**(2018) UNBELIEVABLE similarities between Ferraris’s ideas (2012) and my ideas (2002-2008)**

**Gabriel Vacariu (November 2018)**

**Maurizio Ferraris (2014/2005) WHERE ARE YOU?**

***An Ontology of the Cell Phone***

(2014 2014 Fordham University Press *Dove sei? Ontologia del telefonino*, by

Bompiani, in 2005, © RCS Libri S.p.A. - Milano) Translated by Sarah De Sanctis

**[This book has nothing to do with my EDWs perspective !!! There is no one similar idea to my ideas in this book! However, in his book 2012, there are UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas! – see below]**

42 In a nutshell, one might formulate the following framework:

1. In the world there are *subjects* and *objects*. Subjects refer to objects

(they represent them, have them in mind, do something with them), that

is, they are endowed with intentionality;44 objects do not refer to subjects.

2. Objects are of three kinds: (a) *physical objects* (mountains, rivers, and

human and animal bodies) existing in time and space in de pen dently from

the subjects knowing them, even if they might have made them, like in the

case of artifacts (chairs, screwdrivers); (b) *ideal objects* (numbers, theorems,

relations) existing outside time and space and in de pen dently from

the subjects knowing them who, nonetheless, aft er knowing them, can socialize

them (for instance, the publication of a theorem: it will be the

publication that will begin in time, not the theorem itself); (c) *social objects*,

which do not exist *as such* in space but subsist as traces (inscriptions,

rec ords in people’s minds) and, through these traces, acquire duration in

time; they depend, for their existence, on the subjects who know or use

them and who, in some cases, constituted them.

3. Th is last circumstance warns us that social objects, for which construction

is necessary, depend on social *acts*, whose *inscription* constitutes

the *object*.45

103 Th e fi rst has to do with *existence*. Physical objects are as big as the sum

of their molecules and change only if the latter change. Ideal objects exist

without molecules and would be such also in the supposed absence of all

intelligent life on earth, in de pen dently from any recording. On the contrary,

social objects exist if there is an *act*, even if a mute one, tying up at

least two people, and if there is an *inscription*, entailing a (small) quantity

of molecules that can change without altering the nature of the object.

I can take a mental note of an appointment, I can write it down on my

agenda or in my mobile phone: the appointment is still the same, unlike

the physical objects. It is the same with memos: I can use Mount Blanc or a

pin to remind me of something, but the *memorandum* stays the same.

Th e second diff erence has to do with objectivity. Th e marvelous character

of social objects— what makes them diff erent from, for instance, tastes

and imagination— lies in the fact that *while depending on subjects, they are*

*not subjective*. Th is point is obvious, yet it is oft en misunderstood, given

that one of the most banal and false assumptions on this is that social objects

are subjective. Th ere is clearly some confusion about the meaning of

*subjective*. I can *fi nd* a picture ugly even if everyone else loves it, and this is

what we call subjective: *de gustibus non disputandum est*. I can also *say* that

that picture is valued at thirty, three hundred, or three thousand euros,

and the valuation certainly depends on the subjects (for a beaver it would

be another story), but here we already have to do with an element that is

surely not subjective in the sense, as it presupposes social sharing. Finally,

I have no diffi culty in *imagining* that the value of the euro depends on a

deliberation in which subjects intervene; but if, in my room and with no

authority, I decided that a euro is worth twenty dollars I would be, at the

very least, a solipsist.1

111 Th e minimal requirement for the constitution

of an ontology of social objects is the adoption of an underlying realism.

Realism, here, is not a scientifi c theory supported by physics, but the

obvious presupposition of a research that can be developed both in the

direction of a study of nature and toward an inquiry of the social world, as

they constitute *one* world and not two distinct and irreducible entities. I

will show later how such a request might turn out to be demanding, but for

now I will focus on the two central points that constitute the condition of

possibility of social objects: fi rst, not everything is socially constructed and

second, what is socially constructed is not consequently subjective, because

it concerns at least two people. [not my EDws!!!]

**[In his book 20012/2014 –see below, maurizio ferraris published UNBELIEVABLE similar ideas to my ideas 2002-2008.** It would seem as if Maruizion Ferraris wrote this book under the EDWs umbrella! See below several of his ideas…**]**

**Maurizio Ferraris (2014/2012) MANIFESTO OF NEW REALISM**

*Translated by Sarah De Sanctis*

*Foreword by Graham Harman*

 2014 State University of New York (2012, Gius. Laterza & Figli,)

Graham Harman “Foreword”

