was only sponsored by the Aleuadai at first (7.172.1): Θέσσαλοι δὲ ὑπὸ ἀναγκαίης τὸ πρῶτον ἐμήδισαν, ὡς διέδεξαν, ὅτι οὐ σφι ἥνδανε τὰ οἱ Ἀλευάδαι ἐμηχάνωντο. For when they first heard of Xerxes' intention to cross into Europe, they sent ambassadors to the Greeks at the Isthmus and impressed upon them the necessity of sending a force to guard the Olympic pass. Herodotus' personation pays careful attention to the psychology of the Thessalians (7.172.2f):

> ὡς εἰ μὴ πέμψετε, ἐπίστασθε ἡμέας ὁμολογήσειν τῶι Πέρσηι· οὐ γάρ τοι προκατημένους τοσοῦτο πρὸ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος μούνους πρὸ ὑμέων δεῖ ἀπολέσθαι. βοηθέειν δὲ οὐ βουλόμενοι ἀναγκαίην ἡμῖν οὐδεμίαν οἷοί τέ ἐστε προσφέρειν· οὐδαμὰ γὰρ ἀδυνασίης ἀνάγκη κρέσσων ἔφυ. ἡμεῖς δὲ πειρησόμεθα αὐτοί τινα σωτηρίην μηχανώμενοι.

Clearly for the Thessalians the myth of Hellenic unity has begun to run a little thin: they see no reason why they should be expected to make sacrifices for the rest of Greece, rather than simply look to their own safety. Naturally they express their choice as no choice: if the Greeks do not help them, they have no choice but to medize. However Herodotus has been clever in his personation of the Thessalians' position: there is undoubtedly a contrast implied here between their arguments and the actions first of the Spartans (with the reservations expressed below) and then of the Athenians - though as we shall see, even the Athenians at one stage threaten the allies with the same argument about the 'necessity' of medism (cf. (I).1, below)[106]. Herodotus here represents clearly the conflict of pragmatism and idealism, which is such a central theme of his narrative.

The expedition to Tempe shows the Greeks sadly lacking in resolve, even though with good enough strategic reasons (7.173.4, δοκέειν δέ μοι, ἀρρωδίη ἦν τὸ πεῖθον, ὡς ἐπύθοντο καὶ ἄλλην ἐοῦσαν ἐσβολὴν ἐς Θεσσάλους ... τῇι περ δὴ καὶ ἐσέβαλε ἡ στρατίη ἡ Ξέρξεω). As for the Thessalians, this is the moment when their slender loyalty to the Greek cause collapses (7.174):

> Θέσσαλοι δὲ ἐρημωθέντες συμμάχων οὕτω δὴ ἐμήδισαν προθύμως οὐδ' ἔτι ἐνδοιαστῶς, ὥστε ἐν τοῖσι πρήγμασι ἐφαίνοντο βασιλέϊ ἄνδρες ἐόντες χρησιμώτατοι.

There seems to be something of a paradox here: the Thessalians had made themselves out to be reluctant medizers, even to the extent of describing their condition as one of unalterable necessity[107]; but once they have made the decision to medize, they do so, as Herodotus has it, with pronounced enthusiasm. Herodotus himself endorses the Thessalians' judgement of their position only to the extent of saying that they medized 'at first' under necessity (cf. 7.172.1, above), but we now see that qualification as a foil to the present passage. The enthusiasm of medizers is a motif we shall meet again: the Greeks who are not loyal to the Hellenic cause instead make a virtue of loyalty to the Persian king, and rejoice in the opportunity to do harm to their fellow-Greeks (for the Thessalians in this role, cf. esp. the anecdote discussed in (A).1, above). There is nothing really paradoxical in the behaviour of the Thessalians here, except in Herodotus' presentation. He was after all careful to show that their loyalty to the Greek cause was only a flimsy thing in the first place, and that the 'necessity' of which they spoke was merely a relative necessity. We are warned here that even where there is not positive duplicity, the loyalty of the allies is most volatile and changeable[108].

2. This will be a convenient point to examine the medism of the Thebans in Herodotus' account. The first mention of the subject follows shortly at the beginning of the narrative of Thermopylae[109]. Leonidas is particularly concerned to take the Thebans along with him (7.205.3):

> ὅτι σφέων μεγάλως κατηγόρητο μηδίζειν· παρεκάλεε ὦν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον
> θέλων εἰδέναι εἴτε συμπέμψουσι εἴτε καὶ ἀπερέουσι ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανέος
> τὴν Ἑλλήνων συμμαχίην. οἱ δὲ ἄλλα φρονέοντες ἔπεμπον.

Once again we must be clear how much of this is Herodotus' work and to what extent he has freely inferred the motives of the parties concerned. Was he actually told by his informants either that Leonidas suspected the Thebans or that the Thebans sent their force to Thermopylae concealing their treacherous intent? Given what we have seen in other contexts (e.g. Corcyra, above), we have no clear warrant to assume this: we should hesitate before accepting charges of duplicity as authentic reports (cf. 7.168.2 above, alla noeuntes). The part played by the Thebans at Thermopylae is, of course, a notorious crux for the historian[110]. Herodotus reports that Leonidas sent away the rest of the allies when the news came that they could no longer hold the pass (7.220.1f, below), but that he kept back the Thebans against their will (7.222):

> τούτων δὲ Θηβαῖοι μὲν ἀέκοντες ἔμενον καὶ οὐ βουλόμενοι (κατεῖχε γάρ
> σφεας ἐν ὁμήρων λόγωι ποιεύμενος), Θεσπιέες δὲ ἑκόντες μάλιστα,
> οἱ οὐκ ἔφασαν ἀπολιπόντες Λεωνίδην καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτοῦ ἀπαλλάξεσθαι,
> ἀλλὰ καταμείναντες συναπέθανον.

It is quite clear what literary effect Herodotus has aimed at here: the Thebans' treachery is a foil to the Thespians' loyalty. But as an account of something that really happened in the battle, this story is hard to credit in this form[111]. That Leonidas should have kept the Thebans by him in the last extremity, and even before, 'as hostages' is certainly suprising: they could only have been a liability if their loyalty was indeed suspect[112]. But Herodotus' account is surely satisfactory enough in itself: for him, the Thebans always meant to medize as soon as they were given a chance, and that is what they did (7.233.1f):

> τέως μὲν μετὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐόντες ἐμάχοντο ὑπ' ἀναγκαίης ἐχόμενοι πρὸς τὴν βασιλέος στρατιήν· ὡς δὲ εἶδον κατυπέρτερα τῶν Περσέων γινόμενα τὰ πρήγματα, οὕτω δὴ ... ἀποσχισθέντες τούτων χεῖράς τε πρότεινον καὶ ἤισαν ἆσσον τῶν βαρβάρων, λέγοντες τὸν ἀληθέστατον τῶν λόγων, ὡς μηδίζουσι καὶ γήν τε καὶ ὕδωρ ἐν πρώτοισι ἔδοσαν βασιλέϊ, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀναγκαίης ἐχόμενοι ἐς Θερμοπύλας ἀπικοίατο καὶ ἀναίτιοι εἶεν τοῦ τρώματος τοῦ γεγονότος βασιλέϊ[113], ταῦτα λέγοντες περιεγένοντο· εἶχον γὰρ καὶ Θεσσάλους τούτων τῶν λόγων μάρτυρας[114].

It seems clear that Herodotus has made up his own mind and imposed his own interpretation: the Theban claim to be medizing was absolutely correct, he says, and true too their claim not to have been responsible for the harm done to the king. The words here underlined are an advertisement of Herodotus' own reflexion on the matter: 'I know the Thebans to have begun to medize long before and not now for the first time, as it might have seemed'. He must himself be aware that the presence of the Thebans at Thermopylae in the last stages was problematic on his interpretation, and hence he is here concerned to vindicate the truth of his judgement that they were kept there against their will (cf. the repetition of hyp' anagkaiēs ekhomenoi).

The sequel to this action of the Thebans also contains a lesson, where again Herodotus intrudes his own reflexion (7.233.2): οὐ μέντοι τά γε πάντα εὐτύχησαν . The Thebans thought that, like many other medizers, they would profit from their treachery, and that they might escape the vengeance of Persians and Greeks alike: Herodotus' inference is quite clearly malicious. But their luck now ran out (233.2):

> ὡς γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἔλαβον οἱ βάρβαροι ἐλθόντας, τοὺς μέν τινας καὶ ἀπέκτειναν

> προσιόντας, τοὺς δὲ πλεῦνας αὐτῶν κελεύσαντος Ξέρξεω ἔστιξαν στίγματα βασιλήια, ἀρξάμενοι ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ Λεοντιάδεω, τοῦ τὸν παῖδα Εὐρύμαχον χρόνωι μετέπειτα ἐφόνευσαν Πλαταιέες στρατηγήσαντα ἀνδρῶν Θηβαίων τετρακοσίων καὶ σχόντα τὸ ἄστυ Πλαταιέων (cf. Thucyd.2.2ff).

The forward reference to the Thebans treacherous attack on Plataea is not a casual parenthesis, but a deliberate comparison of then and now[115]. The treachery of the Thebans in the present is no different from their behaviour during the Persian Wars: the coincidence between the fates of father and son is meant to bring home to us that the Thebans have not changed. One need only remember how they behaved then to understand what they are doing now. Would we however really be justified in assuming, as is usually done[116], that Herodotus was not independent here, but relied for his understanding of the Thebans' conduct on malignant gossip at Athens or some other state hostile to Thebes? Certainly there can have been many (not only the Athenians) who would have wished to give Herodotus a malicious account of Theban behaviour during the Persian Wars (cf. Thucyd.3.54ff), but has Herodotus merely been gullible, or is he rather being malicious on his own account? It may indeed be that he was wrongly told that the Thebans at Thermopylae were kept behind by Leonidas against their will; but may it not equally be that he has supplied this motif entirely on his own authority? Given the facts that the Thebans did stay behind with Leonidas and that they capitulated at the last moment, he may have proceeded to give the story dramatic elaboration, by inferring (a) their original duplicity, (b) Leonidas' suspicions, and (c) the manner of their appeal to the Persians when they finally surrendered. That these inferences are so uncharitable need occasion no surprise by now (and see below, 9.86ff).

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3. Of the Spartans at Thermopylae Herodotus tells a number of stories to illustrate their sang froid and quiet heroism: what the Persian scout sees before the battle[117] and its interpretation by Demaratus[118]; Leonidas' devotion

in the light of the oracle (7.220.3f, either Sparta must fall or Lakedaimon bewail the loss of her king); Megistias' foreknowledge of his own end and his determination to remain (7.221); the heroic remark of Dienekes (7.226.1). Herodotus emphasis on the heroism of the Spartan self-sacrifice is clear (e.g. 7.223.4, knowing that they were to die, they fought magnificently, without regard for their lives), in particular his insistence on having discovered the names of all the Spartans who died[119], a claim that has a clear encomiastic function. The unusually affecting recital of the epigrams on the slain (7.228,) - Herodotus significantly does this for no other battle of the war - confirms that Thermopylae is meant to be seen as an act of heroism of a kind more honestly grand and pathetic than anything else in the war[119a]. The narrative is an illustration of those virtues claimed for the Spartans by Demaratus (7.101ff): but, as we shall see , it is also in a different way an illustration of the weaknesses of Spartan nomos.

The Spartans remain at the centre of the stage throughout, but their own conduct sets off and is set off by the behaviour of the rest of the allies. The Spartans send Leonidas and his force of 300 to Thermophylae (7.206.1): ἵνα ὁρῶντες οἱ ἄλλοι σύμμαχοι στρατεύωνται μηδὲ καὶ οὗτοι (i.e. like the Thebans!) μηδίσωσι. In other words, the Spartans hope that their initiative will help keep together the faint-hearted alliance. Nonetheless once assembled at Thermopylae, with the Persians approaching, the Greeks lose heart (7.207): καταρρωδέοντες ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς. "It was proposed by the Peloponnesians generally to fall back and hold the Isthmus secure; but when the Phocians and Locrians expressed anger at this suggestion, Leonidas voted that they should stay where they were and send messengers to the cities demanding help, as their numbers were inadequate to cope with the Persians"[120]. The inconstancy of the allies, a motif we shall meet again and again throughout the narrative of the Persian Wars, is set against the decision of Leonidas to remain - though this decision is only reached at the most urgent - and self-interested - demands of the Phocians and Locrians. When the news of the descent of the

Persians over the mountain path reaches the beleaguered Greeks after several days of fighting, there is once more a division of opinion (7.219.2), "some urging that they should not abandon their post, others taking the opposite view". And some leave for home, while the rest remain to fight with Leonidas[121]. Herodotus then raises the question of how it was that they actually came to go home (7.220.1f):

> λέγεται δὲ ⟨καὶ⟩[122] ὡς αὐτός σφεας ἀπέπεμψε Λεωνίδης, μὴ ἀπόλωνται κηδόμενος· αὐτῶι δὲ καὶ Σπαρτιητέων τοῖσι παρεοῦσι οὐκ ἔχειν εὐπρεπέως ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν ἐς τὴν ἦλθον φυλάξοντες ἀρχήν. ταύτηι καὶ μᾶλλον[123] τὴν γνώμην πλεῖστός εἰμι, Λεωνίδην, ἐπείτε ἤισθετο τοὺς συμμάχους ἐόντας ἀπροθύμους καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλοντας συνδιακινδυνεύειν, κελεῦσαί σφεας ἀπαλλάσεσθαι, αὐτῶι δὲ ἀπιέναι οὐ καλῶς ἔχειν· μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο.

It is hard to believe, however exactly we constitute the text, that Herodotus is here simply repeating the same opinion twice over (λέγεται δὲ ... / ταύτηι καὶ μᾶλλον ...) in more or less the same words; rather he must be contrasting the opinion first reported with the opinion he goes on to give in his own person. Originally, in the first narrative report, it seemed that after the debate the allies simply got up and left on their own intiative; then (λέγεται δὲ ...) it is suggested that Leonidas dismissed them formally, because he knew that the cause was now hopeless and nothing was to be gained from their staying to die with him; finally Herodotus offers his own opinion that Leonidas sent them away because he saw that they in fact had no stomach for the fight and would not be of much use if they stayed. In other words Herodotus goes out of his way to give authority to an account of the matter which credits the allies with the least firmness of purpose and unity of resolve. It would have been quite possible for Herodotus to have glossed over the allies' lack of loyalty: instead he makes so much fuss over the matter of their departure that we cannot but take notice of this uncomfortable detail (and cf. Herodotus' recapitulation at 7.220.4, ἀποπέμψαι τοὺς συμμάχους μᾶλλον ἢ γνώμηι διενειχθέντας οὕτως ἀκόσμως οἴχεσθαι τοὺς οἰχομένους).

4. The last word on Spartan heroism is not given in the honorific catalogue which draws to an end at 7.228.4. Not unnaturally Herodotus has dissociated

the story of the Thebans' medism (7.233, above) from the main account of the battle, so that it does not disturb the heroic narrative of the Spartan achievement[124]; but before the Theban section and after the catalogue of Spartan heroism he has added a most detailed account (complete with an unusually trenchant commentary), whose clear purpose is to suggest the weaknesses inherent in Spartan obedience to *nomos*[125]. It is said, Herodotus begins, that two of the 300 might have made common cause and either both returned safe home to Sparta, as they had been released by Leonidas and lay at Alpenoi suffering severely from ophthalmia, or both have chosen to die along with the rest. But they did not choose to act in concert: instead, Eurytos, when he heard about the Persian circumvention, armed and ordered his helot slave to tale him to the battle, where he plunged into the throng and was killed; Aristodemos on the other hand was left behind in a swoon[126]. Herodotus then (229.2) offers his own judgement on the matter - although the preceding narrative is also heavily coloured in anticipation of this paragraph, in particular in its forceful emphasis on the failure of the two to make common cause (παρεὸν αὐτοῖσι ἀμφοτέροισι κοινῶι λόγωι χρησάμενοι ... παρεόν σφι τούτων τὰ ἕτερα ποιέειν οὐκ ἐθελῆσαι ὁμοφρονέειν, ἀλλὰ γνώμηι διενειχθέντας ...). Herodotus argues that if either Aristodemos had returned to Sparta as the only one afflicted with his disability, or if both had returned together, δοκέειν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἄν σφι Σπαρτιήτας μῆνιν οὐδεμίαν προσθέσθαι. But as it was, since one of them was killed and the other with the same excuse chose not to die, ἀναγκαίως σφι ἔχειν μηνῖσαι μεγάλως Ἀριστοδήμωι. And that is how some say Aristodemos came home to Sparta (7.230), but others recount that he was sent as a messenger from the camp, and though he could have made it back to the battle, chose not to, whereas his fellow-messenger returned to Sparta (7.231), ὄνειδός τε εἶχε καὶ ἀτιμίην[127]. No Spartan would kindle a fire for him and no-one spoke to him: ὄνειδός τε εἶχε ὁ τρέσας Ἀριστόδημος καλεόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐν τῆι Πλαταιῆισι μάχηι ἀνέλαβε πᾶσαν τὴν ἐπενειχθεῖσαν αἰτίην. And another messenger sent to Thessaly from the 300, named Pantites (7.232), returned alive to

Sparta, νοστήσαντα δὲ τοῦτον ἐς Σπάρτην, ὡς ἠτίμωτο, ἀπάγξασθαι.

All this is not merely of antiquarian interest to Herodotus, as shown by the length of the narrative and the care he takes both in preparing and expounding his interpretation. For a clearer picture, however, we should look forward to the resolution of the story in the later account. Of the *aristoi* at Plataea Herodotus first of all singles out Aristodemos (9.71.2): καὶ ἄριστος ἐγένετο μακρῶι Ἀριστόδημος κατὰ γνώμας τὰς ἡμετέρας, ὃς ἐκ Θερμοπυλέων μοῦνος τῶν τριηκοσίων σωθεὶς εἶχε ὄνειδος καὶ ἀτιμίην. After him ranked Poseidonios, Philokyon and Amompharetos, all Spartans. And yet when the Spartans discussed who had been the most virtuous (71.3), they decided that Aristodemos had wanted an illustrious end because of his disgrace: βουλόμενον φανερῶς ἀποθανεῖν ἐκ τῆς παρεούσης οἱ αἰτίης, λύσσωντά τε καὶ ἐκλείποντα τὴν τάξιν ἔργα μεγάλα ἀποδέξασθαι. But Poseidonios had fought bravely having no wish to die and was thus so much the more virtuous (i.e. brave). But Herodotus adds significantly (71.4): ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν καὶ φθόνωι ἂν εἴποιεν. While the others all received honours for their valour, Aristodemos alone did not.

What Herodotus himself feels about all this is surely that the Spartans' respect for valour is limited and arbitrary: his remarkable inference that they merely witheld honours from Aristodemos because of envy points to an obvious scorn for their arguments[128]. Similarly in the earlier narrative we can understand from Herodotus' careful hints that it was merely a matter of chance that Aristodemos came to be dishonoured: had it not been for the invidious comparison with Eurytos, the Spartans would not have blamed him, that is, there was nothing objectively wrong about what Aristodemos did, it only came to seem wrong to the Spartans (with their peculiar conception of virtue), because of what Eurytos did. It is most unlikely, however, that the Spartans actually felt as they did towards Aristodemos simply because of the comparison[129]; they were surely not as perverse as Herodotus makes them in having been prepared not to blame Aristodemos at all if there had been no such comparison (cf.

7.229.2, δοκέειν ἐμοὶ οὐκ ἄν σφι Σπαρτιήτας μῆνιν οὐδεμίαν προσθέσθαι) It seems likely that Herodotus has constructed the paradox simply to provoke the reader to think about the arbitrariness of Spartan ideas of virtue.

The story surely invites further reflexion: it is hard to believe that the prominence given it in Herodotus' account is meant only to show up one particular anomaly in Spartan behaviour on one particular occasion; it is surely rather a comment on the nature of Spartan valour itself, and on the intransigent demands of the state on the individual. Demaratus had defined Spartan *nomos* as a harsh and uncompromising master, which demanded unquestioning obedience of its subjects (7.104.5): ποιεῦσι γῶν τὰ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ἀνώγηι· ἀνώγει δὲ τὠὐτὸ αἰεί, οὐκ ἐῶν φεύγειν οὐδὲν πλῆθος ἀνθρώπων ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλὰ μένοντας ἐν τῆι τάξι ἐπικρατέειν ἢ ἀπόλλυσθαι. Eurytos' sacrifice, Pantites' suicide, Aristodemos' disgrace, all testify to the power exercised over the minds of the Spartans by this demanding despot. Yet surely Herodotus feels that this is wrong: Aristodemos is a brave man, as his fighting at Plataea showed, and he did not deserve to be treated as he was. As for Eurytos' sacrifice, it is perhaps an act of senseless devotion, given that he and Aristodemos were both incapacitated with an ailment which unfitted them for fighting (ὀφθαλμιῶντες ἐς τὸ ἔσχατον): Eurytos needs to be helped to the battle by his helot, unable to make it alone. Nothing is served thereby, except some rather extreme demand of honour.

It is tempting to see here a comment on the sacrifice of the whole 300 at Thermopylae: did they not merely give up their lives because Spartan *nomos* told them to? This interpretation is supported by a strange omission: nowhere in the account of Thermopylae does Herodotus ever state or imply[130] that the Spartan sacrifice was undertaken on behalf of Hellas, let alone for the ideal of Hellenic liberty! Not least significant is that the epigram he cites in celebration exclusively of the Spartan achievement is that which, most pathetically to the non-Spartan ear, records simply and plainly that they died 'doing their duty' (7.228.2):

> ὦ ξεῖν', ἀγγέλλειν Λακεδαιμονίοις ὅτι τῇδε
> κείμεθα τοῖς κείνων ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

It is hard to believe that there were not epigrams for Sparta which spoke of Thermopylae as a service to Greece[131]. Moreover the epigram quoted is typically Spartan: it is hard to imagine any other state idealising its own authority in this way, and this is surely the reason why Herodotus cites it. The only thing approaching 'idealism' in the Spartans is the desire to achieve *kleos*; as, for example, in Leonidas' reasons for deciding to send away the allies (7.220.4), βουλόμενον κλέος καταθέσθαι μούνων Σπαρτιητέων[132], where there is the faintest hint of fanaticism in the desire that the Spartans should be alone in winning the glory of dying in this lost cause. But surely the 'Legend'[133] would have had it that Sparta's sacrifice was for Greece: no other state, however small its contribution to the defence of Greece, failed to tell the world that its heroic sacrifice was first and foremost a service in the common interest of all the Greeks (*hyper Hellados*: see above), that its warriors laid down their lives to ensure that Hellas did not see the dawn of slavery. We may conclude that Herodotus' picture of the Spartan sacrifice is an equivocal one, tempered by the insight that Sparta did not share in the Greek ideal of freedom: her society under the despotism of *nomos* was free in name only, the sacrifices of her soldiers, at least from a certain point of view, vain and unlovely[134].

5. Herodotus attaches to the account of Thermopylae a final episode whose purpose is clearly to explain the significance of the Spartan resistance. Xerxes asks Demaratus[135], since his words have proved true, to tell him how many Spartans remain, and now many of them are fighters of the same quality (7.234.1ff). Demaratus replies (234.2) that the "Lakedaimonians are many and their cities numerous, but there is in Lakedaimon a city called Sparta of some 8000 men, who are all of the same quality as those he has just seen, and as for the other Lakedaimonians, they are not the same, but good nonetheless".

In other words what we (and Xerxes) have seen at Thermopylae is something exceptional: such things could only have been done by Spartans, their state being what it is. Xerxes then asks the easiest way to conquer them (234.3); and Demaratus proceeds to tell him of how he might take 30 ships and capture Cythera, of which Chilon had once said it were better it were sunk beneath the sea[136]. Xerxes' fleet should make its base on this island and strike terror into the Spartans (235.3):

> παροίκου δὲ πολέμου σφι ἐόντος οἰκηίου οὐδὲν δεινοὶ ἔσονταί τοι μὴ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἁλισκομένης ὑπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ βοηθέωσι ταύτηι. καταδουλωθείσης δὲ τῆς ἄλλης Ἑλλάδος ἀσθενὲς ἤδη τὸ Λακωνικὸν μοῦνον λείπεται.

If Xerxes does not follow this advice, the loyal Peloponnesians will assemble at the Isthmus and provide him with more trouble even than he has just experienced (235.4): ἐκεῖνο δὲ ποιήσαντι ἀμαχητὶ ὅ τε Ἰσθμὸς οὗτος καὶ αἱ πόλιες προσχωρήσουσι. All this strategic speculation, what might have happened had the Persians been able to threaten the Spartans' homelands, is without doubt the product of Herodotus' own imagination, his own interpretation of the story - no question here that he has borrowed the judgements of his sources. The result is a remarkable pendant to his earlier 'strategic analysis' at 7.139. The contrast is obvious: whereas the Athenians were actually prepared to sacrifice Athens and Attica in order to be able to bring the rest of the Greeks into the fight, the Spartans, Herodotus implies, if threatened with danger to their own state (παροίκου δὲ πολέμου σφι ἐόντος οἰκηίου), would have given up all thought of fighting with the rest of the Greeks, that is, they would have at once abandoned the common cause in order to defend themselves alone. Whereas the Athenians see that they can best secure their own survival by abandoning the defence of their own city and lands and making common cause with the rest of the Greeks[137], the Spartans could not see that the unity of the loyal Greeks was the only thing that could guarantee their common survival. If threatened as the Athenians were, they would have adopted a course which would have resulted not only in the defeat of the rest of Greece, but also in defeat for themselves. Once again Herodotus is making a point of the failure of Spartan idealism (or better perhaps, vision): Thermopylae was about Spartan kleos, not about the championship of Hellenic freedom[138].

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(G) Artemisium.

1. We come next to the preparations for Artemisium, where again the issue of Greek unity is raised, this time in a form which poses with the greatest clarity Herodotus ever allows himself the paradox of Athenian motivation (8.3.1f): ἐγένετο γὰρ κατ' ἀρχὰς λόγος, πρὶν ἢ καὶ ἐς Σικελίην πέμπειν ἐπὶ συμμαχίην, ὡς τὸ ναυτικὸν 'Αθηναίοισι χρεὸν εἴη ἐπιτρέπειν. However we are to interpret this passage, we have no licence to argue that Herodotus' portrayal of Athens' stance on the matter of the hegemony here conflicts with what he represented of it in the debate at Syracuse (7.157ff), since he makes clear and deliberate reference to that very debate here. But, he goes on, the allies objected to the Athenian claim:

> ἀντιβάντων δὲ τῶν συμμάχων εἶχον οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι, μέγα πεποιημένοι
> περιεῖναι τὴν 'Ελλάδα καὶ γνόντες, εἰ στασιάσουσι περὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίης,
> ὡς ἀπολέεται ἡ 'Ελλάς, ὀρθὰ νοεῦντες[139]· στάσις γὰρ ἔμφυλος πολέμου
> ὁμοφρονέοντος τοσούτωι κάκιόν ἐστι ὅσωι πόλεμος εἰρήνης. ἐπιστάμενοι
> ὦν αὐτὸ τοῦτο[140], οὐκ ἀντέτεινον ἀλλ' εἶκον, μέχρι κάρτα ὅσου ἐδέοντο
> αὐτῶν, ὡς διέδεξαν· ὡς γὰρ διωσάμενοι τὸν Πέρσην περὶ τῆς ἐκείνου
> ἤδη τὸν ἀγῶνα ἐποιεῦντο, πρόφασιν τὴν Παυσανίεω ὕβριν προϊσχόμενοι
> ἀπείλοντο τὴν ἡγεμονίην τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ὕστερον
> ἐγένετο[141].

The passage is remarkable for its transparent cynicism - and also for its eccentric interpretation of the facts. Herodotus is the only source to suggest that Athens 'made an excuse of Pausanias' behaviour' and 'took away the hegemony from the Spartans': all the others, starting with Thucydides[142], represent the changeover as something that the allies themselves wished, and to which the Spartans consented. After the disgrace of Pausanias, records Thucydides, the Spartans sent out other commanders, led by Dorkis, οἷς οὐκέτι ἐφίεσαν οἱ ξύμμαχοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν (1.95.6f). The Spartans send no more generals, fearing lest they turn out like Pausanias: ἀπαλλαξείοντες δὲ καὶ τοῦ Μηδικοῦ πολέμου καὶ τοὺς 'Αθηναίους νομίζοντες ἱκανοὺς ἐξηγεῖσθαι καὶ σφίσιν ἐν τῶι τότε παρόντι ἐπιτηδείους. And Thucydides goes on (1.96.1): παραλαβόντες δὲ οἱ 'Αθηναῖοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τούτωι τῶι τρόπωι ἑκόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων διὰ τὸ Παυσανίου μῖσος ... [143]. Anyone who believes either that Herodotus is a supporter of contemporary Athens, or even simply that his judgement is coloured by Athenian sources, must surely find this detail impossible to explain away: no Athenian could have told Herodotus such a malicious version of the matter. The probability is that he is distorting the account for his own ends: about the empire, even in its earliest infancy, he can only be cynical - even if only rather allusively (see (L) below).

But this is not the greatest surprise that this short paragraph has stored up. For it quite openly implies that Athens' resignation of her claim to the hegemony had, despite the praiseworthiness of the action, a self-interested motive: nowhere does Herodotus' interest in the conflict of motive and action emerge more strikingly than here. The Athenians, he says, yielded and did not hold out, *just so long as they had need of the Spartans*, as events proved[144]. Inasmuch as the events in question are the beginnings of the Athenian empire, that is, of Athens' claim to the hegemony of all the Greeks whom she could persuade or compel to submit to her authority[145], Herodotus' meaning can only be that their duplicity was a matter of ambition. This casts a curious light on the earlier part of the paragraph: the Athenians had thought it of great importance that Hellas should survive (cf. 7.139.5, ἑλόμενοι δὲ τὴν 'Ελλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην), and realised that for them to dispute the hegemony would mean the destruction of Greece.

There are two implicit observations here. In the first place, the mention of the destruction of Greece through a dispute over the hegemony inevitably calls to mind the war which was destroying Greece at the time of Herodotus' writing (cf. 6.98.2, αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων). The moral στάσις γὰρ ἔμφυλος πολέμου ὁμοφρονέοντος τοσούτωι κάκιόν ἐστι ὅσωι πόλεμος εἰρήνης is not too strictly tied to the present context: although the word stasis here in part at least answers stasiasousi in the previous sentence, we can hardly conclude that the generalization is meant to refer only to disputes over hegemonies between Greeks fighting together against a common enemy, which is surely an absurdly narrow field for generalization. Herodotus must here be broadening his horizons dramatically, and using the word stasis in the sense which Plato gives it at Republic 470BD, where it is distinguished from polemos, war against foreigners, as denoting war between Greeks - an argument which depends on the assumption that to Hellēnikon is a unity with common interests (cf. e.g. Hdt 8.144.2, with 7.9b.2; and especially Aristoph.Lysistr.1128ff, in (A).2, above)[146]. Thus the relation of the moral to the present issue is surely ironical: it was all very well for the Athenians to resign their claim to the hegemony then, and they observed a sound principle in doing so; but have they not forgotten it since, laying claim to that hegemony in such a way as to bring the Hellenic nation to a war more terrible by far than the war against Persia?

The second point emerges if we take the whole paragraph together. Given that Athens' resignation was only provisional, 'as long as they really needed the alliance of the Greeks, as events showed', we can only conclude that their apparent idealism in desiring the survival of Greece (cf. 7.139.5) was itself not such a straightforward matter after all. Athens desired the survival of Greece beause she had plans of her own: that is, even while 'heroically' acting in the common interest, making sacrifices for the safety of Greece, she was thinking about the future, thinking about empire! This remarkable conclusion is supported by what Miltiades is made to say to Callimachus before Marathon (6.109.3): ἢν δὲ περιγένηται αὕτη ἡ πόλις, οἵη τέ ἐστι πρώτη τῶν Ἑλληνίδων πολίων γενέσθαι. Miltiades means that Athens will 'lead' the Greek cities in more than just the sense of being the most prosperous or enjoying the most acclaim; he sees that Athens' survival brings with it the chance of another prize than just liberty - it promises empire. The present passage shows that the Athenians possess just what Herodotus had decided the Spartans lacked, namely vision. For them the important thing is not simply to show valour or obedience, it is to act in the interests of a cause: the survival of Greece. And that's what makes them so dangerous! For what looks to casual observers like idealism, the championship of Hellenic interests, is for Herodotus the determined pursuit of self-interest. The Athenians are the work's chief, and most disturbing, example of Herodotus' pre-occupation with the conflict between apparently admirable action and shady motive, which is but an offshoot of the interest in instructive paradoxes which we explored in Chapter One[147].

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2. With the Greek fleet drawn up at Artemisium, Herodotus offers us a further example of a regular scene-type, that is, a decision by the Greeks to abandon that particular line of defence and retreat to safety (8.4.1): ἐπεὶ αὐτοῖσι παρὰ δόξαν τὰ πρήγματα τῶν βαρβάρων ἀπέβαινε ἢ ὡς αὐτοὶ κατεδόκεον, καταρρωδήσαντες δρησμὸν ἐβούλευον ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἀρτεμισίου ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα. The motif is one that Herodotus used at Tempe (7.173.4, δοκέειν δέ μοι ἀρρωδίη ἦν τὸ πεῖθον), and at Thermopylae (7.207, ἐπειδὴ πέλας ἐγένετο τῆς ἐσβολῆς ὁ Πέρσης, καταρρωδέοντες ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ ἀπαλλαγῆς ; cf. 218.2), and it appears again after Artemisium (8.18, δρησμὸν δὲ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα; and cf. 23.1)[148], and especially before Salamis (8.40.1f, 49.2, 56ff, and 70.2, τοὺς δὲ Ἕλληνας εἶχε δέος τε καὶ ἀρρωδίη, οὐκ ἥκιστα δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου ; cf. 74.1, 75.2 (the message to Xerxes), φράσοντα ὅτι οἱ Ἕλληνες δρησμὸν βουλεύονται καταρρωδηκότες ...). The emphatic repetition of this litany suggests that Herodotus is concerned to make as much as he can of the inconstancy of the allies, certainly in part as a foil to the heroism of those who do remain constant, but also clearly to show us the lack of really decisive leadership on the Greek side, resulting in near-disastrous division.

In the present instance at least we cannot much admire the manner in which the Greeks are made to stay at Artemisium. The Euboeans[149] are dismayed at the desertion of their cause, and approach Eurybiadas to make him change his mind - unsuccessfully[150]. Whereupon they turn their attentions to the Athenians and persuade Themistocles (8.4.2), ἐπὶ μισθῶι τριήκοντα ταλάντοισι, ἐπ' ὧι τε καταμείναντες πρὸ τῆς Εὐβοίης ποιήσονται τὴν ναυμαχίην. Themistocles achieves this object by first approaching Eurybiadas with 5 talents (8.5.1), ὡς παρ' ἐωυτοῦ δῆθεν διδούς. And then he turns to the Corinthian, Adeimantos (Ἀδείμαντος γὰρ ... τῶν λοιπῶν ἤσπαιρε μοῦνος), and Herodotus gives his speech (!) (οὐ σύ γε ἡμέας ἀπολείψεις, ἐπεί τοι ἐγὼ μέζω δῶρα δώσω ἢ βασιλεὺς ἄν τοι ὁ Μήδων πέμψειε ἀπολιπόντι τοὺς συμμάχους[151]. Themistocles gives him 3 talents (5.3):

> οὕτω τε δὴ πληγέντες δώροισι ἀναπεπεισμένοι ἦσαν καὶ τοῖσι Ευβοεῦσι ἐκεχάριστο, αὐτός τε ὁ Θεμιστοκλέης ἐκέρδηνε, ἐλάνθανε δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ ἔχων, ἀλλ' ἠπιστέατο οἱ μεταλαβόντες τούτων τῶν χρημάτων ἐκ τῶν Ἀθηνέων ἐλθεῖν ἐπὶ τῶι λόγωι τούτωι.

Herodotus' choice and elaboration of this story testifies clearly to the lack of idealization in his account: the decision to make a stand at Artemisium is taken entirely for reasons of the generals' private profit, not in any way because it is in the common interest of the Greeks[152]. It is even suggested in the brief speech of Themistocles to Adeimantos that the Corinthian may have been discouraging the engagement because he was planning to betray the Greeks to Persia for a better price. The salvation of Greece depended on a slender thread indeed, is surely Herodotus' moral here. There is also the unsettling paradox of Themistocles' own behaviour: he achieves the desired result by corrupt means, and moreover sees here an opportunity of profiting himself. We have discussed elsewhere the paradoxical aspect of Themistocles' character (cf. Ch.I.i.7): the present story forms a parallel with that of Themistocles' behaviour after Salamis, when, likewise nominally serving the common interest, he again finds an opportunity for private profit. The precision of the parallel may tell against the view that these are merely stories echoed from Herodotus' sources. At any rate the present story of bribery is almost certainly not 'true', reporting as it does secret and obviously undisclosed negotiations; and supposing it to be a fiction, there is no reason why Herodotus should not be its author, rather than the Themistocles-legend[152a].

The battle of Artemisium itself is given a somewhat cool treatment by Herodotus: Plutarch (MH 34.867C) is right to note the discrepancy between this and Pindar's resonant description of Artemisium (F77 Snell): ὅθι παῖδες Ἀθαναίων ἐβάλοντο φαεννὰν / κρηπῖδ' ἐλευθερίας ; not to mention the inscription which the Greeks set up in the temple of Artemis Proseoa[153]. As Plutarch remarks, Herodotus comes near to contradicting the claim of the **epigram (cf. line 3:** ναυμαχίαι δαμάσαντες, ἐπεὶ στρατὸς ὤλετο Μήδων ...), **when he has the Greeks *running away* from the engagement (8.18):**

> ὡς δὲ διέστησαν, ἄσμενοι ἑκάτεροι ἐς ὅρμον ἠπείγοντο, οἱ δὲ Ἕλληνες ὡς διακριθέντες ἐκ τῆς ναυμαχίης ἀπηλλάχθησαν, τῶν μὲν νεκρῶν καὶ τῶν ναυηγίων ἐπεκράτεον, τρηχέως δὲ περιεφθέντες, καὶ οὐκ ἥκιστα Ἀθηναῖοι ... δρησμὸν δὴ ἐβούλευον ἔσω ἐς τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

It is hard to see what justifies his use of the expression, beyond noting, as Plutarch does (see above n.148), his obvious attachment to it. The most that can be said is that there is a certain Homeric grandeur and pathos in Herodotus' conclusion to the battle narrative (8.16.3): πολλαὶ μὲν δὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων νέες διεφθείροντο, πολλοὶ δὲ ἄνδρες, πολλῶι δ' ἔτι πλεῦνες νέες τε τῶν βαρβάρων καὶ ἄνδρες (cf. e.g. Hom.Il.4.543-4, with e.g. Alcaeus L-P 283.12ff). Again, as at Marathon and later at Salamis and Plataea, Herodotus allows the battle itself to emerge as an *ergon axiologon*, while finding as much as possible to be cynical about in the framing context. Just because the gods wanted the Greeks to win the battle (cf. 8.13), it does not mean that Herodotus is prepared to show us they deserved to do so for any other reason than that, when it came to it, they fought bravely: they clearly do not win in his account because of their virtue in any other respects!

*

(H) Salamis.

1. The account of Salamis is remarkable for an extraordinary disproportion in its dramatic emphasis. Though the account of the battle itself is full enough (8.83-96), its effect is overwhelmingly outweighed by the enormously protracted build-up, from the moment when the Greeks first assemble at Salamis (8.40-82): the battle itself covers roughly 7 pages of OCT, the build-up 19 pages. Certainly the length of the build-up is defensible in dramatic terms, the battle being without dispute the turning-point of the war, and so deserving elaborate preparation[154]. But that the greater part of this is disturbingly unheroic, concentrating almost exclusively on the protracted and circling indecision of the Greek allies, is something different[154a]. It is only at the urgent request of the Athenians that the Greeks are made to stay and fight at Salamis (8.40.1f; see n.149 above). The Athenians want to be able to evacuate their women and children from Attica, and to have time to consider what they ought to do; they are at heart really only concerned with their own preservation, though they see that this lies in being able to persuade the allies to fight for them:

> ἐπὶ γὰρ τοῖσι κατήκουσι πρήγμασι βουλὴν ἔμελλον ποιήσασθαι ὡς ἐψευσμένοι γνώμης. δοκέοντες γὰρ εὑρήσειν Πελοποννησίους πανδημεὶ ἐν τῆι Βοιωτίηι ὑποκατημένους τὸν βάρβαρον, τῶν μὲν εὗρον οὐδὲν ἐόν, οἱ δὲ ἐπυνθάνοντο τὸν Ἰσθμὸν αὐτοὺς τειχέοντας, τὴν Πελοπόννησον περὶ πλείστου ποιεομένους περιεῖναι[155] καὶ ταύτην ἔχοντας ἐν φυλακῆι, τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ἀπιέναι.

In this paragraph Herodotus sets the scene for the entire narrative until just before Plataea, when the Athenians are again disappointed at the abandonment by the allies. The Athenians require the Peloponnesians not to desert them; the latter on the other hand see no reason why they should not retire behind the Isthmus wall and protect their own homes, rather than defend what they believe is a lost cause. Which of these sides is to get its way is the theme of the long build-up to Salamis. When the council does take place (8.49.1ff), the question put to the allies by Eurybiadas seems already to have prejudged the issue (49.1): ὅκου δοκέοι ἐπιτηδειότατον εἶναι ναυμαχίην ποιέεσθαι τῶν αὐτοὶ χωρέων ἐγκρατέες εἰσί· ἡ γὰρ Ἀττικὴ ἀπεῖτο ἤδη (even though they were still unaware that Xerxes had taken it!), τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πέρι προετίθεε. Most of the allies are for a retreat to the Peloponnese and the Isthmus wall (49.2). At this moment a messenger arrives to announce that the Mede has reached Attica and is even now ravaging it with fire (50.1ff). Having narrated Xerxes' arrival at Athens in a longish parenthesis (8.51-5), Herodotus records the reaction of the allies at Salamis (8.56):

> ἐς τοσοῦτον θόρυβον ἀπίκοντο ὥστε ἔνιοι τῶν στρατηγῶν οὐδὲ κυρωθῆναι ἔμενον τὸ προκείμενον πρῆγμα, ἀλλ' ἔς τε τὰς νέας ἐσέπιπτον καὶ ἱστία ἀείροντο ὡς ἀποθευσόμενοι· τοῖσί τε ὑπολειπομένοισι αὐτῶν ἐκυρώθη πρὸ τοῦ 'Ισθμοῦ ναυμαχέειν[156].

As we have seen, the inconstant panic of the Greeks before a major battle is almost a stock motif with Herodotus, and it is here given a comic exaggeration. Again it is partly no doubt a foil to the introduction of Themistocles' famous plan, to highlight the presence of mind and steadfastness of purpose of Greece's saviour (but see below); but equally Herodotus makes a point of not sparing any of the allies assembled at Salamis[157].

The narrative of Themistocles' negotiations follows at once; but here again Herodotus seems to be doing his best to subtract from the glory of the legend (cf. Plut.MH 37.869CF). The Mnesiphilos-episode, as we have seen earlier (cf. Ch.I.i.7), must be judged to be a story told against Themistocles, as Plutarch so indignantly observes it to be. To what extent Herodotus is responsible for the story cannot be decided for certain: Mnesiphilos was definitely a historical personage (known to us even from the *ostraka*), and his association with Themistocles as mentor and friend is well established outside Herodotus; but it may still be that it was Herodotus himself who chose to introduce him at this critical juncture to 'advise' Themistocles, like many another Herodotean 'warner'[158]. Herodotus' Mnesiphilos, we may say, knows and thinks things that Herodotus' Themistocles does not and the nature of his promptings deserves careful note. Just as before Artemisium Themistocles needed the prompting of Euboean gold to make him do the 'right thing' for Greece, so here too he converts the advice of

Mnesiphilos into the saving of the allied cause. Herodotus' Themistocles needs to be instructed in the importance of Hellenic unity - but once given a lead, he can turn it to the best practical advantage, dressing up Mnesiphilos' idea as his own (8.58.2, ἑωυτοῦ ποιεύμενος, καὶ ἄλλα πολλὰ προστιθείς, ἐς ὃ ἀνέγνωσε). Without Mnesiphilos, Themistocles would appear an idealist in his own right; as it is, Herodotus can suggest that the hero of Salamis is a man of immense practical abilities, but devoid of sentiment; the same man who later turns just as easily to the shameless betrayal of the Greeks.

Mnesiphilos points out the importance of Hellenic unity (8.57.2):

> οὔ τοι ἄρα, ἢν ἀπάρωσι τὰς νέας ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος, οὐδὲ περὶ μίης ἔτι πατρίδος ναυμαχήσεις· κατὰ γὰρ πόλις ἕκαστοι τρέψονται, καὶ οὔτε σφέας Εὐρυβιάδης κατέχειν δυνήσεται οὔτε τις ἀνθρώπων ἄλλος ὥστε μὴ οὐ διασκεδασθῆναι τὴν στρατιήν· ἀπολέεταί τε ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἀβουλίηισι.

Once more we are made to hear that pan-Hellenic idealism is lacking in the allies: once they have sailed away from Salamis, there is no-one who will be able to recall them to fight 'for Greece', for national unity. Somehow they must be constrained to fight for Greece 'against their will': and this (eventually!) is what Themistocles achieves. But of couse hardly any source for Salamis can have wished to imply that the heroism of that hour was merely a matter of constraint, even the Athenians, who are after all only incidentally party to Themistocles' conspiracy in Herodotus' account: even if such a tale were true, the tradition would surely have done its best to suppress it. This seems particularly clear from the story of Themistocles' message to Xerxes, which appears in the tradition as early as Aeschylus' Persae (355ff), and is for that reason probably historical in some form[159]. Whereas in Aeschylus it seems clear that there is nothing secret here between the Greeks, no suggestion that Themistocles was deviously forcing the hands of the Greek generals, nothing for the Greeks to have been ashamed of, and the ploy seems to be meant as a concerted scheme of the Greeks as a whole, in Herodotus there is no doubt that the whole business reflects the utmost discredit on the Greeks, who are forced against their will into fighting at Salamis by this secret and almost 'treacherous' ruse of Themistocles. No doubt with enough ingenuity it would be possible to think of a 'source' for Herodotus' version of the story; but it must surely seem probable, in view of Herodotus' clear and repeated insistence on the inconstancy of the Greeks at Salamis, that this re-interpretation is no-one's work but his own. At any rate he certainly knew Aeschylus' play (cf. n.171), so that we cannot argue that he was involuntarily misled into adopting a malicious version of the story.

Once Themistocles has persuaded Eurybiadas of the urgency of his request, there is another assembly (8.59ff) at which Themistocles' presumption is chided by the same Adeimantos who had only been diverted by the former's bribe from deserting the Greek cause at Artemisium (8.59; cf. 8.5.1f). Themistocles resolves at first to conduct himself meekly and not to advance the invidious argument he had used to Eurybiadas (8.60.1, ὡς ἐπεὰν ἀπάρωσι ἀπὸ Σαλαμῖνος διαδρήσονται): παρεόντων γὰρ τῶν συμμάχων οὐκ ἔφερέ οἱ κόσμον οὐδένα κατηγορέειν (see below). Herodotus reminds us that the inconstancy of the Greeks demands castigation, but that Themistocles' practical diplomatic sense prevents him saying so. Instead he begins with an appeal to the safety of Greece (8.60a.1): ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἐστι σῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα, ἢν ἐμοὶ πείθηι ναυμαχίην αὐτοῦ μένων ποιέεσθαι[160]. But given that this sort of idealism runs a bit thin with the allies, he proceeds at once to detailed strategic arguments, not insisting that the loss of Salamis, Megara and Aegina would be a betrayal of the Greek cause; he merely adds this parenthetically to the disadvantages of fighting at the Isthmus, and indeed insists (8.60g) that the survival of these will be of profit (*kerdos*) to them, and that the Peloponnesians own interests will be best served if they follow his plan (8.60b.1):

> καὶ μὲν καὶ τόδε ἐν αὐτοῖσι ἔνεστι, τοῦ καὶ περιέχεσθε μάλιστα· ὁμοίως αὐτοῦ τε μένων προυναυμαχήσεις Πελοποννήσου καὶ πρὸς τῶι Ἰσθμῶι, οὐδέ σφέας, εἴ περ εὖ φρονέεις, ἄξεις ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον.

But for all this Themistocles has to face further criticism from Adeimantos (8.61.1): σιγᾶν τε κελεύων τῶι μή ἐστι πατρὶς καὶ Εὐρυβιάδην οὐκ ἐῶν ἐπιψηφίζειν ἀπόλι ἀνδρί· πόλιν γὰρ τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα παρεχόμενον ἐκέλευε οὕτω γνώμας συμβάλλεσθαι. The gibe shows that so far from wishing to consult the common interest of all the Greeks, Adeimantos at least can regard the responsibilities of the allies to the Athenians as now at an end. But it also offers a foil to Themistocles' riposte, which finally breaks out into abuse (8.61.2, πολλά τε καὶ κακὰ ἔλεγε):

> ἑωυτοῖς τε ἐδήλου λόγωι ὡς εἴη καὶ πόλις καὶ γῆ μέζων ἤ περ ἐκείνοισι, ἔστ' ἂν διηκόσιαι νέες σφι ἔωσι πεπληρωμέναι· οὐδαμοὺς γὰρ Ἑλλήνων αὐτοὺς ἐπιόντας ἐπικρούσεσθαι.

The underlined words are an extraordinary addition: Themistocles rightly stresses the importance of the Athenian fleet, but why sould he be made to insist not on the advantage to the Greeks of this asset (the argument required by the context) but on the superiority which it brings the Athenians over all the other Greeks[161]? The Athenian fleet, says Themistocles, gives them the ability to attack any of the Greeks with impunity: but this refers to nothing that Herodotus is to tell us about the Athenians in the narrative, and can only be read as an anticipation of the future. The Athenians may have had to sacrifice their lands and their city, but the fleet which is to guarantee not only their survival but their future empire, remains safe. Already in the depths of acute crisis, the Athenians, through Themistocles, are foreseeing what can come out of victory for them. Themistocles finally turns to Eurybiadas and in less antagonistic terms (8.62.1f, μᾶλλον ἐπεστραμμένα), though still more pointedly than before, calls upon him to save Greece: σὺ εἰ μενέεις αὐτοῦ καὶ μένων ἔσεαι ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός· εἰ δὲ μή, ἀναστρέψεις τὴν Ἑλλάδα· τὸ πᾶν γὰρ ἡμῖν φέρουσι αἱ νέες. If Eurybiadas does not listen to this, the Athenians will up and sail for Siris in Italy: ὑμεῖς δὲ συμμάχων τοιῶνδε μουνωθέντες μεμνήσεσθε τῶν ἐμῶν λόγων. Whereupon Eurybiadas is persuaded (8.63): δοκέειν δέ μοι, ἀρρωδήσας μάλιστα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους, μή σφεας ἀπολίπωσι, ἢν πρὸς τὸν Ἰσθμὸν ἀνάγηι τὰς νέας· ἀπολιπόντων γὰρ Ἀθηναίων οὐκέτι ἐγίνοντο ἀξιόμαχοι οἱ λοιποί. The conclusion is far from simple: Themistocles' threat may be meant only as a gambler's bluff, although Herodotus does not help us to decide, but even so it raises the possibility, which the Spartans take seriously, distrusting the Athenians as they have done before (cf. e.g. 5.91.1) and are to do again (cf. e.g. 8.141.1 below), that if the Athenians cannot ensure the adoption of the plan that will guarantee their own survival, they will not remain by the Greek cause. It does seem that Athens' pan-Hellenic 'idealism' rests only on the understanding that Greek unity means their own survival.

The most disturbing impression of the debate as a whole is its tone: the repeated insults of Adeimantos, which finally sting Themistocles into complementary abuse, despite his original intention to keep bitterness out of his speech; Themistocles' threatening reminder that the Athenians are a match for any of the Greeks (and can prove it!); the distrustful fears of Eurybiadas that the Athenians really mean to desert the Greek cause. All this vividly illustrates the extreme uneasiness of the Greek alliance, and undermines the epic glamour of the Greek defence; and there can be no doubt that this 'dramatization' is Herodotus' own free composition.

Herodotus has not yet finished with the theme of Greek inconstancy. Shifting attention briefly to the Persian side (8.66-9), he tells us of the advice Artemisia gave the king, first of the superiority of the Greeks at sea (8.68a.1) and then the recommendation that if he must attack, he should not attack at once (68b.1f):

> οὐ γὰρ οἶοί τε πολλὸν χρόνον εἰσὶ ἀντέχειν οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀλλά σφεας διασκεδᾶις, κατὰ πόλις δὲ ἕκαστοι φεύξονται ... οὔτε αὐτοὺς οἰκός, ἢν σὺ ἐπὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον ἐλαύνηις τὸν πεζὸν στρατόν, ἀτρεμιεῖν τοὺς ἐκεῖθεν αὐτῶν ἥκοντας, οὐδέ σφι μελήσει πρὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ναυμαχέειν.

Artemisia's forecast that the Persians will be defeated in an engagement at Salamis by the superior skill of the Greeks at sea, contrasts uneasily with her reminder that they are far from steadfast in their decision to defend Salamis and in their championship of the Athenians (see below). Indeed we have seen that things are worse even than she implies - and there is still more to come. When the Persians finally sail up to Salamis, Herodotus describes a further change of heart among the Greeks (8.70.2): τοὺς δὲ Ἕλληνας εἶχε δέος τε καὶ ἀρρωδίη, οὐκ ἥκιστα δὲ τοὺς ἀπὸ Πελοποννήσου. "They were afraid at having to remain at Salamis and fight a sea-battle for the Athenians' land, and feared that they would be defeated and then besieged on the island, while their own homes went unprotected". At this point Herodotus describes the Peloponnesian arrangements for the fortification of the Isthmus (8.71f), the wall which is to play such a significant role in Peloponnesian strategy after Salamis (below). After a brief listing of the Peloponnesians who did not help the Greek cause in any way (8.73.3, εἰ δὲ ἐλευθέρως ἔξεστι εἰπεῖν, ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι ἐμήδιζον), and a reminder that the Peloponnesians at the wall put no faith in the outcome of Salamis (8.74.1), Herodotus returns once more to the doubts of the loyal Peloponnesians at Salamis (74.1). In Homeric fashion, they grumble amongst themselves (8.74.2):

> ἕως μὲν δὴ ἀνὴρ ἀνδρὶ παραστὰς σιγῆι λόγον ἐποιέετο, θῶμα ποιεύμενος τὴν Εὐρυβιάδεω ἀβουλίην· τέλος δὲ ἐξερράγη ἐς τὸ μέσον. σύλλογός τε δὴ ἐγίνετο καὶ πολλὰ ἐγένετο περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἐς τὴν Πελοπόννησον χρεὸν εἴη ἀποπλέειν καὶ περὶ ἐκείνης κινδυνεύειν, μηδὲ πρὸ χώρης δοριαλώτου μένοντας μάχεσθαι, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ καὶ Αἰγινῆται καὶ Μεγαρέες αὐτοῦ μένοντας ἀμύνεσθαι.

The resentment of the allies has finally reached its apogee - its embittered tone is caught in Herodotus' pointed language (compare this with 8.70.2, above) and Themistocles is powerless to influence them further. There follows the famous stratagem, whose probable revision by Herodotus we have discussed above (8.75.1f). What in Aeschylus was deception pure and simple, here has much more truth in it[162] (75.2):

> ἔπεμψέ με στρατηγὸς ὁ Ἀθηναίων λάθρηι τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων (τυγχάνει γὰρ φρονέων τὰ βασιλέος καὶ βουλόμενος μᾶλλον τὰ ὑμέτερα κατύπερθε γίνεσθαι ἢ τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρήγματα) φράσοντα ὅτι τοι Ἕλληνες δρησμὸν βουλεύονται καταρρωδηκότες ... οὔτε γὰρ ἀλλήλοισι ὁμοφρονέουσι οὔτ' ἔτι ἀντιστήσονται ὑμῖν, πρὸς ἑωυτοὺς τε σφέας ὄψεσθε ναυμαχέοντας, τοὺς τὰ ὑμέτερα φρονέοντας καὶ τοὺς μή.

The emphasis on the disunity of the Greeks in Herodotus' version is unsettlingly true: we see the allies in the same condition of disarray as the Ionians at Lade.

The debate of the allies is still going on[163], when Aristides crosses from Aegina with the news of the encirclement. The interview between Aristides and Themistocles[164] seems unlikely to have been part of the tradition, especially when we consider that it requires a doublet of Aristides' mission (the arrival of the deserting Tenian trireme at 8.82.1f, ἥ περ δὴ ἔφερε τὴν ἀληθηίην πᾶσαν. διά τε τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον ἐνεγράφησαν Τήνιοι ἐν Δελφοῖσι ἐς τὸν τρίποδα ἐν τοῖσι βάρβαρον κατελοῦσι) to get the allies to believe the truth of the report. Why Herodotus should wish to give Aristides, the architect of the of the Delian League, the glowing approval that he does is hard to guess (8.79.1): ἀνὴρ 'Αθηναῖος μὲν ἐξωστρακισμένος δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου, τὸν ἐγὼ νενόμικα, πυνθανόμενος αὐτοῦ τὸν τρόπον, ἄριστον ἄνδρα γενέσθαι ἐν 'Αθήνησι καὶ δικαιότατον. No doubt the Aristides-legend was already well under way[165], but it may be that Herodotus sees something significant in his ostracism by the new democracy: Aristides might be imagined as a paragon of the lost world that Themistocles, the empire and the radical democracy of Ephialtes and Pericles had supplanted[166]. At any rate it is clear that Herodotus brings him in here more than anything as a foil to Themistocles, and more particularly to illustrate how the rest of the allies ought to be behaving and are not. Aristides realizes more clearly than anyone else in Herodotus' narrative that this time of national crisis demands the reconciliation of private differences (8.79.2): ἐξεκαλέετο Θεμιστοκλέα, ἐόντα μὲν ἑωυτῶι οὐ φίλον, ἐχθρὸν δὲ τὰ μάλιστα· ὑπὸ δὲ μεγάθεος τῶν παρεόντων κακῶν λήθην ἐκείνων ποιεύμενος ἐξεκαλέετο, θέλων αὐτῶι συμμεῖξαι . Before he announces his news, he delivers a homily to Themistocles on how they both ought to conduct themselves (79.3):

> ἡμέας στασιάζειν χρεόν ἐστι ἔν τε τῶι ἄλλωι καιρῶι καὶ δὴ ἐν τῶιδε
> περὶ τοῦ ἑκάτερος ἡμέων πλέω ἀγαθὰ τὴν πατρίδα ἐργάσεται[167].

This sounds paradoxical: stasis is the endemic malady of the Greek polis, the last thing to be encouraged - unless of course it is directed to the good, rivalry not in self-seeking but in serving the common weal. But in the context of Herodotus' narrative Aristides' words raise disturbing doubts: the 'good' rivalry which he advocates here is quite obviously lacking between the allies. Indeed the bitter antagonism between Themistocles and Adeimantos which Herodotus has just so vividly described is clearly meant to testify to its absence - and there are more examples still to come. Aristides' message brings home the inadequacy of Greek homonoia, on which the legend of the Persian Wars seems to have laid great stress (see Isocr.Paneg.85, quoted above, n.167)[168].

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2. All this time the Greeks have been wavering, planning to abandon Salamis, to leave the Athenians and others to their fate, and to save their own homelands. But the battle is now upon them and they have no escape. Themistocles delivers the speech of encouragement to the troops (8.83.1f):

> προηγόρευε εὖ ἔχοντα μὲν ἐκ πάντων Θεμιστοκλέης, τὰ δὲ ἔπεα ἦν πάντα ⟨τὰ⟩ κρέσσω τοῖσι ἥσσοσι ἀντιτιθέμενα, ὅσα δὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσι καὶ καταστάσι ἐγγίνεται· παραινέσας δὲ τούτων τὰ κρέσσω αἱρέεσθαι καὶ καταπλέξας τὴν ῥῆσιν, ἐσβαίνειν ἐκέλευσε ἐς τὰς νέας.

This is the only straightforward example of this type of speech (the 'encouragement to battle') in Herodotus' entire narrative (contrast e.g. Dionysios at 6.11.2f, with (B), above) and even this is singular for its lack of explicitness. The absence of such speeches, so common throughout Thucydides' work and, of course, borrowed originally as a literary form as much from Homer as from real life, is surely to be explained by Herodotus' unwillingness to make any more than is necessary of the 'idealism' of the Greek defence:there is to be no talk on such occasions of the unity of Hellas, or the common interests of the Greeks. Instead the abstractions of Themistocles' reported speech leave the reader somewhat detached and cold - and indeed wondering whether what the Greeks in fact do in the battle is to choose virtue rather than vice, at least in quite the way that Themistocles seems to mean[169]. As we shall see again, no idealistic speech precedes actions which do show Greek courage, while on the other hand such speeches as there are which do suggest idealism are set in contexts where no worthy actions substantiate that suggestion.

The narrative of the battle from the Greek point of view is curiously dominated not by stories of Greek virtue, but rather by stories of Greek feuding, recrimination, even treachery. This is no doubt to put the matter too simply, but there is once more a clear disproportion of scale and emphasis. In Aeschylus, by contrast, everything on the Greek side is order and firmness of purpose. The dawn finds the Greeks drawn up unexpectedly in tight battle formation, which strikes terror into the barbarians (392ff):

> ... οὐ γὰρ ὡς φυγῆι
> παιᾶν' ἐφύμνουν σεμνὸν Ἕλληνες τότε,
> ἀλλ' ἐς μάχην ὁρμῶντες εὐψύχωι θράσει.

The trumpet sounds the attack (395ff), and all advance in perfect order, with the right wing leading the assault (399ff):

> τὸ δεξιὸν μὲν πρῶτον εὐτάκτως κέρας
> ἡγεῖτο κόσμωι, δεύτερον δ' ὁ πᾶς στόλος
> ἐπεξεχώρει ...
> ... ἦρξε δ' ἐμβολῆς Ἑλληνικὴ (409)
> ναῦς, κἀποθραύει πάντα Φοινίσσης νεὼς
> κόρυμβ', ἐπ' ἄλλην δ' ἄλλος ηὔθυνεν δόρυ.

No doubt it would be wrong to imply that Aeschylus' version was in any sense canonical outside Athens or that there were not available to Herodotus numerous different versions of the course of battle. But Herodotus' account, selective as it is[170], is surely eccentric in choosing to elaborate just those stories which most suggest Greek disorder and disunity. We should imagine that such stories were largely the exceptions and that the legend of Salamis told (as Aeschylus does) that the battle was a triumph of concerted and determined action. Instead Herodotus begins his narrative with a disagreement (8.84.1f). The battle commences when the Greeks put out to sea, where they are set upon at once by the enemy, and proceed to back water (84.1):

> οἱ μὲν δὴ ἄλλοι Ἕλληνες πρύμνην ἀνεκρούοντο καὶ ὤκελλον τὰς νέας, Ἀμεινίης δὲ Παλληνεὺς ἀνὴρ Ἀθηναῖος ἐξαναχθεὶς νηὶ ἐμβάλλει· συμπλεκείσης δὲ τῆς νεὸς καὶ οὐ δυναμένων ἀπαλλαγῆναι, οὕτω δὴ οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀμεινίηι βοηθέοντες συνέμισγον.

All this is clearly at variance with Aeschylus' story of the confident advance of the Greek fleet, a story which Herodotus' evident acquaintance with that play[171] might have been thought to have recommended to him in some way. The story of Ameinias is, however, according to Herodotus, an Athenian version itself: but though in a sense it reflects well on the Athenians in giving them the honour of having started the battle, it does not imply that the Athenians as a whole initially showed the same courage or foolhardiness as Ameinias. This version Herodotus sets off with another derived from the Aeginetans (8.84.2): Αἰγινῆται δὲ τὴν κατὰ τοὺς Αἰακίδας ἀποδημήσασαν ἐς Αἴγιναν, ταύτην εἶναι τὴν ἄρξασαν. And there is even a third version (λέγεται δὲ καὶ τόδε), that the apparition of a woman was seen by the whole fleet and heard to berate them in these terms: ὦ δαιμόνιοι, μέχρι κόσου ἔτι πρύμνην ἀνακρούεσθε;[172] This third version, whatever its provenance is supposed to be, dramatically emphasizes that what really characterized the opening of the battle was Greek indecision. But Herodotus also wishes to reminds the reader that the heroes of Salamis afterwards squabbled among themselves about who had done what, something which further underlines the already disquieting impression that they all very nearly threw away the chance of being heroes at all. This is not, of course, the healthy rivalry advocated by Aristides, but its opposite; and it is this motif of Greek squabbling which emerges strongly from the whole account of the battle.

The rivalry of Athens and Aegina[173] is the subject of another anecdote from the middle of the battle (8.92.1f). Herodotus brings together the ships of Themistocles and Polycritus of Aegina and the latter uses the occasion to taunt the Athenian general (92.2): καὶ βώσας τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα ἐπεκερτόμησε ἐς τῶν Αἰγινητέων τὸν μηδισμὸν ὀνειδίζων. ταῦτα μέν νυν νηὶ ἐμβαλὼν ὁ Πολύκριτος ἀπέρριψε ἐς Θεμιστοκλέα. It is hard to believe that we are really faced here with a traditional anecdote, since outside the context given it by Herodotus it can scarcely stand up for itself, lacking as it does either a particularly significant action or a striking expression. On the other hand it works in terms of Herodotus' own work because of what he has told us about the background of the rivalry between Athens and Aegina (cf. Ch.II.ii.F). But whether or not it is a Herodotuean invention, it is clear that its introduction serves to tell us less about the battle itself[174] than about the spirit in which it was fought on the Greek side: even in the midst of the struggle of national unity these two states could not set aside their squabbling. Moreover its effect is all the more piquant inasmuch as Herodotus, with a most suspicious narrative economy, contrives to sandwich into this anecdote a mention of Pytheas, whose bravery against the Persians in the engagement off Euboea had been so admired by the enemy (cf. 7.181.1ff): Krios just happened at this moment to be ramming the Sidonian ship on which was held Pytheas (8.92.1). The juxtaposition of Greek heroism and Greek squabbling is characteristic of Herodotus' equivocal treatment throughout.

There is a third anecdote in a similar vein, which by its treatment, position and scale produces an even more remarkable effect than the two discussed above. Almost the last thing that Herodotus reports from the battle is the long story of Adeimantos' desertion (8.94.1ff):

> ᾿Αδείμαντον δὲ τὸν Κορίνθιον στρατηγὸν λέγουσι ᾿Αθηναῖοι αὐτίκα κατ' ἀρχάς, ὡς συνέμισγον αἱ νέες, ἐκπλαγέντα τε καὶ ὑπερδείσαντα, τὰ ἱστία ἀειρόμενον οἴχεσθαι φεύγοντα, ἰδόντας δὲ τοὺς Κορινθίους τὴν στρατηγίδα φεύγουσαν ὡσαύτως οἴχεσθαι.

But as they fled, they were approached by a ship of mysterious origin (περιπίπτειν σφι κέλητα θείηι πομπῆι, τὸν οὔτε πέμψαντα φανῆναι οὐδένα, οὔτε τι τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς στρατιῆς εἰδόσι προσφέρεσθαι τοῖς Κορινθίοισι), whose sailors addressed them in portentous fashion: ᾿Αδείμαντε, σὺ μὲν ἀποστρέψας τὰς νέας ἐς φυγὴν ὅρμησαι καταπροδοὺς τοὺς Ἕλληνας· οἱ δὲ καὶ νικῶσι ὅσον αὐτοὶ ἠρῶντο ἐπικρατῆσαι τῶν ἐχθρῶν. They finally persuade a reluctant Adeimantos by suggesting that he take them along as hostages against the truth of their report. But Adeimantos and his companions reach the Greek camp only when all the fighting is over (ἐπ' ἐξεργασμένοισι). The most remarkable part of the account is still to come (8.94.4):

> τούτους μὲν τοιαύτη φάτις ἔχει ὑπὸ ᾿Αθηναίων, οὐ μέντοι αὐτοί γε Κορίνθιοι ὁμολογέουσι, ἀλλ' ἐν πρώτοισι σφέας αὐτοὺς τῆς ναυμαχίης νομίζουσι γενέσθαι· μαρτυρέει δέ σφι καὶ ἡ ἄλλη ῾Ελλάς[175].

Herodotus' proceeding, as no commentator has failed to remark to his discredit, is extraordinary. Not only the self-evident malice towards the Corinthians of the Athenians, to whom he ascribes the story, but also the confirmation of the Corinthian denial by 'the rest of Greece' should automatically have warned Herodotus that the story was worthless - and yet he reports it in considerable detail, and omits any account of how else the Corinthians might have conducted themselves. We should also note, as does Plutarch (MH 39.870Aff), that there is a wealth of evidence, most of it accessible to Herodotus, which should have proved that the Corinthians, and indeed Adeimantos himself, did take a valorous share in the fighting at Salamis[176]. It is inconceivable that Herodotus failed to see that the story was untrue, nor can we believe that he thought it worth telling simply because it was his duty to report whatever was told him (cf. 7.152.3, above). We need an explanation not for the story's inclusion, but for its selection: when he might have chosen any number of stories of heroism and Greek unity, why does Herodotus give such uncomfortable prominence to an anti-heroic story, whose only interest to the critical reader is that it is a slander, as corroborated by the evidence Herodotus himself has given? The best answer is the one chosen by Plutarch (MH 39.870CD):

> τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ἐν πολλοῖσι ὁ ἄνθρωπος· ἑτέρας καθ᾽ ἑτέρων διαβολὰς καὶ κατηγορίας κατατίθησιν, ὥστε μὴ διαμαρτεῖν τοῦ φανῆναί τινα πάντως πονηρόν· ὥσπερ ἐνταῦθα περίεστιν αὐτῶι, ἀπιστουμένους Ἁθηναίους, πιστευομένης δὲ τῆς διαβολῆς Κορινθίους ἀδοξεῖν.

In other words it is very likely part of Herodotus' intention that we should be in a position to infer the probable falsehood of the story; and if we do make that inference, the Athenians emerge in a bad light as slanderers.

He must surely be relying on his reader's appreciation of the intense hatred between Corinth and Athens so prominent in his own day[177]. On at least one level, then, this story is further evidence of Greek division, of the spirit of recrimination and antagonism which so much coloured the memory of the Greek defence for Herodotus, if not the ordinary Greek. This is not to deny, however, that Herodotus has chosen the Corinthians, and Adeimantos in particular, as representatives of those Greeks whose loyalty to the cause could justly be considered suspect. What the Athenians lay at Adeimantos' door here is at least consistent with what Herodotus has reported of him up to now, his suspect loyalty at Artemisium (cf. 8.5.1f, with Themistocles' speech there) and his obstruction of Themistocles in the debate before Salamis (8.59 and 61.1f)[178]. To that extent Herodotus' inclusion of the story does indeed work both ways, as Plutarch suggests. If this was not what actually happened, it is at least, he hints, not inconsistent with the way things actually stood. We should not forget that in Herodotus' account the Greeks as a whole are fighting at Salamis against their will. The story may possibly contribute to the impression of a supernatural background to the battle, with the mysterious ship playing much the same role as the mysterious lady earlier (cf. 8.84.2, above; with e.g. 8.13), and suggest that the gods appeared to be watching over the proceedings in the interests of a Greek victory; but given Herodotus' telling insistence that this is only an Athenian story, discredited by all the rest of the Greeks, that is unlikely to be the principal reason for its inclusion. If he was principally interested in it as a story about the divine background, he need not have been so explicit about the source-problem, a proceeding which considerably undermines whatever poetic dignity such a story might have aspired to.

3. What there is of glory attaching to the victory at Salamis is rather abruptly clouded by Herodotus' narrative of the sequel on the Greek side. On the morning after, the Greeks, observing the flight of the barbarian, resolve to give chase, which they do without success as far as Andros (8.108.1ff). There they hold a council of war, in which Themistcles at first advises that they sail to the Hellespont and dismantle the bridges. Eurybiadas opposes him, pointing out the strategic undesirability of trapping the Persians in Europe, and the Peloponnesian generals concur in this view (8.108.4). Themistocles, thus defeated, turns his attention to the Athenians, who are most eager to sail to the Hellespont alone if need be. He argues to them the case Eurybiadas has just put (8.109.2 , καὶ αὐτὸς ἤδη πολλοῖσι παρεγενόμην καὶ πολλῶι πλέω ἀκήκοα τοιάδε γενέσθαι ...)(!), and advises them (109.2ff) to be content with their unexpected success and to stay at home, restoring

their fields and property, until the following spring. And this, says Herodotus, was all bluff (109.5): ταῦτα ἔλεγε ἀποθήκην μέλλων ποιήσασθαι ἐς τὸν Πέρσην, ἵνα ἢν ἄρα τί μιν καταλαμβάνηι πρὸς 'Αθηναίων πάθος, ἔχηι ἀποστροφήν· τά περ ὦν καὶ ἐγένετο. The Athenians believe him because of his, by now, high repute, and he at once sends a message to Xerxes, once again by Sikinnos (110.2f):

> ἔπεμψέ με Θεμιστοκλέης ὁ Νεοκλέος, στρατηγὸς μὲν 'Αθηναίων, ἀνὴρ δὲ
> τῶν συμμάχων πάντων ἄριστος καὶ σοφώτατος, φράσοντά τοι ὅτι
> Θεμιστοκλέης ὁ 'Αθηναῖός σοὶ βουλόμενος ὑποργέειν ἔσχε τοὺς Ἕλληνας
> τὰς νέας βουλομένους διώκειν καὶ τὰς ἐν Ἑλλησπόντωι γεφύρας λύειν.
> καὶ νῦν κατ' ἡσυχίην πολλὴν κομίζεο.

We have discussed the remarkable implications of this duplicity of Themistocles in detail elsewhere (cf. Ch.I.i.7). We need only remind ourselves here of the main points: how he seizes on the arguments of Eurybiadas and makes them his own (just as before he had used the arguments of Mnesiphilos), how his change of tactic is the merest opportunism, how the dignity of sentiment of his speech to the Athenians is undermined by the cynicism of his motive in so speaking to them, how Herodotus sets out to show the parallelism between this message to Xerxes and the earlier one, which had been the saving of Greece. In other words, Herodotus implies that the same quality in Themistocles which helped the Greeks to win at Salamis, is revealed in his present treachery: the same opportunist duplicity, even the same want of idealism[179].

The ensuing narrative of the Greek expedition under Themistocles against the medizing islanders enables Herodotus both to observe once more the duplicity of Themistocles, and to reflect on the arrogant presumption which victory has so soon given the Greeks. Once they had decided not to pursue the barbarian further nor to break up the bridges (8.111.1), τὴν Ἄνδρον περικατέατο ἐξελεῖν ἐθέλοντες. The remarkable thing about this episode is that Herodotus fails to explain clearly why the Greeks now embarked on this expedition, even to the extent of not directly remarking that it was in recompense for the islanders' medism[180]. Indeed it is tempting, inasmuch as Herodotus emphasizes principally the Athenian role in all this (8.111.2f), to see him offering us here a foretaste of the reprisals of the Athenian empire against the island states which resisted its power[181]. But the episode soon becomes more an illustration of the corruptibility of Themistocles (8.112.1): οὐ γὰρ ἐπαύετο πλεονεκτέων. Herodotus reminds us that his exactions of money from the islanders here are no more than a repetition (hence οὐ γὰρ ἐπαύετο) of the kind of behaviour we have already seen from him. Thus he observes that Themistocles used Sikinnos yet again in his threatening approaches to the other islanders (διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀγγέλων τοῖσι καὶ πρὸς βασιλέα ἐχρήσατο). It appears from Herodotus' closing sentence that Themistocles' exactions after Andros are secret negotiations of his own (8.112.3): Θεμιστοκλέης μέν νυν ἐξ Ἄνδρου ὁρμώμενος χρήματα παρὰ νησιωτέων ἐκτᾶτο λάϑρηι τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν. We are reminded not only of his negotiations before Artemisium (8.5), but also of his two missions to Xerxes.

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4. The next episode involving the Greeks, no less unattractive in its implications, is the matter of the aristeia[182]. After having told us of the offerings of the victors to the gods (8.121.1ff), Herodotus describes the council of the generals in which they voted for the aristeia (8.123.2f):

> ἐνϑαῦτα πᾶς τις αὐτῶν ἑωυτῶι ἐτίϑετο τὴν ψῆφον, αὐτὸς ἕκαστος δοκέων ἄριστος γενέσϑαι, δεύτερα δὲ οἱ πολλοὶ συνέπιπτον Θεμιστοκλέα κρίνοντες ... οὐ βουλομένων δὲ ταῦτα κρίνειν τῶν Ἑλλήνων φϑόνωι ... ὅμως Θεμιστοκλέης ἐβώσϑη τε καὶ ἐδοξώϑη εἶναι ἀνὴρ πολλὸν Ἑλλήνων σοφώτατος ἀνὰ πᾶσαν τὴν Ἑλλάδα.

After recounting the honours given to Themistocles and Eurybiadas at Sparta, Herodotus adds an anecdote about Themistocles' treatment by one of his fellow-Athenians (8.125.1f)[182a]:

> ἐνϑαῦτα Τιμόδημος Ἀφιδναῖος, τῶν ἐχϑρῶν μὲν Θεμιστοκλέος μὲν ἐών, ἄλλως δὲ οὐ τῶν ἐπιφανέων ἀνδρῶν, φϑόνωι καταμαργέων ἐνείκεε τὸν Θεμιστοκλέα ... ὡς διὰ τὰς Ἀϑήνας ἔχοι τὰ γέρεα τὰ παρὰ Λακεδαιμονίων, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἑωυτόν.

Themistocles' reply is an appropriate put-down: οὔτ' ἂν ἐγὼ ἐὼν Βελβινίτης ἐτιμήϑην οὕτω πρὸς Σπαρτιητέων, οὔτ' ἂν σύ, ὤνϑρωπε, ἐὼν Ἀϑηναῖος.

Herodotus evidently means the story of the generals' voting at the Isthmus (depriving Themistocles of the *aristeia* through *phthonos*) and the story of Timodemos (minimizing Themistocles' achievement through *phthonos*) to complement one another. He thus observes pointedly that not only between individuals of different states but also between members of the same state mutual rivalry of the worst sort prevents either virtue being rewarded as it ought to be[183], or the citizens helping one another to do the best for the state. This is perhaps a further reflexion of Aristides' observations about *stasis* (8.79.3, above); but we may also turn back to a remarkable account of the workings of *phthonos* in the polis given by (of all people) Xerxes. Defending the goodwill of Demaratus against the attack of Achaimenes, the king explains that he judges by Demaratus' former good advice (7.237.2f):

> καὶ τῶι ἐόντι, ὅτι πολιήτης μὲν πολιήτηι εὖ πρήσσοντι φθονέει (i.e. just as Timodemos 'envies' Themistocles!) καὶ ἔστι δυσμενὴς τῆι σιγῆι, οὐδ' ἂν συμβουλευομένου τοῦ ἀστοῦ πολιήτης ἀνὴρ τὰ ἄριστά οἷ δοκέοντα εἶναι ὑποθέοιτο, εἰ μὴ πρόσω ἀρετῆς ἀνήκοι· σπάνιοι δέ εἰσι οἱ τοιοῦτοι (e.g. like Aristides!). ξεῖνος δὲ ξείνωι εὖ πρήσσοντί ἐστι εὐμενέστατον πάντων, συμβουλευομένου τε ἂν συμβουλεύσειε τὰ ἄριστα.

It seems unlikely that Xerxes is meant to be describing the life of a Persian polis, and the word *poliētēs* is surely meant to direct our attention to the Greek city-state, of which Demaratus is after all a representative, and an envious citizen at that (cf. e.g. 7.104.2). The very remoteness of Xerxes' analysis from the immediate dramatic situation should open the reader's eyes to its general application. As we have seen, Herodotus is interested in the contrast between the 'generous loyalty' of defecting Greeks towards the king (*xeinos* / *xeinōi*) and the bitter enmity towards their fellow-Greeks (*poliētēs* / *poliētēi*); and as for the relations between Greek states and between the individual members of those states, Herodotus observes the almost complete absence of loyalty and fellow-feeling and the almost complete dominance of private interest and mutual hostility. The matter of the *aristeia* is for Herodotus symbolic of the weakness of Greek freedom, where every man is encouraged, in the absence of restraint, to go out for what he can get for himself (in the words of 5.78: αὐτὸς ἕκαστος ἐωυτῶι [προθυμέεται] κατεργάζεσθαι)[184].

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(I) Between Salamis and Plataea.

1. The next important Greek action that demands our attention here is the mission of Alexander to Athens and the debate which follows (8.136.1ff)[185]. Mardonios sends Alexander to Athens to win them over from the Greek cause (8.136.2f):

> λεών τε πολλὸν ἄρα ἀκούων εἶναι καὶ ἄλκιμον, τά τε κατὰ τὴν θάλασσαν συντυχόντα σφι παθήματα κατεργασμένα μάλιστα Ἀθηναίους ἐπίστατο. τούτων δὲ προσγενομένων κατήλπιζε εὐπετέως τῆς θαλάσσης κρατήσειν, τά περ ἂν καὶ ἦν, πεζῆι δὲ ἐδόκεε πολλῶι εἶναι κρέσσων ...

This is of course a reworking of a theme Herodotus has deployed before, principally in 7.139, but also at 8.63 (above): the saving of Greece depends on the fortitude of the Athenians. Before Salamis the Athenians could not, unlike the other Greeks, do much to save themselves by medizing, since the king meant to punish them for their crimes against him - so that previously there had been a motive of self-preservation to keep them loyal to the Greeks. Now on the other hand Mardonios seems to be promising them not merely immunity but profit as well - and yet the Athenians still resist. Surely Herodotus sees in this resistance a clear triumph of Athenian idealism, preferring to save Greece, even, if it must be, at their own cost (see the orators quoted above, n.185)? But if Herodotus is simply and unequivocally glorifying Athens' altruistic defence of Greek freedom, then we have misjudged his sympathies entirely. However, as usual the matter is rather more complex[186].

We should state briefly here that this debate at Athens, in which the Spartans challenge the Athenians with their loyalty to the Greek cause, is part of a larger structure which includes the mission of the Athenians to Sparta at the start of Book Nine, in which the Athenians accuse the Spartans of disloyalty to them and to Greece. Rather than prejudge the intricate design of this structure, however, it will be better to analyse it first as Herodotus meant it to be read, by considering how it works as a linear sequence.

Alexander's speech (8.140a.1ff) puts the Persian offer to the Athenians: he reports the message of Mardonios, which itself purports to contain a message from the king. Mardonios elaborates on the king's 'offer' by pointing out the weakness of the Greek position and the measureless resources of Persia, as well as the losses Athens stands to incur, and concludes (8.104a.4): παρέχει δὲ ὑμῖν κάλλιστα καταλύσασθαι βασιλέος ταύτηι ὁρμημένου. ἔστε ἐλεύθεροι, ἡμῖν ὁμαιχμίην συνθέμενοι ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης. The irony of Mardonios' offer is palpable: such an arrangement would neither be 'fine' (at least morally, though it may be so prudentially), nor would it give the Athenians 'freedom' in any honourable sense. Alexander, however, in his well-intentioned way (8.140b.1ff) urges the Athenians to accept the offer for their own sake rather than suffer from their exposed position (ἐν τρίβωι τε μάλιστα οἰκημένων τῶν συμμάχων πάντων).

Instead of having the Athenians reply at once, Herodotus complicates matters by introducing an embassy which Sparta has sent having heard of Alexander's overtures (8.141.1): ἀναμνησθέντες τῶν λογίων ὥς σφεας χρεόν ἐστι ἅμα τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Δωριεῦσι ἐκπίπτειν ἐκ Πελοποννήσου ὑπὸ Μήδων τε καὶ Ἀθηναίων, κάρτα τε ἔδεισαν μὴ ὁμολογήσωσι τῶι Πέρσηι Ἀθηναῖοι. We should notice the ominous effect of the mention of this prophecy here: Herodotus raises the possibility that Athenian treachery against the Dorian Greeks may, if not now then later, become a reality. He does not as a rule (pace Macan, ad loc.) care to cite prophecies whose untruth is glaringly obvious, and as suggested in my discussion of 7.151 above (cf. (E).3), there is reason to suppose that the possibility here envisaged, namely that the Athenians would come to terms with the Mede and set about enslaving the Peloponnesians, may indeed have been canvassed as Athens and Sparta prepared to go to war at the time of Herodotus' writing[187]. To have such a suggestion brought to our attention here surely throws a disturbing light on the Athenians' apparently so forceful repudiation of the Persian overtures. And there are other indications in the debate that this is a deliberate irony.

The Athenians, Herodotus says, made a point of delaying in their reply, knowing the reason for the Spartan embassy (141.2): ἐπίτηδες ὦν ἐποίευν ἐνδεικνύμενοι τοῖσι Λακεδαιμονίοισι τὴν ἑωυτῶν γνώμην. The Spartan speech is an important addition to the debate[188]; it is clear that to have the Spartans so forcibly point out the disgrace of the Athenians accepting Mardonios' overtures substantially dilutes the force of the Athenians' own repudiation. It looks almost as though Herodotus means to show the Athenians miscalculating the effect of allowing the Spartans to speak first. Instead of being able to score points off them, they are put in the invidious position of having to answer a challenge to their virtue. The Spartans (142.1ff) require the Athenians not to submit to Mardonios:

> μήτε νεώτερον ποιέειν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδα μήτε λόγους ἐνδέκεσθαι παρὰ
> τοῦ βαρβάρου. οὔτε γὰρ δίκαιον οὐδαμῶς οὔτε κόσμον φέρον οὔτε γε
> ἄλλοισι Ἑλλήνων οὐδαμοῖσι, ὑμῖν δὲ δὴ καὶ διὰ πάντων ἥκιστα πολλῶν
> εἵνεκα· ἠγείρατε γὰρ τόνδε τὸν πόλεμον ὑμεῖς οὐδὲν ἡμέων βουλομένων,
> καὶ περὶ τῆς ὑμετέρης ἀρχῆθεν ὁ ἀγὼν ἐγένετο[189]· νῦν δὲ φέρει
> καὶ ἐς πᾶσαν Ἑλλάδα. ἄλλως τε τούτων ἁπάντων αἰτίους γενέσθαι
> δουλοσύνης τοῖσι Ἕλλησι Ἀθηναίους οὐδαμῶς ἀνασχετόν, οἵτινες αἰεὶ
> καὶ τὸ πάλαι φαίνεσθε πολλοὺς ἐλευθερώσαντες ἀνθρώπων.

They then offer to look after the Athenians' women and children as long as the war lasts; and they conclude with a warning against Alexander (τύραννος γὰρ ἐὼν τυράννωι συγκατεργάζεται) and the untrustworthiness of the barbarians (ὡς βαρβάροισί ἐστι οὔτε πιστὸν οὔτε ἀληθὲς οὐδέν)[190]. The Spartans in other words charge the Athenians with their duty (*to dikaion*): they were responsible for involving Greece in the war, so that it would be shameful indeed for them to back out now; moreover, the Athenians' reputation, of which they themselves make so much, demands that they should not be responsible for enslaving the Greeks. It has often been seen that this debate is interlarded with motifs of Athenian state rhetoric, best known to us from the *Epitaphioi*

Logoi[191], and Herodotus' readers are bound to have been familiar with the Athenians' own catalogue of their contributions to Greek freedom. It is this reputation with which the Spartans are challenging them, and which is appealed to once more in the Athenian reply. The Spartan challenge, however, surely contains an irony, unseen in the dramatic context, but transparent to the attentive reader: while Herodotus was writing, Athens was being charged throughout the Greek world with responsibility for enslaving the Greeks (cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.124.3, et saepe). As the Athenian empire and its threat to Greek liberties were the central issues of Greek international affairs in Herodotus' lifetime, we can hardly avoid reading these words about "the unacceptability of the Athenians being responsible for the enslavement of the Greeks" as a deliberate irony. The only alternative to this view is to assume that what Herodotus thought he was doing was exonerating Athens' record in his own time; but this is hard to maintain when he so signally fails ever to make such an apology explicit. Thus the debate is yet another example of Herodotean equivocation, going as it does to the very brink of outright approval of Athens' record, but supplying just enough hints to give the attentive reader pause.

The Athenian repudiation too must be read again this background: that was what they said then, but look what they have done since and how empty their claims to be the guardians of Greek freedom! Their reply (8.146.1ff) serves only to compound the irony[192]. To Alexander they say that they are aware of Persian superiority: ἀλλ' ὅμως ἐλευθερίης γλιχόμενοι ἀμυνεύμεθα οὕτως ὅκως ἂν καὶ δυνώμεθα. Their reply to the Spartans sounds an uneasy note of rivalry (144.1f):

> τὸ μὲν δεῖσαι Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ ὁμολογήσωμεν τῶι βαρβάρωι κάρτα ἀνθρωπήιον ἦν. ἀτὰρ αἰσχρῶς γε οἴκατε ἐξεπιστάμενοι τὸ Ἀθηναίων φρόνημα ἀρρωδῆσαι, ὅτι οὔτε χρυσός ἐστι ουδαμόθι γῆς τοσοῦτος οὔτε χώρη κάλλεϊ καὶ ἀρετῆι μέγα ὑπερφέρουσα, τὰ ἡμεῖς δεξάμενοι ἐθέλοιμεν ἂν μηδίσαντες καταδουλῶσαι τὴν Ἑλλάδα. πολλά τε γὰρ καὶ μεγάλα ἐστὶ τὰ διακωλύοντα ... πρῶτα μὲν καὶ μέγιστα τῶν θεῶν τὰ ἀγάλματα ... αὖτις δὲ τὸ Ἑλληνικόν, ἐὸν ὅμαιμόν τε καὶ ὁμόγλωσσον, καὶ θεῶν ἱδρύματά τε κοινὰ καὶ θυσίαι ἤθεά τε ὁμότροπα. τῶν προδότας γενέσθαι Ἀθηναίους οὐκ ἂν εὖ ἔχοι.

The inflated rhetoric of this speech drives home the irony even further. "It is clear that the brave words of the Athenians are double-edged when viewed from the perspective of Herodotus and his contemporaries. Athens made peace with Persia to gain land and gold. The burned shrines were rebuilt by Pericles with imperial revenues. Those common bonds linking Greek to Greek were snapped by the outbreak of war between them" (Fornara p.86). In particular the resonant appeal to the community of interest of all Greeks, their common language and culture, is one that rings distinctly hollow in the context of Herodotus' narrative: we have seen few Greeks if any who really respected the unity of Hellas, a great number to whom it meant nothing at all. Indeed we clearly recall what Mardonios had said about the Greeks and their civil wars (7.9b2): τοὺς χρῆν, ἐόντας ὁμογλώσσους, κήρυξί τε διαχρεωμένους καὶ ἀγγέλοισι καταλαμβάνειν τὰς διαφορὰς καὶ παντὶ μᾶλλον ἢ μάχῃσι. Herodotus has given some reason to believe that the Athenians are different in their apparent attachment to the ideal of Hellenic freedom (esp. 7.139.5), but equally those hints have never been quite unequivocal. Athens seems attached rather to the idea of a unified and free Hellas - with herself as hēgemōn! This interpretation is once more re-inforced by an irony in Herodotus' choice of words, "under no circumstances whatsoever would we ever 'medize' and enslave Hellas", the same irony that we saw prepared by Herodotus' citation of the oracles (8.141.1) which predicted just such an eventuality, an eventuality already given some substance by Athens' coming to terms with Persia in the Peace of Callias (cf. 7.151), and very probably, as we said, canvassed more urgently as war with Sparta drew ever nearer (see above)[193].

To see the debate in its proper context, and to understand the spirit in which Herodotus 'reports' it, we need to read on to the parallel debate at Sparta a few chapters later. The Athenian speech had ended requiring of the Spartans that, rather than make offers of protection for their women and children, they make sure to send an army as quickly as possible to Boeotia (8.144.4f): νῦν δὲ ... στρατιὴν ὡς τάχιστα ἐκπέμπετε ... πρὶν ὦν παρεῖναι ἐκεῖνον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικήν, ὑμέας καιρός ἐστι προβοηθῆσαι ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην. But time passes and Mardonios once more captures Athens and once more tries to bring the Athenians round to his side (9.4.1ff); once more the Athenians resist temptation (9.5.1ff, below), but they continue in vain to wait for the Spartans. They had crossed to Salamis disappointed in their expectation of an army from the Peloponnese, which never came (9.6, ἐπεὶ δὲ οἱ μὲν μακρότερα καὶ σχολαίτερα ἐποίεον). Accordingly they send messengers to Sparta:

> ἅμα μὲν μεμφομένους τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ὅτι περιεῖδον ἐσβαλόντα τὸν βάρβαρον ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν ἀλλ' οὐ μετὰ σφέων ἠντίασαν ἐς τὴν Βοιωτίην, ἅμα δὲ ὑπομνήσοντας ὅσα σφι ὑπέσχετο ὁ Πέρσης μεταβαλοῦσι δώσειν, προεῖπαί τε ὅτι εἰ μὴ ἀμυνεῦσι Ἀθηναίοισι ὡς καὶ αὐτοί τινα ἀλεωρὴν εὑρήσονται.

The explicit reference back to the debate of Book Eight (by no means the only one in this passage, cf. esp.9.8.2, below) rules out the suggestion of Macan[194] that Herodotus' two narratives "are from independent sources, and *more suo* he gives them both, without adjustment, for what they are worth". But Macan was right to note the discrepancy: it is extraordinary that the same Athenians who had just asserted that nothing on earth would persuade them to make peace with the Mede at the expense of the other Greeks are now threatening darkly (and later 9.11.1ff, not so darkly) that if the Spartans do not hurry up, they will find some means of saving their own skins - and the Greeks be damned!

We have no way of knowing to what extent Herodotus is alone responsible for this discrepancy, since it is theoretically possible that he has a composite picture from his sources, with one informant stressing the loyalty of the Athenians and another questioning it. But it should be remembered that Herodotus is offering us very few hard facts here, beyond the information that there was a debate at Athens, at which the Athenians turned down Alexander's overtures and the Spartans agreed with them on a joint strategy, that the Spartans then gave the Athenians reason to doubt their loyalty, and that Athenian ambassadors then crossed from Salamis to Sparta to tax them with their inactivity. There is a fair likelihood that the rest is all Herodotean dramatization or interpretation, the licence he habitually allows himself in the composition of speeches. We need by no means suppose that any source actually told him that the Athenians showed signs of being less than loyal to Greece in the episode at Sparta: is this not rather Herodotus' malicious inference about how they might have spoken on that occasion, given his interpretation of the Athenian character? It is worth remembering that the Athenian tradition, as retailed by Isocrates (Paneg.94, cf. n.185), had it that despite provocation the Athenians "refused to be angry" at their betrayal by the allies (οὐδ' ὀργισθέντες τοῖς Ἕλλησι ὅτι προὐδόθησαν ...). Herodotus will have none of that sentimentality: his dramatization ensures that we sense the note of bitterest recrimination in this embassy to Sparta, and further that we do not stay fooled (if we ever were) by the earlier rhetoric of the Athenians, but rather notice that here again fine words can perfectly easily be the merest show, disguising ignoble intentions. It could be objected that Herodotus is merely having the Athenians blackmail the Spartans rather than actually implying they meant at this moment to medize, though I would be happier with such an explanation if Herodotus had actually pointed out that they were only pretending, especially in view of the very aggressive tone of the final speech (see below). Even if this is what he means, however, it clearly reflects ill on the Athenian character - the blackmail is cynical and self-interested, not the blackmail of a city whose first interest is in the survival of Greece - and, to judge from Isocrates, it is a version unlikely to have been favoured by many Athenians (and cf. Thucyd. 1.74.2).

