THE FUNCTION OF WERTFÜHLEN IN
SCHELER'S THEORY OF VALUE
ABSTRACT

Lucinda Ann Vandervort Brettler, THE FUNCTION OF WERTFÜHLEN IN SCHELER'S THEORY OF VALUE, Philosophy, M. A.

Wertfühlen, the faculty which theoretically provides a cognitive grasp of objective value, is shown to be of central importance to Scheler's value theory. The role of Wertfühlen in Scheler's value theory is presented in detail. The history of affective perception as a cognitive principle is traced through the writings of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl in order to establish the extent to which Scheler modified the theory. The evaluation of Scheler's notion of Wertfühlen focuses on three problems: the nature of value, the existence of Wertfühlen, and error and illusion. Scheler's position is found to be unsatisfactory in certain respects in relation to each of these problems and alternative positions are proposed. Scheler's account of self-givenness and his suggestions for the elimination of illusory intuitions are found to be inadequate.
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SCHIELE'S THEORY OF VALUE

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GENERAL REMARKS

The following abbreviations used in the footnotes of the text are grouped here for the convenience of the reader. The full titles are also given in the first footnote referring to each work.

Formalismus - Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik: Neuer Versuch der Grundlegung eines ethischen Personalsmus.

PPES - Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt.

0 - The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong.

VUSE - Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis.

Ideas - Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.

Ideen - Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie.

Zur Ethik - Zur Ethik und Erkenntnislehre.

All English translations in the text of the thesis of quotations from Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik and from Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt are mine, as there is no published English translation of the former and no English translation of the latter was readily available to me. In all cases where I have translated a passage, the original German is provided in a footnote. The German has also been given whenever a term is used which has a particular significance not easily rendered in English or where confusion might occur due to the technical or systematic use of a term.
"Wertfühlen" is a term of central importance for the problems discussed in this thesis and consequently has been introduced with particular care on pages 2 and 3. "Erfolgsethik" (see page 5) is also a difficult term as it has no exact English equivalent. I have chosen to render it as "an ethic based on the outcome of action" though this is not necessarily the only possible translation. 'Gesinnung' (see page 5) is not precisely "state of mind" or "state of spirit", but somewhere between the two, and in addition involves the notion of the "predisposition" or "disposition" of the agent.

All references in the text of the thesis in the form (p. 190) refer to the Formalismus.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ........................................... 1

CHAPTER TWO: AFFECTIVE PERCEPTION AS A COGNITIVE PRINCIPLE
IN THE WRITINGS OF FRANZ BRENTANO
AND EDUARD HUSSERL .......................................................... 20

CHAPTER THREE: WERTFÜHLEN AND ITS ROLE IN SCHELER'S VALUE THEORY. . 35

CHAPTER FOUR: EVALUATION OF SCHELER'S DOCTRINE OF WERTFÜHLEN. ... 57

1. The Nature of Value
2. The Existence of Werterfühlen
3. The Problems of Error and Illusion

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ...................................................... 88

APPENDIX: COMMENTS REGARDING MATERIALS AVAILABLE IN ENGLISH
ON SCHELER'S ETHICS ......................................................... 91

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................. 97
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

One of the fundamental questions in ethical theory is that of how ethical disagreements arise and how they may be resolved. The age-old problems of what the good is, and how men decide what the good is, lie immediately at the base of such questions. It is in our interest in these two problems that we find common ground with Max Scheler; for these problems are the central issues with which Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik is concerned. Moreover, insofar as we are interested in the possibility of a universal science of value, we will consider Scheler's notions of value and value-feeling (Wertfühlten) with particular care. This is especially true in an era when there are few who find it possible to oppose ethical relativism.

The notion of a universal science of value suggests two questions in particular. The first is whether there are universal value categories and the second is whether, once given these universal value categories, there is a universal order by which these categories are ranked in importance. We will return to the first question in our evaluation of Scheler's notion of Wertfühlten and his concept of value and to the second

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in connection with Scheler's hierarchy of values. Both questions relate to the epistemological basis of value discussion and disagreement. If it were possible to find common ground here, communication between disagreeing parties would become possible even in the face of continuing disagreement as to the particular object each party valued through the same feeling of value. The second question is concerned with the measure in which there can be a universal order of the realm of value as grasped by human beings and how abstract this order necessarily would be. The problem of error is of fundamental significance for both of these questions and indeed for any attempt to discover what the good is and how men decide what the good is. Our analysis of Scheler's doctrine of Wertfühlen will therefore be focused on the question of whether, and to what degree, Wertfühlen solves the problem of error in value knowledge.

We have chosen to translate the German adjective material, which signifies that which pertains to content rather than to form, as 'non-formal' rather than as 'material' in order to avoid confusion with the German adjective materiell which signifies 'material' in the sense of non-spiritual, corporeal, occupying space. The main problem with such a choice is that the term thus translated gives a more negative sense to Scheler's response to ethical formalism than does the German term. Wertfühlen is the other term for which a technical explanation must be given at this point though it is assumed that a grasp of the full significance of the term will be gained only through exhibition of its use in Scheler's system. Wertfühlen is quite literally 'feeling of value'. Fühlen is used by Scheler to designate affective perception which must be strongly differentiated from
both *Einsicht*, which has the significance of intuitive insight of an
axiological essence or essential axiological correlation, and *Gefühl*,
which is a feeling-state or affective state. Affective perception is
by definition intentional, that is, it is a conscious act (not a state,
not passive) oriented towards an object. *Wertfühlen*, as a type of affec-
tive perception, has in common with the other kinds of *Fühlen* the char-
acteristic of intentionality. *Wertfühlen*, however, has, in addition
to this characteristic of intentionality, a cognitive function, unlike
*Fühlen von Gefühl*, or *Fühlen von gegenständlichen emotionalen
Stimmungsa-Charakteren* (p. 271, n. 1). Why *Wertfühlen* alone among the
various forms of *Fühlen* should have a cognitive function is worthy of
further examination, but the fact that Scheler makes such a bold claim
is set forth by way of preliminary explanation for our interest in
*Wertfühlen* in connection with the epistemological basis of Scheler's
value theory.

Much of the *Formalismus*, particularly the first half, was written
in the form of a critique of previous philosophic theories rather than
as positive philosophy. Positive philosophizing tends to be set forth
by Scheler once previous theories have been judged defective, and thus
in response to clearly stated need. Scheler states in his Foreword to
the first edition that he has no pretense of discovering positive truth
through criticism of previous theories. Another characteristic of the
*Formalismus* is the amount of discussion devoted to excursions into
psychology, sociology, and philosophy of religion which Scheler found
required in order to demonstrate that values had objective existence
and were available to the consciousness of the individual human subject. Scheler reaches such a position through criticism of ethical formalism, which attributes value only to dispositions of the human agent and leaves no place for the existence of values as realities among other objective contents of the universe. Scheler regarded the Formalismus as central in importance for an understanding of his work and even as late as 1926 stated that the Formalismus, with the exception of Section 6. A, 3d, still represented his value theory since he had in no way based it on metaphysical or religious assumptions (many of which for Scheler had undergone notable alteration).

In his introduction to the Formalismus Scheler sets forth the main questions with which he will be concerned. Kantian ethics is to be criticized because Scheler regards it as the most rigorous and well developed expression of ethical formalism. The Formalismus discusses the following eight presuppositions, all of which must be refuted if Scheler's theory of non-formal value is to be accepted:

1. Any non-formal ethic must necessarily be an ethic of goods and ends.
2. Any non-formal ethic is necessarily only of empirically

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1 See Formalismus, p. 9, where, in the context of his Foreword to the first edition Scheler comments that he has adopted the method of descending to the concrete, whereby the sphere of the a priori ideas is enlarged far beyond the pure and "practical formal" spheres which Kant recognized.

2 See Foreword to the second edition of the Formalismus for Scheler's comments on the relation of certain of his conclusions in the Formalismus to his other works.

