What Is So Bad about Plurality?

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, I list various kinds of 'plurality' in philosophical investigations. By plurality, I mean a plurality of methodological criteria which we apply to philosophical phenomena and which are very often incompatible with each other. Any philosophical phenomenon can be approached from different methodological viewpoints and result in utterly different ontological and ideological commitments. In other words, I assume that one philosophical problem can have different solutions which depend on different methodological and theoretical presuppositions. Instead of considering this feature of philosophical theories as a problem, I take this plurality as a natural meta-philosophical result. As an example, I consider impossible phenomena and ways of treating them systematically.

KEYWORDS: *Metaphysics; Plurality; Impossibility; God; Consistency*

RESUMEN

En este artículo enumero varios tipos de "pluralidad" que se dan en las investigaciones filosóficas. Por pluralidad entiendo una pluralidad de criterios metodológicos que aplicamos a los fenómenos filosóficos y que muy a menudo son incompatibles entre sí. Cualquier fenómeno filosófico puede abordarse desde distintos puntos de vista metodológicos y dar lugar a compromisos ontológicos e ideológicos totalmente diferentes. En otras palabras, asumo que un problema filosófico puede tener diferentes soluciones que dependen de diferentes presupuestos metodológicos y teóricos. En lugar de considerar esta característica de las teorías filosóficas como un problema, considero esta pluralidad como un resultado meta-filosófico natural. Como ejemplo, considero los fenómenos imposibles y las formas de tratarlos sistemáticamente.

PALABRAS CLAVE: *metafísica, pluralidad, imposibilidad, dios, consistencia.*

I. INTRODUCTION

The main idea to be developed in this paper is that philosophical problems can be investigated from two non-equivalent, competitive, and explanatorily adequate perspectives. Specifically, the paper discusses two kinds of strategies: the consistentisation strategy and the non-

consistentisation strategy. I argue that both strategies possess theoretical appeal and provide justification for what I term methodological pluralism. In essence, methodological pluralism posits that many problematic phenomena can be approached both consistently and inconsistently.

From now on, I use plurality in two distinct senses that should not be conflated. On the one hand, PLURALITY refers to a purely methodological term that applies to different methodological strategies. It serves as a metaphilosophical principle allowing for distinct assumptions in constructing philosophical theories. On the other hand, I use 'plurality' to denote diverse domains of discourse and the variety of commitments associated with those domains. Although I argue that incompatible methodological views can explain the same phenomena, my primary focus is on the former sense of plurality. However, it's worth noting that 'plurality' can often exemplify PLURALITY.

The structure of the paper is as follows: after brief introductory remarks in Section II, I explore two examples of the consistentisation strategy in Section III. Section IV examines whether this strategy introduces *ad hoc* distinctions. Section V shifts to the non-consistentisation strategy. In Section VI, I apply my proposal to the examples under consideration, and Section VII addresses several objections

II. PRELIMINARIES

To commence with a brief overview of philosophical arguments, they can be divided into various classes depending on various aspects. One class of arguments, metaphysical arguments, concern reality as a whole and aim to decipher its fundamental structure. Theorists disagree about when, precisely, a set of premises followed by a conclusion count as a valid metaphysical argument, but several criteria are generally accepted. First, such arguments are non-naturalistic arguments; in a sense, the premises of the argument have to do with non-causal facts, that is, facts which are not empirically detected and, consequently, are independent of empirical assumptions. Second, the scope of such arguments is much broader than the scope of the arguments to be found in the natural sciences, for while naturalistic arguments are primarily connected with the nomological behaviour of the world, metaphysical arguments 'transcend' the scope of nomological modality, towards metaphysical modality. In addition, despite their non-naturalistic character, metaphysical arguments aim at explaining mind-independent, factual, objective facts,

although proponents of such arguments are aware of the limits of our experience and admit that such arguments must go beyond them.

This (admittedly controversial) characterisation of metaphysical arguments raises the question of the kind of modality they involve. On the face of things, this modality should not be confined to nomological modality, and nomological laws (whatever they are) should not set the limits of philosophical reasoning. Rather, the character of the arguments would suggest that they concern metaphysical modality, and such arguments, when valid, tell us something about reality as a whole. More precisely, by *metaphysical arguments* I mean arguments that a) go beyond the empirical evidence, b) concern metaphysical necessity and, importantly, c) invoke metaphysical impossibility.