The episode also throws light on the Spartans. Characteristically, Herodotus avoids giving away his position all at once. The Spartans, he begins, were at this time engaged with the Hyacinthia (9.7.1):

περὶ πλείστου δ' ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν· ἅμα δὲ τὸ τεῖχός σφι, τὸ ἐν τῶι Ἰσθμῶι ἐτείχεον, καὶ ἤδη ἐπάλξις ἐλάμβανε. The Spartans apparently have a reasonable excuse, the service of the gods (but see n.200 below); the mention of the Isthmus wall remains as yet a dark hint of something less honourable. Herodotus then proceeds to give the Athenian speech (9.7a.1ff). They explain first of all how things stand between them and Persia; the ephors, they 'charitably' assume, will not remember what transpired in the debate at Athens: τοῦτο μὲν τὴν χώρην ἀποδιδοῖ, τοῦτο δὲ συμμάχους ἐθέλει ἐπ' ἰσῆι τε καὶ ὁμοίηι ποιήσασθαι ἄνευ τε δόλου καὶ ἀπάτης (cf. 8.140a.4), ἐθέλει δὲ καὶ ἄλλην χώρην πρὸς τῆι ἡμετέρηι διδόναι, τὴν ἂν αὐτοὶ ἑλώμεθα. Presumably we are meant to notice that the Athenians here significantly embellish the offer they actually received from Persia, for we have heard nothing so far about any gift of dominions: do they imply that they would choose the right to rule over a subjugated Greece (cf. 9.11.2, below)? The Athenian speaker then reminds the Spartans in elevated terms of the decision to repudiate any agreement with Persia (9.7a.2): ἡμεῖς δὲ Διά τε Ἑλλήνιον αἰδεσθέντες καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα δεινὸν ποιεύμενοι προδοῦναι οὐ καταινέσαμεν ἀλλ' ἀπειπάμεθα. But this lofty opening gives way to something less dignified:

> ... καίπερ ἀδικεόμενοι ὑπ' Ἑλλήνων καὶ καταπροδιδόμενοι ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι ὁμολογέειν τῶι Πέρσηι μᾶλλον ἤ περ πολεμέειν· οὐ μὲν οὐδε ὁμολογήσομεν ἑκόντες εἶναι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀπ' ἡμέων οὕτω ἀκίβδηλον νέμεται ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας.

There is clearly a discordant note or two here. The talk of *kerdos* is certainly unattractive: the Athenians now appear to be insisting that their loyalty conflicts not so much with survival (i.e. resistance to Persia might mean destruction if they failed) as with profit (i.e. in choosing the Greek cause they are missing out on the rewards that they might buy with their treachery). In addition they can now see themselves coming to terms with Persia through "necessity" (cf. οὐ μὲν οὐδὲ ὁμολογήσομεν ἑκόντες εἶναι), where before they had insisted that "as long as the sun travels in the same course, we will never come to terms with Persia" (cf. 8.143.2). These are no doubt the merest details, but as we shall see, they are significant. With the claim that 'they at least are honest towards the Greeks' (above), the Athenians launch into a tirade against the Spartans for their 'treachery' (9.7b.1ff).

> "In the former debate your fear was real enough that we might give in to Persia; but now that you have discovered our true mind, that we would never betray Hellas, and now that your Isthmus wall is complete, you have betrayed us, standing by and watching while the Mede invaded Attica. We have just cause to be angry with you for such unbecoming behaviour. We demand that you now send a force to face the Mede in Attica, now that Boeotia is lost to us".

There is no denying the bitter tone of all this - almost as though the Athenians were pleased to be able to berate the Spartans for their inconstancy - and it is all the less happy because Herodotus has not yet made it quite clear that the Spartans were indeed 'betraying' the Athenians.

His narrative, however, is now quick to correct this omission[195] - though not perhaps altogether with the effect of dispelling the impression that the Athenians were happy to infer the worst. The ephors, he goes on, put off replying until the following day (9.8.1), and then the next, and so on for ten days: ἐν δὲ τούτωι τῶι χρόνωι τὸν 'Ισθμὸν ἐτείχεον σπουδὴν ἔχοντες πολλὴν πάντες Πελοποννήσιοι, καί σφι ἦν πρὸς τέλεϊ. Having prepared the ground so carefully with innuendo, Herodotus then shows his determination to make the most of Sparta's treachery by offering his own judgement (9.8.2):

> οὐδ' ἔχω εἰπεῖν τὸ αἴτιον δι' ὅτι ἀπικομένου μὲν 'Αλεξάνδρου ... σπουδὴν μεγάλην ἐποιήσαντο μὴ μηδίσαι 'Αθηναίους, τότε δὲ ὤρην ἐποιήσαντο οὐδεμίαν, ἄλλο γε ἢ ὅτι ὁ 'Ισθμός σφι ἐτετείχιστο καὶ ἐδόκεον 'Αθηναίων ἔτι δέεσθαι οὐδέν[196].

Anyone who supposes that Herodotus' sympathies are really with Sparta[197], must find this entirely ungenerous insistence on their treacherous desertion of Athens most indigestible. The simple truth is that Herodotus has contrived the sharpest possible antithesis between their fine words about justice and loyalty in the earlier debate (which he is, of course, quite explicit in recalling here, in the references to 'Alexander's arrival at Athens') and the obvious cynicism of their real intentions as revealed by their subsequent actions.

Herodotus now explains how they came to change their minds, in an anecdote which is certainly worthless historically[198], though not certainly a Herodotean invention. On the day before the final meeting was due (9.9.1f), the ephors were approached by a Tegean named Chileos who urged them to consider that with the Athenians against them and on the side of Persia the gates to the Peloponnese would be thrown open to Mardonios' army, despite the Isthmus wall: ἀλλ' ἐσακούσατε πρίν τι ἄλλο 'Αθηναίοισι δόξαι σφάλμα φέρον τῆι 'Ελλάδι. The speech of Chileos, besides implying that the Spartans meant to go through with their abandonment of Athens, makes the impression even stronger that Athenian capitulation is really likely, and that unless the Spartans act quickly the Athenians will indeed bring disaster on Greece. The ephors see the truth of what Chileos has said (9.10.1ff) and decide to send out a force of Spartans at once, while it was still night. This secrecy gives Herodotus the opportunity of staging another meeting with the Athenian ambassadors (9.11.1ff), at which (with piquant injustice now!) the Athenians can be made to berate the Spartans with treachery and to threaten even more openly than before that they mean to accept Mardonios' offer. It is hard to imagine any reason for Herodotus' introduction of this extra speech beyond his desire to extract the last drop of embarrassment out of the mutual suspicions of Athens and Sparta[199]. He could for instance instead have given us a speech in which the two sides made up their differences and agreed to fight together in the common cause. But the Athenian accusations are this time more bitter still:

> ὑμεῖς μέν, ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, αὐτοῦ τῆιδε μένοντες 'Υακίνθιά τε ἄγετε
> καὶ παίζετε, καταπροδόντες τοὺς συμμάχους· 'Αθηναῖοι δὲ ὡς ἀδικεόμενοι
> ὑπὸ ὑμέων χήτεϊ τε συμμάχων καταλύσονται τῶι Πέρσηι οὕτως ὅκως
> ἂν δύνωνται. καταλυσάμενοι δὲ δῆλα γὰρ ὅτι σύμμαχοι βασιλέος γινόμεθα,
> συστρατευσόμεθα ἐπὶ τὴν ἂν ἐκεῖνοι ἐξηγέωνται. ὑμεῖς δὲ τὸ ἐνθεῦτεν
> μαθήσεσθε ὁκοῖον ἄν τι ὑμῖν ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἐκβαίνηι.

The Athenians accuse the Spartans of making an excuse of their Hyakinthia in order to betray their friends (the sarcastic tone of paizete is clear)[200] - but Herodotus has of course contrived that the suspicion is now unfair!

It is the 'unfairness' of this speech, the fact that the Athenians' criticisms no longer apply, which is surely its point, bringing out as it does the uneasiness and distrust which have been in the background of all the previous exchanges between the Athenians and Spartans. As for the Athenians themselves, it is now transparent that they are about to renounce the loyalty to the Greek cause which in the debate at Athens they had declared to be as unswerving as the course of the sun itself (cf. 8.143.2), but which we already saw developing flaws in their first speech at Sparta (9.7a.1ff, above). The future tense katalysontai no longer leaves their intentions in any doubt: had it not been for the timely intervention of Chileos, Herodotus implies, the Athenians would indeed have gone through with this threat (cf. here also Themistocles at Salamis: 8.62.2, above). The way that they choose to close this tirade, moreover, cannot be anything but sinister: what other complexion can we give to the warning to Sparta to "watch out what will result for you if the Athenians are forced to side with Persia" than that they will end up marching against the Spartans themselves and not too unwillingly at that? The tone of this remark, and its climactic position, surely mark it out as a thoroughly poisonous threat: 'if you let us go over to the Mede, assuredly we will be given power over you that we will be happy to use to your extreme disadvantage'. The redundancy of this speech in purely narrative or expository terms cannot be over-stressed. The story is already complete before the Athenians open their mouths: the Spartans have finally done the honourable thing, and we have watched them march out to Boeotia, and have been introduced to Pausanias, the hero of Plataea (cf. 9.10.1-3); the importance of Athenian loyalty to the success of the Greek cause has been more than adequately illustrated and discussed. I see no other possible explanation for the addition of this speech except its purpose in showing us something about the Athenian character, the sinister flash of menace in their dealings with Sparta, the disturbing insight that all those proud claims to idealism in the debate at Athens could give way to such a cynical expression of self-interest in despite of the common good of Greece.

Herodotus has contrived to disquiet the reader by juxtaposing the apparently glorious affirmation of Hellenic unity in the debate at Athens with the almost complete rejection of that position by both sides in the ensuing negotiations at Sparta[201]. He ensures that we keep sight of the original debate by constant reference back to it, as we have seen, confirming that there is nothing accidental in the transformation. Moreover, though the facts reported to him no doubt offered him the opportunity to make something of the contrast, the elaboration of the idea in a complex series of speeches is entirely his own work. We have also observed that Herodotus is particularly conscious of what can be done with tone. There are clear signs of the artificiality of the Athenian-Spartan concord in the earlier debate, especially in the tone of prickly uneasiness on both sides. This mood has degenerated into open contentiousness in the debates at Sparta, finally breaking out into almost unreserved hostility. This is not merely a matter of style or dramatic presentation: Herodotus is interested to show the true character of relations between Athens and Sparta, because that is the burning issue of his own time.

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2. In bringing these two debates together we have of course passed over a significant portion of Herodotean narrative, in which in particular two things stand out. The first is the advice given by the Thebans to Mardonios (9.2.1ff). He should decide to encamp in Boeotia and follow their plan to bring the Greeks into subjection without a fight:

> κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν Ἕλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας, οἵ περ καὶ πάρος ταὐτὰ
> ἐγίνωσκον, χαλεπὰ εἶναι περιγίνεσθαι καὶ ἅπασι ἀνθρώποισι· εἰ δὲ
> ποιήσεις τὰ ἡμεῖς παραινέομεν ... ἕξεις ἀπόνως ἅπαντα τὰ ἐκείνων
> βουλεύματα. πέμπε χρήματα ἐς τοὺς δυναστεύοντας ἄνδρας ... πέμπων δὲ
> τὴν Ἑλλάδα διαστήσεις· ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ τοὺς μὴ τὰ σὰ φρονέοντας
> ῥηιδίως μετὰ τῶν στασιωτέων καταστρέψεαι.

Mardonios of course does not adopt this plan, but goes on to take Athens a second time - but would it have worked, why does Herodotus mention it, and why does he mention it here? Certainly the story reflects in part on the character of the Thebans, and their presumption that their fellow-Greeks are as lacking in idealism as they evidently are themselves (cf. 9.88, below). But what does Herodotus want the reader to think might have happened if the plan had been tried out? He has told us earlier of how powerful factions in a number of Greek states did indeed medize merely in the hope of private profit (cf. e.g. (E).5), so that it is a realistic enough proposal to raise unsettling doubts in the reader. Moreover, when we go on to read (as we have seen) that the loyalty of both Athens and Sparta to the cause of Hellenic unity is by no means as unshakable as has just been made out, the doubts sink deeper. The phrase κατὰ μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἰσχυρὸν τοὺς Ἕλληνας ὁμοφρονέοντας strikes a positive enough chord, if we remember only the impression of the preceding chapters, but the illusion begins to crumble when we consider what follows. The same idea in fact recurs later in Herodotus' narrative, at the council of the Persians after 10 days' fighting at Plataea. Artabazos advises that they withdraw to Thebes (9.41.2ff), and at their leisure send bribes to the Greeks, and especially to the leading men: καὶ ταχέως σφέας παραδώσειν τὴν ἐλευθερίην, μηδὲ ἀνακινδυνεύειν συμβάλλοντας. And Herodotus adds, lest by chance we had forgotten (41.4): τούτου μὲν ἡ αὐτὴ ἐγίνετο καὶ Θηβαίων γνώμη, ὡς προειδότος πλεῦν τι καὶ τούτου. That last addition ("and Artabazos knew a thing or two about the Greeks!"; cf. Macan, "rather insight than foresight") most strikingly confirms that Herodotus too believes, what Artabazos and the Thebans saw, that the Greeks' attachment to the ideal of freedom was not so secure that it could not easily be loosed by the solvent of money. This is a somewhat disturbing intrusion into the narrative of Plataea, especially since (as we shall see) Herodotus goes out of his way to show that Greek unity at this point is less complete than it might be[202].

The other important anecdote which Herodotus inserts between the two debates is the story of the fate of Lykides (9.5.1ff). When Mardonios' second ambassador delivers his overtures to the Athenians at Salamis, Lykides, one of the bouleutai, expresses the opinion that it would be a good thing to present the matter before the assembly, εἴτε δὴ δεδεγμένον χρήματα παρὰ Μαρδονίου, εἴτε καὶ ταῦτά οἱ ἑάνδανε. But the Athenians are so enraged both those in the council and those outside, that they surround Lykides and stone him to death (whereas the Hellespontine envoy was sent away unharmed). And with the uproar, the Athenian women soon heard the news; whereupon, without a word from the men, they got together, and, each one egging on her neighbour and taking her along with the crowd, flocked to Lykides' house: καὶ κατὰ μὲν ἔλευσαν αὐτοῦ τὴν γυναῖκα, κατὰ δὲ τὰ τέκνα. Kleinknecht suggests (p.570) that the story "zeigt noch einmal die unabänderliche und instinktive Entschlossenheit des gesamten athenischen Volkes"; and indeed there are prima facie reasons for adopting this interpretation. Demosthenes (18.204)[203], speaking of Athens' heroic attachment to the ideal of freedom in the Persian Wars (n.185, above), can refer to the story (its protagonist here is not Lykides but Kyrsilos) as confirmation of his thesis: τὸν δ' ὑπακούειν ἀποφηνάμενον τοῖς ἐπιττατομένοις Κυρσίλον καταλιθώσαντες, οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ γυναῖκες αἱ ὑμέτεραι τὴν γυναῖκ' αὐτοῦ. There is no suggestion there that the stoning was anything other than a glorious assertion of the love of freedom.

But can Herodotus really admire Athens' love of freedom to the extent of countenancing such a barbarism as just? Certainly Lykides may be for him one of those Greeks susceptible to the lure of Persian gold (above), although Herodotus significantly adds that he may simply have been expressing his own opinion. To judge from the similar story of Arthmius of Zelea[204], the Athenians would probably have insisted that Lykides was indeed corrupted by gold, rather than allowing as Herodotus does that he may not - which does put a slightly different complexion on the story. What is surely decisive is the context of the story in Herodotus: as we have seen, Athens' original declaration of loyalty to the ideal of freedom (8.143f) is very nearly reversed in the debate at Sparta which follows this anecdote (9.6ff). The senseless horror of Lykides' death is surely brought out by the suggestion hinted at by this juxtaposition that it was an expression of irrational mob violence curiously at odds with the cynical rationalism of Athenian policy as shown in the ensuing debates at Sparta. Then there is also the dramatic emphasis of Herodotus' narration itself: the detailed description of the way hysteria worked on both men and women, and in particular the forceful and pathetic effect of the anaphoric tmesis with which Herodotus describes the stoning of Lykides' wife and children. It is surely of considerable importance that Herodotus does include the children, a detail absent in Demosthenes' account: we may contrast Pausanias' magnanimous treatment of the children of the Theban medizer Attaginos (9.88, below), when he declares that "children are not responsible" in such matters. Certainly Herodotus leaves the present story without explicit commentary, and we may suspect that an Athenian reader might well have been pleased with this rehearsal of the famous event; but a more objective reader must surely be meant to view this as an unacceptable side to the Athenians' devotion to freedom[205]. As we shall suggest later (cf. (L) below), Herodotus may well have a particular reason for evading direct comment in such matters. To judge what he might have said here, we may compare a story from the narrative of the retreat of the Persian forces after Salamis (8.116.1f). The king of the Bisaltai had originally determined never to help Xerxes, saying that he would never willingly be a slave to the king; and he forbade his sons to march either. But they wanted to see the war and so accompanied the expedition; and when all six of them returned unharmed, their father dug out their eyes in punishment. Not for nothing does Herodotus introduce that story as an ergon hyperphyes: the king's attachment to freedom leads him to a fanatical and monstrously unnatural action. Herodotus' failure to offer a similar expression of disapproval of the stoning of Lykides (not so terrible, but terrible enough!) may be put down to a general principle of never speaking a word of explicit criticism of any Athenian action, however atrocious or shameful (cf. e.g. Xanthippus at 9.120.4 ,with (K) below), a principle not, however, inconsistent with 'letting the facts speak for themselves', as surely they are meant to do here.

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(J) Plataea.

1. With Mardonios encamped at Thebes, Herodotus reports an anecdote about the Phocians which raises further questions about Greek heroism. The Phocians (9.17.1ff), who did not join Mardonios in his attack on Athens, although they had already medized (see below), were late in arriving at Thebes, and were at once ordered to encamp away from the rest of the army. Whereupon the Persian cavalry rode up to them, and the rumour went round among the Phocians and other Greeks that they were to be massacred. At this, the Phocian general Harmokydes encourages his men (9.17.4):

> "Men of Phocis, it is clear that these men are coming quite openly to kill us. We have been slandered by the Thessalians, I should guess. Now then is the time for each man to show his mettle: κρέσσων γὰρ ποιεῦντάς τι καὶ ἀμυνομένους τελευτῆσαι τὸν αἰῶνα ἤ περ παρέχοντας διαφθαρῆναι αἰσχίστωι μόρωι. ἀλλὰ μαθέτω τις αὐτῶν ὅτι ἐόντες βάρβαροι ἐπ' Ἕλλησι ἀνδράσι φόνον ἔρραψαν.

The cavalry now encircles them and actually begins to attack them, but they stand firm, and the Persians wheel about and retire. Herodotus then observes to the puzzled reader (9.18.2) that he "cannot tell whether they came to murder the Phocians at the bidding of the Thessalians, or whether Mardonios was just trying to test their mettle". We are then given Mardonios' speech to the Phocians (9.18.3), commending their bravery, which was not what he had been led to expect: καὶ νῦν προθύμως φέρετε τὸν πόλεμον τοῦτον· εὐεργεσίηισι γὰρ οὐ νικήσετε οὔτ’ ὦν ἐμὲ οὔτε βασιλέα[206]. And that is where the story ends. It is hard to see why else Herodotus should have lavished so much attention on this trivial episode, which after all leads to nothing, except as an ironical reflexion on Greek heroism. One of the motifs here is certainly the mutual hostility of Phocians and Thessalians, which clearly calls to mind what Herodotus had earlier said (cf. 8.27.1ff) about the Phocians only not medizing in order to do the opposite to the Thessalians. Harmokydes' suspicion that they have been denounced by their enemies is tacitly confirmed by Mardonios' comment about the things he has heard of the Phocians: at any rate the suspicion that the Thessalians had wanted their rivals massacred leaves a very nasty taste. More suprising, however, is the incongruity of Harmokydes' speech: ostensibly we seem to be hearing the true voice of Greek heroism faced with Persian treachery (cf. ἀλλὰ μαθέτω τις αὐτῶν ...); but the circumstances are clearly not right. The Phocians are not fighting for their freedom, for they have already medized - 'decidedly', if we may so read the text at 9.17.1[207] - and are presumably about to follow Mardonios' injunction to medize 'enthusiastically'. Moreover the Phocians do not end up "showing the barbarian the folly of trying to murder Greeks", but instead they incongruously and undesignedly prove to Mardonios that they are loyal and worthy subjects of the king. A speech like the one given to Harmokydes here belongs more properly in a context where the Greeks are indeed about to make a noble sacrifice in the name of Greek *aretē* and Greek freedom, that is before any of the great battles - precisely where Herodotus avoids any rhetoric of that kind. Coming where it does, its grand effect is perceptibly deflated both by the resulting action and by Mardonios' unexpected acknowledgement. Thus the very triviality of the episode may well be its point for Herodotus: having exploited the theme of Greek courage in this 'wrong place', he goes on to avoid any repetition of it where it does belong - at least as a motif in a battle speech.

2. The battle at Plataea is delayed (like Salamis, above) by a long preparatory narrative, in which Greek indecision and inconstancy are amply explored. The account begins decisively enough. The Spartans march from the Isthmus (9.19.1): πυνθανόμενοι δὲ ταῦτα οἱ λοιποὶ Πελοποννήσιοι τοῖσι τὰ ἀμείνω ἑάνδανε, οἱ δὲ καὶ ὁρῶντες ἐξιόντας Σπαρτιήτας, οὐκ ἐδικαίευν λείπεσθαι τῆς ἐξόδου. This elevated opening (the demands of honour compel the Peloponnesians to march) is something of a foil to the undignified sequel and the absence of any concerted action by the Greeks as a whole at Plataea.

The Greeks encamp on the foothills of Kithairon, but make no attempt to descend into the plain (9.20), and Mardonios sends the cavalry against them. The Megarians happen to be drawn up where they are most open to attack (9.21.1ff), and when they begin to suffer, they send a messenger to the generals appealing in hurt tones for support:

> οὐ δύνατοί εἰμεν τὴν Περσέων ἵππον δέκεσθαι μοῦνοι, ἔχοντες στάσιν ταύτην τὴν ἔστημεν ἀρχήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐς τόδε λιπαρίηι τε καὶ ἀρετῆι ἀντέχομεν καίπερ πιεζόμενοι. νῦν τε εἰ μή τινας ἄλλους πέμψετε διαδόχους τῆς τάξιος, ἴστε ἡμέας ἐκλείψοντας τὴν τάξιν.

Herodotus' reason for introducing this speech in oratio recta[208] is clearly to allow himself an ironic reflexion at the Megarians' expense. They are all too ready to cast themselves as heroes, when faced with no more than a skirmishing attack: Herodotus of course offers nothing to vouch for their heroism. They show rather a distinct readiness, despite their heroism, to want to escape from the line of fire. When Pausanias asks for volunteers, only the Athenians are prepared to go to their aid (9.21.3), although once the Athenians have dispatched Masistios, the whole army is bold enough to join in the fight over the body (9.23.1). After the success of this encounter the Greeks gain in confidence (9.25.1) and they decide to move down to Plataea (9.25.2f). This episode is important in setting the scene: what characterized the actions of the Greeks as a whole at Plataea (as at Salamis) was a lack of confidence for the fight.

The episode which immediately follows is the dispute between the Athenians and Tegeans (*logōn pollos ōthismos*) about who should have the privileged left flank balancing the Spartans on the right (9.26ff). Once more Herodotus intrudes a debate whose keynote is rancour, disagreement and division - like the debate over the hegemony at Syracuse (7.157ff), or like the debate over the *aristeia* at the Isthmus (8.123f). In each instance the Greeks make great claims to honours for themselves, envious of each other, while the narrative itself suggests only that all such argument is vain and vainglorious. This is another such example of Greek silliness, standing in ironic contrast to the vacillations which follow and which Herodotus describes at such length (below). Moreover, in the actual engagement when it comes, the disposition of the Greek forces has become a matter of no importance and the left flank is actually left out of the main fight[209].

There are however bigger questions concealed in the debate. It has been noticed that the Tegean speech is little more than a foil to the Athenian reply[210]. In particular, the Tegeans pride themselves (26.1ff) on the ancient achievement of their king, Echemos, who they say fought and defeated Hyllos in single combat when the Heraclids returned to claim the Peloponnese; it is to this service that they trace their right to the left flank in all expeditions of the Peloponnesians. Their speech offers in this way a perfect opportunity to the Athenians (9.27.2):

> Ἡρακλείδας, τῶν οὗτοί φασι ἀποκτεῖναι τὸν ἡγεμόνα ἐν Ἰσθμῶι, τούτους πρότερον ἐξελαυνομένους ὑπὸ πάντων Ἑλλήνων ἐς τοὺς ἀπικοίατο φεύγοντες δουλοσύνην πρὸς Μυκηναίους, μοῦνοι ὑποδεξάμενοι τὴν Εὐρυσθέος ὕβριν κατείλομεν, σὺν ἐκείνοισι μάχηι νικήσαντες τοὺς τότε ἔχοντας Πελοπόννησον.

The story is advanced as an answer to the Tegean claim about their treatment of the Heraclidae, but is belongs of course firmly in the traditional catalogue of mythical *topoi*, by which the Athenians asserted their attachment to the ideals of justice and freedom in their state orations, most notably for us the Epitaphioi[211]. Should we not say then that Herodotus has constructed the debate, on his own initiative or on instructions from his Athenian source (the latter less likely), to glorify these Athenian virtues? Such a view would indeed imply a devoted admiration for Athens - but we have not seen Herodotus hold such a position elsewhere. The answer must again be more complicated.

It is clear that Herodotus is equally convinced of the futility of the claims of both parties to the debate. Certainly the Athenians make a great show of disdaining the value of the exercise (9.27.1): ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν σύνοδον τήνδε μάχης εἵνεκα συλλεγῆναι πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ λόγων. And yet they are drawn into the debate for all their protestations: this avowal turns out to be a mere debating ploy. Herodotus has them rehearse not merely their championship of the freedom of the Heraclids, but the rest of their mythical catalogue as well, including their championship of the rights of the Seven, the defeat of the Amazons, and the exploits of the Trojan Wars (9.27.3f; cf. 7.161.3, above). But then he makes them perform a remarkable volte-face which cuts the ground from under the whole debate so far - a rhetorical trope no doubt, but nonetheless remarkable for all that (9.27.4f):

> ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γάρ τι προέχει τούτων ἐπιμνησθῆναι· καὶ γὰρ ἂν χρηστοὶ τότε ἐόντες ὠυτοὶ νῦν ἂν εἶεν φλαυρότεροι καὶ τότε ἐόντες φλαῦροι νῦν ἂν εἶεν ἀμείνονες. παλαιῶν μέν νυν ἔργων ἅλις ἔστω.

And they go on to record their achievement against the Mede at Marathon[212]:

> οἵτινες μοῦνοι Ἑλλήνων δὴ μουνομαχέσαντες τῶι Πέρσηι καὶ ἔργωι τοσούτωι ἐπιχειρήσαντες περιεγενόμεθα ... ἆρ᾽ οὐ δίκαιοί εἰμεν ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ἀπὸ τούτου μούνου τοῦ ἔργου;[213]

Though on the face of it Herodotus would seem to be acquiescing wholeheartedly in Athenian propaganda in these words, and simply giving himself the opportunity to celebrate Athenian heroism, this very climax sounds the essential note of qualification. The Athenians' patronizing disclaimer ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γάρ τι προέχει τούτων ἐπιμνησθῆναι will for the contemporary reader surely seem to cover their whole speech, their services at Marathon included. This is of course precisely the observation which Thucydides has Sthenelaidas make to crush the Athenians' rehearsal of their services to Greece in the debate at Sparta (Thucyd.1.86.1):

> τοὺς μὲν λόγους τοὺς πολλοὺς τῶν Ἀθηναίων οὐ γινώσκω· ἐπαινέσαντες γὰρ πολλὰ ἑαυτοὺς οὐδαμοῦ ἀντεῖπον ὡς οὐκ ἀδικοῦσι τοὺς ἡμετέρους ξυμμάχους καὶ τὴν Πελοπόννησον· καίτοι εἰ πρὸς τοὺς Μήδους ἐγένοντο ἀγαθοὶ τότε, πρὸς δὲ ἡμᾶς κακοὶ νῦν, διπλασίας ζημίας ἄξιοί εἰσιν, ὅτι ἀντ' ἀγαθῶν κακοὶ γεγένηνται[214].

We must repeat here what we said earlier (cf. (A).2 above): the Persian Wars, and all that they could stand for as propaganda, were in Herodotus' day still a topic of the most passionate interest The question whether or not Athens was justified in having built up her empire on the strength of her services to Greece at Marathon and the rest, was one in which it was surely impossible not to take sides (cf. esp. the discussion of 7.139, above). In reading Herodotus on the Persian Wars, therefore, we are obliged to imagine ourselves in the position of his original audience, to whom such recriminations and self-justifications by appeal to the Persian Wars were thoroughly familiar. Hence the merest echo of those arguments is enough to stir a response: the Athenians, Herodotus reminds the reader, were already, even at the time of Plataea, using those same arguments we are now so tired of hearing them use; then it was a trivial matter they were arguing about, but since it has become 'empire' itself which is at issue (ἆρ' οὐ δίκαιοί εἰμεν ἔχειν ταύτην τὴν τάξιν ἀπὸ τούτου μούνου τοῦ ἔργου; with Thucyd.1.75.1, ἆρ' ἄξιοί ἐσμεν ... καὶ προθυμίας ἕνεκα τῆς τότε ... ἀρχῆς δὲ ἧς ἔχομεν τοῖς Ἕλλησι μὴ οὕτως ἄγαν επιφθόνως διακεῖσθαι;). Herodotus comes very near to conceding the Athenian position in all this - but finally gives them the words that convict their own case, for Marathon and the rest are as much *palaia erga* to Herodotus' generation who had seen the growth of the empire, as the story of the Heraclids was at the time of Plataea[215], and the Athenians are demonstrably (to all but themselves) no longer the heroes they were in that earlier time (καὶ γὰρ ἂν χρηστοὶ τότε ἐόντες ...).

The Athenian speech ends on what seems like an even higher note, with the insistence (9.27.6):

> ἀλλ᾽ οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῶι τοιῶιδε τάξιος εἵνεκα στασιάζειν πρέπει[216], ἄρτιοί εἰμεν πείθεσθαι ὑμῖν ... πάντηι γὰρ τεταγμένοι πειρησόμεθα εἶναι χρηστοί. ἐξηγέεσθε δὲ ὡς πεισομένων.

This elaborate deference again seems at first sight creditable to the Athenians[217]: they are prepared to accept the decision of the Spartans and to follow their lead without demur and to the best of their ability. But once again the context must qualify their claim. We remember that Herodotus has told us (8.3.2) that the Athenians' acceptance of Spartan hegemony is entirely provisional: μέχρι κάρτα ὅσου ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν. The very emphasis of their deference here forcefully underlines the irony of it: the unwillingness of the Athenians to accept Spartan hegemony is already evident as Herodotus draws the work to a close[218], and it is this very desire to have all and yield nothing (cf. 7.162.1) which leads to the Peloponnesian War[219].

We cannot adequately understand this speech (any more than the debate at Athens, 8.140ff) unless we appreciate that Herodotus is not, as is often supposed, speaking for the Athenians in his own voice, but rather indulging in the most subtly provocative impersonation. There is no more reason why we should read this Athenian speech in simple good faith than we did, for example, the assurances of Histiaios to Darius that he owed the king absolute loyalty (5.106.3ff), or their own claim earlier that they would never at any price agree with Persia and enslave the Greeks (8.143.2 and 144.1). There can scarcely be any more forceful irony in Herodotus than the claim of the Athenians here that they intend to defer to Sparta's hegemony. Moreover, as we have said, the debate itself is not a bizzarely chosen opportunity to glorify Marathon (cf. n.213), but rather yet another dramatization of Greek division. Once again the tone is all-important (note especially the designation *logōn pollos ōthismos:* a hard-fought tussle): the patronizing disclaimers of the Athenians that this is all a waste of time and that they, at least, are prepared to accept whatever the Spartans decide, are in striking confict with the obvious fact that they are indeed contesting the honour. The whole proceeding rings with the note of rancour on the part of both sides to the dispute which we have so frequently noted in Herodotus' Persian Wars debates (cf. esp. (H).1, above).

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3. After Herodotus has listed the contingents on both sides (9.28-32), and explained that the *manteis* on both sides found the omens against an offensive engagement (9.36 and 38.2), we hear how on the advice of the Theban, Timagenides, Mardonios sends the cavalry to Dryos Kephalai to cut off the Greek baggage-trains (39.1ff). This goes on for three days (9.40), neither side wanting to start the fighting, but with the cavalry harrying the Greeks, enthusiastically encouraged by the Thebans[220]. On the eleventh day of the two armies sitting opposite each other at Plataea (9.41.1ff), the Persians hold a council of war, at which Artabazos suggests the use of bribery rather than force (see above); but Mardonios, with headstrong impatience, decides to ignore the portents and oracles and risk an engagement (9.41.1ff). At this point Herodotus introduces a justly suspected episode, whose only point seems to be to show Greek, and particularly Spartan, inconstancy[221]. During the night, Alexander comes secretly to the Greek camp (9.44.1ff) with a message for Pausanias[222], warning that Mardonios means to attack at dawn. The Athenian guards (9.46.1ff) deliver the nessage to Pausanias, who is "filled with fright at the thought of the Persians" (ὁ δὲ τούτωι τῶι λόγωι καταρρωδήσας τοὺς Πέρσας)[223], and suggests to the Athenians that they take up their position opposite the Persians, and the Spartans theirs opposite the Boeotians (46.2). "You know about the Medes and their way of fighting, having done battle with them at Marathon, but no Spartan has

ever fought with them - though we are all familiar enough with the Boeotians and the Thessalians". The Athenians agree to this (46.3), explaining that they had thought of this earlier: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἀρρωδέομεν μὴ ὑμῖν οὐκ ἡδέες γένωνται οἱ λόγοι [224]. The changeover is decided upon and carried out (9.47), but the Boeotians advise Mardonios, who at once changes his own line: whereupon Pausanias, realizing that he has not escaped detection, changes once more, promptly followed once more by Mardonios. When all is back as it was, Mardonios sends a messenger to the Spartans, mocking their lack of resolution (9.48.1):

> ὦ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, ὑμεῖς δὴ λέγεσθε εἶναι ἄνδρες ἄριστοι ὑπὸ τῶν τῇδε ἀνθρώπων, ἐκπαγλεομένων ὡς οὔτε φεύγετε ἐκ πολέμου οὔτε τάξιν ἐκλείπετε, μένοντές τε ἢ ἀπόλλυτε τοὺς ἐναντίους ἢ αὐτοὶ ἀπόλλυσθε. τῶν ἄρ' ἦν οὐδὲν ἀληθές ...[225].

Mardonios ends, after much scoffing in the same vein, by challenging the Spartans to a combat of champions - to which there is no reply (9.49.1): ὁ δὲ περιχαρὴς γενόμενος καὶ ἐπαρθεὶς ψυχρῆι νίκηι ἐπῆκε τὴν ἵππον ἐπὶ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ...

Herodotus, with much elaboration through speeches (there is very little else!), here serves up a narrative which cannot really have much to do with anything that actually happened at Plataea. It is well recognized that it would scarcely have been possible for two such large armies to complete these elaborate manoeuvres not once but twice in the same day; moreover the rationale of the whole business, namely that the Spartans were quite simply unwilling to face the Persians, has not about it the look of truth. It is usually supposed that Herodotus has either misunderstood some quite different manoeuvres of the two armies or borrowed the story wholesale from an Athenian (and hence anti-Spartan) source, or both. But neither of these options nor any combination of them can really satisfy, except on the most condescending view of Herodotus' method. It is inconceivable that Herodotus can have relied for his narrative of Plataea on one source only, which he failed to check against any other (any more than he can have done at Thermopylae, cf. n.124

above). This battle is the climax of the history of the war: that Herodotus can have been so little interested in ascertaining the facts as to have been content with the first or only version he came across, defies belief[226]; or if it is true, then we can have no respect for Herodotus' skills, or application as a reporter. But the present story is by general agreement (cf. n.221) not true as it stands, though perfectly consistent in itself. Assuming either that the report does bear some remote relation to something that actually happened or that it is a plain slanderous fiction, we need to explain how Herodotus failed in any way to cross-check his information, since he had but to approach a different set of informants to discover that things were not as straightforward as they appeared[227]. These considerations leave us with only two options. Either Herodotus has kept the story knowing it to be a mere slander (cf. 8.94.1ff, with (H).2 above), and deceitfully given it the elaboration of truth, or he has done something else rather more complicated but equally devious. Knowing some vague story of changes in the battle-order, he has snatched at the opportunity of making this another illustration of Greek inconstancy, and has elaborated that hint out of all proportion, or rather virtually invented his own narrative around it, adding, certainly on his own initiative, the most important element here, the speeches, which expose the rationale of the whole affair as far as he is concerned. In particular, unless he was able to confirm from his various sources (by cross-checking) that the real reason for these manoeuvres was Pausanias' own nervousness (καταρρωδήσας τοὺς Πέρσας), which seems unlikely unless all those he spoke to happened to be hostile to Sparta, we must conclude that this essential ingredient is Herodotus' own fabrication. If these options seem unpalatable, and we wish to maintain that the story was essentially an authentic report of something he heard from a single source or group of sources (which was or were peddling falsehood), we must face the equally unpalatable conclusion that he has allowed himself to elaborate extensively, through the addition of substantial speeches, an anecdote he has not so much as taken care to cross-check with a single independent source[228]. For throughout the passage there is not the slightest hint that anything could possibly have been otherwise than Herodotus describes it.

At any rate the message of the episode is clear: Mardonios is given just reason to question the claims made for Spartan *aretē*[229]. Ultimately of course his misjudgement is the height of folly, for the Spartans win at Plataea! But the immediate occasion (Pausanias' sudden fear of Persia, to which Herodotus testifies in his own person, cf. n.223) makes the unavoidable impression that his scorn is in part at least justified. Spartan *aretē* is not what it was at Thermopylae, not the unalterable quality that Demaratus claimed it was. We can hardly avoid this conclusion, when Herodotus is so careful to have Mardonios echo the words of Demaratus (cf. n.225). Thermopylae was then after all something exceptional, the golden hour of Spartan valour. We have since seen them less willing to repeat the performance, in particular when they dragged their feet over the expedition to Boeotia (9.6ff cf. (I).1 above). Clearly Herodotus means us to observe that already in his work the degeneration has begun. Thermopylae was the high point from which all else descends: Pausanias and the Spartans who fought at Plataea are the feeble *epigoni* of Leonidas and the 300.

After this, with Mardonios' cavalry harrying them and interfering with their water supply from Gargaphia (9.49.2f) and their food supplies (9.50ff), the Greeks decide to move to the 'island'. This done, they plan on the following day to send half the army to Kithairon to assist the movement of supplies (9.51.4). But having been harried all day by the cavalry, when night comes and the time for them to move as planned (9.52): ἐνθαῦτα ἀερθέντες οἱ πολλοὶ ἀπαλλάσσοντο, ἐς μὲν τὸν χῶρον ἐς τὸν συνέκειτο οὐκ ἐν νόωι ἔχοντες, οἱ δὲ ὡς ἐκινήθησαν, ἔφευγον ἄσμενοι τὴν ἵππον πρὸς τὴν Πλαταιέων πόλιν. This manoeuvre disposes of the majority of the army for almost the entire remainder of the campaign (note the inferences as to motive, underlined). When later the Spartans come under attack, they appeal to the Athenians to help (9.60.1)[230]:

> ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ἀγῶνος μεγίστου προκειμένου ἐλευθέρην εἶναι ἢ δεδουλωμένην τὴν Ἑλλάδα, προδεδόμεθα ὑπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἡμεῖς τε οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα διαδράντων.

When finally news reaches Plataea of the rout of the Persian army (9.69.1f), the army is then at last emboldened to fight: οἱ δὲ ἀκούσαντες ταῦτα, οὐδένα κόσμον ταχθέντες ... The Megarians and Phleiasians are spotted by the Theban cavalry who promptly rout them: ἐπειγομένους οὐδένα κόσμον ἤλαυνον ... οὗτοι μὲν δὴ ἐν οὐδένι λόγωι ἀπώλοντο [231]. Lastly, in describing the burial of the dead at Plataea (9.85.1ff), Herodotus again reminds us of the absence of the main army from the battle, and conjectures that besides the graves of those known to have died in the battle, there are others set up as a pretence by those states which had been absent (85.3): τούτους δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ πυνθάνομαι, ἐπαισχυνομένους τῆι ἀπεστοῖ τῆς μάχης ἑκάστους χώματα χῶσαι κεινὰ τῶν ἐπιγινομένων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων. He knows, he says, of an Aeginetan grave there, which he has heard (τὸν ἐγὼ ἀκούω ...) was set up 10 years later by one Kleadas of Plataea, at the request of the Aeginetans, whose *proxenos* he was[232]. In other words, Herodotus is concerned throughout to remind the reader that Plataea was no triumph of Greek unity, and that, whatever we may have heard, most of the Greek army played the coward - effectively, as Pausanias puts it, 'betraying' their fellow-Greeks in the process. We will not, having observed Herodotus' concerns thus far, think it necessary to invoke any special theory about his sources to explain this cynicism. He wants to make clear that he has seen beyond the smoke-screens thrown up by the Greeks themselves around their achievements in the Persian Wars (τῶν ἐπιγινομένων εἵνεκεν ἀνθρώπων). We are not to be fooled by the myths and the monuments: little enough has changed after all.

When Pausanias sees that the army has left the camp, apparently still following the agreed plan (9.53.1ff), he orders the Spartans to march out after them. But then follows the remarkable story of Amompharetos[233].

All the other commanders are prepared to obey, but not Amompharetos[234]: οὐκ ἔφη τοὺς ξείνους φεύξεσθαι οὐδὲ ἑκὼν εἶναι αἰσχυνέειν τὴν Σπάρτην, ἐθώμαζέ τε ὁρῶν τὸ ποιεύμενον ἅτε οὐ παραγενόμενος τῶι προτέρωι λόγωι. Pausanias and Euryanax are angry that Amompharetos refuses to obey them (53.3), but worry even more that he and his men will be destroyed unless they follow the agreed plan. Meanwhile the Athenians had been holding their position as arranged (54.1): ἐπιστάμενοι τὰ Λακεδαιμονίων φρονήματα ὡς ἄλλα φρονεόντων καὶ ἄλλα λεγόντων [235]. The verb epistasthai in Herodotus does not of course exclusively mean 'know', but often 'believe', so that we cannot say that he is here vouching for the Athenian opinion[236]. Certainly Herodotus' narrative has told us enough to justify the Athenian suspicions at least in part: the unwillingness to march from the Isthmus, the implausible excuse for the change of flanks, the uncertainty of the present plan (cf. 9.54.2). But of course these words reflect as much on the Athenians themselves: despite their insistence in the debate (9.27.6) and after (46.3) that they are prepared to follow the lead of the Spartans with complete deference, we now see that they harbour suspicions which bring home to us that their promise was merely to obey the Spartans, not to trust them[236a]. For Herodotus this episode is merely confirmation that the Athenians, unjustly as events show, were ready to suspect the least indication of Spartan indecision. When they saw the army move (9.54.2), they sent a messenger on horseback: ὀψόμενόν τε εἰ πορεύεσθαι ἐπιχειροῖεν οἱ Σπαρτιῆται, εἴτε καὶ τὸ παράπαν μὴ διανοεῦνται ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι, ἐπειρέσθαί τε Παυσανίην τὸ χρεὸν εἴη ποιέειν[237]. The Athenian herald however finds the Spartans still in their old position: καὶ ἐς νείκεα ἀπιγμένους αὐτῶν τοὺς πρώτους[238]. Pausanias tells the Athenians to join him and follow the same plan of retreat. Meanwhile the quarrel drags on to dawn (9.56.1ff). Pausanias decides that Amompharetos will not remain if the rest of the Spartans move off and accordingly gives the signal. The Spartans lead off in the opposite direction to the Athenians; Amompharetos, not believing that Pausanias would dare to leave him, remains steadfast (περιείχετο αὐτοῦ μένοντας μὴ ἐκλιπεῖν τὴν τάξιν: the key-words repeated once more), until he realizes that he is indeed being left, when he changes his mind and tags along behind.

The whole episode[239] has the ring of black comedy[240], a parody of the Spartan claims about ' never leaving their station' which Demaratus had insisted upon to Xerxes (7.104.5) and which had been so resoundingly vindicated at Thermopylae. Amompharetos carries adherence to this Spartan *nomos* to the ridiculous extreme of refusing to obey an order of his superiors which has the best interests of the army at heart. As far as that *nomos* is concerned, he is of course in principle right - but his obedience to *nomos* involves him paradoxically in disobedience to his commanders. From another point of view the story again reminds us that the way the Spartans behave at Plataea is not the way they behaved at Thermopylae. That may mean that the Spartans are here no longer true as they then were to the demands of *nomos*; but it may also suggest something about Thermopylae itself, that there was something not a little perverse in the 'obstinacy'[241] of Leonidas and the 300. That same sort of Spartan obstinacy on the same principles turns Amompharetos into something of a fool. Although in this case there is no particular reason to doubt the historicity of the story, we must still explain why Herodotus has thoughtit important to elaborate it to such a remarkable extent (9.53-7: about 60 lines of OCT), so that it casts a shadow over the narrative of the battle. The answer that it simply makes ' a good story' does not strike me as adequate: is it really so inconsequential as that? The story is worth including from Herodotus'point of view because it raises questions central to his narrative of the Persian Wars, and in particular the Spartan role in them: the issue of 'not leaving one's station' and all that implies about Spartan *nomos*, and the theme of Greek division (here *neikos*), as well as the uneasy relationship of Athenians and Spartans in the war.

That the first of these questions is indeed at issue here is in part confirmed by Mardonios' speech to the Aleuadai which follows (9.58.1ff):

> ὦ παῖδες Ἀλεύεω, ἔτι τί λέξετε τάδε ὁρῶντες ἔρημα; ὑμεῖς γὰρ οἱ πλησιόχωροι ἐλέγετε Λακεδαιμονίους οὐ φεύγειν ἐκ μάχης, ἀλλ' ἄνδρας εἶναι τὰ πολέμια πρώτους· τοὺς πρότερόν τε μετισταμένους ἐκ τῆς τάξιος εἴδετε (cf. 9.44ff above!), νῦν τε ὑπὸ τὴν παροιχομένην νύκτα καὶ οἱ πάντες ὁρῶμεν διαδράντας· διέδεξάν τε, ἐπεί σφεας ἔδεε πρὸς τοὺς ἀψευδέως ἀρίστους ἀνθρώπων μάχῃ διακριθῆναι, ὅτι οὐδένες ἄρα ἐόντες ἐν οὐδαμοῖσι ἐοῦσι Ἕλλησι ἐναπεδεικνύατο ...

And so on in the same vein[242]. Naturally this speech, even more than the last, must be read in part as an indication of Mardonios' blindness and folly, of his misapprehension of the superiority of the Spartans, soon to vindicated in the encounter that follows (cf. 9.64.1, 71.1; cp. 62.3!)[243]. In that sense it is surely a foil to the glorious narrative of Greek heroism. But again Herodotus is almost certainly trying to have it both ways. Coming as it does after the protracted narrative of Amompharetos' obstinacy the speech has a most disquieting effect. Indeed it includes an explicit reminder of the theme of that narrative (Λακεδαιμονίους οὐ φεύγειν ἐκ μάχης), as well as a reminder of the earlier speech and its occasion (9.44ff, the changing of the battle line, above). Both Amompharetos and Mardonios are drawing attention to the same thing, the fact that Spartan indecision and hesitancy in their present actions conflicts with the story of their unalterable constancy as told by Demaratus. In a sense both are wrong, and events prove them wrong. Yet the inconsistency remains and Herodotus has constructed his narrative up to now in part at least to illustrate it.

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4. The battle itself of course produces a Greek victory, which Herodotus does not hesitate to call fine (9.64.1): ἐνθαῦτα ἥ τε δίκη τοῦ φόνου τοῦ Λεωνίδεω ... ἐπετελέετο καὶ νίκην ἀναιρέεται καλλίστην ἁπασέων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Παυσανίης. Nor does he neglect to remind us that the Spartans

won the prize for valour (9.71.1): Ἑλλήνων δέ, ἀγαθῶν γενομένων καὶ Τεγεητέων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὑπερεβάλοντο ἀρετῆι Λακεδαιμόνιοι [244]. We are told also of the noble utterance of the 'most beautiful' Callicrates (9.72.1f): οὐ μέλειν οἱ ὅτι πρὸ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀποθνήσκει, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐχρήσατο τῆι χειρὶ καὶ ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστί οἱ ἀποδεδεγμένον ἔργον ἑωυτοῦ ἄξιον προθυμευμένου ἀποδέξασθαι [245]. In other words Plataea in Herodotus' account acquires the same paradoxical character as most of the other battles of the war: the Greeks, and here especially the Spartans who are the undisputed heroes of the battle, show considerable indecision and disunity in the lead-up to the fighting, while the battle itself is acknowledged to be a fine victory, in which the Greeks fought bravely and well. The equivocation is impossible to miss.

On the Athenian side Herodotus commends the virtue of Sophanes of Decelea (9.73.1ff), at which point he allows himself what seems at first sight an entirely gratuitous digression about Decelea, which he merely pegs onto the name of the Athenian hero (9.73.1): Σωφάνης ... ἐκ δήμου Δεκελεῆθεν, Δεκελέων δὲ τῶν κοτε ἐργασαμένων ἔργον χρήσιμον ἐς τὸν πάντα χρόνον. The transition seems not a little forced! According to the Athenians, when the Tyndarids came to Attica to recover Helen, the Deceleans, annoyed at the arrogant behaviour of Theseus and fearing for Attica, gave away the whole secret and led the Tyndarids to Aphidna. And for that reason the Deceleans even now enjoy honours at Sparta:

> οὕτω ὥστε καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν ὕστερον πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι τούτων γενόμενον Ἀθηναίοισί τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοισι, σινομένων τὴν ἄλλην Ἀττικήν Λακεδαιμονίων, Δεκελέης ἀπέχεσθαι.

It is usually assumed that this passage is an inorganic addition to the whole, added to the text at a late stage in the composition [246]. Yet is not the reference to the war between Athens and the Peloponnesians perhaps a pointed intrusion here? Herodotus reminds us here, at the end of the narrative of Plataea, a position of dramatic emphasis, that the uneasy unity of Hellas which won them the war against Persia, was to collapse and revert to open war in his own lifetime, at which time Sparta would not hesitate to ravage Attica (as we have been told that Xerxes and Mardonios did), except insofar as they remembered an ancient act of treachery of the Deceleans!

Herodotus repeatedly makes opportunities to set the Persian wars in the context of wars fought by Greeks against each other, most spectacularly, as we saw, at the start of the entire proceedings (6.98.2, with (C).1 above)[247]. We may note, for example, his occasional obituary notices on heroes of the Persian Wars, in which we are reminded that men who fought there in the defence of Greek liberty died fighting in wars against other Greeks. So Arimnestos, who distinguished himself by killing Mardonios at Plataea, died later in an invasion of Messenia (9.64.2); Sophanes himself, having distinguished himself previously in combat in the war with Aegina, was later killed by the Edonoi in Thrace, in a battle for the gold mines of the region (9.75; cf. Thucyd.1.100 and 4.102); Hermolykos, a hero of Mykale, later died and was buried at Geraistos, having fallen in the war betwen Athens and Carystus (9.105; cf. Thucyd.1.98). A war of Spartan imperialism, and two wars of Athenian imperialism: it is not hard to read these brief references as more than mere obituary notices, and to see in them a deliberate attempt to put the heroism of the Persian Wars against the disillusioning background of Greeks fighting Greeks for power and profit.

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5. In the epilogue to Plataea Herodotus assembles, as has often been noticed, a collection of anecdotes centring around Pausanias, the hero of the hour, which seem devoted to the illustration of the virtues of the

Hellenes as against the vices of their barbarian opponents[248]. But it would be curious if Herodotus ever allowed himself a message quite as simple as that, especially since he is clearly far from regarding the Greeks as unspotted or the Persians as wholly black. It has been noticed for example that the anecdote of Pausanias and the trappings of Mardonios (9.80ff) is a foreshadowing by ironic means of the Spartan's later fascination with oriental luxury[249]. For our purposes here it will be necessary to consider only the interview with Lampon of Aegina (9.78f)[250]. Lampon, says Herodotus, approached Pausanias with an utterly impious proposal (9.78.1ff). He begins his speech with praise for Pausanias' victory (78.2): ὦ παῖ Κλεομβρότου, ἔργον ἔργασταί τοι ὑπερφυὲς μέγαθος καὶ κάλλος, καί τοι θεὸς παρέδωκε ῥυσάμενον τὴν Ἑλλάδα κλέος καταθέσθαι μέγιστον Ἑλλήνων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν. These words clearly echo - though in a noticeably exaggerated form - the words that Herodotus himself used of the victory earlier (9.64): καὶ νίκην ἀναιρέεται καλλίστην ἁπασέων τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Παυσανίης. Herodotus' reticence in mentioning nothing about saving Greece is quite as significant as Lampon's exaggeration. Lampon then goes on: σὺ δὲ καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τὰ ἐπὶ τούτοισι ποίησον ὅκως λόγος τέ σε ἔχηι ἔτι μέζων καί τις ὕστερον φυλάσσηται τῶν βαρβάρων μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἔργα ἀτάσθαλα ποιέων ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας. And he then reveals his suggestion, that in retribution for the maltreatment of Leonidas' corpse by Xerxes (cf. 7.238.1f), when the king had the body beheaded and the head stuck on a pike, he should do the same to the body of Mardonios: τῶι σὺ τὴν ὁμοίην ἀποδιδοὺς ἔπαινον ἕξεις πρῶτα μὲν ὑπὸ πάντων Σπαρτιητέων, αὖτις δὲ καὶ πρὸς τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων. Pausanias replies by thanking him for his goodwill and thoughtfulness but condemning his suggestion (79.1):

> ἐξάρας γάρ με ὑψοῦ καὶ τὴν πάτρην καὶ τὸ ἔργον, ἐς τὸ μηδὲν κατέβαλες παραινέων νεκρῶι λυμαίνεσθαι, καὶ ἢν ταῦτα ποιέω, φὰς ἄμεινόν με ἀκούσεσθαι· τὰ πρέπει μᾶλλον βαρβάροισι ποιέειν ἤ περ Ἕλλησι· κἀκείνοισι δὲ ἐπιφθονέομεν[251].

Accordingly he would not be happy with anyone who approved such an idea: ἀποχρᾶι δέ μοι Σπαρτιήτηισι ἀρεσκόμενον ὅσια μὲν ποιέειν, ὅσια δὲ καὶ λέγειν. Leonidas has his retribution and his meed of honour together with the other dead at Thermopylae through the countless souls of the dead at Plataea. The story contains as much irony as the others mentioned above. Pausanias declaration that he is content to do what is 'pleasing to the Spartans' and to behave and speak only justly, is precisely calculated as a foil to his later life, when the Spartan way suddenly no longer held the same attraction and the barbarian way, which he here affects to deplore, came to seem much more desirable. There is a pathetic irony too in his horror at being raised up only to be laid low (ἐξάρας γάρ με ὑψοῦ ... ἐς τὸ μηδὲν κατέβαλες): this is of course a mirror of Pausanias' career as it is known to the reader, the glory of his victory at Plataea brought to nothing by his subsequent actions. The moral of the story is clearly that the achievement of Plataea in no way gives Pausanias or any other Greek the licence to behave as they please: however great the glory they have won, they cannot be excused if they then allow themselves to do wrong. The victory is sufficient in itself - even as it requires no more than the souls of those killed in the battle to honour Leonidas and the 300 (φημὶ μεγάλως τετιμωρῆσθαι). This indeed illuminates Herodotus' treatment of the Persian Wars as a whole: the Greeks, and notably the Spartans and the Athenians, won the highest glory from their victories, but that fact must be taken as self-sufficient. They are not in a position to justify anything they may have done since simply in the name of the kleos of that achievement: indeed if they have since done wrong, they are all the more deserving of censure (cf. Thucyd.1.86.1, above). It is clear that Herodotus believes the Greeks have listened to the arguments of Lampon and tarnished their glory just as Pausanias tarnished his: from the great heights of the Persian Wars they have been brought to nothing.

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6. The first action of the allies after the battle, Herodotus tells us, was to decide on revenge (9.86.1ff)[252], to march against Thebes and demand the surrender of the medizers: ἢν δὲ μὴ ἐκδιδῶσι, μὴ ἀπανίστασθαι ἀπὸ πόλιος πρότερον ἢ ἐξέλωσι. ὡς δέ σφι ταῦτα ἔδοξε, οὕτω δὴ ἑνδεκάτηι ἡμέρηι ἀπὸ τῆς συμβολῆς ἀπικόμενοι ἐπολιόρκεον Θηβαίους. The Thebans resist, the Greeks ravage the land and lay siege to the walls. Clearly we cannot be surprised at the inclusion of some mention of the attack on Thebes[253]; it might reasonably be felt, however, that the prominence and emphasis that Herodotus gives to it ('only eleven days after Plataea') are meant to have a negative effect. So soon after defeating Mardonios the Greeks devote their energies once more to fighting one another. The narrative, moreover, consists very largely of a speech given to the Theban Timagenides, which has the unsettling effect of letting us see the episode through the eyes of its, admittedly guilty, victims. The Greeks, says Timagenides (9.87.1f) to the Thebans on the 20th day of the siege, have decided not to leave off before either taking the city or having you surrender us, the medizers:

> νῦν ὧν ἡμέων εἵνεκα γῆ ἡ Βοιωτίη πλέω μὴ ἀναπλήσηι, ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν χρήματα χρηίζοντες πρόσχημα ἡμέας ἐξαιτέονται, χρήματά σφι δόμεν ἐκ τοῦ κοινοῦ (σὺν γὰρ τῶι κοινῶι καὶ ἐμηδίσαμεν οὐδὲ μοῦνοι ἡμεῖς), εἰ δὲ ἡμέων ἀληθέως δεόμενοι πολιορκέουσι, ἡμεῖς ἡμέας αὐτοὺς ἐς ἀντιλογίην παρέξομεν.

It would be interesting to know if Herodotus wrote this passage in the knowledge of the events at Plataea in 427 BC (Thucyd.3.52ff), when the Thebans were demanding the surrender of the 'atticizing' Plataeans, and the Plataeans gave themselves up in the hope of being able to present the case for their defence, only to be thwarted by the Thebans. The present episode would surely have struck Herodotus as an ironic contrast of roles. At any rate it is hard to avoid the impression that there is something heroic in the preparedness of Timagenides to give himself up, with the other medizers, to save his city[254] - even though he is not alone responsible for the medizing of Thebes[255]. That he is given no opportunity to present his defence

(cf. 9.88, below) heightens the pathos of his self-sacrifice. But his speech also tells us something about the Greeks: how just is his suspicion that all the Greeks are really after is money? Certainly past experience, in particular what happened in similar circumstances at Andros after Salamis (and cf. 9.2.1ff and 41.2ff, above), suggests that his conjecture might indeed be right in this case. There is no opportunity for testing it, because Pausanias sends away the rest of the allies and takes the matter into his own hands.

This action of Pausanias is itself somewhat hard to judge (9.88). Attaginos manages to escape, but Pausanias spares his children: φὰς τοῦ μηδισμοῦ παῖδας οὐδὲν εἶναι μεταιτίους. This is clearly meant as a just and humane action, in keeping with the chivalrous role that Pausanias is given in this part of the narrative[256]. But as for the medizers surrendered by the Thebans:

> οἱ μὲν ἐδόκεον ἀντιλογίης τε κυρήσειν καὶ δὴ χρήμασι ἐπεποίθεσαν διώσεσθαι· ὁ δὲ ὡς παρέλαβε, αὐτὰ ταῦτα ὑπονοέων τὴν στρατιὴν τὴν τῶν συμμάχων ἅπασαν ἀπῆκε καὶ ἐκείνους ἀγαγὼν ἐς Κόρινθον διέφθειρε.

And this is the last we hear of the hero of Plataea. This is surely a disquieting end to the story of Plataea: the secrecy of Pausanias' action[257] and its calm brutality almost seem prophetic of his later behaviour[258]. The story of the revenge on Thebes seems calculated to leave a bitter taste after the narrative of Plataea, not least after Pausanias' own strictures on just and unjust revenge only a little earlier (9.79.1f). We need only compare Thucydides on the massacre of the Plataeans in 427 (3.52.ff) to remember that the Greeks did not as a rule sanction the execution of prisoners without fair trial (antilogia: what Timagenides and the others are denied here), whatever their crimes. Does Herodotus not mean, however, that the Thebans surrendered on condition not merely that the medizers were handed over but also that they would get the right of antilogia, which he leaves us in no doubt that they expected (cf. 9.88, ὡμολόγησαν ἐπὶ τούτοισι)[259].

(K) Ionia.

The liberation of Ionia (9.90ff) is clearly not a dramatic climax for Herodotus, even though it is in this narrative that the work's original theme is finally brought to a close (cf. 1.5.3): the long enslavement of the Greeks of Asia Minor to oriental despotism is now for the first time ended for good. Herodotus' reason for playing down this climax may simply be that he is looking to the future: the liberation of Ionia is once again short-lived, and the new empire has already made its appearance at the point where he chooses to lapse into silence.

The aftermath of Mykale is dominated by the actions of the Athenians and this emphasis may well reflect Herodotus' own desire to read into this earliest stage the beginnings of an aggressive Athenian policy in Ionia. At the debate on the future of the Ionians (9.106.2ff), it is mooted that they should be evacuated to some settlement in the Greek mainland, and the Peloponnesians suggest that the Ionians be settled in the emporia of medizing states; but the Athenians object in principle (106.3): Ἀθηναίοισι δὲ οὐκ ἐδόκεε ἀρχὴν Ἰωνίην γενέσθαι ἀναστατὸν οὐδὲ Πελοποννησίους περὶ τῶν σφετέρων ἀποικιέων βουλεύειν. The implication of these words is unmistakable: Athens is already claiming the right to decide the fate of Ionia, and the first step has already been made to her rejection of the hegemony of Sparta and to her own imperial independence. The eagerness that Ionia should not be evacuated is a clear reminder of where Athens' ambitions lie: had such a plan been effected, there would have been no empire. The outcome is that the Athenians get their way:

> ἀντιτεινόντων δὲ τούτων προθύμως (cp. 8.3.2!) εἶξαν οἱ
> Πελοποννήσιοι, καὶ οὕτω δὴ Σαμίους τε καὶ Χίους καὶ Λεσβίους
> τοὺς ἄλλους νησιώτας, οἳ ἔτυχον συστρατευόμενοι τοῖσι Ἕλλησι,
> ἐς τὸ συμμαχικὸν ἐποιήσαντο, πίστι τε καταλαβόντες καὶ ὁρκίοισι
> ἐμμενέειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσασθαι.

It is clearly the Greeks as a whole, the Hellenic League itself, which here admits these states to the alliance; and yet there is little doubt that this oath was the model for that later administered to the new members of the Delian League[260]. Has not Herodotus, realizing this, over-enthusiastically inferred that already at this stage the allies were bound by oaths not to *secede* (ἀποστήσασθαι), a word found frequently in the later imperial oaths of allegiance, but not in our texts of the oath for the Delian League itself (cf. Ar.Athpol.23.5; Plut.Ar.25.1)[261]? Similarly by deciding to carry his narrative on as far as the siege of Sestos Herodotus contrives to end with a picture of the Peloponnesians "thinking that the best thing to do was to return to Greece", while the Athenians under Xanthippus "determined to stay where they were" (cf.9.114.2), a picture which anticipates the later withdrawal of the Spartans from Ionia, leaving the hegemony in the hands of the Athenians (cf. Thucyd.1.95.7, above). This closing tableau may well be meant to set the reader thinking how things developed next, and remembering how these events led to the Delian League, and thence to empire. The sense that things are not complete, which led some commentators to suspect that the work was itself not complete[262], is on this view a deliberate effect.

The siege of Sestos drags on longer than expected, and the Athenian troops begin to grumble (9.117):

> ἤσχαλλον οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπό τε τῆς ἐωυτῶν ἀποδημέοντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι ἐξελεῖν τὸ τεῖχος, ἐδέοντό τε τῶν στρατηγῶν ὅκως ἀπάγοιεν σφέας ὀπίσω· οἱ δὲ οὐκ ἔφασαν πρὶν ἢ ἐξέλωσι ἢ τὸ Ἀθηναίων κοινὸν σφέας μεταπέμψηται. οὕτω δὴ ἔστεργον τὰ παρεόντα.

Quite how we are to take the last sentence here is doubtful. The orthodox view is that the subject of *estergon* is 'the Athenians', and that Herodotus is here signing off in a colourless way: "Thus the soldiers put up with their lot" (cf. e.g. Powell, s.v. *stergō*, although the word does not otherwise mean "put up with" in Herodotus). Fornara (p.81 n.9) suggests that the subject is rather 'the generals' (and 'the assembly', though this is somewhat forced) and that there is an ironic barb here: "so greatly did the generals like the present situation". I would suggest another possibility, given Denniston's observation (Greek Particles p.209) that houtō dē "is often ironical, contemptuous or indignant in tone", namely that it is indeed 'the Athenians', i.e. the troops, who are "putting up with the present situation", but that Herodotus is inviting us to remember that this indifference towards the affairs of Asia Minor was not long-lived and that the same Athenian troops were soon strenuously fighting for empire (cf. e.g. Aristoph.Vesp.1098ff). The assembly never did recall the fleet from Ionia and the decision to stay soon put the means to empire into their hands.

The last act of Xanthippus in Asia after the capture of Sestos and before the Athenians retire for the winter is his punishment of Artayktes. As the Thebans hoped to do with Pausanias (above), Artayktes (9.120.3) tries to bribe the Athenian general: 100 talents for the wronged Protesilaos and 200 talents for the Athenians, if he and his son are allowed to live. But Xanthippus is not persuaded[263] (9.120.4): οἱ γὰρ 'Ελαιούσιοι τῶι Πρωτεσίλεωι τιμωρέοντες ἐδέοντό μιν καταχρησθῆναι, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ ταύτηι ⟨ὁ⟩ νόος ἔφερε. If there was some doubt as to how to take Pausanias' similar treatment of the Thebans, Herodotus' account of the last act of Xanthippus in the work is unmistakably disturbing (120.4-121):

> ἀπαγαγόντες δὲ αὐτὸν (sc. Αρταΰκτην) ἐς τὴν ἀκτὴν ἐς τὴν
> Ξέρξης ἔζευξε τὸν πόρον, οἱ δὲ λέγουσι ἐπὶ τὸν κολωνὸν τὸν
> ὑπὲρ Μαδύτου πόλιος, σανίδι προσπασσαλεύσαντες ἀνεκρέμασαν,
> τὸν δὲ παῖδα ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσι τοῦ 'Αρταΰκτεω κατέλευσαν. ταῦτα δὲ
> ποιήσαντες ἀπέπλεον ἐς τὴν 'Ελλάδα, τά τε ἄλλα χρήματα ἄγοντες
> καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ ὅπλα τῶν γεφυρέων ὡς ἀναθήσοντες ἐς τὰ ἱρα.
> καὶ τὸ ἔτος τοῦτο οὐδὲν ἔτι πλέον τούτων ἐγένετο[264].

Xanthippus' revenge has all the character of the despotic punishments of the oriental kings[265]: the father who had asked his son to be spared sees him destroyed before his own eyes[266]. The 'oriental' character of the act is perhaps highlighted by Herodotus' reminder that it took place (at least according to the tradition he prefers, cf. 7.33) at the headland where Xerxes yoked the strait between Asia and Europe. That correspondence also suggests something else, that in this first victory at Sestos was born the empire to replace (at least in Asia Minor) the one that was just passing. It has symbolic significance that the Athenians take home with them to Greece the ὅπλα τῶν γεφυρέων, the symbols of Xerxes' own imperial ambition: the reader may doubt that the Athenians learnt the lesson that these trophies stand for. Significant also is that Herodotus' account of Greek action with the pregnant reminder that all is not over, that the Athenians' work has just begun: 'nothing more happened in that year', but the Athenians would continue each year after that to prosecute the business they had so ominously started here at Sestos.

Athens' growth through freedom, first freedom from political domination (the tyranny of the Peisistratids, cf. Ch.II.ii), then freedom from imperial domination (Persia), parallels exactly the growths through freedom of Media and then Persia, which we followed in the first section (cf. Ch.II.i.B): through freedom Athens comes to empire and the enslavement of her fellow-Greeks. Herodotus drops the curtain abruptly at just the moment when the transition to empire begins: the reader can be expected to fill in the rest[267]. This is the point to which everything has been leading: we might almost say that the work's interest in empire, enslavement and liberty, has from the beginning had in mind this climax. The analogy between the empires of Persia and Athens, far-fetched as it may seem to us, was actually canvassed in Herodotus' own day. Thucydides can have an Athenian speaker openly acknowledge the comparison, recalling that their 'allies' were subjects of Persia before (1.77.5): ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου δεινότερα τούτων πάσχοντες ἠνείχοντο, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἀρχὴ χαλεπὴ δόκει εἶναι εἰκότως· τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις[268]. Accordingly we may suggest that in choosing to write about the Persian empire Herodotus in some degree at least chose a subject which would provoke thoughts about the Athenian empire, and even that the importance of the theme of freedom throughout the work reflects a prominent contemporary concern[269].

(L) Conclusion.

The liberation of Greece is such an equivocal story in Herodotus' hands because it is written with the present in mind: it illustrates in and through the narrative of the Persian wars those qualities in the Greeks, their weaknesses, their rancorous divisions, their unscrupulous ambitions, which led by an inevitable and continuous process to the war during which the work was brought to completion. This interpretation of the work is indeed not new - but the essential fact of Herodotus' systematic equivocation has not yet been fully recognized. The story is only wholly comprehensible if we appreciate that Herodotus has gone out of his way to exploit a paradox: the salvation of Greece was achieved through the actions of men whose characters, manners and institutions were (and still are for Herodotus) corrupt and unadmirable. We might suggest - *si parva licet componere magnis* - that Herodotus' treats the Greeks and their achievements in the same sophistic and paradoxical manner as the so-called Old Oligarch treats the Athenians and Athenian democracy[270]. The Ps.-Xenoph.Athpol. has learnt from the sophists the paradoxical trick of praising something abhorrent to general opinion (cf. Ch.III.E), so that the author simultaneously deplores the democracy and'praises' its remarkable 'good sense' (Athpol.I.1):

> περὶ δὲ τῆς Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας, ὅτι μὲν εἵλοντο τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον τῆς πολιτείας οὐκ ἐπαινῶ ... ἐπεὶ δὲ ταῦτα ἔδοξεν οὕτως αὐτοῖς, ὡς εὖ διασώιζονται τὴν πολιτείαν καὶ τἆλλα διαπράττονται ἃ δοκοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνειν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἕλλησι, ταῦτ᾽ ἀποδείξω.

Similarly, though more subtly, Herodotus paradoxically sets out at the same time to praise the Greeks for their achievements in the war with Persia and to deplore their frailties and vices. In the light of this we may turn back to his astonishing 'Encomium of Athens' (7.139, with (E).2 above): like the Old Oligarch, Herodotus has taken it upon himself to question criticisms levelled at Athens by the rest of Greece and to set the record straight in certain precise particulars, while all the time including himself among the critics. But while the Old Oligarch cannot resist giving vent to his hatred of the very idea of democracy, Herodotus allows the case for the prosecution to emerge with scarcely any explicit advocacy on his part.

In many respects Herodotus shows in this narrative of the Persian Wars the same equivocal manner that we discovered in earlier sections, the same desire to contrast the admirable and the shameful qualities in human nature through paradoxical juxtaposition, to explore the conflicts of motive and action, of public pretensions and private ambitions. The Greek defence, like the Ionian revolt earlier (cf. (B) above), combines attractive and unattractive elements in the same perplexing patterns: individual noble acts of heroism and self-sacrifice alongside corporate acts of treachery, inconstancy and disunity. In another way, the two protagonists on the Greek side exhibit different combinations of faults and virtues, or rather the same essential qualitites manifest themselves at different times in different ways: the Spartans fight the most heroically of all the Greeks, in particular at Thermopylae, but they do so at the command of a despotic nomos, which gives their heroic sacrifices a certain perversity - while at the same time they fail to show any appreciation of the common intersts of the Greeks, but respond only to demands of their own honour or survival; the Athenians on the other hand show the greatest interest of all the allies in the survival of the whole of Greece, not just their own city, a factor which in fact proves the saving of the cause (cf. 7.139), but they do so because that is where they see their private interests as lying, both their immediate interests, in the sense that they need the rest of the Greeks if they are to avoid destruction by Persia - in which respect their position is unlike that of the others (cf. n.57, above) - and their long-term interests, in the sense that through success in the Persian Wars they anticipate that their own power will grow in the Greek world (cf. e.g. 6.109, with (C).2 and (G).1, above). Herodotus' view of the world is made up of such contradictions and perplexities, and it is typical of his literary manner that he allows them essentially to 'speak for themselves' - which is not to say that many of the perplexities are not of his own devising!

There may, however, be another side to Herodotus' equivocation in this account besides the taste for paradoxes and moral uncertainties, and that is that he did not feel himself wholly free to make the explicit criticisms he wanted to make, given the audience he anticipated for his work. Let us confine ourselves to Athens. On the above interpretation Herodotus comes surprisingly close on a number of occasions to echoing Athens' own propaganda about her democracy (cf. 5.78), about her role in the Persian Wars (cf. e.g. 9.27), and even about how her services to Greece justified her empire (cf. esp. 7.139), so much so that the traditional view of the work as a panegyric of and an apology for that city is not entirely without foundation. It has needed a somewhat painstaking attention to details of emphasis and omission to appreciate that Herodotus' heart and mind are not so committed. I believe we can offer an explanation of this curious evasiveness which will at the same time suggest the reason for the work's most startling omission, namely Herodotus' failure anywhere to speak directly about the Athenian empire, which is puzzling on any other interpretation[271]. If Herodotus was indeed an enthusiast for Periclean democracy and empire, why does he leave out any explicit justification of them, even, as we have seen, in contexts which clearly cry out for it (cf. esp. 7.139, above)? On the other hand if he is a critic of Athenian empire, why again does he never take the bit between his teeth and attack it outright, rather than confining himself to innuendo, and even coming close to conceding the Athenians' own propaganda? The answer seems to me that he wanted his work to succeed at Athens itself above all, the prytaneion tēs sophias, the centre of Greek intellectual life of the day - and there are clear hints that he is writing at least in part directly for an Athenian audience[272], besides the very obviously Atheno-centric bias of so much of the work - but that he deplored the behaviour of his hosts and the way they had abused their power in the Greek world. Thus he anticipated that an Athenian audience, in the main, would hear only what it wanted to hear and would be well pleased, so that we might almost credit the clearly unreliable claim of the ancient biography that he was handsomely rewarded by the democracy for his work; but at the same time he hoped that the attentive and reflective reader, who saw with him the dark side of Athenian empire, would be aware that there were deeper currents beneath the surface. An outright critique of Athens and the empire was something he felt he could not write without fear at least of unpopularity, and perhaps even of censure or sanction of some kind.

How safe could someone like Herodotus have felt, if having chosen to live and work at Athens among his intellectual peers (cf. Ch.III), he then found himself increasingly out of sympathy with the city and all it stood for? We may reasonably question whether Athens' much famed tolerance of free-speech (parrhēsia)[273] would have stretched to accepting a foreigner's explicit criticisms of her empire in a work designed for an Athenian audience, or rather an audience at Athens. If Cleon could prosecute Aristophanes (unsuccessfully as it may be) for 'wronging the city' in his 'Babylonians'[274], when in all probability the play did no more than question the mis-management of the empire, would Herodotus have been immune from attack if he had questioned the very existence of that empire? Not even the Old Oligarch does that, and we may imagine that his pamphlet did not aim at the wide circulation that Herodotus must have hoped would attend his work - indeed there may be some reason to suppose that the Old Oligarch is not actually writing for an Athenian audience at all. Herodotus was completing his book at a time when Athens was already at war, and thus no doubt demanding a greater solidarity than usual for the empire and the city, and already intolerant (as Thucydides' speeches for both Pericles and Cleon show) towards those who advocated a soft line over the empire. If Herodotus was writing in Athens (we cannot know when he went to Thurii: cf. Ch.III. Introd.) or writing with a view to being heard in Athens, where he would have the ears of those who really mattered, his equivocation in treating Athens and its doings is not at all hard to understand.

*

CHAPTER THREE

HERODOTUS
AND THE
SOPHISTIC MOVEMENT

Herodotus and the Sophistic Movement.

Anyone trying to write a chapter in the history of ideas must be daunted at some time or other by the suspicion that there has never been anything new under the sun, that the persistence of old ideas in and alongside new ones renders the task of mapping even the most elementary boundaries at best arbitrary. But the novelty of the sophistic movement is such that we need scarcely be troubled by such considerations: the evidence, direct and indirect, from Euripides, Aristophanes, Thucydides, Plato especially, Xenophon, and even Aristotle, to mention only the major witnesses, is quite sufficient to show us the radical consequences, moral, intellectual, social, political, even spiritual, of the sophists[1]. Even Plato's pejorative reflexions on the moral and intellectual standing of some of the leading figures of the movement arise more from anxious defence than from lordly scorn: if the sophists were indeed as intellectually negligible as he sometimes seems to imply, he would have no business to devote so much time to them and their ideas. From Thucydides' speeches, on the other hand, we gain a clear impression of the impact that sophistic ways of thinking and talking had on the social and political life of the more advanced cities, as for example in Cleon's denunciation of the Athenian infatuation with clever speakers (3.38.4ff). The Mytilenean debate can be called historical in the limited sense that Thucydides remembered how, already at that time, the influence exerted over the political life of the democracy by sophistic rhetoric and sophistic morality was an issue for concern.

It is not necessary for our purposes here to decide what exactly we mean by a sophist, nor to ask how accurate is Plato's scornful definition which limits the role of sophist to that of professional teacher[2]. Rather, since we have such clear evidence of a radical intellectual revolution with a wide impact, we should ask what common inspiration of ideas and methods held it together, and allow that as a movement it attracted many participants not strictly sophists under Plato's definition, who nevertheless by their involvement helped to sustain and direct its momentum.

What distinguishes the sophistic movement above all from all that preceded it, is that it initiated a whole new field of intellectual inquiry, the inquiry into the nature of man[3]. This is not to deny that generations of Greek poets had in various ways formulated impressive insights into the human condition, insights which in some degree provided the sophists with a base to build upon; but there had not been anything approaching a systematic intellectual inquiry into such things until this period. Previously intellectual endeavour, outside the poets, had centred almost exclusively on the physical world, on the kosmos and the forces that brought it into being. Man could be studied as a zoological organism, with a place on the evolutionary map[4] - but not yet as a social animal, or even a rational animal. The idiosyncracies of human perception were studied only insofar as they provided an explanation for prevailing misconceptions about 'nature' - not for the light they shed on the nature of man himself (see (D) below). The sophistic movement was at the same time more and less ambitious: less, in the sense that it largely lost the taste for the mysteries of the kosmos, more in that by placing the nature of man at the centre of the inquiry, it threw open the door to the whole range of human experience. The proliferation of questions is breath-taking: the nature of human society, the nature of perception and moral judgement, human psychology, the use and abuse of language - to mention only the major categories. The typical sophist challenged his audience with the claim to be able to speak on any subject, even if need be impromptu[5]. And though there is good evidence that the search for the right answers, rather than merely possible, or probable ones, was not often as tenacious, disciplined or scrupulous as it might have been, the insight that no area of human experience was inaccessible to inquiry, clearly exerted the most powerful effect on the imagination. It can scarcely have been possible any longer to make any statement about religion, politics, morals, which would carry intellectual authority, without having to acknowledge the consequences of the sophistic revolution.

As we have said, this account of the movement will require us to include a number of figures not covered by Plato's definition. There seems, for example, little reason to exclude Socrates from the movement: he may or may not have attended the lectures of Prodicus (cf. Pl.Cratyl.384B), but it is clear that both in the questions he treats and in the techniques he employs in tackling them he is a pupil of the sophists and an heir to their tradition. Democritus is another major candidate, and ancient testimony to his participation in debates on sophistic issues, and even with particular sophists like Protagoras[6], fully justifies this, as does the evidence of the fragments and doxography itself. In another direction we cannot ignore the 5thc medical writers, Hippocratic texts like On Ancient Medicine On the Art, Airs, Waters, Places, On the Sacred Disease, On Breaths, both because of their style (and especially what they have borrowed from the sophistic *epideixeis*) and in some degree their content[7]. Or in a different way, we may wish to admit Thucydides, whose absorption and working-out of sophistic ideas is one of the clearest testimonies to the influence and scope of the sophistic movement, as we shall see[8]. Clearly there are complex problems of discrimination here if we are concerned to distinguish 'borrowers' from 'initiators'; but such discriminations unhelpfully mask an essential common factor, namely that all these men in their different ways, and despite their separate individual pre-occupations, are demonstrably caught up in a common debate, and sense the importance of availing themselves of the language of the debate and in most cases taking a stand on its various issues.

Is there any good reason to deny that Herodotus was caught up in this same debate? It has been widely recognized that there are certain passages in Herodotus in which the influence of sophistic thought can scarcely be denied, most notably for instance in the Persian constitution-debate, in which style, form, argument and content all point in the same direction (see below). But equally it appears to be universally agreed, on no very thorough review of the evidence, that Herodotus is only really 'influenced' in a half-hearted sort of way, or only at the end of his life, or only to a degree that is not, on balance, significant. So, for example, W. Aly (one of the few to make any serious attempt at analysing the question of sophistic influence in Herodotus), despite having assembled a fair array of evidence remains convinced that Herodotus is 'essentially' primitive or archaic:

> "Denn während Herodotus sich in die Geistigkeit seines grossen Freundes (sc. Sophokles) innig eingelebt hat, bleiben die Sophistika Öltropfen, die sich dem Übrigen nicht vermischen. Sie beweisen nur aufs Neue, mit welcher Energie Herodot aufgesaugt hat, was die ihn umgebende Welt zu bieten vermochte. Wie weit er das Empfangenes assimilierte, lag nicht in seiner Macht, ein Zeichen zugleich für die werbende Macht des Neuen, wie für die Festigkeit der in Herodot lebenden Tradition, die die Unmöglichkeit, einer organischen Verbindung des unbewusst schaffenden 'Logos' (i.e. Ionian story-telling) mit der bewussten Kunst des neuen Geistes empfand"[9]

Wherever Herodotus' 'modernity' is discussed - and it is not a popular topic - the conclusion is some such equivocation: Herodotus turns out to be neither wholly one thing nor wholly another, although if anything rather archaic than modern. But this is clearly unsatisfactory, for the reason that it fails to account for the influence of sophistic thought on the basic conception of Herodotus' work. To take the most obvious example, the constitution debate, as we have seen repeatedly in the above chapters, is in no sense an alien adjunct to the work, but rather a fully integrated part of the whole, in which the debate on government is one of the major thematic threads. This is not consistent with any of the orthodox views: if we are to argue that Herodotus is only incidentally or superficially affected by sophistic thinking, we need to be able to show that it has not penetrated deep into the roots of the work, but that it has rather coloured only certain isolated and incompletely assimilated passages. Hence what is required is not simply a new emphasis in this question, but rather a complete rethinking of the terms of the inquiry. It is not that there is a greater degree of sophistic influence than has hitherto been supposed, there is rather a difference in the kind of influence: the work's conception depends on sophistic influence, not merely its decoration. Herodotus may, in short, be classed as a participant in the sophistic debate.

I shall not here attempt an exhaustive illustration of this thesis; the aim of the present chapter is merely to establish that there is indeed a case worthy of consideration. My contention is that the orthodoxy tends on the one hand to misunderstand the 'Ionian Enlightenment' and the limitations of its horizons and on the other to underestimate the range of interest of the sophistic movement itself, with the result that what ought to be recognized as modern in Herodotus is either thought to be 'archaic' and Ionian or passes by unremarked.

A final point that must be made before the main investigation is that the supposed chronological hindrances to the hypothesis of sophistic influence in Herodotus are unfounded[10]. We have, as Jacoby has shown, no reliable biographical tradition for Herodotus, that might assist us in determining his dates[11]. The only reasonably certain biographical datum, deriving not from the biography alone but from an early text of Herodotus[12], is his involvement with Thurii (founded 444-3: Diod.XII.10.3ff); but even here the usual assumption that he was among the first colonists is wholly unnecessary, and hence the datum is worthless for our purposes. As for the evidence relating to the composition of the work[13], the only certain clues point to his being at work on at least some part of it around the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (cf. 5.77.4 (?); 6.91.1;

7.137.3, 233.2; 9.73.3)[14], and even, if we are to accept the powerful arguments of Fornara, as late as the end of the Archidamian War. For example, the reference to the failure of the Spartans to ravage Decelea in the war (9.73.3, καὶ ἐς τὸν πόλεμον τὸν ὕστερον πολλοῖσι ἔτεσι τούτων γενόμενον ’Αθηναίοισί τε καὶ Πελοποννησίοισι, σινομένων τὴν ἄλλην ’Αττικὴν Λακεδαιμονίων, Δεκελέης ἀπέχεσθαι)[15] is inconceivable before hostilities have been brought to a close in 421: at any date before this, Herodotus' statement must be an unaccountably rash prediction which the events of the following year could all too easily have controverted. It does not seem likely that he could have confidently assumed that there would be no more Laconian invasions of Attica after Pylos, something that Thucydides does not have the Athenians anticipate even just after the successful conclusion to the affair (Thucyd.4.41.1; does he not exaggerate Spartan despondency after the capture of Cythera at 4.55.1ff, and was a Spartan revival not to be expected after Delium and the successes of Brasidas?). If Herodotus' conviction depended on the signing of the one-year's truce 422 (Thucyd.4.117.1ff; still, of course, an acknowledgement that the two states were at war), we are carried beyond what would otherwise be chosen as the terminus ante quem for 'publication', namely that provided by the apparent parody of the opening of the work in Aristophanes' Acharnians, which was produced at the Lenaea of 425 (cf. n.18), and the precise date when Herodotus finished work would still be obscure. Certainly there are statements which we might have expected Herodotus to have changed if he was still working on his book as late as this: in particular, his report of the earthquake on Delos in 490 (6.98.1, καὶ πρῶτα καὶ ὕστατα μέχρι ἐμεῦ σεισθεῖσα) is hard to imagine having been written after 432-1, when another notable earthquake took place there[16]. But we cannot assess the likelihood of his making a thorough revision of all he wrote before 'publication': the physical problems of ancient book writing tell against the up-dating of details, and the whole business of correction must have been far more cumbersome than is anachronistically assumed by some modern scholars[17].

We can perhaps do no better than conclude that the second half of the work was being written down during the twenties: as for the rest, there is nothing to show whether it was written before or after this[18].

An author who has reached literary maturity by the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, is perfectly capable of having formed his thoughts through contact with the sophists. By general agreement[19] the main 5thc sophists fall into two groups, the older group headed by Protagoras and Gorgias (and probably including Antiphon), both born probably between Marathon and Salamis, the younger group including Hippias and Prodicus, both still alive in 399[20]. An important text here is Plato's Protagoras, with a dramatic date shortly before the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (? 433)[21]. Here Protagoras appears as the father-figure of the sophistic movement (317C): he has been practising his craft now for many years, and he even claims he is old enough to be the father of anyone of the company. That company includes besides Socrates, both Hippias and Prodicus, who are nonetheless introduced to us as established professionals giving their own seminars (315Bff), and whom the young Hippias is as eager to meet as to hear Protagoras himself (314C). If Hippias and Prodicus are already well established at this time, and Protagoras the 'old man' of the movement, we are entitled to see Herodotus, who is still at work on his book possibly more than a decade later, at the very least as a contemporary of Protagoras, if not nearer in age to the younger sophists.

(A) Herodotus and Hippias.

Of all the sophists known to us the one who most suggestively recalls Herodotus is the peripatetic master of all knowledge, Hippias of Elis. A vivid picture of his interests and activities emerges from the opening of Plato's Hippias Major, in which the sophist describes to a suitably respectful Socrates how he travels around the Greek world, lecturing on whatever his audiences want to hear (Hipp.Maj.285BE). This might be astronomy, geometry, arithmetic (or logic?), language and poetry, or at Sparta the particular delight of the audiences which is *arkhaiologia,* for example, the generations of heroes and men or the foundations of cities. As the fragments show, moreover, this by no means completes the tally of his interests. When Socrates, not without irony, exclaims (285Ef) that Hippias is lucky that the Spartans' taste is not for the complete list of Athenian archons from Solon, Hippias corrects him: he need only hear a list of 50 names once over to be able to remember them all. Of course, replies Socrates, I forgot that you are skilled in mnemonic devices (*to mnēmonikon*)[22]. Similarly in the Hippias Minor (363C) the sophist reminds Eudikos how he made a habit of going to Olympia at the time of the festival, where he would offer either to deliver any of the *epideixeis* he had prepared or to answer any questions anyone chose to put to him. In other words Hippias had a vast store of general knowledge and the ability to remember enormous lists of facts, a cornucopia from which he could equally well give prepared or impromptu lectures on any topic anyone could wish for.

The biographical tradition which makes of Herodotus the same sort of peripatetic lecturer cannot unfortunately be trusted in any way[23]. We cannot, for example, give much credit to Lucian ('Herodotus' 1.1ff) who has him recite from his work at Olympia, even comparing this practice with that of Hippias and the other sophists; nor can we trust the story that he was rewarded by the Athenians after a recitation of his work in the city[24]. It remains possible that Thucydides (1.21.1) is indeed referring to Herodotus among the authors who recited their works or from their works (ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῆι ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον). It is probably wisest to say that neither external nor internal evidence[25] can be taken to prove that Herodotus either delivered the work in lecture form, or gave lectures adapted from it, or pieced it together out of already existing lectures. On the other hand it seems *a priori* credible that, like the sophists and some of the medical writers, he did indeed make a living delivering display lectures[26]. Given the predominance of oral over written culture which continued in the late 5thc despite a widespread familiarity with reading, writing and books[27], it would be curious if Herodotus was not concerned to gain as wide as possible an audience for his views and researches (and by no means only those which found their way into his book) through public lecturing in a sophistic manner.

Herodotus may well be thought to have given 'seminars' of the kind typical of the sophists whose activities we see pictured in Plato's Protagoras[28]. Certainly it would be useful to know how reliable is the report of Aristophanes of Boeotia preserved in Plutarch (MH 864CD = FGH 379F5), according to which Herodotus asked for money from the Thebans but failed to get it: ἐπιχειρῶν δὲ τοῖς νέοις διαλέγεσθαι καὶ συσχολάζειν ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων ἐκωλύθη δι' ἀγροικίαν αὐτῶν καὶ μισολογίαν . Aristophanes is thought by Jacoby to have written as early as the end of the 5thc (see Kommentar, ad loc.), and Jacoby is convinced enough of the reliability of the anecdote to consider ascribing it to the author's own recollection. If we can bring ourselves to share this suspension of scepticism (and certainly the story is almost sufficiently uncomplimentary to the Thebans to rule out the simple hypothesis that it was invented to get revenge for the slanderous treatment of them in Herodotus' work), we are afforded as clear a glimpse of Herodotus the sophist as we could wish: a professional lecturer, conducting seminars for the young men of the city and distrusted by the authorities as being 'too clever' for the common good. We can hardly be confident that the story is true: but even if it is not, that a Greek of the late 5thc or early 4thc could think of portraying Herodotus as a sophist is a piece of evidence worthy of our attention as being nearly contemporary[28a].

To consider the texts themselves: there are a number of intriguing correspondences between the work of Hippias and Herodotus which at the same time show that Herodotus' interests are characteristic of this kind of sophist, and suggest that Herodotus may actually have been acquainted in some way or other with the work of Hippias[29]. The most obvious thing that both of them have in common is a pride in the extent (though not necessarily the depth!) of their general knowledge. Hippias' mnemonics were essential to him to remember lists of facts, names, places, and so on: it is not hard to imagine that Herodotus made rather more use of such devices than he did of the 'notes', card-indexes and filing-systems which have been so anachronistically foisted on him. But there are also correspondences in the type of knowledge that both were expert in. Unfortunately we know nothing of Hippias' *Ethnōn Onomasiai* (DK II.331.20ff = B2); Snell suggested with some plausibility that the work contained something like a doxography of earlier philosophical writings[30]. Certainly it seems very probable that we should associate the work with the fragment quoted by Clement (DK II.331.12ff = B6), in which Hippias introduces some kind of collection of interesting information culled from numerous different sources: from Orpheus, Musaeus, Hesiod, Homer and other poets, and from the *syggraphai* of Greeks and barbarians (this last a rather remarkable claim!): ἐγὼ δὲ ἐϰ πάντων τούτων τὰ μέγιστα ϰαὶ ὁμόφυλα συνθεὶς τοῦτον ϰαινὸν ϰαὶ πολυειδῆ τὸν λόγον ποιήσομαι. Herodotus' work is indeed much more than a compendium of materials from other people' work: but like Hippias he is clearly aiming at a novel synthesis, a compendium among whose chief attractions is variety of interest. We may wonder whether Herodotus' search for variety, never admittedly claimed by him as a principle but clearly discernible in the choice and handling of his material, his search for remarkable and arresting subjects (*ta thōmasia*)[31], is not naively archaic and 'Ionian', as it is often portrayed, but rather modern and sophistic[32]. It is possible that Thucydides is linking Herodotus with the sophists when he appears to allude to his work as designed ἐπὶ τὸ προσαγωγότερον τῆι ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον: the meretricious elements of Herodotus' work surely have more in common with the alluring displays of the sophists, with their fanciful use of fables (cf. (B), below), their brilliant arguments (cf. (E), below), their sophisticated worldliness, than with the apparently much drier intellectualism of the Ionians, with their contempt for the common man, their lofty physical speculations, their plain and unalluring catalogue-style.

Hippias' *arkhaiologia* suggests more precise points of contact with Herodotus, in particular for example their common interest in Sparta. We know that Hippias mentioned Lycurgus (DK II.332.15-6 = B11), though unlike Herodotus he casts him as a military man, experienced in many strategies. Plato's evidence (Hipp.Maj. above) seems to confirm that Hippias did indeed have an interest in early Sparta: we can but speculate whether it is not Hippias to whom Herodotus refers, when introducing his account of Spartan customs he says he will not embark on the early history (6.55): ἄλλοισι γὰρ περὶ αὐτῶν εἴρηται ... τὰ δὲ ἄλλοι οὐ κατελάβοντο, τούτων μνήμην ποιήσομαι[33].

There is another possibility which might well be thought to point to Herodotus' acquaintance with the work of Hippias. The *Olympionikōn Anagraphē* is known to us from a single reference in Plutarch's Life of Numa (DK 86B3 = Plut.Vit.Num.1), where we are told that Olympic dating is a particularly untrustworthy activity, in that the first list was a relatively late production: ὧν τὴν ἀναγραφὴν ὀψέ φασι Ἱππίαν ἐκδοῦναι τὸν Ἡλεῖον ἀπ' οὐδενὸς ὁρμώμενος ἀναγκαίου πρὸς πίστιν. If Plutarch's information is reliable, then it is clear Hippias must have set himself a task involving a considerable amount of original research, and possibly even some mere speculation. There being no list for him to copy from[34], Hippias' list must have been a typical combination of erudition, memory and organization[35]. Turning to Herodotus, we find that his work is liberally annotated with information about Olympic victories. Such are the mentions of the victories of Miltiades (6.36.1), of Demaratus (6.70.3), of Cimon (6.103.2f), of Alcmaeon (6.125.5), of Cleisthenes of Sicyon (6.126.2), even of Philippos of Croton (5.47.1); the discussion of Pheidon's usurpation of the administration of the games (6.127.3); the judgement of the Olympic officials on the nationality of Alexander and his victory in the stadion (5.22.1f); and the efforts of Teisamenos to win the five victories he believes he has been promised by the oracle (9.33.2)[36]. It is tempting to conclude that Herodotus writes as someone who had access to Hippias' work. Certainly famous victories and famous victors will have survived long in the oral tradition, but where Herodotus brings in an Olympic victory without obvious necessity, where the information has no integral relevance to the tradition he is relating, as he often does in the passages cited, his liberality might well have to do with his reading of Hippias[36a].