3 See Foreword to the third edition of the Formalismus.
inductive and a posteriori validity; only a formal
ethic is a priori certain, independently of inductive
experience.
3. Any non-formal ethic is necessarily an ethic based on
the outcome of action, and only a formal ethic can
present the disposition of the agent or the will
arising from this disposition as the primary bearer
of the values 'good' and 'bad'.
4. Any non-formal ethic is necessarily hedonism and is
based on the existence of sensual states of pleasure
bound to objects. Only a formal ethic is, in showing
moral values and in establishing moral norms which
are founded on these values, able to avoid considera-
tion of sensual states of pleasure.
5. Any non-formal ethic is necessarily heteronomous;
only a formal ethic is able to establish and to
guarantee the autonomy of the individual.
6. Any non-formal ethic leads only to simple legality
of behavior, only a formal ethic is able to establish
the morality of the will.
7. Any non-formal ethic puts the human person in the
service of his own conditions or of goods which are
alien to him; only a formal ethic is able to show and to
establish the dignity of the human person.
8. Any non-formal ethic must in the end locate the basis
of all ethical valuations in the instinctive egoism
of human nature; only a formal ethic is able to lay
the foundation for a moral law valid for all rational
beings, independent of all egoism and of all the
particular forms of organization of human nature. 1
Scheler has thus clearly told us what a non-formal theory of value is not. The following twelve pages present a summary of Scheler's theory of non-formal value for the purpose of allowing the reader not familiar with the Formalismus to understand the wider context in which Scheler saw the more technical questions with which it is our intention to deal in the main body of this discussion. It should be noted that Scheler's positive philosophic statements, rather than his criticism of the eight presuppositions listed above, will be emphasized.

Scheler agrees with Kant that the moral value of the human will must be independent from existing things and ends. There are no such things as "good ends" and "bad ends". Only the act which strives toward some end has value. Ends have value only as value is abstracted from the related willed act. But Scheler parts company with Kant when the latter concludes that no ethic can therefore consider values of a non-formal nature. Thus Kant states:

"All practical principles which presuppose an object (matter) of the capacity to desire as the ground of the determination of the will, are entirely empirical and cannot produce any laws of

7. Alle materiale Ethik stellt die Person in den Dienst ihrer eigenen Zustände oder ihr fremder Gütéringe; nur die formale Ethik vermag die Würde der Person aufzuweisen und zu begründen.

8. Alle materiale Ethik muss in letzter Linie den Grund aller ethischen Wertschätzungen in den triebhaften Egoismus der menschlichen Naturorganisation verlegen, und nur die formale Ethik vermag ein von allem Egoismus und aller besonderen menschlichen Naturorganisation unabhängiges, für alle Verunmacht-wesen überhaupt gültiges Sittengesetz zu begründen, Formalismus, pp. 30-31. All English translations of quotations from the Formalismus are mine as there is no published English translation.
action. I understand by matter of the capacity
to desire, an object whose actuality is desired." ¹

Scheler wants to allow ethics to continue to consider "the values which
express themselves in these goods" (p. 36). For Scheler, unlike Kant,
value concepts (Wertbegriffe) are not abstracted from goods but find
"the plentitude of their content in the autonomous phenomena" (p. 36).
Scheler insists that the value orientation of the will is immediately
given independent of all ends and is not determined by empirical ends.

Scheler compares values to colors. "As little as the names we give
to colors designate mere properties of corporeal things; . . . as little
do the names that we give to values indicate mere properties of the
units, given in the shape of things, which we call goods." ² Values can
be represented (to oneself) as independent of any thing which might
possess these qualities. The sensorially agreeable quality, a value
quality, of an apple is not reducible to any other qualities of the
apple. In most cases language does not distinguish value qualities
and their supports save by fundamental sensations (for example, that
something bitter is disagreeable). Many values are conceptually inde-

¹"Alle praktischen Prinzipien, die ein Objekt (Materie) des Begehrens-
vermögens als Bestimmungsgrund des Willens voraussetzen, sind insgesamt
empirisch und können keine praktischen Gesetze abgeben. Ich verstehe unter
der Materie des Begehrensvermögens einen Gegenstand, dessen Wirklichkeit
begehrt wird." (Kr. d. pr. Y., Erster Teil, I. Band, I. Hauptst.), As
quoted by Scheler, Formalismus, p. 34. English translation is mine.

²"So wenig wie die Farbennamen auf blosse Eigenschaften von körper-
lichen Dinge gehen . . . ., so wenig gehen auch die Namen für Werte auf
die blosse Eigenschaften der dinglich gegebenen Einheiten, die wir Güter
nennen." Formalismus, p. 35.
findable. Though we som. grasp what a "noble horse" is we are unable
to list the essential properties common to all noble horses without some-
thing, which is essential to this value, eluding our grasp. It is there-
fore clear to Scheler that all attempts to reduce values to physical
attributes can only lead to errors in analysis, and necessarily so, since
this confounds value with supports of value. Scheler concludes:

... that there are authentic and true value
qualities, which constitute a special realm of
objects, which have their special relations and
connections, and which even as value qualities
can be, for example, higher and lower, etc.
But if this is the case then, too, an order and
a hierarchy can prevail between these values,
which are totally independent of the existence
of the world of goods in which they appear, as
well as of the movements and changes of this
world of goods in history, and which is a priori
for our experience of this world of goods.

Scheler rejects the objection that he has succeeded in showing only
that values are not properties of things and thus allows one to maintain
that "powers, faculties, and dispositions" of things are capable of deter-
mining certain affective states and appetites in sensing and desiring sub-
jects on the basis of which value judgements are made (p. 38). This
theory, Scheler says, would explain value preference either by the quantity
of these "powers" in a thing or by the subjective consideration of what

1"... dass es echte und wahre Wertqualitaten gibt, die ein eigenes
Bereich von Gegenstanden darstellen, die ihre besonderen Verhaltnisse und
Zusammenhange haben, und schon als Wertqualitaten z. B. hoher und niedriger
usw. sein konnen. Ist aber dies der Fall, so kann zwischen ihnen auch eine
Ordnung und eine Rangordnung obwalt, die vom Dasein einer Guterwelt, in
der sie zur Erscheinung kommt, desgleichen von der Bewegung und Veranderung
dieser Guterwelt in der Geschichte ganz unabhängig und fur deren Erfahrung
a priori ist.» Formalismus, pp. 37-38.
our senses respond to most strongly. The first alternative makes values occult qualities since such "powers, faculties, and dispositions" do not exist, while the second identifies values with affective responses. It is rather the case that values are phenomena which are clearly graspable by affective perception (klare fühlbare Phänomene) (p. 39).

It is a fact for Scheler that values are given to us immediately, with clarity and evidence, independent of experience of the supports of these values. Therefore values are independent of their supports "in their being" (p. 40). All value relations, for example, that of the superiority of one object to another, are grasped in the same immediate way (p. 41). Values and their hierarchy do not change though supports may change value. Values are likewise distinct from the affective states and the desires by which we experience them (p. 42).

Good and evil, like other values, are non-formal and clearly graspable by affective perception (klar und fühlbar) (p. 47). Like all other value phenomena they cannot be defined. Because there is a hierarchy of non-formal values the realization of a given non-formal value can itself be good or bad. The value good is that which appears in the act of realization of the supreme value (p. 47), while the relatively good value is that which appears in an act oriented towards the realization of a superior value (p. 48). Since the fact that a value is superior is given to us in an act of preference (the latter are acts of knowledge and not of will, hence they are neither good nor bad), the morally good act is the act of realizing values which are in accord with the preferred value. Non-formal ethics is therefore possible if the good or evil value
of value realizations is based on the hierarchical order of other non-formal values (p. 48). The following are axioms of such a non-formal ethics:

I. 1. The existence of a positive value is itself a positive value.
2. The nonexistence of a positive value is itself a negative value.
3. The existence of a negative value is itself a negative value.
4. The nonexistence of a negative value is itself a positive value.

Good and evil are the values of persons, of the being of such of persons (p. 50). The value of a person's will depends on the value of the person (p. 50).

Strivings are not necessarily oriented towards a given end (p. 54). For example, an internal urge may not at first have an end in view (p. 54). A second type of striving includes Wegstreben and Fortstreben (striving to remove ourselves and striving to go before). Unlike repulsion in the face of a certain state (Widerstreben), this type of striving has no goal originally (p. 54). A third and completely distinct type of striving is that in which there is an original internal orientation (p. 55). We become clearly and distinctly conscious of this orientation when our strivings encounter a value which corresponds to or contradicts the orientation. Such an orientation may be towards a certain value (which need not have

1I. 1. Die Existenz eines positiven Wertes ist selbst ein positiver Wert.
2. Die Nichtexistenz eines positiven Wertes ist selbst ein negativer Wert.
3. Die Existenz eines negativen Wertes ist selbst ein negativer Wert.
already been given as a *fühlbare Wertqualität* rather than to a specific content or determined object (p. 55). A fourth type of striving is that in which the specific content of the goal is given (p. 55).

Scheler must now consider how value is immanent to striving. The values are given to us immediately in affective perception, but it is impossible that an affective state (Gefühl) should produce the striving and that such an affective state (for example, pleasure) should be the goal of the striving (p. 57). The immediate content of the goal would not be the pleasure as such, but the value of this pleasure (p. 57). Hence the hedonistic assumption that man has an original striving towards pleasure is false. In reality pleasure is a goal of striving only when it is intentionally viewed as a value or non-value (p. 57).