Besides their broader domain, arguments in philosophy can be divided on the basis of their background account of logical consequence, where a logical consequence enjoys a certain privilege and exclusiveness as embodying full generality and topic neutrality. Such a relation governs the arguments of a given theory, as that by which its elements 'hang together'. The arguments of non-philosophical theories – for example the theories found in mathematics, biology and chemistry – they usually assume the classical consequence relation without explicitly acknowledging it. The consequence relation behaves 'normally' because 'true' theories investigate the space of possibilities as defined by classical logic. This consequence relation holds across all such (true) theories. The consequence relation is the classical logical relation.

Tracing the origins of this privileging of classical logic is an arduous task, but indications lead back to Aristotle's account of logic and its status. Putting aside the fact that classical logic makes many intuitively valid inferences formally invalid, its basic principles have dictated the direction scientific theories have taken over the centuries. These theories display logical clarity and use fundamental logical principles, and violations of such principles lead to their rejection. For instance, they view *modus ponens* (A, A → B ∴ B) and *modus tollens* (¬A, B → A ∴ ¬B) as argumentative forms that guarantee valid reasoning. Special sciences that rely on classical reasoning reject possibilities that lie beyond the scope of their preferred consequence relation. This is in part because we do not usually face non-classical phenomena in otherwise classical theories.

When seeking to explain certain phenomena, many metaphysical theories transcend the bounds of the classical consequence relation, and this for several reasons. To begin with, reality as such appears to display features that do not easily 'hang together' in the form allowed by classical

logic. For instance, metaphysical explanations of the nature of impossibility, cases of metaphysical vagueness [Weber (2010)], God's 'super' properties [Grim (2007)], non-representational examples of counterpossible conditionals [Nolan (2014)] and omissions [Bernstein (2016)] would seem to indicate that reality as a complex and, more importantly, hyperintensional domain does not fall neatly within the confines of classical logic.

It is commonly believed that the applications of distinct logics are mutually exclusive. This belief asserts that if a metaphysical theory is true, it must be necessarily true, and conversely, its negation must be necessarily false. Likewise, theories employing different logics are often deemed meaningless because their logical consequences contradict those of their counterparts. However, such exclusivity not only overlooks the entirety of philosophical discussions but also disregards the fundamental practice of reasoning within philosophy itself. There exist cases where the same subject matter is approached through diverse theoretical and methodological frameworks. These frameworks include varying semantic representations, different logical systems, or alternative packages of ontology and ideology.

To demonstrate the point, I will argue that impossible phenomena are usually explained in one of two ways: either we can represent them in a fully classical way, or we can consider alternatives to classical logic by regimenting the discourse into a plurality of contexts. I call the former option the *consistentisation strategy* and identify two faces of this approach: ontological duplication and semantic ambiguity. The latter option, the *non-consistentisation strategy*, is more liberal and challenges the universality and topic neutrality of logic. If I am correct, the consistentisation strategy and the non-consistentisation strategy offer two distinct approaches to the same problem. They demonstrate that there exists a diversity of philosophical theories. While the term 'kind' may be potentially misleading here, I will proceed under the assumption that theories differ in kind if they are built upon incompatible theoretical commitments. Let's examine each option in detail.

III. The Consistentisation Strategy

I this section, I discuss the consistentisation strategy. The strategy – which represents impossibility through a consistent apparatus – comes in many versions, a common feature of which is an attempt to propose (usually) complicated systems which turn out to be internally consistent

but strong enough to represent inconsistent phenomena. As an example, I will discuss two such versions: one based on the denial of ontological unity, and another based on semantic determinacy. Importantly, the common feature of these approaches is that they are same instances of one kind: they are based the consistentisation.