In June 2012, at the Italian Institute for Philosophical Studies

in Naples, I met a young German colleague, Markus Gabriel,

who was planning an international conference on the fundamental

character of contemporary philosophy. Markus asked

what I thought could be the right title for such an event, and

I replied to him, “New realism.” It was a commonsensical

consideration: the pendulum of thought that, in the twentieth

century, oscillated toward antirealism in its various versions

(hermeneutics, postmodernism, “linguistic turn,” etc.) had

moved, with the entry into the new century, toward realism

(once again, in its many aspects: ontology, cognitive science,

aesthetics as theory of perception, etc.). (xiii)

Therefore, to me the reference to realism has not been a

means to boast of a laughable philosophical monopoly over the

real, in a way that would not be too different from the claim of

privatizing water. It has rather meant the affirmation that water

is not socially constructed; that the sacrosanct deconstructive

vocation lying at the core of any philosophy worthy of its name

has to come to terms with reality, otherwise it will turn into a

futile game; and that any deconstruction without reconstruction

is irresponsibility.5 (Xiv)

 Chapter 2 REALISM

*Things That Have Existed*

*Since the Beginning of the World*

27 Following and radicalizing

Kant, constructionists will confuse, without residues (i.e.,

also abolishing the noumenon), ontology with epistemology:

what there is (and is not dependent on conceptual schemes)

and what we know (and depends on conceptual schemes).

33 This is clear proof of the fact that

if we abandon the reference to an external world that is stable

and independent of schemes, then everything is possible, since

this decision comes to interfere with practical decisions (political

and moral) and not only with theoretical observations. It

certainly can be argued that ontology is not what there is, but

it is the discourse on what there is. So there is always an epistemological

remnant in ontology and an ontological residue in

epistemology. This is indisputable: ontology is never without

epistemology, just as one cannot live without knowledge.

37 subchapter Internal world and External World

50 Claiming (as the very-differentists do) that there is a gap

between perceptions and facts, and then between facts and

judgments, would perhaps be possible—however, only if one

were able to indicate the point of discontinuity in which one

passes from the unamendable and irrevocable to the interpretable.

Now, it is precisely this discontinuity that seems unobtainable:

assessments are made on facts and facts take place in

a world of objects. If this is so, it is not true that the ascertainment

of facts in the physical world (for instance, that snow is

white)9 lies at a radically distinct level from the ascertainment

of facts in the historical world and, in general, in a higher

sphere where, according to the very-differentists, the decisive

matches are played and interpretations have emancipative functions.

52 This work consists in distinguishing carefully between the

existence of things that exist only for us, that is, things that

only exist if there is a humanity, and things that would exist

even if humanity had never been there. That is why, in my

opinion, the real deconstruction must commit to distinguishing

between regions of being that are socially constructed and others

that are not, to establishing for each region of being some

specific modes of existence, and finally to ascribing individual

objects to one of these regions of being, proceeding case by

case.12

56 The illusion that these objects are an infinitely interpretable

phantasmagoria makes us blind, and therefore helpless,

in front of the world in which we live. So I formulated a

definition of social objects as “inscriptions of acts,” that is, as

the establishment of relationships that access the dimension of

objectivity through recording.

58 First, as regards the distinction between ontology

and epistemology (and the distinctions that follow, between

external world and internal world, and between science and

experience), it seems to me that it responds to the necessity

to preserve two essential needs for realism, so as to overcome

the fallacy of being-knowledge, that is, the collapse between

objects and the knowledge we have of them that began with

transcendental philosophy and culminated with postmodernism.

59 On the other hand,

it allows us to see in the social world the work of human construction,

which however—precisely to the extent to which it

is a social interaction—does not constitute a purely subjective

production. In this way, the sphere of natural objects, as well as

that of social objects, becomes the field of a possible and legitimate

knowledge, that is, of an epistemology that undoubtedly

involves hermeneutics (since in many cases knowledge requires

varying degrees of interpretation). Nevertheless, this epistemology

has a very different value depending on whether it refers

to natural objects or social objects. In respect of the former,

in fact, epistemology exerts a purely reconstructive function,

merely acknowledging something that exists independently of

knowledge.

63 The result of the reconstruction I propose is, as announced

in chapter 2, a “treaty of perpetual peace” between the realist

insight and the constructionist one. It is simply a matter of

assigning each one to its field of competence: 1) Natural objects

are independent of epistemology and make natural science true.

2) Experience is independent of science. 3) Social objects are

dependent on epistemology, without being subjective. 4) “Intuitions

without concepts are blind” applies primarily to social

objects (where it has a constructive value) and less to the epistemological

approach to the natural world (where it has a reconstructive

value). 5) The realist intuition and the constructionist

insight have therefore equal legitimacy in their respective fields

of application. We can obviously dispute on questions such as:

Are there subatomic entities? What kind of existence do promises

have? Are species and genders a part of nature or culture?

This is the real debate, and it is here that the philosophical,

political, and scientific discussion takes place.