Values can be given and preferred outside of all strivings (p. 58). Value judgements can be subject to illusion. Such illusion is commonly produced when we attribute a positive value to something because it attracts us and a negative value to something either because it repels us or we cannot attain it. It is erroneous to accept the principle of Spinoza that good is what we desire and bad that which repels us, for this reduces good and bad to "entia rationis" (p. 59).

There can be a willed end only if there has first been a representation of a goal of striving. In the end of the will the content of the goal is given as something to be realized. Values do not depend on ends, but rather ends and the will on values (p. 62). Kant was in error when he found "inclinations" to be axiologically indifferent, for the will is good insofar as it chooses the highest value among those which
already belong to its inclinations. The will is thus dependent on the
inclinations for the content among which it chooses (p. 63). There is,
despite Kant's contrary opinion, an order of preference among strivings
prior to an act of will (p. 64).

All unities of meaning and ideal principles, which are self-given
due to the contents of an immediate intuition, are a priori (p. 69).
The contents of such an intuition are given in a Wesenssachau, a vision
of essences. The "what" given here cannot be more or less given, it
either is "itself" given or it is not grasped intuitively and thus is
not given. The principles of the laws of connection of essences are
also given a priori and are true a priori (p. 69). That which is a
priori may be either formal or non-formal (p. 74). Kant was in error
when he identified the formal and the a priori (p. 74).

We are first given goods, not things. Secondly, through affective
perception values appear. Thirdly and quite independently, appear the
affective states (Gefühlsmustände) of pleasure and displeasure which
relate us to the affective action of the goods on us. Then come the
affective states mixed with the above. These are the specifically
sensorial affective states, which, Scheler notes, Carl Stumpf well
called "affective sensations" (Gefühlsempfindungen). It is hence clear
that sensorial affective states are never immediately given (p. 80).
The effect of the sensorial affective states on what the will has as
an end is essentially negative. That is, they may in part determine
what we will cease to will, but not what we will originally will (p. 82).
Kant therefore much overrated the significance of the experience of
pleasure and displeasure for the content of the will (p. 83).

It is false to identify the *a priori* with the rational and the *a posteriori* with the sensible. The *a priori* is the immediately intuitive "given". Likewise propositions are *a priori* only insofar as they receive a content of facts from phenomenal experience (p. 83). There are original *a priori* constituents of the will and of the emotional which are not borrowed from thought. The axioms of axiology are quite independent of logical axioms (p. 84).

The presupposition that all aspects of the human spirit are either rational or sensible is false (p. 85). Study of sentiments, of love and hate, does not establish ethics on an empirical or sensible basis (p. 85). There is an *a priori* of the emotional (p. 85), quite distinct from any inductive experience. Kant was in error to assume that what is "given" is a "chaos without order" (p. 86). The *a priori* is rather the real objective structure (*die sachliche gegenständliche Struktur*) and not at all imposed by reason on the matter of experience (p. 87).

In the case where a value and its hierarchic range is "self-given" and is thus absolutely evident the Socratic principle that knowledge of the good determines the will holds (p. 89). Judgements of what is good, not based on affective perception of value, do not, however, have force to determine the will, hence the Socratic principle must be qualified (p. 90).

The subjective and the *a priori* are not linked (p. 96). The I is only a support of values, not an evaluating subject who produces values, or that without which values would not exist (p. 98). Formal *a priori*
correlations are those which are independent of value modes and qualities and of the idea of value supports, and which are grounded in the essence of values. All values are positive or negative in their very essence. Brentano's axioms regarding the value of the existence and non-existence of positive and negative value are based on formal \textit{a priori} correlations. There are similar axioms regarding obligation (p. 102). These axioms are intuitive essential correlations, and are not based on the laws of logic. Such axioms are relevant to the will \textit{not} originally, but because and insofar as the will is determined by value (p. 103).

Unlike Kant, Scheler says that principles such as that of contradiction apply to thought only \textit{because} they apply to all being (p. 104). In the realm of values the same object can be regarded as both negative and positive only by virtue of distinct intentional views bearing on two value structures co-existent in the object (p. 104). Moral conflict arises in the case of an opposition between what we know is good and what is precious to us whether good or not (p. 105).

Persons alone of all value supports can be morally good or bad. All other things are so only by reference to persons (p. 105). Superiority and inferiority belong to the essence of values themselves, not simply as known to us. Brentano's scheme for determining value superiority and inferiority is inadequate. The act in which we know the superiority of a value is "preference" and may be subject to illusion if it is not based on self-givenness (p. 108). Durability does not necessarily imply superiority (p. 112). Extension and divisibility are associated with superior value only in the case of material goods (for
example, food and clothing), not in the case of spiritual goods. Hence the criteria of extension and divisibility, like that of durability, are of doubtful significance for distinguishing superior and inferior value (p. 114).

Certain values are based on other values. For example, the useful is based on the agreeable, and the agreeable on the vital. Vital values are by essence superior to both agreeable and useful values, and in turn the agreeable is superior to the useful. The spiritual value hierarchy can be grasped only by spiritual acts which are not vitally conditioned (p. 115). A superior value is by essence one which is less relative to, and less dependent on, other values (p. 116).

Values may be values of person or of things of value. The latter may be material, vital, or spiritual, and are by essence inferior to values of persons (p. 120). The values of acts (love, hate, will), functions (sight, hearing, affective perception), and reaction (sympathy, vengeance) are inferior to values of persons, but those of acts are superior to those of functions, and those of acts and functions are superior to those of reaction (p. 121). Values of success are not moral, unlike the values of spiritual states or those of actions (p. 121).

The hierarchy of values that the above essential relations presuppose must be independent of all goods which can, or do, exist and of all particular organic structures which affectively perceive value. All modalities of value, that is, systems of qualities of value, contain a real value, a functional value, and a value of a state. For example, in the modality of the agreeable and disagreeable with its real values,
there is also the value of the function of the affective sensorial perception (with its modes of joy and pain), and the value of the affective states of pleasure and sadness (p. 125). That the agreeable should be preferred over the disagreeable is an a priori principle. Vital and spiritual values are quite independent from one another and from material values (values of the agreeable). The respective acts of preference and the functions of affective perception of the three modalities are also quite distinct (p. 127). The last axiological modality is that of the sacred and the profane, in which values appear only in objects intentionally seen as absolute (p. 129). The affective states of this modality are beatitude and despair (p. 129).

A willed act has a moral value quite independent from the effects this act may have (p. 131). Behavior is ruled by the person's spiritual state. The spiritual state is a given graspable by intuition (p. 137). Behavior may, however, mask the true spiritual state of a person as is seen, for example, in the case of a man who does the good only because he wishes to be regarded as a "good man" (p. 136).

Practical objects of the will are not primarily things perceived, but rather goods, or things of value (p. 153). For it is only in affective perception of value (Wertfühlen) that striving is immediately based, not in an objective content in the form of an image that must be represented (vorgestellt) or perceived (wahrgenommen). It is thus clear that the possible objects of the will are selected according to the values which spiritually correspond to the spiritual state which founds the will (p. 153). Each person's value attitudes are based on a partic-
ular hierarchy of the rules of preference which rule our inclinations in all empirical situations. Thus it is that the same empirical situation can present quite different values to two individuals (p. 162).

Scheler begins Part II of the *Formalismus* by stating that all knowledge is rooted in experience (Erfahrung) (p. 179). Ethics must also be founded on experience. The problem, however, is that of determining what constitutes the essence of the experience that gives us moral knowledge and what are the essential elements of such an experience. How are moral facts to be distinguished from other facts?

"Moral facts" are not found in inner perception (inneren Wahrnehmung) (p. 181). Nor are they ideal objects to be grasped by reason in the manner that the concept of triangle is (p. 181). We must set aside the old duality of reason and sensibility (p. 181). According to Scheler, a child senses the goodness and care of its mother though it has not the least idea of the concept "good" (p. 182). We grasp the moral qualities of other persons in the same fashion. Moral facts are therefore facts of non-formal intuition (materialen Anschauung), that is, they are immediately given (p. 182). Rationalism has reversed the proper order by assuming that value exists in actual world objects only by comparison to the "good", the *ans realissimum*. In reality values belong originally to all degrees of being (p. 183).

Ethical nominalism is also rejected by Scheler. We often make judgements of value about things or persons towards which we feel no enthusiasm or indignation. The value is not less fully given though our affective state is neutral. Likewise a value can remain identical
as given to us though our affective state and its expression change. We can grasp values which are not realizable by any striving or which do not correspond to the orientation of any striving present to us. Our universe of values would be far poorer if this were not the case and we could grasp only those values to which we had an actual striving (p. 189).