(B) Human origins, early society and the inventive mind.

One of the most striking concerns of the sophistic enlightenment appears to have been the speculative reconstruction of the development of mankind through social and technological change, from his earliest beginnings as a social animal[37]. This whole field of research is clearly a new discovery of the second half of the 5thc. Certainly Hesiod has some conception of how human history has progressed from its beginnings, in his myth of the Golden Age, but his view is that of a poet, a mythographer and a moralist, and we are offered descent rather than ascent. A further anticipation has been seen in the remarkable fragment of Xenophanes in which the gods are said to have witheld knowledge from man in the beginning (DK 21B18): οὔτοι ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς πάντα θεοὶ θνητοῖσ’ ὑπέδειξαν, / ἀλλὰ χρόνωι ζητοῦντες ἐφευρίσκουσιν ἄμεινον . We may reasonably doubt, however, that

Xenophanes attempted a developed account of the progress of human culture. But by the 440's there is clear evidence of a new interest in explaining, without recourse to mythology or theology, how man emerged from being a wild animal (thēriōdēs) into a social and technological animal. It was not until the sophistic period that there arose the idea of human culture as an autonomous, self-developing and self-perpetuating system, whose workings could be accounted for in purely naturalistic terms.

Unfortunately we know of these discussions only indirectly, whether through poetic echoes, or borrowings and imitations in other writers, most of whom are late[38]. Nonetheless the impact of these new speculations is clear enough, even though in the poetic texts the naturalistic explanations have been largely re-mythologized. Prometheus' account of the technological gifts that elevated man from his original brutish state in the Prom.Vinct. (442-68 and 478-506) is one of the early echoes, though in considering its date we need no longer be hampered by the hypothesis of Aeschylean authorship[39]. The chorus of the Antigone (332-64) which celebrates man's technological ascendancy over nature, while warning of his weaknesses and limitations, can be read as a poetic reaction to the amoralist optimism of the new ideas of the ascent of man[40]. The most direct testimonies are the mythical narrative of the origins of man in Plato's Protagoras (DK 80C1 = Pl.Protag.320Cff), and the account in the first book of Diodorus (1.8.1-7), ascribed originally by Reinhardt to Democritus[41], which illustrates the social and technological advance of man from the earliest beginnings. The complex account of man's early social life, 'after the flood', in Plato's Laws III[42] clearly has a sophistic origin, though its moral lesson has been twisted into an unusual shape by Plato himself[43]. Four pieces of specifically 5thc evidence are worth mentioning, as providing the most direct ancient testimony we can hope for: the account of the development of medicine in the Hippocratic 'On Ancient Medicine'[44]; Thucydides' reconstruction in the

Archaeology of the social development of Greece from the earliest times; Diodotus' speculative account of the history of punishment (Thucyd.3.45.3ff, καὶ εἰκὸς τὸ πάλαι τῶν μεγίστων ἀδικημάτων μαλακωτέρας κεῖσθαι αὐτάς), and Pherecrates' Agrioi (421 BC), a satire on the primitive life of man, a comic poet's reaction to the search for man's origins[45]. Pherecrates' comedy should remind us that there can hardly have been a long tradition of such speculation: like Aristophanes' Clouds, the play must have been a topical reaction to a contemporary fashion.

The impact of this modern speculation has left clear marks in Herodotus: and the influence is very far from superficial. The sophistic anthropology made a clear break with the past in its insistence on the vastness of historical time, as a precondition of the social evolution of man[46]. Herodotus' 'discovery' that Egyptian history extends back for many thousands of years, without any sign of an age of heroes or gods, which he contrasts with the perception of Hecataeus (2.143.1ff, with n.69 below), is surely a point he emphasizes because of the bearing he knows it to have on the question of the evolution of human culture as posed by the sophists. There is a remarkable parallel here with what Solon learns about the antiquity of human civilization from the Egyptians in Plato's Timaeus (22Bff), which it is tempting to suppose has a common model with Herodotus (see below). Admittedly the vastness of time was an important part of Pre-Socratic speculation on the evolution of the physical world (cf. e.g. Anaximander, DK I.85.20ff; with Democritus, DK II.94.22), but the insight that this could have relevance for the evolution and diversity of human culture is very probably a sophistic one (see below). We may compare here Herodotus' observation that the Median origin of the Thracian Sigynnae is not something he can confirm (5.9.3): γένοιτο δ' ἂν πᾶν ἐν τῶι μακρῶι χρόνωι[47]. The diversity of the human world could now be explained as a result of evolution over measureless tracts of time.

A good example of such a process of diversification is Herodotus' remarkable story of the origins of the Sauromatai (4.110-17), a new ethnic group formed by the union of a band of wandering Amazons with a tribe of Scythians. The account has rightly been identified by Cole as bearing "the marks of being a thinly disguised piece of speculative ethnology"[48]. Cole well illustrates the similarities between the assumptions of this passage and the theory of society advanced in Polybius VI (5.10-6.1), an account which may well go back to a 5thc sophistic model. The natural obstacles to the mingling of different ethnic groups can be overcome by their living together in peaceful proximity (*synētheia*, *syntrophia*); the next stage is for individuals of the two groups to begin sexual relations, this leading to intermarriage and subsequently the formation of a new *ethnos*. Herodotus' account is particularly interested (again, as we shall see, a sophistic pre-occupation) in what happens to language in such cases of racial mingling. When the Amazons first arrive in Scythia the inhabitants cannot make out their language (4.111.1), and the first meeting of individuals of the two communities has to be conducted in sign language (113.2). When the two groups start living together the linguistic problems continue, the men being unable to make headway with the language of the Amazons, but the women picking up that of the Scythians (114.1). So too once the new community has broken off from the old, the new culture becomes a complex mixture of the two original ones, not least in its language (4.117): φωνῆι δὲ οἱ Σαυρομάται νομίζουσι Σκυθικῆι, σολοικίζοντες αὐτῆι ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀρχαίου, ἐπεὶ οὐ χρηστῶς ἐξέμαθον αὐτὴν αἱ Ἀμάζονες. This microscopic attention to the mechanics of linguistic change and the generation of new languages, all of it of course speculative, is clearly a product of the sophistic interest in defining culture and the ways in which its various forms and manifestations come about.

The same speculative interest in language, and the way it survives or alters over time through contact with other languages, recurs in a number of other contexts. So, for example, Herodotus speculates how the language of the early Pelasgian inhabitants of Greece is related to that of the Hellenes (1.57.1ff). What language the Pelasgians spoke, says Herodotus, he cannot say for certain; but there are still Pelasgians living in Etruria and on the Hellespont, and if we can judge from these, the Pelasgians spoke a barbarian language. And if all the Pelasgians were like these, then the people of Attica, being originally Pelasgian, must have changed their language when they became Hellenes. While on the other hand the Pelasgians of Kreston (Etruria):

> οὐδαμοῖσι τῶν νῦν σφεας περιοικεόντων εἰσὶ ὁμόγλωσσοι οὔτε οἱ Πλακιηνοί (on the Hellespont), σφισι δε ομογλωσσοι, δηλοῦσί τε ὅτι τῶν ἠνείκαντο γλώσσης χαρακτῆρα μεταβαίνοντες ἐς ταῦτα τὰ χωρία τοῦτον ἔχουσι ἐν φυλακῆι. τὸ δὲ Ἑλληνικὸν γλώσσηι μέν, ἐπείτε ἐγένετο, αἰεί κοτε τῆι αὐτῆι διαχρᾶται, ὡς ἐμοὶ καταφαίνεται εἶναι.

The method of reasoning clearly has something in common with the techniques of Thucydides' Archaeology, as we shall see in a moment. Here, as in the case of the Sauromatai, Herodotus explores the racial origins of the Greeks and the Pelasgians through speculation about language. His discussion is based on the perception that language, no less than the other characteristics which differentiate the various ethnea, has evolved its variety over historical time, again a perception derived from sophistic anthropology[49].

The natural origins of language are explored in the remarkable story which introduces Herodotus' account of Egypt, Psammetichus' experiment to discover the oldest language and hence the oldest people (2.2.1ff)[49a]. The form of the story, its obvious relation to the other 'sophistic experiment' of Darius (3.38), as well as its mythopoeic manner, similar to that of the story of the Sauromatai (above), immediately remind us of the sophists. And the content too clearly justifies this suspicion[50]. Psammetichus hopes that by bringing up two children under strict experimental conditions and not allowing them to hear any human speech[51], he will provide himself evidence for the original language of man from the first words they speak. There are two assumptions underlying the experiment[52]: the first is that of environmental determinism, that if the conditions of the first men are recreated (i.e. a state of speechlessness), the children will produce the same language as those original men (see below on this theory); the second is that human history is in some sense linear, so that in the beginning there was one language invented, from which all other languages are descended. This latter presumption coincides with the presumption of sophistic speculation into man's origins, that inventions are made once only and in one place only: the *prōtos heuretēs* for the first time acquires a secure historical footing in the anthropology of the sophists[53].

We may turn here to the related topic of man's technological and social inventions or discoveries. In 'Democritus'' account of the discovery of fire and its accompanying technologies, for example (cf. e.g. Cole pp.36ff), the catalogue of human inventions is clearly an essential part of the search for the origins of human civilization. But there seems to have been also a sophistic interest in human inventions, which inclined as much to the antiquarian as to anthropology. Of such work Critias' somewhat superficial invention poems (DK 88B2 and B6) may be a pale reflexion[54]; but we can see that the importance of inventions to the improvement of man's lot was also illustrated by the revival of certain culture heroes, notably Prometheus and Palamedes[55], though Isocrates even offers us a variant in which 'oratory' performs this function[56]! For Prodicus (and others) the gods are brought back into the picture (i) as personification of elements useful to man (including besides sun, moon, water etc., 'discoveries' like bread, wine and fire), and possibly (ii) as apotheosized *prōtoi heuretai*, inventors elevated to divine status for their services to humanity[57]. Kleingünther, in a special study of the *prōtos heuretēs*[58], recognizes both the explosion of interest in the idea in the sophistic period (pp.95ff) and the considerable attention to the subject in Herodotus (pp.43ff), but insists on treating Herodotus as though he belonged to an earlier generation[59], untouched by sophistic influence.

This is clearly improbable[60]. We may take two examples, one trivial, the other much more weighty. Herodotus reports that the Lydians invented the games which they now share with the Greeks (1.94.2ff), and elaborates the claim in a typically fanciful sophistic aetiology: the games were invented in response to a need, as a way of taking their minds off a period of acute famine. Need or necessity (khreia) is a characteristic element of sophistic anthropological aetiologies (cf. e.g. Diod.I.8.7, τὴν χρείαν αὐτὴν διδάσκαλον γενέσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις)[61]. The other example is Herodotus' elaborate and sophisticated account of the introduction of writing into Greece (5.58-61)[62]. Admittedly we know that Hecataeus mentioned the introduction of writing (FGH 1F20), or rather we know that along with Anaximander and Dionysios (? of Miletus) he mentioned Danaus as having introduced it. However it is hard to believe that this was much more than a brief notice in the mythological Genealogies (to which Jacoby assigns it). What we have in Herodotus is something quite different, a scientific anthropological study of the question, with reference to documentary evidence (after the manner of Hippias?), and a subtle discussion of the mechanics of transmission. Writing, he claims, was an invention of the Phoenicians and brought over to Greece by the Phoenician 'Cadmaeans' (5.58.1):

> ἄλλα τε πολλὰ οἰκήσαντες ταύτην τὴν χώρην ἐσήγαγον διδασκάλια ἐς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ δὴ καὶ γράμματα, οὐκ ἐόντα πρὶν Ἕλλησι ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκέειν, πρῶτα μὲν τοῖσι καὶ ἅπαντες χρέωνται Φοίνικες· μετὰ δὲ χρόνου προβαίνοντος ἅμα τῆι φωνῆι μετέβαλον καὶ τὸν γραμματων.

In the same way that the Scythian language developed into the 'new' language of the Sauromatai by adaptation, so the Greek alphabet is metamorphosed out of the Phoenician - by a process of historical evolution over time. Significant too is the way Herodotus explores the archaeology of writing materials (5.58.3):

> καὶ τὰς βύβλους διφθέρας καλέουσι ἀπὸ τοῦ παλαίου οἱ Ἴωνες, ὅτι

> κοτὲ ἐν σπάνι βύβλων (i.e. necessity) ἐχρέωντο διφθέρηισι
> αἰγέηισί τε καὶ οἰέηισι· ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἐμὲ πολλοὶ τῶν
> βαρβάρων ἐς τοιαύτας διφθέρας γράφουσι.

The insights underlying this passage, that language can preserve historical data, that evidence for the historical past can be extracted from the usages of primitive peoples, strikingly recalls the argumentation of Thucydides' Archaeology (esp. e.g. Thucyd.1.6.6, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἄλλα τις ἀποδέξειε τὸ παλαιὸν Ἑλληνικὸν ὁμοιότροπα τῶι νῦν βαρβαρικῶι διαιτώμενον), as well as Herodotus' own inferences from the surviving Pelasgians for the reconstruction of the pre-historic past of Greece (1.57.1ff, above).

The greatest number of inventions of this kind are, of course, to be found in Herodotus' account of the Egyptians and the discoveries which spread from Egypt to the other peoples of the world and especially the Greeks. It seems probable that the idea of Egypt as the birthplace of the culture of mankind, an idea so elaborately pursued, for example, in Diodorus' First Book (I.10-29; with Hecataeus of Abdera, *Peri tēs Aigyptiōn Philosophias*, DK II.242-5), or in Plato's Timaeus (22Bff, above), is one that first achieved concrete expression with the sophists[63]. If this is right, we should hesitate before explaining Herodotus' conviction of the primacy of Egyptian culture as a private discovery. Certainly the same sophistic conception of original unique inventions spreading from a single source across the world, a conception curiously oblivious to the possibility of independent discoveries in different places at different times, is at the root of Herodotus' numerous *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacies in this account[64]. The rationalism of his account of the diffusion of Egyptian religious ideas is well known (see below), and his speculative reconstruction of the religion of the Pelasgians before the introduction of Egyptian gods, for example (2.52.1ff), has a sophistic character to compare with the experiment of Psammetichus to discover the state of man before speech (above). Herodotus imagines that the Pelasgians originally worshipped gods without names and without attributes, until in the course of time they learnt these from the Egyptians. The story combines speculation about primitive man (for the Pelasgians, cf. 1.57.1ff above) with the theory of cultural diffusion.

Like Thucydides in the Archaeology, Herodotus prefers to adapt what is likely to have been generalized speculation about the pre-history of man to the reconstruction of particular moments in the history of particular peoples - unless, that is, the sophists too wrote something approaching history. The clearest example in Herodotus is his account of the condition of Media before the tyranny of Deioces and after the liberation from Assyria, which we have discussed elsewhere (1.96-7, with Ch.II.i.B.1). That Herodotus finds it natural to do this suggests that he has indeed absorbed the implications of this sophistic speculation: having meditated on the problems of society and social change in the light of the researches of the sophists, he went on to explore particular questions of historical reconstruction with a disciplined eye. That is, the sophists turned him, if not actually into a historian in the first place (cf. App.IV), at least into the sort of historian that we admire him for being.

(C) Ethnography and the Idea of Culture.

One of the grandest achievements of Herodotus, though for various reasons the least remarked, is the confidence and fluency with which he handles the idea of culture, his appreciation that *nomoi*, *nomaia*, *nomima*, form coherent systems within each different society, which distinguish and characterize societies from each other. This is apparent in his ability to bring the particular cultures vividly to life before our eyes; and this is not simply a question of piling up distinctive details, lists of ethnic peculiarities. On the contrary, Herodotus treats the major cultures in his work, Egypt, Scythia, Persia, Babylonia, with a clear appreciation that a culture is a coherent, systematic thing, in which the parts are related to the whole in an organic sense. The antique civilization of Egypt, with its profound respect for traditions, its extensive learning, and its rigid political and religious life, has a distinctive and unified character[65], which immediately marks it out from the youthful culture of Scythia, with its brutal customs and its primitive, nomadic way of life.

The traditional view of Herodotus' ethnography is that it is essentially based on Ionian models, and especially on Hecataeus, that there is really no important difference in Herodotus' ethnography except that it is more detailed, better researched, and somewhat more broadly ranging[66]. So self-evident has this seemed, that the work of Hecataeus is often reconstructed out of Herodotus[67]. But this whole approach is quite misleading: there is every indication that Hecataean ethnography (and the rest of the 'Ionian tradition' is a closed book to us) was different in kind and not merely in degree of detail from Herodotus. We should remind ourselves what the scale of Hecataeus' Periegesis is likely to have been. If the division into two books[68] is Alexandrian, as there is no reason to doubt, neither is likely to have been longer than the longest book of Herodotus; and given the remarkable number of places that Hecataeus got around to mentioning, it is very difficult to imagine that in so short a space he can have developed anything approaching a rounded picture of any one culture. The only place that he seems at all likely to have lingered over is Egypt, though even here the evidence is scarcely promising (F300-24): (i) the Herodotean story of his visit to the priests at Thebes (F300 = Herodotus 2.143), which may well be an oral anecdote told about Hecataeus rather than something he wrote about himself[69]; (ii) Egypt as the gift of the Nile (F301); (iii) an account of the river's inundation (F302); (iv) a brief and unremarkable note on the island of Chembis (F305: contrast Herodotus 2.156); (v) a couple of notices about food and drink (F322, 323), and another about dress (F307); (vi) accounts of the phoenix, the hippopotamus and the crocodile-hunt (F324)[70]; and otherwise (vii) just a list of names (F303-4, F306, F308 (the name *Kanōbos* aitologized), F309-21). Nothing anywhere about religion, politics, history[71], customs (e.g. marriage and death, as opposed to food and drink), values, ideas. This may just conceivably be an accident of transmission: all this part of Hecataeus' account may have been eclipsed by Herodotus' more thorough treatment of Egypt - but the chances are against it - especially when we consider that nothing of this kind has survived from any part of Hecataeus' work: at the most a few more references to food, drink and clothes (e.g. F154, 284, 287, 335, 358, 367), little more[71a]. We have a few materials to reconstruct the average page of Hecataeus' book and the results are scarcely impressive: it is clear that the backbone of his writing was geography, rather than culture or even ethnography in any except the most trivial sense. Typical of the kind of writing we ought to expect is e.g. F292(a):

> Πάρθων πρὸς ἥλιον ἀνίσχοντα Χοράσμιοι οἰκοῦσι γῆν, ἔχοντες
> καὶ πεδία καὶ οὔρεα· ἐν δὲ τοῖσιν οὔρεσι δένδρεα ἔνι ἄγρια, ἄκανθα

> κυνάρα, ἰτέα, μυρίκη ... ; or e.g. F299: ἐν δ' αὐτοῖς οἰκέουσιν ἄνθρωποι παρὰ τὸν Ἰνδὸν ποταμὸν Ὠπίαι, ἐν δὲ τεῖχος βασιλήιον. μέχρι τούτου Ὠπίαι, ἀπὸ δὲ τούτου ἐρημίη μέχρις Ἰνδῶν.

It is impossible to imagine that a Hecataeus who can write as drily as this was interested in describing at all (let alone with any Herodotean amplitude) what life was like in the places he mentions.

The gulf between all this and Herodotus is huge: we cannot possibly assume that the Hecataean 'ethnography' metamorphosed into the cultural research of Herodotus by unaided development. And the essential difference of course brings us back again to the sophists. To Hecataeus geographical and crude ethnographic data are interesting enough in themselves to build a book around. For Herodotus the focus of interest has shifted entirely to put man and culture in the centre of the picture[72]. As we have seen, the interest in speculative anthropology was a discovery of the sophistic movement; and this work depended on the insight that human culture was indeed what Herodotus sees it to be, a coherent system, created by a process of evolution and selection, in which the parts have become adapted for the successful working of the whole. Herodotus can see the elements of a culture as cogs in a machine, that marriage, education, religion, politics, moral values, are all mechanisms for the perpetuation of a society (below)[72a].

The sophists' interest in how societies worked extended beyond mere abstract speculation and into anthropology. The clearest evidence of this is the curious Doric sophistic text, the Dissoi Logoi (from some time after the end of the Peloponnesian War: cf. Dialex.1.8), which, though thought by some to draw on Herodotus, is in fact clearly independent of him[73]. The second chapter of that piece discusses the relativity of kaka and aiskhra, first in general terms, and then with reference to the different customs of cities and nations. The examples chosen, while they contain sufficient divergences from and additions to Herodotus to suggest that he is not being used as a source, are many of them identical to observations made by Herodotus. These include the Thracian custom of branding (2.13 with Herodotus 5.6.2), Scythian head-hunting (2.13 with Herodotus 4.64.1ff), the Massagetai's custom of eating their parents (2.14 with Herodotus 1.216.2; see below), Persian effeminate dress and the habit of incest (2.15; but see Herodotus 3.31.1ff below), the Lydian custom of prostituting their daughters before marriage (2.16 with Herodotus 1.93.4), and the observation that Egyptian nomoi, in such matters as the distribution of work between men and women and the like, are contrary to those of other people (2.17 with Herodotus 2.35.2ff below)[74]. The most natural explanation of these correspondences is that the earlier sophistic source(s), on which the Dissoi Logoi draws, is reflected in Herodotus as well. Unfortunately earlier sophistic ethnography is not too easy to identify. I would suggest that there was indeed a particular sophistic interest in the culture of Egypt, for what its antiquity could show of the origins of human culture (cf. (C) above), as well as in the culture of Persia, for what it could show of the phenomena of kingship and empire (cf. esp. e.g. Xenoph.Cyropaedia; Plato, Alcibiades I; with the Cyrus dialogues of Antisthenes, F19-21 and F29-33 Caizzi). There are too the Ethnōn Onomasiai of Hippias (cf. (A) above), and references to ethnographic examples or parallels in Antiphon's Peri Homonoias (DK 87B45-7)[75]. Most useful for our purposes, however, is the ethnographic section of the Hippocratic 'Airs, Waters, Places', which clearly shows some sophistic influence in other directions.

The Hippocratic treatise falls into two parts, the first of which is designed (1.1ff) to assist the itinerant doctor in predicting how in the cities he visits the health of the inhabitants will be affected by climate and environment. The second part is devoted to considering how not only physical but also psychological differences in the various peoples of Europe and Asia can be explained in terms of 'environmental influence'. Not content, however, to observe simply the effects of climate, the author gets drawn into discussing man's own interventions in these matters, the conditioning of *nomos*[76]. It is natural to suppose that where the author is carried beyond his brief in the description of lands, peoples and customs in the real world, he is somewhat over-enthusiastically reproducing the ethnographic researches of some earlier source or sources. Here again there are obvious correspondences with the ethnography of Herodotus, but it does not seem likely that either draws directly or indirectly on the other[77]. Diller, however, suggests that in basic outline both the geography and ethnography of Hippocrates go back to Hecataeus, or more loosely the Ionian tradition. But aside from the claim that the mildness of the climate of Ionia is due to a perfect mixture of the seasons[78], which is hardly decisive for Ionian authorship, there is not much to go on. Diller argues that the geographical framework of both Hippocrates and Herodotus derives from a common Ionian source (pp.72ff), and certainly both strikingly agree on the polarity between Egypt and Scythia, as representatives respectively of the extremes of Europe and Asia. Both authors insist in an exaggerated way that the Egyptians and Scythians are uniquely like themselves and unlike all other men (cf. Airs 19.2ff):

> ὅτι πολὺ ἀπήλλακται τῶν λοιπῶν ἀνθρώπων τὸ Σκυθικὸν γένος καὶ ἔοικεν αὐτὸ ἑωυτῶι ὥσπερ τὸ Αἰγύπτιον (cf. 18.1ff, 20.13ff); with Herodotus 2.91.1 (on Egypt): Ἑλληνικοῖσι δὲ νομαίοισι φεύγουσι χρᾶσθαι, τὸ δὲ σύμπαν εἰπεῖν, μηδ᾽ ἄλλων μηδαμῶν ἀνθρώπων νομαίοισι; and 4.76.1 (on Scythia): ξεινικοῖσι δὲ νομαίοισι καὶ οὗτοι[79] αἰνῶς χρᾶσθαι φεύγουσι, μήτε τέων ἄλλων, Ἑλληνικοῖσι δὲ καὶ ἥκιστα[80].

But there is no convincing reason why this polarity should derive from the work of Hecataeus: as we saw, there is no evidence to suggest that Hecataeus was ever interested in anything more than the crudest ethnographic data and certainly he shows no signs of the developed appreciation of culture we find in these ideas. If his Egyptian fragments offered little to suggest such an interest (above), the Scythian ones (F184-90) offer nothing but a list of places and ethnic names, and the solitary notice, possibly supplied by Stephanus not Hecataeus himself, that the Melankhlainoi are so called after their clothes (F185).

Does not this polarity point rather in another direction? As we saw, the Dissoi Logoi shared with Herodotus the theory that Egyptian *nomoi* were somehow topsyturvy[81], and the corresponding passage in Herodotus betrays more than any other the crisp and artificial antitheses characteristic of sophistic style[82]. Inasmuch as we find the same theory independently in each of Herodotus, Hippocrates and the Dissoi Logoi, and since Herodotus shows a sophistic style here and the Dissoi Logoi is demonstrably a sophistic text, it is tempting to draw the economical, though not, of course, necessary, conclusion that Hippocrates shares with these two a common sophistic source for the theory. In addition the exaggerated cultivation of paradox and antithesis here is not hard to imagine emanating from such a quarter, and it may be worth remembering that the sophists seem to have taken a special interest in Egypt, as the birthplace of human culture (above).

That Hippocrates is indeed influenced in this section by sophistic ideas is clear. His discussion of the Makrokephaloi, for example establishes the principle that *nomos* (that is human conditioning) can sometimes have the force of nature. The Makrokephaloi[83] are supposed to bind their children's heads at birth to make them narrow and long instead of round (14.3ff):

> ... οὕτως τὴν ἀρχὴν ὁ νόμος κατειργάσατο, ὥστε ὑπὸ βίης τοιαύτην τὴν φύσιν γενέσθαι· τοῦ δὲ χρόνου προϊόντος ἐν φύσει ἐγένετο, ὥστε τὸν νόμον μηκέτι ἀναγκάζειν.

The words *physis* and *nomos* are clearly being used in extended, quasi-technical, sophistic senses: in particular *nomos* seems to mean not the particular custom under discussion, but rather something much more abstract, almost equivalent to 'conditioning'. And if not only the language of this passage, but also its thought[84] and its ethnographic subject, the Makrokephaloi, known to us admittedly in an uncertain connexion from Antiphon (DK 87B46, above), can be plausibly argued as having sophistic connexions of some sort, we are offered a valuable pointer to the sources of Hippocrates' ethnography.

As for the source of the theory of 'environmental influence' itself, it is difficult to be certain about its origins, despite the confidence of the orthodoxy which upholds the claims of 'Ionian science' here. It is not clear whether what seem to us like the two different parts of the theory, on the one hand natural influence (climate etc.), on the other human influence, the latter itself divisible into two parts, physiological (e.g. Makrokephaloi, Sauromatai etc.) and political or social (e.g. despotism) - whether these different parts have a common origin in a single theoretical conception, or whether it is merely the confused synthesis of Hippocrates which has brought them together[85]. This is not the place to explore these distinctions - but certain general observations may be useful.

We should not be misled by the Ionian dialect of the Hippocratic writings into the assumption that their theoretical preconceptions are necessarily Ionian - even less so in a case like this, where there is no reliable supporting evidence for Ionian influence. For example, as for the 'natural' side of the Hippocratic theory, there is remotely discernible a trend towards linking 'environment' with the physical characteristics of men and animals at least in the later Presocratics, Diogenes, Parmenides, Empedocles, as in the supposed relation of male and female sex to the temperature of the womb[86]. It is just possible that this kind of work had an influence on the medical writers, if we are to judge from On Ancient Medicine's complaints about the encroachments of scientific 'hypotheses' into medicine (Vet.Med.1.1ff)[87]. But these Presocratics are none of them Ionians. Only in Democritus, an Ionian certainly, but also, of course, a participant in the sophistic debate, does the doxographic evidence suggest a theory of environmental influence similar to that in Airs, Waters, Places, as, for example, in his discussion of the effects of heat and cold on the parturition of animals, which recalls the comments of both Herodotus and Hippocrates on the hornless oxen of Scythia[88]. But Democritus seems from the ancient testimonies to have given an altogether more complete picture of the world in action than any of his 'Presocratic' forbears, whose interests extended little if at all beyond describing how the world and its inhabitants came to be. And he can hardly be taken as evidence for the older traditions of Ionian scientific thought: even in physical theory his roots are in Magna Graecia rather than the Greek East[89].

Moreover if we could accept that the various parts of the theory are an original unity, there is a strong argument against Ionian authorship. Heinimann (pp.29ff) argues that it must have been the stimulus of the Persian Wars which first provoked considered debate (as opposed to unargued prejudice) about the opposition between Europe and Asia, and with it inquiry into the reasons for the superiority of Greek temperament and hardiness, which those events seemed to have proved[90]. The combination of environmental and political reasons for the superiority of Europeans over Asiatics in Hippocrates clearly reflects that original stimulus (Airs 16.16ff and 23.30ff):

> διὰ τοῦτό (sc. the climate) εἰσι μαχιμώτεροι οἱ τὴν Εὐρώπην οἰκεόντες καὶ διὰ τοὺς νόμους, ὅτι οὐ βασιλεύονται ὥσπερ οἱ Ἀσιηνοί.

If this correctly explains the origins of the theory, it is hard to see that Ionia is the most natural place for its conception, presupposing as it does the superiority of the mainland Greeks to those who live in Asia - unless it is meant to be apologetic, which seems unlikely. In addition, a date of conception after the Persian Wars takes us well away from the heyday of Ionian science, and into the period when the focus of Greek intellectual life had shifted to Magna Graecia and, of course, Athens[91].

In more general terms still we may argue that the debate as to what characteristics men owe to nature and what to culture, that is education, social or political conditioning and so on, is one that only really comes to life in the context of the sophistic movement[92]. Indeed, as we have already seen, the sophistic sociology of Democritus and others seems to have accounted both for the development of human culture generally and for the generation of variety in different cultures in naturalistic terms: change takes place in response to external pressures, whether environmental or social. It is difficult not to conclude that the sophistic climate is a much more natural breeding ground for the theory of 'environmental influence' than Ionia, a source favoured by not a single piece of evidence.

This conclusion is important for our purposes for a number of reasons. It confirms the distinction we have already made between Ionian (especially Hecataean) ethnography and the anthropology of the sophistic movement. It removes the only substantial argument for supposing that Herodotus' intellectual roots are Ionian rather than sophistic. It shows that where Herodotus comments on or, as often, simply alludes to such matters as the connexion between environment, culture and temperament, he is making a contribution to a current debate[93].

It is well-known that these and related ideas have a thematic role in Herodotus, that the influences of culture and environment on temperament and disposition explain certain of the narrative sequences basic to the work's structure. Thus, for example, while it was natural for the Greeks, ever since Homer and his Trojans, to depict barbarians, and Persians in particular, as enfeebled by their addiciton to luxury and softness of living (cf. e.g. Xenophanes on Lydian softness, F3 West; and the softness of the Persians in Aeschylus), Herodotus appreciates that the Persians were not always so and that a number of different influences have combined to make them the way they now are. Early in the work, Sandanis has to advise Croesus on the folly of attacking the Persians (1.71.2ff), a people who wear leather trousers, and other clothes made of leather, who eat only what they can get, not what they want, who live in a harsh land (trēkhean: a key word); who indeed drink water not wine, whose only luxury is figs[94]. They must not get a taste for Lydian culture, or they will never let go. In Sandanis' description the harshness of the Persian way of life is an allusive warning:

Herodotus clearly wants us to see Persia here as a primitive culture, whose very strength lies in its ignorance of luxury and soft living[95]. However, during the work the Persians gradually change, and by the end the transformation is complete. After Plataea Pausanias can compare the luxury of Mardonios' way of life with the austerity of the Spartans, and exclaim at the folly of the Persian invasion (9.82.3): τοῦ Μήδου τὴν ἀφροσύνην ... ὃς τοιήνδε δίαιταν (another keyword) ἔχων ἦλθε ἐς ἡμέας οὕτως ὀϊζυρὴν ἔχοντας ἀπαιρησόμενος. What Cyrus is made to predict in the closing chapter of the work has indeed come true: the Persians have exchanged their harsh primitive life for one of soft luxury which has made them weak rather than strong (9.122.3): φιλέειν γὰρ ἐκ μαλακῶν χώρων μαλακοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι [96]. This theme is one of the principal interpretative ideas of the whole work, and, as we have seen, it is an idea which may well have achieved its first precise articulation in the context of the sophistic movement; so that we could say that in this respect one of the work's basic ideas shows sophistic influence.

The sophistic inspiration of Herodotus' ethnography can further be inferred from its characteristically sophistic pre-occupations, from the level of the family, through the small community, to the nation or state. We may concentrate for economy's sake on Herodotus' interest in the institution of the family and ideas of kinship. This is clearly a field of much sophistic inquiry, both sociological and moral. Aristotle's view of the family as the microcosm of the state goes back past Platonic totalitarianism to the 5thc, and Plato's own concern with the institution of marriage in the Republic and the Laws is certain to have been stimulated by sophistic thought[97]. We might compare in particular the fragments of both Democritus and Antiphon on the family, on the procreative drive and the tensions of marriage[98]. Herodotus' ethnography provides an instructive set of illustrations of the various different ways the family can be conceived. In particular he examines many different examples of 'marriage customs', different ways of institutionalizing sexual relations between men and women. So for example, he introduces us to marriage by purchase in Babylon (1.196.1ff: a most wise custom) and Thrace (5.6.1), to prostitution before marriage in Lydia (1.93.4; cf. 5.6.1), to ritual prostitution with strangers in Babylon (1.199.1ff: the most shameful of their laws), to the 'droit du seigneur' of the King in Libya (4.168.2), and to the promiscuity of the Libyan Gindanes (4.176), whose women commemorate each act of intercourse with an ankle-bracelet: ἣ δ’ ἂν πλεῖστα ἔχηι, αὕτη ἀρίστη δέδοκται εἶναι ὡς ὑπὸ πλείστων ἀνδρῶν φιληθεῖσα.

It will be useful here to focus on a particular example of Herodotus' interest in the institution of marriage. He mentions a number of different cases of the custom of sharing wives in common, among the Massagetai (1.216.1), the Scythian Agathyrsoi (4.104) and the tribes of Libya (4.172.2, τρόπωι παραπλησίωι τῶι καὶ Μασσαγέται (!); and 4.180.5-6). Herodotus does more than simply list examples: he shows a clear interest in the rationale and the mechanics of the practice. So we are told that the Agathyrsoi practise wife-swapping (4.104): ἵνα κασίγνητοί τε ἀλλήλων ἔωσι καὶ οἰκήιοι ἐόντες πάντες μήτε φθόνωι μήτ’ ἔχθεϊ χρέωνται ἐς ἀλλήλους. It is scarcely conceivable that Herodotus is here reproducing the reasoning of the Agathyrsoi themselves: rather he is allowing himself a theoretical inference as to the kind of society that might result if each of its members was related by blood to each other (see Plato Republic V). The Agathyrsoi are a people who live in accordance with the laws of nature, monogamy not being observed for example in the animal kingdom: their primitive institutions make for a society without the resentment and mutual hostility common to societies with 'unnatural' prescriptions. This implicit reasoning reminds us in particular of how Antiphon, in the *Peri Alētheias* papyrus, observes that man-made laws are hostile to nature and make demands on man which are not in his best interests (cf. frg.A col.2-4). A later example from Libya, the tribes around lake Tritonis (4.180.5-6), offers Herodotus an opportunity to consider the mechanics of such a system. Here men and women do not set up house together, but merely couple at random like animals: οὔτε συνοικέοντες κτηνηδόν τε μισγόμενοι. The way they decide the parentage of the child is to wait until it is full grown, at which time the men gather together and agree which of them it most resembles. Aristotle discussing the issues arising out of Plato's advocacy of the community of wives, has occasion to allude to 'certain tribes of Upper Libya', who share wives in common and who distinguish their children kata tas homoiotētas (Pol.1262A19ff). Possibly Herodotus is the source here, though a common sophistic model is just as likely[99]. In either case it is illuminating that both Herodotus and Aristotle find the case interesting, though they move in different directions, Herodotus from the instance to the generalizable problem, Aristotle from the general problem to the instance.

Herodotus is interested to see the different ways in which different peoples respect the institution of the family and the family bond. Quite different from these Libyan polyandrists are the Persians, among whom a man is honoured highest for prowess in battle, but next in order for the number of children he sires. Those who produce the greatest number receive annual gifts from the king (1.136.1): τὸ πολλὸν δ' ἡγέαται ἰσχυρὸν εἶναι. Here then the family is the bulwark of the state: the prosperity of the community (as in Plato) is felt to depend on the healthy production of citizens and soldiers. At the same time, the child is kept from its father until five years of age, on the principle that if it dies in rearing, it will cause the father less grief if he has not seen it (1.136.2). The theory that, though procreation is a natural drive, the parents of children suffer torments of anxiety, is one that we can see developed, for example, in Democritus[100]. But most remarkable is the Persian theory of murder within the family (1.137.2): no-one, they say, has ever yet killed his father or mother, but wherever this has apparently happened, it has turned out that the child was either a changeling or a bastard: οὐ γὰρ δή φασι οἰκὸς εἶναι τόν γε ἀληθέως τοκέα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἑωυτοῦ παιδὸς ἀποθνήισκειν. Clearly the Persians believe that there is a natural law which prevents such occurrences: the ties of blood are thought to be so strong as to be physically inviolable - a rather extravagantly naturalistic theory of morals[101].

In another area, Herodotus takes pains to distinguish the variety of different ways that people honour their parents (or family) in death. All the larger ethnographies indeed set aside a section for the discussion of funeral practices; but the most famous example is the parable of Darius' experiment (3.38.2ff), where sophistic thought has been widely recognized[102]. Darius asks first the Greeks and then the Callatian Indians whether either would adopt the funeral practices of the other (burning and eating, respectively), and both parties show that nothing could persuade them to do so (3.38.4): οὕτω μέν νυν ταῦτα νενόμισται, καὶ ὀρθῶς μοι δοκέει Πίνδαρος ποιῆσαι νόμον πάντων βασιλέα φήσας εἶναι. Both the form of the parable (its obvious similarity to the experiment of Psammetichus, above) and its characteristically sophistic use of the famous Pindaric tag on *nomos*[103], so frequent in sophistic illustrations of the relativity of *nomos*, point us to the sophists. That moral, moreover, is significantly both a pre-occupation of leading figures of the sophistic movement and one of the *Leitmotive* of Herodotus' own work.

The discovery of the relativity of moral values, customs and attitudes gave rise to the question whether there were indeed no such things as universal taboos. The aspect of attitudes to the family that receives most attention in this respect is the taboo on incest. This is a subject that Xenophon has Socrates raise with Hippias (Mem.4.4.20ff): in discussing the existence of *agraphoi nomoi* common to all men, Socrates gets the sophist to agree that parents are everywhere held in honour by custom, and then asks: οὐκοῦν καὶ μήτε γονέας παισὶ μίγνυσθαι μήτε παῖδας γονεῦσιν; Hippias denies that this is a divine law, inasmuch as he knows of people who contravene it;

but Socrates argues that incest between parents and children at least carries a natural sanction. In Euripides' Andromache, Hermione taunts the heroine of the play with incest (170ff) and states that: τοιοῦτον πᾶν τὸ βαρβαρικὸν γένος. Parents mate with children, brothers with sisters: καὶ τῶνδ' οὐδὲν ἐξείργει νόμος. Xanthus (FGH 765F31) ascribes incestuous practices to the Persian magi, and the Dissoi Logoi (2.15) similarly to the Persians as a whole[104]. It is against this background that Herodotus' narrative of Cambyses' incest with his sister should be read (3.31.1ff). This he says was a precedent: οὐδαμῶς γὰρ ἐώθεσαν πρότερον τῆισι ἀδελφεῆισι συνοικέειν Πέρσαι. Cambyses realizes that for him to marry his sister will be unparalleled (*ouk eōthota*) and so calls together his advisers to ask whether there is any law that bids a man who wants to marry his sister. The question is of course nonsensical: laws do not compel (*keleuein*) people to do things they want to do - rather the opposite, according to Antiphon! Their reply is described by Herodotus as 'just and safe': they say they know of no such law, but they know of another which says that the Persian king may do whatever he wishes. Thus, adds Herodotus (31.5), they were able to avoid changing the law despite their fear of Cambyses, but instead managed to pacify him with another. It seems certain that Herodotus is here taking up a position in a contemporary debate: he claims that there was no *nomos* among the Persians that condoned incest, as Xanthus and the Dissoi Logoi both seem to have it; rather he implies that the universal taboo existed there too, until it was broken quite exceptionally by Cambyses, notoriously no respecter of laws (cf. 3.38.1). But the story also points to the weakness of temporal laws, which can sometimes be made to condone practices which are absolutely wrong: legal systems, Herodotus implies, are both inconsistent and only feeble allies of natural justice.

This is only, of course, a specimen discussion of one aspect of Herodotus' ethnography: enough has been said, however, to show that sophistic preconceptions do indeed underlie his interpretation of what sort of a thing culture is, what are its essential components, what are the forces which keep it together, and so on. This is not the place to show that *nomos* is one of the major themes of the entire work, both narrative and ethnography. We may observe that the work is on the grandest view a discussion of the range of meaning of the term barbaros ; a consideration of what the Greeks look like seen against the background of world culture, and what that shows about them, about 'barbarians', and about mankind as a whole[105]. Herodotus' expansive vision of humanity in all its transformations is indeed closely akin to that of Antiphon in the remarkable passage of the *Peri Alētheias* papyrus (DK II.352-3: frg.B) in which he compares the attitude which distinguishes the low from the high-born with the equally artificial distinction of Greek and barbarian: ἐν τούτωι δὲ πρὸς ἀλλήλους βεβαρβαρώμεθα, ἐπεὶ φύσει πάντα πάντες ὁμοίως πεφύκαμεν καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες. We are in short all men, without distinction in nature, only in *nomos*[106]. A full study of the place of *nomos* in Herodotus' work, with a proper appreciation of his contribution to the sophistic debate, is called for[107].

We may conclude here by saying that Herodotus' relationship to the sophists in the matter of 'culture' is not one of mere dependence: he is rather working parallel to the sophists, adopting their ways of looking at society and human institutions, but responding to their somewhat shallow interest in ethnography by producing much more elaborate and detailed studies of his own to illustrate how real cultures actually work. My impression is that Herodotus set about gathering his material through research and travel with his sophistsic interests already formed. I doubt, however, that he travelled nearly as extensively as either he makes out or as modern scholars, going far beyond anything he tells us, have made him do (cf. Appendix III, for Egypt), so that there is very little need to set aside any substantial period in his life when his travels took place, and before his intellectual maturity was complete. We cannot tell how much he owed to Hecataeus in conceiving his plan, but it does not seem on this view nearly as much as traditionally supposed. If we are right in supposing that Hecataeus had not come round to the idea of portraying culture but spent his time, if not exclusively in geography, collecting merely superficial ethnic details, then there is an unbridgeable gap between his work and Herodotus. At the very best we could try to argue that Herodotus thought of rewriting Hecataeus from the point of view of the sophistic enlightenment. On any view, it is not possible to understand Herodotus' interest in ethnography without appreciating its sophistic inspiration.

(D) Nature and Convention.

We have argued that Herodotus' interest in ethnography has been shaped by his participation in the sophistic debate on the nature of human society, as well as on the relativity of (temporal) *nomoi*. It remains to illustrate that Herodotus shows a typically sophistic preoccupation with the general question of what (abstract) things are prescribed by or exist in nature, and what things are artificial constructs of the human imagination.

Heinimann's discussion of the *nomos-physis* antithesis rightly observes that is does indeed have antecedents outside the sophists, notably in the later Presocratics' concern with the limitations of human perception. So that, for example, when Democritus asserts that the impressions we perceive and the things that really exist, are not one and the same (B6-11; especially B9: νόμωι γλυκύ, νόμωι πικρόν ... ἐτεῆι δὲ ἄτομα καὶ κενόν), he is probably doing little more than echoing the strictures on sense perception of Parmenides or Empedocles, or even Heraclitus[108]. However there are important differences in the character of the debate as conducted by the Presocratic physicists and the sophists. The Presocratics sought to devalue sense perception, or even to remove it from consideration altogether, in order to justify their constructions of the physical world and to protect themselves from refutation by appeal to sense perception. There is no evidence that they were really interested in the philosophical implications of the question; in fact all they offer us is stricture, never debate. The sophists on the other hand were genuinely interested in probing the question of perception philosophically; and the contribution of Protagoras in initiating the debate has been widely recognized[109]. Moreover this new departure involved a broadening of the inquiry. No longer is it simply a question of disposing of sense perception in order to make room for constructions of the physical world. Rather the full range of objects of human perception can now be explored: not merely the material components of the physical world and their properties or qualitites, but also abstract questions of justice, virtue, law, indeed the whole range of ideas about the world. And it is surely this change that makes the sophistic debate on nomos-physis such an important advance on anything that went before.

It is clear moreover that it was the sophists who initiated the debate on the conflicting claims of natural and temporal law, the agraphoi nomoi and the laws of the state, which gained such a strong foothold in the second half of the 5thc, in particular at Athens[110]. There is no indication whatever that the question had been so clearly formulated or so enthusiastically explored before this time[111].

There are several different ways that Herodotus reflects the various parts of this debate, and the two examples that follow are only selection[112]. We may consider first a remarkable geographical discussion (4.42ff). Having proceeded earlier with an account of the geographical extension of the continents in accordance with established convention (4.36ff), Herodotus stops and corrects himself, and explains that to talk in this way is quite arbitrary, that such divisions do not correspond to anything in nature. He has already indicated his reserve in using the conventions, when describing the borders of Arabia (4.39.1): λήγει δὲ αὕτη, οὐ λήγουσα εἰ μὴ νόμωι[113]. The ensuing discussion (4.42ff) can be described as a reaction to the naiveté of the old Ionian geographers in the light of a sophistic understanding of the conventionality of names and words in general (4.42.1): θωμάζω ὦν τῶν διουρισόντων καὶ διελόντων Λιβύην καὶ ’Ασίην καὶ Εὐρώπην. The old way of thinking is indeed deeply ingrained in people's minds, despite its arbitrariness (4.45.2): οὐδ’ ἔχω συμβαλέσθαι ἔπ’ ὅτεὺ μιῆι ἐούσηι γῆι οὐνόματα τριφάσια κεῖται, ἐπωνυμίας ἔχοντα γυναικῶν ... οὐδὲ τῶν διουρισάντων τὰ οὐνόματα πυθέσθαι καὶ ὅθεν ἔθεντο τὰς ἐπωνυμίας . And Herodotus goes on to speculate on the possible history of the names (apparently without realizing that the women are mere personifications - unless this is a joke?). This supposition that human conventions or *nomoi* must have had original inventors somewhere back in the mists of history is typically sophistic, as we have seen. It would be interesting to know in what connexion Hippias (DK 86B8) spoke of the continents of Asia and Europe having been named after the daughters of Oceanus: it seems likely that, like Herodotus, he was speculating on the origins of the conventional names[114], rather than simply mythologizing. Herodotus however concludes that he had better follow convention in naming the continents (4.45.5): τοῖσι γὰρ νομιζομένοισι αὐτῶν χρησόμεθα[115]. It seems highly probable that Herodotus is here taking a side in the sophistic debate, best known to us from Plato's Cratylus, on whether names exist in nature or only by convention[116].

If in this passage Herodotus adopts a sophistic position on the arbitrariness and conventionality of names, he is clearly unhappy about accepting that norms also do not exist in nature. In his account of Egyptian religious attitudes, he observes (2.64.1-2) that almost all other men besides the Greeks and the Egyptians see no objection to having intercourse in sacred places and to entering temples unwashed after contact with women: νομίζοντες ἀνθρώπους εἶναι κατά περ τὰ ἄλλα κτήνεα . Birds and beasts, they say, can be seen mating in temples and sanctuaries: εἰ ὦν τῶι θεῶι τοῦτο μὴ φίλον, οὐκ ἂν οὐδὲ τὰ κτήνεα ποιέειν. But Herodotus is not content with such an argument from 'nature': οὗτοι μέν νυν τοιαῦτα ἐπιλέγοντες ποιεῦσι ἐμοίγε οὐκ ἀρεστά. It is certain that Herodotus has not in fact derived this argument from the mouths of barbarian informants[117]. Rather the comparison of human behaviour with that of animals at once recalls sophistic ethological and moral speculation[118]. So for example Democritus observes that the biological drive to reproduce the species is identical in man as in animals (DK 68B278: δῆλον δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώιοισι)[119]. So too Callicles supports the claim of the stronger to rule over the weaker by appeal to the animal kingdom (Pl.Gorg.483D: καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώιοις); while Pheidippides supports the right of sons to beat their fathers by a similar argument (Aristoph.Nub.1427ff): σκέψαι δὲ τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας καὶ τἆλλα τὰ βοτὰ ταυτί, ὡς τοὺς πατέρας ἀμύνεται· καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν / ἡμῶν ἐκεῖνοι, πλήν γ' ὅτι ψηφίσματ' οὐ γράφουσιν;[120] What Herodotus seems to be doing here is conceding the amoralist case that such behaviour can be justified by appeal both to the relativity of morals (most peoples besides the Greeks and Egyptians have no taboos on the subject) and to the behaviour of animals - 'nature' allows it and makes no distinction between sacred and profane. But at the same time he advances his own intuition that such things seem to him repugnant. As in his discussion of Cambyses' incest (cf. (C) above), Herodotus is here facing a central question of the sophistic debate, whether or not there are taboos in nature. Here again he seems to be drawing back from his extreme relativist position as expressed in 3.38, where it seemed there were no such absolute taboos; he is, however, simply observing the discrepancy between his intuition of what is fitting and the evidence of 'nature'.

(E) The Use and Abuse of Logos.

The sophists were not the first to discover the intrinsic appeal of arguments: this honour clearly belongs to the Eleatic physicists, Parmenides and Zeno, who are the first to appreciate that an argument is a tool that can be used over and over again, and does not need to be forged afresh for each new emergency[121]. However the range of such tools was enthusiastically extended by the sophists: even Aristotle's Sophistici Elenchi is only the catalogue of a strict logician, impressive testimony though it is to the fascination of the sophists with the mechanics of argument. But besides an evident interest in strictly logical argument and syllogistic techniques, as dramatically exampled for instance in Gorgias' treatise on 'Not Being'[122], the sophists were equally, if not more concerned with arguments whose purpose was to persuade rather than prove. Many of them seem to have advertised their services as being essentially of practical value: thus Prodicus is said to have defined a sophist as mid-way between the philosophos and the politikos anēr[123], and repeatedly in the Platonic dialogues the sophists are made to claim that their teaching is designed to give an advantage to the man intending to embark on a 'political' life. Hence the sophists popularised a whole range of practical arguments to make the weaker case seem stronger[124]. In the matter of persuasion the sophists favourite tool was the argument from eikos, probability, the appeal not to reason pure and simple, but to reasonable expectation[125]. Similarly, borrowing no doubt from the law-courts, the sophists seem to have given a new currency to the terms tekmērion and martyrion, not in the sense of forensic evidence merely (cf. e.g. Aesch. Eum.485-6), but also for 'evidence' in theoretical arguments such as those of Thucydides' Archaeology, for example[126]. Sophistic argumentation is particularly concerned with what one might call reconstruction, that is the testing of possible 'models' (cf. Ch.II.i): what could have happened, what might have happened, if such and such had been true, what may happen, given certain assumptions about human nature[127].

In Herodotus[128] there is clear evidence of sophistic argumentation, particularly, for example, in Darius' defence of *apatē*[129], or in his justification of monarchy (3.82): but rather than discuss isolated and striking examples like these, it will be more useful to remind ourselves of the widespread, almost automatic, resort to sophistic persuasive techniques. The word *eikos* used for a probable inference was by no means new with the sophists (cf. e.g. Pind.Py.1.34-5), but there are clear signs of its having become a stock-in-trade of both theoretical and forensic argument under the influence of the sophists (cf. n.125), and Herodotus' evident attachment to the word in such contexts is surely an indication that he shares that influence[130]. So, for example, the discussion of the inundation of the Nile (2.19ff) has repeated recourse to the argument from *eikos* (2.24.2, 25.2, 25.5, 27, and esp. 22.2): ἀνδρί γε λογίζεσθαι τοιούτων πέρι οἵωι τε ἐόντι, ὡς οὐδὲ οἰκὸς ἀπὸ χιόνος μιν ῥέειν, πρῶτον μὲν καὶ μέγιστον μαρτύριον ...[131].

More striking is his use of the words *tekmērion* / *martyrion* in the context of more formal arguments. The range of applications and contexts is noticeably wide: arguments about the Nile (2.13.1, 22.2 above), about the history of Egyptian and Greek religion (2.43.2, 58), about racial origins (2.104.4), about the relativity of *nomoi* (3.38.2), for the establishment of historical traditions (5.45.1 bis, 45.2; 7.221; 8.120), for supernatural intervention (9.100.2). The historical 'reconstructions', in particular of the far distant past, inaccessible to oral tradition, clearly mirror the work of Thucydides in the Archaeology[132].

The *argumentum per contrarium* is another type of argument from probability, which establishes the essential importance of a proposition by illustrating what would follow, or might have followed, if its contrary were assumed. Thus the author of Ancient Medicine (1.11ff) establishes that it is the experience and skill in the art of medicine that makes the good doctor and the bad doctor, by assuming the non-existence of an art of medicine:

> εἰσὶν δὲ δημιουργοὶ οἱ μὲν φαῦλοι, οἱ δὲ πολλὸν διαφέροντες·
> ὅπερ, εἰ μὴ ἦν ἰητρικὴ ὅλως, ... οὐκ ἂν ἦν, ἀλλὰ πάντες ὁμοίως αὐτῆς
> ἄπειροί τε καὶ ἀνεπιστήμονες ἦσαν[133].

As Kleinknecht has shown, this type of argument is common in Herodotus, notably in his demonstration of the importance of Athens' contribution to the saving of Greece (7.139.2, εἰ Ἀθηναῖοι καταρρωδήσαντες ...), but in many other contexts as well[134]. So for example in discussing the historical relationship of Greek and Egyptian religion, Herodotus argues the impossibility of the Egyptians having learnt of Heracles from the Greeks (2.43.3f) by the following means. The Egyptians do not know of Poseidon or the Dioscuri; but if they had learnt the name of any deity from the Greeks, it was these more than any that they were likely to remember, given that both peoples were seafarers (i.e. these being the gods of the sea). So that these names would have been better known in Egypt than that of Heracles. Ergo the Egyptian Heracles must be prior to the Greek. The argument is scarcely solid, but it is remarkable for its ingenuity and for the near perversity of its argumentative display.

Perversity is indeed one of the hallmarks of sophistic argument, some of it not obviously deliberate (as perhaps here), much of it consciously and provocatively so. The sophistic techniques for making the weaker case appear the stronger were chiefly useful for forensic purposes. But they also gave rise to epideixeis whose primary purpose was to illustrate what could be done with argument, what a powerful weapon logos could be. Such pieces as Gorgias' Helen and Palamedes or Isocrates' Helen and Busiris are the most familiar examples of these epideixeis, in which the author attempts the defence of an 'indefensible' criminal. Another 5thc text, the Ps-Xenoph.Athpol., as we commented in Ch.II.iii.L above, takes not a mythical defendant, but a historical one, the Athenian democracy, and while bitterly castigating its criminality, argues the case for its supreme good sense - against the verdict of the 'rest of the Greeks'. It would be interesting to know here if this type of double-edged defence had anything to do with the techniques of 'indirect praise and censure' taught by Euenos (Pl.Phaedr. 267A: *hypodēlōsis* ... *parepainoi* ... *parapsogoi*)[135].

That Herodotus too tries his hand at such defences seems very probable. A more or less trivial example is his version of Heracles' adventures in Egypt (2.45.1ff), which turns into a defence of the Egyptian character against Greek slander (cf. Isocrates' Busiris!), and similar is his much more elaborate account of the story of Helen and Menelaus in Egypt (2.112-120), which again turns out to be a defence of the Egyptians, though not delivered in Herodotus' own voice. Proteus' self-righteous claim to piety (2.115.6, νῦν ὦν ἐπειδὴ περὶ πολλοῦ ἥγημαι μὴ ξεινοκτονέειν ...) is clearly an indirect riposte to the Busiris myth. Similar again is Herodotus' reconstruction of how the Persians might have tried to excuse the conduct of Paris at 1.4.2, with its obviously sophistic antitheses:

> τὸ μέν νυν ἁρπάζειν γυναῖκας ἀνδρῶν ἀδίκων νομίζειν ἔργον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ἁρπασθεισέων σπουδὴν ποιήσασθαι τιμωρέειν ἀνοήτων, τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν ὥρην ἔχειν ἁρπασθεισέων σωφρόνων.

Besides these mythological examples, however, there are the 'apologies' for the Alcmeonids (6.121.1ff), for Argos (7.152.3) and for Athens (7.139.1ff). The latter two we have already discussed in detail (cf. Ch.II.iii), arguing that Herodotus is provocatively 'defending' the indefensible, in the case of Athens in something like the same way that the Old Oligarch 'defends' the democracy[136]. No less than in the sophistic *epideixeis* mentioned above, Herodotus allows the essential improbability of his 'apology' to show through: he says enough to show that both Argos and Athens are indeed deserving of the accusations which have been levelled against them.

Is the matter not the same with his remarkable defence of the Alcmeonids against the charge of having displayed the shield after Marathon? Strasburger's excellent discussion of this 'apology' does much to justify the suspicion that Herodotus is here simply indulging in a grim charade and that he has deliberately chosen suspiciously weak ground for his defence[137]. The Alcmeonids' hatred of tyranny (6.121.1ff) is a weak argument from character (cf. e.g. Gorgias Palam.28ff), which squares ill with Herodotus' own account of Megacles' involvement with Peisistratus (1.60.1ff) and with his evident awareness that past principles can always be forgotten in the pursuit of present advantage (cf. esp. Ch.I.i and ii). His reminder that the Alcmeonids rather than the tyrannicides rid Athens of the Peisistratids (6.123.1f), depends on the unflattering appreciation that the Alcmeonids were the ones who bribed the Pythia (εἰ δὴ οὗτοί γε ἀληθέως ...); it hardly makes sense to rebut one charge of dishonest and corrupt dealing by appeal to another. Herodotus raises the objection (6.124.1)[138] that the betrayal was occasioned by hostility to the demos, which charge is first briefly then at length (125-131) 'answered' by the observation that the Alcmeonids were then and always in high regard at Athens: οὐ μὲν ὦν ἦσάν σφεων ἄλλοι δοκιμώτεροι ἔν γε Ἀθηναίοισι ἄνδρες οὐδ᾽ οἳ μᾶλλον ἐτετιμέατο· In the long account of the Alcmeonid rise that follows, the association of Alcmeon with Croesus (tyranny and wealth) (125.1-5), and especially the marriage of Megacles into the house of Cleisthenes of Sicyon (126-131), are stories hardly best calculated to allay our suspicions that the Alcmeonids were always a family that nourished tyrannical ambitions. We know Herodotus to be a more than competent advocate when he needs to be, capable of the most subtle and persuasive use of evidence: that he should here have negligently used all the 'wrong' arguments seems inconceivable. As for the climax, the portent of Pericles' birth (6.131.2), there can be scarcely any doubt that Herodotus wishes to interpret Agariste's lion-dream as a sinister prophecy[139]. That he does not explicitly draw out its so obvious meaning accords with our interpretation of the entire excursus as a mock apology: beneath the surface the attentive reader sees the improbability of the defence. It would be interesting to know to what extent Herodotus himself saw (and expected his readers to see) the 'Alcmeonid' Pericles (he accepts the matrilineal descent!) as the man who effected what the traitors of Marathon failed to do: that is, come to terms with Persia (cf. Ch.II.iii.E.3) and set himself up as a constitutional _tyrannos_ at Athens[140].

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No less than Thucydides, Herodotus is interested in the relation between words and actions, _logos_ and _ergon_, the conflict of reason and passion[141], a concern inseparable from the sophistic discovery of the power of _logos_. The use and abuse of _gnōmē_ in Herodotus is, however, a theme whose importance has been obscured by repeated affirmations that he is a determinist, that advisers in Herodotus are powerless to alter the decisions of rulers and men of power because the freewill of such protagonists has been immobilized by fate and by divine infatuation. The scenes of advice in Herodotus are on this view merely vehicles for the elaboration of such motifs as the inevitability of fate, the envy of the gods, the blind folly (_atē_) of despotic rulers doomed to disaster, and so on[142]. But Herodotus devotes so much detailed attention to the mechanics of advice, the techniques and psychology of persuasion, the value of debate and deliberation, that we are bound to see in these speeches a pre-occupation with the intrinsic interest of such things and to accept that he did believe men could influence each other's actions through reasoned argument. The fact that it is possible for Herodotean warners on occasion to make their addressees see sense (cf. e.g. 1.27.2ff, 88.2ff, etc.) shows that the determinist explanation of the speeches is an incomplete one: illustrating the infatuation of the addressee is only one of their possible functions, and one that does not always operate.

Artabanus is the chief advocate of the importance of careful deliberation and reasoned debate (e.g. 7.10a.1):

> μὴ λεχθεισέων μὲν γνωμέων ἀντιέων ἀλλήλησι οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀμείνω αἱρεόμενον ἑλέσθαι, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τῆι εἰρημένηι χρᾶσθαι, λεχθεισέων δ' ἔστι, ὥσπερ τὸν χρυσὸν τὸν ἀκήρατον αὐτον μὲν ἐπ' ἑωυτοῦ οὐ διαγινώσκειν, ἐπεὰν δὲ παρατρίψωμεν ἄλλωι χρυσῶι διαγινώσκειν τὸν ἀμείνω[143].

Artabanus is here setting out one of the recurrent themes of Xerxes' expedition against Greece, which is at the same time a theme of the sophistic debate itself[143a]. It is clear, for example, from Euripides, Thucydides, and even Aristophanes' Clouds, that the use and abuse of *logos* (or *gnōmē*), the value of argument in resolving practical problems, was itself the subject of animated contemporary discussion. Given that men like Protagoras were claiming that it was possible to argue both sides of any case with equal force and persuasiveness (cf. DK 80B6a: δύο λόγους εἶναι περὶ παντὸς πράγματος ἀντικειμένους ἀλλήλοις; cf. DK II.260.1ff)[144], a skill we find deployed in virtuoso fashion in Antiphon's Tetralogies, for example, was it any longer true that reasoned debate was the best means of arriving at the truth or the best practical solution, or would such debate not more usually result either in confused *aporia* or the success of the best argued, but not necessarily the right position? An appreciation of the power of *logos*, of the advantages and dangers of debate, had been with the Greeks at least since Homer, but it is not until the sophistic period that there is any sign of a fully developed debate about debate itself[145].

In the same speech Artabanus further observes that even when one has deliberated well, there is an incalculable relation between one's plans and the vagaries of chance (7.10d.2):

> τὸ γὰρ εὖ βουλεύεσθαι κέρδος μέγιστον εὑρίσκω ἐόν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ ἐναντιωθῆναί τι θέλει, βεβούλευται μὲν οὐδὲν ἧσσον εὖ ἕσσωται δὲ ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης τὸ βούλευμα· ὁ δὲ βουλευσάμενος αἰσχρῶς, εἴ οἱ ἡ τύχη ἐπίσποιτο, εὕρημα εὕρηκε, ἧσσον δὲ οὐδέν οἱ κακῶς βεβούλευται.

This rather artificial (sophistic) antithesis relates chance and planning in a way that reminds us at once of Thucydides: chance is an unmeasurable quantity that threatens to make even the best deliberation arbitrary[146].

The theme of the conflict of chance and deliberation crops up again later in the discussion of Xerxes and Artabanus at Abydos. Here Artabanus is even more cautious about the dangers of chance (7.49.3): μάθε ὅτι αἱ συμφοραὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἄρχουσι καὶ οὐκὶ ὤνθρωποι τῶν συμφορέων. This is of course not either fatalism or determinism as usually ascribed to Herodotus, as the context shows (49.5):

> ἀνὴρ δὲ οὕτω ἂν εἴη ἄριστος, εἰ βουλευόμενος μὲν ἀρρωδέοι,
> πᾶν ἐπιλεγόμενος πείσεσθαι χρῆμα, ἐν δὲ τῶι ἔργωι θρασὺς εἴη;
> (cf. Antiphon DK 87B56: κακὸς δ' ἂν ⟨εἴη⟩, εἰ ⟨ἐπ'⟩ ἀποῦσι μὲν καὶ
> μέλλουσι τοῖς κινδύνοις τῆι γλώττηι θρασύνεται καὶ τῶι θέλειν
> ἐπείγει, τὸ δ' ἔργον ἂν παρῆι, ὀκνεῖ).

The *symphorai* referred to here are the variables of chance, which, as in Thucydides, can undermine the most acute planning. 'Thucydidean' too is the description of a 'rational fear' (here *arrhōdia*), which encourages one to foresee as many pitfalls as possible (cf. esp. Thuc.4.62.4). As de Romilly has shown, Thucydides makes a special point of distinguishing this rational fear (*deos*) from the irrational fear (*phobos*) which is detrimental to all good planning[147]. But in this passage Artabanus' somewhat exaggerated pessimism about planning becomes a foil to the elaborate riposte of Xerxes (7.50.1-3):

> εἰ γὰρ δὴ βούλοιο ἐπὶ τῶι αἰεὶ ἐπεσφερομένωι πρήγματι τὸ πᾶν
> ὁμοίως ἐπιλέγεσθαι, ποιήσειας ἂν οὐδαμὰ οὐδέν· κρέσσον δὲ
> πάντα θαρσέοντα ἥμισυ τῶν δεινῶν πάσχειν μᾶλλον ἢ πᾶν χρῆμα
> προδειμαίνοντα μηδαμὰ μηδὲν παθεῖν.

Indeed the discussion here turns into a debate about debate: Xerxes puts the case for determined, decisive action, without undue deliberation, citing the example of his Persian predecessors, and insisting that great prizes call for great risks. In Thucydides the Corinthians, for example, offer the Spartans similar advice against the excessive devotion to deliberation (1.120.5): πολλὰ γὰρ κακῶς γνωσθέντα ἀβουλοτέρων τῶν ἐναντίων τυχόντα κατωρθώθη, καὶ ἔτι πλείω καλῶς δοκοῦντα βουλευθῆναι ἐς τοὐναντίον αἰσχρῶς περιέστη . Herodotus is perhaps less pessimistic than Thucydides about the value of planning, and of course shows us that Xerxes is mistaken in his rebuttal of Artabanus[148].

What Herodotus is particularly pessimistic about are the psychological tensions that hinder good advice: whether the recipient accepts good council depends both on his own predisposition and on his opinion of the motives of his adviser; whether the adviser advises well depends both on his own motives and his ability to allay the suspicions of the person he is advising. We may instance Demaratus' problems in 'telling the truth' to Xerxes before Thermopylae (7.101.3f and 104.1, ἀρχῆθεν ἠπιστάμην ὅτι ἀληθείῃ χρεώμενος οὐ φίλα τοι ἐρέω ; cf. 104.5) and Xerxes' defence of Demaratus' good intentions later in the face of the slanders of Achaimenes (7.236.1; cf. 237.1f: "as a foreigner, he is more prepared to give me good advice, being free from the envy which attends all dealings between men of the same city")[149]. We should acknowledge the importance of the dramatic setting here and Herodotus' desire to dramatize the problems faced by advisers to oriental despots[150]; but here again there is a point of contact with Thucydides, and in particular his analysis of the pressures on speakers in the Athenian assembly. To take an example from the Mytilenean debate, Cleon warns against speakers who want to appear cleverer than the laws (3.37.4), and suggests that anyone who speaks against the agreed decision either wants to make a display of his cleverness or is pursuing some private gain (38.2ff); on the other hand Diodotus has to defend the value of debate (3.42.1ff) and argue that anyone who wants to block debate is either stupid or pursuing some private gain (!): the general suspicion in which speakers are held in the assembly, he concludes, does no good to the city (42.4ff). It is surely possible to explain this correspondence in terms of the sophistic debate on the use and abuse of _logos_, which was certainly stimulated in part by the phenomenon of the

Athenian democratic assembly (and others like it), in which parrhēsia was discovered to be such a double-edged weapon[151].

Clearly it would not be right to suggest that the traditional view of Herodotus' scenes of advice as illustrations of the infatuation of doomed kings, is wholly to be discarded: Herodotus remains enough of a theist to believe in divine punishment. But this is only one aspect of the problem, and one that has been absurdly over-played. Herodotus is equally interested - on another level - with the mechanics and theory of deliberation and debate. That Herodotus seems so clearly to 'anticipate' Thucydides in all this is surely to be put down to a common sophistic inspiration: there is a thoughtfulness in both authors' treatments of the question which shows that it is still something of a novelty, not an old inheritance from the poets. Whatever our prejudices about Herodotus, we do not expect to find Thucydides devoting so much space to a tired old theme.

(F) Religion and the Supernatural.

We cannot possibly hope to characterize here the complexity of Herodotus' conception of the divine, much as the subject needs thorough re-examination. It may, however, be thought that it is in the area of religious belief that Herodotus' alienation from the cold rationalism of the sophists is most apparent; yet this is to misconceive in some degree both Herodotus' own position and that of the sophists themselves. Naturally, whatever conclusion we come to, we will want to avoid the mistake of supposing that the degree of a man's belief or disbelief in the divine can ever be used as a measure of his intellectual sophistication. Socrates after all was both a convinced theist and intellectually quite as forward-looking as any sophist.

To start with a comparison. Herodotus introduces his account of Egypt with an apology or disclaimer (2.3.2):

> τὰ μέν νυν θεῖα τῶν ἀπηγημάτων οἷα ἤκουον, οὐκ εἰμὶ πρόθυμος ἐξηγέεσθαι, ἔξω ἢ τὰ οὐνόματα αὐτῶν μοῦνον, νομίζων πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἴσον περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπίστασθαι (and cf. 2.65.2).

And in recounting what seems to have been a supernatural occurrence at Plataea, he apologizes for his conjectural explanation with the words (9.65.2): δοκέω δέ, εἴ τι περὶ τῶν θείων πρηγμάτων δοκέειν δεῖ ... What Herodotus seems to indicate in his Egyptian introduction[152] is that he will refrain from relating anything to do with the metaphysical world (*ta theia* as opposed to *ta anthrōpēia*), with only the 'necessary exceptions'; that is, he will allow himself to talk about the cults of the gods (temples, festivals, etc.) and their names[153], which belong to man's sphere of activity, but not about the genealogies, myths, attributes and forms of divine beings, which belong to a different order. About this order every man knows equally much - that is, equally little: there can be no certain knowledge of such things. The parallel with Protagoras' famous introduction to his *Peri theōn* is clear (DK 80B4): περὶ μὲν θεῶν οὐκ ἔχω εἰδέναι, οὔθ᾽ ὡς εἰσὶν οὔθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ᾽ ὁποῖοί τινες ἰδέαν; πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι ἥ τ᾽ ἀδηλότης καὶ βραχὺς ὢν ὁ βίος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου[154]. Opinion may be divided as to whether Protagoras is claiming that it is impossible to know 'that' the gods exist or not, or 'how' the gods exist or not; the former seems at first sight more natural, but the latter seems rather more probable in the context: the appearance of the gods (*idea*) is a redundant consideration, if their very existence is being called into dispute. But it remains clear that he is disqualifying any discussion of the attributes and characteristics of the divine as matters it is futile to speculate about, given the limitations of human experience and perception.

How Protagoras managed to find anything to say after this is a matter of some doubt[154a], but it is possible that he went on to discuss 'religion' as a component of human culture and a historical phenomenon, as Herodotus does in Book Two. This after all is what interests the other sophistic writers: Prodicus seems to have written some sort of anthropological study of the history of religion[155], and Democritus, demonstrably not an atheist, gave an account of how men came to conceive of their gods through fears of such things as storms and lightning[156]. Clearly, too, sophistic naturalistic anthropology helped stimulate the revolt from the traditional mythical conception of the gods and the growth of the idea of an abstract divine (*theion* as opposed to *theos!*), about which speculation was impossible. Certainly Xenophanes and other Ionians had helped to start this rationalist revolt[157], but the reductionist historical analysis of the development of religion(s) is clearly new and sophistic.

It is just this anthropological speculation we find in Herodotus, especially in the lengthy discussion of Egyptian religion and the origins of Greek religion in Book Two - side by side with an unwillingness to talk about *ta theia*, and about matters directly relating to the divine itself, rather than religion as social phenomenon. Herodotus allows himself to discuss how the Greeks came to have the religion they do, including a speculative reconstruction of the 'Pelasgian' religion of Greece before the advent of Egyptian gods[158] and the elaborations of the poets[159].

The most startling example of Herodotean rationalism in these matters is his discussion of Poseidon and the mountains of Thessaly (7.129.4). The Thessalians themselves say that 'Poseidon' created the exit through the mountains for the river Peneios:

> οἰκότα λέγοντες. ὅστις γὰρ νομίζει Ποσειδέωνα τὴν γῆν σείειν καὶ
> τὰ διεστῶτα ὑπὸ σεισμοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ τούτου ἔργα εἶναι, καὶ ἂν ἐκεῖνο
> ἰδὼν φαίη Ποσειδέωνα ποιῆσαι· ἔστι γὰρ σεισμοῦ ἔργον, ὡς ἐμοὶ
> ἐφαίνετο εἶναι, ἡ διάστασις τῶν ὀρέων.

It seems probable that these words presuppose the theory that the gods of Greek religion have acquired their attributes and functions by a historical process: men saw the natural phenomena of storms, earthquakes, and the like, and came to think of them as the actions of gods - just as in Democritus' theory of the origins of religion[160]. Of course Herodotus does not commit himself to either view: and he certainly does not share the Democritean view that the gods do not influence the world we live in. For example, he seems to accept that the same Poseidon was responsible for the tidal wave that destroyed the army of Artabazos (8.129.3), though he does not there go beyond commending this interpretation of the Potideans. And yet it remains that he feels it necessary here to take up a rationalist position: not everything in the world, he concedes, is the result of divine intervention; there is room for naturalistic explanation, and we should not forget that religious beliefs have a historical origin. As a rule we might suggest that Herodotus sees divine intervention as essentially limited to particulars, not as covering every imaginable event in the world. Thus the tidal wave which engulfed the Persians was a particular intervention to secure a particular moral equilibrium, the punishment of a Persian impiety; and that is the nature of all Herodotus' divine interventions. Aside from such particulars, the world behaves as a place where natural laws hold sway, where natural phenomena have natural causes, as with the earthquake in Thessaly, although those natural laws are probably put there by the gods in the first place, as we shall now see.

A more remarkable passage still is one where it is possible to see a close link with Protagoras. In describing how the poisonous snakes of Arabia are (like vipers) prevented from increasing to unmanageable numbers, Herodotus comments (3.108.2):

> καί κως τοῦ θείου ἡ προνοίη, ὥσπερ καὶ οἰκός ἐστι, ἐοῦσα σοφή, ὅσα μὲν ψυχήν τε δειλὰ καὶ ἐδώδιμα, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα πολύγονα πεποίηκε, ἵνα μὴ ἐπιλίπηι κατεσθιόμενα, ὅσα δὲ σχέτλια καὶ ἀνιηρά, ὀλιγόγονα.

Accordingly hares are allowed a twofold parturition, while lion-cubs scratch their mothers' wombs to prevent them giving birth a second time.

The theory of a balance of nature is advanced in remarkably similar terms by 'Protagoras' in Plato's dialogue (321B) in describing Epimetheus' disposition of the original world[161]:

> ἔστι δ᾽ οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζώιων ἄλλων βοράν· καὶ τοῖς μὲν ὀλιγογονίαν πρόσῆψε, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀναλισκομένοις ὑπὸ τούτων πολυγονίαν, σωτηρίαν τῶι γένει πορίζων.

The coincidence[162] ought to suggest that Herodotus owes this argument to Protagoras[163]. And if this (admittedly tentative) conjecture is right, have we any reason to suppose that Protagoras did not admit '*divine pronoia*' as Herodotus does here? If we were to accept that the *Peri theōn* fragment merely rules out speculation about the attributes of the gods, rather than denying that we can know whether or not they exist at all (above), then we might be in a position to accept that Protagoras admitted some form of divine legislation *in the begininning*, whatever he thought about the subsequent involvement of the gods with the world. It seems perverse (and it is hard to think of any reason why it should be so) to accept that Plato's 'parody' represents Protagoras' thought in any usable particulars, and deny that the divine legislation, without which the myth makes little sense, is either merely 'conventional' or a Platonic intrusion. Protagoras' thesis is that the materials for the good life exist in nature, including man's share both of the divine mind (322A) and his sense of *aidōs* and *dikē* (322CD): what explanation of these things did Protagoras offer if not 'divine forethought'?

We should remember that in addition to the atheists among the sophists (the minority?), there were those who argued that the gods did exist but that they took no notice of human affairs (cf. e.g. Pl.Legg.888C; with Thrasymachus DK 85B8). Democritus was, of course, an extreme exponent of this view, but no doubt there were considerable variations. There was quite possibly a debate among such as held this view as to the precise extent of the gods' involvement with the world, or lack of it.

Where Herodotus stands in all this is not hard to decide: clearly he envisages considerable involvement in human affairs by the gods, not merely in giving the world its original shape (3.108.2), but in influencing the course of human lives. We might even wish to argue that his explicit examples of divine intervention are meant as a contribution to this very debate on the extent and nature of divine involvement in human affairs. There is certainly something peculiarly pointed about such references: e.g. 7.137.1 and 2,

> δῆλον ὦν μοι ὅτι θεῖον ἐγένετο τὸ πρῆγμα (sc. the wrath of Talthybios);
> or 9.100.2, δῆλα δὴ πολλοῖσι τεκμηρίοισί ἐστι τὰ θεῖα τῶν πρηγμάτων
> (of the news of Plataea reaching Mykale the same day)[164].

It is as if Herodotus were saying, against the agnosticism of the sophists, that there are indeed moments when the workings of the divine can be recognized - even though we cannot be sure that we understand what sort of thing the divine actually is and what it does.

The remarkably prevalent view that Herodotus is a strict determinist is wholly unsatisfactory. The 'gods' are involved in human affairs only in certain broad respects: not every detail of human action is planned by the divine. So, for example, the gods send the storm which equalizes the Greek and Persian fleets off Euboea (8.13): ἐποιέετό τε πᾶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅκως ἂν ἐξισωθείη τῶι Ἑλληνικῶι τὸ Περσικὸν μηδὲ πολλῶι πλέον εἴη. But this means that it was left up to the Greeks to make use of the advantage given them. The Greeks have to make the choice to stand and fight: the intervention of the gods is not enough on its own to guarantee the outcome[165]. In other words the gods make plans only in broad outline and it is left to men to make entirely free decisions within that framework. The rationalist knows this to be nonsensical, but it is not a primitive view[166].

Another consideration which could affect our understanding of the supernatural in Herodotus, is that his attitude to and interest in dreams, prophecies and portents may itself be 'sophistic'. The reason for such a suggestion is the (admittedly surprising) evidence of the work of Antiphon[167] on dreams and portents (DK II.367.16ff; cf. 87A1), apparently entitled *Peri kriseōs oneirōn*[168]. This work seems from the various references to have offered some sort of commentary on the symbolic language of dreams and portents (e.g. B78, on the *sēpia*), as well as testing out alternative explanations of the same phenomena against one another. So for example Cicero records two Antiphontic interpretations, which answer the patient's simplistic assumptions with more complicated 'true' explanations (DK II.368.9ff = Cic.de Div.II.70): for example, the man who dreamt before setting out for Olympia that he was driving in a four-horse chariot, was told by an interpreter that he would win, the speed and strength of the horses signifying as much, but by Antiphon that he would lose, inasmuch as 'four were running before him'. Herodotus is similarly interested in 'alternative explanations', where the recipient of a dream or portent leaps to a simplistic or misguided conclusion, as for example in his account of the portent of the horse which gave birth to a hare, as Xerxes set out for Europe (7.57.1f): εὐσύμβλητον ὧν τῆιδε ἐγένετο, ὅτι ἔμελλε μὲν ἐλᾶν στρατιὴν ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα Ξέρξης ἀγαυρότατα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπέστατα, ὀπίσω δὲ περὶ ἑωυτοῦ τρέχων ἥξειν ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν χῶρον. No doubt it would be rash to make too much of this: there is nothing especially new about the interpretation of dreams (cf. e.g. Aesch.Choe.523ff, esp.540ff; and, of course, Homer), and we do not know enough about the rationale of Antiphon's work to do any more than guess at his likeness to Herodotus[169].

But other evidence showing that Herodotus' interest in portents and prophecies is not necessarily a primitive or 'archaic' preoccupation is perhaps offered by Thucydides. Marinatos[170] has recently argued with considerable plausibility "that Thucydides accepted oracles, like his pious contemporaries Herodotus and Sophocles (?), and indeed that he exhibited a consistent interest in oracular puzzles and their correct interpretation".

So, for example, Thucydides comments on the misreading by Cylon of the oracle which told him he could successfully stage a coup 'during the great festival of Zeus' (1.126.5-6), which he wrongly took to mean Olympia rather than the Athenian Diasia: the way in which Thucydides describes Cylon's mistake (νομίσας ... οὔτε κατενόησε ... δοκῶν δὲ ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκειν) clearly seems to show that he believes there was a 'right interpretation' which Cylon missed, that is, that the oracle was reliable, if characteristically ambiguous. In other words, like Herodotus and Antiphon, Thucydides is interested to contrast the mistaken interpretations of both amateurs and the traditional *khrēsmologoi* (cf. 2.17.2, 54.2-3; 5.26.3) with the correct interpretations of those who understand the ambiguities and enigmas of oracles: the correct resolution of such riddles was a novel intellectual challenge.

These various considerations suggest that we are in danger of overestimating the divide between Herodotus and the sophists in the matter of religion and the supernatural through an inclination to credit the sophists with a greater rationalism than they by and large professed[171]. On the other hand we may be in a better position to understand Herodotus' explicit statements about the divine if we see him as participating in a modern debate on the extent to which the gods influence the natural and human worlds[171a].

(G) Psychology and Human Nature.

The sophistic movement established man himself as a field for systematic intellectual inquiry for the first time. Besides introducing the new social sciences of politics, sociology, anthropology and the rest, this made room for a serious analytical approach to human psychology[172]. Man's social institutions, even his moral behaviour, could be best approached if attention was paid to the peculiarities of his psychological make-up, his needs and desires, his passions and affections, and to discovering which of these belonged to him by nature and which by conditioning, how and to what extent each could be controlled.

Nowhere is the impact of these inquiries clearer to us than in Thucydides, to whose work the study of human psychology is of very great importance, and where the term *physis anthrōpou* has an almost technical psychological sense (cf. 3.82.2; with n.3, above). The study of states of hope and fear, of the acquisitive drive in man (*pleonexia*), of the conflict of passion and reason - this gives the work an underlying unity. It can scarcely be doubted that Thucydides owes this interest to the sophistic movement. Not much parallel material has survived in the fragments of the sophists themselves, though Democritus is clearly much concerned in his ethical work to illuminate questions of human psychology, as is Antiphon, not least in the remarkable papyrus fragments of the *Peri alētheias*. Although it was not until Aristotle's Ethics that there appeared what could be called a wholly systematic study of the subject, it remains true that the discussion was already well under way in the late 5thc[173].

Detailed discussion of Herodotus' interest in psychology need not be undertaken here, since we have already devoted a chapter to illustrating this (cf. Ch.I.i and ii). But we should remind ourselves that what we saw as Herodotus' concern with paradoxical or 'contradictory' psychology may well reflect the sophistic taste for instructive surprises. We might however observe that, quite as much as Thucydides, Herodotus is concerned to explore the themes of *elpis*, *epithymia*, the pursuit of *kerdos* and the acquisitive drive in man. Certainly the moral expressed by Artabanus (7.18.2), ὡς κακὸν εἴη τὸ πολλῶν ἐπιθυμέειν , does indeed go back as far as the poetry of Solon (esp. F13 West); but it is equally clear that discussion of the ambition for gain, pleonexia, acquired a new currency in the sophistic period, in the context of the debate on the ethics of giving reign to one's natural desires. So, for example, Callicles argues that nature itself shows that it is just that the better man should 'have more' (pleon ekhein) than the worse and the stronger than the weaker, taking as his text the history of the Persian empire (Pl.Gorg.483CD): ἐπεὶ ποίωι δικαίωι χρώμενος Ξέρξης ἐπὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα ἐστράτευσεν ἢ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ ἐπὶ Σκύθας; It is tempting to see a historical stimulus here: from the middle of the 5thc with the experience of the rise of the Athenian empire so hard on the heels of the Persian empire, it began to seem that the desire of the stronger to impose his will on the weaker was a law of human psychology, that it would always happen that success bred the appetite for power and profit, an appetite that once fed became insatiable. Or as Democritus observed (DK 68B219): χρημάτων ὄρεξις, ἢν μὴ ὁρίζηται κόρωι, πενίης ἐσχάτης πολλὸν χαλεπωτέρη· μέζονες γὰρ ὀρέξεις μέζονας ἐνδείας ποιεῦσιν[174]. As we said earlier (cf. Ch.II.iii.K), Herodotus may even have chosen his subject with half a mind to illustrate the growth of the Athenian empire: at any rate, it would be curious if in this major respect he did not exhibit the influence he shows so often elsewhere[175].

(H) The Political Debate.

Political theory is another area in which there is no evidence of any systematic inquiry before the sophistic period[176]; it has even been suggested that the concept of the constitution, and in particular the tripartite opposition of democracy, oligarchy, monarchy (tyranny), only came into being in the political consciousness of Greece after the Persian Wars and with the rise of the Athenian democracy[177]. Here at least Herodotus' involvement with the sophistic movement has been widely recognized. Here too, however, commentators have tended to argue that sophistic influence is confined to isolated and unusual passages, rather than having contributed to the overall conception of the work.

The influence of so-called 'metabolē-theory' in Herodotus, the idea of the evolution of constitutions through distinct phases, has been clearly observed by Ryffel in his important study of the idea[178]. We have already discussed in detail the various prominent examples, notably of the rise of tyranny out of political anarchy, as in the cases of Peisistratus (1.59.2ff with Ch.II.ii.A), Deioces (1.96.1ff with Ch.II.i.B.1) and even Darius (cf. 3.80.1), where we noted the correspondences between Herodotus and the Anon.Iambl. on anomia, but also in the history of the Lycurgan reforms (1.65.1ff with Ch.II.i.A.2). The theory is explicitly voiced by Darius in the constitution debate (3.82.3f), where it is explained that both oligarchy and democracy degenerate 'inevitably' into stasis, out of which emerges tyranny (Ryffel pp.64ff).

The constitution debate itself is almost universally agreed to be sophistic in some sense - even by those who obstinately hold that it is a genuine report[179]. Thus not only has the content been judged sophistic, for example, from clear correspondences with the 'constitution debate' in Euripides' Supplices (399ff)[180], but also the form of the debate, with its three mutually opposed speeches, which has been thought, for example, to recall the Kataballontes Logoi of Protagoras. To these considerations we may add that of style, which is appropriately sophistic in the pervasive brevity of the cola (statistically unparalleled in Herodotus) and the accumulation of such decorative figures as isokolon, paronomasia, parechesis. However the very obviously sophistic character of the debate has led many critics to regard it as an alien body in Herodotus' work, to the extent that some have even followed Maass in suggesting that Herodotus has substantially 'copied out' some sophistic source (usually Protagoras!). This results in, or possibly stems from, the view that the 'sophistic elements' in Herodotus are not typical of him (or even not his work!), he being 'essentially' an 'archaic' writer. But this interpretation of the debate is wholly unsatisfactory. As we have seen in the rest of this chapter, there is scarcely any area of Herodotus' work which has not in some way been influenced by the sophistic hand, we have seen again and again how the constitution debate is undoubtedly an integral part of the work's conception, a reference-point for the running debate on democracy, tyranny and freedom[181]. If Herodotus adopts a virtuoso sophistic manner here, it is because this one of the work's main set pieces.

In short the constitution debate is not the exception it has been thought to be, but rather the proof that Herodotus' thought is indeed 'essentially' sophistic: the very corner-stone of the work's construction turns out to be made of the same material as the whole. The same considerations apply to the chapters on Peisistratus, Deioces, Lycurgus and the rest, which we saw exhibited a fundamental unity of thought: Herodotus has clearly planned the work's basic structure out of sophistic materials. Herodotus' thinking on the subject of freedom, on eunomia and anomia, on democracy and tyranny, even on empire, forms one single monumental conception, in which sophistic thought is the essential catalyst. We may return here to the argument of Ch.II.i, where it was claimed that Herodotus made use of various transformations of a historical model in the reconstruction of certain of the work's most important historical turning-points, and that he was led to adopt this method through his experience of particular developments of the sophistic movement, which for the first time set about exploring systematically the social and political functioning of human society. The model, as we saw, incorporated elements of such sophistic theoretical discussion, elements whose influence we can trace variously in Plato's Protagoras, in the Anonymous Iamblichi, and in Thucydides' Archaeology.

Conclusion.

My argument in this chapter has a strong cumulative force, even if some of the details adduced cannot be pressed as far as others. There is clear evidence that Herodotus shows the influence of the sophistic movement in his range of interests, in his attitudes to particular isssues of the sophistic debate, on culture, on the functioning of social and political systems, on human nature itself, which led Herodotus to conceive and shape his work in that way that he has. The sophistic movement is thus surely a primary influence of the work, as important for the evolution of Herodotus' thought and method as are Homer and the epic in literary matters. It may be thought that this makes Herodotus merely _sophistikos_ rather than _sophistēs_, a Thucydides rather than a Protagoras; but in certain respects he is very close to a particular type of sophist, the type exemplified by Hippias, who is not so much concerned to explore the finer subtleties of abstract philosophy or the resources of rhetoric in the manner of Protagoras or Gorgias, as to set himself up as a master of all knowledge, catering for the widest possible audience, but bringing to his researches an appreciation of sophistic issues, problems and methods. If Hippias, with his _arkhaiologia_, his ethnography (?), and the rest, can count as a sophist, then surely Herodotus could count as well. It is not, of course, necessary to force this extreme position: it is enough that we realize that in certain fundamental qualities of his work Herodotus shows himself a participant in the sophistic debate.

APPENDICES

Appendix I: Milesian Politics.

Herodotus' introduction to the Ionian revolt attaches blame to Naxos and Miletus for disturbing the peace of Asia Minor (5.28): μετὰ δὲ οὐ πολλὸν χρόνον ἄνεσις κακῶν ἦν, καὶ ἤρχετο τὸ δεύτερον ἐκ Νάξου τε καὶ Μιλήτου Ἴωσι γίνεσθαι κακά. Before describing the circumstances which caused these two cities to provoke the revolt, however, he indulges in a longish explanatory parenthesis:

> τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἡ Νάξος εὐδαιμονίηι τῶν νήσων προέφερε, τοῦτο δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον ἡ Μίλητος αὐτή τε ἑωυτῆς μάλιστα δὴ τότε ἀκμάσασα καὶ δὴ καὶ τῆς Ἰωνίης ἦν πρόσχημα, κατύπερθε δὲ τούτων ἐπὶ δύο γενεὰς ἀνδρῶν νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, μέχρι οὗ μιν Πάριοι κατήρτισαν ...

And there follows at some length the account of the Parian settlement (cf. 5.30.1, completing the inner ring: Πάριοι μέν νυν Μιλησίους οὕτω κατήρτισαν), before the narrative is properly begun: τότε δὲ ἐκ τουτέων τῶν πολίων ὧδε ἤρχετο κακὰ γίνεσθαι τῆι Ἰωνίηι[1].

It seems clear from the run of the passage, and notably the connecting particle (γάρ), that Herodotus means the reader to infer that it was the contemporaneous prosperity (κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον) of Naxos and Miletus that brought them into conflict with each other[2] and ultimately provoked the Ionian revolt. It also seems clear that we are meant to infer that Herodotus' digression on the way the Parians brought political stability to Miletus is integral to his argument: Miletus' confidence and ambition which led her to stir up the revolt is the product of this successful political change, in the same way that, rather more vaguely, Naxos' prosperity is an encouragement to her to get involved in the preliminary conflict (5.30f). Herodotus' treatment of Miletus here clearly reveals the application of the same theoretical model that we observed in his treatment of 'post-Lycurgan Sparta' (cf. Ch.II.i.A.2): a political change, here the Parian settlement, there the Lycurgan reforms, brings a condition of prosperity (cf. μάλιστα δὴ τότε ἀκμάσασα; with 1.66.1, ἀνά τε ἔδραμον αὐτίκα καὶ εὐθενέθησαν), in both cases after a period of acute stasis (cf. νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι; with 1.65.2, κακονομώτατοι ἦσαν σχεδὸν πάντων Ἑλλήνων); and with the confidence inspired by that new prosperity comes the inclination to interfere in the affairs of neighbours and to make some show of strength: here the interference in the domestic politics of Naxos, and subsequently the incitement to the rest of Ionia to revolt from Persia, there Sparta's campaigns against the Arcadians[3]. That it was in fact Aristagoras, and later Histiaios, who were responsible for leading the Milesians into these ambitious enterprises (cf. Ch.II.iii.B) does not seem to divert Herodotus from this interpretation which so well serves his purposes in this introduction.

My contention is that in the present passage Herodotus can be detected forcing the facts to fit his model rather than adapting or distorting the model in the interests of the facts, in other words following the same procedure we discovered in his treatment of Lycurgus' reforms. It is, of course, possible to argue that Herodotus merely reports the 'prosperity' of Miletus as an economic fact, whether rightly or wrongly[4], and so to claim that the digression on the Parian settlement is not meant to be brought into conjunction with the fact of Miletus' prosperity at all, that it is merely an interesting tale without any logical relation to the context (cf. e.g. Macan, ad loc.: "Herodotus has here, in his way, brought in a good story which has no obvious bearing on the situation"). If this were so, then some of the force of my arguments here would be lost; but I cannot believe that Herodotus would really insert such a confusing excursus at such a point without warning the reader against the natural inference from his order of exposition, that the escape from stasis did indeed have something to do with enabling Miletus to reach its akme at just this moment. In my opinion, Herodotus has a clear reason for wanting the reader to make this inference, without, however, drawing it out explicitly himself.

If then we are meant to understand that Miletus' prosperity had a political cause, and that it was the Parian settlement which (like the reforms of Lycurgus at Sparta) stimulated Miletus' rise to her akme just at the time of the Naxian campaign, we are faced with considerable problems of historical reconstruction[5]. Let us consider first a curious problem of chronological compression which Herodotus' version seems to produce for us. Herodotus seems to be implying that in the period before the Naxian campaign and Miletus' akme (κατύπερθε δὲ τούτων) there was a period of severe stasis 'for two generations, until the Parians put and end to it'. On independent evidence we will need to set a terminus post quem for the start of that period of stasis at the death of the tyrant Thrasybulus, who as a younger contemporary of Periander probably died between 585 and 580[6]; but even if we assume the stasis to have set in immediately he died[7], two generations on from that (on Herodotus' own reckoning of 3 generations to a century: cf. 2.142.2)[8] would bring us down to c. 520-15 at the very least. On Herodotus' own evidence, however, Histiaios is either already tyrant in these years or just about to be, as shown by his arguments to the tyrants at the Danube bridge (c. 514-3?)[8a] at 4.137.2: τῆς Δαρείου δὲ δυνάμιος καταιρεθείσης οὔτε αὐτὸς Μιλησίων οἷός τε ἔσεσθαι ἄρχειν οὔτε ἀλλὸν οὐδένα οὐδαμῶν[9]. Perhaps on its own this compression is not too serious: Herodotus may here be working with shorter generations, or he may have a higher date for Thrasybulus' death; but taken in conjunction with the question of the Parian settlement it is surely syptomatic of a more serious anomaly in Herodotus' reconstruction.

