**(2018) Unbelievable similar ideas between Jason Winning’s ideas (2018) and my ideas (2002-2008)**

**Jason Winning** (2018) ‘Mechanistic Causation and Constraints: Perspectival Parts and Powers, Non-Perspectival Modal Patterns’ Forthcoming in *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science*

Many ideas of this paper are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ideas published long time ago! Let me introduce paragraphs. In Abstract it is written that ‘

According to this alternative account, we must resort to a type of ontological entity that is new to metaphysics, but not to science: constraints.’ (p. 1)

As we will see, these ‘constraints’ are UNBELIEVABLE similar to my ‘interactions’ that produces EDWs! Of course the author comes with a NEW METAPHYSICS!

After presenting this notion of ‘mechanisms’ and some authors on this topic, Winning introduces section 3.1: ‘Multi-perspectival realism and causal structure’.

A new type of ‘multi-perspectival realism’ (to use Wimsatt’s [2007] terminology) has been

emerging that can offer us guidance to finding the right metaphysical account of mechanistic

causation. Sandra Mitchell, for example, writes: I will argue for a pluralist-realist approach to ontology, which suggests not that there are multiple worlds, but that there are multiple correct ways to parse our world, individuating a variety of objects and processes that reflect both causal structures and our interests. ([2009], p. 13; see also Glennan [2017], p. 93)

AMAZING! This paragraph from Sandra Mitchell seems to be taken from one of my books!! It is clear that the ideas are very similar to my ideas of the EDWs! After investigating these words, Winning writes about ‘3.4 A metaphysics inspired by analytical mechanics: Constraints as Ontologically primitive modal structures’. Only reading the title and you will have the feeling to indicating the EDWs! At pages 14-15 there is this paragraph:

Return to the example of the chaperone and substrate molecules. From one perspective, each is a collection of atoms held together in a certain way by bonds. From another perspective, each is an object constrained to possess a certain shape. Neither of these perspectives is the ‘right’ one; they merely represent distinct ‘ways of parsing’ the world. However, in each case the same underlying, invariant causal structures (whether we conceptualize them as configurations of bonds between atoms or as shapes of objects)—constraints—are determining how the system will behave.

It might be argued that when we abstract away from object-oriented ways of carving up the world,

and merely refer to the universe as consisting of an uncarved expanse of ‘stuff’ that is constrained

in various ways in various locations, we are still adopting a ‘perspective’. Yes, but this will by

definition not be a world-carving perspective. When I say that constraint is an inter-perspectival

ontological category, I mean that it is an ontological category that is independent of any perspective

on where the boundaries between objects (events, processes, and so on) are. It is an ontological

category that picks out the full range of real causal patterns in the world which are the candidates

for populating such world-carving schemes; any world-carving perspective will selectively isolate

a subset of such causal patterns to form the basis of its parcellation into objects, events, processes,

and so on.

(pp. 14-15)

I draw the attention that this paragraph is not from one of my books! ‘Ways of parsing the world’ are very similar to my EDWs and the relationship parts-whole that I investigated in my works! I wrote very similar ideas about the ‘an ontological category that is independent of any perspective on where the boundaries between objects (events, processes, and so on) are.’!

Moreover, the next sentence ‘any world-carving perspective will selectively isolate a subset of such causal patterns to form the basis of its parcellation into objects, events, processes, and so on.’ indicates something very similar to my EDWs!!! Does the reader want more???

Instead, the relation is a certain kind of ontological dependence: the constraints, that is, the perspectiveindependent causal structures, are what make it possible to usefully adopt a causal powers

perspective. When we adopt an object-oriented perspective, the way that the stuff constituting an

object is dynamically constrained allows us to talk instead of powers that the object has.19

Constraints are the truthmakers for modal facts about the dynamics of a system; when looked at

from a perspective that parcels the system into objects and properties, these modal facts map onto

dispositional facts about such objects and properties. In other words, they serve as the intrinsic and

actual grounding of perspectival facts about what kinds of behaviours will manifest under certain

conditions. (p. 16)

Also, this paragraph seems exactly taken from one of my works! It seems that author talks about something UNBELIEVABLE similar to my EDWs!

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