We think we live in a common universe of values, one which is common because it is objective, and we distinguish from it both our subjective aptitude to grasp it and our degree of interest in its various elements (p. 190). When we say "This man is good" we mean to refer to an objective reality, not the expression of our strivings (p. 190). Such facts as these cannot be explained by ethical nominalism, but only by an objective axiology (p. 191). Utilitarianism is in error insofar as it supposes itself to be a theory of good and evil in themselves, while in fact it is only a theory of social praise and blame, applied to good and bad (p. 195). All attempts to reduce original moral experience to a product of any axiologically neutral experience are doomed to failure (p. 196). Thus Scheler also rejects Brentano, Herbart, and Smith in their assertions that value is produced by appreciation (p. 196).

All ideal obligation is based on value, and is oriented toward the exclusion of non-value (p. 224). Thus all propositions expressing an obligation rest on a positive value, but do not contain this value. Obligation cannot oppose discernment of what is positively good, but can only have a purely negative character.
It is hoped that this summary, while no substitute for knowledge of the first third of the *Formalismus* itself, will provide the reader unfamiliar with that work a preliminary context for the discussion to follow. Other aspects of the *Formalismus* will be discussed as they become important for a proper evaluation and understanding of the implications of the doctrine of *Wertfühlen*.

Scheler's doctrine of *Wertfühlen* and his use of affective perception are best understood against the philosophic background from which they arose. Consequently we will trace the history of affective perception as a cognitive principle through the writings of Franz Brentano and Edmund Husserl. We will then be in a position to consider Scheler's notion of *Wertfühlen* and its role in his ethics in greater detail as well as to establish which aspects of the theory were original to Scheler. The phenomenological method of Scheler must be distinguished from that of Husserl.

Our task will then be to evaluate *Wertfühlen* as it is conceived of by Scheler. In this context we will be concerned with the existence of affective perception in the Schelerian sense and its ability to perform the required cognitive function, the objectivity of values and the value hierarchy, the problems of error and illusion, and the necessary nature of an ethic based on *Wertfühlen*. Der *Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* is the work of Scheler's upon which the discussion will be based, for the most part, as it is his principal ethical work and the one he regarded as key for an understanding of the rest of his writings.
CHAPTER TWO

AFFECTIONE PERCEPTION AS A COGNITIVE PRINCIPLE

IN THE WRITINGS OF FRANZ BRENTANO

AND EDMUND HUSSERL

Franz Brentano influenced both Husserl's and Scheler's views of affective perception. Psychology was defined by Brentano as "die Wissenschaft von den psychischen Erscheinungen" or "the science of mental appearances." Throughout the Psychologie Brentano uses the term "phänomen" (Phänomen) as a synonym for the term "appearance" (Erscheinung). Brentano states that "with the name mental phenomena we designate representations, as well as all those appearances for which representations constitute the basis." Representations are the basis for all mental acts, because "nothing can be judged, nor can anything be desired, nothing can be hoped for or feared, if it does not have a mental phenomenon as its basis."
is not represented."¹ By this argument Brentano intended to establish clearly the priority of representation among all mental acts.

With the notion of intentionality, which he regarded as a positive common characteristic of mental phenomena,² and which was later to become a fundamental notion for phenomenology, Brentano set forth the relation between the "objective" and "subjective" aspects of mental experience. In The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong the intentional relation is said to be "to something which, though perhaps not real, is none the less an inner object of perception."³ Physical phenomena are grasped only by "outer" perception. The class of appearances of mental phenomena are characterized by the "intentional inexistence of objects,"⁴ unlike the class of physical phenomena. "Intentional inexistence" signifies the perceptibility of an object only in inner consciousness, where consciousness is defined as any "mental appearance" (psychische Erscheinung) insofar as it has a content.⁵

¹"Nichts kann beurteilt, nichts kann aber auch begehrt, nichts kann gehofft oder gefürchtet werden, wenn es nicht vorgestellt wird." FVES, p. 104.

²FVES, pp. 115-116.


⁴FVES, p. 118.

⁵FVES, p. 181.
Methodology was regarded by Brentano as the source of much error. Psychology had to be established on a firm empirical basis, that of perception and experience (Wahrnehmung und Erfahrung).\footnote{FVES, p. 34.} Traditional introspection methods (Selbstbeobachtung) were unsatisfactory since "observation" (Beobachtung) could be only of the externally perceivable.\footnote{FVES, p. 35.} Mental phenomena could be grasped only in inner perception (innere Wahrnehmung). The full implications of this distinction emerge later as Brentano maintains that inner perception gives a self-evident, adequate, and immediate grasp of mental phenomena, whereas physical phenomena cannot be said actually to be as they are grasped. In making such a sharp distinction between the two classes of phenomena Brentano is attempting to allow mental phenomena to be regarded as objects of true and evident cognition. Scheler subjects the self-evidence of inner perception to a far more thorough scrutiny than did Brentano.

Brentano distinguished three fundamental classes of mental phenomena, each being a distinct type of intentional relation. These three fundamental classes (Grundklassen) were representation, judgement, and affectivity. Representations, which may be of any object, however concrete or abstract, are the basis of the other two intentional relations, as for example, a judgement is the act of accepting or rejecting an object presented in a representation. The third fundamental class is that of "the emotions in the widest sense of the term" ("der Gemütssbewegungen im weitesten Sinn des Wortes")\footnote{VUSE, p. 16.} from the simple forms of inclination or...
disinclination in respect of the mere idea, to joy and sadness arising from conviction and to the most complicated phenomena as to the choice of ends and means."1 The intentional relation for this class is that of love or hate, a form of pleasing or displeasing.2 Representation can never be in error, it either is or is not, but judgement and affectivity may be wrong or right.3 "Good", in its widest sense, is "that which can be loved with a right love"4 and which is good in itself.5

There is a distinction between forms of judgement and affectivity based on self-evidence, and those based on instinct or habit.6 The principle of contradiction is self-evident to judgement7 and, analogously, that "all men naturally desire knowledge" is an example of a self-evident statement in the sphere of affectivity.8 There is, however, "no guarantee that everything which is good will arouse within us a love with the character of rightness."9 Error, at least in the form of affective indifference, if not active hate, thus has not yet been eliminated. Nor has any criteria for ranking goods been established. The best method of ranking goods is in terms of preference, i.e., what good would be chosen over another good, but this still does not tell us how we make such a choice, how we know which is better.10 To say 'x' is better when the act of preferring it is right, as Brentano initially suggests,11 seems only to

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involve us in a tautology, and moreover turns us back to the uncertainties of self-evidence in affectivity.

Chapter Eight, entitled "Einheit der Grundklasse für Gefühl und Wille", in Book Two, Volume I of Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt is valuable in showing the degree to which Brentano, as compared with Scheler, developed his analysis of affective perception. It is clear from section one\(^1\) that though Brentano noted differences between the phenomena of Gefühl and Wille, Fühlen and Streben he did not find it possible to assert the existence of categorical distinctions between these phenomena as did Scheler. Brentano hopes no one will believe him to think that affective phenomena are cognitive acts (Erkenntnissakte) whether of goodness or badness, value or non-value.\(^2\) Scheler did not attribute full cognitive status to all affective perception (Fühlen) and certainly not to strivings, acts of will, or any affective state (Gefühl), but he did regard Wertfühlen as cognitive.

Brentano's fundamental classes are related in such a way that both representations and judgements constitute the basis of affectivity. Thus though affectivity is not regarded as cognitive it is based on cognitive acts. The problem of error still exists for affectivity since judgements, which though cognitive are subject to error, join the representations, which are not subject to error, in founding the phenomena of affectivity. Scheler was able to eliminate this particular source of error insofar as he was successful in establishing Wertfühlen as immediate and

\(^1\)PVES, pp. 306-310. \(^2\)PVES, p. 312.
clearly evident, attributes which Brentano would reserve for representations.

One of the more valuable sources for discovering Scheler's relation to Brentano is found in Scheler's comments on Brentano's work in the Formalismus itself. For example, Scheler notes in passing in his discussion of the goals of striving that Brentano was in error when he asserted that all acts of desire must be founded on a representation (p. 60). Scheler, unlike Brentano, differentiates strivings, which as yet have no specific object which could be represented, from acts of will oriented towards a specific end.

In the Formalismus, as we have already noted, Scheler asserts that in the phenomenology of values and of the emotional life there is an a priori objectivity independent of logic, of reason, and of sensibility (p. 85). It is in the end the a priority of love and hate that constitutes the foundation of all other a priority, that of being, as well as that of will for contents. It is in this a priority that theory and practice are ultimately united in the phenomenological scheme. Scheler noted that Brentano had already set forth an analogous opinion (p. 85, n. 1). We have already noted Scheler's use of Brentano's a priori axioms of the existence and non-existence of positive and negative value (p. 102).