Let us start with ontological unity. Qualitative parsimony is a principle according to which we should keep the number of ontological kinds to a minimum. In practice, Lewis (1986) argues on behalf of modal realism by claiming that the cost of its ontological extravagance is outweighed by its ideological parsimony. In particular, the plurality of *concreta* is justified by minimising *abstracta*, and as far as modality is concerned, a plurality of entities of one kind is preferable to a plurality of kinds themselves. However, Lewis concludes, there are no concrete impossibilities and, therefore, no impossible worlds.

Divers (2002) and Berto (2010), among others, argue for the need for impossible worlds and that any sufficiently fine-grained theory of modality ought to find space for such exotic entities. To do so, they provide surrogates for impossible worlds within the limits, and with the resources, of modal realism. Their starting point is the postulate of modal realism which identifies propositions with sets of possible worlds. The next step is to ontologically identify impossible worlds with sets of propositions. As a result, we can ontologically identify impossible worlds with sets of sets of possible worlds. For example, a conjunctive contradictory proposition, $A \land \neg A$, is identified with a set of two sets of worlds: a set of worlds in which A holds and a set of worlds in which $\neg A$ holds. Since a set A can be distinguished from a distinct set B by having distinct possible worlds as members, by using a simple set-theoretic machinery we get $A \land \neg A$ and $B \land \neg B$ as ontologically distinct constructions [Berto (2010)].

In other words, philosophers have (at least) two options for addressing impossible phenomena. They can uphold the ontological unity of worlds by adjusting the logic governing their theory. Alternatively, they can maintain a balance between their ontological and ideological commitments, thereby making the theory more complex but (classically) consistent. The move towards consistentisation certainly involves balancing other theoretical virtues, and this balancing can manifest in various forms. However, what these forms have in common is their nature: non-consistent phenomena are explained solely through consistent means.

The second version of the consistentisation strategy is based on semantic ambiguity. Given the rich history of theorising about God, one

might think that the notion of God is internally inconsistent because several properties ascribed to God lead to a contradiction. An exemplary argument borrowed from Beall runs as follows:

> 1. Christ is human. [Assumption]
>
> 2. Christ is divine. [Assumption]
>
> 3. Christ is mutable. [Human nature entails mutability]
>
> 4. Christ is immutable. [Divine nature entails immutability]

Predicating full humanity and full divinity of God belongs to the dogmas of (at least some versions of) Christianity. Logically speaking, these dogmas together imply the very controversial conclusion that God is a contradictory being. Classically informed analytic theologians are aware of this conclusion and have proposed a semantic version of the consistentisation strategy. To mention but a few, their responses include the following:

> (1). Christ's being God is not contradictory if Christ is not really a human, and hence not a human person at all.
>
> (2) There is in fact no contradiction because Christ is neither a god nor a human but instead has a hybrid nature that overlaps with but is different from God's nature and different from our own nature.
>
> (3) There is in fact no contradiction because the predicates that are true of Christ (e.g., 'divine', 'human', etc.) are not really what they appear to be – they mean something other than what we standardly mean by them.

The above rejoinders will undoubtedly receive different interpretations and can be articulated in various ways. These ways will likely reveal the many semantic nuances of the terms in question and may raise concerns about how to represent predication when God is the subject. But at least one consistentisation reading relies on the change in meaning of a crucial predicate.

Once again, various semantic manoeuvres fall under a broader category: the consistentisation strategy. Despite different semantics yielding different outcomes, it's important to note the common feature they share. Specifically, the emphasis on consistency highlights their role in categorizing incompatible views on the same subject matter.

In sum, the above proposals offer ways of avoiding inconsistency by what we might call 'circumventive routes'. We start with an impossible phenomenon and, using philosophically accepted tools, end up with a perfectly consistent explanation. The consistency comes at the cost of a more complicated analytic structure and as such is not without its problems. One such problem is identified in what I will call the *ad hoc objection*. I will briefly overview this worry in the next section.

IV. AD HOC?

The question might arise: isn't the introduction of 'plurality' within consistentisation approach an *ad hoc* move? Briefly, a philosophical hypothesis is considered *ad hoc* when it is added to a theory in order to save its explanatory power but does not contribute to its explanatory power in a systematic way. The added assumption can be metaphysical, semantic or simply pragmatic and the question is whether the above proposals are of this kind.