Clearly it is impossible that the Parians should have been called into Miletus while Histiaios was tyrant, not least since the Parian settlement so obviously provides a 'constitution' (see below) in which there is no room for a tyrant[10]. That means, however, that the settlement must be squeezed into the chronologically minute space that we have seen is left if we count two generations after the death of Thrasybulus. This consideration brings home the full problem of Herodotus' account[11]: we are asked to believe that the Parian settlement brought stability after a long period of stasis, thus enabling Miletus to reach her akme at the time of the Naxian campaign (c.500); and yet this is to gloss over the fact, which Herodotus does not want us to appreciate here apparently, that the akme was, in fact, reached under a period of tyranny, first Histiaios and then Aristagoras. In failing to mention Histiaios here, and in speaking of Milesian politics only in terms of the constitutional Parian settlement, Herodotus is surely hoping that the reader will not spot the gap in the argument: clearly he can have had no wish to suggest that the responsibility for Miletus' prosperity rested on Histiaios of all people, who never once in Herodotus' view acted in the interests of anyone except himself (cf. Ch.II.iii.B). On the other hand if we do remember Histiaios, we must conclude that Herodotus is disguising the fact that the Parian settlement was singularly unsuccessful except in the very shortest term, in that the constitution it provided for was succeeded almost immediately by a tyranny; that being so, Herodotus' use of that settlement to suggest how Miletus secured political stability and hence prosperity must be felt to be distinctly fraudulent.

I believe, however, that the answer is not that Herodotus knew the Parian settlement to have taken place in or before the last quarter of the 6thc and is thus suppressing the knowledge that is was unsuccessful, but rather that he did not believe the period of stasis to belong to the 6thc at all, and that he is deceiving the reader into inferring that it did.

We need first to re-examine Herodotus' text to see whether it supports this view of his intentions. The temporal indicator κατύπερθε δὲ τούτων which links the Parian settlement narrative to that of the Naxian campaign is on this view deliberately elusive. Clearly Herodotus wants the reader to infer a close relation in time between these events, so as to give the impression that Milesian prosperity was caused by the settlement; indeed if such a relation cannot be inferred, then the narrative of the settlement becomes a confusing excursus with no obvious connexion. But if there did exist such a close relation in time why does Herodotus not tell us of it, since it would so clearly serve his purposes to do so? In other words this is the same chronological evasion as we detected in Herodotus' account of the Lycurgan reforms (cf. Ch.II.i.A.2), where, important as it was to know the length of time between the reforms and Sparta's Arcadian imperialism, Herodotus offered at best only a vague impression, seemingly calculated to mislead. It will also be significant for Herodotus' intentions here that he avoids any mention of how and when the Parian settlement gave way to the tyranny of Histiaios, knowing, as I believe he does, that this was not the way things happened at all - although it should be conceded that he would equally have wanted to suppress the process by which the Parian settlement gave way to a tyranny, if he knew or believed that to have been the real scenario.

Whether or not Herodotus knew it to be so - and I claim that he did - there is a strong case for supposing that in historical fact the Parian settlement belonged to the period before Thrasybulus, that is to the 7thc. That is not, however, the view of modern historians, who are in general agreement that the period of stasis described by Herodotus belongs between Thrasybulus and Histiaios, and that this is the meaning of his text[12]. Admittedly this reconstruction is not dependent on Herodotus alone, but the supporting evidence is hardly decisive:

(a) Plutarch in the Greek Questions (Qu.Gr.32, Mor.298CD: τίνες οι ᾽Αειναῦται παρα Μιλησιοις;) speaks of a time when 'the tyrants with Thoas and Damasenor' were abolished (τῶν περὶ Θόάντα καὶ Δαμασήνορα τυράννῶν καταλυθέντων)[13] and two factions held sway in the city, one under the name Ploutis, the other Kheiromakha. The dynatoi gained the upper hand and took control of affairs through their faction: their most important decisions were taken out at sea aboard their ships, and for this reason they were called the Aeinautai (i.e. on this interpretation, 'Perpetual Sailors')[13a].

(b) Athenaeus preserves a fragment of Heraclides Ponticus (Athen.523Fff= Heracl.F50 Wehrli), which describes how Miletus succumbed to luxury and political strife. The men of property were at strife with the demotai, whom they dubbed Gergithes; at first the demos prevailed, exiled the rich and took horrible revenge on their children by trampling them to death with oxen. Then the rich gained the ascendancy and set alight their enemies as human torches. The god showed his displeasure in a series of portents and repelled the victorious faction from his shrine, explaining his anger in an oracle: καί μοι Γεργίθων τε φόνος μέλει ἀπτολεμίστων / πισσηρῶν τε μόρος καὶ δένδρεον αἰεὶ ἀθαλλές.

(c) If we accept that Phocylides of Miletus was a historical figure and a Milesian poet of the 6thc, then it may be possible, as West has recently done[14], to interpret the fragments of his poetry as evidence of stasis in 6thc Miletus.

(d) The Milesian list of Aisymnētai tōn Molpōn (Milet I.iii.122-8; pp.241ff), which appears to date from 525-4 by backward counting from later synchronisms, was taken by von Gaertringen[15] as evidence of a new political order instituted at just this time.

These pieces of evidence are decidedly weak as a corroboration of a 6thc stasis and a Parian settlement in the last 25 years on the century. Plutarch and Heraclides are, of course, without any indication of date and I shall be suggesting a much more suitable context for them later; that leaves only Phocylides and the list of Aisymnetai.

There are a number of possible objections to using Phocylides as evidence. In the first place, we cannot be sure that we are actually dealing with a single historical poet, rather than a name haphazardly linked with any stray gnomic hexameters (or even some elegiacs; cf. West, IEG II.93, for the testimonia)[16]. West has recently argued a case for the historical identity of Phocylides, on the basis that comparison with the gnomic literature of other cultures helps to reveal the unity of the Phocylidean corpus; but he admits (p.165) that "it is equally possible that

(Phocylides) was someone known at the time and place of composition as a sage of a former generation". As for the fragments in question, there is perhaps no compelling reason to use them as West does, even if we do accept that they were all written in and about Miletus. Their content is in most respects so general and their thought so commonplace that we need not attach them to any particular political situation[16a]: they talk of the folly of aristocrats (F4 Bergk), of the advantages to a city of kosmos (F5); they warn of the danger of malicious rumours (F6), advise acquiring wealth through farming (F7), comment on how men are not always as reliable as they seem (F9), equate arete with the possession of a sound livelihood (F10), and praise the mean rank in a city (F12). The respect for a man who looks after his livelihood is as old as Hesiod, and need by no means be brought into conjunction with Herodotus' Parian settlement with its preferential treatment for good farmers; the political advice too is commonplace enough and need not presuppose any particular régime as its context. Comparison with Theognis reveals a significant absence in these verses of any mention of political conflict, of rich and poor, khrestoi and poneroi, the whole language of factions, which we surely want to hear if they are to be evidence of 6thc Milesian stasis. If we are to keep West's view of these fragments, there is no objection to giving them a 7thc context, before the tyranny of Thrasybulus, where I shall be putting Herodotus' stasis and Parian settlement; in other words, West's correspondences between Phocylides and Herodotus could thus be allowed to stand. The ancient synchronism between Phocylides and Theognis is no obstacle to this view, based as it surely is on perceived similarities between them[17]. The only internal evidence for Phocylides' date is the mention of the folly of Nineveh in F5 (Bergk), which if we accept the somewhat fragile argument that it did not impinge on the Greek consciousness until it fell in 612[18], gives a terminus post quem for that fragment which is still some few years before the accession-date of Thrasybulus[19].

The list of Aisymnetai, on the other hand, turns out to be of little value for reconstructing Milesian politics at this date. Even if we accept the highly questionable restoration of the text of the Athenian Regulations of 450-49 (SEG X.14.7) to give us the προσ[εταιροι μολπων and the α̣ι̣[συμνητης negotiating with the Athenian arkhontes[20], we cannot be sure that the political functions of this clearly religious body extended back to the late 6thc. There are severe problems in the way of interpreting the list as a political document in this earliest period, notably its failure to show any sign of interruption with the Persian evacuation of the city in 494, or to show any change with the tyranny of Histiaos[21], Aristagoras' suppression of the tyranny and the institution of isonomia at the start of the Ionian revolt (cf. Hdt 5.37.2), or with any of the political changes of the 5thc (see below). The political life of Miletus in the early period of the list is marked by discontinuity, while the list shows only continuity: it is hard to see any other explanation of this than that the list has no political or constitutional significance in this period[22].

Thus a 6thc Milesian stasis and Parian settlement receive no firm support from any of this supplementary evidence. More seriously, however, there is a decisive objection to such a reconstruction, as we can see from a consideration of Miletus' external relations in this period. Herodotus himself gives us clear evidence of a treaty of immunity for Miletus negotiated with Alyattes of Lydia by the Milesian tyrant Thrasybulus (cf. 1.22.4), an agreement which seems to have continued under Croesus, since it is still in place when Cyrus renews it after the Persian takeover (1.141.4): πρὸς μούνους γὰρ τούτους (sc. the Milesians alone of the Ionians) ὅρκιον Κῦρος ἐποιήσατο ἐπ' οἷσί περ ὁ Λῦδός (and cf. 1.169.2). If, however, the death of Thrasybulus brought not only a change of régime in Miletus (i.e. something other than tyranny) but also a period of violent political unrest (νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι), which continued unchecked until around 525, in other words if we accept the orthodox reconstruction of 6thc Milesian politics, it is impossible to understand (a) why the Lydians would have wanted to maintain their old relations with the city and (b) why the Persians, too, when they took over control of Ionia, should have been prepared to single out Miletus for preferential diplomatic treatment. We know that Persia accepted and understood tyranny, and even perhaps on occasion actively promoted it in the interests of better imperial administration[23]: surely the only reason that Cyrus was prepared to be indulgent towards Miletus, in the same way as the Lydians had been, was that the Milesian tyranny, reliable, tractable, and sympathetic to eastern imperialism, had been preserved unchanged since the death of Thrasybulus? Persia was certainly happy to leave the administration of Babylon virtually unchanged after the fall of Nabonidus, as the documents show[24], but that was because its stability and loyalty to the empire could be guaranteed. By contrast the Behistun Inscription shows clearly enough how concerned Darius was at his accession at any suggestion of political unrest within the empire, even in places where there was no direct threat of secession[25]. Later still, Artaxerxes is persuaded to prevent the Jews doing any further work on the temple at Jerusalem, begun under the auspices of Cyrus, when he is told of the unsettled record of the city (Ezra 4.19): "And I commanded, and search was made, and it is found that this city of old time hath made insurrection against kings, and that rebellion and sedition have been made therein". If even unjust suspicion such as this can withdraw the king's favour from a city of the empire, it is surely unimaginable that Cyrus will have been prepared to enter into a special friendship with Miletus at the time of conquest, if there was at this moment anything remotely resembling the extremely violent stasis described by Herodotus, when at any moment a rival faction could have gained ground on its opponents and threatened secession from the empire[25a].

If we accept that there was indeed tyranny at Miletus continually through the 6thc down to the Ionian revolt, we have the obvious explanation of how it is that Herodotus can introduce Histiaios at the Danube bridge as a tyrant who claims he owes his position to Persian support (cf. 4.137.2, above) at just the time when we would otherwise have expected the Parian settlement to have begun operating at Miletus. On the orthodox scheme there is no very easy answer to this problem[26]. The present explanation might also make sense of Histiaios' abdication in favour of Aristagoras, while he went off to pursue other prizes (cf. 5.30.2, τῆς δὲ Μιλήτου ετύγχανε ἐπίτροπος ἐὼν Ἀρισταγόρης ὁ Μολπαγόρεω, γαμβρός τε ἐὼν καὶ ἀνεψιὸς Ἱστιαίου τοῦ Λυσαγόρεω, τὸν ὁ Δαρεῖος ἐν Σούσοισι κατεῖχε ; cf. 5.11.2, for Histiaios' ambitions in Myrkinos). This looks very much like the luxury of a well-established tyranny, rather than something a tyrant would be likely to do only a few years after having seized power at the expense of a constitutional government.

We must turn now to consider how well a 7thc *stasis* and Parian settlement might work. We cannot say with any confidence when or how the aristocracy of the Neleids fell, nor are the accounts of Nicolaus of Damascus and Konon clearly enough rooted in history to enable us to determine what followed that collapse[27]. That what followed was two generations of *stasis* before the emergence of Thrasybulus cannot by any means be ruled out, especially if the dynasty fell as early as the beginning of the 7thc. A Parian settlement of the late 7thc, giving way to the tyranny of Thrasybulus some years after, has on the other hand positive recommendations. There is, for example, evidence of diplomatic activity, including arbitration, by the Parians in this period, which certainly adds colour to the view that their present intervention in Miletus belongs there too. The famous story of Koiranos (variously a Milesian or a Parian) appears in its earliest form in Archilochus (F192 West; cf. SEG XV.518): the dramatic setting of his well-known rescue by dolphins appears to have been that of an embassy sailing between Miletus and Paros[28], which we could conjecturally identify with some stage of our Parian arbitration. In addition we know of another example of Parian arbitration belonging to the 7thc (cf. Plut. Qu.Gr.30.298AB), when, together with the Erythraeans and the Samians, they arbitrated between the Andrians and the Chalcidians. Was the 7thc thus perhaps the heyday of Parian diplomacy[29]? The argument is admittedly fragile - there is no reason why Paros should not have played the role of arbiter in the 6thc - but the fact that the two securely datable archaic Parian arbitrations (and one actually involving Miletus!) belong to the 7thc, while none is apparently known from the 6thc, except supposedly this Herodotean arbitration, is one certainly worth one remarking where there is so little other evidence.

We are on firmer ground, however, when we come to consider the content of the arbitration itself. It is hard to accept that the constitution the arbitrators set up here, with its extremely primitive appearance, can have been a constructive political solution as late as the end of the 6thc. The Parians select those landowners whose farms they deem to be the best kept and assign them political office (5.29.2):

> τούτους μὲν τὴν πόλιν νέμειν τῶν εὗρον τοὺς ἀγροὺς εὖ ἐξεργασμένους· δοκέειν γὰρ ἔφασαν καὶ τῶν δημοσίων οὕτω δή σφεας ἐπιμελήσεσθαι ὥσπερ τῶν σφετέρων.

It is the clear implication of the Greek that these selected landowners are to be the sovereign body under the new dispensation. It could be argued, on a literal interpretation of the story, that these are equally likely to be small, efficient hoplite farmers as to be prosperous aristocrats; but it is surely more credible in Greek political terms that what the Parians established was a high property qualification, assessing not the efficiency of the farmers' methods (a somewhat unquantifiable standard for these purposes) but the absolute value of their estates, either in terms of productivity (the annual yield) or, less likely given the implications of the story, in terms of their total assets. If this is the right interpretation, a constitution which puts political power exlusively into the hands of the prosperous landowners could well have been still acceptable in the late 7thc, but surely seems hard to swallow in the late 6thc, after a period in which throughout Greece the hoplite classes had begun to secure substantial political recognition. The anachronism becomes clear when we compare the character of the Chian constitution of 575-50, substantially earlier than the earliest date offered for a 6thc Parian constitution at Miletus, if not quite as early as was once thought[30]. The constitution at Chios is clearly quite politically advanced, bearing comparison even with Solon's provision for Athens[31]. Here we find a considerable measure of responsiblilty devolved to a boulē dēmosiē (cf. Meiggs.Lewis no.8), which is to "transact the other affairs of the demos, and to [pass?] final [judgement on?] all verdicts which have been appealed against during the past month" (Jeffery's translation and supplements). On the other hand the primitive character of the Parian constitution is revealed by comparison with the reconstructed archaic constitution of Phocaea's colony of Massalia (founded c.600)[32] where we find a council (synedrion) of 600 timoukhoi, "who held their seat for life and were all heads of houses, the eldest son succeeding to the seat on his father's death - a rigid principle which may have been based on inalienable kleroi which had been allotted to the original settlement of 600 males"[33]. This procedure indeed offers us a very probable parallel to the Parian constitution: we may imagine that the Parians selected a synedrion on some principle of land-ownership, presumably a very narrow property qualification, that is by a once for all decision on who should count as timoukhoi, and that they proposed the same hereditary principle for the replacement of office-holders on the death of the original appointees. In other words the Parian constitution is narrow, aristocratic in character, and surely primitive, scarcely an acceptable or even conceivable solution to a 6thc *stasis*. It could be that we are wrong to expect a linear progression in Greek political history, but it is hard to believe that the Parians thought they would be able to get away with a settlement, an arbitration (!), which so flagrantly ignored the currents of political change: well over 50 years before at Athens Solon had seen that there would have to be a mediation between the wishes of the *plousioi* and the aspirations of the *penētes*. Assuming the arbitration to have taken place towards the end of the 7thc, it is much easier to understand how the hoplite majority can have been so ignored: it might even have been that the arbitration was between rival aristocratic factions such as those of Megakles and Lykurgus at Athens before the tyranny of Peisisrtatus (cf. Hdt 1.59.3), where, had it not been for the *prostasia* of Peisistratus, the *penētes* (assuming this to be the composition of the *hyperakrioi* of his faction) would not have received recognition, presumably even despite the earlier arbitration of Solon.

If the Parian solution would have been unacceptable to the parties to a 6thc *stasis*, to the extent that it could never have been ratified, let alone instituted at such a time, it is also of such a kind that it would have soon led to abuse in the 7thc. It is not difficult to see how such a system of government could have given way before very long to the tyranny of Thrasybulus. Aristotle describes the rise of a Milesian tyranny, usually presumed to be that of Thrasybulus[34], out of too narrow a constitution (Ar.Pol.1305A15ff):

> ἐγίγνοντο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας
> ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, ὥσπερ ἐν Μιλήτωι τῆς πρυτανείας (πολλῶν
> γὰρ ἦν καὶ μεγάλων κύριος ὁ πρύτανις).

It would not be difficult to interpret the office of *prytanis* here in the light of the Parian constitution, assuming our analogy with the Massalian system is correct. At Massalia, according to Strabo (IV.5 p.179), executive power was put into the hands of a committee of fifteen:

πάλιν δὲ τῶν πεντεκαίδεκα προκάθηνται τρεῖς οἱ πλεῖστον ἰσχύοντες, τούτων δὲ εἷς. The single all-powerful president at the top of this pyramidal structure could well have existed in the Parian constitution for Miletus, and hence be the same as Aristotle's *prytanis*. We may compare further the 7thc constitution of Dreros (Meiggs/Lewis no.2), which makes provision against just the danger that was apparently actualized at Miletus, setting limits to the presidential office of *kosmos* to avoid the possibility of the office being used as a stepping-stone to tyranny or to bolster the power of an individual family.

Cumulatively the case for transferring Herodotus' *stasis* and Parian settlement to the 7thc is clearly very strong: not only is there a powerful objection to admitting a 6thc stasis, but a number of arguments combine to make a 7thc settlement highly attractive. It should, however, be conceded that a possible objection to a continuous 6thc tyranny is provided by a passage of Aristotle's Politics (1315B11ff), which argues that tyranny (like oligarchy) is the most short-lived form of government. There follows a league-table of the longest tyrannies, with the Orthagorids at Sicyon in first place (100 years), second the Cypselids at Corinth (73 years and 6 months), and in third place the Peisistratids at Athens - although this tyranny was not continuous (35 years in power). The tyranny at Syracuse (Gelon, Hieron, Thrasybulus) lasted only 18 years: αἱ δὲ πολλαὶ τῶν τυραννίδων ὀλιγοχρόνιαι πᾶσαι γεγόνασι παντελῶς. Clearly no allowance is made here for a Milesian tyranny of a little over a hundred years. There is, however, reason to doubt that Aristotle is the author of this section and clear evidence that the list of tyrannies is hardly authorative, omitting as it does any mention of the long-lived tyrannies of Aristotle's own time, such as that of Dionysios I and his succerssors at Syracuse[34a]. We are not well informed about Ionian tyrannies and there may well have been exceptions to this rule of brevity in that part of the world, especially given its special relations with the empires of the East. Ephesus, for example, a city comparable with Miletus in its ability to work with Lydians and Persians, seems to have been ruled by tyrants for most if not all of the 6thc. The dynasty was founded by Pythagoras in the late 7thc (cf. Baton FGH 268F3), who is followed by Melas, then Pindaros, who married the daughter of Alyattes; and the tyranny is still in evidence in the second half of the 6thc, when Komas and Athenagoras exiled the poet Hipponax (cf. Suda s.v.; West, IEG I.109), and we cannot be sure that it did not last even down to the Ionian revolt[34b]. This Ephesian tyranny is thus not only a long-lived exception ignored by the Politics passage, it is also a useful analogy to our reconstruction of a continuous 6thc Milesian tyranny.

What then remains to be done with the evidence for Milesian stasis offered by Plutarch and Heraclides? The simplest answer would be to assign them along with Herodotus to the 7thc; but we should not neglect another possibility, viz. that they belong in the 5thc political history of Miletus.

Our evidence for 5thc stasis in Miletus derives otherwise almost exclusively from evidence relating to its relations with the Athenian empire[35]:

> (a) the earliest quota-lists, which show Miletus itself failing to make a payment in 454-3, but in the same year show contributions from *Milesioi ekhs Lero* and *Milesioi ek Teikhiousses*, as well as *Neopolitai ek Mileto en Leukoi Akroterioi* (cf. List I.vi.19-22; with B.D. Meritt, Hesperia 41 (1972) 406ff). There are no Milesian entries for the following year and it is not until 452-1 (List III. ii.23) that Miletus herself re-appears. The natural conclusion is that Miletus was in revolt from 454-3 or some time before, until 452-1, and that exiled Athenian loyalists made payments in the first year from their various places of refuge[36].
>
> (b) the Athenian regulations for Miletus of 450-49 (SEG X.14: ATL II.D11), in which five Athenian magistrates (*arkhontes*) are appointed, possibly to serve alongside the Aisymnetes and Prosetairoi (lines 4-7), though the restoration is very doubtful (cf. n.20,

above). The decree also mentions a garrison (line 77), though it is not clear whether it is imposed now for the first time or had figured in an earlier settlement[37]. Again the regulations show that Miletus has been in revolt, though the decree itself must be an afterthought of some kind after an earlier suppression of the revolt indicated by the quota-lists (see above).

(c) Ps.-Xenoph.Athpol.3.11, speaks of occasions when Athens has 'tried to choose the *beltistoi*', as in Boeotia and Miletus: τοῦτο δὲ ὅτε Μιλησίων εἵλοντο τοὺς βελτίστους, ἐντὸς ὀλίγου χρόνου ἀποστάντες τὸν δῆμον κατέκοψαν.

(d) the Milesian banishment decree (Milet I.iv.187: Meiggs/Lewis no.43)[38], which outlaws ' ... the sons(s) of Nympharetos, together with Alkimos and Kresophontes, the sons of Stratonax' (and possibly others, missing from the start of the inscription), with their descendants: φεύγεν τὴν ἐπ᾽ αἵ[ματι φυγὲν] καὶ αὐτὸς [κα]ὶ ἐκγόνος. A price is put on their heads of 100 staters to be paid from the property of Nympharetos, and if they are captured, the *epimenioi* are to put them to death or pay heavy fines. The decree has no secure date: epigraphically (e.g. Rehm, Meiggs) it may be as early as c.470, but historical contexts have been found either in the late 450's (Meiggs, ATL) or the late 440's (Earp, Barron).

(e) At some stage Miletus was given a democratic constitution on the Athenian model, as shown by a decree of 380-79 with Epistates and Prytaneis bearing Athenian tribe-names (cf. Wiegand, SBBA (1901) 911), and by a more recently discovered *lex sacra* for the cults of Poseidon Helikonios, plausibly assigned by Hermann (Klio 52 (1970) 163ff) to 437-6, which shares the same form of prescript. The evidence that Miletus' tribute was halved to 5 talents from 443-2 onwards, there having been no payments recorded before that since 447-6[39], has been taken to show that the democracy was set up by Athens c.443 after a second revolt (Earp pp.144-5, Barron p.2). Meiggs however has argued (AE 564) that it seems improbable that Athens would have allowed Miletus to defy her for 3 years after the crisis of 446, having reduced the Euboeans and made peace with Sparta, and that the non-payments of the 3rd assessment period should be accounted for by the paying-off of an indemnity (as happened at Chalcis and Eretria), arguing that the change in constitution came instead in 447. Gehrke denies that the tribute-lists can be taken to show any second revolt (pp.27ff) and claims that the democracy was imposed in the Athenian regulations of 450-49, which other commentators are agreed reflects Athens' 'choice of oligarchy' as reported by Ps.-Xenophon.

(f) Barron, following an ingenious study of the banishment decree by Glotz (CRAI (1906) 511ff), argues that Milesian stasis in this period revolved around an oligarchy which claimed Neleid descent. The case depends (i) on identifying the names Alkimos and Kresphontes from the decree as good Neleid names (hardly decisive?), and (ii) on correspondences of wording between the text of the decree and the passage in Nicolaus (FGH 90F53: cf. n.27, above), which describes the overthrow of the Neleids seemingly at the end of the monarchy. On this view Nicolaus' account proceeds from a confusion and conflation of two events, the early (7thc) expulsion of the Neleid monarchy and a later 5thc expulsion following some sort of treasonable activity by a 'Neleid faction'[40]. Barron argues that this thesis helps explain why Athens should have taken the unusual step recorded by Ps.-Xenophon of supporting an oligarchy at Miletus (p.6): if this was a Neleid faction, the reason will have been Athenian propaganda of the Ionian migration, Codrus of Athens being the father of the Neileus who founded Miletus (cf. Hdt 9.97).

Two points of interpretation need to be made before we can attempt a reconstruction. (i) We would naturally expect the Athenian-loyalists in exile in Leros and Teikhioussa in 454-3 to be an exiled democratic faction and that the party conducting the revolt was an oligarchy of some description: only democrats could reasonably be expected to feel such an urgent necessity to remind the Athenians of their loyalty and equally a democratic revolt goes somewhat against the grain[41]. (ii) The banishment decree is usually taken to belong to the occasion of the expulsion of the oligarch rebellious against Athens either after the first revolt[42] or the second (c.443-2)[43]. There is however a clear objection to this view, namely that the decree makes no mention of Athens in any way whatsoever, The regulations for Erythrai (Meiggs/Lewis no.40), with which the present decree is often compared[44], reveal all too clearly what is missing here (esp. lines 26ff):

> τῶν φυγάδον ϰαταδέχσομαι οὐδὲ ἕνα οὔτ[...8...] ἄλλοι πείσομαι τῶν
> ἐς Μέδος φευγόντον ἄνευ τε͂ς βολε͂ς τε͂ς Ἀθηναίον ϰαὶ το͂ δέμο οὐδὲ
> το͂ν μενόντον ἐχσελο͂ ἄνευ τῆς βολε͂ς τε͂ς Ἀθηναίον ϰαὶ το͂ δέμο.

It is surely inconceivable that the Milesian decree, if it has anything at all to do with an Athenian settlement, should be later in date than this Erythrai decree and neither be an Athenian enactment (as the other is) nor show any sign of Athenian intervention, especially when we consider the character of the regulations of 450-49. The decree must accordingly belong before the period of Athenian involvement in Milesian politics[45].

Let us now turn to our reconstruction, making use of Heraclides and Plutarch where appropriate. The banishment decree can be taken first: the fact that the order of expulsion includes the exiles' descendants, as well as the heavy sanctions for all involved, show that the crime is likely to be treason, and it is a reasonable inference that this took the form of 'tyranny'[46]. That being so we may interpret the decree in the light of Plutarch's reference to 'the tyrants around Thoas and Damasenor' (τῶν περὶ Θόαντα καὶ Δαμασήνορα τυράννων καταλυθέντων). Certainly we do not find these names on the inscription. although by chance the traces happen to allow us to restore Δαμα]σ[ηνορα τ]ο[ν] Νυμφαρετο. We do not know, however, how many names have been lost before the first preserved; and it may equally be that Thoas and Damasenor had themselves already killed in the coup which deposed them[47]. We cannot lay much stress, if any, on the appearance of the democratic-sounding *epimenioi* in this inscription and thus argue that the government which passed the decree must have been democratic[48]. Certainly we do not find here the Aisymnetes and Proserairoi who sound oligarchic, but can we be sure they have a political role even in SEG X.14 (cf. n.20)? Moreover it is unnecessary to suppose that, when one faction gained the ascendancy over the other, this was actually accompanied by a change in the structure of government, rather than that the personnel occupying the main offices of state was changed. Thus we may argue from Plutarch that the fall of the 'tyrants' was followed by an ascendancy of the oligarchs - unless by a compression he has left out a previous democratic ascendancy.

For the second phase of the *stasis* we may turn to Heraclides and posit an ascendancy of the democrats, involving the exile of the *plousioi* and the gruesome revenge taken against their children. This in turn leads to a third stage, the re-establishment of the oligarchs, as also set out by Heraclides. This will then coincide with the first revolt of Miletus from Athens as indicated in our other evidence. It may be that it was disagreement over whether to send ships to help in the Egyptian expedition in 460 (cf. ATL III.253) that precipitated the oligarchic coup and led to the revolt from Athens which shows up in the first quota-lists of 454-3 (cf. (a) above). The democrats escaped to exile in

Leros and Teikhioussa and continued from there to remind the Athenians of their loyalty by sending payments of their own to the League chest.

The quota-lists show that the revolt is suppressed in 452-51 (cf. (a) above), and depending on our interpretation of the Athenian decree of 450-49 Athens either restores the democracy or allows for the continued existence of the oligarchy. Gehrke's objections to accepting that it is an oligarchy that Athens negotiates with here amount to nothing more than the case against the restoration of Aisymnetes and Prosetairoi in the text of the decree (lines 6-7: cf. n.20, above); but this is not enough in itself to rule out an oligarchy here, and we may wish to accept Meiggs' observation that the use of the word *sōphronō[si* (line 82) is an appeal to an oligarchic virtue (Cf. AE 563). In my view it is easiest to understand the introduction of *arkhontes* and garrison in the decree as provisions to ensure the loyalty of a potentially suspect oligarchy rather than to supervise a recently established democracy: in particular it is curious that there should be no mention in the decree of an *episkopos* (cf. n.41, above), whom we normally expect to find superintending the setting-up and teething troubles of new constitutions in the allied states. It is of course of considerable importance for my reconstruction that Athens should be allowing the continued existence of an oligarchy here, in order to give some reference to Ps.-Xenophon's report of how the Athenians 'chose the *beltistoi* at Miletus' (Cf. (C) above). I believe it is only appropriate to talk about Athens 'choosing' the oligarchic party (*heilonto*) if she had made a positive decision to favour oligarchs when she might have given her support to a democratic party already in existence[49]; and on this reconstruction that is surely what she is doing on the evidence of the regulations decree. In other words sooner than proceed heavy-handedly by restoring the original democracy or imposing a new one on the Athenian model, Athens decides to try to make the existing oligarchy work[50]. The reason for this may be Barron's (and Glotz') theory of Ionian (Neleid) propaganda; but equally we could argue either that Athens still considered it necessary to keep up the pretence of a League and was not yet ready to try direct political interference with such a powerful ally, or that Athenians of 'oligarchic' temperament managed to persuade the assembly to give the beltistoi another chance (cf. Ps.-Xenoph.I.14).

If this is the reference of Ps.Xenophon (3.11), it is clear that Athens' velvet-glove approach soon failed: "within a short time the oligarchs revolted and cut down the demos". The puzzle, as Earp sees it (p.145, n.10), of "why, if the oligarchs were already in control, any bloodshed should have been necessary" can perhaps be explained by assuming that the oligarchy which the Athenians sanctioned after suppressing the revolt was a reasonably broad-based one, giving the demos a blocking-vote for example. At any rate it is not difficult on this reconstruction to see the reason for the second revolt: the oligarchs will have felt that the coming of peace with Persia (449) removed any further justification for loyalty to Athens; possibly the demotai tried to block this secession but discovered that with the Athenian garrison no longer in place[51] there was no-one to protect them against their enemies and there ensued another violent pogrom. If we allow that Heraclides has perhaps conflated two consecutive cases of oligarchic revenge, it will be possible to parallel Ps.-Xenophon's katekopsan in the details of his graphic account (see above).

Finally the oligarchy is at last removed by a further Athenian settlement after the suppression of the revolt in either c.446-5 or c.443-2 (cf. (E) above), at which time Athens installs a democracy on the model of her own, realizing the failure of her earlier diplomacy.

There are three further considerations in favour of referring Plutarch and Heraclides to this period of Milesian stasis. (i) Jeffery argues that if Plutarch's democratic faction Kheiromakha is to denote the party of 'Labour', as seems to be required by the lexicographers[52], it seems out of place in the 6thc. Her answer was to render it 'Close-fighting' (i.e. presumably the hoplite party); but perhaps this is an indication that the account belongs to the 5thc rather than the 6thc. (ii) Parke observed of the oracle reported in Heraclides that it looks anachronistic for the 6thc[53]: we would expect the shrine concerned to have been Branchidae if the account belonged in the 6thc, but the verse form of the oracle suggests Delphi; hence either the oracle is a 5th or 4thc forgery, as Parke argued, or it shows that the account belongs in the 5thc, when we can more easily understand why the Milesians should have consulted Delphi rather than Branchidae, which had been in abeyance since its sack by the Persians. (iii) If Barron (with Glotz) is right that the oligarchic party advertised themselves as Neleids, that is Milesians of pure Hellenic stock (cf. (f) above), we can readily accomodate the evidence of Heraclides and the Suda[54] that the plousioi taunted the demos with the name Gergithes (or Gergethes), for the Gergithes were thought to be the last remnants of the ancient Teukroi (cf. Hdt 5.122.2 and 7.43.2): in other words the demotai are cast as Milesians of impure stock, cross-bred with the natives of Asia Minor[55]. This is, however, not the strongest of inferences: that the oligarchs were Neleids at all depends only on the combination of the banishment decree with Nicolaus, which is far from certain.

It should be stressed that the evidence of Plutarch and Heraclides is highly flexible and moreover historically imprecise, so that we need not be too concerned that all the details do not match the suggested context precisely. Neither account is of course principally interested in the precise historical context: Heraclides is being a moralist (cf.

e.g. F49 Wehrli, for a similar treatment of the fate of Sybaris), Plutarch an antiquarian. Thus there is no reason to be surprised that neither mentions any involvement of Athens in this Milesian stasis, especially since on the above reconstruction both are talking about the period before the first intervention of Athens in 452-1, so that the only possible omission is the mention that the ascendancy of the oligarchs coincided with the secession from the Athenian alliance, which is not really relevant to either author's theme.

Appendix II: Esoteric sources and 'polis-traditions' in Herodotus' Greek history.

There has been much speculation on the subject of Herodotus' sources for his Greek histories, but the emphasis has almost invariably been on arguing from Herodotus' text to the identity of his informants, while the question of what can be inferred from extra-Herodotean evidence about the probable character of his sources has been almost entirely ignored. Certainly Jacoby achieved a significant advance by establishing that Herodotus' sources were in principle, if not invariably, likely to be oral traditions, and that he did not, as was supposed by many earlier writers, depend at all heavily on written sources[1]. But Jacoby reached this conclusion (now generally accepted) without touching on the external evidence for the question of Herodotus' sources, beyond inquiring to what extent he did or did not depend on any given written texts; Jacoby's account of what oral traditions were available to Herodotus' makes no use of any other evidence than the text of Herodotus itself. His _Quellenanalyse des Werkes_[2] offers a description of the sources for the entire work, passage by passage, which in common with almost all source-criticism of Herodotus, depends on a highly questionable method: where Herodotus does not explicitly cite his source (but cf. below and App.III), his text is analysed for whatever it can show of 'bias', and the 'likeliest' representative of that bias is postulated as Herodotus' informant. Thus if Herodotus' account of Thermophylae shows the Spartans in a heroic light and seems in any way to devalue the achievement of the other Greeks, his source must be Spartan (but cf. Ch.II.iii n.124); if the narrative of the liberation of Athens seems to highlight the role of the Alcmeonids at the expense of any other party, the Alcmeonids must be his source (but cf. Ch.II.ii.B-C). This proceeding is in my view seriously flawed, and, because of its tendency to restrict the inquiry to the text of Herodotus, it has reached some anomalous results: the hypothesis of an

Alcmeonid source for the liberation of Athens appears to be held in defiance both of external evidence for what the Alcmeonids might have told Herodotus and of what is shown by a close reading of the text on which it purports to be based. There are, moreover, clear methodological objections. In the first place, we often cannot be sure that it is the influence of any one source rather than any other that led to the version Herodotus actually sets out. For example, is his version of Marathon to be explained as a tradition of either of the families of (i) Miltiades or (ii) Callimachus, or is it merely an 'Athenian version'? The 'bias' of the account, if such there is, could be due to any of these three sources - or indeed any combination of them, or even others we cannot know. Secondly, there is a tendency to postulate only single sources and to ignore the possibility that Herodotus is selecting and combining from among several different versions he has heard of any particular event. Finally, and most important, as I have argued repeatedly in the text, it is quite possible, and in many cases probable, that it is Herodotus' own doing that a particular passage shows the 'bias' which the traditional criticism treats as a pointer to the identity of his informant(s). I would argue that Herodotus can take neutral reports and give them any 'bias' he chooses (cf. e.g. Plutarch on his kakoētheia), as well as neutralising positive or negative bias, or even turning it into its opposite. This being so, the precarious constructions of the traditional criticism are even further undermined: before we can start looking for the biasses of Herodotus' informants, we must make a determined effort to see whether Herodotus has his own reasons for interpreting his evidence in one way rather than another and to see what he has added (or taken away) on his own initiative (e.g. motivation, speeches, etc.), and finally we should allow that Herodotus may have 'interpreted' in ways and according to principles or ideas that we cannot necessarily identify as his own.

I would suggest that, if real progress is to be made in the investigation of Herodotus' sources, inference from the text as to the identity of individual witnesses should give way to a much more broadly based inquiry: we need to inquire into the nature of Herodotus' sources in general, what sort of traditions might have been available to him, how they came into being, how they were kept in circulation, how they came to Herodotus' attention. In other words, it is necessary to see what can be done to reconstruct Greek oral traditions, a question for which Herodotus' own text should not be the primary evidence. Herodotus offers the largest amount of evidence for such a reconstruction, but for the reasons outlined above, not by any means the clearest evidence. Clearly this new approach will not yield the answers to all the questions we want to ask, but it should be possible to establish certain basic principles from which to generalize - and on occasion to suggest the form that particular traditions are likely to have taken or not taken and to set those reconstructions against the narratives of Herodotus (cf. Ch.II.B, for the Alcmeonid tradition).

Any systematic treatment of this question is, of course, quite beyond the scope of this appendix: I offer here merely some assorted doubts and observations designed to give colour to some of my arguments in the main text. I would contend that in principle and for the greatest part of the work, and in particular the Greek sections thereof, Herodotus relies on the traditions he designates as those of 'the Athenians', 'the Spartans', 'the Aeginetans', or whoever it might be, and which I would designate 'polis-traditions', both for convenience and because I would suggest the term explains their true nature. The often invoked esoteric sources for his Greek history, on the other hand, whether priestly traditions or family traditions, are in my view of much smaller importance.

It has been argued by Finley, however, that such esoteric sources, the great families of the Greek states and in a different way the priestly offices of the shrines such as Delphi or Eleusis, were the only important repositories of knowledge about Greek history and that other sources are of no account[3]. Only such groups, it is argued, have the necessary interest in ensuring that stories relevant to the preservation of their status or power within the society are remembered, and the necessary influence to impress them on the rest of society. Some anthropological studies of oral tradition, those of the 'structural-functional' type, have argued that in pre-literate or semi-literate societies the community as a whole and groups within it as a rule remember things about the past because they need to remember them, that family traditions, group traditions, state traditions, are preserved in order to ensure the stability of rights and privileges for the group doing the remembering[4].

The functional theory of oral memory attempts to exclude all other explanations, but this seems singularly artificial. Even if the theory is correct - and certainly common sense suggests that in the case of certain types of memory in certain societies it ought to be -, there are clearly other reasons why groups, or even individuals, should preserve traditions, such as antiquarian or even aesthetic interest[5]. I would argue, however, that Finley's picture of Greek oral tradition, at least insofar as it has relevance to the study of Herodotus' sources, is misleading not so much because the functional theory itself does not work as because it puts a false emphasis on the evidence we in fact possess. I shall suggest in a moment that the functional theory may in part help us to understand the notion of 'polis-traditions'; but I must first examine the case for Greek esoteric traditions.

I start with priestly traditions, a problem that is relevant to our inquiry since the shrine of Delphi has been thought to represent a relatively frequent unstated source for Herodotus, not only for Greek but also for Lydian history[6]. Did the priests at Delphi have an interest in preserving historical memories, and if so what sort of memories will those have been?

It is worth observing first of all that Delphic priests would not have stood to gain political advantage by the preservation and re-iteration of historical traditions: the success of the shrine lay in its political adaptability[7], not in claiming for itself a role in the political life of Greece. On the other hand, it did have a clear interest in influencing the Greek world in respect of the traditions about its own oracle, an interest which resulted in the interpretation, distortion and even invention of Delphic oracular responses with a view to preserving the authority and credibility of Delphic Apollo. It need not follow, however, that the priests preserved extensive oral or written records, even for these purposes[8]; indeed such historical knowledge as was current at Delphi need not even have exceeded the common stock of Greek popular memory on any matters not directly connected with the administration of the shrine. It is worth noting that even in such matters as knowledge about dedications made at the shrine there seems to have been little organized Delphic record[8a]. Thus, for example, Herodotus says he thinks the Delphians (see below) may be right when they claim that the silver kreter dedicated by Croesus was the work of Theodoros of Samos, "it being an impressive piece of work" (cf. 1.51.3): Herodotus clearly implies that his guess may well be as good as theirs, which seems to suggest that he has little confidence in their authority. This seems to be further illustrated in what he goes on to say of the golden sprinkler which he takes to be another dedication of Croesus; he claims that it is falsely inscribed as being a dedication of the Spartans, and that some Delphian, whose name he knows but will not divulge, added the inscription to please them (51.3-4). Again Herodotus does not show any sign of being impressed with the authority of the Delphic traditon - although he could, of course, simply be trying to show us his critical independence from a source on which he has relied quite heavily; at any rate, it is surely significant that he does not show to Delphic priests any of the respect he so strikingly affects in the case of his Egyptian 'priests' (See below; but cf. App.III). It seems likely then that insofar as Delphic officials remembered any traditions in their official capacity those were almost exclusively traditions to do with the administration of the shrine in quite a narrow sense: thus I imagine that, though there may have been traditions about the dedications made by Gyges and Croesus at the shrine these will not have included any detailed knowledge of the historical background, which Herodotus picked up in Ionia rather than mainland Greece - although Bacchylides shows the story of Croesus at least to be more widely known.

It is thus significant that while Herodotus makes extensive reference to priestly informants in his account of Egypt (but cf. App.III)[9], only once is any Greek priestly source quoted (2.55.1ff, the promanties at Dodona, for the tradition about the foundation of their own oracle!)[10]. As for Delphi itself, Herodotus nowhere explicitly cites priestly officials, and even the citation of hoi Delphoi, which may or may not refer to priests or other officials of the shrine but is surely striking for not doing so clearly, only occurs a meagre four times (1.14.3 and 51.3 (above), for the treasures of Gyges and Croesus; 1.20, for the oracle given to Alyattes; 8.39.1, on the heroes Phylakos and Autonoos and the Persian attack on Delphi[11]). The Delphians are nowhere cited for any extended historical tradition and certainly for no tradition not directly connected with the shrine. Clearly this evidence is somewhat indecisive, although it is more worrying on the traditional view that the source-citations are meant to give a reasonably accurate picture of Herodotus' researches; if we accept the arguments of Fehling (cf. App.III) that the source-citations are to a great degree a fiction, and in particular that Herodotus tends to observe a rule of citing the 'nearest or most obvious source' (der Wahl der nächstliegenden Quellen), we ought perhaps to admit that they offer little access to his real informants. I take it, however, that Herodotus' failure to cite Delphi or any other Greek priestly witness for his Greek history reflects an appreciation that in the Greek world religious centres were not recognized as repositories of secular historical traditions - at any rate, not in anything like the degree that they were, or rather could be believed to be in Egypt, where Herodotus accepts that their authority ought to be paramount on any question of Egyptian culture and history.

It is worth mentioning finally Jacoby's massive refutation of Wilamowitz' theory of the sources for the Atthidographers: Jacoby showed that there was no reason to suppose that the Eupatrid exegetai at Athens preserved any historical information in their hieratic records, and certainly no evidence that such historical notes formed the source material for the earliest writers of Athenian history[12]. It is not clear how far we may generalize from this instance and argue that no priests anywhere in the Greek world ever preserved either in writing or in oral memory any secular historical traditions; but I would suggest that in talking of Greek priestly traditions for Greek history, as Finley does, we may be importing a notion that misconceives the status and function of 'priests' in Greek culture of the period[13].

The importance of family traditions as sources for Herodotus is even less easy to decide. It is, of course, true that Greek families did have an interest in keeping alive the memory of distinguished ancestors (cf. e.g. Pl.Charm.157Dff, etc.), and indeed we find Andocides, for example, using the record of his great-grandfather, Leogoras, in the period of the tyranny (cf. Andoc.2.26, with 1.106) as evidence that he himself is dēmotikos, i.e. for political capital. The political and social importance of the genos remained considerable even in the radical democracy at Athens[14], and certain types of family tradition, especially those which showed the family to have been good servants of the state, are likely to have been preserved for public rehearsal, as in the Andocides example, while others will have been preserved simply as evidence of the kleos or even simply the blue-bloodedness of the family. The family traditions that Herodotus would have used, if any, would have been of the former variety which related the family's history to the history of the state, or even of Greece as a whole - the Alcmeonid excursus is the only sign that he used the latter sort, and even there his evidence need by no means inevitably derive from family tradition (see below). The sort of traditions, however, which bridge the gap between family and state clearly presuppose that others will be familiar with the broad outlines of the events to which they refer; and this being so, we must be clear that it is indeed family traditions that Herodotus is using rather than the background knowledge that they presuppose, i.e. the 'polis-tradition'.

Herodotus certainly did use 'family traditions' of a kind, but, if we may trust the picture he seems to want to convey, he did so only very rarely and cautiously. He cites at 3.55.2 an interview he had with Archias of Pitana, whose grandfather had distinguished himself in the campaign against Samos. This later Archias, says Herodotus, particularly honoured the Samians as his xeinoi, and he told him that this father had been called Samios on account of the place of his father's heroic death; he explained also that he honoured the Samians because they had buried his grandfather at public expense. There are a number of observations to be made about this passage. Herodotus does not name Archias as the source for the Samian campaign, or indeed as a witness for any other event but the death of his grandfather and the honours paid to him by the Samians; to judge from Herodotus' introduction to this narrative, we are meant to understand (whether it is true or not!) that he has balanced the evidence of the Samians (as a whole!) against that of the Spartans (as a whole!) in order to build up his account of the campaign (cf. 3.47.1). The traditional source-criticism might argue that Archias is indeed a major source and has provided Herodotus with much else in his account; but the inference is not a reliable one and it is clearly not one that Herodotus himself wants us to make.

It may be right to understand here that he would in principle not construct major narratives on the evidence of a single witness, but would need to arrive at least at a consensus 'polis-tradition' (see above), both presumably for reasons of reliability and perhaps, since one man could not remember everything about a battle or a campaign or anything of that scale, simply for reasons of completeness.

The same considerations seems to apply to other citations of single witnesses[15]. Archias, we should notice, is not even cited for the fact that his grandfather fought valiantly - Herodotus pretends to know that already (cf. 3.55.1) - but merely for the information that the Samians gave him a burial at public expense and that for that reason there exists even now a xeinia between Archias' family and the Samians. It would seem that if single witnesses are to be used for anything but matters of incidental detail, their reports need to be substantiated. Thus, as we shall see in App.III, the story offered by the grammatistēs at Sais on the source of the Nile (2.28) does not receive Herodotus' stamp of approval because it is the view of a single witness which he cannot confirm with reference to a consensus (cf. 2.28.1 and 29.1). Herodotus' attitude seems to be that single witnesses, whatever their possible authority, represent either partisan, distorted or simply partial views of the truth: thus they may be cited for details, decorative anecdotes, isolated scraps of information which may give colour to a particular account, but not for major accounts themselves (cf. e.g. Tymnes, the steward of Ariapeithes at 4.76.6, cited only for details of the family's connexions of Anacharsis; Thersandros at 9.16.1 and 5, cited only for the Theban dinner party, not for any other story from Plataea)[16].

It may, of course, be the case after all that Herodotus does occasionally depend on such witnesses for major accounts, and is merely deceiving the reader with a pretence of having researched consensus 'polis-traditions'. Certainly it seems likely that in some cases the 'polis-citations' are themselves source-fictions (cf. e.g. Ch.II.i, n.35); but it would not follow even from this that polis-citations in reality 'disguise' citations of family traditions, as argued, for example, by Jacoby[17]. We must surely allow that it makes sense for Herodotus to have depended in principle on polis-traditions, since these are all he cites for major Greek narratives: significantly no 'family' is ever actually *cited* for any detail, however small, and indeed all the single witnesses named in the work have been mentioned above, so few is their number. If it was Herodotus' regular practice to consult family traditions, it is strange that he should have let slip no clear indication that he ever did so, or only one if we count Archias. It would be foolish to deny that he was occasionally supplied details, as in the case of Archias, by descendants of those involved in the events he narrates: but there is a considerable difference between this and a dependence on family traditions for major narratives, in the way that, for example, we are asked to believe that he depends exclusively on a Philaid account of the Danube-bridge episode (cf. Ch.I.i.6) or substantially on an Alcmeonid account for the liberation of Athens (cf. Ch.II.ii.B). We may add that, apart from these two examples, which on close examination prove illusory, there are very seldom any signs at all of Herodotus consistently favouring one individual or family in dealing with any particular state.

It remains to ask whether it makes any sense to talk of polis-traditions, which could on an extreme view be argued to be merely another variety of consistent source-fiction (cf. the Egyptian priests in App.III). We may start by observing that Herodotus' practice is followed, whether consciously or not, by Thucydides on those few occasions where he makes reference to sources (e.g. 2.5.6: Θηβαῖοι μὲν ταῦτα λέγουσι ... Πλαταιῆς δ' οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσι ...; cf. also e.g. 'the Athenians' at 6.54.1, with 1.20.2). This may be sufficient to prove that Herodotus' polis-citations can have a valid reference - unless we argue that Thucydides too is dependent on family traditions! As for what may be meant by a polis-tradition and how such a thing might be transmitted, we may turn back to the functional model. It may be possible to argue that the citizen-body of the typical Greek state, i.e. those who made up the voters in the assembly, had an interest in preserving particular memories about its past in order to perpetuate its corporate identity, its corporate status and privileges, both in the sense of its being a political unit within the state (threatened from above by aristocrats and from below by those excluded from the franchise) and as representing the interests of the state in relation to the outside world.

This is, of course, to simplify somewhat: the citizen-body at Athens, to take the only state for which we have enough evidence, was an aggregate of different classes, the aristocratic *Hippeis*, the middle class of hoplites, and the thetes, and there was no doubt a fairly wide spectrum of political opinion to be garnered from these various groups[18]. It is nevertheless a reasonable contention that the middle ground was occupied by the majority, that in principle, when the state was at its most stable, there was the sort of democratic solidarity which Pericles in Thucydides' Funeral Oration singles out as the strength of the city (Thucdy.2.37.1-3). Certainly there may have been disaffected aristocrats resentful of this solidarity (cf. the Old Oligarch, distinctly addressing himself to a minority audience, if he is writing for Athenians at all), but it was very likely not until the rise of the aggressive democracy of Cleon, Hyperbolus and the rest that the aristocrats began in any number to disassociate their own interests from the interests of the democracy[19]. It may be that Athens is something of a special case in this respect - although it is surely probable that

Sparta too in a different way was a state closely bound together by civic solidarity through the very narrowness and precariousness of its political life[20].

What polis-traditions can we identify at Athens and how are we to see them perpetuated? It may be that comedy and oratory are not merely our main sources for such traditions but also among the means by which they were kept alive in the corporate consciousness[21]. Both make clear reference to certain 'charter myths' of the democracy, most obviously (a) the liberation of Athens from the Peisistratids, i.e. the tyrannicide-myth (cf. e.g. Lysistr.632f), which we also find celebrated in public dedications and decrees (cf. Ch.II.ii.B), and (b) the Persian Wars, and especially Marathon and Salamis; such myths are typically rehearsed either when the rights of the citizen-body are threatened from within (e.g. by corrupt officials or oligarchic conspirators) or, particularly in the case of the Persian Wars, when Athens needs to justify herself to the outside world (cf. Ch.II.iii.A.2 and E.2). Other lesser polis-traditions that we have touched on in the text are e.g. (a) the stories of Lykides/Kyrsilos and Arthmius of Zelea, i.e. stories about men who had dared to threaten the stability of the democracy (cf. Ch.II.iii.I.2), and (b) the story of the double-victory over Boeotia and Chalcis, which we find revived in an inscription of the mid-5thc, i.e. the earliest victory of the democracy (cf. Ch.II.ii.E).

It could well be, however, that this is to overplay the theme: this sort of historical memory tends to be sketchy and possibly rather limited in what it encompasses. Moreover it cannot be merely such officially reiterated traditions that Herodotus is using: his range of subjects is too wide for that. Nonetheless it can be shown that Athenians did remember traditions about their city in their capacity as citizens. Perhaps in the last resort we need to remind ourselves of the relatively greater tenacity of oral memory in the cultures without extensive historical records, and particularly societies like the city-states of the Greek world in which so much political capital could be gained from the rehearsal of the city's historical (and mythical) traditions.

That Herodotus relied principally on such traditions seems likely on internal grounds: the relative absence of unequivocal heroes not only, as we said, gives the lie to the extensive use of family traditions, it may also reflect the polis' distrust of over-prominent individuals, individuals who by their eminence or outstanding success threaten the stability of the state. If it is indeed possible to see behind Herodotus' own authorial distortions to the traditions with which he is working (and it must be admitted that on my view that is an uncertain task), his narratives could perhaps be seen to reflect attitudes to powerful men (and powerful families) similar to the distrustful attitudes to be found in particular in Attic comedy, in this respect surely a fairly reliable monitor of the views of the polis as a whole[22].

We may add that Herodotus' traditions for the age of tyranny are demonstrably not derived from sources close to the centre of power. This is is surely what we must conclude from the prevalence of folk-tale elements in these narratives, in particular, for example, in the stories of Peisistratus (and Phye), Polycrates (Amasis and the ring), Kypselos and Periander, and the like[23]. Such folk-tales are surely unlikely in family traditions, and support the inference from the lack of any clear bias in favour of families and individuals in these narratives: these are surely the sort of traditions that we can imagine having been generated and sustained by the polis as a group. The marriage of Agariste is a good example (6.126-131): there is really no opportunity to extract from it the pro-Alcmeonid or anti-Philaid propaganda that it has been thought it must contain.

The heroes, not only Megakles and Hippokleides, but the other suitors too, fantastically assembled from all over the Greek world with a carefree disregard for chronology[24], are all remembered equally distantly. Hippocleides' famous dictum (6.129.4f, οὐ φροντὶς Ἱπποκλεΐδηι) is hardly quoted from an eyewitness who bequeathed it to his family's private memory!

We may conclude that Herodotus' 'polis-citations' do indeed seem to have a positive reference, and that any picture of the oral traditions accessible to and used by him that tries to suggest he is predominantly dependent on esoteric sources is likely to be seriously misleading. Moreover, since, as we have seen, the supposed influence of (unstated!) family sources in Herodotus' text is hard to maintain, they should be invoked with even more caution than these general considerations have suggested. If the precise reference of 'polis-traditions' is hard to pin down - and it is reasonable to object to what has been said here that the traditions evidenced by oratory and comedy at Athens seem to be less complete, accurate (?) and wide-ranging than whatever traditions Herodotus may be using -, that may be simply because our evidence is incomplete. We only have (limited) evidence of what could be said in gatherings of the whole polis, at the theatre, in the assembly, in the law-courts, where the common denominator of historical knowledge was, for various reasons, likely to be low. The knowledge of the old will have been greater than that of the young (cf. Thucyd.1.42.1), that of the better educated, wealthier, more politically experienced, than that of others not so happy. Herodotus, certainly, is likely to have sought out those who were more logioi[25], who were best acquainted with the city's traditions: but such men need by no means have been better, more complete sources because they had access to family traditions. Andocides' version of the liberation of Athens (above) is clearly less complete and less accurate than Herodotus', for all that it is a family tradition! Certainly Herodotus may have moved among the more well-to-do families, whose previous generations, fathers and grandfathers, may actually have had prominent parts to play in the events he describes in his work[26]; but it is likely that where he came across such traditions, and if he ever felt inclined to use them, he had enough critical sense to beware of any tendency in them to self-glorification, self-justification or hostility to prominent rivals, and to guard against such distortion by cross-checking with other witnesses - thus arriving at some sort of consensus which could fairly be called the version of 'the Athenians', or whoever it might be. At any rate, I would argue not that Herodotus did not have access to such traditions or that he never used them - which would be impossible to prove - but (a) that it was not necessary for him to have relied heavily on them, and (b) that there is little justification for the traditional view that we can identify their influence in the text.

This vast and treacherous area calls, as I have said, for much more careful and detailed investigation; the purpose of this appendix has been chiefly to explain my prejudices and my objections to the prejudices of others.

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Appendix III: The case for 'source-fictions'.

It is an important, though not essential, ingredient of my view of Herodotus that I accept the conclusions of Fehling that the source-citations in the work are in general fictitious (cf. Introd.). I would argue that in a substantial number of cases Herodotus did not hear what he says he heard from the person or people he claims as his informant(s). Unlike Fehling, I see no need, however, to make of this a universal rule, and I would insist that we must be cautious in how we generalize from particular cases: by proving the existence of source-fictions we have not ruled out the possibility of Herodotus ever having conducted oral inquiry; we have only shown that he tends to claim the support of authorities whom he has either not interviewed or whom he has no right to claim as sources for what he reports. I offer here two examples of the phenomenon from Book Two which clearly present a formidable case; on the basis of these I will suggest how we are to approach the problem of who exactly Herodotus' informants might be for his Egyptian account.

Herodotus introduces his account (after the story of Psammetichus' experiment) by saying that what he will be recounting has been cross-checked in three different places (2.3.1)[1]:

> ἤκουσα δὲ καὶ ἄλλα ἐν Μέμφι, ἐλθὼν ἐς λόγους τοῖσι ἱρεῦσι τοῦ Ἡφαίστου· καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐς Θήβας τε καὶ ἐς Ἡλιόυ πόλιν αὐτῶν τούτων εἵνεκεν ἐτραπόμην, ἐθέλων εἰδέναι εἰ συμβήσονται τοῖσι λόγοισι τοῖσι ἐν Μέμφι ...

As he goes on to distinguish between his information about the gods (2.3.2, τὰ μέν νυν θεῖα τῶν ἀπηγημάτων οἷα ἤκουον) and his information about secular matters (2.4.1, ὅσα δὲ ἀνθρωπήια πρήγματα, ὧδε ἔλεγον ὁμολογέοντες σφίσι), it is clear that he does mean that the whole account has been cross-checked in the manner he states. It is, however, incredible that this should have been true. The most devoted defender of Herodotus' reliability on matters Egyptian would be forced to admit that much of what he says is either seriously distorted or simply mistaken[2]. This causes few problems until we bring it into conjunction with the present passage: regardless of whether or not his 'priests' can be assumed to have accurate knowledge of their own history and culture (a knowledge which has been minimized by commentators seeking to trust Herodotus' every word about his researches)[3], it is extraordinary that they should never have disagreed with each other over anything - for Herodotus never once tells of any disagreement between any of his three independent priestly sources in Memphis, Thebes and Heliopolis. Even if everything he reports were entirely true to the facts of Egyptian history and culture, this apparently complete correspondence of independent witnesses would be hard enough to accept: could there really have been no discrepancies of emphasis between his sources? Since, however, so much is plainly wrong or distorted, it is impossible to defend Herodotus' claim to have cross-checked his information in the manner he describes.

The traditional defence of such improbable agreements of independent witnesses is to argue that Herodotus contrived to secure such agreements by the device of leading questions, i.e. simply making do with any sign of assent to questions of the type 'do you agree with this story told me in Memphis, etc.?'.[4] In this instance, however, this defence will hardly work: Herodotus explicitly claims to have tested whether his informants would agree, so that it would have needed an extraordinarily lucky (or unlucky!) use of leading questions for him to have failed to detect any disagreements of any kind. In addition, it seems most unlikely that the Egyptians of these three different cities would have had no interest in 'correcting' each other, whether or not they recognized that the story they were being asked to agree about was true or not: in other words, Herodotus' Egypt appears to be a place with no discrepant, epichoric traditions

(unlike his picture of Greece), and such places do not exist in the real world. It could be argued that Herodotus is exaggerating, i.e. that he did not cross-check everything and mostly just collated different stories from different sources; but this is not what he wants us to understand, and the problem remains that there are no disagreements whatsoever. At the very least he claims to have cross-checked the opening Psammetichus-story (but cf. A.B. Lloyd (1976) p.12), which has a suspiciously Greek colour and which requires some special pleading to vindicate as an authentic Egyptian tradition[5]; but the only variant he cites for the story is a Greek one!

The second example is stronger still[6]. Herodotus' transition to his Egyptian history (2.99.1ff) brings us back to the priests. After recounting what they said about Min, the first king of Egypt (cf. 2.99.2), he reveals what he would like us to understand as the basis of his information at least for his first period of Egyptian history (2.100.1):

> μετὰ δὲ τοῦτον κατέλεγον οἱ ἱρέες ἐκ βύβλου ἄλλων βασιλέων τριηκοσίων τε καὶ τριήκοντα οὐνόματα.

In this number were 18 Aethipoans and one Egyptian queen, and the rest were Egyptian kings. Herodotus then goes on to describe an event from the reign of queen Nitocris, before sweeping aside all the remaining 330 kings (2.101.1f):

> τῶν δὲ ἄλλων βασιλέων οὐ γὰρ ἔλεγον οὐδεμίαν ἔργων ἀπόδεξιν, κατ' οὐδὲν εἶναι λαπρότητος, πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ ἐσχάτου αὐτῶν Μοίριος (whose achievements Herodotus briefly notes) ... τοῦτον μὲν τοσαῦτα ἀποδέξασθαι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων οὐδένα οὐδέν.

Herodotus then announces his intention of passing over all the others and beginning with Sesostris, the king who came next after Moiris (2.102.1). We need only concern ourselves here with one of the peculiarities of this curious passage. If there was one fact of Egyptian history which we could confidently have expected any Egyptian of however lowly an education to have known, it would have been that the pyramid-builders (4th dynasty) belonged to the very earliest centuries of that history: if asked when the pyramids were built, any Egyptian would surely have answered that it was a very long time ago indeed, and that if anything were proof of the antiquity of Egyptian culture it was the pyramids. If any chronological distortion is likely it is upwards not downwards: it defies belief that any Egyptian should have wanted to minimize rather than maximize the antiquity of such monuments[7]. But Herodotus claims that his priests (substantiating one another here as well?) told him quite a different story: not only does he place the pyramid-builders a mere handful of generations before Psammetichus (2.147ff) and the arrival of the Greeks in Egypt - they are the fifth to eighth kings of the ten from Sesotris to Sabakos, with Cheops following Rhampsinitos (= Ramses III: 20th dynasty) -, he also explicitly has the 'priests' tell him that, with only two exceptions (Nitocris and Moiris), the 330 kings after Min performed no action worthy of record. On its own, the misplacement of the pyramid-builders seems relatively unimportant: Herodotus could perhaps have forgotten the correct order or 'jumbled his notes'. But in conjunction with the fact that Herodotus has the priests vindicate this chronology by their comments on the earliest kings, the problem assumes serious proportions[8]. Either Herodotus has in some way misremembered his interview with the priests (but it is hard to believe he can have misremembered something to which he gives such confident prominence), or for some unaccountable reason the priests did actually suggest to him that the pyramid-builders were only relatively recent (cf. n.8, but such a deception seems extremely unlikely!), or the report of the interview is a thoroughgoing fiction. If we take this example together with the one already discussed, it seems clear that both ought to be interpreted in the same way: Herodotus is affecting methods he did not use and authorities he did not consult.

To whom, then, did Herodotus speak in Egypt? Logically, of course, it may still be that he spoke to 'priests', even if these examples show him not to have done so in the manner that he claims. But it seems probable to me that these 'priestly informants' are throughout a convenient fiction to give his account the greatest possible authority - and to disguise the more prosaic truth of his Egyptian researches[9]. Another passage offers a telling clue. In discussing the source of the Nile (2.28ff), Herodotus claims that no-one he met, whether Egyptian, Libyan or Greek, could tell him anything (2.28.1), with the exception of the grammatistēs of the sacred objects in the temple of Athene at Sais (28.2ff). Whether or not the grammatistēs' explanation here reflects genuine 5thc Egyptian tradition[10], it is extraordinary that in all his supposed dialogues with priests Herodotus should not have been able to hear any other Egyptian account of the matter - or even either a substantiation or a refutation of this story, which he himself believes to be merely a joke played on him by the scribe! Herodotus has clearly forgotten for the moment that he is meant to have been talking to much more distinguished informants. I would suggest that in making anything of what this man told him he is incautiously revealing a pride in having spoken to at least one genuine Egyptian: lowly though he is, the grammatistēs is nonetheless an Egyptian and Herodotus cannot help giving him the attention which he is doubtful his story quite deserves[10a].

Herodotus, it seems certain, spoke no Egyptian - and yet apart from one mention of an interpreter (2.125.6; see below), he claims to be speaking all the time to Egyptians. It would, however, have been the obvious thing for him to have done to have acquired most of his information from a much more accessible source, namely the Greeks in Egypt! I would suggest that the source-fiction of the 'Egyptian priests' is meant to mask the fact that this was exactly where almost all his information did come from.

We know not only from Herodotus, but also most impressively from archaeology, how long and in what ways the Greeks had been settled in

Egypt[11]. The two chief reasons that brought Greeks to stay in Egypt were mercenary service (from Psamtik I onwards: 664-10) and trade, the latter reflected in the foundation of Naucratis some time between 640 and 620. Thus both in the mercenary camps and the emporia the Greeks had been living on the fringes of Egypt and in continuous contact with Egyptians and Egyptian culture for some 200 years or more before Herodotus' day, some of them possibly acquiring an even closer intimacy with things Egyptian by intermarriage with natives[12]. It is inevitable that these Greeks should have developed their own traditions about Egyptian culture and history, an abundant store of information for a non-Egyptian speaking visitor like Herodotus. To deny that he drew heavily, if not almost exclusively on such Greek sources is surely perverse[13]: we are only justified in doing so if we find that his citations of Egyptian sources are above suspicion, and that is far from being the case.

Does is make sense, then, to see Herodotus' account of Egypt as depending of Egyptianized Greeks? There are many hints that this is so.

(a) The misplacement of the pyramid-builders may show signs of a Greek source: the Greeks may have wished to belittle the antiquity of Egyptian history as natives themselves would not (above), insisting that the early kings did nothing of note; also the pyramid-builders may be attracted down to the more recent past by a Greek story (2.134.1ff) which identified one of the pyramids as belonging to the famous Greek courtesan Rhodopis: assuming all the pyramids to have been built about the same time and believing one of them to belong to Rhodopis, the Greeks may have been encouraged to place the pyramid-builders only a few generations earlier.

(b) Two of the names of Herodotus' kings are instructive: Proteus

(2.112.1ff) is clearly a Greek name, borrowed from Greek myth - indeed the Odyssey seems certain to be a source in some form for Herodotus' narrative[14]; Pheros, on the other hand, is surely nothing but the Greek for Pharaoh[15], and if that is so, it is extraordinary if Herodotus spent time talking to Egyptians that it did not become clear to him that Pharaoh was a title not a name, whereas the mistake is understandable if he only spoke to Greeks who would have referred to the Pharaohs chiefly (as Herodotus does) as basileis.

(c) A similar question can be asked of Herodotus' obvious confusion as to Egyptian god names: he believes, as Lattimore showed[16], that the Greek god names were actually used by the Egyptians for their own, equivalent gods - a mistake it was easier to make if his informants were Greeks who had developed their own equivalences for referring to Egyptian shrines and cults; Egyptian guides are much less likely to have evolved a system so indulgent to Greek visitors[17].

(d) Was the hermeneus of 2.125.6, who told Herodotus that the hieroglyphs on the Great Pyramid stood for the amount of silver spent on radishes, onions and garlic for the workmen, perhaps a Greek who pretended he knew more than he did about Egypt? Again this is an easier hypothesis than to assume that this was an illiterate or malicious Egyptian guide[18]. It remains possible, however, that this is Herodotus' own joke at the expense of Egyptian writing.

(e) The oracles at 2.133 (Mykerinos) and 152.3 (Psammetichus) are obviously Greek not Egyptian[19]; and this being so, it is easier to suppose that the sources for the narratives in which they appear are also Greek, rather than that Greek detail has somehow or other found its way into a narrative from an Egyptian source.

Thus the inadequacy of Herodotus' account of Egypt may best be explained if he spoke principally to his own expatriate countrymen rather than to the Egyptian natives whom his source-citations imply to have been his main informants. Not surprisingly he dissimulates as to the source of his information in order to give authority to what he has to say: any Greek could go to Egypt and speak to Greeks, but a proper appreciation of a foreign culture requires research into the beliefs, opinions and traditions of the native inhabitants. We may note that Herodotus similarly dissimulates about the extent of his travels in Egypt, if we may accept the excellent arguments of Sayce that he can never have been as far as Upper Egypt[20]. I suggest that these limitations are reflected in the character of his account: he knows a great deal about Egyptian culture and history, but very little about Egyptians - he is even under the impression, it seems, that Egyptians look like negroes, a view held by some vase-painters but one which could hardly survive extended commerce with the people themselves![21]

If such a proceeding may be generalized, if others of the ethnographies are the product of much less extensive travel and research than they claim to be, we must begin to re-write the itineraries and time-tables of Herodotus' travels which have hitherto been drawn up with such confidence[22]. Herodotus becomes no longer a field anthropologist, though not necessarily an arm-chair anthropologist either: his researches will have taken him as far as the Greek dockyards and market-places, and at least in Egypt to some of the most accessible local sites and monuments. This picture of Herodotus' travels considerably weakens the traditional hypothesis of the course of his early life: if those travels were less extensive than his own claims state and imply, then there is much less need to set aside a large number of years devoted to nothing but geographical and ethnographic research in all corners of the known world, and to suppose that such a period of years formed an early stage in Herodotus' intellectual development before he finally came to Athens(?) and for whatever reason 'discovered' the science of history (cf. App.IV).

It should, of course, be conceded that in showing the existence of the source-fiction in the Egyptian account we have not necessarily undermined Herodotus' source-citations in other parts of the work: it might be that in places less mysterious and inaccessible than Egypt, and especially in Greece itself, Herodotus is entirely truthful about his researches, about who told him what. I do not, however, believe that this objection can bring the comfort which it seems to promise; there are good arguments for the existence of the source-fiction even in the case of Greek informants[23], in other words even where it might be thought that the fiction could have been exposed for what it was. The case for the source-fictions is indeed generalizable: I have merely chosen here the most dramatic and elaborate examples of its use, and the reader is referred to Fehling to judge the somewhat subjective question of the extent to which it is generalizable.

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Appendix IV: The composition problem.

The central concern of most Herodotean criticism, particularly since Jacoby's monumental RE article, has been the debate as to whether the evident problem of the work's unity (or lack of it!) is to explained with reference to Herodotus' intellectual development, as showing the signs of separate stages of composition, or in terms of certain unifying themes or principles of selection and organization[1]. It may be objected that such a basic problem should have been tackled earlier: if the work was composed in separate stages at different times and under the influence of different interests and pre-occupations, any attempt at contextual analysis should be very wary of bringing together passages not originally conceived and/or written as part of the same unity. However, it seems to me that nothing certain has been uncovered by the analysts about the composition of the work, which by comparison with that of Thucydides offers no unambiguous clues to the stages of its construction. Moreover, some of the basic assumptions of the analysts seem to me quite unsound.

What almost all the analysts have in common is the belief that 'ethnography' must come before 'history' in Herodotus' development: it is this hypothesis which is taken to explain the striking disharmony between the ethnographic (and geographical) portions of the work and the more or less continuous narrative which otherwise seems to give it a broad unity. If Herodotus was first an ethnographer/geographer and had substantially completed the ethnographic logoi before 'discovering history', we could assume that he was loth to discard his earlier studies and produced a final work which unhappily synthesized his old and new interests[2]. There are a number of objections to this view. Herodotus did put ethnography and history in the same finished work and evidently assumed, on any theory of the work's composition, that he was producing some sort of unity: there is no reason why he should not have 'published' his material in separate books - as Hellanicus, a contemporary working in the same fields, was able to do - if we are to suppose that Herodotus himself did not feel that it ought to belong in a single book. It has been well shown by a number of unitarians[3] that 'excursuses' long and short are a basic feature of Herodotus' composition, as he himself claims at 4.30.1: προσθήκας γὰρ δή μοι ὁ λόγος ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐδίζητο. Whether or not the ethnographic sections are themselves 'excursuses' or *prosthēkai* - and admittedly Herodotus does not so describe them -, and whether or not we see them as 'digressive', the developmental hypothesis may well do violence to a principle of Herodotean style: Herodotus himself may either regard the ethnographies as legitimate digressions given the kind of work he is writing (i.e. *prosthēkai*), or else have set himself so wide a brief as not to think of them as digressive at all!

The developmental model, moreover, rests on what I believe to be mistaken assumptions about the nature of Herodotus' ethnography itself and about what is actually involved in his writing 'history'. The ethnographic sections, it is argued, are those which depend most heavily on a pre-existing (Ionian) tradition, while Herodotus must have come to write 'history', i.e. the narrative sections of his work, only after having 'discovered' the new discipline through some accident of his intellectual development. To take the second of these asssumptions first. We may object first of all that, for example, the Egyptian 'excursus' contains a large proportion of historical narrative and indeed illustrates a sophisticated appreciation of the problems of evidence (e.g. the cross-checking of independent witnesses; cf. 2.3.1, with App.III)[4] which it is hard to accept as an early tentative grasping towards the discipline of history, as von Fritz, for example, would explain it[5]. The analysts, convinced as they are that there is something remarkable in Herodotus' having come to write 'history', by which they seem to mean chiefly the fact of his coming to write a narrative of the Persian Wars, need to explain what it is that brought him to this: so, for example, Jacoby suggested that he came to Athens after an early ethnographic period and was sufficiently impressed with Pericles, the democracy and the empire to want to write an apology for the city in the form of a narrative of Athens' services to Greece in the Persian Wars. But is it credible that Herodotus should have needed any such stimulus to be able to see the potential of the Persian Wars as a subject for him to write about, or even, as is usually suggested, that he came to that subject _via_ a study of the Persian empire[6]? As has recently been stressed by Drews[7], the Persian Wars acquired the status of myth as soon as they happened: Phrynichus, Aeschylus, Simonides, Pindar, are all testimony to the fact that the heroic defence of Greece against Persia was at once elevated alongside the subjects of epic as a theme for poets to celebrate. For the first time historical events could attract the same literary interest as had hitherto been reserved for the mythical past: in a sense we might say that the Persian Wars gave the Greeks their historical consciousness - or at least made them fully aware of it for the first time[8]. This being so, however, the subject of the Persian Wars was available to Herodotus all his life - he did not have to show much originality in choosing it. And, of course, Herodotus shows no sign of believing that he has 'discovered' history: there is nothing radically new in his telling the story of an epic _polemos_, something that Greek poets had been doing in one way or another as far back as Homer, who is demonstrably one of Herodotus' primary models. It could indeed be argued that Herodotus' earliest plan was to write a prose narrative of this epic subject and that he was only gradually drawn back into exploring its antecedents, into writing the story of the rise of Persia and finally (!) examining the extent of the Persian empire through ethnography. It is my view that it is not the plain fact of Herodotus' writing about the historical past rather than the mythical past that makes him a 'historian' (if we need to label him as such at all), but rather his appreciation of method, of types of explanation and arguments for reconstructing the past (see below).

As for the hypothesis that Herodotus' first intellectual efforts were in the field of ethnography, leaning heavily on a ready-made Ionian literary tradition, we are again faced with a precarious assumption. As we argued in Ch.III.C, Herodotus' ethnography shows a very substantial advance on Hecataeus: to simplify the argument, we may say that Herodotus has 'discovered' an interest in culture of which there is no sign in Hecataeus, and which we may with some confidence ascribe to the influence on Herodotus of the sophistic movement. If this is correct, there is much less warrant for the traditional model: Herodotus' ethnography is revealed not as a mere inheritance from archaic Ionia but as a mature product of reflexion on modern (non-Ionian) theories of human culture and society. It could be added that even by the earliest possible date for the beginnings of Herodotus' ethnographic researches Hecataeus was already long dead, so that the idea of Herodotus following in his 'Ionian predecessor's' footsteps is itself chronologically illusory. Thus in terms of content it is Herodotus' historical subject which is the least original part of the work's conception and the ethnography which is the most original - the reverse of the traditional view. It is not clear how long we will require for Herodotus' 'theory of culture' to have matured, but it begins to seem less likely that this was his earliest intellectual discovery. We may add that if, as suggested in App.III, Herodotus' travels were not as extensive as his claims for them make them appear, we need not set aside any great length of time during which he is doing little except travel for ethnography's sake - though even if he did travel widely it is hard to see why this should be a serious problem!

Thus the traditional developmental hypothesis, even allowing for the refinements of its different advocates, proves itself distinctly weak on the most general grounds; its assumptions could easily be replaced by their opposites! My view is that certainty as to how Herodotus came to conceive and set down his work is scarcely worth aiming at, given how little unambiguous evidence the work itself provides. I would, however, offer this alternative model, if only to make clear how different a view can be sustained with equal cogency.

Herodotus' earliest thought was to write a narrative of the Persian Wars, a subject which it took no great effort to choose and which, if we follow Drews[9], may have been attempted much less ambitiously by others at much the same time as Herodotus chose it, if not earlier. During the 440's, however, Herodotus came into contact with the sophistic movement, which with its new ideas and methods turned him both into a 'historian' and into a student of culture[10]. He learnt about the need for caution in the use of evidence (cf. App.III); he learnt techniques of historical reconstruction (e.g. models: cf. Ch.II.i.A-B); he learnt about the mechanisms of political and social life (cf. Ch.II.i.A-B, and ChIII.B-C and H); he learnt of the vastness of historical time (cf. Ch.III.B). These new ideas, and especially the last, encouraged him to extend his original theme, to look for more distant origins and causes than those he had been contemplating so far. But there was a further stimulus in this direction, which also began to make itself felt in the 440's and without which his historical narrative would not have taken the form nor acquired the range that it eventually did, and that was the rise of the Athenian empire, which deepened and broadened his interests in various ways. First he was faced with the irony that the city which had done most to save Greece from enslavement in the Persian Wars was now turning to the enslavement of her fellow-Greeks. It was interesting now to look further back into Athens' past to trace the course of her growth; it was also incidentally of interest to trace the earlier history of Sparta, the city next most important in his story and the city with which Athens had already been in confrontation in contesting the hegemony of the Greeks. But the phenomenon of Athenian empire offered a further stimulus to Herodotus to broaden his perspective: here was an analogy with that Persian empire which had tried to enslave Greece in the Persian Wars - maybe exploring the earlier empire further back would help to explain this new arkhē which was threatening the peace of the Greek world anew. The history of the Persian empire, a subject on which others too may have been engaged, if again we follow Drews, gave scope for another sophistically inspired interest of Herodotus, an interest in ethnography, the problems of nomos, the difference between Greeks and barbarians.

By this means Herodotus became involved in writing a work of considerable diversity, one which would give much opportunity for display - in other words a work for the sophistic age, which prized polymathiē (cf. Ch.III. Introd. and (A)) and which was familiar with the virtuoso epideixeis with which men like Gorgias and Hippias would regale their audiences at Olympia. Herodotus' digressions on, for example, the sources of the Nile, on the Homeric Helen-story[11], on Spartan kingship, can well be understood as sophistic epideixeis brought together into one book, a work characterized above all by variety of interest. Thus there is no need to understand this variety as the analysts have done as a sign of clumsy synthesis, or as the unitarians have tended to do as a mark of Ionain naivete (especially since the Ionians share scarcely any of Herodotus' interests!): in neither sense is Herodotus here looking back to his Ionian past, but rather responding to the stimulus of a new movement. If we have eyes only for Herodotus' development as a 'historian' and show impatience with the other half of the work, we are guilty of myopia which prevents us seeing that the same stimulus produced what is new in his historical work and made of him a student of human culture and society.

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NOTES

Chapter One: NOTES

(1) Cf. Timaeus, Lex. Plat.s.v.knaphos: like a carding-comb, used to torture slaves to extract evidence. A slave torture used on a free man is a shameful indignity and this increases the horror of the deed; moreover even slaves were not as a rule tortured to death.

(2) For the relationship between Nic.Dam. and Xanthus (and Hdt), cf. H.Diller, in Navicula Chiloniensis (1956) pp.66ff - but not on this story.

(3) Immerwahr p.29 mentions the story only to point out that Hdt is not elsewhere concerned to present the early history of Croesus; Powell pp.39f, unconvincingly argues that the story shows incomplete assimilation. The most useful observation is that of Plutarch (MH 18. 858DE), who, though he exaggerates Hdts 'malice' towards Croesus elsewhere, aptly notes how this episode works a discordant effect:
'τῶι δὲ Κροίσωι μηδὲν ἄλλο καλὸν ἢ τὸ τιμῆσαι τοὺς θεοὺς ἀναθήμασι πολλοῖς καὶ μεγάλοις μαρτυρήσας, αὐτὸ τοῦτο πάντων ἀσεβέστατον ἀποδείκνυσιν ἔργον.

(4) Cf. 2.146.1, 4.195.2, and 7.152.3, the texts usually cited in support of this 'principle' - but can we safely take them as 'programmatic'? For an alternative account of 7.152.3, in its context, cf. Ch.II.iii.

(5) Learning through suffering is something that comes as suddenly to certain other kings in Hdt: e.g. Astyages (1.129), Psammenitos (3.14), Cambyses (3.65); others, however, show no signs of learning: e.g. Xerxes, Cyrus, Cleomenes. Cf. H.-P. Stahl, YCS 24 (1975) 1-36, for this motif. Hdt uses the device as much for dramatic purposes as for insight into character: a sudden *peripeteia* affords a new perspective (cf. 1.129.1: "what is slavery like after kingship?", with 6.67.2, Leotychidas' gibe to the deposed Demaratus: "what is *arkhein* like after *basileuein*?")There is also a certain paradox in seeing men like Astyages and Cambyses acquire insight, or foresight, when they earlier so signally lacked it; see below.

(6) Cf. Pindar Py.1.94f, where Croesus' φιλόφρων ἀρετά is contrasted with the barbarity of Phalaris; and Bacchylides III. 23ff. Also Furtwangler/ Reichold II Taf.113 (= Boardman ARF no.171). Cf. Weissbach, RE Suppl.Bd.5 (1931) s.v.Kroisos, 455-72, and on this passage, 457.67ff. For Hdts sources for Croesus, cf. Jacoby, RE art. 419ff.

(7) Cf. Bruns, pp.110-12, who argues that the portrait of Croesus is so obviously unified that it must be the result of a subtle imaginative synthesis: "aber der Poet, der diese Züge so wirksam gruppiert hat, ist ein grosserer als Hdt - das griechischer Volk".

(8) Cf. Immerwahr p.155: "Croesus thus represents a type of ruler morally superior to the Persian kings, and one on whom Hdt looks with more favor, following therein the bias of Greek tradition". Cf. n.6 above.

(9) Cf. Pausanias and Lampon at 9.79.1 (τὰ πρέπει μᾶλλον βαρβάροισι ποιέειν ἤ περ Ἕλλησι· κἀκείνοισι δὲ ἐπιφθονέομεν). But this example shows that even the Greeks can be barbaric in thought: barbarity is something common to all human beings in varying degrees. Cf. also on 9.120.4 (Xanthippus' punishment of Artayktes), below Ch.II.iii, sub fin.

(10) Cf. Bruns p.104, arguing that the story is not strictly a contradiction of the earlier narrative: "wohl aber stimmt auch in dem so liebevoll und farbig ausgeführten Bilde des Xerxes zu früheren Beobachtungen die völlige Verbindungslosigkeit, in der Hdt die so verschiedenen wirkenden Theile gelassen hat". For us, the lack of explicit connexion and comment is deliberate: the positioning of the anecdote is what speaks loudest for Hdts intentions, here as in the Croesus example. For an excellent account of the integrality of this story and its relation to the opening narrative of the court of Candaules, see E. Wolff, 'Das Weib des Masistes', Hermes 92 (1964) pp.51-8, repr.rev. in Hdt WdF pp.668-78.

(11) Hdts story of Croesus' early life (unlike that of Nic.Dam./Xanthus) describes the unfortunate victim as an *antistasiotes*, a political opponent (cf. 4.164.1 and 5.69.2). In Nic.Dam. the kingship passes to Croesus by right as the elder brother: in Hdt the succession is in the gift of Alyattes (1.92.4: δόντος τοῦ πατρός), and by implication might as well have fallen to Pantaleon. Compare esp. the confusion over Darius' successor (7.2.1f: *stasis*), where Hdt improbably envisages that Xerxes' claim is bolstered by the Greek political reasoning of Demaratus (7.3.1f). Hdt repeatedly goes into the conflicting claims of successors to kingships (cf. n.137, below), as though to draw our attention to the vagaries of autocracy, for him something that rests on no natural or self-evident rights. Hdt introduces the Greek political idea of *stasis* into the Croesus story, whether from a suggestion of his source or (more likely) on his own initiative, to sharpen its edges: Croesus' barbarity is inspired by political animosity and the pursuit of power. Thus the episode throws light on the ambition for absolute power, which can so often pervert human behaviour. Cf. esp. Otanes on the corruption of absolute power (3.80.3), discussed below.

(12) Cf. Bruns p.81: "Der Verdacht is gerechtfertigt, dass, wo uns seiner Charaktere widerspruchvoll und unklar erscheint, dies dem Schriftsteller zur Last fällt, der noch gezwungen war, in unmittelbarer Abhängigkeit von den ihm vorliegenden Traditionen, auch wo sie sich widersprachen, zu arbeiten". And cf. von Fritz, GGS I.238f: " ... so ergibt sich das Resultat, dass Hdt ... die Geschichten, die er erzählt, gewiss nicht erfunden hat. Er hat sie gesammelt ...".

(13) Cf. e.g. A. Momigliano, 'Historicism Revisited', in Essays in Ancient and Modern Historiography (1977) at pp.367-8. This argument is offered merely *ad homines*; as we saw in the Introduction, there is no reason to suppose that Hdt thought he was writing 'History', or that we can expect to understand him on those anachronistic terms.

(14) D. Fehling, Die Quellenangaben bei Hdt (1971). See Introduction.

(15) Cf. H. Strasburger, Hdt u.das perikleische Athen, in Hdt WdF pp.579f: "Uneingeschränkte Bewunderung bzw. Anhängerschaft fur einen bestimmten Mann oder Staat bei Hdt zu vermuten, heisst einen Bruch mit seiner eigenen Geschichtsauffassung von ihm fordern. In seinem Werk hat er keiner Persönlichkeit, deren Lebensweg er auf eine längere Strecke erfolgt, uneingeschränkte Anerkennung erzollt. Ebensowenig hat er irgendeine der grossen Figuren einseitig als hassenswert oder verächtlich dargestellt". The problem is however more complicated than the mere presence or absence of partisanship and more important than just an issue of 'historical method'.

(16) Cf. less cautiously Fornara (1971) 56 n.37: "Hdt, clearly, *scatters praise and blame without any evident direction*"' but there are some good remarks here on 'balanced presentation' (see below). Much less

cautiously H. Wood (1972) 138 n.49: "Our author's chief characteristic in biography is that he *always* presents *all sides and aspects* of character and acts, *without attempting to reconcile or subordinate the often contradictory results* ...", but again some useful remarks on individual passages. Cf. also Immerwahr, 'Historical Action in Hdt', TAPA 75 (1954) pp.14-45; e.g. p.26: "The ability to look at the same event, or the same person, from two different points of view without attempting to reconcile the resulting paradox is characteristically Hdtean", or pp.39f: "Hdt *distributes praise and blame freely* in his Histories, but there are few *human actions which do not partake* of both desirable and undesirable features ...". (My italics here, showing points of disagreement or uncertainty). The only extended discussion of the question is the dissertation of Th. Spath, 'Das Motiv der doppelten Beleuchtung bei Hdt', Diss.Wien (1963); see the Endnote to this chapter. Even this study does not adequately treat the importance of this critical principle for the understanding of the problems of Hdts sources.

(17) K. Reinhardt, Hdts Persergeschichten, repr. in Hdt WdF p.358: "Jetzt gehört das Schwanken ... zum Wesen der Gestalt. Notwendig ist das Schwanken, weil in den Geschichten, die die Majestät in irgendeiner grossen Geste zeigen, schon geheim das Gegenteil enthalten ist: indem der Mensch die Rolle, in die er hineingeboren und -gestellt ist, nicht mehr ausfüllt, der Konigsornat in einem Missverhältnis zur Person des Trägers steht, der Purpur um die Majestät zu schlottern anfängt. Auf Xerxes lastet der Fluch, dass er ein Nachfahr ist ...". And cf. Bruns pp.95-104, for whom the portrait of Xerxes is the single successfully unified conception of character in Hdt. Also e.g. Immerwahr pp.182f: "In all his complexity, Xerxes is primarily a contradictory character, in whom opposite qualities balance each other throughout ... Thus we may say that in Xerxes *all character traits turn into their opposites* and help to destroy him". (The generalization, underlined, seems unhappy). For Hdt Xerxes volatile changes of direction (see below) have much to do with his youth (cf. his apology to Artabanus before the Persians at 7.13.2, παραυτίκα μὲν ἡ νεότης ἐπέζεσε), but also with his position as heir to a demanding tradition of Persian expansion (cf. 7.5.1, his initial reluctance to march against Greece: οὐδαμῶς πρόθυμος ἦν κατ' ἀρχὰς στρατεύεσθαι ; but cp. his later speech to the Persians at 7.8a.1: οὔτ' αὐτὸς κατηγήσομαι νόμον τόνδε ...), and in more general terms with his character as *tyrannos/despotēs* (see below). To this extent Hdt is careful to offer *an explanation* of Xerxes' psychology which will reconcile the paradoxes of his behaviour (contrast the interpretations cited in n.16 above). For the beginnings of 'biography' in Hdt, especially in the stories of the eastern kings, but also those of Miltiades, Themistocles and other outstanding Greeks, cf. H. Homeyer, 'Zu den Anfängen der gr.Biographie', Philol.106 (1962) pp.75ff.

(18) For this kind of *thōma*, cf. 7.135.1 (below), and 6.121.1 and 123.1. With 9.37.3 (below n.64) and 5.92ē5, etc.

(19) Cf. Themistocles' speech of encouragement before Salamis (8.83.1): τὰ δὲ ἔπεα ἦν πάντα ⟨τὰ⟩ κρέσσω τοῖσι ἥσσοσι ἀντιτιθέμενα, ὅσα δὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπου φύσι καὶ καταστάσι ἐγγίνεται. He encourages the Greeks to choose 'the better' (*ta kressō*). For the expression *physis kai katastasis*, cf. Democritus DK 68B278.

(20) Cf. Thucyd.1.138.3 and 2.65.8f, though such commentaries are exceptional even for Thucydides, whose practice presumably owes something both to Hdt and indirectly to Homer. Cf. H. Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides (Cambr. 1968). And see Bruns pp.1ff and 64ff, on Thucydides. Bruns makes an artificial and misleading comparison with Hdt (p.75): "Genug der Beispiele dafür, dass dieser Mann (sc. Hdt) weit davon entfernt war, seinem persönlichen Urtheil irgendwelche Beschränkungen

aus stilistischen Gründen aufzuerlegen. Wer so frei und ohne Umschweife seine Meinung ausspricht, wo ihm das Herz dazu treibt, von dem wäre es sehr fälsch, in Fällen, wo wir sie vermissen, zu vermuthen, er verschweige sie. Diese Thukydideische Feinheiten liegen ihm vollkommen fern". (cf. also p.108). But see below.

(21) Character through speech and action in Homer: cf. esp. J. Griffin, 'Homer, on Life and Death' (1980) pp.50-80.

(22) Cf. esp. Strasburger (1965) p.581f: "Pointen werden nicht erklärt; der Erzähler kommentiert sich nicht selbst und schränkt die eigenen Meinungsaüsserungen auf den Mindestmass ein. Er setzt Gedanken in Aktion oder Rede um ... vor allem auch die Widersprüche".

(23) Compare this *ainos* and Antiphon DK 87B54: both deal with the same moral situation, the responsibilities of a man entrusted with a *parathēkē*, although their respective conclusions are different. For the influence of sophistic stylistic patterns on Hdt, see Ch.III, sect.B, below. The *ainos* here is no mere diverting narrative but a moral lesson. This is not to deny that the *ainos* was an established literary form from the earliest times: compare Aeschylus Agam.717f, with Fraenkel at line 719. For the form *parathēkē*, cf. Hippias DK B10; with Nestle, Progr.Schöntal 1908 p.23. And for the present moral, cf. esp. Democritus DK 68B265: ὥσπερ⟨γὰρ τὸν⟩ τὰς παρακαταθήκας ἀποδιδόντα οὐ χρὴ ἐπαινεῖσθαι, τὸν δὲ μὴ ἀποδιδόντα κακῶς ἀκούειν καὶ πάσχειν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἄρχοντα ...

(24) That is, he will swear an oath (cf. 86g.4) that he knows nothing of the deposit (cf. Stein ad loc.), in effect a false oath. Compare Cyrus' denunciation of the Greek habit of perjury at 1.153.1.

(25) Attempts to test the divine invariably end in disaster: cf. e.g. Croesus and the oracles (1.46.2ff); Aristodicus and Apollo (1.158.2ff); Polycrates and the ring (3.40ff); Artabanus and the dream sent to Xerxes (7.17.1ff).

(26) Cf. also Macan at 6.86g (51): "It is obvious from what follows that Hdt approves of the action of the Athenians (!), but was not going to throw away so delightful a story on mere critical grounds". I do not see the force of these criticisms: the story is approapriate because the Athenians too are thinking of witholding a *paratheke*. Immerwahr pp.213-4, notices that the "parable is used *ironically, not only* with reference to the speaker", adding "but also in respect of the Athenians, who do not anywhere receive punishment from the gods for refusal to hand over the hostages". But Hdt does not imply that punishment, late though it be, will not find out the Athenians eventually: cf. 5.89.2; 7.133.2; for Hdt the working of the divine is by no means clearly accessible to human intelligence, except very rarely.

(27) See esp. Strasburger, (1965) p.581f, on this story and its 'calculated contradictions'.

(28) In one version at least (6.75.3), this is the crime for which Cleomenes was ultimately destroyed: see below.

(29) Cf. Thucyd.5.63.1ff, the punishment of Agis.

(30) For a fuller treatment of this passage in its context, cf. Ch.II.iii.

(31) In this sense W. Marg may be right to describe Xerxes as more than the sum of his parts (repr. in Hdt WdF p.622): "nicht die Besonderheiten des Individuum Xerxes sind für Hdt von Interesse, wohl aber seine Person als ein Beispiel des Menschlichen, menschlicher Gefahren in der Geschichte". But Hdt is obviously also interested in Xerxes as a particular human being in a particular historical situation (see n.17 above), so that the

disjunction here is a false one.