Scheler rejects Brentano's axioms whereby a value, that is the sum of values $v^1$ and $v^2$, is at the same time a value superior to values $v^1$ and $v^2$. Scheler also rejects Brentano's identification of superior and preferred value. Preference is our means of access to superior value, but may be subject to illusion. Scheler also finds it impossible to
follow Brentano in his decision to leave the problem of forming an actual hierarchy of values to historical relativity (p. 107, n. 1). Scheler finds Brentano to be akin to Adam Smith and to Herbart in that they all denied the existence of autonomous ethical value phenomena by maintaining that appreciation need not be oriented by value and that value only appears, or is produced, in or through appreciation (p. 196).

The relation between Husserl and Scheler is somewhat problematic. Scheler was a younger contemporary of Husserl, who came to his own full development after Husserl did, was influenced strongly by Husserl's early work, and yet soon diverged from the path which Husserl thought phenomenology must follow. Scheler died in 1928, before the original text of Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* appeared, and must necessarily have been quite unaware of most of the ethical theories which are found in Husserl's unpublished manuscripts. The *Ideen*, which appeared in 1913, is the latest of Husserl's published works with which we can be reasonably certain Scheler was familiar at the time when he wrote the *Formalismus*.

In the *Ideen*, when Husserl sets forth the natural standpoint of the I in the world, he says that "this world is not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs, but, with the same immediacy, as a world of values, a world of goods, a practical world."¹ Values belong to "the

constitution of the 'actually present' objects as such, irrespective of my turning or not turning to consider them or indeed any other objects.¹ Likewise men are my "friends" or my "foes", my "servants" or "superiors", "strangers" or "relatives".² It is to such a world that the manifold forms of consciousness, including "the diverse acts and states of sentiment and will: approval and disapproval, joy and sorrow, desire and aversion, hope and fear, decision and action"³ relate. Other egos experience the world in like manner though for each ego "the fields of perception and memory actually present are different" and are "known in different ways", are "differently apprehended" and show "different grades of clearness".⁴ Yet we are able to "set up in common an objective spatio-temporal fact-world."⁵ It should be noted that Husserl has thus left it open to question whether it is possible to set up in common a world of goods and values.

The essential property of consciousness is to be a consciousness of something. All experiences which have this essential property are called "intentional experiences" (intentionale Erlebnisse) and are "intentionally related" (intentional bezogen) to this something of which they are conscious.⁶ This relation is not one between a psychological event

¹Ideas, p. 103. For German, "gehören konstitutiv zu den "vorhandenen" Objekten als solchen, ob ich mich ihnen und den Objekten überhaupt zuwende oder nicht," see Ideen, p. 59.
²Idee, p. 103. See Ideen, p. 60. ³Ideas, p. 103. See Ideen, p. 60.
⁵Ideas, p. 105. For German, "setzen gemeinsam eine objektive räumlich-seitliche Wirklichkeit," see Ideen, p. 62.
⁶Ideas, p. 119. See Ideen, p. 80.
and some other real existent (Dasein). 1 The something which is grasped is not the fact as lived in the world but "the pure essence grasped ideationally as pure idea," the "a priori essence in unconditioned necessity". 2

The spheres of sentiment and will contain many varied intentional stratifications, noetic and noematic. "The objects, things, qualities, the various matters which are taken in valuing to have value and the corresponding noemata of the representations, judgements, etc., on which the consciousness of value rests," must be distinguished from "the objects and contents of value themselves, or the noematic modifications corresponding to these, and then generally the complete noemata which belong to the concrete consciousness of value." 3

If a cognitive intention is to result in the action of a subject in relation to the object there must also be an affective intention. This means that affective intentionality is presupposed by the active life of the subject. Affective intentionality is not simple awareness of, but a reaching of the subject towards, the object. 4 Affective acts, such as appreciation have a double intentionality. 5 The "subject matter", pure and simple ("blossen 'Sache'") must be distinguished from the "full

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1 Ideas, p. 119. See Ideen, p. 80. 2 Ideas, p. 120. See Ideen, p. 80.

3 Ideas, p. 276. For German, "die Gegenstände, Dinge, Beschaffenheiten, Sachverhalte, die im Werten als Werte dastehen, bzw. die entsprechenden Noemata der Vorstellungen, Urteile u.dgl., welche das Wertbewusstsein fundieren ... die Wertverhalte selbst, bzw. die ihnen entsprechenden noematischen Modifikationen, und dann überhaupt die dem konkreten Wertbewusstsein zugehörigen vollständigen Noemen," see Ideen, p. 237.

4 Ideas, p. 122. See Ideen, p. 82. 5 Ideas, p. 122. See Ideen, p. 83.
intentional object" ("vollen intentionalen Objekt"). That which is valued or enjoyed "first becomes an apprehended object through a distinctively 'objectifying' turn of thought".

Though affectivity is founded on a cognitive type of intentionality, such as representation and judgement, it has a cognitive function of its own as well. Complex phenomena are cognitive, or noetic, because it is the "essential nature" ("seine Wesen") of intentional experience "to harbor in itself a 'meaning' of some sort." Husserl includes in representation all acts in which something is represented as objective to us, including some mental phenomena which belong to Brentano's third fundamental class, that of affectivity. For Husserl representation is involved in any act in which a content is given.

Intentionality as a simple "consciousness of", in which we are aware of objects without fully grasping them, is distinct from intuition. In intuition we have a knowing grasp of the object in its genuine essentiality. In intuition we gain clear and evident insight into an object which thus gains full "meaning". Husserl states that there are parallels in the self-evidence of the spheres of reason and affectivity and will.

"Every act, as also every act-correlate harbors explicitly or implicitly

2. *Ideas*, p. 122. For German, "wird vielmehr erst in einer eigenen 'vergessenstandlichen' Wendung zum erfassten Gegenstand", see *Ideen*, p. 82.
3. *Ideas*, p. 257. For German, "so etwas wie einen 'Sinn' ... in sich zu bergen," see *Ideen*, pp. 218-219.
Such logical factors can always be made explicit. Hence all acts, even those of feeling and will, are 'objectifying' acts. Original factors in the 'constituting of objects.' The valuing consciousness constitutes over against the mere world of positivity the typically new "axiological" objectivity. The rational categories of truth and validity can be applied to acts of feeling and will through "objectification" ("Objektivierung") of the latter. The objectivity of axiology is founded on the concept of evidence. Intuitions are fully adequate and evident if they are given as "pure self-givenness" ("reine Selbstgegebenheit").

In the Formalismus Scheler mentions Husserl's work occasionally and never in criticism. The tone of all his comments is that of praise and appreciation, whether in the 1916 Foreword where he attributes the unity of the phenomenological approach to Husserl, or in the later passages where he refers the reader to Husserl's critique of nominalism, notes that he is using a term in the particular sense set forth by Husserl, or attributes to Husserl credit for having made the original distinction between two concepts, etc.

From Husserl Scheler took the notion that objects are indeed immediately given and that what is self-given is as it is 'meant'.

1 Ideas, p. 322. For German, "Jeder Akt, bezw. jedes Aktkorrelat birgt in sich ein 'Logisches' explizite oder implizite," see Ideen, p. 290.
6 Ideas, p. 194. Ideen, p. 156.
Husserl was more careful than Brentano in noting that perceptual illusions in regard to one's own experience could produce error in knowledge based on inner perception. Scheler found Brentano to have been correct to regard inner perception adequately given as valid, though he agreed with Husserl that caution was required. It is the doctrine of essential intuition which is used by Scheler as the foundation for his theory of value. Scheler did not regard Husserl as having escaped from the traditional duality of reason and sensibility.¹ The thesis of the intentionality of affectivity, which is found in Brentano and Husserl, became a far more important concept in Scheler's work. Both Husserl and Scheler attempted to escape from the subjectivism that threatened Brentano's theory of value.

The principal gulf between Husserl and Scheler lies in the difference between the natures of their experienced worlds. This difference in short is that between idealism and realism. Husserl speaks of the consciousness as "constituting" its world, and is thus untroubled by the I-object abyss of Brentano, while Scheler is overwhelmingly insistent on the ability of the person to grasp the essential in itself in its objectivity without any superposition of structure on the experienced object. On the one hand all structure lies in the experiencing subject at one with the intentional object, and the aim is to discover pure essences of absolute consciousness, while on the other hand all structure lies in the experienced object, in reality itself, and the aim is

¹See Ideas, p. 407, or Ideen, p. 360.
to discover pure essences of any kind. Paul Landsberg differentiated the points of view of Husserl and Scheler in the following way:

La méthode de réduction et l'idéalisme transcendental conçus dans les Idées (Idées zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie) ne représentent que la prise de conscience du sens fondamental d'une position qui est déjà immanente aux Logische Untersuchungen. Déjà dans ce premier livre le divorce entre Husserl et Scheler se trouvait donc préformé: Scheler, cet esprit avide de toute sorte de réalité, vivant dans une intuition polymorphe du réel. Il paraît qu'il y a deux types très différents de philosophes. Les uns s'efforcent à pénétrer par une lumière limitée les arcanes de la réalité concrète et de la vie vécus. Les autres comme Husserl aspirent à la clarté absolue, à une région spirituelle qui précède ou transcende l'humaine existence.