Let us begin with hybrid modal realism and its denial of the so-called *parity thesis*. The parity thesis says that possible and impossible worlds are ontologically on a par, while the denial of the parity thesis says that possible and impossible worlds differ in ontological kind. Given that hybrid modal realism is of the latter stance, the ad hoc objection can be articulated along the following lines:

> ...there is, as far as I can see, absolutely no cogent (in particular, non-question- begging) reason to suppose that there is an ontological difference between merely possible worlds and impossible worlds – any more than there is for supposing there to be such a difference between merely possible worlds which are physically possible and those which are physically impossible. To differentiate between some non-actual worlds and others would seem entirely arbitrary [Priest (1997), pp. 580–1].

As this passage indicates, the introduction of an additional ontological category in this case is disputable. One reason for thinking so is that the classification of ontological categories into distinct kinds is a highly theoretical enterprise, and one might wonder, together with Vander Laan (1997), whether there is a principle of ontology that could justify our construing these similar parts of our modal language in such dissimilar ways. But hybrid modal realism implies that possibility is concrete and

impossibility abstract and, consequently, that possible worlds are concrete and impossible worlds are abstract.

Admittedly, we can avoid such an objection by either challenging the exclusivity of the abstractness/concreteness distinction or pointing out the widely accepted ambiguity of the notion 'world' in theorising about possible worlds. Proponents of possible worlds mean different things when they talk about the actual world, sometimes referring to the concrete 'stuff' we inhabit, in other cases referring to a genuine/nongenuine representation of it. Assuming we are happy with their distinct uses of 'world', there is no principled reason to worry about 'possible world' and 'impossible world' as picking out distinct ontological kinds.

A more important response on behalf of hybrid modal realism rests on methodological grounds. Its proponents can insist that the distinction is not ad hoc precisely because it allows for a conceptual and ontological reduction of modality within the classical framework. If a theory is classical in nature, and if we seek to extend it through impossible worlds without undermining its classicality, the introduction of distinct ontological categories will not count as ad hoc. In short, the introduction of such distinctions would be motivated by the conceptual aims of the theory.

What about semantic ambiguity? By parity of reasoning, in order to avoid a plain contradiction, theologians could argue that 'human' in fact corresponds to two different predicates, as does 'divine', allowing them to argue that an apparent contradiction, namely God's being capable and incapable, is not in fact a contradiction because the predicates at issue are to be understood in different ways. These ways range

> from sophisticated accounts of 'persons', to sophisticated accounts of 'divine', to sophisticated accounts of 'human', to sophisticated accounts of the semantics of divine predicates or human predicates, to the many mereological and metaphysical maps of how the hypostatic union may be drawn, to so much more. [Beall (2021), p. 37].

In principle, any route is philosophically legitimate as long as it is instrumental to the success of sustaining the consistency of the view. Moreover, such an apparent violation of semantic parsimony can be justified along the same lines that hybrid modal realism justifies its duplication of ontological kinds, for if the subject matter investigated by a theory is such that part of it requires one sort of metaphysical commitment and another requires a distinct kind of ontological commitment, we should

not be surprised if the plural character of the subject matter requires a plural analysis. If the analysis works best via the introduction of distinct categories to sustain consistency, the ad hoc objection does not threaten the framework. Both examples – hybrid modal realism and classical Christianity – appear to demonstrate such a need.

The moral of these responses is that the introduction of an additional metaphysical postulate, or an additional semantic distinction, need not be viewed as an ad hoc move. One reason is that if a theory concerns a highly complicated subject matter, and if the analysis fares well on the cost/benefit scale, a modification of one's ontological and semantic postulates can be justified independently. It can be persuasively argued that 'consistentisation' strategies are such cases because consistency as a structural feature is a sufficient, and importantly non–ad hoc, reason to modify one's theory on a non-logical level.

So far, so good. Consistentisation is just one of many possible ways of dealing with impossibility, however. Notably, it is a combination of two crucial assumptions: a) the truth of classical logic, and b) what I call the maximal neutrality of logic. Its opposite, non-consistentisation, takes a much simpler yet more controversial path, maintaining that there really are impossibilities in (some) worlds and that theories that deal with them must, so to speak, be non-consistent. This is not to say that classical logic is truth-preserving. Rather, classical logic, if truth-preserving is not maximally neutral (contra b). In any case, if reality displays impossible features, their proper representation should not be classical. I will explore this route in the next section.