(32) For the comparison between human nature and the nature of the physical world, cf. 1.32.8 (Solon): ὥσπερ χώρη οὐδεμία καταρκέει πάντα ἑωυτῆι παρέχουσα, κτλ. ; and perhaps Megabyxos' image for the behaviour of the demos at 3.81.2: χειμάρρωι ποταμῶι ἴκελος.

(33) The parallelism of the Pythios-story with that of Darius and Oiobazos (4.84) has often been remarked, as one of a sequence of overt parallels between the Scythian expedition of Darius and the expedition of Xerxes: cf. e.g. Powell (1939) pp.57ff; and esp. Bornitz (Teil II) pp.125ff.

(34) The words closely echo those of Darius to Syloson (3.140.4); and cf. 9.89.3, Artabazos' promise to the Thessalians (a deception).

(35) For another tyrant delivering a lecture on human psychology, see Gelon to the Greek embassy (7.160.1): ὀνείδεα κατιόντα ἀνθρώπωι φιλέει ἐπανάγειν τὸν θυμόν. . Cf. 7.238.2 (Xerxes' anger at Leonidas), and contrast 1.137.1 (Persian justice!). And see 1.155.3 and 3.36.1. Compare Democritus DK 68B236 (θυμῶι μάχεσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν· ἀνδρὸς δὲ τὸ κρατέειν ευλογίστου), and esp. Antiphon DK 87B58.

(36) There may be some apotropaic ritual behind this story; see the Old Testament parallels cited by How and Wells ad loc.; and add Pl.Legg. 753D, where those appointing magistrates are to pass διὰ τομίων However this human sacrifice is clearly a barbarity even for the Persians, not to mention its effect on Greek ears.

(37) Cf. e.g. Immerwahr p.182, with n.101: "Xerxes rewards and punishes his own subjects to excess". See e.g. an incident at Salamis (8.90), in which Hdt contrasts (90.1) Xerxes' punishment of the Phoenicians (by decapitation: 90.3) with his rewarding of the Ionians (90.4), whom the Phoenicians had tried to accuse of treachery. For Darius, cf. Immerwahr, p.173, n.74.

(39) For metamelēsis, cf. Antiphon DK 87B58: esp. for its discussion of the conflict of passion (thymos) and restraint (sophrosyne).

(40) Cf. Hellmann p.104, on this passage: "Die beiden ersten naheliegenden allgemeinen Möglichkeiten bilden den Hintergrund, von dem sich die besondere Eigenart des dritten Grund klarer abhebt. Nur dieser beeinflüsst die Darstellung und in seiner Durchführung wird die Wohlgesinntheit des Gottes erwiesen". Hdt may have invented Cyrus' change of heart out of nothing. Our earliest sources (cf. Bacchyl.III. and Boardman ARF no.171: cf. n.6 above) suggest that Greek tradition thought Croesus' immolation was self-imposed, rather than the work of Cyrus. Bacchylides says that the fire was quenched by Zeus, as it is by Apollo in Hdt: but Hdts version introduces a doublet in Cyrus' attempt to put out the fire earlier, and it may be that he has simply contaminated the original story on his own initiative. Moreover the attempted rescue depends on Croesus' calling upon Solon at this point, and inasmuch as the Solon-Croesus conversation, upon which this itself depends, seems likely to be a Hdtean fiction, the story of Cyrus' attempted rescue (and change of heart) ought likewise to be Hdtean invention. Compare also Fehling pp.148-9.

(41) Cf. 1.86.2: "either as a victory-offering to some god, or in fulfilment of a vow, or knowing Croesus to be a pious man (theosebēs) to test whether some god will save him from his fate". We pass from seeing his act as a sign of pietyto the gods to seeing it as a gross impiety: to test whether the gods really help those who honour them, is the act of one who does not hold the gods in high esteem (for the

motif of testing the divine, cf. n.25 above). The last motive is the one that leaves the strongest impression here (cf. also n.40 above), and indeed it is the one presupposed in Cyrus' change of heart: it makes little sense for him to repent of a religious duty, but it is clear why he should do so if the act was a real impiety. Note that Hdt informs us elsewhere that it contravenes Persian *nomos* to burn human bodies (cf. 3.16.3). Contrast Hellmann pp.106f.

(42) Cf. Hom.Od.18.130-142; Soph.Aj. 121-6, OC 560-8; and cf. Arist. Rhet. 1385B11ff, on *eleos*.

(43) Cp. von Fritz GGS I.258: "Die Darstellung einer psychologischen Entwicklung eines Individuums liegt offenbar ausserhalb des Gesichtskreises Hdts" (with special reference to Xerxes). This will not do, if it means that Hdt cannot see changes in psychological disposition.

(44) See also Chapter Three, section H, on the background to the debate and its place in the work.

(45) Cf. Democritus DK 68B266: οὐδεμία μηχανὴ τῶι νῦν καθεστῶτι ῥυθμῶι μὴ οὐκ ἀδικεῖν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἢν καὶ πάνυ ἀγαθοὶ ἔωσι.

(46) The complexity of Hdts attitude to tyrants is well known: cf. e.g. H. Berve, Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen (1967) p.197: "Aufs Ganze der grundsätzlichen Erörterungen gesehen, kann es nicht zweifelhaft sein, dass Hdt die Tyrannis ablehnte ... Doch erregten nicht nur die eindrucksvollen Gestalten mancher Gewalthaber Interesse und Lust des farbenfrohen Erzählers, der sie menschlich sah und beurteilte. Es wurden ihm, angeregt durch die staatstheorethischen Erörterungen seiner Zeit und vermutlich auch durch Diskussion über die fast monarchische Stellung des Perikles ... sowohl die Tyrannis wie die reine Demokratie zum Problem". And cf. Strasburger (1965) p.588. On the present interpretation, however, this 'equivocation' turns out to be more than either simply the desire to tell colourful stories, to investigate political institutions, or to be scrupulously unpartisan: tyrants are contradictory because they are human nature writ large. Cf. also (somewhat erratically), K.H. Waters, 'Hdt on Tyrants and Despots', Historia Einzelschr.15 (1971).

(47) For the parallel between Maiandrios here and Cleomenes later in the interview between the two at 3.148, see below Ch.I.ii.

(48) For the idea of a tyrant elevating himself artificially above his equals, see esp. Deioces at 1.99.2 (below). Hdt insists that the autocrat is not obviously marked out by nature from ordinary men: he exercises an arbitrary authority over men who are by nature no different from him and not inferior. And cf. n.11 above.

(49) ἐς μέσον τὴν ἀρχὴν τιθείς. Compare Cadmus at 7.164.1, ἐς μέσον ... καταθεὶς τὴν ἀρχήν, and esp. Otanes at 3.80.2, ἐς μέσον ... καταθεῖναι τὰ πρήγματα. Also Demonax at Cyrene (4.161.3).

(50) Cp.Ostwald (1969) pp.107-9, who discusses Hdts text as though it embodied the words actually spoken by Maiandrios in 533 BC. But the ideas of this speech are in Hdt as hypothetical as those expressed by Otanes in the constitution-debate - though Ostwald believes this too to be 'historical' (ibid.pp.178-9).

(51) The acceleration of criminal acts is well suggested in Hdts presentation here: arrest of prisoners, murder of prisoners, surrender of power to the traditional enemy, revenge of Charileos, destruction of Samos by the Persians.

(52) *hypomargoteros* (cf. Cambyses at 3.29.1 and Cleomenes at 6.75.1): surely one of the shadiest advisers in Hdt!

(53) Cf. e.g. the deception practised by Deioces on the Medes (1.96.2ff, below); by Darius to bring Histiaios to Sardis (5.24.1f); by Miltiades to arrest the Chersonitai (6.39.2); by Cleomenes on the Argives to make them leave the grove (6.79.1f).

(54) Cf. B.M. Mitchell, 'Hdt and Samos', JHS 95 (1975) pp.75ff, who discusses Hdts Samian sources and claims that *aristocratic bias* is easy to detect. But as we shall see there is little reason to suppose that Hdt ever relies on aristocratic or esoteric sources of any kind, rather than on the humble polis-traditions of the Greek states; cf. Ch.II.ii.

(55) According to Erxias' *Kolophoniaka* (otherwise unknown: quoted by Athen.561F = FGH 449F1), the Samian Eleutheria were conducted in honour of Eros, not Zeus as here. Cf. Jessen RE V (1905) 2348.23ff, s.v. Eleutherios, esp. 2349.53ff. Has Hdt made a mistake, or is this a different festival? Might it be (anyway) that the Eleutheria were not in fact connected with the fall of Polycrates at all? As a rule the cult of Zeus Eleutherios is associated with victories in battle (cf. Jessen); but cf. e.g. the cult of Zeus El. at Syracuse after the fall of Thrasybulus (Diod.XI.72).

(56) Cf. e.g. 2.147.2: οὐδένα γὰρ χρόνον οἷοί τε ἦσαν ἄνευ βασιλέος διαιτᾶσθαι : and cp. 4.142, the Scythians' abuse of the Ionians for their failure to accept freedom from Darius.

(57) i.e. *aphrosynē* as (a) folly, stupidity, and (b) the opposite of *sophrosynē* (in its moral sense), e.g. criminal insanity. Cf. Pl.Protag. 332E. And see e.g. Eurip.Bacch.386.

(58) See Chapter Three, section H, for bibliography. Cf. e.g. even von Fritz GGS I.289: " ...dass die Deiokesgeschichte zu einem grossen Teil aus Hdts eigenem Nachdenken über gewisse historisch-politishce Probleme hervorgegangen ist".

(59) Stein renders: "obgleich er wusste, dass die Gerechten von den Ungerechten befeindet werden", taking the neut.adj.s as collective personal plurals and the participle as concessive. But this makes little sense in the context, as well as being somewhat stretched. It is easier to assume that Hdt (paradoxically) means that Deioces used justice to combat injustice (see below). For the modernity of the 'abstract' neut. of the adj., see e.g. F. Solmsen, (1975) pp.110ff.

(60) The prescriptions for the rights of audience anticipate what we are told of Darius (3.118.1ff), and the excessive punishment of Intaphrenes for transgression of the rules (on which see Bornitz pp.216f).

(61) For the arbitrariness of despotic penalties: cf. e.g. 3.36.6 (Cambyses), 119.2 (Darius and Intaphrenes); 4.84 (Darius and Oiobazos); 7.39.3f (Xerxes and Pythios: see above); 8.118 (Xerxes punishes his sea-captain: see below). Occasionally, and surprisingly, the tyrant may weigh the penalty against the crime: so Darius, having decided to impale Sandoces (7.194.1f) for giving false judgement for bribes, pardons him on consideration that his good deeds have outweighed his faults. Compare the parallel anecdote of Cambyses and Sisamnes (5.25.1f), whom the tyrant had flayed for corrupt judgement: it is perhaps a paradox to have Cambyses practising justice in any form. Hdt has of course told us that the balancing of good deeds against crimes was the rule of Persian justice (1.137.1), in which also the death

penalty was never supposed to be inflicted by the king or anyone else for one offence only. Hdt praises the principle, but seldom, if ever (cp. 7.194.1f above: only a partial exception) observes it in operation, and as a rule severe and arbitrary sentences are the mark of all Persian royal judgements. But the 'discrepancy' is not accidental: the noble ideals of Persian *nomos* as represented in the ethnography are seen to be consistently perverted in practice, where irrational passion prevails over reason and moderation. The contrast between principle and behaviour is thus another deliberate paradox. In another respect however the arbitrariness of Persian royal judgements turns out to be paradoxically 'fair', as in the story of Xerxes' return after Salamis (which however Hdt affects to disbelieve). The king rewards the sea-captain with a gold crown for having saved his life, but cuts off his head because he had done so at the expense of so many Persian lives (8.118-9): the sentence has a terrible juristic logic about it. Characteristically, the despot judges results rather than motives and tends to punish or reward accordingly, or, put more simply, he is unable to distinguish whether his subjects are really helping or harming him. Thus, for example, Darius honours Histiaios highly even after his death (6.30.2, ὡς ἀνδρὸς μεγάλως ἑωυτῶι τε καὶ Πέρσῃσι εὐεργέτεω), having consistently mistaken his treachery for goodwill; or at Salamis Artemisia (by accident or design) contrives to sink a Calyndian ship and at the same time win the praises of the king (8.87.1ff, esp. 88.1): τοῦτο δὲ συνέβη ὥστε κακὸν ἐργασαμένην ἀπὸ τούτων αὐτὴν μάλιστα εὐδοκιμῆσαι παρὰ Ξέρξῃ.

(62) Indeed nothing that Deioces does as tyrant really fits the familiar picture of autocratic excess: none of the cruelties of a Cambyses, none of the perversions of a Periander; he does not even have the usual ambition of empire (1.101). He comes instead surprisingly close to the ideal king of Darius' apology for monarchy (3.82.2 and 4-5): Cyrus alone could give the Persians freedom, Deioces alone could give the Medes *eunomia* (cf. Ch.II.i.B.1).

(63) Note that the shift from just behaviour to injustice is structurally the same in the episodes of Deioces, Maiandrios and Glaucus: in each case Hdt goes out of his way to lay stress on the character's original *dikaiosynē* (6.86a.2, 3.142.1, 1.96.2), but avoids in each case any explicit comment on the character's changed condition. The paradox of Deioces' behaviour is noted by Plutarch (MH 18.858E), although he is not quite clear what to make of it: Δηιοκὴν δὲ τὸν Μῆδον ἀρετῆι καὶ δικαιοσυνῆι κτησάμενον τὴν ἡγεμονίαν οὐ φύσει γενέσθαι φησὶ τοιοῦτον ἐρασθέντα δὲ τυραννίδος ἐπιθέσθαι προσποιήματι δικαιοσύνης. Hdts point is not quite this simple contrast between natural and feigned virtue.

(64) *tolma*: the word does not mean bravery (cp. *andrēiē*). The other two uses in Hdt are neither morally approving (2.121z.1 and 9.37.3), both of them describing acts of criminal daring, both as here arousing *thōma*. Hdt often avoids using morally charged words in his comments on the action where we seem to expect them.

(65) For the sentiment here, compare Democr.DK 68B251.

(66) αὐτὸς δὲ τὰ ἐκείνοισι ἐπιπλήσσει ταῦτα οὐ ποιήσειν . Compare the words of Maiandrios at 3.142.3: ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ τῶι πέλας ἐπιπλήσσω, αὐτὸς κατὰ δύναμιν οὐ ποιήσω. Instructive to note that Hdts mind is working on the same lines in these two passages.

(67) Macan, following Stein, compares 7.146 for the quality, but not the word; he believes the passage to be a doublet of the present one, i.e. two separate anecdotes describing the same historical event. May we suspect rather Hdts own penchant for parallel scenes? See Fehlingpp.142f,

on Motivwiederholungen as a structural device.

(68) Contrast e.g. Immerwahr p.177 n.86: "Here also Xerxes is boasting and wants to show himself superior to the Spartans".

(69) Compare the ambiguity of Polycrates' megaloprepeiē at 3.125.2; and cf. Isocr.ad Nicocl.19: "Display megaloprepeia, not in any of the extravagant outlays which straightway vanish, but in virtue ..."

(70) For a further discussion of this passage in its context, see Ch.II.iii.E.1.

(71) The pattern of this Miltiades-narrative is repeated in the Greek narratives which likewise follow the battles of 480 and 479. Miltiades' pursuit of gain here finds a ready parallel in the behaviour of Themistocles after Salamis (8.112.1, οὐ γὰρ ἐπαύετο πλεονεκτέων), in the collecting of the money from Andros and the other islands. Cf. Immerwahr p.125; Bornitz, pp.134-5. For the 'contradictions' of the Miltiades-narrative, cf. esp. Bruns pp.82-4; "Widerspruchvoller kann sich ein und derselbe Mann auf so engem Raum wohl kaum darstellen ... ein Historiker, der über seine Personen nachdenkt, wird, wo das Leben eines weltgeschichtlich bedeutenden Menschen so krasse Gegensätze enthält, sie nicht ohne ein vermittelndes Wort weitererzählen ... Liegt es nicht nahe zu glauben, dass der Grund für dies Schweigen darin liegt, dass Hdt durch die in ihrer Wirkung so widersprechenden Erzählungen in seinem Urtheil über ihn selbst unsicher gemacht ist?"

(72) Cf. Obst, RE XV.2 (1932) s.v. Miltiades 2, 1681ff; H. Berve, 'Miltiades. Stud.z.Gesch.des Mannes u.seiner Zeit', Hermes Einzelschr.2 (1937); K. Kinzl, 'Miltiades' Parosexpedition ...', Hermes 104 (1976) pp.280ff, with some useful remarks on the peculiarities of the Hdtean narrative here. For the present interpretation compare also Bornitz, pp.95ff: "Miltiades, der die Athener so bewusst auf den Weg der Macht führt, weist in seinem weiteren Schicksal die gefährliche Doppelsichtigkeit der Machtfülle auf, die Hdt an allen grossen Gestalten, Städten und Völkern nachzuweisen bemüht ist". The extra-Hdtean tradition for the Paros-expedition preserved in Ephorus (FGH 70F63, with Nepos Milt.7.1ff: cf. Gottlieb pp.65ff, and Kinzl pp.293ff) has nothing to offer on the problems discussed here , although it contradicts Hdt in suggesting that the assault on the island almost succeeded. Kinzl (pp289f) is right to remark that the division of Hdts Parian narrative into two parts (at 6.134.1), the first from general Greek tradition, the second from the Parians themselves, is merely an expository device. The Parians are named 'informants' for the part of the story that takes place on Paros: cf. Fehling, on the 'Wahl der nächstliegenden Quellen'. But even if this were not so, a Parian tradition would not of itself account for the 'discrepancy' of the Miltiades-story, since the slanders against Miltiades (his corrupt manipulation of the Athenians) are not credited to them.

(73) proskhēma: it is the characteristic sign of ambition in Hdt that the aggressor makes use of spurious grievances: cf.e.g. Croesus (1.26.3), and 4.167.3 (proskhēma), 6.49.2 (prophasis), etc.

(74) On this odd detail, cf. Berve p.93 n.1; Kinzl p.284 n.21. And compare esp. Cleomenes' expedition against the Athenians (5.74.1): οὐ φράζων ἐς τὸ συλλέγει . See below n.125.

(75) It is not clear what this was: had Miltiades been betrayed while trying to escape from the Phoenicians to Athens (this does not fit with diaballein) or is it something from the time when Miltiades was officially in league with Persia? Compare n.86 below.

(76) Cf. Immerwahr, pp.191-2.

(77) Fully described by Hdt, from its beginnings with Miltiades, son of Kypselos, through Stesagoras, the brother of the elder Miltiades, down to Miltiades himself (6.34.1ff). Cf. H.T. Wade-Gery, 'Miltiades', JHS (1951) pp.212-21, for an imaginative study of the family history.

(78) Cf. Wade-Gery pp.217ff: "... all of 6.39 was meant (not by Hdt, but by the parties whom he echoes) to be damaging: the treacherous arrests, the foreign wife, the bodyguards, not least the help from Hippias, all have the smell of tyranny". We may object to the implied disjunction in the parenthesis: Hdt too means these details to sound damaging, and has made a conscious choice to bring them to the fore.

(79) For Hdts implied commentary on the weakness of the democracy here, cf. Kinzl pp.283ff. Cf. 6.136.3, where the demos saves Miltiades from the death penalty demanded by the hawkish Xanthippus (προσγενομένου δὲ τοῦ δήμου αὐτῶι κατὰ τὴν ἀπόλυσιν τοῦ θανάτου). And cf. 6.104.2, where Hdt says that after his first treason trial, he was elected strategos: αἱρεθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου , with deliberate, if perhaps anachronistic, emphasis. For the possible historical inaccuracy, cf. C.W. Fornara, 'The Athenian Board of Generals', Hermes Einzelschr.16 (1971)pp.9-10, with n.29 ("he extrapolated ... from the conditions of his own time"); but contrast Hignett (1952)pp.69-70. The attempt of the Athpol.28.2 to make of Miltiades a leader of the gnorimoi and Xanthippus the leader of the demos is unlikely to have any historical basis (cf. Berve pp67f). For Hdts picture of the Athenian democracy, its strengths and weaknesses, see Ch.II.ii.D-H.

(80) Immerwahr p.192, views the ambiguity of Miltiades' argument merely as a "tyrannical trait"; but Miltiades with his ambition, his quick thinking, his trickery, is representative also of the Athenian character as a whole, just as Themistocles later proves to be. See esp. Bornitz, pp. 93-4. See Ch.II.iii.C.2.

(81) Cf. e.g. Jacoby RE art.434.12ff; Berve pp.41ff: on the Danube-bridge episode (contra Bornitz pp.113ff). For Marathon, cf. Berve pp.75ff; and for the impossible theory that Hdts account of the battle derives from the 'Philaid propaganda' of the Stoa Poikile, cf. e.g. V. Massaro, L'Ant.Class. 47 (1978) pp.458-75.

(82) For Eupolis' Demoi, cf. Kock I.279ff (F90-135), with papyrus frg.s in Austin CGF pp.84-94. And cf. Adesp.F361K (? Eupolis' play): αὐχμῶντα δ' οὕτως ἄνδρα καὶ κεκονιμένον'/ καλλίον ἢ τῶν νῦν παλαιστῶν ὁστισοῦν . In Aristoph.Hipp. the Sausage-Seller rejuvenates Demos to the condition he enjoyed in the good old days (1325): οἷός περ Ἀριστείδηι πρότερον καὶ Μιλτιάδηι ξυνεσίτει.

(83) Cf. n.81 above. And Obst 1683.42ff (!)

(84) Cf. the arguments of Bornitz pp.113ff. But if the Danube-bridge story is unlikely to be a Philaid apology, it may yet be a fiction of one sort or another.

(85) Cf. Berve pp.62f, who argues that Miltiades actually did not participate in the Revolt. Contrast Obst 1687.4ff. On the assumption of a Philaid source for Hdts Miltiades, we would need to explain the lack either of an apology for his absence or of some indication of his involvement: it is hard to believe that the Philaids could have made Hdt swallow the Danube-bridge

fiction, but failed to impress upon him that Miltiades did the best thing in either involving himself or not involving himself in the actual liberation of Ionia later. But typically the machinery of esoteric sources is only invoked when it is convenient, and quite forgotten when it is not.

(86) The explanation of Kinzl (pp.284f) that what Hdt means here is not a private grievance of Miltiades, but a reaction of the Athn demos to an attack on their champion at the time of Marathon, seems a highly improbable interpretation of what Hdt actually says, though not a necessarily historically impossible. The contrast of πρόσχημα λόγου and ἔγκοτόν (τινα)is between the official reason given to the Athenians by Miltiades and his own private grievance, which he witheld from them. For the word egkotos in this sense; cf. n.132 below.

(87) Plut.Kim.8.1f, preserves the story that when Miltiades was asking for an olive crown, Sophanes of Decelea stood up and attacked him, saying that when Miltiades had fought single-handed against the barbarian, then he might demand such an honour. There seems however little reason to regard the story as representative of an early 'anti-Miltiades' tradition, as does Gottlieb (pp67-8), attributing it to Ion of Chios: "das zeugt von einem ausgeprägten Gemeinschaftsbewusstsein des athenischen Volkes". It is more than likely that the story, like so many of its kind which compare and contrast heroes of former times, is a late compilation: the 'source' could well be Hdt himself, the compiler misremembering that Sophanes' own monomachia took place earlier against the Aeginetans, while his brave action against the Persians took place later at Plataea (cf. Hdt 9.73.1 and 74.1f, with 75).

(88) Cf. Paus.10.10.1, with Pomtow, RE Suppl.IV 1924 s.v.Delphi 1214.59ff.

(89) Cf. M. Bieber, in AJA 58 (1954) pp.282-4.

(90) Cf. esp. A.J. Podlecki, 'The Life of Themistocles. A critical survey of the literary and archaeological evidence' (1975). And see F.J. Frost, 'Themistocles' place in Athenian Politics', Calif.Stud. in Class. Ant.1 (1968) pp.105ff; G.L. Cawkwell, 'The Fall of Themistocles', in Auckland Class.Essays (1970) pp.39ff. And cf. esp. Brunspp.85-90: 'es ist [deshalb] kein Wunder, dass Hdt den Themistokles nie selbst beurtheilt hat. In dem Durcheinander verschiedenster Eindrücke fand er nicht den centralen Punkt, aus dem sie ihm verständlich wurden. Er war ihm ein Rätsel". Contrast Strasburger, (1965) pp603-4; and Gottlieb pp49-50: "Hdt dagegen (sc. unlike Thucydides) stellte günstige und ungünstige Nachrichten über Themistokles nebeneinander; er hat das bewusst, wie ich glaube. Dem Leser werden die Umrissen einer Persönlichkeit gezeichnet, und es bleibt ihm uberlassen, welcher Bild er gewinnt. Hdt zeigt in einem ihm eigenen Bewusstsein von gerechter Geschichtsschreibung den Menschen so wie man ihm diesen beschrieb". Cf. also W. den Boer, Mnemosyne 15 (1962) 225ff.

(91) Cf.(?) Eupolis, Demoi F104A Edmonds (= Plut. Aristid.4.2, a somewhat optimistic ascription): σοφὸς γὰρ ἀνήρ, τῆς δὲ χειρὸς οὐ κρατῶν. And see e.g. Vit.Sophocl.1: (the comic poets) τῶν οὐδὲ Θεμιστοκλέους ἀπεσχημένων, although the context shows he was made fun of for his supposed low birth (for which cf. P. Bicknell, Hist.31 (1982) pp.161ff, and esp. 166-7). It is not clear whether Telecleides' Prytaneis F22K, "life in Themistocles' day was habros", is meant to be favourable or not (cf. Podlecki p.58).

(92) Cf. Aristoph.Hipp.811-19, with Podlecki 59-60. Cf. Hipp.80-4. a reference to Themistocles' death by drinking bull's blood.

(93) Themistocles certainly fortified the Peiraeus (cf. Hipp.884-6), but the Long Walls are here anachronistically ascribed to him (cp. Thucyd.

1.107.1 and 108.3); they are possibly even Periclean (cf. Cratinus F300K = Plut.Per.13.7). It is a measure of the development of the Themistocles-cult that already he is credited with services to Athens which he did not perform.

(94) Cf. Pl.Gorg.455DE, 503C and 516D; also Meno 93BE and 99B.

(95) Cf. Lys.30.28, with Podlecki p.82. Cf. Isocr.8.75, the demagogues Hyperbolus and Cleophon contrasted with Aristides, Themistocles and Miltiades (cf. Antid.233 and 307, Panath.51). Also Demosth.c.Aristocr.196-8 and 207 (cp. 205); and esp. de Corona 204.

(96) Cf. Podlecki pp.77ff, with Xenoph.Symp.8.39; Mem.2.6.13, 3.6.2, 4.2.2. And see Aeschines Socr.Fl. Krauss (Alcibiades), see below. Cf. Frost, art.cit. p.109: "In fact, articulate spokesmen of the 5th and 4thc seem to be unanimous in viewing the general as a non-political statesman and hero of Athens' greatest hour".

(97) Podlecki's witnesses here are Timocreon, Ion of Chios and ("perhaps") Stesimbrotus. But Timocreon, bitter though his denunciation of Themistocles may be (cf. PMG727 = Plut.Them.21.4, with Podlecki pp.51ff, for problems of historical context), both speaks a private grievance (he contrasts the heroes, Pausanias, Xanthippus, Leotychidas and Aristides, with the scoundrel who "did not bring his guest-friend Timocreon home to Ialysos, but took 3 talents of silver and sailed off to the devil") and represents a non-Athenian and *early 5thc* view. The only relevant fragment of Ion of Chios (FGH 392F13 = Plut.Cim.9.1) has the guests at a dinner praise their companion, Cimon, for his singing and call him 'cleverer than Themistocles': ἐκεῖνον γὰρ ἀιδειν μὲν οὐ φάναι μαθεῖν οὐδὲ κιθαρίζειν, πόλιν δὲ ποιῆσαι μεγάλην καὶ πλουσίαν ἐπίστασθαι (cf. Podlecki pp55-6). It is hard to see this as a perjorative comparison: the story is meant as a pretty compliment to Cimon ('cleverer than the cleverest man of the Greeks'; contrast Stesimbrotus FGH 107F4), which nevertheless does nothing to minimize the fame of the man he is compared with. Stesimbrotus' On Themistocles, Thucydides, Pericles (FGH 107F1-11) is a much better candidate, and two of the fragments do indeed look hostile to Themistocles, one which has him secure his naval policy for Athens in the teeth of opposition from Miltiades (F2) - an oligarch's objection to the change which brought the radical democracy perhaps - and the other which has him fleeing to Gelon in Sicily, asking his daughter's hand in marriage and promising to deliver the Greeks into his hands (F3). F. Schachermeyer, in a recent study of the work ('Stesimbrotos u.seine Schr.ü.die Staatsmanner', SBÖAW Bd.247, Abh.5 (1965)), has argued that the common view that it is a mere political pamphlet is mistaken, and has suggested that it is rather a serious attempt at objective historical biography inspired by Hdt himself. This is probably too generous a reading of the fragments: more likely is that the work is indeed a pamphlet, but a decidedly eccentric one, in that it directs itself equally against the democrats Themistocles and Pericles and the oligarch Thucydides, son of Melesias. This eccentric view-point (probably just anti-Athenian), and of course the Thasian origin of the author, make it an unworkable piece of evidence for reconstructing an Athenian anti-Themistocles tradition. And is the work even certainly a product of the late 5thc? It makes Themistocles, who died in the 460's, a pupil of Anaxagoras (*diakousai*, not merely 'hear a lecture of' but rather 'be a pupil of': cf. LSJ s.v.), who was still alive in the early 420's, and an adherent of Melissus (*spoudasai*), also of a younger generation. Can a writer of the late 5thc really be this unaware of the relative ages of these three, οὐκ εὖ τῶν χρόνων ἁπτόμενος , as Plutarch rightly observes (Them.2.3)? More telling than Stesimbrotus is the notice in Aelian that Critias (DK 88B45) compared the profit made by Themistocles during his political career with that made by the demagogue Cleon, presumably to the discredit of both. Thus possibly

in the narrowest oligarchic circles, as frequented by Stesimbrotus and Critias, where even the people' hero Pericles was attacked, Themistocles was held up as an early representative of the trend towards the corruption of the radical democracy; but the evidence for a widespread anti-Themistocles tradition is simply not there. Cf. also den Boer, art.cit.pp.233ff. Further on Stesimbrotus' pamphlet, cf. K. Meister, Historia 27 (1978) pp.274ff.

(98) Cf. e.g. Stein at 8.110: "Die Äusserung zeigt wie eingenommen des Vf.s Urtheil auch da gegen den Charakter des Them. ist, wo nicht einmal ein Schein von Hinterhaltigkeit auf ihm liegt". Jacoby, RE art.458.58ff: "Die Geschichten von Themistokles ... verraten ihren athenischen Ursprung durch eine dem grossen Manne bitter feindliche und hämische Ausdeutung". And e.g. Cawkwell p.40: "Although he does not neglect Themistocles' part..., he constantly denigrates him, both his motives and his reputation, and Themistocles emerges as a cunning, corrupt, self-seeking schemer". H. Barth, Klio 43-5 (1965) pp.30-7, well shows that Themistocles' pleonexia is a Hdtean theme, but concludes that the stories which show it (cf. 8.4f and 112), fictional though they surely are, are nonetheless a product of a lively anti-Themistocles tradition. But cf. Ch.II.iii.G-H, for these stories.

(99) Cf. Thucyd.1.135-8, with Podlecki pp.72ff. But see below.

(100) Cf. e.g. Podlecki pp68-9; Cawkwell p.40. The further criticism that the words pais de Neokleos ekaleeto imply that "Themistocles' real father was not necessarily given by the patronymic" (Cawkwell ibid.), is mistaken. As Stein on 6.88, line 3, shows, this use of kalein seems to be meant as poetic and dignified: cf. e.g. Pind.Py.3.67, ἤ τινα Λατοΐδα κεκλημένον ἢ πατέρος (with Wilamowitz ad Eurip.Herakles 31). The usage is almost certainly meant to sound Homeric: in the epic kaleisthai in expressions of this type often has the force of einai. Cf. Eustath.445.8ff; and see esp.Il.2.260, μηδ’ ἔτι Τηλεμάχοιο πατὴρ κεκλημένος εἴην, and Il.15.338, υἱὸς δὲ Σφήλοιο καλέσκετο Βουκολίδαο . If this is right, then Hdts introduction is meant to sound honorific rather than slanderous - and this too tells against the malicious interpretation of neōsti pariōn. But see perhaps Aeschines of Sphettos, P.Oxy.1608, supplementing Fl Krauss, which discusses the story of Themistocles' supposed repudiation (ἀποκηρυχθῆναι) by his father; for which cf. also Plut.Them.2.6. Hdt is unlikely to be alluding here to this tradition of an apokēryxis, a formal disinheriting, which does not imply that Neokles was not Themistocles' natural father, but merely that he fell out with him and legally disowned him.

(101) Cf. Podlecki pp196-7; cf. esp. R.J. Lenardon, 'The Archonship of Themistokles, 493-2', Historia 5 (1956) pp.401-19; but contra e.g. C.W. Fornara, 'Themistocles' Archonship', Historia 20 (1971) pp.534ff, who argues that Themistocles never held the office. The relevant evidence is D.H.Ant.Rom.6.34.1 and Thucyd.1.93.3; the only reason to doubt Dionysios' date however is the literal interpretation of this passage of Hdt!

(102) Cf. Podlecki pp.189ff, for discussion and bibliography.

(103) Cf. Frost art.cit.p.115.

(104) The introduction of Aristides is a striking exception (8.79.1), not the rule by which to judge the rest of Hdt: cp. e.g. Cawkwell p.40, with n.1.

(105) Cf. e.g. Podlecki pp69-70. That the objection is valid is shown by the outrage felt by Plutarch at this passage (MH 37.869CF: εἰ γάρ εἰσιν

ἀντίποδες ἡμῶν, ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, τῆς γῆς τὰ κάτω περιουκοῦντες, οἶμαι μηδ' ἐκείνους ἀνηκόους εἶναι Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ τοῦ Θεμιστοκλέους βουλεύματος ...). Hence Fornara's defence (p.72 n.19: "his mention of Mnesiphilus is calculated to give dramatic emphasis to the crucial moment at Salamis, not to deprive Themistocles of credit. We are over-solicitous of Themistocles") is misguided. Cf. Strasburger (1965) pp. 603f: "Ich finde nicht, dass Themistokles von Hdt einseitig parteiisch oder gar gehässig behandelt wäre".

(106) Cf. e.g. 1.96.2 (Deioces), 6.132 (Miltiades); cp. 1.59.4 (Peisistratus) etc.

(107) Cf. e.g. Cawkwell pp42-3; Bodin, REG 30 (1917) pp.123ff.

(108) Cf. Thucyd.1.137.4 (the text is somewhat confusing: see Gomme); Ktesias FGH 688F13(30), with Plut.Them.16.6 (?); Aesch.Socr.Fl Krauss (Alcibiades), with Dittmar, Aiskhines v.Sphettos, Philol.Unters.21 (1912) pp.99ff. Cf. Gottlieb pp.108ff, for the tradition in Diod.,Plut.,Polyaenus and Justin. And cf. for the course of the tradition, Bodin in REG 30 (1917) pp.137ff.

(109) Cf. Podlecki pp26-7, who seems to conclude that the Hdtean version is a re-interpretation of an original story (a true one!) which made of the mission a ruse (of Themistocles and Aristides) to expedite Xerxes' departure from Greece - but the new story is for him invented by Themistocles in his letter to Artaxerxes!

(110) The speech is usually bracketed with those of Solon, Amasis and Artabanus on divine envy and the mutability of human fortune, as though they are all equally evidence for 'Hdts thought': cf. e.g. Pohlenz, (1932) p.115; and Immerwahr p.313, with n.16.

(111) And on the view that Hdt has maliciously re-interpreted the story of a ruse to save Greece, he must have been told even less than this.

(112) Cf. von Fritz,GGS I.278.

(113) Cf. Fornara pp.62ff: " ... the reflexions of his contemporaries are the precondition of his narrative ... his portrait of Pausanias is in the light of that knowledge a masterpiece of irony and a harbinger of tragedy". See further in Ch.II.iii.J.5. Contrast Bruns pp81-2: "Pausanias ist von Hdt einseitig, aber ohne Widersprüche dargestellt ... es fällt kein Schatten von ihr (sc. his later life) auf den Helden des grossen Tages".

(113a) For an appreciation of some of the ways in which men's speeches and actions can conflict, cf. Democritus DK 68B53a, πολλοὶ δρῶντες τὰ αἴσχιστα λόγους ἀρίστους ἀσκέουσιν (cf. B63); and esp. B177, οὔτε λόγος ἐσθλὸς φαύλην πρῆξιν ἀμαυρίσκει οὔτε πρῆξις ἀγαθὴ λόγου βλασφημίηι λυμαίνεται . Such conflicts are frequently given dramatic expression in the plays of Euripides, where characters can say the right things for the wrong reasons, or, as Democritus has it, mask foul deeds with fine words.

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(114) Cf. Jeffery (1976) p.124. And e.g. Bruns pp.75-80. For the present interpretation cf. e.g. Wood p.138, n.49: "The ability to view a single figure or act ambivalently is shown in Hdts treatment of Cleomenes in VI: it has often been objected that Hdts portrayal of Cleomenes is inconsistent because of the supposed inconsistency of Cleomenes' character. But in Hdt all great men are both good and bad ...". Also Immerwahr e.g. p.204.

(115) For Demaratus' family as a source for Hdt, see e.g. Lewis (1977) at p.54, with n.30, for whom Hdt meets the exiled family on their estate in Kaikos valley. On the supposed sources for Hdts Cleomenes, see Jacoby, RE art.438.43ff and 442.28ff; Lenschau, RE XI.1 (1921) s.v.Kleomenes 701.46ff, and Klio 31 (1938) 412-3.

(116) This logical but not strictly chronological arrangement of Hdts material was a point of style which Dionysios (DH.Ep.ad Pomp.773-4) found to praise above the strictly annalistic method of Thucydides. Narrative dislocation is of course quite typical of Pindar's treatment of myth, and Hdt perhaps shares this literary taste for variety and surprise.

(117) Cf. e.g. Immerwahr pp.192-3, for the structure of the Cleomenes-narrative: "The story of Cleomenes forms ... a particularly vivid account, despite the fact that it has to be pieced together from separate logoi".

(118) Cf. H. Wood p.63 n.10, on the oriental narratives in this respect.

(119) Cf. 3.64.3 (Cambyses' fatal accident), with 6.75.3 (Cleomenes' self-mutilation). And compare esp. the fatal wounding of Miltiades at the temple of Demeter in Paros at 6.134.2 (like Cambyses, he dies from an accidental wound to the thigh). Miltiades' career indeed, as we shall see, has clear points of contact with that of Cleomenes, an intriguing reflexion of the unity of the work.

(120) Cf. Bornitz pp.55f, on this passage.

(121) Cf. 5.63.1, the Pythia had apparently been bribed by the Alcmeonids; cf. 5.90.1 and 91.2, with 6.123.2. See Ch.II.ii, on this narrative.

(122) Cleomenes proceeds ἅμα Ἀθηναίων τοῖσι βουλομένοισι εἶναι ελευθέροισι (5.64.2), an expression calculated to excite our immediate approval. Contrast the expedition to restore Peisistratus a third time (1.62.1) by those τοῖσι ἡ τυραννὶς πρὸ ἐλευθερίης ἦν ἀσπαστότερον (cf. Ch.II.ii), an obvious antithesis. (And cf. 3.143.2, Maiandrios and the Samians, above). Cleomenes is also assisted by a lucky chance (syntykhiē), which might suggest that the gods were on his side. But Hdt is not going to say as much. The syntykhiē was τοῖσι μὲν κακὴ (sc. the Peisistratids) ... τοῖσι δὲ ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη σύμμαχος. . Compare esp. Croesus' words to Cyrus at 1.87.3f, τῆι σῆι μὲν εὐδαιμονίηι, τῆι ἐμεωυτοῦ δὲ κακοδαιμονίηι . Hdt chooses rather to emphasize the relativity of fortune here, so that we do not concentrate too completely on the desirability of either cause. And cf. (?) 6.67.3.

(123) Bornitz pp.56-9, offers an unacceptably subtle explanation of this detail, when he has Isagoras force Cleomenes' hand with the threat of a prosecution for adultery (moikheia). For the present interpretation, cf. Plut. MH 23.860D.

(124) An obvious reminder of the siege of the Peisistratids in the Pelargic fortress at 5.64.2f. Hdt must have been alive to the ironic symmetry of these events, though he would presumably distinguish the ironies of chance (as the siege motif) and the ironies of human action: the important irony is that Cleomenes behaves on two comparable occasions in contradictory ways because of the kind of person he is, and because of the vagaries of human nature itself. For Cleomenes besieged on the Acropolis, cf. Aristoph.Lysistr.274ff, with Schol.

(125) Hdts insistence on the secrecy of Cleomenes' intentions (οὐ φράζων ἐς τὸ συλλέγει) seems confusing (e.g. How and Wells ad 5.74.1: "it seems impossible that the Spartans and the allies should not have known that the expedition was directed against Athens, especially as the Boeotians sieze Oenoe by a concerted plan"). If the answer is that while it was known that the expedition was to be against Athens, it was not known that Cleomenes meant to install Isagoras as tyrant, and that it was the discovery of this intention that started the disaffection of the allies (so e.g. Forrest (1968) p.87; de Ste Croix *OPW* p.109), it remains that Hdt has not told it this way because he wants to emphasize Cleomenes' misuse of power in the pursuit of private grudges. (Pausanias III.4, does not give anything independent of Hdt here). Hdts report indeed both closely echoes what he says of Miltiades' Parian expedition (6.132, see text) and raises an identical historical problem (cf. n.74 above): in neither case can we be certain what historical inferences to draw from Hdts suggestion of an abuse of power.

(126) The expression puzzles the commentators (e.g. How and Wells ad loc.): "Hdts tone here is unusually favourable to Cleomenes".

(127) ἐξ ἐπιστόλης : for the motif of 'accusation on instruction', cf. Cleomenes' accusation of Cleisthenes on instruction (ἐκ διδαχῆς) from Isagoras at 5.70.2, and Leotychidas' accusation of Demaratus at the instigation of Cleomenes at 6.65.3 (ἐκ τῆς Κλεομένέος προθυμίης). Cf. also perhaps the Spartans' accusation of Leotychidas at the instigation of the Aeginetans at 6.85.1 (καταβωσομένους). This sequence of plots and counter-plots builds up a disturbing picture of the dissension between the various factions in the Greek states, which is such an important theme of Hdts Greek history: cf. Ch.II, Parts ii and iii.

(128) Except for the hint at 5.75.1, to be picked up later at 6.64 (see below) - but not here, for reasons of dramatic effect.

(129) A ring with 6.51, but an amplified ring, so that the restatement of the theme quite alters our appreciation of it.

(130) For *phthonos* as an essential characteristic of Greek polis life, Ch.II.iii.H.4. Cf. 3.80.3-4 (*phthonos* in political life); 7.237.2; 8.79.1, 124.1 and 125.1; 9.71.4.

(131) Cf, P. Carlier, 'La vie politique à Sparte sous ... Cleomène Ier', Ktema 2 (1977) 75-6.

(132) For *egkotos* as a private grudge, cf. Miltiades (again) and the Parian expedition (6.133.1, above). Cf. also 9.110.1 (Amestris).

(133) The Spartans have fulfilled the required conditions (cf. 6.50.2) by arriving with two kings. But there are two possibly related difficulties here. On Hdts own evidence (cf.5.75.2), a law had been made only a few years before at the time of the Eleusis expedition that the two kings should no longer go out together in command of an army (cf. Xenoph.Hell.5.3.10), a law whose existence Hdt seems to forget again at 7.149.2. See How and Wells ad loc.; and Carlier, Ktema 2 (1977) 78-9, who argues (unconvincingly) that Demaratus was using the Aeginetans to get the recent law repealed. Secondly, however, did the Aeginetans really believe this technicality made any difference, or that it could be used to their advantage, and did Cleomenes really accept it? More surprising still is Hdts account only a few pages later of how the Athenians used exactly the same objection against Leotychidas, when he came to reclaim the Aeginetan hostages (6.86.1). Carlier's account of this problem (see above) fails to take any effective notice of this second use of the objecion (merely a

"reprise ironique"); nor does the discussion in de Ste Croix (OPW p.150) do much to allay suspicion. If we agree that the probable explanation is that the Aeginetans' objection was in reality that Cleomenes was acting without the authority of the Spartan state, as Hdts text certainly seems at one point to imply (6.50.2, ἄνευ…τοῦ κοινοῦ), this still leaves a lot unexplained. Why does Hdt explicitly say all along that what Cleomenes needed was for Leotychidas to accompany him to Aegina (6.65.1), and that the Aeginetans decided that the arrival of both kings meant they could no longer reasonably hold out (6.73.2)? Cleomenes on this interpretation only needed to obtain the approval of the Spartan assembly by some means, which should not have been that difficult, given that the cause was 'Greek freedom' (cf.6.61.1?). He should not have needed both to secure the deposition of Demaratus and to take his successor with him to Aegina. And even if we assume that the Aeginetans were appealing to some statutory right as members of the Peloponnesian League, the justification does not stand in the case of the Athenians, who were clearly not members (cf. de Ste Croix), to judge from Hdts acount, in that Leotychidas accompanies the Aeginetans to Athens (6.85.3) following a ruling by the Spartan courts which had made the king over to them to do with as they wished (85.1, ἔκδοτον ἄγεσθαι). The advice of Theasides (if it is historical) is best understood as a formal amendment to the court's decision, which meets with the agreement of the Aeginetans (ὁμολογίῃ δὲ ἐχρήσαντο τοιῇδε). It is very hard to see how either the Athenians or Leotychidas can have thought the objection binding. The historical objections to Hdts narrative as it stands are thus formidable: can we infer that the internal coherence of the narrative masks a confusion of Hdts sources which he himself has exploited in the interests of his pattern? Compare here also T. Figueira, CPh 76 (1981) pp.1-24, arguing against Aegina's membership of the Peloponnesian League, but also with a good appreciation of some of the problems of this Hdtean narrative (at pp.8-14).

(134) For the gesture of declining 'good things', profit (*agatha*), on point of principle, cf. Lycophron at 3.52.3ff, Maiandrios at 3.142.3, Cadmus at 7.164.1 (ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης). And cf. H. Barth, Klio 43-5 (1965) at 31-2, on the Hdtean theme of the greed for profit: the resistance to temptation is characteristically *dikaiosynē* .

(135) The reception of visitors is a most frequent scene-type in Hdt. Cf. e.g. Solon/Croesus (1.30ff); the Spartans at the court of Cyrus (1.153); Darius, the Egyptian priests and the statue of Sesostris (2.110); Helen, Paris and Menelaus at the court of Proteus (2.112ff); Hecataeus and the Egyptian priests (2.143); the Eleans in Egypt (2.160); the Ichthyophagi at the court of the Aethiopian king (3.21f); the Persians as guests of Amyntas (5.18ff); the Athenians and Artaphrenes (5.73). These scenes often involve 'reflexion': in the examples cited here, the visitor who comes full of arrogant preconceptions, is put in his place by the host and we at least are made to see the emptiness of his self-esteem; the Solon/Croesus encounter is merely an inversion of the type, with the roles of host and visitor reversed. The frequency of this scene-type surely shows the hand of Hdt, prepared to turn his material to literary effect, perhaps on the model of the scenes in Homer (cf.Il.ix and xxiv, Od.ii-iv and (inverted) xvi-xxiii). Compare what Lattimore, CPh 34 (1939) p.35, has to say of the related Warner-motif: "The regular occurence of the wise adviser is illuminating to the student of Hdt as a writer; but, by reason of this very regularity, at his apearance the historian must proceed with care". Contrast von Fritz GGS I.215f.

(136) Immerwahr at p.192 n.10, notes the similarity of the episodes and the way they contrast with the portrait of Cleomenes elsewhere, explaining: "but these two stories are outside the main *logos*, as it were", and referring to his comment at p.167 n.54, on the 'inconsistencies' in the story of Cyrus): "such inconsistencies between major *logoi* (but not within a *logos*) are characteristic of Hdts dramatic technique". It is not made

clear how this structural or 'formal' interpretation is meant to work. Certainly, as we shall see, the Aristagoras-episode is not a 'separate logos', but coheres closely with the surrounding narrative. Moreover, as we have already observed, there are clear cases of paradox (Immerwahr's 'inconsistencies') within narratives, not merely between them, as in the stories of Deioces and Maiandrios, to name but two of our examples.

(137) Cf. 6.52.2ff, the twins of Aristodemos and the problems of the Spartan dual kingship; 6.61.1ff, the paternity and right to the kingship of Demaratus; 7.3.3, Demaratus supports Xerxes' claim to succeed Darius by reference to a Spartan *nomos* (of doubtful authenticity!); 7.205.1, the coincidence which brings Leonidas to the kingship.

(138) On Cleomenes 'madness', see below; with 6.75.1.

(139) Cleomenes seems to have ruled for some 25-30 years; he was already king when Maiandrios came to Sparta c.515BC, and possibly as early as 519BC (cf. Thucyd.3.68.5, with Gomme II.358, though the date ought perhaps to be 509BC; cf. Hdt 6.108.2); and he was apparently still on the throne around the time of Marathon (cf. Hdt 6.73). When exactly he died we have no way of knowing. Cf. Lenschau RE XI.I (1921) 695.65ff, who argues on the evidence of Plut.Apothegm.Lac.Cleom.7 (Mor.223D) that Cleomenes is already king in 525BC; and cf. id. Klio 31 (1938) pp.412ff.

(140) Cf. Beloch, I.2, p.174; and e.g. O. Murray (1980) p.249: "Spartan oral tradition sought to minimize his importance, claiming that he was 'somewhat mad' and ' did not rule for very long'".

(141) We should not underestimate the difficulties of comparative chronology for Hdts Greek history: see esp. W. den Boer, 'Hdt u.die Systeme der Chronologie', Mnemosyne ser.4.20 (1967) pp.30ff, emphasizing rightly the considerable limitations of Hdts resources for accurate calculation. Even the reign lengths of the eastern kings, despite their authoritative appearance, may well rest on a borrowed and artificial Greek scheme: cf. R. Drews, 'The Fall of Astyages and Hdts Chronology', Historia 18 (1969) pp.1-11.

(142) Cf. Stein ad loc.: "er war aber als Sohn zweiter Ehe ziemlich jung zur Herrschaft gekommen und starb vorzeitig eines gewaltsamen Todes, sodass noch sein zweiter Bruder Leonidas im besten Mannesalter folgen konnte". That this was indeed the way Hdt thought is confirmed by his mention of the circumstances of Leonidas' succession at 7.205.1, which clearly implies a knowledge of the present passage, echoing its words explicitly: ἀποθανόντος δὲ Κλεομένεος ἄπαιδος ἔρσενος γόνου, Δωριέος τε οὐκέτι ἐόντος ἀλλὰ τελευτήσαντος ἐν Σικελίῃ.

(143) Even if Hdt did know the length of Cleomenes' reign to have been 25 or even 30 years, he is still on his own terms almost justified in describing it as relatively short, since he is familiar with kings who reigned much longer than this: e.g. Ardys at 1.16.1 (49 yrs), Alyattes at 1.25.1 (57 yrs.), Deioces at 1.102.1 (53 yrs.), Cheops at 2.127.1 (50 yrs.), Chephren at 2.127.3 (56 yrs.).

(144) Cf. the remarks of Stein ad 5.33, line 9, on this use of *tis*.

(145) Hdt quite often balances the length of a king's reign against what he has done in his life: e.g. *Gyges* at 1.14.4, who despite reigning for 38 years (*basileusantos*, concessive) achieved nothing beyond the capture of Colophon (ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν γὰρ μέγα ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἄλλο ἔργον ἐγένετο); or *Amasis* at 3.10.2, who despite his 44 years of rule managed to come to *no harm*, (ἐν τοῖσι οὐδέν οἱ μέγα ἀνάρσιον πρῆγμα συνηνείχθη), in contrast to his successor, *Psammenitos* (at 3.14.1), who reigned for only

6 months before falling to Cambyses; or Darius at 7.4, who reigned for 36 years but died before he could complete his two latest projects (οὐδέ οἱ ἐξεγένετο οὔτε τοὺς ἀπεστεῶτας Αἰγυπτίους οὔτε Ἀθηναίους τιμωρήσασθαι ; contrast Aesch.Pers.554f, 652f, 709f, 780f, for a different perspective on Darius' career); and cf. Kypselos at 5.92z.1, ἄρξαντος δὲ τούτου ἐπὶ τριήκοντα ἔτεα καὶ διαπλέξαντος τὸν βίον εὖ ... Hdt invites us to consider the appropriateness of the fates of these men: do they get what they deserve, are they fortunate beyond their deserts, beyond what is reasonable for men in their positions? Compare esp. the way Solon at 1.32.2ff balances the length of a man's life (carefully computed in days, not merely years or even months) against his chances of happiness (cf. Artabanus and Xerxes at 7.46.2ff).

(146) Cf. de Ste Croix, OPW p.140, on Cleomenes: "There is scarcely an event of any importance in his reign (sc. in foreign affairs?), apart from the proposal to restore Hippias ...". By comparison with Hdts 'inaccuracy' a statement like this, even taken in its context, is a downright falsification!

(147) Cf. H. Bischoff, Der Warner bei Hdt, Diss.Marburg 1932. For a discussion of this speech, cf. L. Solmsen, 'Reden beim ionischen Aufstand', in Hdt WdF pp.633-7 ("ein Beispiel von Überredungskunst"); Heni, (1976) p.123.

(148) There are certain obvious points of contact between this speech and the 'temptation-speeches' of Maiandrios and Xerxes at the start of Book Seven, urging the invasion of Greece. Cf. 7.5.3, περικαλλὴς χώρη καὶ δένδρεα παντοῖα φέρει τὰ ἥμερα ἀρετήν τε ἄκρη, and 7.8a.2, χώρην ... τῆς νῦν ἐκτήμεθα οὐκ ἐλάσσονα οὐδὲ φλαυροτέρην παμφορωτέρην δέ, with Aristagoras on the wealth of Asia at 5.49.4, ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὰ τοῖσι τὴν ἤπειρον ἐκείνην νεμομένοισι ὅσα οὐδὲ τοῖσι συνάπασι ἄλλοισι. Compare Xerxes on the conquest of Europe at 7.8g.1, γῆν τὴν Περσίδα ἀποδέξομεν τῶι Διὸς αἰθέρι ὁμουρέουσαν, with Aristagoras on the capture of Susa at 5.49.7, ἑλόντες δὲ ταύτην τὴν πόλιν θαρσέοντες ἤδη τῶι Διὶ πλούτου πέρι ἐρίζετε. For Aristagoras on the weakness of the Persians, compare Mardonios at 7.9a.1ff, ... τῶν ἐπιστάμεθα μὲν τὴν μάχην , ἐπιστάμεθα δὲ τὴν δύναμιν ἐοῦσαν ἀσθενέα.

(149) See the views cited by L. Solmsen, art.cit.p.635. Macan (following Grote) sees this detail as an 'anachronism' which tells against the historicity of the interview; however the Spartans themselves never meant to march into central Asia in Hdts lifetime, nor did even the Delian League at its most ambitious ever quite dream of marching on Susa and claiming Darius' empire, so that Aristagoras' proposition can hardly be an 'anachronism' in that sense. The phantasy is surely Hdts rather than his sources: the idea makes sense in terms of his work, with its scheme of threat and counter-threat between Asia and Europe (cf. also the highly questionable story of the Scythian embassy inviting Sparta's support for a war against Darius, at 6.84.1ff), but is not a credible invention of anyone who does not share this unusual historical perspective.

(150) Cf. 5.49.9, ἀναβάλλομαί τοι ἐς τρίτην ἡμέρην ἀποκρινέεσθαι ; cp. the deceitful stalling of Glaucus at 6.86b.2, ἀναβάλλομαι κυρώσειν ἐς τέταρτον μῆνα, and the delay of the Spartan ephors at 9.8.1 (cf. Ch.II.iii.I.1): ἐξ ἡμέρης ἐς ἡμέρην ἀναβαλλόμενοι. It would seem that Cleomenes' hesitation also betokens a preparedness to do the wrong thing.

(151) Cf. Stein: "verzweifelt er an der Zustimmung des Volkes".

(152) This cannot have been the historical reason for Cleomenes' refusal. There was in reality no question of the Spartans going any further than Ionia (or at most Sardis): the march to Susa is a phantasy (cf. n.149).

(153) Cf. 1.66.1, the result of the Lycurgan reforms (καὶ δή σφι οὐκέτι ἀπέχρα ἡσυχίην ἄγειν), with Xerxes at 7.11.2 etc. See Ch.II.i.A.2, below.

(154) Cf. the contrast between Athenian *polypragmosynē* and Sparta's constitutional lethargy made by speakers in Thucydides: e.g 1.70.1ff, with 84.1ff.

(155) Whose money are we meant to suppose this is, Aristagoras' own or money given him by the Ionians to negotiate in this way? Compare the 30 talents which the Euboeans pay to Themistocles to get the allies to fight at Artemisium (8.4.2f, with Ch.II.iii.G).The figure of 50 talents is fantastically large here - surely a further indication that the story is a fiction.

(156) "And got no opportunity to tell anything more of the journey to Susa", adds Hdt, as he prepares for the excursus which immediately follows. Cp. Fehling pp.134f, who overestimates the naïveté of such linking devices. Before speaking condescendingly of Hdts practice here, we should compare the way Thucydides introduces the Sikelika at the start of Book Six (6.1.1ff): "The Athenians had the notion of trying to conquer Sicily, ἄπειροι οἱ πολλοὶ ὄντες τοῦ μεγέθους τῆς νήσου καὶ τῶν ἐνοικούντων τοῦ πλήθεος καὶ Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ...". Thucydides assumes (for the purposes of his exposition) that the reader shares the ignorance of the Athenians, and with this introduction launches into his account: Σικελίης γὰρ περίπλους μὲν ἐστι ... The technical similarity with Hdt is most striking. And cf. C. Schneider, Information und Absicht bei Thukydides, Hypomnemata 41 (1974), esp. pp.53ff.

(157) For Cleomenes' answer as the voice of a Spartan, cf. Immerwahr, p.204.

(158) This is not however solely a peculiarity of Cleomenes, but rather a general rule about men of power; cf. esp. Miltiades, above. The parallels in the careers of these two men confirm the impression that Cleomenes is portrayed more as an exemplar of the corruption of power than as an eccentric madman (see below).

(159) For political theory in Hdt, see Chapter Three, section H. As implied in this discussion, the work can be said to offer a dialectical treatment of the nature of political institutions, with the constitution-debate as its focus.

(160) In displacing the narrative Hdt has made no effort of any kind to suggest how it fits with the rest of his Greek history in chronological terms. We can conclude that Hdt is interested in other things and does not feel the importance of historical sequence quite as much as historians would like him to do: he prefers to arrange his material impressionistically. For a recent discussion of the date of the battle of Sepeia, cf. F. Kiechle, Philol.104 (1960) pp.181ff.

(161) When Cleomenes discovers that he has been misled (6.80) he groans aloud (ἀναστενάξας μέγα) as a man recognizing the workings of *atē*. Cf. Croesus' recognition of the truth of Solon's advice at 1.86.3, ἀνενεικάμενόν τε καὶ ἀναστενάξας ; and Hippias at Marathon (6.107.4: ἀναστενάξας). The scene closely resembles the *anagnorisis* of Cambyses at 3.64.1ff: compare esp. the inquiry as to the name of the place at 3.64.3, εἴρετο ... ὅτι τῇι πόλι οὔνομα εἴη ... οἱ δὲ εἶπαν ὅτι Ἀγβάταϑα, with 6.80, ἐπείρετο ... τίνος εἴη θεῶν τὸ ἄλσος ... ὁ δὲ ἔφη Ἄργους εἶναι. Cleomenes' complaint that Apollo has deceived him (ἦ μεγάλως με ἠπάτηκας) recalls those of Croesus (1.87.3f, 90.2, ἐπείρεσθαι ... εἰ ἐξαπατᾶν τοὺς εὖ ποιεῦντας νόμος ἐστί οἱ ; cf. 90.4).

(162) When he gets to Thyres as a result of this diversion, he sacrifices a bull to the sea before proceeding (6.76.2): for Cleomenes' 'pious observances', see below.

(163) Cf. e.g. Immerwahr's index under 'river-motif'; and e.g. H. Wood pp. 2f: " for Hdt rivers are not only physical boundaries, but also limits of spheres of authority". For example, the Halys dominates the First Book as a geographical, political, military, historical, 'moral' boundary: 1.6.1, 28, 72.2f, 75.3, 103.2, 130.1 (cf. 5.52.2, 102.1; 7.26.3), so that the story of Croesus' diversion of the river to allow the army to cross (1.75.4f even though Hdt affects disbelief) has a very ominous significance. And cf. e.g. Cyrus' humbling of the river Gyndes at 1.189.1f. Xerxes' humbling of the Hellespont was remembered as an act of the highest folly and irreverence throughout antiquity. But contrast K.H. Waters (1971) p.96: "Xerxes committed no wrong in actually crossing the Hellespont - a feat which obviously aroused Hdts admiration" (!); but see, of course, Aesch.Pers.744ff and 864ff; Darius did not cross the Halys, i.e. did not overreach himself and bring about the disaster that followed Xerxes' crossing of the Hellespont. Do not these actions have the same literary significance in Hdt, if not the same metaphysical moment?

(164) See also Miltiades' entry into the temple of Demeter at Paros (6.134.2), where Hdt affects ignorance as to his motive (εἴτε κινήσοντά τι τῶν ἀκινήτων εἴτε ὅ τι δή κοτε πρήξοντα). Once again, the Miltiades narrative coincides with that of Cleomenes. Cleomenes' trial after the Argive expedition (6.82.1f) is similar again to the trial which follows Miltiades' Paros expedition (6.136.1ff, above).

(165) Cf. Bornitz p.222 "Auch dort, wo Hdt zwischen divergierenden Berichten scheinbar resignierend die Entscheidung dem Leser uberlässt, ist es bei genauer Analyse des Zusammenhangs und der Darstellungstechnik möglich, Hdts eigenes intendiertes Urteil zu erkennen, das es zwar andeutet aber dem Leser auf Grund der nicht eindeutigen Quellenlage nicht aufzuzwingen sucht". My interpretation of this curious practice makes Hdt out to be less interested in objective historical truth than Bornitz implies: the tension between the objectivity of his disavowal and the decisiveness of the narrative is designed to create a sense of unease in the reader, who will automatically feel he can infer the right answer from the narrative but at the same time wonder if he has missed some psychological subtlety discovered by Hdt.

(166) Historians are not always content to leave Hdts narrative as they find it. For example, the episode at Erasinos, though it explains itself naturally for Hdt in terms of Cleomenes' character, is re-interpreted as a piece of military strategy, to trick or circumvent the Argive defence: cf. e.g. Lenschau RE XI.I (1921) 696.20ff. This is unlikely if we remember the importance in Spartan military expeditions of the ritual of the *diabateria*: cf. Pritchett III.68ff, with bibliography. The historical reality of the Argive expedition and especially the reasons for and circumstances of Cleomenes' withdrawal, may well have been very different, although it is unlikely we can extract much of reliable truth from our other sources: Plut.de mul.virtut.4.245CF (citing Socrates' Argolika), Paus.II.20.8f, Polyaen. Strateg.8.33; with e.g. Busolt, II.536ff. If it were true that Cleomenes (with Demaratus!) actually *entered* Argos, as reported by Plutarch (= Socrates), then Hdts account of Cleomenes' trial cannot be historical, as it assumes no attempt was ever made on the city.

(167) Cf. Bruns p.80: "es ist kein Zweifel, dass Hdt sowohl den Kleomenes wie den Kambyses geschildert hat, ohne mit sich über die wichtige Frage ins Reine gekommen zu sein, ob sie von Haus aus als krank oder gesund anzusehen seien". Compare Bruns pp.82-4, on Miltiades, and pp.85-90, on Themistocles (cf. nn. 71 and 90, above).

(168) Cf. 3.29.1 and 30.1, for a similar attack of madness in Cambyses.

(169) For Hdts use of speeches and their relation to the action, cf. Deffner (1933); Hohti (1976); and Heni (1977).

(170) Cf. Schneider (1974) for the demonstration that in principle Thucydides' ascription of motive depends on his own imaginative reconstruction and not on the report of his source(s); Schneider, in my view, actually concedes too much when he allows that there may be exceptions to this rule. At any rate, what appears to be a principle in Thucydides is clearly likely to be a principle in Hdt as well.

(171) Cf. e.g. Fornara pp.92-3: "Hdt is not as simple as he is made to appear. He was capable of irony and aimed at dramatic effect. Above all, he knew full well the *Tendenz* he is supposed merely to reflect ... Hdt is responsible for the objectionable contradictions; it is we who make Hdt simple"; also Strasburger (1965) p.581: "die archaische scheinbare Naivetät nicht tauschen darf", and p.582: "sicher ist dies gerade ein Hauptvergnügen des älteren griechischen Publikums: die eigene Intelligenz als Hörer oder Leser zu geniessen".

(172) For the *dubitatio* εἴτε ... εἴτε, etc.: cf. Schmid-Stählin I.2.630 n.5; e.g. 1.19.2; 2.181.1; 3.33; 4.147.4, 164.4; 6.134.2; 8.54, 87.3, 116.2; 9.5.2, 18.2; and cf. e.g. Hom.Il.9.537.

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Endnote:

It remains to mention here the dissertation of Th. Spath, 'Das Motiv der doppelten Beleuchtung', Diss.Wien (1968), which came to my notice too late for me to take proper account of it. Spath's thesis, which differs little from e.g. the position of Immerwahr (cf. n16, above), is essentially that Hdt makes a point of allowing contradictions in the stories of individuals and states to stand without correction. In this, he argues, Hdt is particularly concerned to observe his own 'principle' (cf. 2.123.1 and 7.152.3, but contrast n.4, above) of 'reporting what was said to him' (legein ta legomena), that is accepting the contradictions of the oral traditions at his disposal without attempting in any way to reconcile them. This procedure constitutes a 'motif of double illumination', which guarantees that every character will in some way be seen in two different lights. Spath goes on to illustrate this by a rapid review of most of the main characters in the work (including the main Greek states), in which he lists, without any detailed commentary, the passages which reflect well on them and those which do not. When he comes to Themistocles, to Cleisthenes and the Alcmeonids, and to the city of Athens, he argues at greater length that the principle is here suspended, and that Hdt was influenced by Pericles and the Alcmeonids into taking a hostile view of Themistocles and a favourable view of the Athenian democracy and the Alcmeonid house (but contrast Ch.I.i, above, for Themistocles, and for the rest cf. Ch.II.ii).

The chief weakness of this study is that is nowhere discusses contexts in any detail, and hence offers no explanation of how Hdt actually wants his effects to work. This means that while the range of examples covered is quite considerable, it is hard to feel that the thesis is anywhere satisfactorily proved, rather than merely stated. My main disagreement, however, is not so much over method, as in interpretation: for me the reason for these Hdtean paradoxes is that he is concerned to show us certain truths about human nature and the ways in which we form our judgements of it. I have in addition numerous points of detailed disagreement with Spath's treatment, which however it would be unprofitable to rehearse here. Cf. the hostile reviews by G. Lachenaud, REG 82 (1969) pp.646-8, N.G.L. Hammond, CR 85 (1971) pp.126-7, and H.C. Avery, AJP 92 (1971) pp.357-8; but contrast W. den Boer, Mnemosyne 26 (1973) pp.65-6.

Chapter Two, Introduction and Parts i.A and B: NOTES.

(1) For the problem, cf. Jacoby, RE art.337.42ff; Powell p.10; contra e.g. Focke pp.9f and Hellmann pp.23f. The significance of *eleutheria* in this passage and the importance of the passage as a whole in defining the limits of the work do not seem to have been appreciated. The explanation of this problem by B. Shimron, Eranos 71 (1973) pp.45ff, that Hdt is distinguishing Croesus of whom he has secure historical knowledge from his predecessors of whom he has not, seems to me preposterous. Shimron, of course, fails to observe that the formula *prōtos tōn hēmeis idmen* which he takes to be proof of this interpretation, is of a kind with the expressions κάλλιστος/μέγιστος/πλεῖστος/ἄριστος/μοῦνος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν/αὐτὸς οἶδα (cf. Powell s.v. οἶδα (1): e.g. 1.142.1; 2.68.2; 3.60.4; 4.46.2; 5.49.5; 6.21.1; 7.20.2; 8.105.1; 9.37.2, etc.). It is clear that this type of expression is merely a rhetorical trope: "let me tell you, this was the first/best/only/biggest, etc.", and in most, if not all cases, Herodotus would clearly be hard pressed to explain how he could lay claim to such certainty!

(2) Would Hdt like us to remember how this sequence could be extended beyond the end of the work, to the time when Ionia was 'enslaved' by the Athenians? Cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.98.4 (on Naxos), πρώτη τε αὕτη πόλις παρὰ τὸ καθεστηκὸς ἐδουλώθη. See below on the importance of 'contemporary perspective'.

(3) Cf. 2.1.2 (Cambyses), Ἴωνας μὲν καὶ Αἰολέας ὡς δούλους πατρωίους ἐόντας ἐνόμιζε.

(4) In this Hdt agrees with the author of Airs, Waters, Places, e.g. 16.3ff, 23.19ff and 30ff, 24.19ff; and esp. 23.40f, οὕτως οἱ νόμοι οὐχ ἥκιστα τὴν εὐψυχίην ἐργάζονται.

(5) Cf. Bornitz pp.116 and 126; and for Hdts nomadic Scyths as an exercise in ethnographic imagination, cf. F. Hartog, Annales (ESC) 34 (1979) 1137-54.

(6) Cf. e.g. Bornitz p.191; also e.g. Pohlenz (1937) pp.78ff.

(7) There has been remarkably little attention paid to such an obviously central theme of the work. K. von Fritz, Die gr.Eleutheria bei Hdt, WS 78(1965) pp.5ff, is concerned almost exclusively with the Greek side, and the Persian Wars in particular (cf. Ch.II.iii.A.2). There is more in his Gr. Geschichtsschreibung, though while he recognizes the thematic importance of freedom throughout the work, he is constrained by his theory of the work's genesis to minimize its coherence and unity as a theme; e.g. GGS I.290 (on the stories of Media and Persia in Book One): "Der Komplex von Geschichten ... ist also inhaltlich dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass er unaufhörlich um das Problem von *eleutheria* und Despotismus ... kreist, formal aber dadurch, dass die Resultate von Erkundungen, die Hdt verschiedenen Ortes angestellt hat, und die Resultate seines eigenen Nachdenkens über die Dinge nebeneinanderstehen und gelegentlich miteinander in Konflikt geraten sowie dadurch, dass, wo dies der Fall ist, der Denkprozess nicht immer ganz bis zu seinem Ende durchgeführt ist, sondern Unstimmigkeiten bleiben". As we shall see, there is very little reason for such criticism of the coherence of Hdts exposition. Besides von Fritz there is little to choose: few commentators ignore the question altogether, and yet there is almost no detailed discussion of contexts in any of them. Cf. e.g Pohlenz (1937) pp.9-21, and (1966); D. Nestle, 'Eleutheria.Stud.zum Wesen

der Freiheit bei den Griechen u.im Neuen Testament', Teil I (1967) at pp.47ff; O. Gigon, 'Der Begriff der Freiheit in der Antike', Gymnas.80 (1973) pp.8-56. And e.g. Fornara p.78: "There was a constant struggle between men fighting to be free and others to enslave, with a constant shifting of role. Cyrus won freedom for the Persians and proceeded to impose slavery on others. It is no understatement to say that for Hdt this was an immutable law of history". And also Strasburger (1965) at pp.578ff.

(8) For the propaganda of freedom in Thucydides, cf. H. Diller, Gymnas. 69 (1962) pp.189ff = Herter (1968) pp.639-60.

(9) Cf. Strasburger (1965) p.600 (in relation to the Socles-scene): "Die Jahre vor 431 sind in Griechenland von einem Meinungsstreit erfüllt, der die Antithese *katadoulosis/eleutheria* zur Grundlage hat. Auch Hdt beteiligt sich an der Diskussion". And cf. Fornara pp.89-90: "Hdt could have learned from a study of his material that Persia made a constant advance spanning the lives of several rulers ... The idea, however, that this process was inevitable because of the nature of things - that Persia had to advance for reasons transcending specific causes - that could not be learned from the study of the facts. It can only have been projected back into the pattern as a 'truth' learned from the present". On the view to be advanced here Persian growth does not depend on 'reasons transcending specific causes', but rather, like the growth of the Athenian empire in Thucydides' analysis, on the drive towards *pleonexia* in human nature.

(10) The comparison between the Athenian empire and Persia was commonly made in Hdts lifetime to judge from Thucydides, cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.69.5 and 77.5 (ὑπὸ γοῦν τοῦ Μήδου δεινότερα τούτων πάσχοντες ἠνείχοντο, ἡ δὲ ἡμετέρα ἀρχὴ χαλεπὴ δόκει εἶναι, εἰκότως· τὸ παρὸν γὰρ αἰεὶ βαρὺ τοῖς ὑπηκόοις) with 6.76.4. Cf.II.iii.K.

(10a) Cf. Kienzle p.85, for *eleutheria* in the praise of cities in Greek poetry.

(11) Cf. e.g. Strasburger (1965) p.587: "Mit der *eleutheria* (sowohl eines Gemeinwesens wie eines Individuums) ist für Hdt ein uneingeschränkt hoher Wert bezeichnet"; and Fornara, p.80: "And Hdt is as devoted as anyone in the history of letters to the ideal of freedom".

(12) Cf. on the problems of justice and self-interest in popular Greek thinking, Dover, GPM pp.309-10, and 81-2.

(13) Cf. Democr.DK II.206.18 (?). Note that Darius follows Atossa's advice in part: the Scythian expedition is undertaken when the empire is at its prime (4.1.1), ἀνθεύσης γὰρ τῆς Ἀσίης ἀνδράσι καὶ χρημάτων μεγάλων συνιόντων ἐπεθύμησε ὁ Δαρεῖος τείσασθαι Σκύθας.

(14) Cf. e.g. Bornitz p.67: "Sobald eine gewisse Ordnung, eine Wohlstand, eine gewisse Machtfülle erreicht ist, tritt das Überhebliche, ungezügelte Verlangen auf, diese Macht über den begrenzten eigene Bereich hinaus aufzudehnen".

(14a) For a similar view of the relative importance in Hdt of divine and natural causation, cf. Huber (1965), passim. G. Nenci, Assoc.G. Budé. Actes IXe Congrès (Paris 1975) pp.133-46: "il comprend très bien la logique du developpement qui change les 'structures' de la société, mais en penseur delphique il veut démontrer que cette logique ne se passe pas de la volonté de l'homme"; I do not, of course, follow the second half of this formulation.

(14b) Cf. P. Hohti, Arctos 9 (1975) 31-7, for these expressions.

(15) That this observation need not be tied to a metaphysical scheme can be seen from the parallels in Pl.Polit.302A and Legg.676BC. And cf. de Romilly (1977), who rightly stresses the appreciation of underlying causes in this recurrent idea: "they had no idea of a general rule or rhythm that would have commanded the rise and fall of states, whatever their conditions or policy"; and on this passage, cf. pp.11-12.

(16) Cf. de Romilly (1977) pp.42-6, who also minimizes the importance of religious hybris as an explanation: "Hdt, although he occasionally puts forth general notions about religious hybris, shows a clear tendency to adopt more rationalistic explanations, an attitude by which he is - volens nolens - paving the way for Thucydides and for a totally political hybris".

(17) For 'over-determination', cf. Dodds (1951) pp.30f.

(18) The nearest ancient word, and one that perhaps has its origins in the sophistic period, is hypothesis, a late 5thc usage to judge from Hippocr.Vet.Med., passim, but otherwise not before Plato. Cf. e.g. G.E.R. Lloyd, Phronesis 8 (1963) pp.108ff, and at p.126: "VM ... indicates that already in the preiod before Plato (in all probability) medical theorists were familiar with the concept of a postulate, i.e. something which has itself not been proved, but which is assumed as a basis for theories and explanations, and had discussed the legitimacy of making use of such assumptions in different fields of inquiry". That such a striking terminological innovation should have survived only in this one text (if indeed it is pre-Platonic: cf. Ch.III, n.87), should remind us of how little we know the language of the sophistic movement.

(19) Hunter (1982), summing up the respective methods of reconstructing the distant past of Hdt and Thucydides, concludes that there is a fundamental difference (p.107): "Both employ generalizations and argue in such a way as to produce a synthesis. Thucydides alone begins with a theoretical and highly speculative construct and consciously applies it to the early history of Greece". That Hunter can overlook the possibility that this too is something Thucydides shares with Hdt, is explained by her having confined her analysis of Hdt to Book Two (cf. pp.50-92), where our model at least is absent. But is even Book Two without the use of theoretical constructs: does not Hdts account of the priority of Egyptian culture and the debt of the rest of the world to Egypt itself depend on a model, a preconceived construct which Hdt artificially forces on the evidence? (cf. Ch.III.B).

(20) The reference of this sentence is disputed (see Gomme, HCT ad loc.): the autois may refer to the Athenians alone (so Classen-Steup) or to both them and the Spartans. The latter alternative is surely the more likely: Thucydides is stressing that both powers had at the same time reached such a condition of strength, each in its own way, that confrontation was inevitable.

(21) For discussion of the thought of the Archaeology, cf. J. de Romilly, ASNP 25 (1966) 144ff; von Fritz, GGS I.557ff; and contrast W. den Boer (1977) pp.21ff (a bizarre piece of negative argument to show that there is

no conception of 'progress' in the account). And see now the analysis of Hunter (1982) pp.17-49.

(22) Cf. Thucyd.8.24.3ff, on Chios as an exception to rule of stability leading to aggressive expansion: Χῖοι γὰρ μόνοι μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων ὧν ἐγὼ ᾐσθόμην ηὐδαιμόνησάν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐσωφρόνησαν, καὶ ὅσωι ἐπεδίδου ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον, τόσωι δὲ καὶ ἐκοσμοῦντο ἐχυρώτερον.

(23) Contrast e.g. 1.15.2, κατὰ γῆν δὲ πολέμους, ὅθεν τις καὶ δύναμις παρεγένετο, οὐδεὶς ξυνέστη· πάντες δὲ ἦσαν ὅσοι καὶ ἐγένοντο, πρὸς ὁμόρους τοὺς σφετέρους ἑκάστοις, καὶ ἐκδήμους στρατείας πολὺ ἀπὸ τῆς ἑαυτῶν ἐπ' ἄλλων καταστροφῆι οὐκ ἐξῆισαν οἱ Ἕλληνες. οὐ γὰρ ξυνειστήκεσαν πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις ὑπήκοοι ... . But these conditions no longer obtained after the Persian Wars, when alliances had been built up on either side to such a scale that major 'international' confrontation became inevitable: cf. 1.18.2ff.

(24) We can imagine that Hdts models of Persian and Athenian expansion in this more distant past are influenced by the experience of the growth of Athenian power after the Persian Wars as threatening confrontation with Sparta. Cf. Ch.II.i.B.3.

(25) Cf. besides the examples cited here: 1.163.3 (Arganthonios' perception of the growth of Persia), ὁ δὲ πυνθανόμενος τὸν Μῆδον παρ' αὐτῶν (sc. the Phocaeans) ὡς αὔξοιτο, ἐδίδου σφι χρήματα τεῖχος περιβαλέσθαι τὴν πόλιν; 5.66.1 and 78, with 91.1 (Athenian growth after the advent of democracy; cf. Ch.II.ii.C); 7.156.3 (the growth of Gelon's Sicilian empire). And cf. Strasburger (1965) p.587, n.36.

(26) Polycrates is encouraged by the evidence of his own prosperity to build himself a small empire. He has much in common here with Thucydides' Minos, whom in Hdt he replaces as the first known thalassocrat (cf. 3.122.2), τῆς δὲ ἀνθρωπηίης λεγομένης γενεῆς Πολυκράτης πρῶτος, ἐλπίδας πολλὰς ἔχων Ἰωνίης τε καὶ νήσων ἄρξειν; cf. 3.39.4, συχνὰς μὲν δὴ τῶν νήσων ἀραιρήκεε, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἠπείρου ἄστεα. In the same way Minos uses his fleet to establish an island empire (cf. Thucyd.1.4, καὶ τῶν Κυκλάδων νήσων ἦρξε) of tribute-paying dependants (and cf. Thucyd.1.15.1). Polycrates indeed brings together in Hdt a number of the main stages of development instanced in the Archaeology: thalassocracy (Thucyd.1.13.2ff, etc.), tyranny (1.13.1), imperialism (1.15.1), international alliances (with Amasis and Cambyses; cf. Thucyd.1.18.2).

(27) For a discussion of Hdts 'pregnant' use of the word epairō, cf. H.C Avery, Hermes 107 (1979) pp.1ff.

(28) For the analogy, cf. de Romilly (1977) p.19; with Thucyd.1.82.6, 124.1, 144.3; 2.64.6; 3.10.1, 82.2.

(29) Cyrus seems here to have forgotten the lesson he learnt when he saved Croesus from the pyre at 1.86.6, ἐννώσαντα ὅτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἄνθρωπος ἐὼν ἄλλον ἄνθρωπον, γενόμενον ἑωυτοῦ εὐδαιμονίηι οὐκ ἐλάσσω, ζῶντα πυρὶ διδοίη (cf. Ch.I.i.3, above). This is perhaps a lesson that a man in his position cannot long remember as long as his good fortune remains unchanged.

(30) For the expression δι' ἡσυχίης εἶναι, cf. 1.66.1, of the Spartans after Lycurgus: καὶ δή σφι οὐκέτι ἀπέχρα ἡσυχίην ἄγειν (with the discussion below; and cf. 1.102.1); and 7.11.2, Xerxes on the supposed

threat of Athens to Persia: εὖ ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι εἰ ἡμεῖς ἡσυχίην ἄξομεν, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐκεῖνοι (with Ch.II.iii.D, below; and cf. 7.8a.1). Compare the expression οὐκ ἀτρεμίζειν: 1.185.1, Nitocris on Median expansion: ἀρχὴν μεγάλην τε καὶ οὐκ ἀτρεμίζουσαν ; and contrast Artabanus at 7.18.3: γνώμην εἶχον ἀτρεμίζοντά σε μακαριστὸν εἶναι πρὸς πάντων ἀνθρώπων.

There is an obvious parallel with Athenian polypragmosyne in Thucydides: "There is no cure for it", says the Athenian speaker, Euphemos at 6.87.3. And see the strictures of Pericles and Alcibiades on apragmosyne at 2.63.2 and 3, 64.4, with 6.18.6 and 7. The Corinthian speaker at Sparta concludes his assessment of the Athenian character with the judgement (1.70.9): ὥστε εἴ τις αὐτοὺς ξυνελὼν φαίη πεφυκέναι ἐπὶ τῶι μήτε αὐτοὺς ἔχειν ἡσυχίαν μήτε τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ἐᾶν, ὀρθῶς ἂν εἴποι. As Pericles observes, the Athenians have burdened themselves with the necessity of ceaseless activity and the taking of ever more risks (2.63.3): οὐδὲ ἐν ἀρχούσηι πόλει ξυμφέρει, ἀλλ' ἐν ὑπηκόωι, ἀσφαλῶς δουλεύειν. In other words, their inability to 'keep quiet' is a direct function of their empire: if they want a different life, they must content themselves with being 'slaves'. Again Hdts perception of the workings of eastern empire bears such a close relation to Thucydides' analysis of the Athenian empire that it looks as though he has built his interpretation on contemporary experience (and possibly sophistic analysis of empire?), although imitation of Hdt by Thucydides cannot logically be ruled out.

(31) Compare here what Hdt says of Miltiades after Marathon (6.132), μετὰ δὲ ἐν Μαραθῶνι τρῶμα γενόμενον Μιλτιάδης, καὶ πρότερον εὐδοκιμέων παρὰ 'Αθηναίοισι, τότε μᾶλλον αὔξετο: the introduction to the account of the Parian expedition (cf. Ch.I.i.6). The use of the verb auxein here seems to involve an ambiguity: the word can mean both 'exalt by praise' (cf. e.g. Pl.Lys.206A) and 'increase in power' (cf. LSJ sv.1.2). Cf. Stein's rendering here: "augebatur, stieg an Ansehen und Einfluss". Coupled with eudokimeōn here it seems to invite the first sense (with which cf. bebōmena of Polycrates' achievements at 3.39.3, cited above); but from the context it is clear that Miltiades' 'influence' (power) at Athens is the more important result of his success at Marathon. That success, and the acclaim which attends it, breeds in him confidence in his own powers, and an ambition for profit and even conquest: he asks the Athenians for ships and money, but does not say where he means to take them, promising them wealth and land (cf. 6.135.1, he sails back οὔτε χρήματα 'Αθηναίοισι ἄγων οὔτε Πάρον προσκτησάμενος). See further Ch.II.iii.C. Compare the way Themistocles too abuses his acclaim after Salamis: cf. e.g. 8.112.2, πυνθανόμενοι (sc. the islanders) ... Θεμιστοκλέα ὡς ἐν αἴνηι μεγίστηι τῶν στρατηγῶν εἴη; and 112.3, χρήματα παρὰ τῶν νησιωτέων ἐκτᾶτο λάθρηι τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν. Both men show the presumption, ambition and even corruption that attend greatness. Cf. Ar.Pol.1304A33ff, on the disruptive effect of men who are responsible for increasing the power of the state: they will either stimulate the envy of others, ἢ οὗτοι διὰ ὑπεροχὴν οὐ θέλουσι μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν ἴσων.

(32) Cf. Thucyd. 1.120.3f, μήτε τῆι κατὰ πόλεμον εὐτυχίαι ἐπαίρεσθαι; and cf. e.g. Pl.Legg. 641C, on the psychological effect of victory in battle: πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑβριστότεροι διὰ πολέμων νίκας γενόμενοι ... Cf. de Romilly (1963) pp.322ff, for a discussion of this theme in Thucydides: it is not clear, however, whether she does or does not distinguish his position from the traditional Greek one.

(33) For metaballein as a 'technical term' in this passage, cf. Ryffel p.58 with n.179.

(34) The oracle apparently has nothing to do with the story of Lycurgus' political activity (contrast e.g. the garbled tradition of Diod.VII.12.6); but it is surely probable that there existed in Hdts day an oracle or oracles which did connect Lycurgus' reforms with Delphi - which Hdt may be deliberately passing over here, for two reasons: (a) to extend his 'obfuscation' of the Lycurgus-story that much further, and (b) to save his story about the discrepant Spartan tradition (see n.35), which would otherwise fall to the ground.

(35) That the Spartans should ever have told Hdt that Lycurgus borrowed their *kosmos* from Crete and not have claimed it as original to them and to the inspiration of Delphi defies belief. Contrast e.g. the argument of Ehrenberg (1925) at p.12: "aber die Version mag ihren Ursprung einer vorübergehenden politischen Entfremdung zwischen Sparta und Delphi verdanken, kann jedenfalls nicht als älteste Form der spartanischen Lykurgslegende angesprochen werden. Das wird schon durch die andere, später kanonisch gewordene Version bewiesen, die Hdt vielleicht in Delphi gehört hat, die aber ursprünglich nicht ohne Wissen und Zustimmung Spartas geschaffen sein kann". See also Kleingünther (1933) pp.122ff; W.G. Forrest, Phoenix 17 (1963) p.161. It is hard to believe that the memory of Apollo's divine approval for the new constitution (cf. e.g. Delphi's sanction for the setting-up of colonies) could ever have been effaced by the state's temporary alienation from Delphi; and see esp. Pl.Legg.624A, 632D, 634A etc., where there is no doubt that Apollo is the 'author' of the Spartan constitution. For whatever the comparison is worth, Plutarch has the Great Rhetra brought back from Delphi by Theopompus and Polydorus (cf. Lycurg.6.1, μαντείαν ἐκ Δελφῶν κομίσαι περὶ αὐτῆς), while Tyrtaeus, whoever and whatever the subject of his poem may be, explicitly claims Delphic sanction for part or whole of the Spartan constitution (F4.1ffW, Φοίβου ἀκούσαντες Πυθωνόθεν οἴκαδ᾽ ἔνεικαν / μαντείας τε θεοῦ καὶ τελέεντ᾽ ἔπεα). Hdts *kosmos* almost certainly combines constitution and *agōgē* in the work of Lycurgus (cf. Stein: "die staatliche und gesellschaftliche Ordnung nach Gesetz und Sitte"), though it is probably right (with Stein) to excise the disorderly sentence at 1.65.5 which seems to link the two. This being so Hdt is disregarding (probably through ignorance) the evidence of Tyrtaeus, to the effect that the Spartan *kosmos* was brought back from Delphi, a tradition which, given the abiding authority of Tyrtaeus at Sparta (cf. Pl.Legg.629AB), is unlikely to have been replaced in the Spartan popular imagination by the story of Cretan borrowing. The latter story was however almost certainly current in the learned speculation of Hdts own day, that is in circles outside Sparta. It is well established in Ephorus (FGH F149) and Aristotle (Pol.II.10.1271B20ff; cf. F535 Rose), but the similarities of Cretan and Spartan constitutions are already taken for granted in Plato (Republ.544C, 547Aff; Legg.631Bff and 780Eff), though the theory of a historical connexion clearly has no basis in reality (cf. e.g. Murray (1980) pp.169f.). These examples show not that the story was a Spartan tradition, but that learned comparisons by early political theorists had shown to their satisfaction that the largely imagined similarities of the two cultures proved dependence. The presuppositions involved (that similarities are sufficient evidence for cultural borrowings) are the same as those which we find in Hdts account of the dependence of Greek culture on that of Egypt (cf. Ch.III.B). It is not hard to imagine that the Spartan theory originated in the work of some 5thc sophist such as Critias (cf. DK 88B32-7, for his *Politeia Lakedaimoniōn*; with Guthrie, HGP III.302) or possibly Hippias (cf. Ch.III.A). As for Hdts source-citation, Fehling has shown that fictitious

epichoric citations are often used to substantiate learned conjectures, and this example could clearly fit this category.

(36) Whether we adopt the Spartan or the non-Spartan version, it is clear that Lycurgus is in Hdts mind the regent for Leobotes: although the information is broached for the first time within the Spartan account, the ensuing sentence pursues the narrative in Hdts voice and in *epetropeuse* picks up *epitropeusanta* as fact not as opinion.

(37) With this provision, cf. esp. Solon's precautions at Athens (1.29.1f): ὁρκίοισι γὰρ μεγάλοισι κατείχοντο δέκα ἔτεα χρήσεσθαι νόμοισι τοὺς ἄν σφι Σόλων θῆται.

(38) Cf. e.g. Diod.12.9.1 (Sybaris), συνέβη ταύτην λαβεῖν ταχεῖαν αὔξησιν διὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῆς χώρας. The metaphor in Hdts *anadramein* may well derive from Homer, as Stein and others have seen: cf. Il.18.56 (of Achilles as a child), ὁ δ' ἀνέδραμεν ἔρνεϊ ἶσος, where the biological image is explicit. The 'suddenness' of the growth of the Persian empire (not the king's own rise to power) is presumably the thought behind the god's warning to Xerxes at 7.14, ὡς καὶ μέγας καὶ πολλὸς ἐγένεο ἐν ὀλίγωι χρόνωι, οὕτω καὶ ταπεινὸς ὀπίσω κατὰ τάχος ἔσεαι. For the metaphor, cf. de Romilly (1977) pp.12-3. Also A. Demandt, Metaphern für Geschichte (1978) pp.18ff, and esp. pp.37ff (das Lebensalter Gleichnis). Aristotle in the Politics is fond of medical and biological metaphors and analogies for political conditions (1281B3ff, 1290B21ff); and the medical metaphor obviously underlies Thucydides' account of the plague at Athens and *stasis* at Corcyra in opposite ways. Compare Hdts way of talking about states as flourishing (*akmazein*), flowering (*anthein*), blossoming (*blastanein*), growing (*auxanesthai*), and being diseased (*nosein*).

(39) Den Boer's calculation of Hdts date (1954) pp.65f, using 40 year (Spartan and/or Hecataean) generations for the king-lists (7.204 and 8.131.2), would put Leobotes with Polydectes at the end of the 11thc (1010-970). Why Hdt chooses this date for Lycurgus cannot even be guessed at: cf. e.g. W.G. Forrest, Phoenix 17 (1963) p.172. If we are to believe that the Simonides mentioned by Plutarch (Lycurg.1.8) is correctly identified as the famous poet (c.556-468), then a tradition older than Hdt and presumably accessible to him made Lycurgus the son of Prytanis and the brother of Eunomos (Hdtean date: 970). It is not hard to imagine that Lycurgus' name came to be associated with king Eunomos because he brought *eunomia* to Sparta, though the name Eunomos, like Prytanis, looks suspiciously like a stop-gap from the point of view of the king-lists. But Hdts Lycurgus is regent for Leobotes, who is a generation older than Eunomos and a member of the opposite house! For a speculative reconstruction of the shape of the chronological tradition for Lycurgus, cf. Den Boer (1954) pp.5ff (cf. esp. Plut.Lycurg.1). Lycurgus is well established later as the guardian of Charilaos (a Eurypontid) and placed early in the 9thc (cf. e.g. Eratosthenes FGH 241F1, who puts him 108 years before the first Olympiad). Xenophon (Lak.Pol.10.8) makes Lycurgus contemporary with the Heraclidae, in other words at the start of Spartan history, in the interests no doubt of maximum antiquity for the creator of the constitution. Other early witnesses do not name Lycurgus but place the 'Spartan constitution' at

widely different times. Hellanicus (FGH 4F116), to the scorn of Ephorus, ascribed it not to Lycurgus but to Eurysthenes and Procles; Pindar (Py.1.61.ff), speaking of the Dorian constitution of Hieron's Aetna (Ὑλλίδος στάθμας) describes the Spartans as content to live τεθμοῖσιν ἐν Αἰγιμίου. Thucydides (1.18.1) dates Spartan eunomia (or more precisely the change of constitution) to 400 years before the end of "the war" (i.e. c.821 or 804). A. Andrewes, CQ 32 (1938) pp.93ff, tries to avoid the implications of Thucydides' words and bring him into line with what he believes to be implied by Hdt (see below); Thucydides, he argues, must be dating not 'the introduction of eunomia' but merely the Spartans' enjoyment of the same constitution. But the supposed disjunction between ηὐνομήθη and τῆι αὐτῆι πολιτείαι χρῶνται is forced, and it leaves Thucydides giving us a surprisingly precise date for a period with an unspecified beginning: what are we supposed to imagine happened that was different in the late 9thc if not the suppression of stasis and the creation of eunomia? Even more improbable is that we are forced to take the words ἔτη γάρ ἐστι μάλιστα τετρακόσια ... as an explanation of αἰεί rather than ἐκ παλαιτάτου: 'always' cannot be paraphrased in terms of a finite number of years! Den Boer (1954) pp.83-5 takes Thucydides to refer to the reign of king Theopompus, reckoning back 10 generations of Eurypontid kings from Archidamus II (d.427) with (Spartan?) 40-year generations. But this implies that Thucydides himself made a calculation using 40-year generations, which seems improbable, or that he borrowed such a calculation from someone else without checking it, which is even less credible. None of this, of course, helps us with Hdt; but it is worth noting the variety of dates in circulation at this early period, none of which points, however, with any certainty to anything as late as a 7thc date for Lycurgus. The tendency is to ascribe great antiquity to the Spartan constitution, as to Lycurgus, no doubt reflecting the success of Sparta's own propaganda.