One wonders ultimately whether there is much to choose between the respective approaches of Husserl and Scheler for in any theory of value based on either of these two approaches the fundamental problems will be those of illusion and error. Scheler can provide no more proof of the validity of his essential intuitions than Husserl can of the validity of his constituted essences. Phenomenology can only attempt to describe its intuitions in such a way that they will be grasped as valid, as self-given, by others.

There are certain distinctions between the phenomenological methods of Husserl and Scheler which must be drawn more sharply than we have thus far. It is true that Scheler is not critical of Husserl in the Formalismus itself, but it is also true that Scheler was elsewhere highly critical of the Ideen. It is probable that had the Ideen appeared earlier

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than 1913 (the year in which Part I of the *Formalismus* was published) the *Formalismus*, which contains some of Scheler's most important discussions of phenomenology and phenomenological method\(^1\), would have made clear distinctions between the positions of Scheler and Husserl.

In the *Ideen* there is no existence outside consciousness. The fact that an object is given as real in consciousness does not lead Husserl to assert the actual reality of the object. Reality does not belong to the essence of objects. The phenomenological reduction suspends all questions of existence or reality. This position is what we referred to earlier as "idealism". Scheler, also using a phenomenological analysis of consciousness, rejected this idealism. In the *Formalismus* Scheler asserted that the very fact that the intentional objects of our consciousness are given to us as independent of the subject is in itself sufficient evidence that the object cannot be conditioned by the subject.\(^2\) In his subsequent works Scheler supplemented Husserl's emphasis on the subjective aspect of givenness with an analysis of objective data.\(^3\) In connection with this contrast between Husserl and Scheler we may note as an example Scheler's rejection in the *Formalismus*, Part II, of the notion that "the world" is an "idea". Making no mention of Husserl Scheler asserts that the world is a concrete existing individual being and that the intention

\(^1\)See, for example, *Formalismus*, II, A.


\(^3\)Ibid., 302.
directed towards it does not at all reduce to an idea without corresponding reality, to a pure object of mental life (pp. 404-405).

Scheler, unlike Husserl, never distinguished "eidetic reduction" (from the particular to the universal essence) from "phenomenological reduction" (from existence to pure phenomenal whatness). The result is that Scheler's "what", once freed from the "that", is still neutral as regards the distinction between universal and particular.¹ In accord with his criticism of Husserl's trend toward idealism, Scheler was particularly critical of the lack of clarification of the meaning of existence prior to its bracketing in the phenomenological reduction.² Scheler's discussion of affective perception, sentiments, and affective states, which we will be considering in detail in the pages to follow, is a model of Scheler's use of the phenomenological method.


²Ibid., 245.
Scheler rejects the traditional division of the structure of spirit into "reason" and "sensibility" (p. 267). In the past all that was not of reason was attributed to sensibility (p. 268). Hence emotional life was necessarily reduced to the scheme of sensibility. Scheler asserts that modern philosophers, for the most part, also reduce all striving, and all love and hate, to sensibility. Intuition, affective perception, striving, love and hate, all those aspects of spirit outside logic, are made dependent on the psycho-physical organic structure of man. As a result no one has even asked if there cannot exist among these non-logical aspects of our spirit original and essential hierarchic differences between the conceptual contents of acts and functions, if there is not to be found among these acts and functions an "original-character" analogous to that which belongs to the acts by which we grasp the objects connected by pure logic, and thus whether there does not exist a pure intuition, a pure affective perception, a pure love and a pure hate, a pure striving and a pure will, as independent of the psycho-physical organic structure of the human race as is pure thought, yet ordered by an original legality irreducible to the rules of the empirical soul. Scheler concludes that the notion that there can and must be an absolute ethic which is at once a priori and emotional

CHAPTER THREE

WERTFÜHLEN AND ITS ROLE IN SCHELER'S VALUE THEORY
has been hardly dreamed of before now (p. 268).

In Blaise Pascal's "ordre du coeur" or "logique du coeur" Scheler finds a precursor of his doctrine of the emotional a priori. Scheler states that when Pascal wrote that "Le coeur a ses raisons", he understood it to mean that there is "an eternal and absolute legality of affective perception, love and hate, as absolute as the legality of pure logic, but which cannot be reduced to an intellectual legality" (p. 268). Scheler notes that other commentators have thought Pascal meant that "when the reason has spoken, the heart also has its say" (p. 269). But Scheler thinks Pascal meant in fact to say that "there is a mode of experience whose objects are absolutely inaccessible to the understanding, in face of which the understanding is as blind as the ears and the hearing are in the face of colors, a mode of experience that puts us authentically in the presence of objective objects and the eternal order that ties them to one another, these objects being the values and this eternal order the axiological hierarchy" (p. 269). Scheler adds that "the order and the laws of this experience are as determinate, exact, and discernable, as those of logic and mathematics" (p. 269). This interpretation of Pascal is in immediate accord with Scheler's notion of the emotional a priori, and indeed is presented by way of introduction to Scheler's detailed discussion of Fühlen and Gefühle.

Simple affective states (Gefühlszustände) are distinct from intentional "affective perception of something" (Fühlen von etwas) (p. 269). In itself this distinction prejudices nothing of the axiological content
of the intentional sentiments (Gefühle) (p. 269). It tells us nothing about the degree to which the intentional sentiments are appropriate organs for grasping values (p. 270). Original intentional affective perception exists ("Es gibt ursprüngliches intentionales Fühlen").

The instance, Scheler argues, which best shows that this is the case is that in which sentiment and affective perception co-exist, particularly that in which the sentiment itself is the intentional object of the affective perception. An example of this is an affective state (Gefühlszustand) of a clearly sensorial sort, such as would correspond to the agreeable character of a meal. Neither the type nor the mode of the affective perception of this affective state is as yet determined.

It is quite an opposite question for the variable states of fact whereby I "suffer from this pain", I "submit to it", or I "support it". What varies here in the functional quality of affective perception is certainly not the state of pain. Nor is attention, understood in the general sense of the term, whereby I "take consciousness of", "remark", "consider", "observe" or "form an idea of". An observed pain is quite the opposite of a pain from which one suffers. Moreover all these forms and degrees of attention and taking consciousness can themselves, within each of the qualities of affective perception, undergo all possible variations within the limits where the sentiment remains itself. The thresholds of the affectively perceivable variations of the givenness of pain are therefore completely distinct from the thresholds and relations of increase of the state of pain in relation to the irritation or cause of the pain.
Aptitudes for suffering and enjoyment are independent from sensibility to sensorial pleasure and displeasure. In the presence of a pain of the same intensity one individual may suffer more or less than another. Affective states and affective perception are therefore fundamentally distinct realities. The former belong to the sphere of contents and phenomena, while the latter are functions of grasping these contents and phenomena.

Specifically sensorial sentiments are by their very nature states. By the means of simple contents of sensations (Empfindens), representations (Vorstellens), or perceptions (Wahrnehmens), they can be "connected" with objects (Objekten), but they can also be more or less objectless. Whenever such a connection is produced it is of a mediate nature. When sentiments are connected with the object it is always by relational acts superimposed on the givenness of the sentiment. If I ask myself what is the cause of my current disposition it is at first by completely different acts that this cause can be perceived or remembered. It is only after the fact and by a mental vision that I can relate the two. It is not true that the sentiment is here connected during the process to an objective reality (p. 270). In certain cases the sentiment is tied to the object by the intervention of perception or representation of the object. Certain affective states appear originally tied to no object. In this case I must first find the cause which has provoked them. In no case does the sentiment itself refer to the object. It contains no mental vision. It is not oriented towards something.
In other cases, where a sentiment is often found in conjunction with exterior objects and situations or with lived experiences of alteration in my own body, it can become an indice of this alteration. This is what happens, for example, when certain pains announce to me the beginning of an illness because past experience has taught me that they are connected with the first signs of this illness. Yet again here the symbolic relation demands first the mediation of the experience and the mental vision.