V. NON-CONSISTENTISATION

In this section, I discuss the counterpart to *the consistentisation strategy*: *the non-consistentisation strategy*. Unlike the consistentisation view, this perspective does not seek to reduce impossible phenomena solely to consistent ones. The primary rationale for adopting this approach is that consistentisation has inherent limitations, and even highly intricate systems may fail to capture all the hyperintensional distinctions we aim to express. For instance, narrow impossibilities – that is, impossibilities which are not reducible to plain contradictions – cannot be adequately represented by hybrid modal realism [Berto (2010)]. Also, the inconsistencies that we predicate of God are not all of the same kind, and cover-

ing all cases of God's omnipotence would require many (otherwise unac-cepted and unintuitively complex) constructions.

Proponents of simplicity and theoretical elegance may be moved to a simple solution: change the logic. Of course, the idea of changing a theory's logic goes against the strategy of consistentisation, and propo-nents of fully consistent theories will immediately reject this option. Methodologically speaking, though, the general agreement is that reality displays impossibility at some level. While consistentisation locates it at the ontological and semantic level, proponents of non-consistentisation take an unorthodox route. There are several motivations for doing so.

The first motivation stems from scepticism about classical logic. Among others, Beall claims:

> Many systematic theorists concerned with truth and logic have largely adopted the mainstream account – the so-called classical-logic account – of logical consequence (i.e., the relation of what logically follows from what). This practice is understandable, since many phenomena seem to be truly and fully described by theories whose space of possibilities is simply the space recognized by classical logic. But the narrow mainstream ac-count of logic is ultimately built on sand [Beall (2021), p. 11].

Interestingly, the above should not be understood as an objection to classical logic. If the world is classical, then true special theories will fol-low classical logic and explain the world correctly. What is at stake, how-ever, is the maximal neutrality of classical logic, because the space of alternatives is wider than the space described by purely consistent means. Consider Beall again:

> A consequence relation for a set of claims is an entailment relation. In particular, a consequence relation tells you what claims follow, according to that relation, from your given set of claims, where 'follows from' is un-derstood as entailment – as necessary truth preservation over some target space of possibilities [Beall (2021), p. 22].

The 'some' in the last sentence draws a line between the space of possi-bilities that is closed under classical consequence and that space which is not. However, since ignorance of a subject matter does not entail its ab-sence, classical logical consequence has only a limited (or consistentised) impact on non-classical phenomena. Impossibility is a non-classical phe-nomenon, however, and we should therefore not expect classical logic to completely provide for it.

There is thus an open alternative which both grants classical logic competence to deal with classical issues and admits a distinct logic for non-classical issues. In any case, logics can be applied for many purposes [see, for instance, Priest (2006), Chapter 12], depending on domain which they systematise. Methodologically, the alternative denies the principle of the maximal neutrality of classical logic and allows distinct logics for distinct subject matters—that is to say, it allows for logical plurality.

Admittedly, unlike ontological and semantic plurality, logical plurality requires more liberal criteria for theory choice because the idea of non-classical logic has always raised doubts in the eyes of classically oriented philosophers. Nonetheless, this incredulity can partly be addressed by pointing out that logical plurality entails neither the invalidity of classical logic nor its replacement by a non-classical logic. Moreover, the introduction of a plurality of logics methodologically resembles the introduction of other sorts of pluralities discussed above. Let us therefore turn to the two consistentisation strategies once again to see what the new proposal would look like.

VI. NON-CONSISTENTISATION AT WORK

To recall, my leading example in the paper is an impossible phenomenon and its two 'pluralistic' interpretations: ontological and semantic articulations. In the former, I overviewed a view that analyses the notion of an impossible world in terms of *possibilia*. In the latter, the apparent inconsistency is avoided by more elaborate work with semantic meanings and their structures. Can the non-consistentisation strategy as an instance of PLURALITY play better?