(40) Cf. A. Andrewes, 'Eunomia', CQ 32 (1938) 92-3. For a reading of Hdt which assumes he actually does mean what he says, cf. N. Hammond, JHS 70 (1950) at pp.53-5 (= Stud.in Greek History (1973) at pp.67-9), who argues for an early date for Lycurgus. Hammond, however, makes no effort to explain why Hdt wants to create quite a different impression from what he believes to be the truth. Cf. also den Boer (1954) pp.25-9. It is certain that Hdt did not intend to date the Tegean Battle of the Fetters with Lycurgus in the 11thc-10thc: cf. D. Leahy, Phoenix 12 (1958) p.156.

(41) We can further object to Andrewes' argument that if Hdt was indeed told of a change in Sparta's constitution around c.600 (i.e. the reigns of Leon and Agasikles), he was almost certainly misled. This is surely too low a date for the Rhetra, and Andrewes' contention that Tyrtaeus knows nothing of that document is surely false. Cf. e.g. Cartledge pp.131ff; Murray (1980) pp.153ff. The evidence now surely seems to require an early or mid-7thc Rhetra, provoked by the demands of the rising hoplite class and the crisis of the second Messenian War, as reflected in the poetry of Tyrtaeus. The 'decline of Spartan culture' illustrated by archaeology and other evidence for the early to mid-6thc (cf. Halliday, CQ 27 (1977) pp.111ff; contra e.g. Cartledge pp.154ff), whether or not it is the product of legislation (e.g. to be associated with the ephorate of Chilon), is clearly a separate stage: the agōgē is the answer, devised after 50-100 years of the new constitution, to the social needs of the new society.

(42) Although the debate referred to by the speaker in Pl.Legg.776C seems to concern the advantages and disadvantages rather than the rights and wrongs of Helotage (and other forms of slavery), it is clear that the issue of its

morality was discussed in antiquity (cf. e.g. Critias DK 88B37; Isocr. Panath.178; Theopompus FGH 115F13; with Cartledge, Appendix 4, pp.347ff, for a selection of ancient comments). Critias may or may not have openly criticised the Spartans on this point, but sophistic discussion of slavery (cf. Guthrie, HGP III.155-60) must have dealt at least occasionally with the example of the Helots - especially when the sophists in question were teaching at Athens! Cf. e.g. the horror of Thucydides at the gratuitous massacre of Helots 'for security reasons' in 424 (cf. 4.80.2-4; and cp. 1.123.1, 3.40.2).

(43) Cf. Cartledge p.127; and cf. 5.49.8, for the Messenian revolt(s) of the 5thc; cp. 9.35.2 and 64.2.

(44) Cf. Cartledge pp.137-8: an "infuriating vagueness" about which wars are meant here; Cartledge's only suggestion is "the struggle for control of Olympia, in which Sparta helped Elis to oust the local Pisatan dynasty (possibly in 572)". Stein understands a reference to an (earlier) struggle with Argos (cf. Hdt 1.82; with Forrest (1968) p.73 and Jeffery (1976) p.138), or to victories over the other Arcadians (cf. 1.65.1) and concludes: "Die messenischen fallen frÜher". But therein lies Hdts problem: the Messenian Wars are too early to serve his purposes.

(45) For a thoughtful account of the problems of the Spartan-Tegean conflict, cf. D.M. Leahy, Phoenix 12 (1958) esp. pp.156ff (cf. DL I.115 = Theopompus FGH 115F69; with Deinias FGH 306F4 and Paus.8.47-8). The Spartan aim, he argues, was principally to prevent Tegea supporting the Messenians, not conquest of Tegeatis.

(46) Cf. 1.65.1, ἐόντας ἤδη τῶι πολέμωι κατυπερτέρους Τεγεητέων; and 1.67.1, ἤδη ... κατυπέρτεροι τῶι πολέμωι. The expression (cf. Powell s.v.) clearly means "having defeated them in war".

(47) The view that the Tegeans are not meant to be included among the *katestrammenoi* at 1.68.6 seems to me untenable: it is surely very difficult to read this last sentence as anything other than the climax to the Tegean narrative, which has served Hdts purposes in illustrating by a particular example what 'Spartan conquest' has consisted in elsewhere. A transition away from Tegea to a series of conquests of which Tegea was not meant to be a part would surely be intolerably abrupt here, especially given that we are offered no further substantiation of this important claim.

(48) We may not perhaps infer much of value from the Alpheios-stele (Plut. Mor 292B; Aristotle F592 Rose; cf. F. Jacoby, CQ 38 (1944) pp.15f): Λακεδαιμόνιοι Τεγεάταις διαλλαγέντες ἐποιήσαντο συνθήκας καὶ στήλην ἐπ' Ἀλφειῶι κοινὴν ἀνέστησαν. The only clause we know stipulates what the Tegeans shall and shall not do (Μεσσηνίους ἐκβαλεῖν ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ μὴ ἐξεῖναι χρηστοὺς ποιεῖν); but the language of the decree (cf. the words underlined above) looks like that of a bilateral agreement rather than an imposed settlement.

(49) Cf. Cartledge l.c; and e.g. Forrest (1968) pp.69-77. Compare D.M. Leahy, Historia 4 (1955) pp.26ff, for the Bones of Teisamenos from Achaean Helike (Paus.7.1.8). See also the propaganda of Stesichorus in this direction: Bowra (1961) 112ff; and cf. M.L. West, ZPE 4 (1969) pp.142ff. It is possible that the recovery of the Bones of Orestes was actually an element of the diplomatic settlement with Tegea, rather than something that happened while the war was still in progress: if so, we should have to abandon Hdts

chronology. The problem is touched on by Leahy (1955) p.35 with n.6; and cf. Jeffery (1976) p.121.

(50) Cf. Hdt 1.82; with Cartledge pp.140-2.

(51) Cf. FGH 105F1, and Plut.Mor.859D, with D.M. Leahy, Phoenix 13 (1959) pp.31ff (and cf. Sch.Aesch.2.80 Ddf.). The Rylands papyrus puts this action later than Hdt requires, in the reign of Anaxandridas.

(52) Cf. Forrest (1968) pp.79 and 88; Jeffery (1976) pp.120ff. And e.g. the contrast between Sparta's leadership of the Peloponnesians (ἐπὶ τὸ ὑμῖν ὠφέλιμον καταστησάμενοι ἐξηγεῖσθε) and Athens' genuine *arkhē* at Thucyd.1.76.1.

(53) Cf. the wording of the Spartan-Aetolian alliance: W. Peek, Abh.d. Sächs.Ak.d.Wiss. 65.3 (1974); and F. Gschnitzer, 'Ein neuer sp.Staatsvertrag' (1978); at lines 4ff: ἑπομένους ὅπυι κα Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἁγιῶνται καὶ κατὰ γᾶν καὶ κα(θ) θάλα(θ)θαν ... (and cf. de Ste Croix, OPW pp.102ff). Hdts choice of words here has however led to inferences about the early 'constitution' of the League. Cf. de Ste Croix, OPW p.109: "Sparta's allies were always in theory autonomous so far as their internal affairs were concerned, but the use of the very strong word 'subjected' (*katestrammene*) would be fully justified if they were obliged to follow Sparta into war at her bidding. I do not see what other justification it could possibly have". This is a most improbable answer in view of what we have said about the range of meaning of the word *katastrephesthai* - and moreover it is far from certain that this provision of the League dates back as far as c.550. De Ste Croix' use of Hdt here to argue a historical case must surely seem in grave error, if we reflect that his language depends on theoretical preconceptions not on historical judgement. Cf. Forrest (1968) p.78, when he speaks of "Hdts vague remark - the greater part of the Peloponnese was under her control". Cf. D.M. Leahy, Phoenix 12 (1968) p.161: "the general picture of Spartan power after the successful conclusion of the 2nd Messenian War".

(54) Compare here Hdt 9.37.4, where Hdt speaks of the escape of Hegesistratos, the Persian seer at Plataea, from Sparta to Tegea: ἐοῦσαν οὐκ ἀρθμίην Λακεδαιμονίοισι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον , i.e. some time around the turn of the 6thc-5thc. What does this imply about the state of the League at this juncture?

(54a) It seems unlikely that Sparta would have wanted to remember that it was once 'the most unsettled of the Greek states and most alienated from the outside world'. It is more probable that the Spartan tradition in general is represented by Xenophon's Laked.Pol., which makes no mention of *anomia* and extends the Lycurgan constitution right back to the time of the Heraclidae (cf. n.39); surely the Spartans likewise 'remembered' their hegemony of the Peloponnese as extending back to the same period? A traditional society like Sparta, one which prided itself on the stability of its political institutions, as well as on its leadership of the Greeks, is likely to have enshrined these two things in its oral memory - at least the self-doubts implied by Hdts version of their early history are improbable. Cf. n.56, below.

(55) Cf. Ryffel p.58: "Deutlicher ... wird es in der ... Herleitung der spartanischen Eunomie, dass Hdt mit Begriffen der Staats- und Verfassungstheorie arbeitet". And cf. Kleingünther (1933) p.124.

(56) Thucydides' corresponding claim (1.18.1), ἡ γὰρ Λακεδαίμων ... ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ὧν ἴσμεν χρόνον στασιάσασαν, may be derived either from Hdt (altering Hdts superlative of degree to one of length) or more likely a common source. Neither Hdt nor Thucydides offers any evidence of this early stasis, and it is left to Aristotle later to scratch together some rather disparate clues (Pol.1306B29ff; cf. Cartledge p.133), none of which is early enough to belong certainly before either Hdts or Thucydides' reforms. Stein ad loc. thought that Hdts kakonomia was "nur eine notwendige theoretische Voraussetzung" for the Lycurgan reforms, and this scepticism may be justified. If we adopt an ingenious argument of W.G. Forrest, Phoenix 17 (1963) at pp.162ff, it may be that we can identify the origin of the tradition of Sparta's kakonomia in malicious Athenian propaganda of the late 5thc. Forrest argues that towards the end of the 5thc there appears an artificial 'tradition' concerning foreign visitors or immigrants to Sparta, who arrive to settle her civil disputes (often by music!) or to win her battles: the Theban Aigeidai; Tyrtaeus, the 'Athenian'; Teisamenos of Elis; Kimon of Athens; the musicians and poets, Stesichorus, Terpander and Thaletas. All these figures appear in older tradition in slightly similar guise, but now they turn up in somewhat altered roles "to produce a saga of a weak and quarrelsome Sparta, dependent at every crisis on outside aid: a deliberate democratic answer to the Spartan myth of Eunomia and stability". Forrest suggests that the author of this fiction was Pericles' musician friend, Damon (cf. Guthrie HGP III.35 n.1, for his theory of the political power of music), and that its propagation was assisted by the democratic Hellanicus. If this argument has anything to it, these 'traditions' obviously do no more than contradict Sparta's claim ever to have had eunomia of a proper kind, referring as they do to a whole assortment of different periods. This is not the story told by Thucydides or Hdt, and Forrest (p.164, n.37) believes they either ignored or reacted against the fiction; but it may be that they are simply retailing a tidier (more abstractly theoretical) version of the same fictitious 'tradition'.

(57) Cf. Thucyd.1.12.1f. A particular instance of the Hdtean rule is the Thucydidean account of the Greek tyrants (cf. Ch.II.ii.A) (1.17): οὕτω πανταχόθεν ἡ Ἑλλὰς ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον κατείχετο μήτε κοινῆι φανερὸν μηδὲν κατεργάζεσθαι, κατὰ πόλεις τε ἀτολμοτέρα εἶναι. Under this inward-looking and divisive form of government (τὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν μόνον προορώμενοι ἔς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ ἐς τὸ τὸν ἴδιον οἶκον αὔξειν) the cities remain insular and unambitious, as Sparta does while in a state of kakonomia. And cf. Thucyd.1.15.2, οὐ γὰρ ξυνειστήκεσαν πρὸς τὰς μεγίστας πόλεις ὑπήκοοι ... κατ' ἀλλήλους δὲ μᾶλλον ὡς ἕκαστοι οἱ ἀστυγείτονες ἐπολέμουν. In Thucydides there is a clear connexion between the creation of peaceful links between states for purposes of commerce, and the creation of alliances for the purposes of war; and these forms of contact are themselves related to the beginnings of hostile contact, aggression against neighbouring states. The confidence needed to forge peaceful relations with other states is the same as that needed to encourage aggression: and this too seems to underlie Hdts account here, for the Spartans put aside their ameixia not only in contradicting the alliance with Lydia, but also in their ambition to subdue the Arcadians.

(58) Cf. Stein, ad loc.: "Dieser letzte Umstand ist besonders betont, weil Krösos im Begriff war ihnen ein Bundesverhältnis anzubieten".

(58a) For Plato's historical writing in Laws III, cf. R. Weil, Ét.et Comm.32 (1959) pp.42-54: "L'histoire n'est donc sérieuse que dans la mesure où son contenu peut aider à la démonstration. Sinon, il faut la reconstruire".

(59) Cf. Luckenbill (1926): the records of Sargon (II.23-4, 146 and 149), Sennacherib (II.238 and 432), Essarhaddon (II.540), Assurbanipal (II.584). Whatever allowances we make for the distortions of these documents, we cannot escape the evidence that the revolts lasted many generations.

(60) I would argue that it is most unlikely that Herodotus had any information directly from eastern sources, and would suggest that his sources for the eastern histories are principally the Greeks of Ionia. Two problems are worth mentioning. Darius' tribute-lists at Hdt 3.89ff have now been shown to diverge significantly from the eastern evidence: Hdts lists are of regions (like the Athenian tribute-lists?) rather than of peoples as are the Persian records; cf. G.G Cameron, JNES 32 (1973) pp.47-56. Secondly, the story of the detection of the false Smerdis by the uncovering of his ears (cf. Hdt 3.68-9) cannot be Persian: in Persian iconographic convention the king never had his ears covered, though this was characteristic of Greek representations; cf. A. Demandt, Iranica Antiqua 9 (1972) pp.94-101. If more attention were paid to the discrepancies between Hdt and the eastern evidence, I believe that the case would become clear. Contrast D. Hegyi, AAntHung 21 (1973) 73-87, who argues that in principle Hdts Persian information is good, even if he sometimes goes in for invention in matters of detail.

(61) Stein at 1.96 (3) takes the words ϰαί ϰως ἐγένοντο as indefinite: "Hdt hat eben über bie Art der Befreiung keine bestimmte Nachricht und ersetzt sie durch Vermutung" (cf. Legrand: "ils durent ... se comporter vaillament"). But this is to misunderstand the idiom (cf. Powell s.v. ϰως (enclitic) 4). In narrative passages ϰαί ϰως is invariably used as a simple narrative connector ("and as it happened": Powell), without any qualification of this kind. Only in non-narrative passages is it used to qualify general statements, and can then be translated "it seems" (cf. Powell s.v. 5). Thus Hdt is in no doubt that the Medes did actually "fight bravely for their freedom".

(62) Cf. the Perinthians' attempt at resisting Persian enslavement at 5.2.1, ἀνδρῶν ἀγαϑῶν περὶ τῆς ἐλευϑερίης γινομένων.

(63) ἄνδρες ἀγαϑοὶ γίνεσϑαι seems to be a wholly desirable thing; hence the use of the expression in exhortations: cf.5.109.3, 7.53.1, 9.17.4; compare 1.169.1, 5.2.1, 6.14.1 and 14.3, 6.114 and 117.2, 9.71.1 and 71.3, 9.75. Cf. Thucyd.2.35.1 (from the Funeral Oration): ἀνδρῶν ἀγαϑῶν (ἔργωι) γενομένων.

(63a) Cf. Wood p.36: "We recognize that Hdt has a political rather than a social concept of history, which is in this sense defined as a function of freedom. History can begin with liberty (as the history of Persia starts with liberation from Medic rule); conversely, history can end with enslavement: thus Lydian history, viz. continuous discourse concerning Lydia, terminates with Cyrus' capture of Sardis. The enslaved nation exists in a state of obscurity where it can claim no erga apodekhthenta". It is not clear whether Wood means that freedom plays an important part in historical processes for Hdt or whether it simply provides him with starting and stopping points for his narratives.

(64) Cf. Kühner/Gerth II.2.110f: "Der Grund dieser abweichended Konstruktion liegt gemeiniglich in dem Bestreben das Satzglied mit grösserem Nachdrucke hervorzuheben und den ubrigen Worten entgegenzustellen"; and Schwyzer/ Debrunner II.399-40.

(64a) For the paradox of a monarchy which allows its citizens political freedom, cf. Eurip.Suppl.352f (Theseus): καὶ γὰρ κατέστησ' αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν δῆμον) ἐς μοναρχίαν / ἐλευθερώσας τήνδ' ἰσόψηφον πόλιν. I would suggest that such a paradox may have come into being in sophistic theory through reflexion on the ambiguous nature of Athenian political life, a democracy which had the character of a monarchy (cf. Thucyd.2.65.9); cf. (B).3, below.

(65) Cf. esp. Pl.Protag.320Cff, with Guthrie, HGP III.63ff; and also Thucydides' analysis of the primitive early life of Greece in the Archaeology. Cf. Ch.III.B. With e.g. Isocr.Paneg.39, τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀνόμως ζῶντας καὶ σποράδην ...; and Diod.I.8.1ff, ἐν ἀτάκτωι καὶ θηριώδει βίωι καθεστῶτας σποράδην ...

(66) Cf. Pl.Protag.322AB, οὕτω δὴ παρεσκευασμένοι κατ' ἀρχὰς ἄνθρωποι ᾤικουν σποράδην; and Thucyd.1.5.1, πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις καὶ κατὰ κώμας οἰκουμέναις, with which cf. Deioces' solution of building the walled city of Ecbatana (Hdt 1.98.2ff).

(67) Cf. Pl.Protag.322B, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους ... ὥστε πάλιν σκεδαννύμενοι διεφθείροντο ; and Thucyd.1.2.2, τῆς γὰρ ἐμπορίης οὐκ οὔσης, οὐδ' ἐπιμειγνύντες ἀδεῶς ἀλλήλοις (cf. 1.5.1).

(68) Cf. Thucyd.1.2.2, οὐδὲ γῆν φυτεύοντες, ἄδηλον ὂν ὁπότε τις ἐπελθὼν ... ἄλλος ἀφαιρήσεται.

(69) Cf. C.W. Macleod, PCPS NS.25 (1975) pp.52ff, showing how Thucydides in a similar way represents Corcyrean stasis as "the undoing of human progress".

(70) Cf. Ryffel pp.60ff; with Ch.III.H.

(71) Cf. A. Andrewes, 'Eunomia', CQ 32 (1938) pp.39ff; and Ostwald (1969) pp.62ff.

(72) Cf. Ryffel pp.52ff.

(73) Lycophron DK 83A3 (II.307.25ff) called nomos an ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων in a society.

(74) For the social compact in Protagoras, cf. e.g. Guthrie, HGP III.136-8 (and cf. Pl.Gorg.483B); but contrast e.g. Kerferd (1981) pp.147-50.

(75) Cf. e.g. Democr.DK 68B267, φύσει τὸ ἄρχειν οἰκήιον τῶι κρέσσονι; and Thucyd.5.105.2, ἡγούμεθα γὰρ τό τε θεῖον δόξηι τό τε ἀνθρώπειόν τε σαφῶς διὰ παντὸς ὑπὸ φύσεως ἀναγκαίας, οὗ ἂν κρατῆι, ἄρχειν; with 1.76.2 and 4.61.5. And esp. Pl.Gorg.483DE, etc.

(76) Hdt emphasizes the idea of unification by listing here the different peoples out of whom the *Medikon ethnos* is made up: the Bousai, Panetakenoi, Stroukhanes, Arizantoi, *Boudioi, Magoi*. There is a similar effect when Cyrus rallies a (divided?) Persia to support the revolt against Media (1.125.3, ἔστι δὲ Περσέων συχνὰ γένεα, καὶ τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ὁ Κῦρος συνάλισε καὶ ἀνέπεισε ἀπίστασθαι ἀπὸ Μήδων : with a list of the Persian tribes).

(77) Cf. H. Herter, RE Suppl.XIII (1973) s.v. Theseus, 1212.8ff; and on this passage of Thucydides, cf. 1213.8ff: "So hat die Tradition vom Synoikismos schon früh die Spuren gelehrten Nachdenken aufgenommen ... Aber im Kern ist sie eine echte Sage, nicht etwa blosse Konstruktion". Cf. Isocr.10.35; Ps.-Demosth.59.75; Theophr.Char.26.6; and Plut.Thes.24f (from Aristotle?). For the tradition of Theseus' founding of the democracy, cf. E. Ruschenbusch, Historia 7 (1958) pp.408ff.

(77a) Cf. (besides 2.15.2, above) Thucyd.1.141.6-7, where Pericles argues that the Peloponnesian League is not well suited to waging long wars, μήτε βουλευτηρίωι ἑνὶ χρώμενοι.

(78) I would suggest that we are meant to see the condition of Media before Deioces (scattered villages with no common political organization) as being the result of the *autonomia* which she secured along with the other peoples of Asia in revolting from Assyria. It seems likely, however, that in reality both before and after the liberation the states which were and had been under Assyrian power retained their own kings: if Deioces is the Daiaukku of the records of Sargon (cf. n.78a), we might argue that it was the kings of Media who helped win them their freedom and continued in power thereafter. For the reality of the Assyrian empire as shown by the evidence of the monuments, cf. J. Reade, 'Ideology and Propaganda in Assyrian Art', in Mesopotamia 7 (1979), Power and Propaganda, ed. M.T. Larsen, at pp.329-43. Thus Hdt could be fabricating the anarchy of Media in despite of the evidence - though whether or not he had access to a tradition for that anarchy we cannot tell, tempting though it is to suppose that, like so much else in the passage, it is a theoretical construct. At any rate Hdt does not want us to think of the subjects of Assyria as being dependent kingdoms: these peoples were for him ruled by the Assyrians in both an imperial and a political sense, and when the liberation came there resulted 'autonomy' in both senses as well. It does not seem to me that we are meant to restrict the meaning of ἐόντων δὲ αὐτονόμων πάντων so as to exclude political control: what happens to the other peoples in this respect is simply something we are not meant to ask.

(78a) Hdts genealogy, confident though it is, may well be false. Deioces seems likely to be the Daiaukku named in the chronicles of Sargon (cf. Luckenbill II.12 and 56), one of the tribute-paying kings of Media, deported to Syria for his rebel activities. If the identification is right (cf. e.g. Burn p.25), then clearly Deioces was no king of a liberated Media, nor can he have been the grandfather of Kyaxares, who lived until 584. For the Medic name represented by Hdts 'Deioces' (*Dahyuka-), cf. R. Schmitt, AAWW 110 (1973) 137-47.

(79) Hdt describes the Persians as the main collaborators of the Medes in the overthrow of the Assyrian empire (cf. 1.102.2, of Phaortes: ἔχων δύο ταῦτα ἔθνεα καὶ ἀμφότερα ἰσχυρά ...), but appears to know nothing of the alliance with Nabopolassar, king of Akkad (cf. J.B. Pritchard,

Ancient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament (1969) (= ANET) 303-5). The revolt of Babylonia is, from the evidence of the chronicles, as much if not more of a threat to the Assyrians as the revolt of Media: and cf. Nabonidus, ANET 309, on the Umman-Manda.

(80) Cf. D. Nestle, Eleutheria (1967), for a survey of Greek attitudes to freedom.

(80a) For Hdts Cyrus, cf. the analysis of H.C. Avery, AJPh 93 (1972) 529-46, and esp. pp.531-2, for the theme of freedom. I do not, however, accept his distinction between aggressive Persian freeedom and non-aggressive Greek freedom at p.532 n.10; human nature being what it is for Hdt, the same principles ought to apply in differing degrees to all men - and he surely illustrates that they do.

(81) Cf. 1.33, the wealth of Croesus; 1.71.3f, the wealth of Lydia as contrasted with the poverty of the Persians, who are to inherit it; 1.207.6f, the wealth of Persia as contrasted with the poverty of the Massagetai; 3.89.3, the good things which Cyrus provided for his people, as here (cf. 3.75.1, the same); 5.49.4 and 97.1, Aristagoras on the wealth of the Persian empire, in his incitements to Sparta and Athens; 7.8g.1, Xerxes on the supposed wealth of Europe. By an obvious extension agatha come to include the prizes of tyranny as well as empire: cf. 1.129.4, the kingship of Media; 2.172.3, the wealth of Amasis; 3.52.3 and 53.4, the Corinthian tyranny, as promised to Lycophron; 3.80.3 and 80.4, the wealth of the tyrant; 4.11.3, the Cimmerian ruling-classes are not prepared to forego their privileges, λογισαμένους ὅσα τε ἀγαθὰ πεπόνθασι καὶ ὅσα φεύγοντες ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος κακὰ ἐπίδοξα καταλαμβάνειν ; 6.109.6, Miltiades on the 'imperial' rewards of an Athenian victory at Marathon (cf. Ch.I.i.6). Compare esp. Thucyd.4.61.3, on Athenian ambitions in Sicily: τῶν ἐν τῆι Σικελίαι ἀγαθῶν ἐφιέμενοι (cf. 6.24.3; and see 2.38.2, Pericles on the prizes of empire). But cf. de Romilly (1963) pp.74-7, who denies the importance of the pursuit of material profit in Thucydides' analysis of the empire.

(82) Contrast e.g. 5.49.2, Aristagoras on the Ionians; and esp. 5.109.3, the Ionian exhortation to the Cypriots.

(83) Cf. Megabazos on the danger of setting up Histiaios as tyrant among the Thracians (5.23.2), where there are Greeks and barbarians, οἳ προστάτεω ἐπιλαβόμενοι ποιήσουσι τοῦτο τὸ ἂν κεῖνος ἐξηγέηται (i.e. aspire to freedom, as here).

(84) For the 'sophistic' Darius, cf. K. Bringmann, Hermes 104 (1976) pp.266ff, at 276ff.

(85) Cf. Ar.Pol.1310B37-8; and e.g. Dio Chrys.XV.22 and XXV.5. Significantly perhaps Cyrus does not appear in this role in Aesch.Pers.767ff, although his benevolence as a ruler is commended there.

(86) Cf. de Romilly (1963) pp.124ff.

(87) Cf. de Romilly (1963) pp.80-2, illustrating "the parallel which Thucydides likes to make between independence and domination". She adds that the Thucydidean examples (see below) show "that the act of ruling was really considered as the perfect expression of both internal and external freedom, and, in fact, as a superior freedom". I would argue that this corollary was not a common perception but rather a specialized argument of the sophists: see below.

(88) Cf. 5.69.1 (the exhortation to the Mantineans to remember what they are fighting for), ὑπὲρ ἀρχῆς ἅμα καὶ δουλείας, τὴν μὲν μὴ πειρασαμένοις ἀφαιρηθῆναι, τῆς δὲ μὴ αὖθις πειρᾶσθαι (cf. e.g. Hdts

Persians at 1.126.5). And cf. Diodotus at 3.45.6, equating freedom and empire as the two principal motives for cities to go to war: περὶ μεγίστων ... ἐλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς·

(89) Cf. Kratos' wry observation in (Aesch.) Prom.Vinct.49-50: ἅπαντ' ἐπαχθῆ πλὴν θεοῖσι κοιρανεῖν· / ἐλεύθερος γὰρ οὔτις ἐστὶ πλὴν Διός, a work which already shows the influence of sophistic thinking (cf. Ch.III.B). With which compare Eurip.Hek.864ff, οὐκ ἔστι θνητῶν ὅστις ἔστ' ἐλεύθερος.

(90) Compare here esp. Pl.Legg.694A, on the fortunes of Persia after the liberation by Cyrus: πρῶτον μὲν ἐλεύθεροι ἐγένοντο, ἔπειτα δὲ ἄλλων πολλῶν δεσπόται. And cf. Legg.962E, on the aims of certain nomothetai: πρὸς ἄμφω βλέποντες, ἐλεύθεροί τε ὅπως ἄλλων τε πόλεων ἔσονται δεσπόται; and Isocr.Paneg. 140, on the Egyptian revolt of the early 4thc: ὥστε τοὺς ἀφεστῶτας μηκέτι τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαπᾶν, ἀλλ' ἤδη καὶ τῶν ὁμόρων ζητεῖν ἐπάρχειν.

(91) This picture of Hdt 'the historian' reverses the claims of such reductionist criticism as that of Waters (1971) p.7: "Yet many writers have claimed to discover patterns, tragic especially, in the historian's treatment (sc. in particular of tyrants). To do so involves committing onesefl to the view that Hdt did not set out to write history, that what he wrote is not history, and that those who before and after Cicero have thought him the Father of History have all been in error". Such arguments, frequently enough heard, simply assume what needs to be proved.

Chapter Two , Part ii: NOTES.

(1) Cf.Il.5.62ff (Meriones), ὃς καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρωι τεκτήνατο νῆας ἐΐσας / ἀρχεκάκους, αἳ πᾶσι κακὸν Τρώεσσι γένοντο / οἷ τ' αὐτῶι. And cf. Thucyd.2.12.3, with Il.11.604, etc. Plutarch, missing the point of Hdts allusion, understands only the Ionian revolt here (MH 24.861AB); but compare Aristotle Anal.Post.II.94A36ff, the burning of Sardis as the *aitia* of the Persian Wars; and cf. Pl.Menex.240A. Cf. Strasburger (1965) p.592, n.4.

(2) Cf. vonFritz, GGS I.361.

(3) Cf. Strasburger (1965) passim; and earlier Focke pp.26ff, against the orthodoxy established by Meyer and Jacoby. And more recently e.g. F.D. Harvey, Historia 15 (1966) 254-5, against Strasburger; and J. Schwartz, Historia 18 (1969) 367-70, for the opposite view.

(4) For *katekho* in this sense of 'repress', cf. besides 1.59.1 and 65.1 (or is this merely neutral?), also 5.78 and 91.1, below. This particular metaphorical usage is confined to these four passages, each concerning the tyranny at Athens; cf. Powell, s.v.; and LSJ, s.v.A.II.6a.

(5) Hdt mentions none of the military successes of the Peisistratids (cf. e.g. How and Wellson 5.78), but not through ignorance; cf. their difficulties in fighting the Mytileneans for control of the Troad at 5.94-5. And compare Peisistratus' achievements before the tyranny, ἐν τῆι πρὸς Μεγαρέας γενομένηι στρατηγίηι (1.59.4); for which cf. Rhodes (1981) 199-200.

(6) The oracular anticipation of the tyranny of the Cypselids is obviously comparable, cf. 5.92b.2 and 3, with 92d.1. And see perhaps the ominous (?) anticipation of Pericles' birth at 6.131.2, with Ch.III.E.

(7) Hdt goes further here than any of our other sources in his commendation of the tyrant, and in emphasizing the constitutional aspects of the reign he is even more explicit than Aristotle (cf. e.g. Athpol.14.3, πολιτικῶς μᾶλλον ἢ τυραννικῶς). Gottlieb p.20, says of the Peisistratus of the Athpol.: "die genannten, allgemeingültigen Einzelheiten über die Herrschaft des Peisistratos, ... (sind) typisch für die sophistische Erörterungen über den gerechten und weisen Tyrannen". The same sophistic influence may well colour Hdts treatment here. Cf. e.g. Ar.Pol.1285A25ff, for the constitutional behaviour of the good monarch.

(8) Cf. Ryffel pp.57ff, with Ch.II.i.A and B.

(9) Hdt presents us with *stasis* in the abstract, and says nothing of the grievances which may have caused it; contrast Ar.Athpol.13.3f, where the reforms of Solon are the cause, some resenting the cancelling of debts, others the change in the constitution. Hdt of course does not describe the condition of Athens before Peisistratus and leaves Solon more or less in a vacuum. Cf. Jacoby (1949) p.153: "he knows about Solon's legislation (cf. 1.29.1f), but he does not set forth the epochal importance of it, nor does he realize Solon's position in the development of the Athenian state". We might have expected Hdt to be curious about Solon, however, given his interest in lawgivers (e.g. Lycurgus, Demonax, Cleisthenes, etc.), and that he would have tried to understand him through research if the evidence was indeed not available. He may have felt, however,

that he was not concerned with the history of the Athenian constitution in mere legal terms, but only with those events which deprived the city of its freedom (the tyranny) and those which gave it her back, with freedom once again defining the limits of the inquiry. Added to that is the desire to have important events happen only once (cf. Ch.II.i.A.1): to acknowledge the 'epochal importance' of Solon would have been to lessen the significance Hdt wanted to attach to the turning-point which 'gave Athens her freedom'. It should be admitted however, that according to E. Ruschenbusch, Historia 7 (1958) pp.398ff, Solon was never thought of as the founder of a constitution until the middle of the 4thc.

(10) This division of Hdts account seems to have been largely ignored, and most commentators speak of 1.59.6 as though it were a judgement on the entire period of tyranny; cf. e.g. Waters (1971) p.15: "The account of Peisistratus is far from unsympathetic, despite the lack of consistency which is here betrayed".

(11) Athpol.15.3, misses Hdts precise distinctionby altering this to: κατεῖχεν ἤδη τὴν τυραννίδα βεβαίως . Contrast Athpol.14.3, which does reproduce Hdt accurately.

(12) Hdt remarks pointedly that Lykurgus and Magakles were at each other's throats again immediately they had rid themselves of their rival. Compare also the second tyranny: Peisistratus returns at the invitation of Megakles (cf. 1.60.2, περιελαυνόμενος δὲ τῆι στάσι ὁ Μεγακλέης ἐπεκηρυκεύετο Πεισιστράτωι), but the tyranny ends when Megakles once again makes common cause with his enemies to expel Peisistratus (cf. 1.61.2, ὀργῆι δὲ ὡς εἶχε ...). Hdt observes closely the workings of these shifting alliances, and how in the pursuit of power men forget whatever ties of friendship or marriage they may have contracted, when these have outgrown their usefulness (cf. 1.74.4, ἄνευ γὰρ ἀναγκαίης ἰσχυρῆς συμβάσιες ἰσχυραὶ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι συμμένειν). None of this, clearly, reflects at all well on Megakles the Alcmeonid, not only since he is quite prepared to enter an alliance with the tyrant, but also because of his so ready disloyalty. This is most surprising if there is any truth in the Alcmeonid-source theory; but cf. the discussion in (B) and (C) below. For the vexed problems of the chronology of Peisistratus' exiles, cf. e.g. J.G.F. Hind, CQ 24 (1974) 1-18; fortunately, these do not concern us here.

(13) Cf. Ar.Pol.1285A25ff, with 1286B35ff and 1311A7ff. For the bodyguard as a hallmark of the tyrant, cf. e.g. Aristoph.Hipp.447-9 (Hippias), and Pl.Republ.566B, τὸ δὲ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ... αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος. Compare Hdts Gelon at 7.154.1, with Gyges at 1.8.1 (cf. 91.1), and perhaps Darius at 3.139.2, for future tyrants associated with the bodyguards of those whose positions they usurp. For Peisistratus' *korynephoroi* as part of the family's political use of the Heracles-myth, cf. J. Boardman, RA (1972) pp.57ff, at 62f and 66f; and Rhodes (1981) 200-1.

(14) Cf. the attitude of Polycrates, who has no care for the Samians who desert him (3.45.3), τῶι ἐπίκουροί τε μισθωτοὶ καὶ τοξόται οἰκήιοι ἦσαν πλήθεϊ πολλοί.

(15) Cf. Rhodes (1981) 215, with Thucyd.6.54.5, on the mild taxation of his sons, καὶ ἐπετήδευσαν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δὴ τύραννοι οὗτοι ἀρετὴν καὶ ξύνεσιν, καὶ Ἀθηναίους εἰκοστὴν μόνον πρασσόμενοι τῶν γιγνομένων.

(16) Cf. Polycrates' taking of hostages from the families of the Samian exiles at 3.45.4, a tyrannical measure.

(17) Cf. A. Ferrill, Historia 27 (1978) pp.358ff.

(18) Cf. e.g. 5.92e.2, on the tyranny of Kypselos, πολλοὺς μὲν Κορινθίων ἐδίωξε, πολλοὺς δὲ χρημάτων ἀπεστέρησε, πολλῶι δέ τι πλείστους τῆς ψυχῆς.

(19) Cf. Thucyd. 6.53.3, ἐπιστάμενος γὰρ ὁ δῆμος ἀκοῆι τὴν Πεισιστράτου καὶ τοῦ παιδὸς τυραννίδα χαλεπὴν τελευτῶσαν γενομένην ; and Athpol.14.3 and 16.1f, with 16.7, they used to call Peisistratus' reign an age of Kronos, συνέβη γὰρ ὕστερον διαδεξαμένων τῶν υἱέων πολλῶι γενέσθαι τραχυτέραν τὴν ἀρχήν. Both Thucyd. and Aristotle are here notoriously dependent on Hdt for their narratives; cf. Jacoby (1949) p. 153, Göttlieb pp.9f, with nn.25-9, and see Rhodes (1981) pp.189ff. And yet both seem unaware that they are making any change.

(20) Cf. Eupolis Demoi F123Kock (= Sch.Ar.Ach.61), Εὔπολις δὲ ἐν Δήμοις εἰσάγει τὸν Πεισίστρατον βασιλέα, that is possibly as Archon Basileus, but at any rate in some flattering role, given the play's premiss that it is the heroes of the democracy who are to be restored to life to help her in her present troubles.

(21) Cf. Wilamowitz (1893) I.118-20.

(22) Cf. also M. Hirsch, Klio 20 (1925) p.168, arguing for a common written source of the late 5thc.

(23) Cf. M. Pohlenz, RE XI.2 (1922) s.v. Kronos, 2006-7, who shows how the golden age of Kronos was a folk-belief which grew out of the Attic Kronia (cf. ibid. 1983-4): "und noch in viel spaterer Zeit haben ja die attischen Bauern, wenn sie die idealen Zustände unter Peisistratos preisen wollten, keinen besseren Ausdruck gewusst als den Vergleich mit dem Regiment des Kronos". And cf. Rhodes (1981) 217-8, who argues for a very early coining of this description of Peisistratus' reign.

(24) Cf. e.g Theopompus FGH 115F135 (= Athen.532F-533A): καίτοι ὁ πατὴρ αὐτῶν Πεισίστρατος μετρίως ἐχρῆτο ταῖς ἡδοναῖς· ὥς γε οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς χωρίοις οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς κήποις φύλακας κατίστα, ... ἀλλ' εἴα τὸν βουλόμενον εἰσιόντα ἀπολαύειν καὶ λαμβάνειν ὧν δεηθείη, ὅπερ ὕστερον ἐποίησε καὶ Κίμων μιμησάμενος ἐκεῖνον (cf. F89). And cf. Diod.IX.37.

(25) Cf. Aristoph.Hipp.447-9;Vesp.502; Lysistr.619, καὶ μάλιστ' ὀσφραίνομαι τῆς Ἱππίου τυραννίδος.

(26) Cf. e.g. Andoc.1.106 and 2.26; Demosth.17.3 and 21.144; [Demosth.] Ep.Philippi 12.7; Isocr.16.25; but contrast Isocr.Panath.148, (Peisistratos), ὃς δημαγωγὸς γενόμενος καὶ πολλὰ τὴν πόλιν λυμηνάμενος καὶ τοὺς βελτίστους τῶν πολιτῶν ὡς ὀλιγαρχικοὺς ὄντας ἐκβαλών, τελευτῶν τόν τε δῆμον κατέλυσε καὶ τύραννον αὑτὸν κατέστησεν. This is the only case known to me from the orators of hostility towards Peisistratus himself, and it may be that Isocrates is adapting the tradition to make the tyranny stand as an interruption of the perfect *politeia* that Athens had enjoyed since Theseus (!); cf. his admission of eccentricity at this point (149-50).

(26a) For modern assessments of the Peisistratid tyranny, cf. Andrewes (1956) pp.100-15, and Berve (1967) I.47-77.

(27) This reticence about Hippias' tyranny accords ill with Jacoby's claim (1949) p.335 n.25, that "the four years of more severe tyranny were evidently the chief argument of Hdts Alcmeonid authorities, who minimized the action of the tyrannicides". See below.

(27a) For the problem of the chronology of the Alcmeonids' exile, and Hdts comments upon it, cf. P.J. Bicknell, Historia 19 (1970) 129-31; and

K.H. Kinzl, Rh.Mus.109 (1976) 311-14. In my view, nothing that Hdt tells us of their exile need indicate anything about his source(s).

(28) Hdts references to Peisistratus outside the main narrative of Athenian history are various in character. We hear that Miltiades resents the tyranny (6.35.3), ἀχθόμενόν τε τῆι Πεισιστράτου ἀρχῆι (cf. Theron at 4.147.3, and Dorieus at 5.42.2), and decides to establish one of his own in the Thracian Chersonese. We hear of the exile of Kimon (6.103.1), κατέλαβε φυγεῖν ἐξ Ἀθηνέων Πεισίστρατον τὸν Ἱπποκράτεος, and of how Kimon had his second chariot victory at Olympia proclaimed in Peisistratus' name (103.2f), καὶ τὴν νίκην παρεὶς τούτωι κατῆλθε ἐπὶ τὰ ἑωυτοῦ ὑπόσπονδος. "And when he won yet another victory with the same horses, he met his death at the hands of Peisistratus' sons, when the father himself was no longer living. And they killed him by setting an ambush for him at night near the prytaneion". That Hdt adds here that Kimon was murdered οὐκέτι περιεόντος αὐτοῦ Πεισιστράτου shows that he is drawing a distinction between father and sons, such as we find elsewhere in the tradition. The episode is designed to tell us something of what life is like under tyranny. Kimon must obsequiously relinquish a prize of the greatest worth to secure his return from exile. Survival under tyranny means stooping to flattery - and it is hard to get the right balance (cf. 3.80.5). Peisistratus, however, surely shows a certain magnanimity in allowing the return of such a distinguished rival, a magnanimity which is sharply contrasted with the murderous revenge of his sons. Finally we hear of Callias (6.121.2), who alone of the Athenians dared, when Peisistratus was in exile, to buy his property when it was auctioned by the state, καὶ τἆλλα τὰ ἔχθιστα ἐς αὐτὸν πάντα ἐμηχανᾶτο. This evidence taken together does little to confirm the existence of a popular anti-Peisistratid tradition, and the Kimon-episode in particular (6.103.2f) suggests that Hdt was familiar with the tradition which contrasted the mildness of Peisistratus with the excesses of his sons. Cf. e.g. Theopompus FGH 115F135, quoted in n.24, above.

(29) Cf. HCT IV.322-3 and 327-8. Also C.W. Fornara, Philol.114 (1970) 155ff, who rightly insists that the 'tyrannicide myth' did not at this stage pretend that the tyranny was brought to an end simultaneously with the death of Hipparchus, but rather stressed the heroism of Harmodios and Aristogeiton as the factor most important in bringing down the tyranny. Contrast e.g. A.J. Podlecki, Historia 15 (1966) 129ff.

(30) Cf. also Thucyd.6.53.3, the Athenians knew that the Spartans were really responsible for the liberation, οὐδ' ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ Ἁρμοδίου καταλυθεῖσαν (sc. τὴν τυραννίδα), ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων.

(31) For the date, cf. Pliny NH 34.17; and cf. Fornara, art.cit.p.158, with n.22. It is worth mentioning that the same Antenor employed to produce the first tyrannicide statue-group was also commissioned by the Alcmeonids to work on the temple at Delphi; cf. e.g. Boardman (1978) p.83. Perhaps both commissions are equally the result of Alcmeonid patronage and Antenor is, as it were, the protégé of the family in the same way that Endoios perhaps was of the Peisistratids.

(32) Cf. Page. Epigr.Gr.Simonides I; and B. Meritt, Hesperia 5 (1936) pp.355ff; ἦ μέγ' Ἀθηναίοισι φόως γένεθ', ἡνίκ' Ἀριστογείτων Ἵππαρχον κτεῖνε καὶ Ἁρμόδιος ... (and the second half of the second pentameter)

... πατρίδα γῆν ἐθέτην, which ought almost certainly to be preceded by the word *isonomon*, the best candidate to supply the required sense of 'free'. See now Page (1981) pp.186-9. What it was that stimulated the apparent resurgence of interest in the myth around 477, when the Antenor group, removed by the Persians, was replaced, and when the murder of Hipparchus became a popular subject for the vase-painters (cf. Bowra (1961) p.394; plates in M. Hirsch, art cit.), we cannot say for sure. That this should be connected with an eclipse of Alcmeonid power after the Persian Wars seems hardly probable, especially if it was their own invention in the first place. Possibly rather the Athenians saw in the myth of the liberation a parallel with their recent equally heroic liberation from Persia, i.e. the spirit shown by the tyrannicides was the spirit which saved Athens from enslavement by Xerxes (cf. Hdt 6.109.3!).

(33) Cf. IG i^2.77 (= SEG X.40), with H.T. Wade-Gery, BSA 33 (1932-3) pp.123ff; his conjecture that the decree was moved by [Per]ik[l]es is hardly certain, as shown by the editors of IG i^3.131, who suggest Antikles, Kharikles, Lysikles or even Arkhikles.

(34) Cf. PMG 893-896, and also Aristoph.Vesp.1225-6, where Bdelycleon tries to teach Harmodios to his father; and cf. Ach.979f and 1093. But contrast Jacoby (1949) p.160, and esp. Fornara, art.cit.p.180, with n.2, who both argue, ignoring the evidence of Aristophanes, that the poems must be aristocratic.

(35) Jacoby (1949) pp.158-9, argued that the claims of the tyrannicides were voiced with vigour and imprecision by the democratic Hellanicus in his *Attikē Syngraphē*, hence Thucydides' assault on the tradition in Book Six. Cf. also Marmor Parium A.45, which dates both the murder of Hipparchus and the expulsion of the tyrants to the same year, the archonship of Harpaktides (511-10), possibly following Hellanicus; cf. Dover / Andrewes, HCT IV.321-2. If this were correct, it would be further evidence that the claims of the tyrannicides were particularly pressed by those of democratic sympathies.

(36) And cf. 6.123.2, οἱ μὲν γὰρ (sc. the tyrannicides) ἐξηγριώσαν τοὺς ὑπολοίπους Πεισιστρατιδέων Ἵππαρχον ἀποκτείναντες, οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον ἔπαυσαν [τοὺς λοιποὺς] τυραννεύοντας.

(37) The [ou] was supplied by Madvig (cf. e.g. Aesch.Pers.570, οὐ πολλοί τινες), but unnecessarily. The context shows that Hdt is remarking on the considerable extent of the isolation of the Gephyraioi (cf. 5.61.2, below). For the expression, cf. Pausanias 1.9.3, παθόντες εὖ πολλά τε καὶ οὐκ ἄξια ἐξηγήσεως.

(38) For a discusison of the possible truth of the matter, cf. Davies, APF pp.472-3. Boardman's suggestion (cited there) that as Euboeans the Gephyraioi came to be associated with Phoenicia through their activities in Al Mina, from where they introduced into Greece among other things the Phoenician alphabet, is certainly attractive.

(39) Hdts treatment of this question gains point when we remember that the Athenians prided themselves above all on being autochthonous, unlike all other Greeks; cf. Pl.Menex.237BC, etc.

(40) Cf. e.g. Jacoby (1949) pp.160ff; Fornara, art.cit.pp.156-7.

(41) Cf. e.g. P. Karavites, Historia 26 (1977) pp.129ff, with G.M.E. Williams, Historia 29 (1980) pp.106ff, on the 'fall' of the Alcmeonids after Marathon. And cf. Davies, APF pp.381-2, on "the almost complete absence from the political scene after 480 of descendants of the family in the male line".

(42) Cf. e.g. Jacoby (1949) p.154, and Fornara, art.cit.p.156: "Striking a blow for an Alcmeonid tradition ... was inevitably to strike a blow against Alcmeonid detractors, and there can be no question that these were motivated politically, for Pericles was Athenian democracy" (?). And cf. Dover / Andrewes, HCT IV.325. For Pericles as an Alcmeonid, cf. esp. Thucyd.1.127.1, with Hdt 6.131.2.

(43) Cf. V. Ehrenberg, Historia 1 (1950) pp.515ff, answered by G.Vlastos, AJP 74 (1953) pp.337ff, and then Ehrenberg, WS 69 (1956) pp.57ff; and see Ostwald, (1969) pp.96ff. Contrast Jacoby (1949) pp.152-68; Podlecki, art.cit.

(44) Cf. n.31, above.

(45) Cf.e.g. Fornara, art.cit.pp.170ff.

(46) For Delphi at the time of the Peloponnesian War, cf. Thucyd.1.118.3. The rapprochment between Athens and the Amphiktyonic League indicated by IG i^2.26 (with Meiggs, AE pp.418ff), possibly at the time of Oenophyta cannot be taken as typical of their relations in the 5thc.

(47) Cf. Bornitz pp.30ff, who also argues (somewhat differently) that the account reflects little credit on the Alcmeonids.

(48) Ar.Athpol.19.3, blurs a distinction in Hdt when he changes this to, οἱ φυγάδες, ὧν οἱ 'Αλκμεωνίδαι προειστήκεσαν.

(49) Cf. 2.180.1, listing the various contributions to the temple-building, and thought by Jacoby to indicate that Hdts source in both places was a Delphic tradition (FGH IIIb.Suppl.1 p.451); but contrast Wilamowitz cited in n.62 below.

(50) Cf. Bornitz p.32: "War die erste Phase gekennzeichnet durch die Taktik des *peirasthai*, charakterisiert die zweite Phase das *mekhanasthai*". And the word *mēkhanasthai*, of course, can have distincly ignoble and unheroic connotations, cf. 5.90.1, below.

(51) Cf. the underhand scheming of Megakles against Peisistratus in Book One, 1.60.1, 60.2 and 61.2, with n.12 above.

(52) Cf. W.G.Forrest, 'The Tradition of Hippias' Expulsion from Athens', GRBS 10 (1969) pp.277f; and K.H. Kinzl, 'Herodotos Interpretations', Rh.Mus.118 (1975) pp.193ff.

(53) These passages clearly support one another, rather than offering alternative versions: cf. Kinzl, art.cit., who, however, surprisingly excepts 5.66.1 (cf. pp.196-7, with n.68 below).

(54) Cf. Jacoby (1949) p.335 n.27: "The Alcmeonid origin of the main account (sc. of the liberation) is manifest, because a variant, with a citation of the source hoi Athēnaioi, accused the Alcmeonids of having corrupted the Pythia", of which claim it is a little hard to see the logic! And e.g. Forrest, art.cit.pp.279ff, substituting Spartans for Athenians (cf. n.56, below); Kinzl, art.cit.pp.194ff; and even Bornitz p.32: "Diese grossfügigere Ausführung (sc. of the temple-project) ... gilt bei Hdt als unbestreibares Indiz für die Einflussnahme (mēkhanōmenoi) der Alkmeonidai auf Delphi", and suggesting that the bribery story is a variant.

(55) Cf. Denniston pp.468-70, for the particle-group ōn dē; and cf. Powell, s.v. ōn II.2 (see below). Forrest's attempt to read adversative force into this connector (art.cit.p.279) is most unconvincing: I see no such force in his supposed parallel at 7.142.2, τοὺς ὦν δὴ τὰς νέας λέγοντας. Kinzl, art.cit. pp.195-6, is incomprehensible to me on this point.

(55a) I know of no citation of a variant version in Hdt which does not make clear what informants are being distinguished form what others: cf. e.g. 1.5.1-2; 2.2.5; 3.15ff; 4.8.1, to select four examples at random. The onus is on those who wish to see a variant in the present passage to show that Hdt is not always so explicit. F.J. Groten, Phoenix 17 (1963) 79ff, has little to offer on the subject of Hdts use of variant versions - beyond the observation that he does use them!

(56) Cf. Fehling's 'Prinzip der nächtsliegenden Quellen'. There is absolutely no warrant for the emendation of Athēnaioi to Lakedaimonioi here, suggested, in defiance of any palaeographical considerations, by Schweighäuser. It is accepted by Forrest, art.cit.p.281, on the extraordinary grounds that "the mass of the Athenians ... accepted Hellanikos", i.e. a version which had forgotten that the actual liberation was performed by the Spartans; but cf. Aristoph.Lysistr.1150-6, and Thucyd.6.53.3, with n.29 above. Cf. also Kinzl, art.cit.p.194, n.8.

(57) For this use of a delayed citation to point the climax or the central point of the narrative, cf. e.g. the narrative at 3.102-5 of how the Indians gather gold from the desert ants. At the point in the story where Hdt has the Indians make off with their spoils, we are told how the ants set off in pursuit (3.105.1): αὐτίκα γὰρ οἱ μύρμηκες ὀδμῆι, ὡς δὴ λέγεται ὑπὸ Περσέων, μαθόντες διώκουσι. . And this is the first we learn that the story is meant to derive from a Persian source! Cf. G. Karsai, AUB 5-6 (1977-8) 61-72, who argues that the story must be a genuine Persian tradition - though whether it is or not little affects the point made here.

(58) Compare the moral outrage of Pausanias III.4.6, who curiously knows of Cleomenes as the only man impious enough to have attempted anything of this sort - possibly a tacit rejection of Hdts story.

(59) Cf. Forrest, art.cit.pp.277ff; and Jacoby, FGH IIIb Suppl.2 p.358 n.7; cf. esp. Ar.Athpol.19.4; Philochorus FGH 328F115; and Sch.Demosth.21.144 (IX.623 Ddf.).

(60) Jacoby, FGH IIIb Suppl.1 p.454, and Suppl.2 pp.361-2 and 363-4, was misled by C. Seltman, Athens (1924) pp.79ff, into supposing there to be numismatic support for this in an 'Alcmeonid-Delphic issue'; but cf. Forrest, art.cit.pp.282-3, for a critique.

(61) Cf. Wilamowitz (1893) II.323-8.

(62) Cf. Wilamowitz (1893) I.32 n.32: "Lediglich ein Akt der Munifizenz und der Frommigkeit, die wir an den Alkmeoniden, von denen seine Tradition stammt, bewundern sollen". It is not a reliable inference from this positive estimate of their munificence and piety, however, to assume that the Alcmeonids are Hdts source here, as my arguments in the text are intended to show.

(63) Cf. Bowra (1961) pp.383-4; and Bornitz pp.34ff.

(64) Cf. Wilamowitz (1893) I.38, with n.20; and Bowra (1961) p.383.

(65) Cf. 5.90.1, συμφορὴν ἐποιεῦντο διπλήν, ὅτι τε ἄνδρας ξείνους σφίσι ἐόντας ἐξεληλάκεσαν ἐκ τῆς ἐκείνων, καὶ ὅτι ταῦτα ποιήσασι χάρις οὐδεμία ἐφαίνετο πρὸς ’Αθηναίων; and 5.91.2, ἐπαρθέντες γὰρ κιβδήλοισι μαντηίοισι ἄνδρας ξείνους ἐόντας ἡμῖν τὰ μάλιστα καὶ ἀναδεκομένους ὑποχειρίας παρέξειν τὰς ’Αθήνας, τούτους ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος ἐξηλάσαμεν. The threefold repetition of this motif leaves us in no doubt that the Spartans were acting without any thought for the ideal of freedom when they 'liberated' Athens.

(66) Ar.Athpol.19.4, 'improves' on Hdt by suggesting that the Spartans overcame their scruples because of the Peisistratids' relations with their enemy, Argos (cf. ibid.17.4). Cf. Forrest, art.cit.p.281, n.7.

(67) Macan at 5.66(1): "The increase or revival of power is antedated: probably the immediate effect of the expulsion of the Peisistratids was to weaken the power of Athens". But the contradiction is in fact thrust on us by Hdts own narrative, which openly acknowledges that *stasis* was the immediate result of the fall of the tyrants.

(68) Not an alternative version of the story already told, since clearly we are simply being reminded that Cleisthenes was one of the Alcmeonids reported to have bribed the Pythia at 5.63.1 (cf. *anapeisai/anepeithon*). But contrast e.g. Kinzl, art.cit.pp.196-7, "yet another *legomenon*, according to which *Kleisthenes himself* persuaded the Pythia".

(68a) I cannot see much to recommend the suggestion that no Greek would have expected Cleisthenes to have done anything but look after his own interest: this is not one of those few exceptions to the 'rule' that the interests of the state should come first; cf. Dover, GPM 301ff.

(69) Forrest (1966) p.191, points to the incongruity of the word *proshetairizetai* here (cf. 5.69.2, πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ μοῖραν προσεθήκατο ... τὸν δῆμον προσθέμενος); Cleisthenes is still playing the game of factions, an aristocratic game, into which he mistakenly draws the demos, thus bringing the game to an end. The irony, of course, may well be of Hdts devising, rather than a reflection of historical fact or even tradition.

(70) Cf. e.g. D.M. Lewis, Historia 12 (1963) pp.22ff; P.J. Bicknell, Historia Einzelschr.19 (1977) pp.1ff; J.S. Traill, Hesperia Suppl.14(1975); A. Andrewes, CQ 27 (1977) pp.241ff. To what extent Hdts cynical interpretation of Cleisthenes as a man and a reformer is justified by the facts is open to dispute. See e.g. Forrest (1966) pp.191ff, who plays down his altruistic motives, emphasizing the apparent evidence that Alcmeonid control was

built into the trittys-system (cf. e.g. Lewis, Bicknell (esp.), Andrewes), and arguing that Cleisthenes fatally miscalculated in playing with the demos. For the opposite view, see e.g. Murray (1980) pp.254ff, emphasizing the eclipse of Alcmeonid power in the wake of the reforms, and the institution of ostracism. In my view the reforms show too much careful and far-sighted thought to have been conceived with Alcmeonid ascendancy as one of their main objectives: no-one who was really interested in establishing the power of his own family would have wasted so much time on detail which did not directly affect this either way. Clearly there was some gerrymandering in favour of the Alcmeonids (though possibly not as much as was once argued), but by breaking up many of the old sources of aristocratic influence (Andrewes) Cleisthenes was also looking towards a new and freer state. The modern controversy as to whether Cleisthenes was more of a politician than a statesman is, however, far removed from Hdts interpretation, which does all it can to deny that Cleisthenes in any way had the interests of Athens at heart.

(70a) Cf. Ar.Athpol.29.3; Isocr.7.16, 15.232 and 16.26; with E. Ruschenbusch, Historia 7 (1958) pp.418-21.

(71) Cf. Ar.Athpol.21.1, where the reforms are instituted ἔτει τετάρτωι μετὰ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν ἐπὶ Ἰσαγόρου ἄρχοντος (cf. DH Ant.Rom.1.75 and 5.1). This in Aristotle's narrative sequence comes after the attempted coup of Isagoras and Cleomenes and the exile of Cleisthenes, unless we accept the argument of Wade-Gery (1958) pp.137-9. that 21.1 is a delayed elaboration (for stylistic reasons!) of 20.1, which reports that before Cleisthenes' exile, ἡττώμενος ... προσηγάγετο τὸν δῆμον, ἀποδιδοὺς τῶι πλήθει τὴν πολιτείαν (Wade-Gery translates, universo populo tribuens rem publicam). If this is so, however, Aristotle has given no indication that this is how he wants to be read, and he is being unnecessarily confusing. See now D.J. McCargar, Historia 25 (1976) pp.385ff, arguing that Aristotle does correct Hdts sequence with independent documentary evidence (cf. Sch.Ar.Lysistr.273).

(72) If Hdt is completely wrong and the reforms did not in any way antedate Cleisthenes' exile, his mistake may be due to a pre-disposition to see them as merely a weapon against Isagoras. If both Hdt and Aristotle are right (cf. e.g. Hignett (1952) App.VI pp.331-6, and now Rhodes (1981) 244-5), and the reforms were set in motion before the exile but not ratified and/or executed until Cleisthenes' return, then Hdt may, for the same reason, have chosen to imply that all was complete before the fall of Isagoras. An acknowledgement that Cleisthenes was engaged in setting up the democracy even after the disposal of his political rival would concede more political altruism to him than Hdt is prepared to do.

(73) Cf. Macan at 5.69.1; but the paradox is certainly one of Hdts own devising.

(74) Contrast How and Wells at 5.67.1: "The resemblance between the two policies ... is less clear that the contrast. The historian's distorted view shows how inadequate was his appreciation of Cleisthenes' political reforms". Distortion, however, can mean more than inadequacy of historical vision, as we shall see.

(75) Mimeesthai can be used of unconscious imitation: cf. esp. 1.176.3 (ironic) and 2.104.4, 9.34.1. But there is no reason to understand that here (cf. e.g. 4.166.1).

(76) It is remarkable that Hdts picture of Cleisthenes should be so hostile when we compare what the author (not Aristotle) of Ar.Pol.1315B12ff has to say of the Orthagorid tyranny, which lasted longest of all tyrannies, "because they treated their subjects with moderation, ruled according

to law, and generally looked after the people in such a way as to earn their goodwill"; the author goes on to single out Cleisthenes, who (it was said) once "placed a wreath on the head of a judge who had decided against him in the games". The narrative of the marriage of Agariste in Hdt (6.126ff) also seems to pre-suppose a tradition favourable to the tyrant. For a modern interpretation of the Orthagorid tyranny, cf. A. Griffin, Sikyon (1982) pp.40ff, esp.47ff.

(77) Cf. 5.70.2f, φονεῦσαι δὲ αὐτούς (sc. the conspirators) αἰτίη ἔχει Ἀλκμεωνίδας. The episode is put in the worst possible light by Hdts insistence on the lawlessness of the Alcmeonids' action in murdering the conspirators after the πρυτάνιες τῶν ναυκράρων had released them ὑπεγγύους πλὴν θανάτου (cf. 5.71.2). Contrast Thucyd.1.126.3ff, where the enageis (i.e. the Alcmeonids) are themselves acting in an official capacity when they put the suppliants to death, inasmuch as they are themselves entrusted as the arkhontes with the powers to do with them whatever they think best (cf. 1.126.8). Cf. Dover / Andrewes, HCT IV.426. Clearly Hdts version reflects far less well on the Alcmeonids, who (like tyrants?) take the law into their own hands. This is surely yet another indication of the inadequacy of the Alcmeonid-source theory, if a story so directly concerning the family, and indeed Pericles himself (cf. Thucyd.1.127.1), can appear in a form so wholly unflattering to them. Cf. M. Lang, CPh 57 (1967) 243-9, comparing the two accounts and concluding that what Thucydides has added is Alcmeonid bias!

(78) Cf. Bornitz p.49: "Wenn wir nun vor diesem Hintergrund (i.e. the character of the tyrant) die Taten des Athener Kleisthenes betrachten, zeigt sich, dass zwar am Ende seiner staatlichen Veränderungen die Einrichtung der Demokratie steht ..., doch die Motive dazu sind keineswegs aus der Sorge um das Wohl der Stadt erwachsen, sondern aus rein persönlichen, machtpolitischen Interessen".

(79) But contrast Forrest (1966) pp.191ff, who supposes that Cleisthenes' endeavours produced accidental results, which he little enough envisaged when he started. Is this any more than an attempt to accomodate Hdts erratic interpretation? Cf. n.70 above.

(80) The text and sense have both been disputed. pantōs is Bekker's emendation for MSS panta or pantōn. Krüger suggested that apōsmenon was middle, with the sense "which before had rejected him". But the most natural interpretation is that of Stein: "'zurückgestossen, verschmächt' von Kleisthenes. Dieser hatte früher, als Haupt einer der angesehensten unter den herrschenden Familien, es verschmäht sich um das Wohl und die Gunst des gemeinen Mannes zu bekümmern". Contrast also Ostwald (1969) p.156: "Cleisthenes first tried to get his programme adopted through a forum other than the Assembly"; but it is hard to believe Hdt means this.

(81) The answer to this question depends both on whether or not we pre-suppose a Solonian boule (cf. e.g. Rhodes (1981) 153-4) and on whether Hdt is right in putting the Cleisthenic reforms before Isagoras' attempted coup (cf. nn.71-2, above).

(82) D.M. Lewis (1977) p.148, considers it to be "a theme of the History that the Persian gradually discover what the Spartans are like". Hdts point seem to be rather that misunderstanding on both sides is not so much dependent on knowledge or information as on the inclination to understand (cf. Reflexion: Ch.III, n.109). Moreover it is not only the Spartans who are treated in this way but the Athenians as well: cf. the present example and esp. Darius at 5.105.1f, εἰρέσθαι οἵτινες εἶεν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι.

(83) A most characteristic action of the democracy; cf. e.g. Thucyd.2.70.4, Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τούς τε στρατηγοὺς ἐπηιτιάσαντο ὅτι ἄνευ αὐτῶν ξυνέβησαν (cf. 4.65.3,etc.). Incidentally there is no indication here in Hdt of what modern commentators have inferred, namely that the authors of this embassy are the Alcmeonids and that its failure means their disgrace (cf. e.g. How and Wells at 5.73.3). For Hdt the episode shows the new corporate spirit of Athens - an unflattering reflexion on the democracy?

(84) Cf. the Spartan embassy to Cyrus at 1.152.3, γῆς τῆς Ἑλλάδος μηδεμίαν πόλιν σιναμωρέειν ὡς αὐτῶν οὐ περιοφομένων.

(85) Cf. Cleomenes' grievance at 5.74.1 after having been ejected by the democracy (ἐπιστάμενος περιυβρίσθαι ἔπεσι καὶ ἔργοισι ὑπ᾿ Ἀθηναίων) as the Spartans here recall (5.91.2, περιυβρίσας ἐξέβαλε). Cf. Ch.I.ii.

(86) Cf. 5.92ē.5, οὐκ ὦν παύσεσθε ἀλλὰ πειρήσεσθε παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον κατάγοντες Ἱππίην;

(87) "Attacked on both sides" is surely a more likely rendering of ἀμφιβολίηι ἐχόμενοι than "in doubt" (so Powell, s.v.), as the Thucydidean parallels cited by Stein illustrate: "von zwei (oder mehreren) Seiten angegriffen sein". The Athenians are in critical danger, isolated by their new independence and compelled to be self-sufficient, but they show the very reverse of 'doubt' or hesitation.

(88) Cf. Thucyd.1.108.2, on Oenophyta; and 1.100.1, on Eurymedon, ἐνίκων τῆι αὐτῆι ἡμέραι ἀμφότερα (i.e. by land and sea). Both those encounters show the speed and decisiveness of Athenian action. In the present case, however, the physical possibility of two such battles on one day is hard to credit.

(89) Cf. Aelian, Var.Hist.6.1, who has has number of cleruchs as *diskhilious* (v.l. *tessarakonta*). Whatever that evidence is worth, it is generally agreed that Hdts figure seems improbably large. This may well not have been the earliest use of cleruchies by the Athenians (cf. e.g. the regulations for Salamis: Meiggs/Lewis no.14), nor in reality anything very surprising or ominous; but it may be that Hdt anticipates that this detail will evoke memories of the empire, of which the cleruchy was a powerful instrument, a cause of resentment as grave almost as the imposition of tribute itself. Cf. Meiggs, AE pp.121ff and 260ff; ATL III.284ff; Schulthess, RE XI.1 (1921) 814-32; and cf. esp. Isocr.Paneg.107ff. He thus shows an interest in suggesting that the Athenians used their victory to secure territorial advantage in Euboea: an account more sensitive to the good name of Athens might have suppressed such a detail.

(90) The latest discussion of the date of the second dedication is by J.H. Schreiner, SO 15 (1976) pp.25-35, who argues that it commemorates victories over Boeotians and Euboeans c.454 in the Sacred War wrongly dated by Thucydides to the early 440's (!).

(91) Cf. e.g. How and Wells: "Hdt here as usual champions freedom and constitutional government against tyranny"; or Jacoby, RE art.358.3ff: "Wenn er (5.78) das Lob der attischen *Isēgoriē* singt, so steht das in einem Passus, der die Bemerkung, wieviel leichter es sei πολλοὺς διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα auf sein richtiges Mass zurückgeführt. Contrast Strasburger (1965) pp.587ff.

(92) All this notwithstanding the translators are virtually as one in rendering otherwise: cf. Rawlinson, Macaulay and Powell "an excellent thing"; Godley (Loeb), "A good thing"; Legrand, "l'excellence de l'égalité"; Feix, "etwas wertvolles"; de Sélincourt, " ... proved, if proof were needed, how noble a thing freedom is" (!). Strasburger appears to be the only exception ("ein Zustand von weittragender Bedeutung"), but he offers no explanation for his divergence. And cf. Fornara p.48, "a thing worth taking seriously", but he goes on to spoil it by paraphrasing what Hdt is doing here as 'praising' and 'applauding'; cf. p.49, "The quality of eleutheria fostered by any government seems to have been for Hdt the ultimate touchstone of its worth".

(92a) For the reference to moral qualities in the poets' praise of cities, cf. Kienzle pp.76ff. When 'excellence in war' is stressed (cf. Kienzle p.74), it is either war against a foreign foe or simply war in the abstract: the poets naturally avoid what Hdt does here, namely stressing the ability of the state in war against Greek neighbours.

(93) For the *epainos* of Athens, cf. O. Schröder, De laudibus Athenarum a poetis tragicis et ab oratoribus epidictis excultis, Diss.Göttingen (1915); at pp.25ff for the praise of the *politeia*. Cf. the use of the theme in tragedy: Eurip.Suppl.433ff, Hkld.181ff; cf. Med.824ff. For Euripides on Athens, cf. Schmid/Stählin I.3.787, n.9. Cf. also Kienzle (1936) p.85, for *eleutheria* in the praise of cities: e.g. Pind.Ol.12.1ff, Py.8.98ff.

(94) Cf. Isocr.16.27 (ἄστυ τῆς Ἑλλάδος), above, with Antid.299; and see esp. Pl.Protag.337D, Athens as the πρυτανεῖον τῆς σοφίας.

(95) Cf. H. Strasburger in Herter (1968) pp.498ff, who compares the other surviving *epitaphios* literature and other similar state orations (cf. Pl.Menex.; Lys.2; Demosth.60; Isocr.Paneg. and Panath.; Aristid.Panath.; cf. Kierdorf pp.83ff), and concludes that "im schroffen Bruch mit der Tradition der Epitaphios werden gerade *nicht* die Verdienste Athens um die übrige Griechenwelt, sondern nur die Besonderheiten seines innerstaatlichen Lebens gerühmt". Certainly the speech has a character all its own; but exaggeration and elaboration apart, there is likely to be a recognizable Periclean core (cf. n.98, below). Cf. P. Landmann, Mus.Helv. 31 (1974) pp.65ff, for a recent analysis of the *epainos* of Athens embodied in this speech.

(96) Cf. Gorg.DK 82B6; Ps.-Lys.2.18-9; Ps.-Demosth.60.25-6; Isocr.Paneg.106 and Panath.114ff (a distinction between the *patrios politeia* and the radical democracy); and cf. Aristid.Panath.383-93. See also esp. Pl.Legg. 698Aff, who describes the heroic defence of Athens against Persia as a triumph of the pre-radical democracy (see (H) below).

(97) It will be remembered that the Athenians had assembled a stock of traditional mythical parallels for their role as liberators, which they regularly trotted out in state orations alongside the story of their championship of Greek freedom in the Persian Wars. Cf. Kierdorf pp.83ff, for a full discussion.

(98) It is most unlikely that the Menexenus parodies Thucydides, whose Funeral Oration it resembles least of all our extant models both in style

and content; rather the speech is meant at least in part to reflect the style and content of a genuine Periclean Epitaphios. Cf. esp. Menex.236B, ὅτε μοι δοκεῖ συνετίθει τὸν ἐπιτάφιον λόγον, ὃν Περικλῆς εἶπεν, περιλείμματ' ἄττα ἐξ ἐκείνου συγκολλῶσα. 'The famous epitaphios of Pericles' was not the one that Thucydides has him deliver in the first year of the Archidamian War, but the Samian Epitaphios (cf. Plut.Per.28, with Ar.Rhet.1365A30ff and 1411A1ff). Socrates' words must imply that there is recognizable Periclean material (περιλείμματ' ἄττα ἐξ ἐκείνου) in the parody.

(99) Or even a non-Athenian audience, if the yearly epitaphios was indeed delivered before an assembly which included non-Athenians, and especially the allies: cf. Thucyd.2.34.4, with Stupperich (1977) p.33.

(100) Cf. also Pericles' last words on the empire at Thucyd.2.64.3, a rather stark and chilling contrast with the sentiments of the Funeral Oration.

(101) *Ethelokakeō*, cf. 1.127.3, 6.15.1f, 8.22.2 (cf. 85.1), 8.69.2 and 9.67 (bis), all examples of the lack of spirit to be expected of the victims of despotism.

(102) Cf. e.g. W. Backhaus, Historia 25 (1976) pp.170ff. See also Ch.III.C.

(103) Cf. perhaps Aesch.Pers.242-3, with Hdt 7.103.3.

(103a) Cf. the rather similar denunciation of (?) civil war at Eurip.Suppl 476-93.

(104) For a recent discussion of the history of this conflict, cf. A.J. Podlecki, 'Athens and Aegina', Historia 25 (1976) pp.396ff; but see also Wilamowitz (1893) II.280-8.

(105) Cf. J. Myres, CR 57 (1943) pp.66f, for the correct interpretation of *akēryktos polemos* as war "without formal declaration" rather than "unappeasable, relentless, truceless".

(106) Cf. N. Hammond, Historia 4 (1955) pp.406-7, for the correct interpretation of this oracle. The words τέλος μέντοι καταστρέφεσθαι are not the sign of an oracle *ex eventu* which can be used to 're-date' the beginning of the Aeginetan war on the basis of an Athenian success in 458-7. Contrast e.g. Wilamowitz (1893) II.281.

(107) Cf. Wilamowitz (1893) II.281: "Hdt bedient sich derselben (sc. the Spartan threat) auch nur als eines stilistichen Mittels, um einen Übergang zu jenen Planen der Spartaner zu finden".

(108) Cf. T.J. Dunbabin, BSA 37 (1936-7) pp.83-91; and see now R.J. Buck, in Stud.in hon.M.F.McGregor (1981) pp.5ff.

(109) This sentence is thought by many to involve Hdt in a serious inconsistency, which is taken by L.H. Jeffery, AJP 83 (1962) pp.44ff, as the main indication that Hdts narrative of the Aeginetan conflict at 6.87-93 is a 'later insertion' into the text. Cf. A. Andrewes, BSA 37 (1936-7) pp.1ff, and N. Hammond, Historia 4 (1955) pp.406ff. But the

problem is unreal: it is assumed that the aorist participle *systas* must mean "by breaking out at that time", and that Hdt is thereby dating 'the war between Athens and Aegina' to shortly before 483-2, while at 6.94.1 implying that it had broken out just before Marathon; but there is no reason why *systas* should be taken as indicating any particular date at all for the outbreak of the war. The temporal adverb *tote* belongs with *esōse*, thereby distancing the action of the main verb from the action of the participle. Indeed *systas* should mean "by its outbreak" (cf. Kühner/Gerth II.i.197ff, for the aorist of the participle), at a time not here specified, but remembered by the reader as having been shortly before Marathon. The *akērytos polemos*, of course, does not count; cf. 6.87-8, with Jeffery, art.cit.p.46. Other objections to Hdts chronology are sensibly dealt with by Hammond, but his treatment of *systas* ("by its continuing"), although answering the problem along the right lines, is based on a misunderstanding; cf. Jeffery p.46.

(110) Cf. 6.11.2 and 13.1, *ataxia* as indiscipline due to lack of training or expertise; and cf. e.g. Thucyd.2.92.1, the difference between Phormio's fleet and the Peloponnesian force at Naupactus.

(111) Hdt clearly knows what our other evidence confirms that the relationship was that of colony and mother city; cf. Busolt I.217, n.5, and Graham pp.90f. Thus it is curious that he does not simply tell us as much rather than elaborating on the specific circumstances of the dependence. There is something odd too in the procedure he describes, cf. Busolt I.217, n.6: "Was Hdt 5.82ff über die Art der Abhängigkeit von Epidauros sagt, trägt den Stempel seiner Zeit. Die Aegineten müssen, *wie die Untertanen Athens*, nach Epidauros gehen, um dort vor epidaurischen Gerichten ihre Prozesse zu führen und fallen dann ab *agnōmosynēi khrēsamenoi*". It seems likely that Hdt wants to suggest that Aegina was indeed subjected to Epidaurus, perhaps like an imperial dependent, in order to represent her disaffiliation as a revolt (cf. *apestēsan*), an assertion of freedom and independence. This, of course, assists the parallel with Athens, acquiring at the same time freedom from tyranny and independence from Sparta (cf. (D) above). It is interesting, if Busolt is right, that Hdt should use the model of Athenian imperial jurisdiction to reconstruct the dependence of Aegina on Epidaurus - though it is unlikely that the reader would be meant to pick this up.

(112) This is somewhat curious, since Aegina's sea-power was at least as old as the Hesiodic catalogue (F205.6-7 M/W), οἳ δή τοι πρῶτοι ζεῦξαν νέας ἀμφιελίσσας,/ <πρῶτοι δ' ἱστί' ἔθεν νηὸς πτερὰ ποντοπόροιο>. Cf. Busolt I.217, n.6 and 449f. The Aeginetans overseas, though difficult to trace because of their lack of native pottery, are prominent in all the major sites; cf. Boardman (1980) p.49 for Al Mina, and pp.117f for Naucratis, with Hdt 2.178.3.

(113) Cf. A. Momigliano, 'Sea Power in Greek Thought', CR 58 (1944) pp.1ff; repr. in Secondo Contributo (1960) pp.57ff.

(114) Momigliano, art.cit.pp.2f, takes Pericles' words at 2.62.1, ὅ μοι δοκεῖτε οὔτ' αὐτοὶ πώποτε ἐνθυμηθῆναι ὑπάρχον ὑμῖν μεγέθους πέρι ἐς τὴν ἀρχὴν οὔτ' ἐγὼ ἐν τοῖς πρὶν λόγοις, to indicate the novelty of the theme at this moment in history. But the claim to novelty is a notoriously deceptive rhetorical device - and does Thucydides mean to reproduce the words actually used by Pericles?

(115) Cf. e.g. Isocr.Paneg.100ff, with Wilamowitz (1893) II.380ff; see Momigliano, art.cit. for further material.

(116) Those who argue for an original 5thc source for the Eusebian Thalassocracy List (e.g. J. Myres, JHS 26 (1906) pp.84ff, and W.G. Forrest, CQ 19 (1969) pp.95ff), suppose that its author shares a common interest with Ps.-Xenophon and Thucydides. But contrast e.g. Jeffery (1976) App.III. pp.252f.

(117) Cf. Momigliano, art.cit.p.1: "Thalassocracy, as is well-known, becomes a clear-cut idea in Hdt". Myres, art.cit.p.87, holds a different view: "There is no trace, from beginning to end of his book, of any such scheme of classification by sea-power, or even of any theory of sea-power such as the List of Thalassocracies presumes". But Myres, ignoring 5.83.2, misrepresents Hdts account of Polycrates at 3.122.2, Πολυκράτης γάρ ἐστι πρῶτος τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Ἑλλήνων ὃς θαλασσοκρατέειν ἐπενοήθη, πάρεξ Μίνω τε τοῦ Κνωσσίου καὶ εἰ δή τις ἄλλος πρότερος τούτου ἦρξε τῆς θαλάσσης. Hdt is surely taking issue with an account of the history of thalassocracy (1.4f). Moreover we cannot criticize Hdt on the basis of a 5thc 'Thalassocracy-list' when (a) there is no indication in Thucydides or Ps.-Xenophon either of a 'scheme of classification by sea-power', and (b) the chronographic 'succession-principle' of the Eusebian list is clearly quite foreign to the historiographical interests of the 5thc. Cf. n.116, above.

(118) *Agnōmosynē* is a difficult word to pin down; cf. Stein and Macan ad loc.. Its basic sense in Hdt seems to be "wilfulness", ranging between "stubborn, or heroic wilfulness" (as in the resistance to oppression) and "foolish wilfulness", and it clearly has the character of an opposite to *sōphrosynē*, with a consequent ambiguity allowing for both "lack of wisdom" and "arrogance". Cf. the Thracian resistance to Persia at 4.93, οἱ δὲ Γέται πρὸς ἀγνωμοσύνην τραπόμενοι αὐτίκα ἐδουλώθησαν ("folly" and "stubbornness"); Mardonios on the folly of Greek civil wars at 7.9b.1 (cf. Ch.II.iii.D); Mardonios' foolish desire to capture Athens a second time, against the advice of the Thebans at 9.3.1; Mardonios' view of the Athenian resistance to Persia at 9.4.2, ἐλπίσας δέ σφεας ὑπήσειν τῆς ἀγνωμοσύνης; Mardonios' determination to fight at Plataea at 9.41.4, (γνώμη) ἰσχυροτέρη τε καὶ ἀγνωμονεστέρη καὶ οὐδαμῶς συγγινωσκομένη. And compare 2.172.2, where Amasis wins over the Egyptians to his monarchy, μετὰ δὲ σοφίηι αὐτούς ... οὐκ ἀγνωμοσύνηι προσηγάγετο. Powell here translates "tactlessness", but the antithesis with *sophie* shows the meaning to be something like "lack of wisdom". It is not clear whether the *agnomosyne* shown by freedom-fighters (cf. 4.93; 5.83.2; 6.10) is meant to be an admirable wilfulness, or whether Hdt is not deliberately exploiting the potential ambiguity; certainly Mardonios' reflexion on Athenian *agnomosyne* at 9.4.2 ought to be somewhat pejorative. The word possibly offers another insight into Hdts equivocal attitude towards freedom-fighting in general.

(119) It may be that Athenian propaganda of the time of the Ionian revolt made much of the glory of Athens' intervention. It is possible that illustrations in art of Theseus in battle with Amazons in Asia might be sufficiently early to be construed as celebrations of their participation in the revolt. For a discussion of the evidence, cf. e.g. E. Culasso Gastaldi, 'L'Amazzonomachia nell' elaborazione propagandistica ateniese', AAT 101 (1977) pp.283ff, who however considers only the propaganda of

the Persian Wars proper. For a full survey of Amazon iconography, cf. D. von Bothmer, Amazons in Greek Art (1957). It is curious if all the Amazonomachies are a response to the Persian Wars of the Greek mainland, that there should have been any emphasis on the narrative of Theseus' expedition against the Amazons in Asia, in which he replaces Heracles (cf. Gastaldi pp.287ff), rather than simply on the story of the Amazons' invasion of Attica (cf. Gastaldi pp.293ff). The latter is a true parallel to the events of 480 and perhaps 490, but the former is much better suited to illustrating an Athenian expedition to Asia. Identification of such representations with the Ionian revolt seems natural, especially since their earliest appearances belong some considerable time before 480-79, after which they might have been taken to stand for Mykale, Eurymedon and the rest. See e.g. the metopes of the Athenian treasury at Delphi, in von Bothmer pp.117-9, now generally dated earlier than Marathon, despite the evidence of Pausanias, cf. Boardman (1978) pp.159-60.

(120) Charonof Lampsacus FGH 262F10 provides Plutarch with a rather inadequate corrective of Hdts account (cf. MH 861CD), but the narrative, however cursory, does look to have been less cynical than Hdts detailed version. Cf. Strasburger (1965) p.592, n.45 (overstated), and Tozzi (1978) pp.60ff.

(121) Hdts apparent disdain for Athens' action may have something to do with the much bigger question of his view of the Ionian revolt as a whole (for which, cf. Ch.II.iii.B), but it has at least as much to do with his conception of Athenian democracy.

(122) Note that it is a *psēphisma* (cf. 5.97.3, ἐψηφίσαντο), a *democratic* decision.

(123) Cf. Ar.Pol.1287A28ff, καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἄρχοντας διαστρέφει καὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας. With Otanes' comment at 3.80.3, cf. Ch.I.i.4.

(124) The observation of mass psychology much interests Thucydides in his treatment of the Athenian assembly: cf. e.g. the plague at 2.59ff, with Pericles' speech; Mytilene at 3.36ff, with the debate; Pylos at 4.21ff and 27ff; and Sicily at 6.8ff, with the debate. Cf. esp. 6.24.3f, καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσι ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι ... ὥστε διὰ τὴν ἄγαν τῶν πλεόνων ἐπιθυμίαν, εἴ τωι ἄρα καὶ μὴ ἤρεσκε, δεδιὼς μὴ ἀντιχειροτονῶν κακόνους δόξειεν εἶναι τῆι πόλει ἡσυχίαν ἦγεν. And cf. de Romilly (1963) pp.329ff. The matter must have been of concern to all those who, like Hdt here, were interested in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of constitutions; cf. Ch.III.H.

(125) Cf. Tozzi (1978) p.39, reviewing the likely tradition at Athens concerning the revolt: "La guerre persiane proposero questo sollevamento come il primo momento dello scontro fra Greci e Barbari, ma il confronto in nessun modo potera riuscire favorevole alla rivolta". The Athenians played down the revolt, he argues, because they wanted to justify their protection of a 'weak' Ionia in the Delian League. This may be right, but it does not mean that if asked for their opinion of their own role in the affair, they would not have insisted that it was their love of freedom which made them go to the aid of the Ionians (cf. e.g. [Lys.] Epitaph.22), even if they had to excuse their departure from the alliance (cf. Isocr.Paneg.164-5). See also Pl.Menex.240A; and cf. n.119, above. It is presumably the greater glory of the liberation of Greece which was chiefly responsible for eclipsing the story of the Ionian revolt

in the Athenian panegyric literature, as well as its unsuccessful outcome. Contrast Tozzi pp.55-6.

(126) Cf. his almost successful bribery of Cleomenes at 5.51.2, προέβαινε τοῖσι χρήμασι ὑπερβάλλων ..., ἐς οὗ πεντήκοντά τε τάλαντα ὑπεδέδεκτο.

(127) Cf. K.H. Kinzl, 'Athens: Between Tyranny and Democracy', in Schachermeyer (1977) pp.199-223, rightly insisting on the gradual emergence of 'democracy' and rejecting the anachronism (fostered by Hdt!) that Cleisthenes brought about that change once and for all in his reforms of 508-7.

(128) There is no sign of the qualification we find later in Plato and Isocrates, for example, to the effect that the Athenian *politeia* which saved Greece in the Persian Wars was quite different from the radical democracy which subsequently gave the city such a bad name: cf. e.g. Isocr.Panath.114ff; Pl.Legg.698Aff.

(129) Cf. Crahay pp.166ff and 256ff, arguing (not very convincingly) that these oracles are mere Spartan propaganda to excuse their turning against the democracy. I would suggest that, unless they are a Hdtean fabrication, they were among the oracles suddenly found in circulation just before the outbreak of war in 431.

(130) Cf. Stein ad loc.: "*aniasthai*, was sich im Kriege wegen Epidamnos und Potidää erfüllte", and Macan ad loc.: "one is tempted to suspect here too a vaticinium post eventum, born probably not of the troubles which immediately preceded the Peloponnesian war ... ". With Crahay pp.166ff and 256ff; de Ste Croix, OPW p.169. The prophecy clearly demands not some gradual growth of antagonism, an accumulation of provocative acts over a period of years; if it is indeed *ex eventu*, the "days appointed" are best understood in terms of the events of Corcyra and Potidaea, not e.g. the creation of an Athenian navy, or Athens' adhesion to Megara (cf. Thucyd.1.105), or the conquest of Aegina, all acts too indefinitely provocative to be thought of as harming Corinth. This implies that the prophecy was 'forged' very close to the time of Hdts writing, if not contemporarily with it: is it out of the question to identify the forger as Hdt himself? The Homeric echo is characteristic of Hdts grand manner, though it may be mere embellishment by him; cf. Hom.Il.1.240ff, Achilles' warning to the Achaeans, ἦ ποθ' 'Αχιλλῆος ποθὴ ἵξεται υἷας 'Αχαιῶν/ ... εὖτ' ἂν πολλοὶ ὑφ' Ἕκτορος ἀνδροφόνοιο / θνήισκοντες πίπτωσι.

(131) Not *theoi horkioi*, as Strasburger (1965) p.590, n.43, has it, for such gods only presided over contractual oaths; cf. e.g. Thucyd.2.71.4.

(132) Cf. Aristagoras to Cleomenes at 5.49.3, νῦν ὦν πρὸς θεῶν τῶν 'Ελληνίων ῥύσασθε Ἴωνας ἐκ δουλοσύνης ; and the Athenian appeal to Sparta at 9.7a.2, ἡμεῖς δὲ Δία τε 'Ελλήνιον αἰδεσθέντες καὶ τὴν 'Ελλάδα δεινὸν ποιεύμενοι προδοῦναι ... , referring back to 8.144.2.

(133) So rightly Strasburger (1965) p.593: "Sosikles' Rede gegen die Tyrannis und für das gemeingriechische Ideal der Freiheit und Selbstbestimmung soll gelten! Aber die Prophezeiung des Hippias ebenfalls!".

(134) Cf. Fornara, Philol.114 (1970) pp.174ff, arguing that *isonomia* is not necessarily the same thing as democracy here. 'Equality before the

law' could be also the watchword of oligarchies: cf. Thucyd.3.62.3 and 4.78.3 (contrast 3.82.8), Isocr.Panath.178 (contrast Areop.20); with Pl.Epp.VII.326D (contrast Republ.561E and 563B). It is not necessarily democracy that Maiandrios promises to the Samians at Hdt 3.142.3f, or that Aristagoras imposes in Miletus at 5.37.2, and in each case, as also in 3.80.6, Hdt uses the word simply of a 'free constitution' as opposed to a tyranny, without specifying its precise form.

(135) According to J. Oliver, Rh.Mus.98 (1955) pp.37ff, Pericles' Funeral Oration in Thucydides (2.37) makes a distinction between 'democracy' which the Athenian constitution is not except in name, and _isonomia_, which it turns out to be in practice. I doubt, however, even if this is right, that Thucydides wants us to think of the 'mixed constitution' that Oliver argues he means. For Hdt, at any rate, the Athenian (Cleisthenic) constitution is clearly 'democracy' (cf. 6.131.1), although he only once so designates it, preferring at 5.78 the term _isēgoriē_; otherwise he tends to refer to the Athenian state as the _dēmos_ (cf. Powell, s.v. 3). There are no grounds for supposing that Hdt thought the Athenian constitution a moderate 'isonomous' democracy and so immune from the potential sting of Megabyxos' criticisms. For Hdt and Thucydides on democracy, cf. H. Edelmann, Klio 57 (1975) 313-27.

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Chapter Two, Part iii: NOTES.

(1) Cf. also 7.176.4, on the wall at Thermopylae, built by the Phocians against the Thessalians; and 7.215, on the famous Anopaia path, by which the Melians had earlier led the Thessalians against the Phocians.

(2) Plut.MH 35.868BF rightly judged Herodotus' *kakoetheia* here.

(3) This designation of Herodotus' narrative of the Persian Wars perhaps needs some justification. A Greek of Herodotus' time would have called these events *ta Medika* (cf. Thucyd. e.g. 1.73.2, 97.2 (a reference to Herodotus' own work?), 6.82.3, etc.), which in its narrowest sense would indeed mean only 'the Persian Wars'; and yet surely he would have expected any literary presentation of the theme to follow the example of the poets, Simonides, Pindar, Aeschylus, and confine itself in the main to the narrative of Greek heroism, as for the most part the orators do, and would have done in the 5thc (see below, for some of the relevant texts). Moreover there are internal hints that Herodotus regards this as his real theme: first the fact that freedom is perhaps the major theme of the work (cf. Ch.II, Introd.), which is here brought to a climax in the most celebrated example of Greece's devotion to that ideal; and second that Greek freedom is the subject of almost every major speech and debate in the course of this narrative of the Persian Wars (cf. e.g. 6.106.2, 109.3ff; 7.51.2, 102-4, 135.3, 157.2; 8.22, 142.3, 143.1, 144.1; 9.41.3, 45.2, 60.1; and cf. 7.139.5, 178.2, etc.).

(4) von Fritz, GGS I.266.

(5) Cf. the excellent discussion of this question by Fornara, e.g. at pp.86-7; also, somewhat more erratically, A. French, Mnemos.25 (1972) 9-27.

(6) Cf. Strasburger (1965) passim, but not on the Persian Wars.

(7) Cf. von Fritz, Die gr. Eleutheria bei Hdt, WS 78 (1965) 5ff.

(8) And cf. Thucyd.2.71.2ff, 72.1, and 74.2 (Archidamus at Plataea); 3.54.3f, 56.4, 58.4f and 59.4 (the Plataean debate); cf. 6.76.4, 82.3f, etc.

(9) Cf. Strasburger in Herter (1968) passim, on the eclecticism of Thucydides' speeches.

(10) Cf. Hdt 8.144.2, below, with distinctly disquieting effect. And cf. perhaps the wording of the 'Themistocles-decree'. if it is authentic at this point, or at all (Meiggs/Lewis no.23.14ff): ἀμύνεσϑαι τὸμ βάρβαρον ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐλευϑερίας τε ἑαυτῶν ϰαὶ τῶν ἄλλων Ἑλλήνων μετὰ Λαϰεδαιμονίων ϰαὶ Κορινϑίων ϰαὶ Αἰγινητῶν ϰαὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶμ βουλομένων ϰοινωνήσειν τοῦ ϰινδύνου.

(11) Cf. Aristoph.Ach.696ff, ἄνδρ' ἀγαϑὸν ὄντα Μαραϑῶνι περὶ τὴν πόλιν; Hipp.781ff; and cf. Hipp.1334, with Vesp.711, and F363; also Thesm.806f, and Batr.1296f. Cf. Critias DK 88B2.15. By contrast the dedication of/for Callimachus (Meiggs/Lewis no.18.4) seems to speak of Marathon as a victory ' on behalf of the Hellenes ' (πρὸ Ἑ]λ(λ)ήνων).

(12) Cf. Wilamowitz, ad loc.: "Der Gedanke kann nur der seitdem zahllose Male wiederholte sein, dass die Hellenen sich gegen den Erbfeind vereinigen sollen". And from the 5thc, cf. Gorgias' Olympikos Logos (DK II.272.4ff) and Epitaphios (DK II.272.9ff, and B5a).

(13) Cf. Meiggs/Lewis no.27. And cf. Herodotus 8.27.5, 82.1; 9.81.1; and Thucyd.3.57.2.

(14) Cf. esp. Meiggs, AE 152f, and full discussion at 512ff; contrast esp. R. Seager, Historia 18 (1969) pp.129-41. And now the eccentric views of J. Walsh, Chiron 11 (1981) pp.31-63, arguing that both the Peace of Callias and the Congress decree are authentic and belong after Eurymedon in the 460's. I much prefer the traditional chronology (cf. Meiggs), and would insist that there is no evidence to determine the date of the congress decree (nothing precise can be inferred from Plutarch), only the relative attractiveness of the reconstructions which accomodate it.

(15) Cf. Hdt 7.132, 145.1, 148, 235.4; with P. Brunt, Historia 2 (1953-4) 135ff. And cf. perhaps the controversial Plataean Oath: P. Siewert, Der Eid von Plataiai (1972), who argues at length for the authenticity of the Acharnae stele (= Tod GHI II.204).

(16) For the various pan-Hellenic celebrations of the victory at Plataea, in particular the Eleutheria, cf. Pritchett III.178ff; with n.252, below.

(17) The judgement in Pl.Legg.692D-693A, that the Greek defence against Persia was a disgrace (αἰσχρῶς γοῦν ἠμύναντο αὐτούς) is surely meant somewhat contentiously. Cf. e.g. R. Weil, Ét.et Comm.32 (1959) pp.117ff: "aiskhrōs n'est certes pas le mot que les Grecs utilisaient le plus souvent pour évoquer leur conduite pendant les Guerres Médiques"; Weil can cite no parallel for this attitude.

(18) See esp. Gottlieb pp.48ff. And in general, e.g. Pohlenz, (1966) pp.10ff; Kierdorf, (1966). N. Wecklein, 'Über die Tradition d.Perserkriege', Sitz.d.kön.bay.Ak.d.Wiss. (1876) pp.239-314, offers a well balanced assessment of the traditions available to Herodotus, acknowledging equally the distortion which strove to make Greek achievement seem as glorious and spotless as possible (pp.270ff), and the distortion caused by "persönliche Neigungen, Parteihass und die Zerwurfnisse der griechischen Staaten" (pp.298ff). For other 19thc views cf. Hauvette (1894) pp.117-80.

(19) Cf. e.g. Fornara p.38: "VII-IX is a 'book' in itself, complete with prooemium; it has a beginning, middle and end testifying to its conceptual independence. It can even be separated from what precedes without contextual damage".