The tie of affective perception, as intentional, with that which is affectively perceived in it, however, is a connection of a completely different sort. But it is this particular connection that we find in all affective perception of values. Three different types of affective perception must be distinguished:

1) The affective perception of sentiments understood in the sense of states, and the modes of this affective perception, such as suffering and joy: Affective perception of sentiments can itself tend toward the zero point if we leave out of account the changes that are produced in the modes although the affective state remains the same. Strong emotions of dread often provoke an almost total disappearance of the capacity for affective perception. In these cases the sensibility (Empfindlichkeit) remains intact in all its aspects. Therefore there is no reason in such cases not to admit that affective states exist. After the paralyzing intensity of sentiment has faded we can affectively perceive the sentiment.
2) The affective perception of emotional and atmospheric character: We find here qualitative emotional characters which can be also given as affective qualities, but which are nonetheless never lived as "sentiments", i.e., as referring to the I.

3) The affective perception of values such as the agreeable, the beautiful, and the good: It is only here that affective perception exercises a cognitive function, absent in the first two cases, in addition to its intentional nature. From the beginning affective perception bears a "relation of itself" and an "orientation of itself" towards an object, towards values (p. 271). This affective perception is not a brute state, a simple state of fact, capable of entering into associative relations or of becoming a sign; it is a movement with a determinate goal, though it is not at all an activity of central origin nor a temporally extended movement. It is a punctual movement, sometimes directed by the I towards the object, sometimes directed towards the I itself, a movement in which something is given to me and manifests itself to me.

Affective perception therefore has the same relation to its axiological correlate as "representation" has to its "object", i.e. an intentional relation. Here affective perception is not tied from without to the object whether immediately or by representation, but views originally a particular kind of objects, i.e. values.

Affective perception is therefore an event having a signification and is therefore also capable of corresponding or not corresponding to a content of realization. This is why all "affective perception of something" is in principle equally a form of "comprehension", whereas pure
affective states can be only established and explained by their causes. Consider the case of an emotional clash. Anger arises and develops in me. The tie between my anger and its object is clearly neither intentional nor original. Representation, thought, or rather the objects given therein, arouse my anger and only then (though usually rather quickly) do I relate the anger to the objects, and always by means of representation. By this anger I do not "grasp" anything. To the contrary, in order for this anger to arise something bad must have already been grasped by me in an act of affective perception.

But it is a contrary situation when I feel so and so about something or on the subject of something. Here the objects have not been grasped already, but they exist before me not as simply perceived, but as affected by value predicates now being given in an affective perception. The axiological qualities immanent to the axiological structures in question themselves demand certain qualities of emotional response reaction of the same type at the same time that they attain their goal in some way in these reactions. They constitute correlations of comprehension and signification, special correlations, which are neither empirical nor contingent, and which do not depend on the individual psychic causality of individuals. These correlations of significations between axiological structure and emotional response reactions belong, as presuppositions, to all empirical comprehension (p. 270). If the demands of the values do not seem fulfilled, we suffer, as for example, when we are sad not to have succeeded in taking delight in an event to the degree to which its affectively perceived value merits, or not to have succeeded in
grieving as deeply, for example, as a fatal accident to a person dear to us demands.

These types of attitudes (which we call neither acts nor functions) have in common with intentional affective perception their orientation. But they do not contain in the proper sense any intentional view, understanding by this lived experience capable of mentally viewing an object and making appear, in doing so, an objective reality. For such is only the case for emotional lived experiences which constitute, in the most rigorous sense, affective perception of values.

Here we do not have an affective perception "on the subject" of something, but a direct affective perceptive view of something, a certain axiological quality. In this case, i.e. in the accomplishment of affective perception, we are not objectively conscious of the perceiving affectively; what presents itself to us, from without or from within, is only an axiological quality. There must be a new reflective act in order that the "perceiving affectively" itself be objectalized for us, and that we thus be able to grasp reflexively what we "perceive-affectively" attached to the objective value already given.

This affective perceptive grasp of values we call the class of intentional functions. These functions have no need of the mediation of pretended "acts of objectivation" belonging to representation, judgement, etc., to be tied to the objective scheme. This mediation is necessary only for the affective state, not for authentic intentional affective perception. When intentional affective perception is produced, it is the world of objects themselves which "open" themselves to us, but
only under its axiological aspect. The simple fact that intentional affective perception is often produced without any imaged object shows quite well that it constitutes an "act of objectivation" which needs no representative mediation.

Moreover, if one studied (Scheler thinks this is not the place to do it) how the natural perception and intuition we have of the world are constructed, if one studied the general laws of the formation of unities of meaning in the language of children, the different ways the meanings in the major linguistic families are organized from which evolve the meanings of words and the syntax of diverse idioms, — one would see that it is the affective perceptive unities and the axiological unities which play the directing and fundamental role in all intuition of the world expressing itself in language (p. 273). Assuredly if one attributes the affective domain only to psychology one is led in principle to neglect these facts. One therefore would never pay attention to that which, in affective perception, in preference, in love and in hate, opens itself to us from the world and the axiological constituents of this world; one would be concerned only with what we find in ourselves by internal perception (i.e. by a representative attitude) when we perceive affectively, when we prefer, when we love and hate, when we enjoy a work of art, when we pray to God.

The emotional functions of lived experiences which are constructed only on "preference" and "subordination" must be distinguished from those which constitute a superior stage of emotional and intentional life and permit us to grasp in these very functions the hierarchy of values, their
superiority and inferiority. "Preference" and "subordination" are not at all striving activities like, for example, choice which itself always presupposes antecedent acts of preference; they do not reduce to a purely affective perceptive attitude, but constitute a special class of lived experiences of emotional acts. The proof of this is that we can only "choose" in the strict sense between actions, while we can also "prefer" one good to another. Preference attaches itself immediately to affectively perceived axiological material, independent of the things that serve to support it, and does not presuppose, as does choice, representation of goals or even of ends. To the contrary, it is under the co-conditional action of preference that the goal contents of striving are formed — goal contents which themselves are not yet end contents, which always supposes a reflection on the pre-existing goal contents and belong only to this kind of striving activity which is the will. Therefore one sees that preference belongs only to the scheme of axiological knowledge, not to that of striving. In reality this class of lived experiences of preference consists of intentional acts in the most rigorous sense of the term, since they are "oriented" and "significant"; but to oppose them to the intentional functions of affective perception, we unite them with love and hate in the group of "emotional acts".

Love and hate constitute the superior level of our intentional emotional life. Here we are far away from the scheme of pure "states". Language itself marks this difference of love from the reactions of response, for one does not say that one loves or hates "on the subject of something" or "of something", but rather "something". It is true
that one frequently hears it said that love and hate belong, with anger, exasperation, and contrariety, to the "emotions" or to the "affective states", but this error can be explained only by the unilateral point of view of our era in regard to this question, which rests on a total lack of phenomenological inquiry. One could believe that love and hate are themselves a preference or subordination, but they are no such things. Preference presupposes at the very least the intentional view of a plurality of affectively perceived values (p. 274). This is not the case for love and hate where it can be that one is concerned with only one value.

Love and hate are a type of "response-reaction" to the superior and inferior being of affectively perceived values such as is given in preference. But we define love and hate as "spontaneous" acts as opposed to response-reactions such as vengeance. In love and hate our spirit does more than "respond" to values already affectively perceived. In love and hate it is rather a question of acts in which the universe of values, whatever it be, which is accessible to the affective perception of a being (a universe equally presupposed by preference) gives way to an experience of enlargement or contraction (and this naturally completely independently of the universe of goods presently given, i. e. the real precious things which are not even necessary for values to be perceived in their diversity, plentitude, and differentiation).

This enlargement and contraction does not at all involve a creation or destruction of values by love and hate. Values can be neither created nor destroyed. They exist independent of all organic structures belonging
to spiritual beings. It does not belong by essence to the act of love to orient itself owing to a "response" towards a value after it has perceived or preferred. Rather the act of love plays the role of a detector in our grasping of values. This is its unique role. Love constitutes a movement owing to the development of which new and superior values, i.e. as yet unknown to the being in question, are clarified and illuminated. Therefore love does not result from affective perception of values and from preference, but precedes them as their guide. This is why its "creative" activity does not manifest itself at all in regard to values which exist by themselves, but in regard to the circle and collection which constitute all the values that a being can perceive and prefer. Ethics will find its completion in the discovery of the laws of love and hate themselves, in that which concerns the degree of their absolute character, their apriority and primitiveness, their bearing on the laws of preference and on the laws of the relations of the axiological qualities to which they correspond (p. 275).

The preceding pages present the definitive characteristics of the various forms of affective perception (Fühlen). We must now examine the role which affective perception, and particularly affective perception of value (Wertfühlen), perform in Scheler's theory of non-formal value.