Let us first consider modal realism and impossible worlds. Hybrid modal realism and non-consistentisation strategies agree that impossible worlds play an important role in analysing hyperintensionality. They also agree that the original theory lacks the resources to cover many hyperintensional phenomena and that its extension through the use of impossible worlds would increase the explanatory power of the theory. The duplication of ontological kinds is motivated by a simple argument:

1. There is a concrete impossible world at which (A & ~A).

2. At w (A & ~A) if and only if at w A & ~ (at w A).

3. The right-hand side of (2) is a contradiction.

   4. Classical logic is the only true logic (there are no true contradic-
      tions).

   C. There are no concrete impossible worlds.

The non-consistentisation strategy, on the other hand, denies (4) be-
cause, as the view goes, the plurality of logics and the non-neutrality of
classical logic lead to a simpler analysis. Of course, this strategy will be
controversial to some. Concrete impossible worlds instantiate genuine
impossibilities, and the supposition as such is internally inconsistent, that
is, inconsistent in the actual world. Note, however, that the presupposi-
tion behind the argument is classical, and classical logical consequence
holds, according to consistentisation, regardless of the subject matter. If
we allow that the underlying logic can vary and depends on the subject
matter, the situation changes. And there are at least two reasons for in-
vestigating this route.

   The leading idea is that the actual world, the world we live in, is
classical. Its biological, chemical, and physical behaviour is fully in ac-
cordance with classical logic, and there actually are no true pairs of mutual-
ly inconsistent sentences, or no true self-contradictory sentences. What
there actually *is*, is fully compatible with special theories, and these theories
correctly describe current events and reliably predict future ones.

   However, there are worlds that violate the laws of the special sci-
ences: these are nomologically impossible worlds. Nomologically impos-
sible worlds are still logically possible worlds, although nomological laws
have a merely 'local' character. The analogy between nomological and
logical possibility leads us to logically impossible worlds, that is, worlds
that violate the laws of logic.

   One reading of this conclusion suggests that classical logic has a
merely local character, and that the actual world is logically possible be-
cause it belongs to the privileged set of logically possible worlds. Ac-
cording to non-consistentisation, however, our accepted account of
logical consequence is limited. The account is valid in every classically
permitted world but ignores many other alternatives. It is therefore not
valid simpliciter, in the sense of being applicable to everything in reality,
the consistent and the non-consistent. On this line of thought, we have
reason to think that the logic of such a reality is not maximally neutral.
In other words, the character of reality as a whole does not 'hang togeth-
er' by virtue of a single consequence relation. Reality is, the view con-
cludes, logically fragmented.

A more sophisticated observation comes from the so-called possibilists. Mortensen (1989), for instance, has argued that the complex equations of physics make sense even in isolation from the concrete world. Their role via abstract models is to characterise the world. Why shouldn't logical models work in the same fashion? If different logical models describe different aspects of reality, there will still be cases where *the consistentisation strategy* reaches its limits.

A similar route is available to those who take the 'omni' properties of God seriously and share a reluctance to admit that they are actually ambiguous. Recently, Beall (2021) employed a strategy that involved admitting that Christianity is contradictory – a result, he argues, that we must learn to live with. Again, this is not to say that the actual world is full of contradictions (Martin 2014) or, God forbid, trivial. Our (part of the) theory can simply be classical as far as the actual world is at issue while holding that special entities like God deserve special treatment. On this approach, the local character of classical entailment is not threatened; it is complemented, not substituted, by logical consequence, which is more friendly to, say, both gappy and glutty propositions.

Although inconclusively, we can conjecture that all versions of the non-consistentisation strategy share the structural feature of responding to extraordinary phenomena. It can be pursued at the ontological, the semantic, or even the logical level. Briefly, the strategy reflects complexity by using distinct accounts for specific subject matters. I propose that we ought to introduce modifications at the level of logic in the case of extraordinary phenomena because it is precisely the logical behaviour of such phenomena that is to be explained.

VII. PROBLEMS WITH THE NON-CONSISTENTISATION STRATEGY

The strategy of modifying one's logic rather than engaging in ontological or semantic duplication is not without its problems, though. I will therefore conclude by outlining several independent motivations for pursuing this strategy.