(20) See esp. Bornitz, Teil II.

(21) See now Tozzi (1978), with full discussion (and useful remarks on Herodotus' narrative) and bibliography. Cf. also e.g. P.B. Manville, 'Aristagoras and Histiaios', CQ 27 (1977) pp.80ff; J. Neville, 'Was there an Ionian Revolt?', CQ 29 (1979) pp.268ff; and for the latest in a long line of historical romances on the revolt cf. D. Lateiner, 'The Failure of the Ionian Revolt', Historia 31 (1982) pp.129ff. On the speeches in Herodotus' account of the revolt, cf. L. Solmsen, 'Die Reden beim ionischen Aufstand', in Herodot WdF pp.629-44 (repr. from AJP 64 (1943) pp.241ff).

(22) Note that all the parties to this sordid affair are alike motivated by the thought of profit for themselves: cf. 5.30.6 (the Naxian exiles: πάντα ποιήσειν τοὺς Ναξίους τὰ ἂν αὐτοὶ κελεύωσι, ὣς δὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νησιώτας) and 31.2f (Persia).

(23) Cf. also the speeches in the narrative of the revolt in Cyprus: 5.109.1ff.

(24) Herodotus' use of the word agnomosyne here is indeed remarkable cf. e.g. Solmsen, art.cit.p.642, n.19), and surely somewhat provocative: but it remains unclear to what extent this 'stubborn folly' is or is not admirable. Cf. Ch.II.ii, n.118, for a fuller discussion of the range of this word.

(25) Herodotus of course does not necessarily endorse their judgement (cf. 5.124.1) as we can tell by comparing similar expressions of doubt which precede a favourable outcome: e.g. 6.9.1 (!), 7.168.2, 8.140a3.

(26) Translate "convinced", rightly or wrongly, Herodotus does not say; see below on 9.54.1 in (J).3.

(27) For Herodotus' 'Samian sources', cf. Jacoby, RE art.220.4ff (in general), and on this passage, 440.23ff. See also B.M. Mitchell, JHS 95 (1975) pp.75ff; and compare the elaborate fantasies of V. La Bua, 'Logos samio e storia samia in Erodoto', MGR 6 (1978) pp.1-88.

(28) Cf. the Athenians on the overtures of Mardonios at 9.7a.2, ἐπιστάμενοί τε ὅτι κερδαλεώτερόν ἐστι ὁμολογέειν τῶι Πέρσηι μᾶλλον ἤ περ πολεμέειν (cf. (I).1, below).

(29) The legontai-formula as so often simply marks the climax or turning-point in the story : cf. Ch.II.ii.B, on 5.63.1.

(30) Cf. Fornara, p.82, n.10: "That the entire period down to the death of Artaxerxes were (sic) three continuous generations of human misery indicates the connection he made between contemporary events and that prior triumph. Indeed, how otherwise could he have taken so grim a view of the 'splendid victory'?".

(31) The dispute over the hegemony of the Greeks (αὐτῶν τῶν κορυφαίων περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς πολεμεόντων) is a prominent motif in the narrative of the Greek defence: see e.g. (E).3 and (G).1, below.

(32) For a somewhat fanciful discussion of this parallelism, cf. A. Hurst, Mus.Helv.35 (1978) pp.202-11.

(33) Herodotus does not mention the apparently historical and certainly well-remembered decision (ψήφισμα) of the people to march out to meet the Persian (cf. Gottlieb pp.59ff, with Demosth.19.303, Ar.Rhet.1411a10f, Plut.Mor.628E). If this is a deliberate omission, it may be that Herodotus wanted to lessen the impression of a firm universal resolve of the whole Athenian people, and so concentrated instead of the indecision of the generals at Marathon itself. Cf. A. Garzetti, Aevum 27 (1953) 18-21; Gomme (1962) p.32; and C. Habicht, Hermes 89 (1961) p.20.

(34) Again the emphasis is surely Hdtean: no Athenian source can have wished to emphasize such a negative side of the story, not even the Alcmeonids, who can hardly have wanted to lay stress on the existence of traitors in Athens! But there were apparently detractors of the Athenian achievement, notably Theopompus (FGH 115F153: "the Athenians try to deceive and beguile the Greeks with such stories"), and no doubt Plutarch is thinking of others as well (MH 27.862D), who maliciously claim the battle was no more than a proskrouma brakhy.

(35) A curious effect this: cf. e.g. the Spartans at Thermopylae (7.210.1), ἀλλά οἱ (sc. Ξέρξηι) ἐφαίνοντο ἀναιδείηι τε καὶ ἀβουλίηι διαχρεώμενοι μένειν; and the Greeks at Artemisium (8.10.1), πάγχυ σφι μανίην ἐπενείκαντες.

(36) A remarkable suspension of rivalry perhaps. Herodotus earlier goes out of his way to give the story of how Plataea came to be allied to Athens, and hence on her side at Marathon. The Spartans, when approached for an alliance, told the Plataeans to look to Athens (6.108.3): οὐ κατὰ εὐνοίην οὕτω τῶν Πλαταιέων ὡς βουλόμενοι τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἔχειν πόνους συνεστεῶτας Βοιωτοῖσι . Herodotus goes on at length to give the details of the conflicts which did in fact ensue between Athens and the Thebans. The report clearly contrasts ironically with the immediate context and the Spartan pledge of support for the Athenians at Marathon. Herodotus' malicious inference as to their motive here (again probably his own rather than his source's) once again highlights the theme of the mutual hostility of the Greek states, and reminds us of Sparta's growing distrust of Athens (cf. Ch.II.ii). Thucydides' date for the alliance at 3.68.5 appears to be 519-8 BC, i.e. under the tyranny at Athens, but the text has been suspected; cf. e.g. de Ste Croix, OPW p.167 with n.2. Herodotus however seems certainly to be thinking of the period after the fall of the tyrants, when Cleomenes had reason to be hostile towards the Athenians: could he be falsifying the relative chronology?

(37) See Bornitz passim.

(38) Cf. 7.9a.1, "What have we got to fear from them, when we know how ineffective they are in battle?" A mis-judgement, since Mardonios is arguing from too limited an experience and also falsifying his own discoveries (cf. 6.43ff).

(39) Cf. Stein ad loc.: "Der Einwurf trifft eigentlich nur eōthasi polemous histasthai : 'Keiner zog mir zum Kampfe entgegen, obgleich sie doch Krieg zu führen pflegen'. Damit ist aber in abspringender Wendung zugleich ein Urteil über diese Kriegführung verbunden ... wodurch dann ein Übergang gewonnen ist zu der Anlassung über das innere Verhältnis der hellenischen Staaten".

(40) The same theme appears incidentally in Aristagoras' speech at Sparta (5.49.8): ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν χώρης ἄρα οὐ πολλῆς οὐδὲ οὕτω χρηστῆς καὶ οὔρων σμικρῶν χρεόν ἐστι ὑμέας ἀναβάλλεσθαι πρὸς Μεσσηνίους ἐόντας ἰσοπαλέας καὶ Ἀρκάδας τε καὶ Ἀργείους, τοῖσι οὔτε χρυσοῦ ἐχόμενόν ἐστι οὐδὲν οὔτε ἀργυροῦ, τῶν πέρι καί τινα ἐνάγει προθυμίη μαχομένους ἀποθνῄσκειν, παρέχον δὲ τῆς Ἀσίης πάσης ἄρχειν εὐπετέως, ἄλλο τι αἱρησεσθε;

Certainly it is not Aristagoras' point to accuse the Spartans of criminal devotion to civil war, for his argument is merely cynical and pragmatic; but behind the underlined words lies a clear editorial comment: this is the same 'madness' of which Mardonios speaks so derisively.

(41) Fornara p.84 n.13, misses the work when he says of these words that they "look as if they could have been typical of Athenian rhetoric before the war (sc. Peloponnesian)". The reference is hardly as narrow as that, and surely includes principally what others said about Athens (see below). But see of course Euphemos at Thucyd.6.87.3: "there is no cure for our polypragmosynē", although this is rather the cynical outspokenness of Thucydidean rhetoric.

(42) Cf. Pohlenz, (1966) p.15, for a classic statement of the traditional view. Heni pp.109f n.24, claims perversely that Herodotus, unlike Thucydides, is incapable of producing a dialectical friction between speech and narrative: "Unbewusste Übertreibung oder ideologische Verbrämung, die eine klare Diskrepanz von angegebenen und tatsächlichen Motiven bewirkten, handelt es sich hier jedoch nicht". Contrast the excellent treatment by von Fritz, art.cit.pp.6f; cf. GGS I.254ff.

(43) Xerxes touches accidentally on the crucial point; but the discussion concentrates rather on the preparedness of the Spartans to fight to the death, and the essential problem of Greek unity is left unanswered (see below).

(44) Cf. von Fritz, GGS II.134, n.45.

(45) Cf. 7.139.3-4 (below), where however Herodotus admits the possibility that Sparta might indeed have capitulated rather than fight to the death, if deserted by the allies. That Herodotus can allow both possibilities so openly there, shows that Demaratus is not speaking here in Herodotus' voice, as has sometimes been thought (see below).

(46) Cf. the expression at 7.11.3, 209.2; 8.15.2; 9.60.1. An *agōn* is not necessarily a contest of honour or idealism.

(47) Certainly the Athenians did: cf. e.g. Thucyd.2.39.1, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παιδείαις οἱ μὲν επιπόνωι ἀσκήσει εὐθὺς νέοι ὄντες τὸ ἀνδρεῖον μετέρχονται, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι οὐδὲν ἧσσον ἐπὶ τοὺς ἰσοπαλεῖς κινδύνους χωροῦμεν. It is clear that Thucydides is thinking of Herodotus while writing this (cf. the key-word *aneimenōs*, almost an answer to Xerxes?).

(48) Cf. von Fritz, art.cit.pp.25ff (with GGS I.256), on the post-Herodotean arguments which compared Athenian freedom from explicit legislation against the rigid codification of the Spartan system, and esp. on Thucyd.Funeral Oration in this connexion.

(49) Compare, however, Pl.Legg.698B, which claims something similar for the political life of Athens at the time of the Persian Wars: καὶ δεσπότις ἐνῆν τις αἰδώς, δι' ἣν δουλεύοντες τοῖς τότε νόμοις ζῆν ἐθέλομεν . But the idea of the 'despotism' of *nomos* is here played up artificially for the desired parallel with Persia (cf. 697C, 698A, etc.). Certainly the idea of *respect* for law is one that was no doubt found in every Greek state, but that is different altogether from Demaratus' *fear* of the law (*phobos*, *deos*, as opposed to *aidōs*, *aiskhynē*): cf. e.g. [Lys.]Epitaph.25, μᾶλλον τοὺς παρ' αὑτοῖς νόμους αἰσχυνόμενοι ἢ τὸν πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους κίνδυνον φοβούμενοι , which does not suggest at all that *aiskhynē* and *phobos* are equal. But see, however, Soph.Aj.1073ff; Pl.Euthyphr.12Aff, with Hom.Il. 15.657-8.

(50) Cf. e.g. von Fritz, art.cit.p.9: "Auch die scheinbar so grossartig in sich geschlossene Form der spartanischen *eleutheria* schliesst in Wirklichkeit ihre Unvollkommenheiten und Gefahren in sich. Dessen war sich Herodot sehr wohl bewusst. Im weiteren Verlauf seiner Erzählung von dem grossen Perserkrieg lässt er diese Unvollkommenheiten deutlich hervortreten" (cf. GGS I.265f).

(51) Pausanias III.12.7, suggests, without detail, that at Athens retribution fell upon Miltiades and his house for this crime.

(52) Cf. 7.8b.2f, οἵ γε ἐμὲ καὶ πατέρα τὸν ἐμὸν ὑπῆρξαν ἄδικα ποιεῦντες; cf. 7.9.2, with 5.97.3 and 8.142.2. Cf. Strasburger, (1965) pp.593-4, on the Herodotean principle that the initiation of *adikia* brings down just retribution on the offender.

(53) Cf. Strasburger (1965) p.594, n.47 (with some surprise?): "Der Perserkönig scheint hier gottesfürchtiger als die Helden der griechischen Freiheit". Contrast e.g. Pohlenz (1966) p.14; von Fritz, GGS I.261; Heni pp.133-4.

(54) Herodotus fails to mention the other Spartan Pratodamos, Timagoras of Tegea or Pollis of Argos (Thucyd.l.c.). The selection is surely deliberate: further names would dilute the effect of correspondence between past and present. Herodotus includes Aristeus, son of Adeimantos of Corinth, because the father plays such a prominent role as a faint-hearted traitor in the later narrative; cf. (G).2, (H).1 and 2.

(55) See also Aristoph.Ach.646ff, with Thucyd.4.50, and (E).3, below.

(56) Cf, von Fritz, GGS I.261f.

(57) Cf. Kleinknecht pp.542ff, for the effectiveness of this build-up. Kierdorf pp.102-3, suggests that on a larger scale, however, Herodotus has misplaced his encomium of Athens; see also von Fritz, GGS II.136, n.67, for some useful remarks on this problem. There are two main points here: (a) the immediate context offers no very good illustration of the sort of action we have been led to expect, only their determination not to give in to the discouragement of the oracles (i.e. only self-preservation, nothing about 'saving Greece'); and (b) at this point, unlike e.g. after Salamis and before Plataea, at which time Persia took to offering them terms, the Athenians had no reason to suppose that they could gain anything from capitulation as the other Greeks could, since at this stage Xerxes was determined to punish them for the wrongs they had done him. It may well be that Hdt has at least the first of these considerations in view, and that the displacement is deliberate, i.e. not to seem to be giving the Athenians credit for pan-Hellenic idealism, except insofar as that could serve their own interests.

(58) Cf. Kleinknecht, llcc, for the encomiastic features of this chapter; and cf. n.66, below.

(59) And specifically on the present passage (MH 29.864AB): ἀλλ' Ἀθηναίους γε μεγάλους ἐνθαῦτα τῶι λόγωι πεποίηκε καὶ σωτῆρας ἀνηγόρευκε τῆς Ἑλλάδος· ὀρθῶς γε ποιῶν καὶ δικαίως, εἰ μὴ πολλὰ καὶ βλάσφημα προσῆν τοῖς ἐπαίνοις ... δῆλός ἐστιν οὐ τοῦτο λέγων εἰς τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἔπαινον ἀλλ' Ἀθηναίους ἐπαινῶν ἵνα κακῶς εἴπηι τοὺς ἄλλους ... This too is well observed - a characteristic Hdtean trick (i.e. perspective).

(60) Cf. also e.g. 1.120.1; 6.69.4.

(61) For the two usages, cf. Denniston pp.115f and 140.

(62) This speech selects only the historical examples and omits the mythical ones (1.73.2, καὶ τὰ μὲν πάνυ παλαιὰ τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὧν ἀκοαὶ μᾶλλον λόγων μάρτυρες ἢ ὄψις τῶν ἀκουσομένων;). Kierdorf (pp.83ff) argues plausibly that the mythical catalogue was constructed only after the Persian Wars, to illustrate Athenian championship of Greek freedom and Athens' claim to the hegemony of the Greeks. Also on this section of Thucydides' speech, cf. de Romilly, (1963) pp.244ff.

(63) Cf. e.g. Jacoby, RE art.356.8ff.

(64) Cf. e.g. Focke pp.32ff; Strasburger (1965) passim; Fornara e.g. pp.56-7. Contrast e.g. J.A.S. Evans, L'Ant.Class.48 (1979) pp.112ff, for a most inadequate critique of Strasburger.

(65) Cf. e.g. Focke, l.c; and Powell pp.81-2.

(66) There may well be an encomiastic idiom here: cf. Pind.Py.2.58.ff, εἰ δέ τις ἤδη ... λέγει ἕτερόν τιν' ... γενέσθαι ὑπέρτερον, χαύναι πραπίδι παλαιμονεῖ κενεά.

(67) Cf. Kleinknecht pp.544-5. I find it hard to see any other way of taking the Greek. Certainly the view that the kai links the two aorist participles mounothentes and apodexamenoi seems most improbable: the passive participle is one sense unit, what might have been done to the Spartans, and apodexamenoi and apethanon are a separate sense unit, what the Spartans might have done - in other words the attraction of sense overrides the apparent attraction of the two participles. For the usage of kai with the participle, cf. Powell, s.v.B.3, sub fin.

(68) Cf. Stesimbrotus FGH 107F2 (=Plut.Them.4.1ff), with Gottlieb pp.99f; and cf. Thucyd.1.74.1f.

(69) The expression (also at 7.172.1 and 9.19.1) certainly seems to indicate approval of the loyalist cause on Herodotus' part.

(70) Cf. von Fritz, GGS I.261ff.

(71) There is a deliberate parallel here with the episode from the Scythian campaign of Darius, where the Scyths send ambassadors to their neighbours for support (4.102.1ff, δόντες σφίσι λόγον ὡς οὐκ οἷοί τέ εἰσι τὸν Δαρείου στρατὸν ἰθυμαχίηι διώσασθαι μοῦνοι ...). Their appeal is obviously couched in the same language as we find here, and indeed in other speeches of appeal throughout the last three books: cf. the phrases at 4.118.1ff,

> ὑμεῖς ὦν μηδενὶ τρόπωι ἐκ τοῦ μέσου κατήμενοι (cf. 8.73.3) περιίδητε ἡμέας διαφθαρέντας, ἀλλὰ τὠυτὸ νοήσαντες ἀντιάζωμεν τὸν ἐπιόντα ... ἡμεῖς μὲν πιεζόμενοι ἢ ἐκλείψομεν τὴν χώρην ἢ μένοντες ὁμολογίηι χρησόμεθα ... ἥκει γὰρ ὁ Πέρσης οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἐπ' ἡμέας ἢ οὐ καὶ ἐπ' ὑμέας.

For parallels in Persian War speeches, cf. e.g. 7.157.2, 172.2; 8.57.2, 60a.1, 62.1; 9.7a.1, 21.2, 60.1 (with Bornitz p.129). The self-possessed refusal of the majority of those approached to assist the Scyths, whom they believe to be in the wrong in having provoked Persia, not having consulted the interests of their neighbours therein, again has something in common with things said by the Greeks here (cf. 4.119.2ff). Thus we may say perhaps that Herodotus has constructed the Scythian story as something of a foil to the Greek one: if the reader had expected the Greeks would behave markedly differently, he finds instead the same lack of unity there too.

(72) A highly improbable result in the real world, where we would not expect such an extensive overlap between the Argive and non-Argive versions: another example of Fehling's 'ineinanderpassenden Quellenberichten', presumably.

(73) And cf. 8.73.3, with Burn p.350.

(74) Cf. e.g. How and Wells II.188: "Herodotus does not explicitly reject the special pleading of Argos because he is influenced by Athenian tenderness for a city which later became a useful ally"; and ibid.189: "Indeed the vain excuses put forward by the Argives cannot cloak their medism". Also von Fritz GGS I.262ff, with II.137, n.78.

(75) Plutarch is not deceived by this passage and sees the withdrawal as a mere pretence (MH 28.863BD): εἶθ' ὑπειπών, ὥσπερ εἴωθε, καὶ ἀναδυόμενος οὐκ εἰδέναι φησὶ περὶ τούτων ἀτρεκέως, εἰδέναι δ' ὅτι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐστὶν ἐγκλήματα.

(76) Cf. How and Wells, II.191, who argues that Herodotus has confused *kaka* (misfortunes) and *aiskhra* (misdeeds). But compare Darius' experiment at 3.38, where a very similar parable deals with *aiskhra* clearly; cf. on both passages, Ch.III.E, for probable sophistic influence.

(77) The existence of such a Peace is, of course, disputed on the basis of Theopompus' criticisms and Thucydides' silence: I know of no better treatment of this question than that of Meiggs, AE.129ff and 487ff, with evidence and excellent bibliographical discussion. Meiggs himself, however, refers the present passage to an earlier unsuccessful embassy of 461 BC (cf. AE.92f), not without plausibility. Neither of these considerations significantly affects the interpretation advanced here. Cf. also Walsh, cited in n.14, above.

(78) For the 'Peace of Epilykos', cf. the essential treatment by Wade-Gery (1958) pp.207ff. And e.g. more recently, A.E. Raubitschek, GRBS 5 (1964) pp.151ff, who spurns the rather compressed chronology of the orthodox date (424-3 BC; cf. esp. IG II^2 8 = SEG XIX 16) and argues for a date shortly before 415 and the Sicilian expedition.

(79) Cf. Wade-Gery (1958) pp.221-2, for the evidence. Wade-Gery does however accept (ibid.) that "Athenian embassies had no doubt been visiting Sousa during these years". D. Gillis, Collaboration with the Persians, Historia Einzelschr.34 (1979), covers only the period described by Hdt and is of no use to us here.

(80) As I believe, a desire to minimize the extent to which Greeks (and Athenians especially) had to demean themselves by turning to the despised Persian; but cf. e.g. A. Andrewes, 'Thucydides and Persia', Historia 10 (1961) pp.1ff, arguing that it was not until a later stage in the composition of the work that Thucydides saw the real significance of Persia.

(81) For the date of the speech, cf. K.J. Dover, CQ 44 (1950) pp.54-5.

(82) Cf. e.g. Aristoph.Hipp.477-8; other evidence in Meiggs, AE.394.

(83) Cf. here Diod.IX.10.5, "they swore at Plataea to hand on to their childrens' children to the end of time the hatred of Persia; but in a short time they were concluding an alliance of friendship with Artaxerxes, son of Xerxes". And cf. Raubitschek's interpretation of Theopompus FGH 115F153 (art.cit.pp.157-8).

(84) See the brilliant study of Periclean Athens by Wade-Gery (1958) pp.239-70, on the opposition of the pan-Hellenist, Thucydides, and the view of the outsider Pindar. Pericles' Athens-Sparta dualism (e.g. the Congress-decree) was 'provisional', and soon gave way to outright confrontation. Cf. esp. the Mytileneans at Thucyd.3.10.4, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἑωρῶμεν αὐτοὺς τὴν μὲν τοῦ Μήδου ἔχθραν ἀνιέντας, τὴν δὲ τῶν συμμάχων δούλωσιν ἐπαγομένους, οὐκ ἀδεεῖς ἔτι ἦμεν.

(85) Sparta may after all have been prepared to compromise further over the hegemony, while the peace never gets a chance to be discussed: the Argives seize on their first opportunity and forcibly eject the ambassadors at 7.149.3, πρὸ δύντος ἡλίου ἀπαλλάσσεσθαι ..., εἰ δὲ μή, περιέφεσθαι ὡς πολεμίους; cf. 7.162.1, below.

(86) Cf. Heni pp.127f; "Herodot hat trotz der negativen Ausgangs dieser Gesandtschaft ein Gespräch gestaltet".

(87) For the metaphor of the diseased body politic, cf. 6.100.1 and 109.5, above .

(88) For the problem of what Carthaginian conflict Herodotus seems to be referring to here, cf. How and Wells, ad loc., and von Fritz, GGS II.137, n.80. It seems most unlikely to me that he means Himera itself (cf. 7.166): see below, n.98.

(89) Cf. the magnanimity of Xerxes (another tyrant) towards Sperchias and Bulis at 7.136.2, above and Ch.I.i.5.

(90) How and Wells remark that "the numbers sound suspiciously uniform, though not incredibly large". Cf. Burn p.307. But did Herodotus really have figures for the size of an army that Gelon 'promised', but never actually provided? He is surely relying here on his own imagination, rather than the imagination of his sources. The passage is ignored by Fehling in his discussion of artificial numbers in Herodotus, but cf. e.g. his pp.162ff, for the number 'twenty'. It should be added that this is really the only 'circumstantial' detail of any importance in the debate.

(91) Cf. e.g. Pl.Menex.237B, Isocr.Paneg.24, etc.

(92) Contrast 7.149.3, above n.85. We have reached the same point but to markedly different effect this time.

(93) Fornara's ingenious interpretation of this curious problem (pp.83f) is that the reference is to the Funeral Speech of Pericles delivered in the first year of the Peloponnesian War, and hence to argue that "Gelon's reference to the Greek unwillingness to compromise, their insistence on 'having the whole', is directly linked to a phrase celebrating the first to die from the fraternal conflict centring on precisely that issue". However the only famous Epitaphios of Pericles in antiquity is not the one 'recorded' by Thucyd. for the first year of the war, but the Samian Oration of a decade earlier: see Plut.Per.8.9 and 28.4; and cf. Ar.Rhet. 1365A30ff, 1411A1ff, for the present tag. Fornara's explanation works less

well for the suppression of the Samian revolt, but may still be on the right lines. Cf. also P. Treves, 'Herodotus, Gelon and Pericles', CPh.36 (1941) pp.321ff, who argues that the phrase indeed comes from the Samian Funeral Oration - and that its use here demonstrates Herodotus' Periclean, pro-Athenian leanings!

(94) Cf. Democr.DK 68B86, for the sense of pleonexia in this passage: πλεονεξίη τὸ πάντα λέγειν, μηδὲν δὲ ἐθέλειν ἀκούειν.

(95) Cf. Heni pp.127-8: "Durch den Streit wird das Versagen der griechischen Einheit drastisch vor Augen gestellt".

(96) Cf. Fornara p.83: "Herodotus' intent could not be clearer on several counts. The issue of the hegemony was more important than national survival. This is the obvious point of the story; Herodotus' contemporaries would have understood it only too well".

(97) He comments, for example, on the credibility of the Carthaginian version of Hamilcar's end (7.167.1): ἔστι δὲ ὑπ' αὐτῶν Καρχηδονίων ὅδε λόγος λεγόμενος, οἰκότι χρεωμένων ; not a likely proceeding if he held the entire Sicilian narrative to be false.

(98) So von Fritz would explain not only this section but also the Argive episode which precedes it (see above), cf. GGS I.264f, and art.cit.pp.14f and 23. For the apparent chronological problem here, cf. E. Lo Cascio, Helikon 13-4 (1973-4), who argues that the debate shows Gelon's war with Carthage to be completed and the danger past (cf. 7.158.2-3), and hence that Himera belongs before 480 and the tradition which made it contemporary with Salamis (cf. n.102, below) is a Deinomenid fiction. I would be much happier trusting Herodotus' narratives than his speeches on points of historical fact, not to mention that Gelon's words could be taken to imply some earlier conflict with Carthage than that which produced Himera. The strongest argument against Lo Cascio's view is that it would be virtually impossible to understand how, with Kyme still to come (c.474 BC), Gelon would have had the confidence not merely to claim that the danger was wholly past, but to be prepared to commit the vast expeditionary force Herodotus has him promise the Greeks to a struggle far away in mainland Greece which nobody believed the Greeks could possibly win; in other words, since Kyme shows Carthage still to be a threat after Himera, and well after the Persian Wars, we are in no position to accept the doubtful evidence of a Herodotean speech to reject the view of Himera that it actually more or less coincided with Salamis. Might we not further argue that it would have been somewhat tactless of Pindar to remind Hieron of Salamis and Thermopylae, if Gelon had rejected an alliance with the mainland Greeks in their hour of need?

(99) A famous enough poem, it would be reasonable to suppose: certainly it is known to the author of the Prom.Vinct.351-72 (cf. Groeneboom ad loc.).

(100) Cf. Gottlieb pp.69ff; Kierdorf pp.40-2; and esp. P. Gautier, REA 68 (1966) at pp.25ff, for the rest of the Greek tradition for Himera. More important must be Gelon's thank-offering at Delphi (Meiggs/Lewis no.28), and Hiero's for Kyme (Meiggs/Lewis no.29). It would clearly have been difficult for Herodotus to have turned a blind eye to the memory and records of this great conflict.

(101) I cannot agree with von Fritz (art.cit.p.23) that Herodotus never invents stories of Greek division like the present one, or rather that

he never creates his own fantasies out of the material: "Dass es nicht Erfindungen Herodots sind, kann man schon daraus entnehmen, dass er abweichende Varianten anführt, obwohl es auf der anderen Seite fur Herodot charakteristich ist, dass er einige von diesen Varianten offenbar in einen grösseren Zusammenhang einfugt, die übringen nur nebenbei erwähnt". Treves, art.cit.pp.331ff, argues that there never was an embassy of the Greeks to Gelon, and that Herodotus is reproducing here in his debate a partisan forgery designed to favour Athens.

(102) Cf. Gautier, art.cit., who argues, however, that the tradition of a common struggle against a common enemy (i.e. of the Sicilian Greeks and those of the mainland against Carthage and Persia working in concert) did not develop until the 4thc, and that Pindar and Simonides are merely flattering the Sicilian tyrants in speaking as though all Greeks thought this way; but there is surely insufficient evidence to decide this question.

(103) i.e. like Gelon with his instructions to Cadmus, above: a further indication of the tight rein Hdt is keeping all the time on his story.

(104) It is just possible that the Corcyreans were detailed merely to guard the southern Peloponnese against attack (so Munro, ap.How and Wells, II.203), and are so not guilty of Herodotus' charge (cf. also Gottlieb p.86, on Diod.XI.15.1). It could be significant that the Corinthians in Thucydides (1.37-43) do not taunt them with the conduct here ascribed to them.

(105) Cf. the Eretrians at 6.100.2,

(106) The words underlined in the text of course contradict the sentiments of many a commemorative epigram of the Persian Wars (see above), the Thessalians declaring themselves not prepared to suffer for the good of the rest of Greece.

(107) How and Wells, Introd.p.40, argue that Herodotus is thus apologizing for the Thessalians, whom they believe he favours as being a state friendly or potentially friendly to Athens! A typical, but impossible over-simplification.

(108) Contrast the tradition (?) of the Thessalians' medism voiced by Critias, DK 88B31, which claimed they 'led the Persians against Greece, anxious to emulate their luxurious way of life'. Does Herodotus perhaps consciously avoid such scurrilous suggestions in the traditions of his day?

(109) For the Thebans at Thermopylae, cf. also Thucyd.3.62.3f, Diod.XI.4.7, with Gottlieb pp.77ff. And see esp. Plut.MH 31ff.864Dff. Plutarch is convinced of Herodotus' malice towards the Thebans, and reminds us that at least they appear to have contributed to the expedition to Tempe. His judgement is however a little partisan (865A): τὸ δὲ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔργον (sc. their part at Thermopylae!) μὴ δυνηθεὶς ὡς οὐ πραχθὲν αὐτοῖς, αἰτίαι φαύληι καὶ ὑπονοίαι διαλυμαινόμενος ... (cf. 7.222).

(110) Cf. Burn, pp.417ff; Hignett, XIG pp.271ff.

(111) Plut.MH 31.865Bff, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῦ πιθανοῦ τῆς διαβολῆς ἐφρόντισεν.

(112) See e.g. How and Wells, ad loc.; Daskalakis (1962) pp.51ff (esp. pp.61-2). There are any number of possibilities and the truth is surely irrecoverable. That Leonidas and his 300 Spartiates could keep by them

'as hostages', that is by force or the threat of force, as many as 400 Thebans (Herodotus 7.202) is hard to believe. The Theban force may be a band of loyalist volunteers, who could hope for no mercy if they returned home after a failure at Thermopylae. Diod.XI.4.7, indeed calls them 'members of the opposing faction' (ἀπὸ τῆς ἑτέρας μερίδος), opposed to agreement with Persia; but this may be mere inference by him or his source. It may however be significant that though the Thebans in Thucydides (e.g. 3.62ff) do not claim a heroic part for themselves at Thermopylae, they do apologize for their medism by arguing that the mass of the people was constrained by the ruling oligarchy (3.62.3f).

(113) Cf. the Corcyreans' imagined plea to the king (7.168.3): οὐκ ἐθελήσαμέν τοι ἀντιοῦσθαι οὐδέ τι ἀποθύμιον ποιῆσαι (above).

(114) Plut.MH 33.866EF rightly pours scorn on the idea of the Thebans delivering this apology (as Herodotus has it) in the heat of battle: a characteristic but untruthful Herodotean dramatization (cf. 8.92.2, in (H).2, below). He further doubts that the Thessalians had enough love for the Thebans to speak up for them; but the detail is perhaps significant: as enemies of Greece and friends of Persia they can join in an unwonted friendship.

(115) Especially clearly if Herodotus has erred in making Eurymachus the commander of the expedition rather than simply its planner: in Thucyd. (2.2.1; cp. 2.2.3) the commanders are the two Boeotarchs, Pythangelos and Diemporos.

(116) Cf. How and Wells, Introd.pp.39-40, and II.229: "We must admit that Herodotus has been misled by malignant Athenian gossip".

(117) The scout just happens to come by when the Spartans alone are visible outside the camp (7.208.2): ἔτυχον δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔξω τεταγμένοι. The story applies only to them, by deliberate choice on Herodotus'part: Thermopylae is the triumph of Spartan heroism in isolation.

(118) Cf. 7.208f, e.g. 209.3, νόμος γάρ σφι οὕτω ἔχων ἐστί· ἐπεὰν μέλλωσι κινδυνεύειν τῆι ψυχῆι, τότε τὰς κεφαλὰς κοσμέονται; and 209.4, νῦν γὰρ πρὸς βασιληίην τε καὶ καλλίστην τῶν ἐν Ἕλλησι προσφέρεαι καὶ ἄνδρας ἀρίστους.

(119) Cf. 7.224.1, τῶν ἐγὼ ὡς ἀνδρῶν ἀξίων γενομένων ἐπυθόμην τὰ οὐνόματα, ἐπυθόμην δὲ καὶ ἁπάντων τῶν τριηκοσίων. To be pedantic,it was surely not 300 that died, since at least Aristodemos and Pantites escaped (cf. 7.229f and 232). If Herodotus had done the research he claims, we might reasonably expect him to be precise about the number, on the same principle of giving the dead due honour. Cf. on this problem, R. Ball, Mus.Afr.5 (1976) pp.1ff.

(119a) For an appreciation of Hdts 'heroic record' of Thermopylae, cf. K. Gross, NJAB 3 (1940) 87ff.

(120) Cf. Hignett, XIG pp.113ff.

(121) Cf. Hignett, XIG pp.371ff.

(122) *kai*: addidit Bekker, fortasse recte.

(123) So Hude (Stein: *kai autos*, presumably a conjecture). For this use of *kai* with comparatives, cf. Denniston 316ff, and esp. 319. Is this sentence progressive or adversative? It is usually rendered as the former (cf. e.g. Daskalakis p.55). It is a circular argument to say that the text requires some form of contrast here; *kai mallon* on its own is neither obviously progressive nor adversative (cf. the oracle at Herodotus 1.65.3, adversative with *alla*), so that we could say the sense of the sentence determines its force. Could it not be, however, that an *alla* or a *de* has dropped out here, i.e. ἀλλὰ ταύτηι καὶ μᾶλλον ... ? It does not seem to me that *kai mallon* on its own is adequate as a connector.

(124) Of course a Thespian achievement as well, something Herodotus recognizes clearly enough (7.222, 226.1, 227); but for dramatic reasons he concentrates almost exclusively on the Spartans. The battle is a paradigm of the effects of Spartan *nomos*, which holds so much of our attention in the work (Thespian *nomos* is for obvious reasons of no comparable interest); and it serves Herodotus' purposes to suggest to us that the Spartans were left virtually alone to show their mettle (cf. 7.139.3, μουνωθέντες ; and cf. the Chians at Lade 6.15.2, μεμουνωμένοι). It is an improbable inference that the account of Thermopylae derives exclusively from Spartan sources: that Herodotus should have relied for a narrative of such central importance whole-heartedly on a single source, and indeed a source whose reasons for self-glorification it takes no imagination to infer, implies the lack of the most basic critical awareness, which no-one should be happy ascribing to him. Cf. e.g. Hignett, XIG p.148, n.2: "The curiously shadowy part played by the Thespians in the final drama is to be explained by the Legend, which found their presence embarrassing"; cf.his App.IV pp.371ff, and esp. 378.

(125) Herodotus has devoted here 32 lines of OCT to dealing with Eurytos and Aristodemos (if we include the pendant story of Pantites, which adheres closely), and in the recapitulation after Plataea (9.71.2ff) he sets aside another 14 lines. This compares with the 'honorific catalogue' (7.226-8) of 32 lines: the parity of the emphasis is most striking, not to mention that the Aristodemos episode coming last (and forcibly recalled later) leaves us with a strong qualification, whose effect Herodotus does nothing to try to erase.

(126) λιποψυχέοντα λειφθῆναι (MSS); or if we choose to read φιλοψυχέοντα (Valckenaer): 'showing a faint heart'. The choice is a difficult one (cf. Tyrt.F10.18W): but surely Herodotus is convinced of Aristodemos' essential bravery, unless there is a paradox in his playing the coward at Thermopylae but excelling in bravery at Plataea?

(127) Again, as with the Gelon story (cf. n.101, above), the alternative version seems to destroy the point: but as we saw in Ch.I, Herodotus is fond of creating moral and psychological uncertainties for the reader.

(128) Envy is of course for Herodotus the distinguishing mark of polis-life: cf. esp. 7.237.2, with 8.124.1, in (H).4, below.

(129) Cf. Herodotus' own story from the Battle of the Champions at 1.82.8, where Othryadas is too afraid to return to Sparta as the last survivor of the battle, not as having been a coward.

(130) Cf. at most 7.206.1 (above), where the Spartans act to avoid further medizing among the loyalists.

(131) Cf. e.g. Page, Simonid. VIII.3f: Ἑλλάδι γὰρ σπεύδοντες ἐλευθερίην περιθεῖναι / κείμεθ' ἀγηράντωι χρώμενοι εὐλογίηι - if indeed this epigram refers to the Spartan 300: cf. Page (1981), pp.197-9, for an indecisive discussion.

(132) And cf. 7.220.2, μένοντι δὲ αὐτοῦ κλέος μέγα ἐλείπετο, καὶ ἡ Σπάρτης εὐδαιμονίη οὐκ ἐξηλείφετο . Herodotus affects to see Leonidas' sacrifice as performed for Sparta alone - no mention of Hellas, here or elsewhere. But the assonance (*homoioteleuton*) here in -*leipeto*/-*leipheto* is nonetheless a grand effect.

(133) Hignett's expression for the eulogistic Spartan tradition (cf. XIG pp.124f. and App.IV).

(134) Cf. Kleinknecht p.545.

(135) The last occasion Demaratus appears as adviser: his usefulness to Herodotus is almost entirely as a *Spartan*, rather than as a Greek or merely a convenient interlocutor for Xerxes. He provides us with an oblique and distorting view of Sparta at the point in the work where Sparta is the centre of attention.

(136) Cf. C.W. Fornara, JHS 91 (1971) pp.33f: a reference to the strategic threat of Cythera can only begin to have significance once the Peloponnesian war has broken out. But need the Athenian action of 424 (Thucyd.4.53) have already taken place? We might prefer to believe that Tolmides seized the island in 455 (so Paus.I.27.5; but cp. Thucyd.1.108.5?), but the Periplous is more of a raid than any concerted threat to Sparta (see Meiggs, AE.100). Chilon's 'prophecy' presupposes the extreme case of Sparta falling before an enemy army, or at the very least capitulating, after a seizure of Cythera, and this can only have seemed remotely possible once Sparta was faced with the only power after Persia strong enough to threaten this, and faced in open war. Against Fornara, cf. (unconvincingly) J. Cobet, Hermes 105 (1977) pp.6-7.

(137) 7.139.5, ἑλόμενοι δὲ τὴν Ἑλλάδα περιεῖναι ἐλευθέρην, τὸ Ἑλληνικὸν πᾶν τὸ λοιπόν, ὅσον μὴ ἐμήδισε, αὐτοὶ οὗτοι ἦσαν οἱ ἐπηγείραντες καὶ βασιλέα μετά γε θεοὺς ἀνωσάμενοι. The unification of the Greek cause, on which the survival of Greece depended, was not something that the Spartans attended to, despite their formal hegemony of Hellas.

(138) Sparta's secrets are here betrayed by one of Sparta's kings (see 7.234.3), who no longer feels loyalty to his country because he has been deprived of honour there (cf. 7.104.2): οἵ με τιμήν τε καὶ γέρεα ἀπελόμενοι πατρώια ἄπολίν τε καὶ φυγάδα πεποιήκασι ... οὐκ ὦν οἰκός ἐστι ἄνδρα τὸν σώφρονα εὐνοίην φαινομένην διωθέσθαι, ἀλλὰ στέργειν μάλιστα (cf. von Fritz, GGS I.265f). Hence it is ironic that Xerxes defends Demaratus' loyalty(to him!) against Achaimenes' criticisms by observing that citizens of the same state naturally envy one another (7.237.2f): ξεῖνος δὲ ξείνωι εὖ πρήσσοντί ἐστι εὐμενέστατον πάντων, συμβουλευομένου τε ἂν συμβουλεύσειε τὰ ἄριστα. This antithesis (not merely an artificial sophistic paradox - but that as well!) typifies the attitude of the medizing Greeks towards Xerxes and towards their fellow-Greeks:

like Demaratus, these Persian sympathizers show envy towards their fellow-Greeks (Xerxes is not of course talking about Persian *poliētai*: see (H).4 below) and do their best to revenge themselves upon them and assist the Persian king, that is, they make a virtue, much rewarded and praised by the king, of their antagonism towards their countrymen. The *phthonos* of Demaratus towards the Spartans is further the subject of a final anecdote (7.239: esp. 239.2, ὡς μὲν ἐγὼ δοκέω, καὶ τὸ οἰκὸς ἐμοὶ συμμάχεται, οὐκ ἦν εὔνοος Λακεδαιμονίοισι, πάρεστι δὲ εἰκάζειν εἴτε εὐνοίηι ταῦτα ἐποίησε εἴτε καὶ καταχαίρων): the authenticity of this chapter has been questioned for no very good reason (cf. How and Wells, ad loc.).

(139) Note that Herodotus says merely *ortha*, not e.g. *dikaia*: the word allows an ambiguity, 'right' as strategically sensible, and 'right' as morally good.

(140) i.e. the strategic fact that Greece's safety depended on unity, not the thought στάσις γάρ ... , which is Herodotus' own explanatory parenthesis.

(141) As so often, this form of ending (ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ... / ταῦτα μὲν δή ..., etc.), suggesting a dispassionate Olympian calm, brings to a close a dramatic and affecting narrative: cf. e.g. 6.91.1, 7.137.3; with e.g. 9.121, below.

(142) Though of course an Athenian, Thucydides quite clearly has no love for the Athenian empire, and even an exaggerated cynicism about the speed of its development: e.g. 1.98.4 (Naxos), with Meiggs, AE.70f.

(143) And cf. Thucyd.1.75.2, καὶ γὰρ αὐτὴν ἐλάβομεν οὐ βιασάμενοι, ἀλλ' ὑμῶν μὲν οὐκ ἐθελησάντων παραμεῖναι πρὸς τὰ ὑπόλοιπα τοῦ βαρβάρου, ἡμῖν δὲ προσελθόντων τῶν ξυμμάχων καὶ αὐτῶν δεηθέντων ἡγεμόνας καταστῆναι; cf. 1.130.2; 3.10.2; 6.76.3. And see Kierdorf p.93, n.1, with parallels and literature.

(144) Strasburger, (1965) p.601, n.62, is right to reject attempts to understand a change of subject here, i.e. to understand οἱ Ἕλληνες rather than οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι as the subject of ἐδέοντο and ἀπείλοντο, attempts which do violence to the Greek and have no other justification than to show that Herodotus is uniformly generous to the Athenians. Cf. also A. Masaracchia, Helikon 13-4 (1973-4) at pp.384ff, with a discussion of how this passage relates to Herodotus' appraisal of Athens.

(145) Cf. e.g. the arguments of the Corinthians in Thucyd.1.124.3: τὴν καθεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῆι Ἑλλάδι πόλιν τύραννον ἡγησάμενοι ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως καθεστάναι, ὥστε τῶν μὲν ἤδη ἄρχειν, τῶν δὲ διανοεῖσθαι.

(146) For the expression *stasis emphylos*, cf. Thgn.51, and Solon F4.19 West; the *phylon* in the present case is clearly not the city but *to Hellēnikon* itself.

(147) For an excellent treatment of this passage, cf. Focke pp.32ff; followed by Strasburger, pp.601-2, and Bornitz p.106. Contrast von Fritz, GGS I.267, and Fornara p.90, n.2.

(148) Cf. Plut.MH 34.867E: οὕτω πικρῶς τῶι ῥήματι προσπέφυκε.

(149) Like the Thessalians before Tempe (7.172.1f), the Phocians and Locrians before Thermopylae (7.207), and like the Athenians later before Salamis (8.40.1 and 56ff).

(150) For Adeimantos in Herodotus' narrative, see (H).1, below, on 8.94.1ff.

(151) Cf. Plut.MH 34.867D.

(152) See esp. 8.112.3, Θεμιστοκλέης μέν νυν ἐξ Ἄνδρου ὁρμώμενος χρήματα παρὰ νησιωτέων ἐκτᾶτο λάθρηι τῶν ἄλλων στρατηγῶν.

(152a) For an excellent discussion of the problems of this account, cf. M.B. Wallace, Phoenix 28 (1974) 22-44, who argues that Hdtean 'distortion' may be involved in representing these negotiations as secret.

(153) Plut.MH 34.867F; and cf. Page, Simonid. XIV, with Further Greek Epigrams (1981) pp.207ff.

(154) So, for example, it is important to hear the story of Dikaios (8.65), with its ominous anticipation of the disaster to Persia.

(154a) For a similar treatment of the Salamis-narrative, cf. A Masaracchia, Helikon 9-10 (1969-70) 68-106.

(155) Contrast 8.3.1 (of the Athenians): μέγα πεποιημένοι περιεῖναι τὴν Ἑλλάδα; and cf. 7.139.5, above.

(156) This sudden flight of the allies is clearly modelled in part on the comically unheroic scene in the Second Book of the Iliad (2.149ff: ... τοὶ δ᾽ ἀλαλητῶι / νῆας ἐπ᾽ ἐσσεύοντο, ποδῶν δ᾽ ὑπένερθε κονίη / ἵστατ᾽ ἀειρομένη ... (subliminally echoed in Herodotus' ἱστία ἀείροντο?).

(157) See Hignett, XIG p.203, who no doubt rightly dismisses this panic as 'mythical': rightly that is, if we take this to mean a Herodotean invention (cf. ibid. p.207).

(158) Cf. Hignett, XIG p.204: "The tradition of the part played by Mnesiphilos is manifestly a spiteful invention".

(159) And cf. Thucyd.1.74.1; Plut.Them.2.6, and MH 37.869CD (!); with Gottlieb pp.98ff, Kierdorf pp.68f; Hignett, XIG, App.IX(a). Cf. Ch.I.i.8, above.

(160) Cf. Miltiades' words to Callimachus at 6.109.3. But as we said, there is a clear difference between fighting for one's city and fighting for the common good of Greece, and Eurybiadas is much harder to persuade!

(161) Cf. Macan ad loc.: "The formula ... is ruined by the explanation that 'no Hellenes whom they attack will be able to resist them'. Nothing further is heard of the threat in this sense; and it spoils the beautiful crescendo of Themistocles' arguments, being the most direct and brutal, if that indeed was what he meant". (!)

(162) Not to mention that Themistocles' message begins to seem considerably more devious, and prophetic of his later 'treachery'. Cf. 8.5.3 and 8.112.3 for similar 'secret' negotiations.

(163) Cf. 8.78, τῶν δὲ ἐν Σαλαμῖνι στρατηγῶν ἐγίνετο ὠθισμὸς λόγων πολλός, with 9.26.1, ἐγένετο λόγων πολλὸς ὠθισμός (see (J).2 below).

(164) Cf. Heni p.136; Fornara p.74, n.23; Gottlieb pp.114ff.

(165) He is linked with Miltiades in Aristoph.Hipp.1325 as a representative of the good old Athenian way of life: in the same spirit he is brought back from the dead in Eupolis' Demoi (Kock I.279ff) to pass judgement on the corruption of the present day.

(166) Cf. Strasburger (1965) p.602: "Will er in ihm ein vergangenes edleres Athen versinnbildlichen, so etwa wie Thukydides (7.86.5) dem unglücklichen Nikias in ähnlich knappen Worten das unvergängliche Denkmal seiner persönlichen Sympathie setzte?".

(167) For the sentiment, cf. e.g. Isocr.Paneg.79 (on the political life of Athens and Sparta before the Persian Wars): οὕτω δὴ πολιτικῶς εἶχον, ὥστε καὶ τὰς στάσεις ἐποιοῦντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐχ ὁπότεροι τοὺς ἑτέρους ἀπολέσαντες τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρξουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁπότεροι φθήσονται τὴν πόλιν ἀγαθόν τι ποιήσαντες ; and cf. ibid.85 (the rivalry of Athens and Sparta in the fight against the Mede): ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς κοινῆς σωτηρίας ὁμονοοῦντες, ὁπότεροι δὲ ταύτης αἴτιοι γενήσονται, περὶ τούτου ποιούμενοι τὴν ἅμιλλαν.

(168) Themistocles tells Aristides the secret of his plan, and remarks that the allies will have to be forced into doing what is right, since they will not do so voluntarily (8.80.1): ἔδεε γάρ, ὅτε οὐκ ἑκόντες ἤθελον ἐς μάχην κατίστασθαι οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀεκόντας παραστήσασθαι. Cf. the Scythian narrative, where the Scyths draw the Persians towards the lands of those who had refused to join the alliance, in order to involve them in the war (4.120.4): εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἑκόντες ὑπέδυσαν τὸν πόλεμον τὸν πρὸς Πέρσας, ἀλλ᾽ ἀεκόντας ἐκπολεμῆσαι. See above for the view that Themistocles' compulsion of the allies at Salamis is Herodotus' own invention.

(169) Contrast Aesch.Pers.402ff, quoted above, for the sort of speech we might have had.

(170) Cf. Hignett, XIG pp.230ff. Also J. Keil, Hermes 73 (1938) 329ff.

(171) Cf. the evident borrowing of the number 1027 for the size of the Persian fleet (Hdt 7.89.1) from Aesch.Pers.341ff; with Hignett, XIG p.345, and Fehling p.165 n.2.

(172) Cf. Hignett, XIG p.234. It is hard to imagine the source of this curious story, which appears to discredit the entire allied fleet: can any Greek have been happy to see all the Greeks equally discredited? It is, of course, from Hdts point of view another story to show that the gods are watching over the Greeks here: cf. e.g. 8.13, 65, 94.2f, below.

(173) The joint heroes of Salamis, according to Herodotus' explicit testimony: cf. 8.86 and 93.1.

(174) There is of course a point in the paradox that the Aeginetans, who were among the first states to medize, were yet the best fighters at Salamis, even above the Athenians, who had denounced their medism to Sparta.

(175) Cf. Hignett, XIG App.IX(c) pp.411f, who rightly discounts the story as an entire fiction, not merely a partial one.

(176) Cf. esp. the commemorative epigrams cited by Plutarch: Page, Simonid. no.X-XIV, with Further Greek Epigrams (1981) pp.200ff. Cf. Meiggs/Lewis no.24. But see also Lycurg. c.Leocr.70, where Adeimantos is named alongside the Spartan Eteonikos and the entire Aeginetan fleet as having tried to run away from the battle at night.

(177) Cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.103.4, with Meiggs, AE 199ff; and esp. A.E. Raubitschek, in Schachermayer (1977) pp.266-9. On this passage cf. Fornara p.89, n.20: "His quotation of the Athenian slander ... is an illustration not of his blind and naive devotion to Athenian dogma but an indication of his ease in shifting from the description of the actual clashes of the early time to allusions to contemporary hatreds".

(178) Cf. Herodotus' inclusion of his son, Aristeus, among the ambassadors who went to Persia with Nicolaos and Aneristos (7.137.3, in (E).1 above).

(179) Contrast Fornara p.71: "What is worthy of especial note in Herodotus' narrative is the care he has taken not to suggest that Themistocles was already marching down the path of treachery" (!).

(180) We hear this at 8.112.2 merely as a perception of the islanders as to the reason why Andros is being besieged.

(181) Cf. Strasburger (1965) p.602: "das gewalttätigen Vorgehen Athens gegenüber den Inselstädten, welches mit der späteren athenischen Praxis innerhalb des Seebundes (Thuk.1.98f) bereits eine so fatale Ähnlichkeit hat".

(182) Cf. Plut.MH 40.871DE, on this passage; with Gottlieb p.93.

(182a) J. Labarbe, RBPh 36 (1958) 31-50, argues that Timodemos was indeed not an Athenian (a Seriphian in e.g. Pl.Rep.329E) and that Hdt has failed to make this clear. Does he not want the story to show envy between citizens?

(183) Cf. esp. Aristodemos at 9.71.2, and perhaps Aristides at 8.79.1?

(184) Contrast 6.14.1 in (B) above, where Herodotus hesitates to award the prize for valour at Lade to any party: ἀλλήλους γὰρ καταιτιῶνται. After Salamis on the other hand each man thought his own contribution the best: αὐτὸς ἕκαστος δοκέων ἄριστος γενέσθαι.

(185) Cf. Kleinknecht pp.553ff; L. Solmsen (1965) pp.650ff (= Platää); von Fritz, art.cit.pp.17ff; Fornara pp.84ff; Masaracchia (1976) pp.118ff. Cf. esp. Isocr.Paneg.94, ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς μὴ μόνον τοὺς παρόντας κινδύνους διαφυγεῖν ἀλλὰ καὶ τιμὰς ἐξαιρέτους λαβεῖν ... οὐχ ὑπέμειναν τὰς παρ' ἐκείνου δωρεάς, οὐδ' ὀργισθέντες τοῖς Ἕλλησι ὅτι προὐδόθησαν ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὰς διαλλαγὰς τὰς πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους ὥρμησαν; and also Demosth. 18.202f, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦν ταῦθ', ὡς ἔοικε, τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις πάτρια οὐδ' ἀνεκτὰ οὐδ' ἔμφυτα, οὐδ' ἐδυνήθη πώποτε τὴν πόλιν οὐδεὶς ἐκ παντὸς τοῦ χρόνου πεῖσαι τοῖς ἰσχύουσι μέν, μὴ δίκαια δὲ πράττουσι προσθεμένην ἀσφάλως δουλεύειν, ἀλλ' ἀγωνιζομένη περὶ πρωτείων καὶ τιμῆς καὶ δόξης κινδυνεύουσα πάντα τὸν αἰῶνα διατετέλεκε.

(186) Cf. Fornara p.85: contrast Kleinknecht p.570 n.56: "Wie später besonders bei Thukydides (!), so dient auch schon bei Herodot hier die Redenform vor allem dem Zweck, die eigene gnome des Gesichichtsschreibers hervortreten zu lassen".

(187) Cf. Crahay pp.315-317, arguing that the oracle is a fiction originating in Themistocles' anti-Spartan propaganda, revived later by Pericles (!). Cf. here also the oracles prophecying similar dangers to Spartans and Peloponnesians from Athens at 5.90.2 and 93.1f, with Ch.II.ii.D and H.

(188) Cf. Kleinknecht p.556: "Die beiden Reden stellen zwei grundsätzlich verschiedene Ansichten dar. Alexander kennt, griechisch gesprochen, nur den *kindynos* und das *khresimon*. Der Massstab der Spartaner ist das *dikaion* und *aiskhron*". I cannot accept the line taken by Solmsen, Platää pp.652-3, here that the Spartan speech is merely a re-inforcement of Alexander's: Herodotus does not go in for such redundancies, as Solmen's own admission seems to recognize : "Verglichen mit der eindrucksvollen Rede Alexanders macht dieser Rede eine recht schwächen Eindruck". There is nothing 'weak' about the speech if we recognize what it adds that is new.

(189) Crahay's retention of MSS *arkhēs* here (l.c.) as an anachronism referring to the Athenian empire (and thus indicating the source of Herodotus' material!) is somewhat hard to swallow. Cf. e.g. How and Wells, ad loc., on this reading. But cf. J.C. Kamerbeek, Mnemosyne 11 (1958) pp.252-3, arguing that the MSS text is right and means "unprovoked aggression", as at Hom.Il.3.100, 'Αλεξάνδρου ἕνεκ' ἀρχῆς, which Herodotus would be deliberately echoing. Cf. Masaracchia (1976) pp.122-3 (!).

(190) There is an irony here which works against the Spartans themselves, for when the scene changes to Sparta at 9.6ff, it turns out to be they who are playing fast and loose with the Athenians!

(191) Cf. Kierdorf pp.95ff, and esp.p.105. The present passage is on his evidence unhistorical in content and indulges in deliberate anachronism.

(192) Cf. von Fritz, GGS 1.267f; Solmsen, Platää pp.653-4. Cf. e.g. Demosth. 6.8-10, for the Athenian claim (in a different context, to be sure), μόνοι τῶν πάντων μηδενὸς ἂν κέρδους τὰ κοινὰ δίκαια τῶν Ἑλλήνων προέσθαι.

(193) There is no reason to suppose that Herodotus is reporting what was actually said, but is he reporting what an Athenian source fed him (so e.g. Jacoby, RE art.462.19ff; Solmsen, Platää p.653, n.11)? Certainly he 'reflects' Athenian propaganda (cf. the *Epitaphioi* motifs), but that by no means requires us to assume that he is *directly* citing an Athenian source rather than (as is surely his universal practice in speeches) composing freely on his own initiative, and merely (by choice) working with Athenian panegyric material.

(194) Macan, note on 8.144 (16). But in principle (cf. n.193) the content of speeches in Herodotus depends entirely on the imagination of the author, not on sources - and it is only in the direction taken by the Athenian *speeches* here that the real discrepancy lies.

(195) Cf. Plut.MH 41.871Eff.

(196) Cf. of course what Herodotus says about the Athenians' need for the Spartans (8.3.2): μέχρι κάρτα ὅσου ἐδέοντο αὐτῶν.

(197) Cf. e.g. Fornara pp.49f.

(198) Cf. e.g. Solmsen, Platää pp.656f, with nn.12-13: "Dass die Spartaner nicht aller Möglichkeit der politisch-strategischen Lage bewusst gewesen auch vor Chileos' Warnung, scheint unmöglich".

(199) The explanation of Solmsen is rather inadequate, and again makes Herodotus redundant; cf. Platää p.658: "Chileos unterstreicht die praktischen Folgen des athenischen Verhältnis fur den Widerstand der Griechen gegen Mardonios, und die zweite Rede der athenischen Gesandten betont die Berichtigung dieser Ansicht".

(200) The matter of the Greeks and their games offers Herodotus the opportunity for a characteristic equivocation. The only episode much discussed in this connexion (cf. e.g. von Fritz, GGS I.272f) is the story of Tritantaikhmes' reaction (εἴπας γνώμην γενναιοτάτην) to the news brought by the Arcadian deserters between Artemisium and Salamis that the Greeks are engaged in celebrating the Olympic festival (8.26.3): παπαί, Μαρδόνιε, κοίους ἐπ' ἄνδρας ἤγαγες μαχεσομένους ἡμέας, οἳ οὐ περὶ χρημάτων τὸν ἀγῶνα ποιεῦνται ἀλλὰ περὶ ἀρετῆς. Naturally the story reflects well on the Greeks and Greek aretē, although of course Herodotus does tell us other stories in which the Greeks signally show themselves more interested in profit than virtue, so that there may be something of an over-generous misapprehension in Tritantaikhmes' noble opinion. In the passage discussed in the text, for example, the Athenians are made scornfully to dismiss the Spartans' celebration of the Hyakinthia as an excuse for betraying them and Greece. It is 'mere playing': the note of sarcasm is unmistakable. Similarly Herodotus' own commentary earlier (9.7.1, καί σφι ἦν Ὑακίνθια, περὶ πλείστου δ' ἦγον τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πορσύνειν ...) contrasts ironically with the disclosure that the Spartans just happenend at the same time to be awaiting the completion of the Isthmus Wall: the 'demands of religion', Herodotus implies, were a mock-pious excuse, as the Athenians correctly saw. More cynical still is his comment on the failure of the majority of the Peloponnesians to assist the Greek cause at Salamis (8.72): Ὀλύμπια δὲ καὶ Κάρνεια παροιχώκεε ἤδη ; that is, they no longer had any of the excuses they had been using up to now. This surely puts Tritantaikhmes' earlier praise of Greek aretē as shown at the Olympia in a less than favourable light. Cf. e.g. 6.106.3 (the Spartans fail to assist the Athenians at Marathon): ἀδύνατα δέ σφι ἦν τὸ παραυτίκα ποιέειν ταῦτα οὐ βουλομένοισι λύειν τὸν νόμον ; and 7.206.1 (the reason why the Spartans only sent a small force to Thermopylae): Κάρνεια γάρ σφι ἦν ἐμποδών. It is clear that religious considerations did indeed play an important role in Greek warfare, but equally obvious to the cynical observer that the rules were there to be broken when it suited. Cf. Pritchett I.116ff, and esp. p.126: "One may conclude that it was part of the etiquette of ancient warfare that religious obligations of the times often prevailed over purely military considerations, but abstinence from aggressive limitary operations during enemy festivals was not always observed". For the Spartans and the Hyakinthia, cf. Xenoph.Hell.4.5.11f (with Pritchett p.125): only the Amycleans are sent home to celebrate the festival, but the main army makes no plans to withdraw. And see esp. the Theban attack on Plataea during the hieromēnia, with e.g. Thucyd.5.54.2f. Herodotus reflects ruefully that during the Persian Wars the Greeks could use their festivals as mere excuses for betraying Greece and leaving their friends in the lurch.

(201) See Fornara pp.85-6.

(202) Cf. Plut.Aristid.13, for a plot by Athenian oligarchs at Plataea to betray the allies to the Mede; with Gottlieb p.120, n.19. There are certainly stories of Greek treachery in the Persian Wars besides the ones Herodotus himself makes use of; but we need not surely conclude that he knows this story and suppresses it. On the present passage, cf. Masaracchia (1976) p.125.

(203) And cf. Lycurg.c.Leocr.122: γενναῖον δ', ὦ ἄνδρες, τὸ ψήφισμα ϰαὶ ἄξιον τῶν ὑμετέρων προγόνων, διϰαίως· εὐγενεῖς γὰρ οὐ μόνον τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ ϰαὶ τὰς τῶν ἀδιϰούντων τιμωρίας ἐϰέϰτηντο. Nothing here about the wife and children though! Cf. A.W. Verrall, CR 23 (1909) pp.36-40, for a comparison of the historical value of these different versions of the story.

(204) Cf. Meiggs, AE 508ff.

(205) Cf. von Fritz, GGS I.268, with II.138, n.100, and art.cit.p.18. For the disquieting prevalence of stoning in antiquity, both legal and illegal, cf. R. Hirzel, 'Die Strafe der Steinigung', Abh.d.Sächs.Akad.Wiss.27 (1909) pp.225ff; with D. Fehling, Ethologische Überlegungen, Zetemata 61 (1974) at pp.59ff.

(206) Cf. Solmsen, Platää p.658; Masaracchia (1976) pp.142-4.

(207) The text at 9.17.1 is clearly problematic: μοῦνοι δὲ Φωϰέες οὐ συνεσέβαλον (i.e. with Mardonios against Attica)· ἐμήδιζον γὰρ δὴ σφόδρα ϰαὶ οὗτοι, οὐϰ ἑϰόντες ἀλλ' ὑπ' ἀναγϰαίης (so Hude's OCT). Solutions: (a) Stein, followed by Macan, takes ἐμήδιζον-οὗτοι as a parenthesis, apparently taking οὐϰ-ἀναγϰαίης with the συνεσέβαλον which applies to the other medizers earlier; (b) some editors delete σφόδρα (only here in Herodotus!); (c) others transpose to give οὐ ⟨σφόδρα⟩ ἑϰόντες . The simplest answer is certainly (b), though it is not easy to see the reason for it (a gloss on ?). But Hude's text may be right, and Herodotus could thus be offering us the same paradox as at 7.174, where the Thessalians likewise medize enthusiastically but unwillingly; but it must be conceded that the text here is somewhat compressed and unexpected if that is the meaning. Herodotus incidentally does not care to tell us here that some of the Phocians did not mean to medize but actually fought on the Greek side at Plataea, cf. 9.31.5.

(207a) Cf. Masaracchia (1976) pp.142ff; also W.K. Pritchett, AJA 61 (1957), who sheds new archaeological light on the topography of Plataea and argues that Hdt is not confused or confusing.

(208) Cf. Solmsen, Platää p.658.

(209) Except that the disposition leaves the Athenians isolated from the rest of the retiring army; but it is hard to believe with some critics that Herodotus retails the debate as an Athenian apology for their absence from the main battle. See Solmsen pp.659ff; von Fritz, GGS I.268f and art.cit. pp.19f; and see esp. Kierdorf pp.97-100. Cf. Masaracchia (1976) pp.148-52.

(210) Cf. Solmsen, Platää p.660: "Die Rede der Tegeer ... ruft ... den Widerspruch und die Argumente der Athener hervor".

(211) Cf. Kierdorf pp.83ff.

(212) Also from the standard catalogue of course: see Kierdorf l.c.

(213) Cf. Thucyd.1.75.1 below (an echo?); and e.g. Page, Simonid. XXI, with Meiggs/Lewis no.18.4. Solmsen, Platää p.661 regards the entire debate as *merely* a preparation for the praise of Athens' victory at Marathon - and perhaps there is a rhetorical *topos* here (*paraleipsis*). But contrast e.g. Isocr.Paneg.68ff, where there is no dismissing either set of achievements in favour of the other. Significantly perhaps Plutarch's reworking of this scene at Aristid.12.1ff has Aristides leave out the whole mythical catalogue and Marathon as well, so that the disclaimer has real force and dignity compared with the pettiness of the Tegeans: ἥϰομεν γὰρ οὐ τοῖς ξυμμάχοις στασιάσοντες, ἀλλὰ μαχούμενοι τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐδ' ἐπαινεσόμενοι τοὺς πατέρας, ἀλλ' αὐτοὺς ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τῆι Ἑλλάδι παρέξοντας. Cf. Plut.MH 42. 872A, which seems to suggest that this will have been a deliberate correction.

(214) Cf. Fornara p.57; Kleinknecht pp.549ff. And esp. Kierdorf p.99, who sees that this is in Herodotus' mind here ("Einmal begegnet Herodotus ... dem Einwand, der sicher auf dem Boden der beginnenden Sophistik gewaschsen ... ist: das Lob früherer Leistungen zählt nicht; man kann sich ja zum schlechteren entwickelt haben und verdient dann doppelt Strafe"), but persists in assuming that Herodotus is here apologizing for the Athenians!

(215) Cf. e.g. Herodotus 7.137.1 and 3, where the present (i.e. the Peloponnesian War) is separated from the Persian Wars by "many years". Cf. esp. Thucyd.1.73.2, the more distant past is *pany palaia*, in contrast with *ta Mēdika*, which are presumably just *palaia*; and 3.55.1, where the Plataeans recount their services to Sparta, beginning with *ta Mēdika* and ending with the helot revolt at Ithome (τὰ παλαιὰ καὶ μέγιστα) with 3.67.2, the Theban rejoinder: καὶ μὴ παλαιὰς ἀρετάς ... ἀκούοντες ἐπικλασθῆτε.

(216) Cf. what Aristides had said to Themistocles at 8.79.3, a curious reversal here, which brings home that this *logōn ōthismos* is the wrong kind of *stasis*.

(217) Cf. e.g. von Fritz, GGS I.269; Solmsen, Platää p.661.

(218) Cf. 9.106.3, and 114.2. And we have already seen it on those occasions where Athens has insisted on having her own way regardless of the Spartans: e.g. 8.63 (in (H).1) and 9.7b.1ff (in (I).1).

(219) Cf. Fornara p.88, n.19: "The Athenians are in the leash, waiting for bigger game".

(220) Cf. 9.40, οἱ γὰρ Θηβαῖοι, ἅτε μηδίζοντας μεγάλως, προθύμως ἔφερον τὸν πόλεμον καὶ αἰεὶ κατηγέοντο μέχρι μάχης . No need, of course, to invoke an anti-Theban source for the malevolence of Herodotus' account here: cp. Macan, at 9.40(5). See (F).2, above.

(221) Cf. Solmsen, Platää p.662, with nn.21-3; von Fritz, GGS I.269f, with II.139 n.108, and art.cit.pp.20f; and Masaracchia (1976) pp.159-64. Also Hignett, XIG pp.316ff, and Burn pp.528f.

(222) Cf. Solmsen, Platää pp.661-2, stressing how this speech shows up Alexander's idealism. It is surely ironic that the Macedonian tyrant (only half-Greek to some eyes, cf. 5.22) should shame the allies with his idealism, when they themselves show so little.

(223) Cf. Plut.MH 42.872B; contrast von Fritz, GGS II.139, n.114. There is no need to be pusillanimous here: Herodotus tells quite simply that Pausanias was 'scared', and on his own authority too!

(224) This clearly echoes their tone of deference in the debate on the left flank, but it hardly justifies assuming that Herodotus is following an Athenian source for the present episode - what he puts into speeches is up to him.

(225) Herodotus has Mardonios echo the claim made by Demaratus to Xerxes in the original discussion of Spartan *aretē* at 7.104.5 (above); cf. Solmsen, l.c.: "mit fast denselben Worten". The correspondence is clearly deliberate; the reader should be expected to have kept such resonant words in his head.

(226) Contrast e.g. his account of Salamis, where he reports variant traditions for how the battle started (8.84.1f) and for the story of Adeimantos (8.94.1ff), in the latter case implying that he has cross-checked his account in different sources, so that he can report that the Athenian version is contradicted by the Corinthians and all the rest of Greece! Assuming this latter source report to be authentic, we ought to be able to argue that the rest (and more important parts!) of the battle narrative has been similarly cross-checked - and if this happened at Salamis, then surely also at Plataea. Cf. however e.g. A.E. Wardman, Historia 8 (1959) 49ff, comparing Hdt and Aeschylus on the defeat of the Persians and concluding that Plataea shows in Hdts version the influence of sources exaggerating the services of Athens at Plataea; and cf. esp. Masaracchia (1976) pp.183-4, who seems to deny that Hdt had access to any source but an Athenian one for the campaign; also e.g. A. Mele, AFLN 5 (1955) 5-41.

(227) Since the story is precisely assigned to the twelfth day of the campaign (cf. 9.41.1, 44.1, 47), we ought to assume that the source of the story, if there is one, is also the unquestioned source of the chronology of the campaign: had Herodotus constructed the chronology out of any more than one source, he would have been confronted with the inaccuracy of this story. It should be noted against the view that the story is not a fiction that its adherents have to ascribe the event to which the story refers to an earlier stage of the campaign (cf. Hignett, XIG pp.317f; Burn pp.528f): but Herodotus would then be freely inventing the chronology and confidently brazening out his ignorance.

(228) The same argument against Herodotus' use of single, unchecked sources for particular episodes of the Persian Wars should be borne in mind throughout this discussion. Where the narrative is more detailed than could be expected of 'common knowledge' of the period (as is surely the case in an episode such as this), Herodotus must have been thrust into the hands of particular informants. For example, we would expect that the narrative of Plataea, built up as it is of discrete and detailed episodes of differing character, has been assembled from several discrete sources; Herodotus has welded those episodes into a seamless narrative unit, kept together by a fairly tight chronology. But to arrive at that he must have spent time trying to reconcile the inevitable discrepancies of detail between the reports of his informants; and he can have done this either by using his own imagination in the study, or by going back and checking again with his sources and asking more and more questions of more and more people until he was clear in his mind. Clearly there must have been a bit of both activities; but we would hope there was at least some degree of the latter. For Herodotus' principle of cross-checking,cf. esp. 2.3.1, with App.III.

(229) I cannot agree with Solmsen that the point of this speech is merely to show something about Mardonios' character (p.664): "Ich sehe den Zweck dieser Rede im Eindruck, den sie uns von Mardonios' Überheblichkeit ... gibt". The speech is an integral part of the entire narrative from Alexander' midnight mission onwards: hence it ought to tell us something about the Greeks as well.

(230) See Solmsen, Platää p.665 (!). Again the speech is not given quite the right context: the Athenians after all fail (through no fault of their own indeed) to come to the assistance of the Spartans (cf. 9.61.1f), who are thus left alone (mounōthentes) with the Tegeans, as at Thermopylae. The elevated rhetoric falls flat through not being followed by the heroic action that it anticipates, and we notice all the more the unfortunate fact that the Athenians are left out of the real battle. Herodotus makes no attempt to exonerate the Athenians in this: indeed by certain standards of honour (cf. e.g. 9.72.1f) their absence is something of a failure (cf. also 9.77.1f, with n.232, below).

(231) Ironically of course the Megarians had earlier (cf. 9.21.1ff, above) made themselves out to be heroes of unremitting courage and virtue.

(232) See Plut.MH 42.872Bff; cf. Hignett, XIG p.341, with Macan ad loc. See also the late arrival of the Mantineans and Eleans (9.77.1f): both cities banish the generals who led the respective expeditions, and affect great sorrow at having been late (e.g. 77.1): συμφορὴν ἐποιεῦντο μεγάλην ἄξιοί τε ἔφασαν εἶναι σφέας ζημιῶσαι.

(233) Cf. von Fritz, GGS I.271f, with II.139 n.133, and II.140 n.116; cf. art.cit.pp.21f. Also Masaracchia (1976) pp.164-9: "Emerge un quadro vivido dello scollamento che domina il campo greco, del mediocre livello morale che caratterizza i raporti tra gli alleati, dell' anarchia, della mancanza di lealta e della vilta degli Spartani, del fariseismo manieroso degli Ateniesi".

(234) Cf. 9.53.2, λοχηγέων τοῦ Πιτανήτεω λόχου ; but cf. Thucyd.1.20.3, with Gomme, HCT ad loc. We may wonder whether Thucydides' scorn is not actually directed at the whole story, though he chooses to criticize only a detail.

(235) Cf. Fornara p.89, on this passage: "His account is the mirror of those animosities (sc. of his sources) as well as the harbinger of the final clash, and his references to them are keyed to it".

(236) Cf. rightly Macan, ad loc.; but contrast Powell, s.v.3. I would contend that many more examples belong in this category than Powell allows.

(236a) It is misguided to argue that Herodotus "unconsciously reflects Athenian prejudice" here (How and Wells, ad loc.: why 'unconsciously'?), since these suspicions, typical as they indeed are (cf. e.g. Aristoph.Ach. 302ff; Pax 1063ff), so obviously reflect badly on the Athenians themselves in this context: they are apparently a little too prepared to suspect the Spartans on insufficient evidence. Accordingly the view that this story is "the excuse put forward by the Athenians to explain their own failure to reach their appointed post on the 'island'" (How and Wells, again) will not do either.

(237) Cf. e.g. Hignett, XIG p.331; also Macan, ad loc., who regards this as a story invented to counter accusations that the Athenians did not resond to Spartan calls for help.

(238) The word neikos is uncomfortably insisted on here. The generals were unable to persuade Amompharetos, ἐς ὃ ἐς νείκεά τε συμπεσόντες ἀπίκατο ; and then, νεικέων δὲ ὁ 'Αμομφάρετος ...; Pausanias finally descends to abuse, ὁ δὲ μαινόμενον καὶ οὐ φρενήρεα καλέων ἐκεῖνον. All this clearly leaves a decidedly uncomplimentary picture of Spartan discipline.

(239) Cf. Hignett, XIG pp.328ff.

(240) Similar in character to the episode of the Phocians at 9.17.1ff, in (J).1 above.

(241) Cf. 7.210.1, ἀλλά οἱ ἐφαίνοντο ἀναιδείηι τε καὶ ἀβουλίηι διαχρεώμενοι μένειν; with n.35 above.

(242) Cf. von Fritz, GGS I.270f.

(243) So Solmsen pp.664f: "Der Angriff auf Artabazos (58.3) ist ebenso ein Zeichen von Mardonios' Blindheit und Überheblichkeit wie die Beschimpfung seiner griechischen Gegner".

(244) It is somewhat surprising that among the Spartans singled out for praise is Amompharetos (9.71.2), notwithstanding that Herodotus had allowed him to look very foolish in the episode discussed above.

(245) Cf. the utterance of Dienekes at Thermopylae, 7.226.

(246) Cf. e.g. Macan, ad loc.; Jeffery, AJP 83 (1962) 51. Contrast the rather curious account of Masaracchia (1976) pp.176-7.

(247) Cf. e.g. Aristagoras at Sparta (5.49.8, with n.40 above); the Greek wars adjourned for the invasion of Xerxes, especially that of Athens and Aegina (7.145.1); the Tegeans and Spartans (9.26.7, πολλοὶ μὲν γὰρ εὖ ἔχοντες πρὸς ὑμέας ἡμῖν ... ἀγῶνες ἀγωνίδαται, πολλοὶ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄλλους). Cf. 9.46.2; and also the victories (*agōnes!*) won by the seer Teisamenos: besides Plataea itself, the others were against Tegea and Argos, the Arcadians, the Messenians, and at Tanagra against Athens and Argos (9.35.2).

(248) Cf. e.g. von Fritz, GGS I.273ff.

(249) Fornara pp.52ff; contrast Strasburger (1965) p.602; von Fritz, GGS I.273f; and Masaracchia (1976) pp.178-83. See Thucyd. 1.130.1f: οὐκέτι ἐδύνατο ἐν τῶι καθεστῶτι τρόπωι βιοτεύειν, ἀλλὰ σκευάς τε Μηδικὰς ἐνδυόμενος ... τράπεζάν τε Περσικὴν παρετίθετο καὶ κατέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν οὐκ ἐδύνατο, ἀλλ' ἔργοις βραχέσι προυδήλου ἃ τῆι γνώμηι μειζόνως ἐς ἔπειτα ἔμελλε πράξειν. It could, of course, be said that Thucydides was merely correcting Hdts record, but he may equally be bringing out what he knew to be implied by it. Possibly too Pausanias' gentlemanly treatment of the Coan woman at Hdt 9.76.1ff is meant to offer an ironic contrast with his later unapproachable manner as reported by Thucyd.1.130.2: δυσπρόσοδόν τε αὑτὸν παρεῖχε καὶ τῆι ὀργῆι οὕτω χαλεπῆι ἐχρῆτο ἐς πάντας ὁμοίως ὥστε μηδένα δύνασθαι προσιέναι.

(250) Cf. von Fritz, GGS I.273f; Solmsen, Platää pp.665f; Heni p.132; and esp. Fornara p.65.

(251) But Herodotus explicitly told us that Xerxes' behaviour was something exceptional for a Persian (7.238.2): his treatment of Leonidas showed the extent of his wrath with the Spartan king, οὐ γὰρ ἄν κοτε ἐς τὸν νεκρὸν ταῦτα παρενόμησε, ἐπεὶ τιμᾶν μάλιστα νομίζουσι τῶν ἐγὼ οἶδα ἀνθρώπων Πέρσαι ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμια (cf. 7.181.1ff and 8.92.1).

(252) Herodotus has very possibly left out here an account of the Plataean covenant (cf. Macan, ad 9.86(2); and Meiggs, AE 507f; F. Frost, C&M 22(1961) pp.186-9; with Plut.Aristid.21.1f), in which it seems that a number of measures were agreed to keep alive the memory of the victory, notably the institution of the Eleutheria (cf. n.16, above: the late evidence for these is no case against their antiquity). If there was such a covenant at this time, it is not hard to see why Herodotus has kept is out: he wants no reminders here of Greek unity in the name of the Persian Wars!

(253) For the original oath of the allies to punish the medizers, cf. 7.132.2.

(254) Cf. Burn p.546: "not without courage".

(255) Cf. also Thucyd.3.62.3f, with n.112, above.

(256) Cf. Macan, ad 9.88(3): "another tribute to the magnanimity of the Spartan general, unqualified by any insinuation of bribery or corruption".

(257) There is no suggestion here that the prisoners were ever tried (cf. Macan), but if there was a trial, Herodotus has made the choice of suppressing it.

(258) Cf. Macan, ad 9.88(7): "This appears to be a very arbitrary proceeding, just such as might be ascribed to him after his fall, at a time when various parties might be glad to wash their hands, at his expense, of anti-Theban conduct".

(259) Cf. Thucyd.3.54.2, 58.3, 59.1, 66.2f, 67.6, and 68.1, with Gomme, HCT, ad loc. The Thebans, of course, answer the Plataeans by pointing out that they too failed to observe a truce. Cf. P. Karavites, Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations, Hypomnemata 71 (1982), at pp.34-5 on the present passage (Hdt 9.87-8): "which perhaps best exemplifies the Hellenic spirit in its finest hour of triumph ... the Greeks limited the punishment to the few Thebans most responsible for medizing". Perhaps indeed this is the story behind Hdts text, and quite possibly this is how most Greeks told it, but the details we have noted surely seem designed to create a very different picture.

(260) Cf. Meiggs, AE 579; Macan, ad 9.106(21).

(261) I do not see by what logic F.R. Wüst, Historia 3 (1954-5) pp.140-50, argues from the appearance of the formula οὐκ ἀποστήσομαι Ἀθηναίων τοῦ πλήθους in such documents as the Regulations for Erythrai (Meiggs/ Lewis no.40.23ff) that these must have been the original words of the Delian League alliance and this one which preceded it; for surely the documents where the formula does occur are 'imperial' decrees, requiring of the states concerned that they do not 'revolt' from Athens, or as at Erythrai that they do not revolt again. I cannot believe that the word ἀποστήσασθαι is wholly appropriate to the language of mere alliances. As for Herodotus' text, we must surely doubt that he is here faithfully reporting the actual words of the decree, rather than simply using his own literary imagination.

(262) Cf. e.g. Jacoby, RE art.372.14ff; and on this passage, 378.12ff. Focke pp.14ff, offers an excellent rejoinder to Jacoby on this point.

(263) Fornara p.56.

(264) Cf. Macan, ad 9.121(3), who wants to excise this last sentence; but this is to misunderstand a characteristic Herodotean device: cf. n.141, above.

(265) Cf. esp. 4.84.1f, for Darius and Oiobazos; and 7.39.3, for Xerxes and Pythios. The present story comes uncomfortably soon after the narrative of Amestris' revenge at 9.108-113. F. Kiechle, Historia 7 (1958) 129ff, argues, however, that at least until the sophists the Greeks saw nothing wrong in the most gruesome revenge on a defeated enemy; cf. esp. Xenoph.Cyrop.7.5.72f. I suspect that Hdts view is already the 'modern' one in such matters!

(266) Cf. Macan, ad9.120(17): "These executions do not exhibit the *eōthyia praotēs* of the Demos".

(267) Cf. Fornara p.81: "In one quick and comprehensive mental stride we would cover the intervening period - think of Athens' league, the retaliatory war against Persia, the reduction of rebellious subjects and transition to empire, and, finally, the outbreak of another war for the sake of freedom. And so we come full circle, sharing with Herodotus some of his sadness and pessimism".

(268) Cf. Thucyd.1.69.5, and 6.76.4; with Ch.II, Introd., above.

(269) For the propaganda of freedom in Thucydides, cf. H. Diller, in Herter (1968) pp.639ff. Cf. Ch.II, Introd., above.

(270) For the date of this treatise, cf. Gomme (1962) pp.32-69; and Connor (1971) pp.207-9, arguing for a more traditional and later date than that advocated by G. Bowersock, HSCP 71 (1967) 33ff.(late 440's). For sophistic inspiration in the Old Oligarch, cf. Gomme (1962) pp.54ff. Cf. Prestel (1939) pp.66-86, for this example of antidemocratic propaganda; also M. Treu, Stud. Class.12 (1970) 17-31, with Pap.Mich.5982.

(271) Cf. e.g. Meiggs, AE.4-5: "One of the main topics of serious discussion when Herodotus travelled in the Aegean must have been the changing relations of Athens with her allies. It would have been impossible for a man so clearly fascinated by the instability of prosperity and danger of greatness not to have wondered what would follow Athens' spectacular rise to dominance. But Herodotus never reveals his feelings on these big issues".

(272) Cf. esp. the topographical comparisons at 1.98.5 (the circuit of Ecbatana approx. = the circuit of Athens), 2.7.1f (the journey from the sea to Heliopolis approx. = the journey from the altar of the 12 Gods at Athens to the temple of Olympian Zeus at Pisa), and 4.99.4 (the Tauric peninsula compared to Sunium). The use of the Peisistratid altar at Athens as a means of measuring distances to and from the city is clearly a genuine Athenian practice (cf. e.g. A.B. Lloyd (1976) pp.45-6, with IG II^2 2640), and surely reflects Herodotus' desire to make himself comprehensible to an Athenian audience first and foremost. The recent attempt by A.J. Podlecki, 'Herodotus in Athens?', in Schachermeyer (1977) pp.246-65, to deny that Herodotus ever went to Athens is wholly unconvincing: it rests essentially on (a) polemic against the ancient biography (justified, to be sure), (b) the suggestion that all Athenian *logoi* could have been heard elsewhere than Athens (perverse), and (c) doubts about Herodotus' grasp of the topography of Athens, and especially the Acropolis (i.e. 5.77.3f, with Podlecki pp.259-60; but can we really use Pausanias to correct Herodotus' account of where movable objects are placed?). Admittedly there is no unassailable piece of evidence that Herodotus went to Athens (or anywhere else for that matter, if scepticism is to reign), but (a) the work gives a clear impression of a deep interest in Athens and the Athenian phenomenon, which ought to betoken a fairly intimate acquaintance with the city, and (b) it is hard to believe that a man of Herodotus' interests (cf. Ch.III) can have been alone among the sophists and *sapientes* not to have wished to spend time in the *prytaneion tēs sophias*.

(273) Cf. e.g. G. Scarpat, Parrhesia (1964) at pp.29ff, for this Athenian ideal. Also e.g. M. Radin, AJP 48 (1927) pp.215ff, with a discussion of the comedy-laws. Cf. esp. Pl.Gorg.461E, where Socrates invites Polus to

speak freely since he is in Athens, "where there is the greatest freedom of speech of anywhere in the Greek world"; with Pl.Protag.337D, and Legg. 641E. Protagoras' words about the dangers of declaring oneself a sophist at Protag.316C-317B can hardly be taken au pied de la lettre - and anyway they do not apply exclusively to Athens. Cf. K.J. Dover, The Freedom of the Intellectual in Greek Society, Talanta 7 (1975) 24-54, who rightly points out, against e.g. Derenne (1930), that the evidence regarding impiety trials at Athens can easily overplayed as indicating the limitations of intellectual freedom in that city; and cf. also Gomme (1962) pp.43-5, on the Old Oligarch's comment that the demos does not like itself to be ridiculed in comedy (Ps.-Xenoph.Athpol.II.18). My point here is not that freedom of speech was in general limited at Athens - which would of course be largely untrue -, but only that at the time when Hdt was completing his work it might have seemed imprudent for a foreigner writing at Athens to be outspoken in his criticisms of the empire in particular and the democracy in general: it seems at least a priori plausible, however we are to deal with the indecisive and severely limited evidence, that the first years of the Peloponnesian War, and perhaps also the years immediately before it, saw a democratic reaction somewhat indiscriminately directed at all oligarchs, radical thinkers, atheists, intellectuals of all kinds, who might be thought of as a threat to the stability of the democratic state. For the democracy's hostility to those who try to criticize it, cf. Isocr.8.3-14, which is perhaps more than a mere rhetorical captatio. And cf. perhaps F.J. Frost, Historia 13 (1964) 385-99, for the view that the attacks on the friends of Pericles (but cf. Dover (1975) above) showed the anti-intellectualism of Cleon and his followers rather than the oligarchic opposition of Thucydides Melesiou. Prestel (1939) is not helpful on the democrats' reactions to the "antidemokratische Strömung".

(274) Cf. G. Norwood, CPh 25 (1930) 1ff; and e.g. W.G. Forrest, Aristophanes and the Athenian Empire, in Essays in hon. C.E. Stevens (1975) pp.17ff. For the controversy as to who actually wrote the Babylonians and who was prosecuted by Cleon, cf. F.S. Halliwell, CQ 30 (1980) 33-45, and D.M. MacDowell, CQ 32 (1982) 21ff; perhaps not of much importance for our purposes.

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Chapter Three: NOTES.

(1) The intellectual and social impact of the sophists has recently been well explored in two books: Solmsen (1975) and Kerferd (1981). Cf. also Guthrie, HGP III; the collection of Classen (1976) is largely concerned with problems of pure philosophy.

(2) Cf. Pl.Soph.231D, Apol.19E, Euthyd.305C, etc.; and Ar.Soph.El.171B25ff: χρηματιστική τις ἀπὸ σοφίας φαινομένης. See Kerferd pp.24ff.

(3) Cf. Antiphon DK 87B48: ἄνθρωπος, ὅς φησι μὲν πάντων θηρίων θεειδέστατον γενέσθαι ...; Democritus DK 68B165: ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, ὅ πάντες ἴδμεν ...; Protag. DK 80B1 (!); and esp. Hippocr.Vet.Med.20.1ff, on the opinion of some doctors and sophistai: ὡς οὐκ εἴη δύνατον ἰητρικὴν εἰδέναι ὅστις μὴ οἶδεν ὅ τί ἐστιν ἄνθρωπος . For Thucydides on anthrōpinē physis, cf. E. Topitsch, WS 61-2 (1943-7) pp.50ff, with Thucyd.1.22.4, 76; with 4.61.5; 3.45, 82.2; 5.105; cf. 5.89f.

(4) Cf. e.g. Anaximander DK 12A30, on the evolution of man from a fishy forebear into the form we know - but no further!

(5) For Gorgias, cf. Pl.Meno 70B, Gorg.447C: ἐκέλευε γοῦν νυνδὲ ἐρωτᾶν ὅτι τις βούλοιτο τῶν ἔνδον ὄντων καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντα ἔφη ἀποκρινεῖσθαι. For Hippias, cf. Pl.Hipp.Maj.285B, Hipp.Min.363C, below. For Democritus, cf. DK II.82.11ff: καὶ ἦν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν φιλοσοφίαι πένταθλος (cf. II.93.6ff).

(6) Cf. DK II.85.26-7, 28ff, 33ff, 36ff (!); 111.15ff; 174.15ff (=B156); and cf. J. Meyer, Hermes 100 (1972) p.178.

(7) For sophistic argument in the medical writers, cf. e.g. G.E.R. Lloyd (1979) pp.86-98, and cf. Kerferd pp.57-8. For the association of 5thc medicine with the sophists, cf. e.g. DK II.277.13ff (Gorgias and Herodikos); II.336.35ff (Antiphon's tekhnē alypias); and esp. Hippocr.Vet.Med.20 (below). For Democritus and Hippocrates, cf. DK II.83.20ff; 225.3ff.

(8) One of the best discussions of Thucydides' participation in the sophistic debate is to be found in Solmsen (1975) passim; cf. also W. Nestle, Thukydides u.d.Sophistik, in Gr.Stud. (Stuttgart 1948) pp.321-73. For Thucydides and the medical writers, cf. e.g. recently C. Lichtenthaeler, Hermes 107 (1979) pp.270ff.

(9) Cf. Aly (1921) p.292, with pp.286ff, for a full discussion; also (1929) p.120. Similarly Schmid/Stählin I.2.572ff, on the failure of the various sophistic influences in the work to affect its design and methods: "Indessen ist davon seine Weltanschauung nicht tiefer, seine Auffassung von der Aufgabe des Gesichichtsschreibers überhaupt gar nicht berührt worden: er hat weder an der Existenz der Götter noch an der Berechtigung der nomoi der einzelnen Völker bezweifelt". Even W. Nestle, in a monograph specially devoted to the topic is surprisingly reserved (Progr.1908 p.37): "So wenig also Herodotus ein philosophischer Denker oder ein Sophistenschüler in der Art der Männer der nächstfolgenden Generation gewesen ist, so wening ist es angebracht, seine Persönlichkeit und seine Denkweise, ja auch seine Art der Darstellung und seinen Stil einfach als 'naiv' zu charakterisieren". That 'einfach' begs the entire question - not to mention that the comparison of Herodotus with the 'next generation' is unhelpful: just because he is not like a Euripides

or a Thucydides does not mean that he has missed the sophistic boat! - It is worth remembering that some (if not most) of the standard works on Herodotus and the history of 5thc thought are far less enlightened than these: cf. e.g. Pohlenz (1937) p.107: "Wer 'Sophistik' als bestimmendes Element in Herodots Wesen ansieht, denkt in Schlagworten und vergisst, wieviele Gedanken und methoden, die uns durch die 'Sophisten' überliefert sind, schon vorher in Ionien durchdacht und ausgebildet waren. Die ganze Grundhaltung Herodots ... weist nach andrer Richtung" (cf. p.185!). Hunter (1982), convincingly argues (against the orthodoxy) that Herodotus and Thucydides in many respects share methods and outlook; but the word 'sophist' is not listed in the index to the book, and the two writers share the anachronistic common designation 'Pre-Socratic thinkers'; cf. p.4, with n.5. Cf. here also Jacoby's RE art. on Herodotus' Style (sect.31), which seems uncertain where precisely to locate Herodotus: e.g. 492.54ff: " ... (Hdt) für den der Einfluss der neuen Sophistik in den Grundlagen seiner Kunst schon zeitlich kaum in Betracht kommt, wenn er auch im einzelnen vielleicht in der Verwendung gewisser Schmuckmittel anerkannt werden kann"; contrast 501.46ff, on Herodotus' meetings with Protagoras and Empedocles, and even Gorgias, in *Thurii* (!) ("kein chronologisches Bedenken spricht dagegen ... "); but see 500.46ff, for doubts about the meaning of the term 'Sophistik' and suggestions as to an 'Ionian Sophistic' (whose existence had already been firmly stamped on by W. Nestle, Philol.24 (1911) pp. 242ff, an article that Jacoby had missed). The debate on sophistic style in Herodotus has been long and hard: see H. Diels, Hermes 22 (1887) p.424 ("Neben der traditionellen Naivetät der ionischen *logopoiia* vernimmt man schon oft die scharfgespitzte Antithese und die Periodenzirkelei der gleichzeitigen Sophistik, die freilich dem biedern Halikarhassier anfänglich noch etwas sauer wird"); with P. Kleber, De gen. dicendi Hdteo (Progr.Löwenberg 1890), and contra A. Nieschke, De figurarum ... (Progr.Münden 1891), and M. Wundt, De Hdti *elocutione* ... (Leipz.1903). Also E. Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa (1909) I.27ff; and e.g. A. Dihle, Philol.106 (1962) p.212, n.1. The controversy was allowed to rage on only because commentators failed to make clear with any precision what they wanted their generalizations to mean and in what respects they wished them to apply. It is clear enough that Herodotus is the master of any number of styles, ranging from the Hecataean right down to the Gorgianic, but it would be a foolish man who thought he could identify Herodotus' 'natural' or 'authentic' voice in all this.

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(10) Cf. Jacoby, RE art.510.49ff, cited in the previous note.

(11) Cf. Jacoby, RE art.213-47, on this and the following; esp. 229.19ff.

(12) Cf. (Ar.) Rhet.1409A28, with Plut.Mor.604F; cf. Jacoby, RE art.205-13; H. Erbse, Rh.Mus.98 (1955) 103ff, suggests that the MS reading *Thouriou* was recognized already by the Alexandrians as an unreliable conjecture. Cf. also Schmid-Stahlin I.2.588 n.5; and now V.G. Borukhovic, VDI 127 (1974) 127-32 (!).

(13) Cf. C.W. Fornara, JHS 91 (1971) 25ff; contra J. Cobet, Hermes 105 (1977) 2ff; and again Fornara, Hermes 109 (1981) 149ff.

(14) For the integrality of these references, cf. Powell pp.69ff; contrast e.g. L.H. Jeffery, AJPh 83 (1962) 44ff.

(15) Cf. e.g. Powell p.75: "Such an irrelevant digression for the sake of topical interest is much harder to understand as a later addition than as part of the original context"; cf. my comments on this passage in Ch.II.iii.J.

(16) Cf. Thucyd.2.8.3, itself a problem for ignoring Hdts earthquake; cf. Powell p.70. The unfulfilled promise of *Assyrioi Logoi* at 1.106.2 and 184 possibly shows inadequate final revision rather than that the work is incomplete;

cf. Focke pp.14ff, arguing that 1.177-200 is itself the Assyrios Logos; G. Huxley, GRBS 6 (1965) 207-12; R. Drews, AJPh 91 (1970) 181-91; and most recently J. MacQueen, CQ 28 (1978) 284-91, who argues that the relevant passage has dropped out of the text; and cf. perhaps my App.IV n.4 (!). For the problem of Ephialtes at 7.213.3, cf. H. Erbse, Rh.Mus.98 (1955) 117-20.

(17) cf. R. Lattimore, CPh 53 (1958) 9ff, for a discussion of these problems.

(18) On the supposed 'parody' of the opening of Hdts work in Aristoph.Ach.523ff, produced Lenaea 425, cf. Fornara art.cit.(1971) 28, and art.cit.(1981) 153-5. The parodies in the Birds, produced Lenaea 414, are rather more impressive (cf. App.IV n.4) and could be taken as evidence of 'publication' c.415: cf. Fornara, art.cit.(1971) 28-9. Cf. also G. Perrotta, RIL 59 (1926) 105ff, for a complete discussion of the Aristoph.parodies. It is not clear what can be made of the almost certain echo of Hdts story of Intaphrenes' wife (3.118-9) at Soph.Antig.904ff; cf. e.g. T.A. Szlezak, Rh.Mus.124 (1981) 108-42, for the most complete treatment of the question (at pp.112-3 and 128-9, for relation to Hdt). I believe two things are clear: (a) that the Soph.passage does imitate Hdt - and that very closely (cf. the demonstration by Page (1934) pp.86ff, who, however, concludes that the passage in the play is interpolated), and (b) that, incovenient as is the conclusion for my purposes, the lines do belong in the play and are not any form of interpolation (cf. esp. Ar.Rhet.1417A28ff). These two hypotheses do not however get us any further with the Hdt problem. The supposed evidence of Aristoph.Byz. in the hypothesis to the play to the effect that Sophocles was given the generalship in the campaign against Samos because of the reputation he had won from the Antigone (i.e. giving a date for the play in that late 440's; cf. e.g. G. Müller, Soph.Antig. (Heidelberg 1967) pp.24-5) surely amounts to nothing more than a scholarly guess (cf. Lefkowitz (1981) pp.81-3) - perhaps dependent on the 'political' theme of the play? This being so, we are left without any guide to its date - unless we would do better to use the evidence of Hdt and put the Antig. later than his publication date (i.e. 425)? An alternative hypothesis that Soph. saw an early draft of this section of the work is one that is quite impossible to test. For Hdtean echoes in other authors, cf. somewhat uncritically K.A. Riemann (1967); and cf. R. Browning, CR 75 (1961) 201ff, for a possible Hdtean echo in Eurip. Cresphontes F449N. For the question of whether different parts of the work were written at different times, or rather whether we can detect signs of this, cf. App.IV.

(19) See in general Guthrie, HGP III.262ff.

(20) Cf. Pl.Apol.19E; cf. Hipp.Maj.282E, for the relative ages of Hippias and Protagoras.

(21) Cf. J.S. Morrison, CQ 35 (1941) pp.1ff; the authenticity of the dramatic setting is, of course, questioned, not without reason, by Athenaeus 218B.

(22) Cf. DK II.327.28; 329.21-2; and cf. Dialex.9.1ff.

(23) Cf. Jacoby, RE art.213.31ff, for the ancient biography. With e.g. von Fritz, GGS I.121ff.

(24) For rewards (requested and obtained) for speaking at Athens and elsewhere, cf. Dio Chrys.37.17; Plut.MH 31.864D (below); Marc.Vit.Thuc.27; and Diyllos FGH 73F3, with Jerome Ol.83.4 (445-4), Arm.Euseb.Ol.83.3 (446-5), and Syncellus 257D (446-5). And compare Marc.Vit.Thuc.54; Suda s.v. Thoukydides s.v. orgai, for recitations, etc. Cf. Powell pp.31ff; contra H.W. Parke, Hermathena 67 (1946) pp.86ff; also Focke pp.42ff.

(25) For the supposed evidence of 'oral style' in Herodotus, cf. e.g. Pohlenz (1937) pp.208ff; Immerwahr p.6, n.12; and R. Lattimore, CP 53 (1958) pp.9ff (!); contrast Focke pp.42ff.

(26) Cf. Jacoby, RE art.353.39ff: "das waren natürlich ausgearbeitete Vorträge, wie wir dergleichen ja noch im Hippokratescorpus besitzen; richtige Manuskripte, die auch stilistische Aspirationen gemacht haben werden, gerade wie die Vorträge der Sophisten".

(27) Cf. Hunter (1982) pp.324-5, for a survey of the literature on this question and its bearing on Hdt; for Sparta add P. Cartledge, JHS 98 (1978) 25-37, and T.A. Boring, Mnemos.Suppl.54 (1979). I would argue not only that literacy is hard to define and even harder to quantify with our limited evidence, but that determining with any precision the extent of the book-reading public at this date is not possible. S. Flory, AJPh 101 (1980) 12ff, argues an unprovable case when he claims that it was only the smallest minority who ever read Hdts book.

(28) Cf. Pl.Protag.314Cff, with Kerferd p.30.

(28a) H. Erbse, Rh.Mus.98 (1955) 99ff, in arguing against the hypothesis of Hdtean lectures, rejects the evidence of Aristophanes of Boeotia, though somewhat casually in my view.

(29) For other possible contacts with Hippias, cf. e.g. Nestle, Philol.21 (1908) 567ff, and Progr.1908 pp.23ff; cf. e.g. Hippias on diabolē, DK 86B17, with Hdt 7.10ē, and Isocr.Antid.18; cf. Aly (1921) p.291.

(30) Cf. B. Snell, Philol.96 (1944) pp.119-28 (repr. in Classen (1976) pp. 478ff); cf. Kerferd pp.48ff. If Snell is right and Thales figured in this doxography of Hippias, it would be interesting to know if he said anything that overlapped with Herodotus' treatment of the man; cf. 1.74.2, 75.3ff, 170.3.

(31) Cf. A.B. Lloyd (1975) pp.141ff. And cf. Thucyd.3.90.1, ἃ δὲ λόγου μάλιστα ἄξια ... τούτων μνησθήσομαι , with K.J. Dover, Maia 6 (1953) pp.8ff. And cf. H. Barth, 'Zur Bewertung und Auswahl des Stoffes durch Herodot', Klio 50 (1968) pp.93-110; cf. Pl.Theaet.155D, on philosophical thaumazein.

(32) Note that Aristotle's description of Prodicus' devices for keeping the audience's attention when it seemd to be flagging (Rhet.1415B12ff = DK II.310. 32ff): ὅτε νυστάζοιεν οἱ ἀκροαταί, παρεμβάλλειν τῆς πεντηκονταδράχμου αὐτοῖς. Such a meretricious approach is not dissimilar to Herodotus' striving in his prosthēkai; cf. e.g. 4.30.1.

(33) Cf. Macan, and How and Wells, ad loc. (the epic 'Aigimios'); Stein, ad loc. (the logographers). And cf. Fehling p.127. Note that Critias too wrote Spartan Politeiai in verse and prose, cf. DK 88B6 and B32-7.

(34) Cf. A. Körte, Hermes 39 (1904) p.230; Kerferd p.47.

(35) G.E.M. de Ste Croix, Class Struggle (1981) p.69, questions the existence of the list, but Plutarch's disparagement is directed at Hippias' methods not against the tradition which ascribed the list to him. Cf. further, Den Boer (1954) pp.42ff.

(36) By contrast the Pythian games are mentioned only once, at 8.47: a three times victor, Phayllos. And cf. e.g. 5.102.3 (Eualkidas): στεφανηφόρους τε ἀγῶνας ἀναραιρηκότα καὶ ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδεω τοῦ Κηίου πολλὰ αἰνηθέντα. It is possible that one of Herodotus' sources of information was epinician poetry, rather than Hippias, although it is clear that Hippias must have used those same sources too.

(36a) B. Virgilio, RIL 106 (1972) 451-68, suggests that besides oral tradition Hdt relies for his extensive knowledge of athletic victories on epigraphic evidence; but we know of no such material for this period, and Hippias' activity suggests that it did not exist.

(37) Cf. esp. T. Cole (1967); L. Edelstein (1967); E.R. Dodds (1973) pp.1ff; and contrast W. den Boer, Progress in the Greece of Thucydides (1977), which is to my mind confused and unhelpful.

(38) Cf. Cole (1967), for a lengthy survey and critical discussion.

(39) Cf. M. Griffith, The Authenticity of Prometheus Bound (1977); see index under 'sophistic elements', and esp. pp.217ff.

(40) See also Theseus in Eurip.Suppl.201-13; and 'Critias' (= Eurip.) Sisyphos DK 88B25 (with A. Dihle, Hermes 105 (1977) 28ff).

(41) Cf. K. Reinhardt, Hermes 47 (1912) 492ff; G. Vlastos AJP 67 (1946) 51ff; and see Cole (1967) passim. Cf. also DK II.137.36ff.

(42) Pl.Legg.677Bff (cf. 782Aff); with Cole (1967) pp.97ff.

(43) Cf. Guthrie, HGP III.63ff and 79ff; Cole (1967) pp.1-10, for a complete survey of the relevant texts.

(44) Cf. H.W. Miller, TAPA 80 (1949) pp.187ff; H. Herter, Maia 15 (1963) pp.464ff.

(45) Note here two passages of Herodotus which bear an obvious relation to Pherecrates' play: 6.137.3, the Athenians in the earliest days sent out their own daughters to fetch and carry water: οὐ γὰρ εἶναι τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον σφίσι κω οὐδὲ τοῖσι ἄλλοισι Ἕλλησι οἰκέτας ; and 8.137.2, ἦσαν δὲ τὸ πάλαι καὶ αἱ τυραννίδες τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀσθενέες χρήμασι, οὐ μόνον ὁ δῆμος. ἡ δὲ γυνὴ τοῦ βασιλέος αὐτὴ τὰ σιτία σφι ἔπεσσε. With Pherecr.Agrioi F10 Kock: οὐ γὰρ ἦν τότ' οὔτε Μάνης οὔτε Σηκὶς οὐδενὶ/δοῦλος, ἀλλ' αὐτὰς ἔδει μοχθεῖν ἅπαντ' ἐν οἰκίαι· εἶτα πρὸς τούτοισιν ἤλουν ὄρθριαι τὰ σιτία,/ ὥστε τὴν κώμην ὑπηχεῖν θιγγανουσῶν τὰς μύλας. Cf. Nestle, Progr.1908 pp.16f and 27. Compare the weakness of the age of tyrannies in Thuc.Archaeol. 1.17; and cf. Crates F14.1f Kock. Since the Agrioi is clearly a satire on sophistic speculations about primitive man (cf. esp. Pl.Protag.327D; produced Lenaea 421: cf. Athen.218D), we may presumably invoke a common sophistic inspiration here.

(46) Cf. Pl.Legg.676BC, 782Aff, and Tim.22Bff.

(47) Cf. 2.11.4, on the time available for the silting of the Nile to form the land-mass of Egypt (!); a similar conception of the unimaginable variety of the known world at 4.195.2: εἴη δ' ἂν πᾶν.

(48) Cf. Cole (1967) pp.143-6. We might add that the fanciful, mythopoeic character of the narrative has little to do with the traditional folk-tale, but rather recalls the meretricious dressing-up of such sophistic parables as the Prometheus-myth in Plato's Protagoras, Prodicus' Heracles in Xenophon, and later Plato's / Socrates' own 'myths', whose purpose is to sweeten the pill of instruction. Cf. F. Dornseiff, Die Archaische Mythenerzählung (1933) pp.82-7, e.g. p.87: "er (Hdt) ist der Übergang von der archaischen Mythenerzählungen zur sophistischen und platonischen".

(49) Cf. Diod.I.8.3-4, for the origins of language and of the archetypes of the main languages. And cf. Hdt 1.142.3f, the four Ionian dialects;

1.171.6, the Carian Zeus, etc.; 1.172.1, the differences and similarities of culture and language between Caunians and Carians; 2.42.4 (the Ammonioi): ἐόντες Αἰγυπτίων τε ϰαὶ Αἰθιόπων ἄποιϰοι ϰαὶ φωνὴν μεταξὺ ἀμφοτέρων νομίζοντες; 2.105, the racial origins of the Colchians in Egypt, proved by similarity of language; 2.154.2, Egyptian interpreters of Greek; 4.106, the Androphagoi and the other Scyths; 4.108.2 (the Gelonoi): εἰσὶ ... τὸ ἀρχαῖον Ἕλληνες ... ϰαὶ γλώσσηι τὰ μὲν Σϰυθιϰῆι, τὰ δὲ Ἑλληνιϰῆι χρέωνται; 6.119.4, the Eretrians transplanted by Darius to Arderikka: οἳ ϰαὶ μέχρι ἐμέο εἶχον τὴν χώρην ταύτην, φυλάσσοντες τὴν ἀρχαίην γλῶσσαν.

(49a) Cf. A.Salmon, LEC 24 (1956) 321-9, arguing this to be a genuine report of an Egyptian story; but cf. Lloyd (1976) ad loc.

(50) Cf. Nestle, Progr.1908 p.35.

(51) Cf. Dialex.6.12: a Greek child brought up in Persia would speak Persian, and vice versa.

(52) Cf. A.B. Lloyd (1976) ad loc.

(53) That the 'variant' version of this story (2.2.5) goes back to Hecataeus (so A.B. Lloyd (1976) pp.8-9) seems to me incredible, when the assumptions and interests without which the story could not have taken shape, are so clearly sophistic.

(54) Cf. Soph.Antig.332ff; and Prom.Vinct.442ff; Eurip.Suppl.201-15; 'Critias' DK 88B25 etc.

(55) Cf. Gorg.Palam.DK 82B11a.30; cf. Isocr.Paneg.28-40. And cf. Eurip. Palamedes, F578ff Nauck, in trilogy with Sisyphos (cf. n.40, above).

(56) Cf. Isocr.Panath.119-48.

(57) Cf. DK II.317.2ff, with Kerferd pp.168-9. Compare Pl.Legg.677D.

(58) Kleingünther (1933); cf. K. Thraede, 'Das Lob des Erfinders', Rh.Mus. 105 (1962) 158-86.

(59) Kleingünther (1933) compares Herodotus with Hecataeus: cf. FGH 1F15 (Oineus) and F20 (writing: see below).

(60) Cf. e.g. Nestle, Progr.1908 p.35.

(61) For _khreia_ in such discussion, cf. e.g. Cole (1967) p.41, etc.

(62) Cf. Kleingünther (1933) pp60ff.

(63) Cf. Cole (1967) pp.179ff and 187ff; and compare esp. Isocr.Busiris passim, a text which has some clear correspondences with Herodotus' account of Egypt; cf. Busiris 17: ὥστε ϰαὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων (? the sophists) τοὺς ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων (cf. Hdt 2.167.1) λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦντας ϰαὶ μάλιστ' εὐδοϰιμοῦντας τὴν ἐν Αἰγύπτωι προαιρεῖσθαι πολιτείαν . Cf. Pl. Legg.656Dff, 799A, etc. And compare Froidefond (1971) at pp.115ff for Herodotus on Egypt, and at pp.231ff for Egypt in subsequent philosophical writers: Froidefond, however, surely exaggerates the extent to which later writers depended exclusively on Hdt. For the originality of Hecataeus of Abdera, however, cf. O. Murray, CQ 22 (1972) at 207-8.

(64) Cf. A.B. Lloyd (1975) pp.147-9.

(65) For an excellent appreciation of the unity of conception of Herodotus' account of Egypt, cf. J. Vogt, 'Herodot in Ägypten', repr. in Hdt WdF pp.412-33.

(66) Cf. esp. Trüdinger (1918), e.g. p.15: "Herodot hat als Geograph und Ethnograph, als Nachfolger des Hekataios begonnen", following Jacoby, RE art.341.9ff.

(67) Assisted by Porphyry and others: cf. Jacoby FGH 1T22 (cf. T1 and T18).

(68) *Alpha* = 'Europe', cf. e.g. F37; *Beta* = 'Asia', cf. e.g. F304, 323a, etc. For ancient doubts about the authorship of H.s 'Asia', cf. FGH 1T15, with Jacoby, Kommentar ad loc.

(69) Cf. Drews (1973) p.149 n.40, who assigns the 'fragment' to the Genealogies. But there is no need to read Herodotus' text as a citation of a work by Hecataeus: in particular, I find it hard to believe that Hecataeus would have been happy to tell a story which reflected so poorly on himself. Is it beyond Herodotus to have made this up to point the difference between himself and the gullible Ionian? Cf. Fehling pp.60ff, for this passage.

(70) For the case for believing Porphyry, cf. S. Lilja, Arctos 5 (1967) pp.85ff. Is it not the case, however, that accusations of plagiarism tend to get exaggerated, especially when, as here, they are made at third hand?

(71) Cf. Drews (1973) pp.11-14, against Heidel (1935) and others, and arguing rightly that there is no real history anywhere in Hecataeus.

(71a) For Hec.s ethnography, with particular reference to Egypt, cf. A.B. Lloyd (1975) pp.127-39; and at pp.138-9, for the most that Hdt can derive from Hec. on Egypt.

(72) Cf. Nestle, Progr.1908 p.36: (the collecting of *nomima barbarika*) "gewann jetzt eine neue Bedeutung: denn erst jetzt muss es dazu dienen, das Wesen des Menschen als Gattung zu erfassen" (?).

(72a) Roffler (1920) for the idea of 'complex-personification'; and at pp. 19-29 for Hdt - without, however, stressing the impact on his work of the sophistic movement.

(73) Cf. Nestle, Philol.21 (1908) 579; Aly (1929) pp.118-9.

(74) The most remarkable correspondence between the Dialex. and Herodotus is the observation in the former that if all men were to bring together their shameful practices (*aiskhra*) and then take away with them those they thought to be fine (*kala*), there would be nothing left behind (2.18; cf. 2.26): this is clearly a variation on the motif which Herodotus himself employs on two different occasions, both different from each other and from the Dialex. (cf. 3.38 and 7.152.2). (Compare Plut.Mor.106B and Val.Max.7.2.ext.2). It is evident that the two works have a common inspiration here (though not necessarily a single source).

(75) Nestle, Progr.1908 p.27: "Heranziehung fabelhafter barbarischer Völker als angeblicher Beispiele für ein Leben in naturgemässen Zuständen"; cf. Aristoph.Av.1470ff, 1520ff; and Pherecr.Agrioi Kock I.146ff (see above).

(76) Cf. Heinimann (1945) pp.14ff; H. Diller, 'Wanderarzt und Aitiologe', Philol.Suppl.26.3 (1933) pp.1ff. For the best defence of the unity of the work, cf. Aly (1929) pp.52ff; contrast e.g. Diller (1933) pp.5ff.

(77) See most recently H. Hermal, Comparaison entre le traité hippocr. Airs ... et les Hist.s d'Hdte (Strasburg 1972) (not available to me). The view

of W. Nestle, Hermes 73 (1938) pp.25f, that Herodotus is the borrower, is no longer accepted; contrast e.g. Diller (1933) pp.69ff. See e.g. the discrepancy over the name of the Scythian Anarieis or Enareis (Airs 22.5, with Hdt 1.105.4 and 4.67.2), improbable if either is drawing directly on the other.

(78) Cf. Herodotus 1.142.1, and Airs 12.7ff; cf. Diller (1933) pp.69ff, Heinimann pp.23f. Contrast Hdt 3.106.1, of Greece as a whole.

(79) sc. like the Egyptians: cf. Stein, ad loc.

(80) See also Hdt 2.35.2 and 4.28f: the affects of climate (extreme hot and extreme cold), which make Egypt and Scythia so different; Hdt 2.2 and 4.5.1: the Egyptians and Scythians are believed to be respectively the oldest and youngest peoples on earth; and Hdt 4.48f (esp.50.1): the Danube is the largest river in Europe and with its tributaries larger even than the Nile, to which alone it corresponds in importance. Cf. Diller (1933) pp.74f, and A.B. Lloyd (1975) pp.167f. Unfortunately we do not possess the Hippocratic treatment of Egypt which has fallen out of the text (lacuna at 12.44).

(81) Cf. Dialex.2.17, and Hdt 2.35.2ff: the Dialex. significantly has no special use for the motif of the topsy-turviness of Egypt (cf. Αἰγύπτιοί τε οὐ ταὐτὰ νομίζοντι καλὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις), since for him the customs of most *ethnea* are paradoxical in some way; in other words it seems likely that the author has simply borrowed the idea from his source. Cf. also Soph.OC 337ff, which may derive from Herodotus, but is more likely to share a common source on the present evidence; and cf. Anaxandridas F39 Kock (II.150), which corresponds in many details with Herodotus here, but diverges in at least one respect (cf. lines 10-11).

(82) Cf. e.g. the antithesis at 2.35.2, αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ἀγοράζουσι καὶ καπηλεύουσι, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες κατ᾽ οἴκους ἐόντες ὑφαίνουσι (homoioteleuton!). And note the straining for effect at 2.35.3, οὐρέουσι αἱ μὲν γυναῖκες ὀρθαί, οἱ δὲ ἄνδρες κατήμενοι : the antithesis (implied throughout) between Egyptian and Greek would require men to urinate standing, against the evidence of Hesiod (Erga 731f) for the crouching position (and cf. Boardman, ARF no.84).

(83) It is hard to imagine what other place the Makrokephaloi ever had in Greek anthropology, except in explanations of their 'long-headedness' (cf. Hes.F153M-W).

(84) Democr.DK 68B33, ἡ φύσις καὶ ἡ διδαχὴ παραπλήσιόν ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ ἡ διδαχὴ μεταρυσμοῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, μεταρυσμοῦσα δὲ φυσιοποιεῖ. And cf. esp. Euenos F9 West, Critias DK 88B9, Protagoras DK 80B3. And also Democr. DK 68B242.

(85) Cf. Airs 14.1ff: καὶ ὁκόσα μὲν ὀλίγον διαφέρει τῶν ἐθνέων παραλείψω, ὁκόσα δὲ μεγάλα ἢ φύσει ἢ νόμωι, ἐρέω περὶ αὐτῶν ὡς ἔχει.

(86) Cf. Emped.DK 31A81, B65 and 67 (cf. A73); and Parmenides DK A53. And see e.g. Diog.Apoll.DK 64A19 (the importance of air). Pythagoras: Vit.Pythag. Phot.Cod.249, p.441A13f; Aetius Plac.I.15.7, p.313 (Diels); with Eurip.Med. 826ff. Compare Menestor DK 32A5 etc.

(87) For the problem of who is attacked in the Vet.Med., cf. e.g. H. Diller, Hermes 80 (1952) pp.385ff, arguing for a post-Platonic date; but contrast G.E.R. Lloyd, Phronesis 8 (1963) pp.108-26.

(88) Cf. Democr. DK II.125.31ff, with Airs 18.17ff, and Hdt 4.29f. Also Democr. DK II.123.35ff,125.8ff, 126.29ff; and for the *peri georgies* on climate, II.149.16ff. With Diller (1933) pp.27ff.

(89) Cf. e.g. Guthrie, HGP II.386ff, and e.g. p.389: "Atomism is the final, and most successful, attempt to rescue the reality of the physical world from the fatal effects of Eleatic logic by means of a pluralistic logic".

(90) Cf. Heinimann pp.35f: "Das unwahrscheinliche und Überraschende Erlebnis des Sieges einer kleine Zahl von Griechen über eine vielfache persische Übermacht zwang zur Frage nach dessen Ursache". See also H. Diller, in E. Hardt 8 (1962) pp.39ff. And cf. esp. W. Backhaus, Historia 25 (1976) pp.170ff, who concludes that Hippocr.Airs is concerned to contrast not so much Europe and Asia as Greek and barbarian (p.185): "die Schrift ... liefert damit unter Berücksichtigung politischer Ordnungsprinzipien die erste naturwissenschaftliche klimatheoretische Begrundung hellenischer Überlegenheit und barbarischer Inferiorität".

(91) For the decline in intellectual life of Ionia after the suppression of the revolt in the first decade of the 5thc, cf. Emlyn-Jones, pp.164ff. Certainly Ionians continued to lead the intellectual life of Greece (e.g. Democritus, Protagoras, Anaxagoras), but they are now exiles from their home-cities, travelling the rest of the Greek world. The new centres of Greek thoughtare first Magna Graecia (Parmenides, Zeno, Empedocles, Gorgias), and ultimately, the *prytaneion tēs sophias* itself, Athens (cf. Pl.Protag.337D). There is no evidence at all that there continued to be a thriving intellectual community in Ionia after the collapse of the revolt: indeed it is tempting to see a causal connexion here. For the chimera of an 'Ionian Sophistic', including proto-sophists unknown to us, see the robust critique of Nestle, Philol.24 (1911) pp.242ff.

(92) There are certainly glimmerings of interest in these questions as early as Pindar: e.g. Ol.10.20f, Ol.2.86f, Ol.9.100, Py.8.44f; and cf. Simonides F15 West and PMG 542. See Heiniman, passim; O. Thimme, Physis, Tropos, Ethos, Diss.Göttingen (1935); Nestle, 'Hippocratica', Hermes 73 (1938) 8ff; K. Deichgraber, Antike 15 (1939) pp.116ff; H. Diller, N. Jahrb.2 (1939) pp.241ff; and D. Holwerda, Commentatio de vocis quae est *physis* vi atque usu (1955).

(93) Cf. 2.77.3, the good health of the Egyptians, as of the Libyans, depends (ἐμοὶ δοκέειν) on the seasons not changing (with e.g. Airs 23.2ff), as well as on their healthy *regimen vitae* (2.77.2). Compare 3.12.1f, on the reasons for the relative thickness of Egyptian and Persian skulls; 3.23.1f (water); 4.187.2f (cauterization); 4.29 (Scythian hornless oxen: cf. Airs 18.17ff); 4.30.1 (mules in Elis; with Democr.DK 68A151); and cp. 2.35.2ff. With allusions at 7.102.1 (Greek poverty, etc.), on which cf. A. Dihle, Philol.106(1962)207ff, who assumes with the orthodoxy that the allusion here is to an "ionisch-ethnographischer Betrachtungsweise".

(94) Cf. R. Merkelbach, Rh.Mus 95 (1952) 288, for this text.

(95) Cf. 1.89.2 (Croesus); amd Herodotus' confirmation of Sandanis at 1.71.4 (!).

(96) Cf. on all this, H. Bischoff, Der Warner bei Herodot, Diss.Marburg (1932) pp.78ff.

(97) Cf. Kerferd pp.159ff; with e.g. Eurip.F653N.

(98) Democritus e.g. DK 68B275-280; Antiphon DK 87B49 (II.357.12ff).

(99) Cf. esp. Aristoph.Eccl.635f, a burlesque on the community of wives: πῶς οὖν οὕτω ζώντων ἡμῶν τοὺς αὑτοῦ παῖδας ἕκαστος/ ἔσται δύνατος διαγιγνώσκειν; (and cf. Dover (1972) pp.200f, on the sources of this passage). Also e.g. Eurip.F1015: αἰεὶ δὲ μήτηρ φιλότεκνος μᾶλλον πατρός·/ ἡ μὲν γὰρ αὑτῆς οἶδεν ὄντ', ὁ δ' οἴεται.

(100) Democr.DK 68B278: Antiphon DK 87B49 (sub fin.); and Eurip.Alc.882ff and 903ff, Med.1081ff, for the paradoxical 'utopian' desire to remain *ateknos*.

(101) There is an excellent discussion of the unity of Herodotus' Persian *nomoi* by E. Wolff, repr. in Hdt WdF pp.404-11, which notes that implicit contrasts and comparisons with Greek culture underlie the whole passage. See here also the story of Intaphrenes' wife (3.119.5-6). Her choice of her brother rather than her children or husband, even though a brother is less close in blood (*allotrioteros*) than children and less loved than a husband, depends on practical considerations: a brother cannot be reproduced once the parents are dead. Her reasoning is paradoxical (note Darius' surprise!), but at the same time logical: the story (possibly from a sophistic source?) is designed to make the reader reflect on the real nature of family ties, whether it is really possible to establish an order of duties within the family.

(102) Cf. e.g. Nestle, Philol.21 (1908) 568f (Hippias?); Heinimann p.80 with n.5; and e.g. Kerferd p.105: "a kind of sociology of knowledge ... applied to moral values". And cf. Dialex.2.18, with n.74 above.

(103) Cf. e.g. Guthrie, HGP III.131-4; J. de Romilly, La loi dans la pensée Grècque (1971) pp.58ff; cf. M. Ostwald, HSCP 69 (1965) 109-38. See esp. Pl.Protag.337Cff (Hippias), and Gorg.484BC; cf. Eurip.Hek.799ff, etc.

(104) Also for the Persians, cf. Antisthenes F29 Caizzi. And cf. Eurip. Aeolus F19N (!); Pl.Legg.838AB (a *nomos agraphos*: no-one thinks of doing so).

(105) The contrasting and juxtaposing of different cultural attitudes is one of the work's main interpretative ideas, a technique I have termed 'reflexion' (cf. e.g. Ch.I.i.5, on 7.135-6). Significantly it is one of the main ideas of Herodotus' introduction to explore what Greeks look like to barbarians, or more precisely how Persians might react to Greek myths about their relations with Asian peoples; Herodotus' 'Persian informants' (cf. Fehling pp.39ff, for an excellent demonstration of the source fiction here) are made to undermine Greek pretensions, pointing out, for example, the folly of the Trojan expedition (cf. esp.1.4.2, with sect.E, below). This theme of the introduction is surely programmatic: the work is to be an exploration of the relativity of attitudes, what can be learnt from seeing an issue through the eyes of a disinterested party, or one not immediately interested and capable of a certain detachment through unfamiliarity, usually someone from a different culture. The examples are very numerous and there is not room here to list, let alone discuss, them all. Cf. e.g. 1.30-2, Solon tries to show Croesus that his prosperity is not the enviable condition he supposes it to be, in particular by contrasting it with the happiness of humble Greek polis-dwellers; 1.88-9, Croesus opens Cyrus' eyes about the Persians; 1.133.2, the Persians on Greek eating habits, with H. Diller, E. Hardt 8 (1962) p.63: "gern nimmt solche Kritik die Form der Spiegelung in fremden Augen an"; 1.152-3, Cyrus on Spartan pretensions and the Greeks' habit of cheating each other; 1.206 and 212, Tomyris on Cyrus; 2.13.3, the Egyptians on Greek weather; 2.110, the Egyptians on the conquests of Darius;

2.112-120, the priests on the story of Helen (!); 2.143, the priests of Thebes on Hecataeus' presumptions about his ancestry; 2.158.5, the Egyptians call all those who do not speak their language *barbaroi*: does Herodotus think *barbaros*, like the Greek god-names (cf. n.158, below), an Egyptian word?; 2.160, the Egyptians surprise the Eleans by not approving their management of the Olympic games; 3.21-2, the Aethiopians on Cambyses and Persian culture; 3.29, Cambyses on the Egyptian theriomorphic god, Apis: as a Persian he cannot understand such a conception of the divine (cf. 1.131) and observes that the Egyptians have the gods they deserve; 3.38, Darius' experiment to discover the relativity of *nomos* (see text above): the Indians and the Greeks express horror at each others' funeral practices (cf. 7.152.2, with Ch.II.iii.E); 4.77, Anacharsis on the Greeks (!): Herodotus suspects the story to be a Greek fiction; 4.79.3, the Scyths on the Greek rites of Dionysos; 4.142, the Scyths on Ionian cowardice and submissiveness; 5.18, Amyntas on Persian attitudes to women; 6.112.2, the Persians on the Athenians at Marathon (cf. Ch.II.iii, for this and the remaining examples); 7.9b, Mardonios on Greeks fighting one another; 7.101-5, Xerxes on Greek freedom, etc.; 7.135-6, the Spartan heralds with Hydarnes and Xerxes; 7.162, Gelon on Greek *pleonexia*; 8.26, Tritantaikhmes on the Greeks at the Olympic Games: 9.82, Pausanias on Persian luxury. The principle of 'reflexion' has not, to my knowledge, been systematically explored and is scarcely even recognized: but cf. Diller, cited above; and e.g. W. Nestle, Vom Mythos zum Logos (1942) p.507: "dies gibt ihm die Möglichkeit, die Kritik der hellenischen Religion fremde Völker ausüben zu lassen". It is impossible to know how many of these anecdotes Herodotus came across in his researches (e.g. 4.77?), how many are his own working-up of suitable hints, and how many are his own fictions (cf. 1.1-5, above): the regularity of the motif suggests a fair amount of invention is involved. Contrast von Fritz, GGS I.292 on Hdt 1.153: "Offenbar stammt die Geschichte aus derselben Umgebung, in welcher Griechen und Orientalen nahe zusammenlebten und sich gegenseitig ihre Schwächen vorwarfen, aus der auch die Geschichten der *logioi* stammen, mit denen Herodot sein ganzes Werk einleitet". We should note that it is not always at all clear where Herodotus stands in such cases, whether the critic is necessarily wholly right or wholly mistaken; and that evasiveness is surely to a large extent deliberate, another of the ways in which Herodotus gets the reader to think for himself, having surprised him with an uncomfortable paradox. This is especially true when it is the Greeks who are the subject of comment, as we have seen in discussion of many of these passages, especially those in the last three books (cf. Ch.II.iii). Cf. here perhaps Isocr. Paneg.133: ἡγοῦμαι δ' εἴ τινες ἄλλοθεν ἐπελθόντες θεαταὶ γένοιντο τῶν παρόντων πραγμάτων, πολλὴν ἂν αὐτοὺς καταγνῶναι μανίαν ἀμφοτέρων ἡμῶν.

(106) Cf. Plato's parody of Hippias at Protag.337Cff.

(107) M. Gigante, Nomos Basileus (Napoli 1956) pp.114-45, repr. with revisions in Hdt WdF pp.259ff, is the only discussion to explore the importance of the theme in Herodotus: but Gigante does not entertain the idea that Herodotus belongs in the sophistic movement - and there is still more to be said. Cf. also e.g. J. Hermann, Nomos bei Hdt u.Thkd., in Gedächtnis H. Peters (1967) pp.116ff.

(108) For Heraclitus, cf. e.g. DK 22B101a, 102, 107 etc.; for Xenophanes, see Guthrie, HGP I.394 and 397f; for Parmenides, HGP II.25; for Empedocles, ibid. 138f; Anaxagoras, ibid.319.

(109) Cf. DK 80B1, with the new papyrus fragment, for which cf. G. Binder and L. Liesenborghs, repr. in Classen (1976) pp.454-62. Cf. Kerferd pp.85ff.

(110) Cf. esp. Soph.Antig.; and the Thucydidean Pericles' Funeral Oration (esp. 2.37.3). See e.g. Guthrie, HGP III.117ff.

(111) Contrast Heraclitus' assertion (DK 22B114) that all human laws are nourished by one divine law, with Soph.Antig.454f.

(112) Heinimann is hampered in his historical discussion of the *nomos-physis* antithesis by the preconception that Herodotus is 'really' pre-sophistic (e.g. p.83): "wenn wir nicht bei Herodot fälschlich eine erhabene Nomosidee suchen, werden wir deshalb darin auch keinen Bruch, sondern eine allmähliche Bedeutungsverschiebung sehen".

(113) Cf. Heinimann p.82.

(114) Cf. esp. DK 86B9, on the history of the word *tyrannos*.

(115) Cf. Emped.DK 31B9.5: οὐ θέμις ἧι καλέουσι, νόμωι δ' ἐπίφημι καὶ αὐτός; with Heinimann p.84.

(116) Cf. Kerferd pp.73ff; and cf. Democr.DK II.148.3ff (θέσει λέγων τὰ ὀνόματα).

(117) For the comparison of the open sexual behaviour of animals with that of men, cf. Hdt 1.203.2 and 3.101.1 (κατά περ τοῖσι προβάτοισι / τῶν προβάτων). For reflexions on the propriety of privacy in intercourse, see esp. Dialex.2.4; Xenoph.Anab.5.4.34.

(118) Cf. Heinimann pp.145ff (without reference to Herodotus): "die Verteidigung der Physis durch Heranziehung der Zustände in der Tierwelt".

(119) Cf. Democr.DK 68B154 (man has copied technological skills from the animals) cf. B198 (with Diels): B257 (an animal that kills another that has either harmed or meant to harm, goes unpunished!); cf. B259. For man as a *zōion*, cf. e.g. Pl.Legg.769Bff; and cf. Legg.840DE, the mating of animals as a model for men to better.

(120) The 'normal' Greek belief, however, was that the difference between man and beast was a difference in kind; cf. e.g. Demosth.25.20; Xenoph.Anab. 5.7.32; with Hes.Erga 276-80. Cf. Dover, GPM pp.74f.

(121) Cf. Guthrie, HGP III.44; GER Lloyd (1966) pp.103ff; Solmsen (1975) pp.18ff.

(122) Cf. Kerferd pp.93ff.

(123) Cf. DK 84B6 = Pl.Euthyd.305C.

(124) Cf. esp. Pl.Phaedr.266Dff (= DK II.261.26ff), e.g. on Gorgias at 267A: πρὸ τῶν ἀληθῶν τὰ εἰκότα ... τιμητέα μᾶλλον, τά τε αὖ σμικρὰ μεγάλα καὶ τὰ μεγάλα σμικρὰ φαίνεσθαι ... διὰ ῥώμην λόγου.

(125) Cf. e.g. F. Solmsen, Antiphonstudien (1931) pp.53-8; and esp. K. Synodinou, Eoika-eikos kai syggenika (1981), for Herodotus' use of *oikos* at pp.100ff.

(126) Cf. e.g. Solmsen (1975) pp.225ff.

(127) Cf. Solmsen (1975) pp.10ff, on the device of 'in utramque partem disputare'.

(128) For a selection of Herodotus' arguments in Book Two, see A.B. Lloyd (1975) pp.160-5.

(129) Hdt 3.72.4f (contrast 1.138.1): cf. Gorg.Hel.8ff, with DK 82B23; and Dialex.3.2f, 3.10, 4.1f. (But cf. Aesch.F301; Soph.F328; Xenoph.Mem. 4.2.14f; Hipp.de diaita 1.24). See Nestle, Progr.1908 p.20 and p.30, n.90. Aly (1929) p.139: "Diese undhdteisch klingende Stelle verrät ihren Ursprung durch eine Kleinigkeit" (sc. 1.138.1). But for the intergrality of this passage with Herodotus' portrait of Darius, cf. Bornitz pp.201ff and 214ff; K. Bringmann, Hermes 104 (1976) esp. pp.276ff.

(130) See A.B. Lloyd (1975) pp.126-3.

(131) Cf. e.g. 4.31.1; 7.129.4.

(132) Cf. on the use of δηλοῦν, δῆλον ὅτι, Strasburger (1965) p.587 n.37, with reference to Hdt 5.78: "dēloun in der wissenschaftlichen Terminologie der Ausdruck unantastbarer logischer Beweisführung". Cf. e.g. 2.5.1 and 2; 2.44.5, 146.2; 2.116.1, 2, and 6; etc.

(133) Cf. De Arte 6.1ff; Morb.Sacr.5.19ff; with Kleinknecht p.546 n.9.

(134) Cf. e.g. 2.22.4, 146.1; 4.118.4, 185.2; 7.10g.2, 50.2; 8.30.2, 119.

(135) Cf. Thrasymachus, DK II.325.17-8; διαβάλλειν τε καὶ ἀπολύσασθαι διαβολὰς ὅθεν δὴ κράτιστος.

(136) Cf. Gorg.Palam.DK 82B11a.28, for the captatio epiphthonon men alēthes de, with Hdt 7.139.1 (Ch.II.iii, above).

(137) Cf. Strasburger (1965) esp. pp.594ff.

(138) A characteristic partition of the charges here: ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἴσως τι ἐπιμεμφόμενοι ; cf. e.g. Gorg.Hel.6, Palam.5, etc. Cf. Solmsen (1975) pp.12ff.

(139) Cf. esp. 5.92b.3, the oracle for Cypselos: τέξει δὲ λέοντα/ καρτερὸν ὠμηστήν· πολλῶν δ' ὑπὸ γούνατα λύσει. Cf. Focke pp.27-31 ("Zweideutigkeit"); and Strasburger pp.596-8; Bornitz pp.95-105. Contrast C.W. Dyson, CQ 23 (1929) pp.186ff: "the ordinary Greek use of leonine symbolism ... was complimentary not derogatory" (a slightly unhelpful disjunction). It was natural for a man to be commended as a 'lion-heart' for being a good fighter, as typically in Homer (though not perhaps without ambivalence: cf. E. Fraenkel, Homerischen Gleichnisse (1921) pp.59ff and 92-3) and as the parody of a lion-birth oracle in Aristoph.Equ.1037ff, makes clear. The story of Agariste's dream may, of course, have reached Herodotus as a complimentary story about Pericles and referring to his martial prowess (though Herodotus could perhaps have made it up?); but Herodotus' failure to make explicit that particular moral and, most important, the context he gives the story suggest that he means to interpret it differently. The Alcmeonid excursus, as we have said, is a 'defence' of the family against the charge of tyranny (and medism) which, however, turns out rather to stress its tyrannical connexions: Pericles' mother Agariste is the great-granddaughter of the tyrant Cleisthenes of Sicyon, as Herodotus' closing genealogy makes uncomfortably clear (6.131.1-2).

Thus Hdt may intend the perceptive reader to see the lion-dream as a portent of Pericles' tyrannical power, as the oracle for Cypselos was (above; and cf. 5.56.1, for Hipparchus the lion?); we might even see a similarity in the portent for the birth of Peisistratus (cf. 1.59.1ff), and remember that in Hdt such portents almost exclusively herald the births of tyrants and imperialists. Pericles was, of course, called a *tyrannos* by Cratinos (F240 Kock: the son of Stasis and Kronos), and his followers were styled the 'new Peisistratids' by the comic poets (cf. Plut.Per.16.1), while contemporaries actually recognized in him a physical likeness with Peisistratus himself (cf. Plut.Per.7.1). Cf. J. Schwarze, Die Beurteilung des Perikles durch die attische Komödie usw., Zetemata 51 (1971), at pp.170-2. It should also be noted that a popular fable and proverb warned of the dangers of nurturing a lion-cub in one's house, which would grow up and bite the hand that fed it (cf. Aesch.Agam.717ff, with Fraenkel II.342; Aristoph.Batr.1431-2; and e.g. Phaedo of Elis, ap. Spengel, Rhet.gr.II.74-5. For lions in proverbs, cf. Steier, RE s.v. Löwe 985.23ff). There is clear reminscence of this fable in a speech of Callicles at Pl.Gorg.483Ef (cf. Ch.II.i.B.3): society takes the best and strongest men at an early age, *hōsper leontas* (!), and binds them with its laws; but the man whose nature is strong enough will burst his bonds: ἐπαναστὰς ἀνεφάνη δεσπότης ἡμέτερος ὁ δοῦλος, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐξέλαμψεν τὸ τῆς φύσεως δίκαιον. Asked to name a model for this lion-man, Callicles might well have said Peisistratus or Pericles. Is Herodotus perhaps thinking of Pericles in the same way, inspired by what the sophists had said about his rise to power (cf. Thucyd.2.65.9)? At any rate it is much easier to believe that Herodotus is thinking here of Pericles the lion as *tyrannos*, since tyranny is the subject of the excursus, than as a courageous hero of Athenian battles, a connexion not assisted by the context.

(140) Note that Plutarch is in no doubt about the deception of Herodotus' defence here (MH 27.862Eff: esp. 862F): ἀλλ' ὅταν γε πάλιν ὑπὲρ τῶν 'Αλκμεωνιδῶν ἀπολογεῖσθαι προσποιῆται...; (and 863A): καὶ σὺ κατηγορεῖς, εἶτ' ἀπολογῆι· καὶ γράφεις κατ' ἐπιφανῶν ἀνδρῶν διαβολάς, ἃς πάλιν ἀναιρεῖς, ἀπιστῶν δὴ σεαυτοῦ δηλονότι(860CD, 862D). Plutarch's entire monograph is an instructive commentary on Herodotus' techniques of 'indirect censure'.

(141) Cf. P. Huart, Gnome chez Thucydide et ses contemporains, Et. et Comm. 81 (1973).

(142) Cf. e.g. Hellmann pp.78f (against the excellent treatment of the question by Bischoff): "es handelt sich überhaupt nicht um die Möglichkeit, ein Geschehen noch abzuwenden, sondern es handlet sich gerade um die Darstellung der Unausweichlichkeit eines im Voraus bestimmten Geschehens".

(143) For the simile, cf. Theog.415ff, 449ff; Pind.Py.10.67-8; Bacch.F14 Sn. Common before his time as a simile for the assessment of a man's character, Herodotus has given it a new function to describe the testing of *logoi* one against the other.

(143a) Cf. however, Aristoph.Vesp.725-6: ἦ που σοφὸς ἦν ὅστις ἔφασκεν, πρὶν ἂν ἀμφοῖν μῦθον ἀκούσηις,/ οὐκ ἂν δικάσαις. Need this be an ancient piece of wisdom, rather than either a dictum of a sophist or an *ad hoc* invention?

(144) Cf. Kerferd pp.59ff, for the sophistic art of antilogic, the technique of "proceeding from a given *logos* ... to the establishment of a contrary or contradictory *logos* in such a way that the opponent must either accept both *logoi*, or at least abandon his first position". See below on the

constitution debate (3.80-2; sect.H) as an elaborate example of *antilogia*; with Kerferd pp.150ff.

(145) Cf. J. de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric (1975) pp.1ff, for Gorgias on the power of *logos*, a new interest of the sophists, but in part inherited from the poets.

(146) Cf. e.g. Thucyd.1.140; 3.37.1ff, etc.

(147) Cf. e.g. J. de Romilly, Class.& Med.17 (1956) pp.119ff.

(148) Compare Antiphon DK 87B56 (!). And see Hdt 7.157.3 (τῶι εὖ βουλευθέντι πρήγματι τελευτὴ ὡς τὸ ἐπίπαν χρηστὴ ἐθέλει ἐπιγίνεσθαι); 8.60g (οἰκότα μέν νυν βουλευομένοισι ἀνθρώποισι ὡς τὸ ἐπίπαν ἐθέλει γίνεσθαι· μὴ δὲ οἰκότα βουλευομένοισι οὐκ ἐθέλει οὐδὲ ὁ θεὸς προσχωρήσειν πρὸς τὰς ἀνθρωπηίας γνώμας); cf. 8.69.1f (Artemisia before Salamis). And cf. 9.16.4 (?).

(149) And cf. Coes and Darius: Hdt 4.97.2 and 97.5.

(150) Cf. Hellmann p.93: "Er weiss, wie ein Minister zu einem Herrscher zu reden hat"; and P. Hohti, Arctos 8 (1974) 19-27.

(151) Compare Hdts comment at 5.97.2 on the Athenian democracy: πολλοὺς γὰρ οἶκε εἶναι εὐπετέστερον διαβάλλειν ἢ ἕνα. Is this the democracy seen as tyrant? Cf. Ch.II.i.B.3.

(152) Cf. A.B. Lloyd (1976) ad loc., for a useful discussion.

(153) i.e conventional names not real ones: cf. esp. Pl.Cratyl.400D.

(154) Cf. C.W. Müller, Hermes 95 (1967) 140ff, repr. in Classen (1976) pp.321ff; and cf. esp. Kerferd pp.165-8. Cf. also Pl.Theaet.162DE (= DK II.260.39ff), where Socrates has Protagoras chide his imaginary interlocutors for introducing the gods: οὓς ἐγὼ ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ.

(154a) But cf. Barnes (1979) II.147-8 and 306 n.5, who suggests that there may never have been a Protagorean theology; but can a work beginning περὶ μὲν θεῶν really have gone on not to mention the gods further?

(155) Cf. DK II.317.2ff; Nestle Philol.21 (1908) 556ff; Kleingünther (1933) pp.274f and 110f; Guthrie, HGP III.238ff.

(156) Cf. DK 68A75 (with Kleingünther (1933) pp.111f; and cf. Diod.I.11.1); contrast B 30 (!) and B166. See also Eurip.Sisyphos (DK 88B25), Bacch.274ff and Suppl.196ff; Isocr.Busiris 25 (with Kleingünther p.120). So too in Plato's parody of Protagoras on the ascent of man, the sophists is made to give a quasi- anthropological account of the origins of religion (Pl.Protag. 322A): the first men set up altars and worshipped the gods because of man's kinship with the divine. Is this intrusive Platonic theism or Protagoras' own view of the relationship of men and gods? See below.

(157) Cf. esp. the parallel between Hdt 2.3.2 and Xenoph.DK 21B34: καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ ἴδεν οὐδὲ τίς ἐσται/ εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων.

(158) The Greek god names are thought of as Egyptian words: cf. R. Lattimore, CPh 34 (1939) pp.357ff. And see similarly e.g. A.B. Lloyd (1976) pp.203-5.

(159) Hdt 2.51ff; see 2.53.2 (Homer and Hesiod). Cf. the sophists' interest in the literary-historical understanding of these poets: cf. e.g. Guthrie HGP III.205f, and see Pl.Protag.326A, 338E (DK 80A30); Hipp.Min.363Aff; and esp. Isocr.12.18. See Kerferd pp.40f.

(160) Cf. DK 68A75 (above): τὰ ἐν τοῖς μετεώροις παθήματα οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καθάπερ βροντὰς καὶ ἀστραπὰς κεραυνούς τε καὶ ἄστρων συνόδους ἡλίου τε καὶ σελήνης ἐκλείψεις ἐδειματοῦντο θεοὺς οἰόμενοι τούτων αἰτίους εἶναι (cf. Lucr.5.1188ff).

(161) *Peri tēs en arkhēi katastaseōs* (?): DK II.255.2

(162) But see also Democr. DK II.125.8ff, who seems clearly to have included an account of this matter in his work on parturition.

(163) Cf. Nestle, Philol.21 (1908) 553; Aly (1921) p.290, n.1; Kleingünther (1933) pp.102ff.

(164) And cf. 1.210.1; 2.120.5; 6.27.3, 98.1; 8.13; 9.65.2 (above). We should not be confused by phrases of the type *theiēi pompēi/tykhēi*, which are simply idiomatic for 'by chance'. Indeed the word *theios* can mean both 'divinely arranged' and simply 'uncanny', the latter without any obvious appeal to divine causation.

(165) Cf. Kleinknecht, pp.541ff (esp. 572-3): a sensible rejoinder to Hellman's strictly determinist view of Herodotus (cf. n.142 above).

(166) Cf. G.E.R. Lloyd (1979) pp.29-32, who grudgingly allows 'double-determination' in some of Herodotus (at p.32, n.108): "What must remain in doubt is the extent to which Herodotus saw nature as a *universal* principle, and *all* natural phenomena as law-like". To what extent does Herodotus really differ from Hippocrates (e.g. Airs 22.8ff) for whom all diseases are *equally* divine and natural?

(167) There was never any doubt in antiquity that this was the same man as the sophist, although the orator/politician was distinguished from the sophist by the negligent and perhaps even incompetent Didymus (for whose papyrus Demosthenes-commentary, cf. S. West, CQ 20 (1970) 288-96). Cf. J.S. Morrison, PCPS 7 (1961) 49ff; and Guthrie, HGP III.292-4.

(168) Cf. now esp. R.G.A. van Lieshout, Greeks on Dreams (1980) pp.217ff; and Dodds (1951) pp.117ff, esp. on the Hippocr.de diaita IV, which accounts for dreams, including prophetic ones, in terms of psychological states. And for the popularity of *oneirokritikē* in the late 5thc at Athens, cf. Aristoph. Vesp.52f, Av.959ff, Hipp.109f, with Dodds p.132, n.99.

(169) Note that Artabanus is given a surprisingly rationalistic account of the dream phenomenon, although the ensuing narrative puts it in doubt (7.16b.2): ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ταῦτά ἐστι ... θεῖα· ἐνύπνια γὰρ τὰ ἐς ἀνθρώπους πεπλανημένα τοιαῦτά ἐστι οἷά σε ἐγὼ διδάξω ... πεπλανῆσθαι αὗται μάλιστα ἐώθασι ὄψιες ὀνειράτων, τά τις ἡμέρης φροντίζει. Cf. Emped.DK 31B108; but the word *peplanēsthai* suggests rather the Democritean theory of dreams (cf. Lucr.5.724; rerum simulacra vagari). Cf. Democr.DK II.82.25 (Antisthenes ap.DL): ἤσκει ποικίλως δοκιμάζειν τὰς φαντασίας.

(170) Cf. N. Marinatos, JHS 101 (1981) pp.138-40, and her 'Thucydides and Religion', Beitr.z.klass.Philol.129 (1981) at pp.49ff.

(171) Particularly striking is the *pessimism* about the human condition expressed by a number of sophistic writers:cf. e.g. Democr.DK 68B285 (cf. B286); Prodicus DK 84B9 (but see Diels, ad loc.?); Antiphon DK 87B50 (τὸ ζῆν ἔοικε φρουρᾶι ἐφημέρωι τό τε μῆκος τοῦ βίου ἡμέραι μιᾶι, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, ἧι ἀναβλέψαντες πρὸς τὸ φῶς παρεγγυῶμεν τοῖς ἐπιγιγνομένοις

ἑτέροις) and cf. B51-2; Critias DK 88B49 (βέβαιον μὲν οὐδέν, εἰ μὴ τό τε καταθανεῖν γενομένωι καὶ ζῶντι μὴ οἷόν τε ἐκτὸς ἄτης βαίνειν). And cf. esp. Euripides, passim (e.g. F449N with Hdt 5.4.2; and cf. Alc.802: οὐ βίος ἀληθῶς ὁ βίος, ἀλλὰ συμφορά). The similarity of these expressions with the sentiments of esp. Solon (1.32.1ff, e.g. pan esti anthrōpos symphorē with the Alcestis passage above!) and Artabanus (7.46.1ff) is very suggestive: this fatalism of Herodotus' has always been thought to be the most typically archaic feature of his thought, but it may after all be yet another area where he shows the influence of the sophistic movement (cf. e.g. Nestle Progr.1908 pp.20f, and Philol.Suppl.8 (1901) 654). Cf. J.C. Opstelten, Sophocles and Greek Pessimism (transl. J.A. Ross, Amsterdam 1952), who does not, however, consider these striking sophistic texts. Nestle, Progr. 1908 pp.20f, thought he observed in Solon's analysis of human happiness a precision in the distinguishing of synonyms which recalled the orthoepeia of Prodicus and the other sophists (cf. e.g. Pl.Protag.337AC; and DK 84A13-20; cf. Kerferd pp.68-77). Solon clearly distinguishes the words olbios and eutykhēs (cf. 1.32.5-9, e.g. 32.7: πρὶν ἂν τελευτῆσαι, ἐπίσχειν μηδὲ καλέειν κω ὄλβιον, ἀλλ' εὐτυχέα) with a Prodican precision which recalls that of the character in Euripides' Antiope F198N, who observes that he would not call a miser olbios but only eudaimon, where the manner and content could both be judged sophistic.

(171a) Cf. Daniels (1946) p.199: "Hdt is een conservatief, die ... tegenover de opkommende sophistiek en het scepticisme de goede elementen der oude Grieksche opvattingen overnam en de slechte ervan verwierp".

(172) Cf. Solmsen (1975) pp.126ff, for Euripides and Thucydides.

(173) Cf. P.Huart, Le vocab. de l'analyse psychologique dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide, Et. et Comm.69 (1968).

(174) Cf. DK 68B220, 283 and esp. 284; with B3, 58, 292, and also B70-4 and 191.

(175) Contrast Hellmann p.87: "Herodot interessiert diese Seite des Problems erst sekundär: ihn interessiert nicht die Projektion dieses Problems auf die Fläche der Beziehungen von Menschen und Völkern untereinander, sondern er stellt es hinein in den Raum der Beziehungen zwischen Mensch und Gottheit".

(176) Contrast e.g. Heraclitus DK 22B33, 44, 49(?), 53(?), 104(!), 114, where political questions are touched on. And cf. Pind.Py.2.86ff, for a sort of elementary classification of constitutions.

(177) Cf. J. Bleicken, Historia 28 (1979) pp.148ff.

(178) Cf. Ryffel, at pp.57-73, for Herodotus.

(179) Cf. originally E. Maass, Hermes 22 (1887) pp.581ff; and e.g. Nestle, Progr. 1908 pp.31ff; Aly (1921) pp.105ff and 287ff. Recently e.g. K. Stroheker, Historia 2 (1953-4) pp.381ff; F. Lasserre, Mus.Helv.33 (1976) pp.65ff; K. Bringmann, Hermes 104 (1976) pp.266ff. And cf. Kerferd pp.150ff. Cf. also Connor (1971) pp.199ff, arguing for a 'late date' (late 430's-420's) for the debate on the basis of its reflexions of contemporary political changes at Athens.

(180) Cf. Nestle, Philol.Suppl.8 (1901) pp.653ff; and e.g. Eurip.Suppl.447-9, with Hdt 3.80.4.

(181) Cf. Bringmann, art.cit., for the integrality of these chapters with the surrounding narrative, and esp. on the character of Darius; also Bornitz, pp.201ff and 214ff.

Appendix I: NOTES.

(1) Macan, ad loc. remarks of this latter sentence that it "somewhat clumsily resumes the narrative broken by the digression"; but this is to miss the connexion Hdt wants the reader to make (below).

(2) For the effect of contemporaneous prosperity in rivals bringing them into confrontation, cf. Thucyd.Archaeology, with Ch.II.i.A.1, above, esp. 1.18.3f, on Athens and Sparta.

(3) Cf. Tozzi (1978) p.129: "Il richiamo alla fortuna della citta come condizione di *hybris* e premessa di rovina - assai frequentemente nelle *Storie* per gli individui, le *poleis*, gli stati, ma quasi isolato nella descrizione della rivolta singolarmente libera da elementi religiosi e sovrannaturali - non fa velo alle ragione politiche che Erodoto coglie alla base di questi eventi". This account is to be commended for recognizing (a) the theoretical significance of Miletus' akmē, (b) the absence of any metaphysical motivation, and (c) the fact that Hdt offers here only a general explanation of the origins of the revolt, to be supplemented and corrected elsewhere in the narrative proper. But we might do better to consider the 'theory' as itself a type of *political* explanation, rather than as a *metaphysical* explanation with the *supernatural* unaccountably absent. Miletus' akmē, like the prosperity of Lycurgan Sparta, is explicitly related to a *political* settlement, i.e. the Parian constitution.

(4) The modern controversy as to whether one of the causes of the Ionian revolt was the economic decline of the region seems incapable of resolution. Cf. Tozzi (1978) pp.114ff (with extensive bibliography), arguing for such a decline, with e.g. D. Hegyi, AAntHung 14 (1966) 285ff, and Jeffery (1976) p.220; but contrast e.g. Roebuck p.136: "The initial conquest of Ionia by Persia ca.546-50 did retard the activity of certain states like Phocaea and Teos but stimulated others to greater activity like Miletus and Samos".

(5) The same may apply to his claim for the prosperity of Naxos (cf. 5.28, εὐδαιμονίηι τῶν νήσων προέφερε): this seems somewhat inconsistent with the evidence of *stasis* in the island which Hdts own narrative later confirms (cf. 5.30.1); but he may just mean economic prosperity and perhaps simply influence in the Ionian world.

(6) Cf. Busolt II.472; F. Hiller von Gaertringen, RE s.v. Miletos (1932) 1594.

(7) If we insert the 'tyrannies' (?) of Thoas and Damasenor here (Plut. Qu.Gr.32.298CD), as is usually done by modern scholars (see below), then the interval is narrowed still further.

(8) Cf. von Gaertringen 1594: "also, wenn buchstäblich zu nehmen, fast 70 Jahre". It is true that the dating may be no better than a rough guess by Hdt or his informant.

(8a) Cf. H.T. Wade-Gery, JHS 71 (1951) pp.215-6, for a full discussion of the evidence for dating the Danube-bridge episode. And see now J.M. Balser, HSCP 76 (1972) 99-132, arguing for 519 BC, which if correct would compress our chronology even further.

(9) Not much can be deduced from the dedicatory inscription from Didyma (Didyma II.14; Tod GHI i.9), which names a Histiaios who may well be our tyrant; cf. Tozzi (1978) p.92.

(10) The Parians are of course called in by the 'Milesians' and not by Histiaios as tyrant or otherwise: cf. 5.28.

(11) Cf. Macan, ad loc.: "The story of the Parian arbitration and constitution of Miletos is very suspicious. What needs to be explained is how the Naxian oligarchs found Miletos under a despotism".

(12) The only exception appears to be Stein, ad 5.28(8): "Es war in Milet, nach dem Sturze der herrschenden Neleiden, zu einem Kampfe zwischen den sog. Reichen, d.h. den eingewanderten Hellenen, und dem Demos (der unterworfenen karischen Bevölkerung, Gergithes gennant), gekommen". My view is that this is indeed what Hdt means, though he is giving the opposite impression also deliberately: I do not agree, however, that the evidence of Heraclides Ponticus used by Stein here can apply to this period.

(13) Halliday, ad loc. objects that this formulation is improbable Greek and suggests that the word *tyrannōn* should be deleted as an explanatory gloss; but the curiously illogical usage of *hoi peri tina* to denote only the person named is quite common in this period of Greek, as shown by S.L. Radt, ZPE 38 (1980) pp.47ff, esp. 50ff; cf. Schwyzer/Debrunner II.417. Accordingly Plutarch probably means simply "after the fall of the tyrants, Thoas and Damasenor".

(13a) The etymology of *aeinautai* is almost certainly a scholarly inference of little evidential value; cf. also Hesych.s.v.: ἀρχῆς ὄνομα παρὰ Μιλησίοις. The name is used of public officials in an inscription from Chalcis, SEG XXVII.559: [δεδόχθ]αι τῶι κοινῶι Ἀεναύτ[ων ἐπαινέσαι, κτλ., and this makes it unlikely as the name of a political party.

(14) Cf. M.L. West, JHS 98 (1978) pp.164-7.

(15) Cf. von Gaertringen 1595f: "Um 525-4 oder etwas früher fiele dann die Neuordnung des milesischen Staates, deren Niederschlag in dem Gesetz von 450-49 vorliegt (cf. Milet I.iii.133, Schwyzer 726: a *lex sacra* of the Molpoi) ... Damit war Milet gewissermassen eine Theokratie unter dem Schutze des Apollon Delphinios geworden". It is hard to see how we are to reconcile this interpretation with the intervening tyranny of Histiaios: cf. n.26, below.

(16) Phocyl.F1 Bergk is the same couplet as Demodocus F2 Bergk, with a mere substitution of names, though West now sees Demodocus parodying the Milesian poet (cf. JHS (1978); contrast (1974) p.171). Phocyl.F17 Bergk is disputed as the property of Theognis (cf. Bergk's testimonia): cf. West, JHS (1978) p.164: "people tended to muddle them (sc. the two poets)". The accretion of *spuria* to shadowy names, and many not so shadowy, is too common a process for us not to suspect it here; it is worth remembering that our earliest references to Phocylides are as late as the 4thc: cf. Pl.Rep.407A, Isocr.2.43, etc.

(16a) I cite Bergk's numeration for convenience; but cf. now the editions of M.L. West, Theognidis et Phocylidis Fragmenta, Kleine Texte, Berlin (1978); and B. Gentili / C. Prato, Poetarum Elegiacorum Testimonia et Fragmenta, Teubner, Leipzig (1979), both adopting a different numeration - without any obvious justification.

(17) It may be, of course, that Theognis himself belongs in the late 7thc, as was argued by West (1974) pp.65ff.

(18) For this argument, cf. West, JHS (1978) p.166. For the ancient dating of Phocylides, cf. West (1974) pp.65-6.

(19) Dunham's date of c.604 for Thrasybulus' accession is a little optimistic (cf. p.126); the consensus is that he is in power by the beginning of the 6thc: cf. Schachermeyer, RE s.v. Thrasybulos 567.64ff; Jeffery (1976) p.213. The only evidence is his association with Alyattes and with Periander (cf. Hdt 1.20-3 and 5.92zē) and the dubious report of Diog.Laert. (from Minyas) that Thales lived at the same time as Thrasybulus (DL I.27).

(20) For doubts about this restoration of Oliver's, cf. Bradeen/McGregor, Stud.in 5thc Attic Epigraphy (1973) pp.24ff, who on a re-examination of the stone claim that the letter following προσε[... looks most like rho but might be kappa. Cf. now IG i^{3} 21; the text printed there is as follows: [...7...]οις προσερ̣ [...13...]ι μετα το α̣ι̣[...20...]. What is clear is that far too little of the surrounding context survives to make any restoration possible.

(21) The list significantly knows neither Histiaios nor Aristagoras, nor their fathers, Lysagoras and Molpagoras. There is certainly a healthy sprinkling of -agoras names in this early part of the list, possibly indicating the social, if not the political eminence of the tyrant family (cf. Tozzi (1978) p.138, with n.22).

(22) H.-J. Gehrke, 'Zur Gesch.Milets in der Mitte des 5.Jhdts', Historia 29 (1980) at pp.20ff, agrees that the list cannot be shown to be a political or constitutional document.

(23) Cf. Tozzi (1978) pp.118ff, with extensive evidence and bibliography for the imposition and support of tyrants by Persia; cf. e.g. p.122: "La posizione del tiranno ionica era dunque singolare rispetto a quella nel tiranno in generale, in quanto la tirannide ionica non era in relazione con la dinamica politica della citta e non esprimeva il risultato della lotta dei parti politiche". If this is a valid generalization, it supports the view that Histiaios is unlikely to have arrived at the tyranny as a result of a political evolution within Miletus: he could have been imposed by Persia, but Herodotus gives no such indication where we would expect it at 4.137.2. Cf. n.26, below, for reconstructions of his rise to power.

(24) Cf. the fundamental discussion of the tolerance of Persia towards her subject peoples by J.L. Myres, 'Persia, Greece, and Israel', Palestine Exploration Quarterly (1952) pp.3-22, who, however, argues that the Greeks accomodated themselves least well to this policy. Two more recent studies have suggested that the idea of Persian 'toleration' may have been exaggerated or slightly misconceived: cf. P. Tozzi, RSI 89 (1977) 19-32; H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, Lampas 12 (1979) 208-22.

(25) Many of the revolts so decisively crushed by Darius are apparently risings within provinces, with local pretenders to power using the disturbance of the change of regime, rather than revolts against the empire.

(25a) It is worth remembering here what Ar.Pol.1276A10ff, says about states declining to fulfil existing treaty-obligations after a change from tyranny or oligarchy to democracy, on the grounds that they were not contracted by 'the state'.

(26) For various attempts at explanation, cf. e.g. Mazzarino p.232: "particolarmente benevoli verso Mileto (sc. the Persians), essi non erano interventi direttamente nella stasis; ma ora, verso il 525, sanzionavano l'arbitrio pario, convalidando la tyrannis di Istieo quasi come 'vicariato' dello stato persiano"; Berve (1967) I.102, arguing for Persian imposition of Histiaios, "da ein solcher Tyrann im Interesse der Erhaltung seiner Herrschaft sich ihm willfährig zeigen musste"; Jeffery (1976) p.219: "We are not told whether one of its members (sc. of the 'emergency cabinet' set up by the Parians) was Histiaios ... ". Cf. von Gaertringen 1596.23ff; Tozzi (1978) p.119, n.10; Dunham p.131: "The constitution set up by the Parians cannot have lasted; for a tyranny was established not long after the Persian conquest".

(27) Cf. Nic.Dam.FGH 90F52-3, and Konon 44 (= FGH 26F1). Reconstructions: Dunham pp.121ff, von Gaertringen (1932) 1588.55ff, Jeffery (1976) p.210.

(28) Cf. also Plut.Mor.984f, and Phylarchus FGH 81F26. With von Gaertringen 1588, Jeffery (1976) pp.211-2.

(29) For arbitration, cf. M.N. Tod, International Arbitration amongst the Greeks (1913); and L. Piccirilli, Gli arbitrati interstatali greci (1973), at pp.7ff, for the Chalcis/Andros arbitration. Still useful for its listing of arbitrations is E. Sonne, De arbitriis externis, quos Graeci adhibuerint ... Diss. Göttingen (1888).

(30) Cf. L.H. Jeffery, BSA 51 (1956) 157ff.

(31) Jeffery (1976) pp.231ff: "The winds of change blowing in Athens in Solon's time were blowing in at least one other Ionic city". Could Miletus have been so much further behind?

(32) Cf. Jeffery (1976) pp.43-4, and p.48, n.3: "Massalia offers a fascinating picture of the type of constitution which must have existed in an Ionic aristocratic city c.600, and was substantially preserved, even to the Roman period, by the tenacious communal memory of a small society descended from emigres who had been transplanted half across the world to the Ligurian coast".

(33) For the evidence, cf Strabo IV.5 (p.179), and Ar.Pol.1305B1ff and 1321A29ff. This archaic hereditary transference of power is a system the Athenian wants for his ideal state in Pl.Legg.740B.

(34) Cf. Dunham pp.126ff; von Gaertringen 1592.57ff; Jeffery (1976) p.210. But contrast Barron, JHS 82 (1962) pp.4-5.

(34a) The passage was bracketed as an interpolation by Susemihl, Newman and others. The question of whether there was an Aristotelian *Milesion Politeia* is perhaps relevant here, but the evidence is not good: the fragments assigned to this supposed work by Rose (F556-7), from Athenaeus, Parthenius and Hesychius, none of them actually cite their source. If there was no such *Politeia*, we may imagine that knowledge of the constitutional history of Miletus never got to be widespread, and accordingly we need not express much surprise that our tyranny is not accounted for in this passage, whether it is by Aristotle or not.

(34b) Cf. Jeffery (1976) p.223.

(35) Cf. R. Meiggs, JHS 63 (1943) pp.25-7, and AE 562-5; ATL III.254ff; A.J. Earp, Phoenix 8 (1954) pp.142-7; J. Barron, JHS 82 (1962) pp.1ff; M. Pierart, L'Ant.Class.38 (1969) pp.376ff; H.-J. Gehrke, Historia 29 (1980) pp.17-31. Also Dunham pp.131ff; von Gaertringen 1598.14ff.

(36) Cf. Dunham pp.132ff; Meiggs, JHS (1943) pp.26f; Earp p.142; Barron p.1. Cf. the Colophonians loyal to Athens, who continue to pay tribute from Notium: Thucyd.3.34.1; with ATL III.253, n.36.

(37) Cf. e.g. Meiggs, AE 562-3.

(38) Cf. Pierart pp.365ff.

(39) ATL III.257 assume, however, that the 10 talents of this year represent a double payment to erase the default of the previous year.

(40) Glotz, CRAI (1909) pointed to the fact that the banishment inscription is preserved on the base of an original stele, and suggested that this untidy arrangement meant the decree was appended to an earlier inscription, which he conjectured was the banishment decree on the 7thc Neleids. Cf. Meiggs, AE 564-5, against Barron p.3, n.18. For objections to Glotz' view, cf. Pierart pp.368-9.

(41) Note that the arkhontes of SEG X.14 belong to the machinery of supervision, whereas if a democracy is here being installed in place of an oligarchy, we would expect some mention of an episkopos: cf. Aristoph. Av.1021ff, with Meiggs, AE 212f; but such constitutional arrangements need not necessarily show anything about which party is in power: see below.

(42) Cf. Meiggs, JHS (1943) pp.26f; ATL III.256.

(43) Cf. e.g. Earp pp.146; Barron p.5.

(44) Cf. e.g. ATL III.256; Barron p.5; Meiggs/Lewis p.107.

(45) Cf. von Gaertringen 1598.43ff, who also puts the banishment decree early, without argument. Pierart p.388, remains in doubt as to whether it belongs early (terminus post 479-8) or late, but does not discuss the absence of Athenians from the text.

(46) Cf. Pierart pp.367-8, for a discussion of the crime, which he concludes must be 'political'. Earp pp.146f, doubts that the exiles were tyrants, but discusses the possibility that Nymphare tos and Stratonax were sons of the Aristogenes, mentioned by Plutarch Mor.859D as having been expelled from Miletus by the Spartans; we do not know when this event took place nor whether it actually brought an end to a dynasty.

(47) Even allowing for what we might have lost from the start of the inscription, it does not seem likely that a whole oligarchic faction is being exiled here (cf. Meiggs/Lewis p.106). Meiggs, AE 565, is surely right to argue that for the rewards of 100 staters a man to be paid all from the property of Nymphare tos shows the number of exiles cannot be large. It may be that we have here a plurality of tyrants, i.e. the sharing of absolute

power between two or three families at most: such joint tyrannies can be paralleled in 7thc Erythrai (Ortyges, Iros and Echaros: cf. Jeffery (1976) p.229), Chios (Amphiklos and Polyteknos: Jeffery pp.230-1) and Mytilene (Myrsilos and Pittacus: Jeffery p.239). If this is right, it is another detail to chime with Plutarch, if also *hoi peri Thoanta kai Damasenora tyrannoi* are a group larger than just Thoas and Damasenor themselves (cf. n.13, above).

(48) For the office of *epimēnioi*, cf. Pierart pp.370ff, and esp. Gehrke pp.24-6. Such officials are found in the Milesian colonies of Istros, Kios and Odessos: cf. Gehrke p.25, n.40, which may mean they were to be found in the mother-city already in the 7th and 6thc. It does not necessarily tell us anything about Miletus that *epimenioi* are to be found in the context of a democratic constitution in early 5thc Eretria: cf. IG XII Suppl.549.4ff; with W. Wallace, Hesperia 5 (1936) pp.277ff, for reconstruction. It is perfectly possible that the name of these officers was introduced early (a 7thc constitution even?), but that the character and make-up of the constitution shifted around them and their functions changed while the name remained unchanged.

(49) I am not convinced by e.g. Pierart and Gehrke when they take Ps.-Xenophon's *heilonto* as not having this positive sense of 'choose': Athens is hardly 'choosing' an oligarchic party by merely allowing it to exist; she has to be allowing it to exist at the expense of a democratic party, which she might have chosen instead. Cf. e.g. Pierart p.388 n.96: "trop vague pour impliquer une action de soutien systematique".

(50) If we take the view of the regulations decree that it is negotiated after Athens has restored a democracy (cf. e.g. Gehrke), we need to explain (a) why there is no mention of *epimenioi* (i.e. the old democracy, as represented by the banishment decree?) or (b) why we do not yet find a democracy on the Athenian model.

(51) Earp p.145, suggest that the garrison was withdrawn in 449 "in accordance with the terms of the peace of Kallias"; but cf. Meiggs, AE 149-50.

(52) Cf. Jeffery (1976) pp.214 and 234; with Halliday, ad loc., and Busolt/ Swoboda I.177, n.5. Cf. Eustath.1425.65: εἶεν δ' ἂν χειρώνακτες οἳ καὶ χειρομάχα πληθὺς λέγονται παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς (with 1783.13, 1833.56, and 1716.4).

(53) Cf. Suda s.v. *Gergēthes*: ἡ τύρβη, καὶ οἱ χειρώνακτες οὕτω καλοῦνται παρὰ τοῖς Μιλησίοις τοῖς ἐν περιβολῆι τουτέστι τοῖς πλουσίοις, an entry which seems independent of both Plutarch and Heraclides.

(55) Cf. Stein, cited in n.12, above.

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Appendix II: NOTES.

(1) Cf. Jacoby, RE art.393.1ff; contrast e.g. Schmid/Stählin I.2.626ff, acknowledging Jacoby's conclusion but not discussing any of the problems of Hdts use of oral tradition.

(2) Cf. RE art.419.26ff.

(3) Cf. Finley (1975) pp.26ff: "In my judgement, for the post-heroic period well into the 5thc, the survival of the sort of tradition I have been discussing must be credited largely to the noble families in the various communities, including royal families where they existed, and, what amounts to the same thing in a special variation, to the priests of such shrines as Delphi, Eleusis and Delos".

(4) Cf. Vansina (1973) pp.76ff: "Every testimony and every tradition has a purpose and fulfils a function. It is because of this that they exist at all ... It is usually the interests of the informant that give purpose and function to a testimony ... but the interests of the informant are almost entirely conditioned by what might be called the interests of the society of which he is a member".

(5) Cf. e.g. Finnegan (1970) pp.331ff; her interests are with the literary qualities of African oral traditions, so that she is critical of the 'functional approach' to oral memory, which "implicitly insinuates the assumption that, to put it crudely, primitive peoples (i.e. Africans) have no idea of the aesthetic, and therefore the only possible explanation of an apparent work of art, like a story, is that it must somehow be useful. And, of course, an assumption of this sort usually turns out to be self-verifying when the evidence is collected and analysed according to it ... These writers tend to assume that any story which looks at all as if it could be interpreted as a 'charter' for society can be labelled 'myth': the impression is thereby neatly given to the reader that this story is widely known, deeply believed, held different from other stories, and, perhaps, part of some systematic and coherent mythology. In fact, it is possible in a given case that none of this may be true at all ... "

(6) Cf. e.g. Wells (1923) p.25, to the effect that the story of Delphi's role in the settlement of the succession of Gyges was "undoubtedly derived from Delphic tradition based on contemporary evidence"; or Pohlenz (1937) p.113, for Delphi as the source for the story of Cleobis and Biton; and cf. most adventurously Murray (1980) p.30: "the great religious shrine is of central importance (sc. among the sources of Hdt): the Delphic tradition is not usually political; it is rather popular and moralizing ..., etc.".

(7) Cf. Parke/Wormell I.416ff: "The supremacy which Delphi long maintained over its rivals and all other methods of divination was largely the outcome of accumulated prestige, and was little supported by dogma or ecclesiastical organization ... (An) equivocal and time-serving attitude in political questions was almost forced on the Delphians by their military weakness ... Mostly they had the Amphictyony to protect them, but its help was a very uncertain factor, frequently subject to the change of empires and alliances in Greece".

(8) It is surely ill-advised to follow Wilamowitz (1893) I.284, and imagine that Hdt had access to Delphic hypomnemata tied to oracles: "eine Sammlung von Sprüchen des Gottes mit den zugehörigen Erzählungen, einen wunderbaren Schatz geschichtlicher und religiöser Belehrung umfassend"!

(8a) It is worth comparing here what we do know of the temple records of another Greek shrine, viz. the evidence of the Anagraphe of Lindos (FGH 529-33, with Jacoby, Komm.III.b pp.443ff), which is a late compilation of material concerning the dedications of the temple of Athena - material derived from the local chronicles! In other words in this case there were clearly no hieratic records to work from. Cf. also e.g. the 'records' of the Athenian Asklepieion: IG 2^2 4960.

(9) And cf. the priests at Tyre, mentioned at 2.44.1ff as having given Hdt information on the shrine of Heracles (!) in the city; with Fehling p.88.

(10) But cf. Fehling pp.50-4, on the source-citations at 2.55.1ff.

(11) For which citations cf. Fehling pp.11-15.

(12) Cf. Jacoby (1949) passim (!).

(13) Cf. here also Hellanicus' Hiereiai tes Heras: FGH 4F74-84; with Jacoby, RE s.v. Hellanikos 144.1ff. Cf. ? Thucyd.2.2.1 and 4.133.2f, etc.). This was merely a work of 'universal history', substantially about the mythological period, which happened to use the succession of Argive priestesses - a most fanciful succession in its earliest stages - as a chronological framework. Cf. den Boer (1954) pp.35ff. Again there is no sign that Hellanicus would have been using priestly traditions or records.

(14) Cf. e.g. Connor (1971) pp.9ff.

(15) Unlike Fehling pp.88f, I believe that the citations of individual witnesses need by no means be fictions; indeed I would suggest that the grammatistēs (2.28) is such an improbable witness (cf. App.III) that Hdt must actually have spoken to him - he is even (pace Fehling) an exception to the rule of the "Wahl der nächstliegenden Quellen", Sais having no obvious connexion whatever with a story about the source of the Nile!

(16) Cf. Dikaios at 8.65, who is not however mentioned as having spoken to Hdt, or indeed anyone that Hdt has spoken to. The theory of P. Trautwein, Hermes 25 (1890) 527ff, that Dikaios was a major written source for Hdts Medika was firmly squashed by Jacoby, RE art.404.1ff.

(17) Cf. RE art.411.42ff.

(18) Cf. E. Kluwe, Die soziale Zusammenstellung d.athen.Ekklesie, Klio 58 (1976) 295ff and Klio 59 (1977) 317ff, who argues that the democracy was not as representative as it might seem and that many citizens were seldom if at all involved in the political process. Even if this is correct, it simply means for our purposes that the 'citizen-body' is a smaller group.

(19) Cf. Gomme (1962) pp.61-8, arguing a similar case on the basis of Ps.-Xenoph.Athpol.III.12-3, which observes that the atimoi are few under

the democracy, and thus seems to imply that at the date when the treatise was produced (cf. Ch.II.iii n.270) the democracy's sense of corporate interest was considerable. Cf. also e.g. the arguments of Dover, GPM pp. 34-5, for the shared values of the citizen-body at Athens: "The rich, the poor and the economically secure majority between the two extremes did not differ in their values and assumptions to a sufficient degree to warrant a belief that forensic speakers and comic poets must be expressing a minority view when they extol the virtues of inherited wealth and expensive education". The attempt of Prestel (1939) to write the history of an "antidemokratische Strömung" in Athens up to the time of Pericles is striking for its somewhat negative conclusions (cf. pp.87-92): there is little concerted oligarchic opposition; it surfaces only intermittently; it has few clear political principles, and even in the Old Oligarch is not systematically articulated; it largely reflects the private political ambitions of individuals - even Prestel's effort to stress the importance of rival aristocratic families is not wholly convincing. This all in some degree confirms our picture of essential civic solidarity for 5thc Athens.

(20) The existence of just such polis-traditions as I am postulating is perhaps nicely demonstrated for Sparta by Xenoph.Lak.Pol.5.6: καὶ γὰρ δὴ ἐπιχώριον ἐν τοῖς φιλιτίοις λέγεσθαι ὅ τι ἂν καλῶς τις ἐν τῆι πόλει ποιήσηι.

(21) The numerous discussions of the use of historical exempla in the orators have tended to be dismissive about the accuracy of the historical knowledge which is there implied: cf. K. Jost (1936); and for Isocrates, G. Schmitz-Kahlmann (1939); also L. Pearson, CPh 36 (1941) 209-29, and esp. S. Perlman, Scripta Hierosolymitana 7 (1961) 150-66. The question that concerns us here, however, is not accuracy of historical knowledge so much as frequency of historical reference and the use made of it, and in both these respects the evidence would fit my theory. For history in Aristophanes, cf. esp. the Lysistrata, at 271ff (Cleomenes), 616ff (Hippias), 530ff (Aristogeiton), 651ff (*ta Mēdika*), 665ff (Leipsydrium), 675 (Artemisia!), 801ff (Myronides), 1137ff (Cimon and the Messenian revolt), 1150ff (Spartan help in the liberation of Athens), 1247ff (*ta Medika*). Besides this, cf. the theme of Athenian-Persian confrontation in the other plays: *Marathon* at Ach.181, 692ff; Hipp.781ff, 1334; Nub.985-6; Sph.711; Thesm.806 (?); Batr.1296-7 (?); F413 Ddf; *Salamis* at Hipp.785; *later events* at Sph.1098ff.

(22) Cf. V. Ehrenberg. The People of Aristophanes^2 (Oxford 1951) pp.337ff; though we should acknowledge, perhaps, that comic poets may at times be voicing more private sentiments.

(23) For folktales in Hdt, cf. the imaginative but now old-fashioned treatment by Aly (1921), which remains, however, the principal guide. For folktale-elements in the narrative of Cypselos, cf. M.V. Skrazinskaja, VDI 101 (1967) 65-74.

(24) Cf. den Boer (1954) pp.59ff.

(25) Surprisingly the word *logioi* is not used of any Greek informants: cf. 1.1.1, of the Persians; 2.3.1, of the Heliopolitans; and 2.77.1, of the Egyptians as a whole.

(26) Fehling pp.170ff, argues provocatively that a man who could report a story like the lion-dream of Agariste (6.131.2) is speaking the ideas of 'the people' and does not look like a house-guest, let alone a house-historian of the Alcmeonids: "Man hat bei der Lekture des Werkes nicht den Eindruck, dass Hdt mit den Grossen seiner Zeit auf Du und Du stand". Similarly J.R. Grant, Phoenix 23 (1969) 264-8, argues "that Hdt did not

move among the top people, did not have ready access to the high-class sources postulated by Jacoby and others, and because he did not have a high standard of exactitude in treating of political and military matters he lacked a sufficiently strong impulse to search them out, and was too easily satisfied with the general report". This argument from the 'trustworthiness' of Hdts evidence seems to me unsound: as suggested in the text, the presumption that a tradition will be more accurate because it is a family tradition may well be unfounded, in which case Grant's argument would not follow.

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Appendix III: NOTES.

(1) Fehling does not make as much as he might of this impressive example: cf. e.g. pp.55 and 65.

(2) Cf. e.g. Spiegelberg (1926); Lüddeckens (1954); Oertel (1970); and with a much more apologetic emphasis, A.B. Lloyd (1975) passim, and for detailed commentary (1976).

(3) Cf. e.g. Lloyd (1975) p.95: "We have in fact no justification whatever in assuming ... that the priests would get their history right in any sense in which we should understand the word "right" ". Is there not a note of desperation here: 'no justification', 'in any sense'?

(4) For the misuse of the explanation of leading questions, cf. Fehling, index s.v. 'Hineinfragen'.

(5) Cf. Ch.III n.49a.

(6) Cf. Fehling pp.54ff, for a more extensive treatment of this problem; but Fehling does not play the trump card, the misplacement of the pyramid-builders.

(7) Cf. e.g. the generalization of Lloyd (1975) p.116: "Egyptians were quite likely to retail or develop traditions ad maiorem Aegyptiorum gloriam".

(8) H.T. Wallinga, Mnemos.12 (1959) 204ff, proposed the radical solution that the relevant sections of Hdts text have become accidentally transposed! H. Erbse, Rh.Mus.98 (1955) 109ff, followed by Lloyd (1975) pp.188-9, argued that the priests did actually tell Hdt that between Min and Moeris no ruler except Nitocris had achieved anything of consequence and that Hdt treated the pyramid-builders accordingly; my contention, however, is that it is precisely this claim which no Egyptian could possibly have wanted to make!

(9) For a thorough traditional account of the question of Hdts sources on Egypt, both oral and literary, cf. Lloyd (1975) pp.77-140; cf. also e.g. Verdin (1971) pp.96-100.

(10) Cf. Lloyd (1976) pp.111ff; and for the names Krophi and Mophi as characteristic oriental rhyme-words, cf. J. Friedrich, AOF 20 (1963) 102.

(10a) Contrast Lloyd (1975) p.90 with n.2 and pp.111-2. I am not happy with Fehling's attempt (pp.68-9) to make of this interview another example of a source-fiction: he can explain why Hdt should have chosen the temple of Athena but not why this should be the temple of Athena at Sais of all places.

(11) Cf. Lloyd (1975) pp.1ff, with Boardman (1980) pp.111ff.

(12) Cf. Lloyd (1975) pp.17ff, on the question of intermarriage; and cf. p.118, on the tomb of Si-amūn (26th-30th Dynasties) from the Oasis of Siwa, which seems to be that of a Greek who had married an Egyptian woman and sired a pair of half-caste sons. "Such half-castes must have contributed a great deal to the growth of the Greek traditions on the country and its civilization" (Lloyd).

(13) Lloyd (1975) pp.116-9. does indeed appreciate the importance of Greek sources for Hdts account and makes some plausible suggestions as to their

identity - but he persists in the belief that his evidence is primarily from Egyptian sources.

(14) Cf. Fehling pp.46-50, with Hom.Od.4.351ff.

(15) Cf. H. Meulenaere, Chronique d'Egypte 28 (1953) 248ff, who argues that the Pheros-story does represent good Egyptian tradition. but is undecided as to whether the name is or is not simply Pharaoh.

(16) Cf. R. Lattimore, CPh 34 (1939) 357ff; with Ch.III n.158.

(17) This notwithstanding Lloyd's observation (1975) p.116 that "the Egyptians were more likely to know Greek than *vice versa*".

(18) Cf. Spiegelberg (1926) p.42 n.12.

(19) Cf. Lloyd (1975) p.95; and Klees (1965) pp.59-60, concluding that these two stories must be taken from non-Egyptian informants.

(20) Cf. A.H. Sayce, J.Phil.14 (1885) 257-86.

(21) Cf. Fehling p.15 n.4, with Hdt 2.104.2: *melagkhroes ... kai oulotrikhes*. The same characteristics are even more suspiciously predicated of the Cholcians in the same place, in the latter case a misconception shared with Pind.Py 4.212 (*kelainopessi*); but cf. the 'vindication' of Hdt by P.T. English, JNES 15 (1959) 49-53 (!). For negroid Egyptians, cf. the red-figured stamnos of Heracles and Busiris, CVA Oxford fasc.i pl.XXVI, with Beazley's comment (p.22): "The figure on the altar is no doubt Busiris himself, although he is represented as a negro like his attendants"; see also the pelike by the Pan painter on the same subject, Boardman ARF no.336. Cf. perhaps Aesch.Suppl.719-20 (*melagkhimois*). Did Hdt perhaps conceive the argument of the present passage before going to Egypt and perhaps forget to change it? Snowden (1971) p.264 n.52, suggests that *oulotrikhes* here may refer to the "less than straight hair" of the Egyptians; cf. e.g. (Ar.) Probl. 909A28ff, where the Egyptians and Ethiopians are both described as having woolly hair; and also Hom.Od.6.231 and 23.158, where Athene makes Odysseus' hair *oulos*. But with black skin this is surely the mark of the negroid type - unless Odysseus' herald Eurybates (of Ithaca: cf. Hom.Il.2.183-4), who is described at Od.19.244ff as distinctively 'black-skinned' and 'woolly-headed' is not meant to be a negro (but cf. Snowden p.19).

(22) For Egypt, cf. esp. the survey of Lloyd (1975) pp.60-76, who is rightly sceptical of many of the accepted inferences as to the date, season and extent of Hdts journeys - while not, of course, accepting the added limitation that Hdts own explicit statements are themselves most unreliable. Cf. in general, Jacoby, RE art.247.42ff, with summary at 276.38ff; and contrast Fehling pp.168-70.

(23) Cf. e.g. Hdt 1.23-4 (Arion) with Fehling pp.17-20 - though Fehling draws his decisive examples mainly from the non-Greek citations. Cf. my arguments about the citations at 1.65.4 (Ch.II.i.n35) and at 7.148-9 (Ch.II.iii.E.3); also e.g. Plutarch's shrewd observation about the Spartan citation at 3.47.1 (Plut.MH21.859BE; Fehling at pp.80-1 and 140-1 does not avail himself of this ally): even if it had not been true that the Spartans undertook the Samian expedition in order to expel Polycrates, it seems almost certain that this would have been the version they

told Hdt (cf. e.g. Hdt 5.92a; with Thucyd.1.18.1) rather than the story about the theft of the krater sent to Croesus (cf. 1.70).

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Appendix IV: NOTES.

(1) The history of Hdtean scholarship since Jacoby is well analysed from this point of view by Cobet (1971) pp.1-44 and 188-98. Cf. also e.g. H. Verdin, L'Ant.Class.44 (1975) 668ff.

(2) Cf. e.g. Jacoby, RE art. passim e.g. 341.9ff, and esp. 353.6ff: "diesen Ianuskopf, der *zurücksieht* auf die geographisch-ethnographische Erdbeschreibung eines Hekataios *und vorwärts* auf das erste reine Geschichtswerk eines Thukydides" (my underlinings). And more recently e.g. von Fritz, GGS I.104ff; and Fornara pp.1-23, who argues somewhat differently (from the evidence of Book Two) for Hdts "progression from something like a *conventional historian* ... into an artist imaginatively harnessing (his) material *to higher purposes*" (my underlinings), but nonetheless retains the assumption that the 'ethnographic' Hdt is earlier than the 'artist historian'.

(3) Cf. esp. Cobet (1971) pp.45ff; H. Erbse, Gymnas.68 (1961) 239-61, argues perversely in my view that *only* the excursuses so designated by Hdt are actually to be taken as excursuses.

(4) On the evidence of Ch.III, Book Two also shows the greatest density of sophistic issues of any part of the work, and this is also relevant here: the section of the work supposedly earliest in composition turns out to be the most *modern* part! I am tempted to agree with Fornara (cf. n.2) that Book Two *is indeed* 'different' in character from the rest of the work, and to wonder whether it is not in fact a *later* addition to the whole, perhaps included in a 'second edition'. *If that* 'second edition' was brought out shortly before Aristophanes wrote the Birds (produced Dionysia 414), that might account for the play's apparent parodies of Hdt and Book Two in particular (cf. e.g. Aristoph.Av.1130 with Hdt 2.127.1; Av.1142ff with Hdt 2.136.4). This idea that Book Two is later rather than earlier than the rest, suggested by Wells (1923) pp.177ff and originally by Bauer (1878) pp.27ff, has much to recommend it (but cf. Ch.III n.18). Is it possible that the two editions also differed in describing the author first as 'Halicarnassian' and second as 'Thurian', and that this explains the currency of both versions of the opening sentence in antiquity (but cf. Ch.III n.12)? Was the additional note at 4.99.5, the comparison of the Tauric peninsula with Iapygia, 'for those who have not sailed past Attica' (cf. 99.4), included for a western audience in this second 'Thurian' edition? Were the Assyrioi Logioi (cf. Ch.III n.16) perhaps dropped for the second edition with its new and lengthy Egyptian account - and the references to it not removed at 1.106.2 and 184?

(5) Cf. von Fritz, GGS I. e.g. 178: "so kann man kaum sagen, dass Hdts Aufenthalt in Ägypten seinen ersten Schritt zum Historiker bedeutet, wie es oben geschehen ist, ausser insofern, als er zum erstenmal ein, wenn auch noch so oberflächliche Interesse an Gegenständen genommen hat, die zu Gegenständen historischer Forschung werden konnen". And cf. Fornara pp.1-23.

(6) So Jacoby, Powell, von Fritz, Fornara, et multi. That Hdt could have set out to write a *Persika* not simply without intending to describe the Persian Wars but *without* even seeing the possibility of doing so, seems to me quite unthinkable: the obvious subject is the Persian Wars, the less obvious subject the history of the Persian empire!

(7) Cf. Drews (1973) pp.20ff.

(8) So Drews pp.35ff: "... it was the Great Event, astounding those who lived through it, which compelled the Greeks to commemorate it in writing. Greek historiography was, in a real sense, a result of history itself". This view seems to me to hold good whether or not we accept Drews' pre-Hdtean Persika: cf. n.9.

(9) Cf. Drews pp.20-32, reviving certain shadowy fore-runners of Hdt in the writing of Persika: Dionysios of Miletus (FGH 687), Hellanicus (FGH 4), and Charon of Lampsacus (FGH 262): the evidence that any of these authors and/or their Persika antedate Hdt, however, derives exclusively from late sources who can hardly be expected to depend on solid testimony for the dates or chronological relationships of any of them (cf. esp. Plut.MH 36.869A, for Hellanicus; and MH 20.859B, for Charon). Drew's hypothesis may be correct, but it is surely hard to substantiate with the evidence available. But for Dionysios, cf. M. Moggi, ASNP 2 (1972) 433-68, arguing that he is used by Hdt; for Charon, cf. L. Piccirilli, ASNP 5 (1975) 1239-54, arguing that Hdt deliberately avoids following Charon; and for Xanthus, cf. P. Tozzi, RIL 99 (1965) 175-84.

(10) H. Barth's promisingly entitled article 'Die Einwirkungen der vorsokr. Philosophie auf die Herausbildung d.historiogr.Methoden Hdts', N. Beitr. z.Gesch. d.alten Welt 1 (1964) 173-83, is disappointingly limited to the study of the word eidenai in Hdt and the pre- Socratics - I cannot believe that epistemology is Hdts most important debt to the philosophers! Barth's 'Methodologische und historiogr. Probleme der Geschischtsschreibung des Hdt', Diss.Halle (1963) is unavailable to me. Cf. also Hunter (1982) passim, for Hdts 'historiographical method' in relation to that of Thucydides, both authors reflecting 'Presocratic thought'.

(11) For the sophistication of this analysis, as historical reconstruction and for its judicious use of the Homeric evidence, cf. J.W. Neville, G&R 24 (1977) 3-12, who does not, however, invoke the parallel methods of the sophists.

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