Let us start with a worry about the possible ad hoc nature of such modifications. This worry mirrors worries about the ad hoc character of postulating distinct categories in order to solve a particular problem. In response, I would point out that non-consistentisation strategies are not a novelty in philosophy. Beall and Restall (2001) have articulated the need for logical pluralism in various areas, but their general claim is that logical principles are truth-preserving only when they are restricted to particular kinds

of linguistic expressions and particular subject matters. Distinct subject matters require distinct approaches, and if subject matters differ in terms of their logical behaviour, their logical descriptions require distinct tools. Moreover, non-consistentisation is not even a bite-the-bullet strategy. Rather, it is an expected consequence that something must be sacrificed and that we should admit the unrestricted failure of otherwise accepted logical principles.

Another worry concerns simplicity as a theoretical virtue and its violation when non-consistentisation is at issue. For many, a plurality of logics is far from a unified philosophical account, and we should keep the number of logics to a minimum. The charge is that non-consistentisation does the exact opposite. In response, we might note that the debate concerning ontological and ideological parsimony is itself very complicated, and distinct notions of parsimony often trigger mutually incompatible understandings of what theoretical simplicity consists in. For instance, Sober (2001) has shown that simplicity as a theoretical virtue is dependent on the subject matter. If it is true that certain subject matters require more complicated accounts than others, we should not be surprised if simplicity as a theoretical virtue stands or falls depending on the context. It should therefore be no surprise to us if special phenomena require an account that is not overly simple and that displays complex features.

Third, transitioning from the lack of neutrality of logic to logical fragmentation requires an additional argument. Without such an argument, the non-consistentisation strategy asserts that classical logic is mistaken rather than advocating for its plurality.

In response, we have previously observed that in the case of possibilism, the 'plurality' of worlds necessitates distinct logical laws to govern different sets of worlds. Put in terms of logical spaces, all possible worlds constitute a structure cantered around the actual world defined by logical laws. Impossible worlds belong to distinct sets governed by different logical laws. Since one's laws of logic dictate their reasoning, different laws of logic result in different logical systems: different logics.

Fourth, the concept that different logics apply in different contexts presupposes the existence of these contexts, which the proposal does not currently provide for discussion.

I think that this objection is not accurate. By introducing 'plurality' as an instance of PLURALITY, proponents of *the non-consistentisation strategy* do introduce a different context. While consistentisationists advocate for a single logical framework and consolidate diverse contexts into a coherent whole, non-consistentisationists adopt a distinct methodological stance: reality is viewed as inherently inconsistent.

Finally, some might object that resistance to attempting to be consistent is itself inconsistent. Yes and no. To repeat, it is not the case that non-consistentisation forces us to change our accepted notion of logical consequence. It remains fully general regarding classical logical consequence and is not revisionary about actually and logically possible matters. Another promising route has been articulated by Nolan (1997). Aware of the problem of the unity of non-consistentisation, Nolan proposes that we reason hypothetically about the plenitude of impossibility and God via subjunctive conditionals. Adding such 'no rules' conditionals to classical logical theory allows us to theorise about strange subject matters while satisfying logically conservative classical logicians. Such an addendum can explain deviant logical phenomena without interfering with our favourite account of logical consequence.

VIII. Conclusion

In conclusion, I have outlined a perspective in which two fundamentally distinct methodologies offer explanations of the same subject matter. One group of theories adheres to *the consistentisation strategy*, accepting a 'plurality' of ontological and ideological commitments as a consequence. Similarly, the group of non-consistentisation theories also embraces multiple commitments. However, while the former maintains a singular logic and diversifies other commitments, the latter adopts the inverse approach: it diversifies logics while preserving ontological and ideological unity. And the diversity of these proposals can be explicated by methodological pluralism.

Impossible phenomena are both complicated and very simple. Their complexity results from an attempt to explain heterogeneous subject matters by homogeneous means. Philosophers' resistance to considering heterogeneous means has been challenged on several levels. However, the considerations that speak in favour of describing complicated matters through a plurality of more straightforward means are growing in number.

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