Scheler asserts quite early in his discussion that values express themselves in things of value, that value contents find their content in phenomena (p. 34), that values themselves are real objective independent entities (p. 37). It is then self-evident that if human beings
are to be oriented in their choices and preferences by these objective values they must have some means of "knowing" these values. *Wertfühlen* performs this requisite cognitive function for Scheler. This simply restates the elementary thesis on which Scheler's value theory rests. We must concern ourselves as well with the fine points of the function of *Wertfühlen*.

The values, which are the basis of striving, are given to the person immediately in affective perception (p. 57). It is thus possible to deny that strivings are oriented by affective states, such as pleasure, for even in those cases where pleasure *seems* to constitute the goal of striving (for example, strivings for particular kinds of food) the goal is not the pleasure itself, but rather the *value* of this pleasure (p. 57). All values can be grasped, preferred, and subordinated independent from striving. Strivings can be oriented toward negative value. There is no guarantee by definition or any other means that a striving is oriented necessarily toward positive value. Illusions about value often arise simply because we assume that what we strive for must be of positive value (p. 58). *Ressentiment* is a more complex form of axiological illusion whereby we transform affectively perceived positive values, which we are powerless to attain, into negative values (p. 59). Strivings and affective perception of values are hence fundamentally independent.

There is, however, an essential correlation whereby there corresponds to all values given in striving a possible grasp of these same values in affective perception. A value given in striving and in affective perception can be identical (p. 59). Presumably the fact that the same value,
was grasped as positive by affective perception, as was given in striving, would assure both the absence of axiological illusion (affective perception alone provides this assurance, striving alone does not) and that the striving was itself good.

Will has the same axiological basis as striving though in willing a content is represented as something to be realized. The ends in their axiological respect are not things but values. The end of the will is determined by an act of choice which in turn rests on the value goals of striving. Thus choice is limited in the field of values open to it by the values which are already the material of striving. A will is "good" insofar as it chooses the highest value among those which belong to the goals of striving. The will is oriented in this choice by the knowledge given it in the preferential act of the superior hierarchic character of the value content given in the striving (p. 63). Affective perception has a role in the second step, that of the orientation of the will by the preferential act, for the latter is a cognitive function of Wertfühlen.

It seems, however, that affective perception cannot in any way extend the field of values among which the will chooses, for this field is determined only by the goals of striving. Though Scheler insists that we can grasp values toward which we have no striving, and that our value universe would be far poorer if we could not, there seems to be no way whereby we can will that which has not been a goal of striving or whereby striving necessarily reacts positively or negatively to all the values grasped by Wertfühlen. This is only realistic however, for
no man, unless his environment is unnaturally limited, desires or wills in respect of each and every element of his environment of which he has at some time judged the value.

The moral value of an individual depends on the nature of the values offered to the will by strivings, on the level of these values in relation to the objective hierarchy and hence on their richness and differentiation, and on the preferential order in which the strivings comply with the will, for strivings, before they are presented to the will, already form a hierarchy of preference in accord with the objective hierarchy of values. The only instances where this hierarchy disappears or is disordered are those of perversions of strivings or illnesses of the will (p. 65).

A priori axiology has two main elements: 1) knowledge of values which is based on affective perception and preference, and 2) knowledge of the essential value correlations, i.e. their superiority and inferiority. A being capable of only perception and thought but not of affective perception could have no a priori axiology. It is on this a priori value knowledge that moral will and moral action is founded. Without this basis in affective perception a will is blind or impulsive, but not moral. Self-givenness is the highest degree of adequation (equivalent to absolute evidence). Values, however, can be given in affective perception in various degrees of adequation (p. 89). In the case where a value is self-given it is necessarily determining for the will (thus Scheler qualifies the Socratic maxim whereby knowledge of the good determines the will) (p. 88).
The admission that affective perception may not give a value in its fullest degree of adequation seems to qualify further our earlier discussion of the necessary role of affective perception in relation to the will. The will, though it chooses on the basis of knowledge provided by affective perception, may be provided with inadequate knowledge and insofar as this is the case chooses "blindly" or on the basis of an axiological illusion.

The field of values which are affectively perceivable is limited by the acts of preference and subordination. This is the case because values present themselves in a hierarchy and this hierarchy can be grasped only in preference and subordination, hence affective perception of value is founded on preference and subordination (pp. 109-110). This reflects the fact that Scheler regards values as essentially hierarchically related and as meaningful as values only insofar as they are grasped as so related.

Affective perception is significant for grasping the hierarchy of values in relation to supports of value. Superior values are commonly affectively perceived as durable in their essence. The validity of durability as a criterion for original superiority of value is problematic, but it is a fact for example that when we find that "we no longer love someone" we do not say "love is a fleeting thing" but rather "my love was an illusion". On the other hand if a community of interests ceases to exist this is accepted as being in accord with the essence of communities of interests. Love is a higher value than communities of interests (pp. 111-113).
Values are higher insofar as they are less divisible and insofar as they unite rather than separate the individuals who grasp them in affective perception. A material good must be divided to be affectively perceived since the value it supports is of the sensorial order. Divine values are least divisible, most unite individuals, and at the same time belong in principle to all beings. Scheler finds it problematic whether these criteria of extension and divisibility constitute the most original essences of the superior-inferior value distinction (pp. 113-114). In all cases where one value is dependent on another, affective perception of the former occurs through that of the latter. The relations of dependency between values is therefore independent of all inductive experience (pp. 114-116).

The values given in immediate intuition as superior are the same values which in affective perception and preference are given as closest to absolute value (p. 118). Affective perception and preference are therefore the means of grasping the original essence of superior and inferior value. The criteria discussed above which Scheler regarded as problematic, though expressive of essential correlations, are based on affective perception of the superiority and inferiority of values and are therefore secondary. A more detailed discussion of the same issue is found in Scheler's comments on the four modalities of value. Each modality, that of the agreeable and disagreeable, the vital, the spiritual, and the sacred, has its own particular form of affective perception, the function of which in each case is to grasp the objective values corresponding to that modality (pp. 125-130).
A man's spiritual state rules his behavior. In order to grasp his spiritual state we need not look at what he does, for in fact this may deceive us, as in the case of a man who acts in such a way as to conceal his true spiritual state. Spiritual states are graspable by intuition and their value can be affectively perceived. Our notions of a man's character and actions are corrected in terms of our knowledge of the particular spiritual state, hence we are not dependent on observation of behavior alone in making judgments about other men (pp. 134-139).

Duty in the first instance is not founded on immediate insight of the good. Insofar as a value is self-given as positive, Socrates' maxim holds and we have no need to speak of duty. In fact, duty is conceptually in conflict with an immediate grasp of value. Duty tends to be imposed precisely when our insight is inadequate or the personal moral responsibility is too heavy for us to bear (pp. 206-208). Hence duty is that which affirms itself as resisting all criticism rather than that which is discerned as a positive good (p. 209). Thus it is clear that the only role of affective perception of value in relation to duty is that of abolishing the need to speak of it, or of exempting oneself and perhaps one's peers from the duties which one might be regarded as obliged to perform according to the universal maxim of a particular society. Thus it is affective perception which founds the moral autonomy of the individual person (pp. 499-506).

From the opposition of duty and immediate insight of values Scheler concludes that it is erroneous to conclude that moral norms
correspond to the disposition of the people who posit them. The lack of a particular prescription may indicate either that the people in question do not at all grasp 'x' as a self-given value in affective perception or that all these people so grasp it and hence there is no need for a prescription regarding it. Hence the use of the existence of the variety of moral norms to prove moral scepticism is false since norms are not at all the ultimate primitive elements of moral life (pp. 230-231).

Each lived experience bears in itself an immediately given intuitive nuance given in the affective perception we have of it. Thus the mental, i.e. all that can be grasped by an act of internal intuition, includes values (p. 214). Affective states can deter us from affective perception. When our environment is given to us only as a source of stimulation for our affective states the environment is still phenomenologically full of value. But in this instance the value qualities of our affective states, rather than those of objects, are given and in illusion can appear to belong to the things in our environment. In the place of the values supported by things appear the value qualities of our changing affective states and the latter tend to hide from us more or less completely the former (p. 256).

It is difficult to know whether what is neutral in value for us is in fact valueless or simply not affectively perceivable, at least for us. Lack of a value distinction in a language does not necessarily imply that native speakers of this language are not conscious of this distinction. Indefinite development of the capacity for affective
perception of values seems possible for individuals and for the human species as a whole. In fact, men are usually most clearly conscious of the values which fulfill the requirements of their needs and instincts (pp. 280-281). Illusions in evaluation often occur through the confusion of objective value with our interests. (p. 327). The view Scheler seems to be supporting here is that as a man's needs develop his natural affective perception becomes more differentiated and developed. Active attention tends to be directed towards those goods and values of which one may potentially be deprived or of which one is deprived in comparison to others (p. 282).

Variation in affective perception of values, and thus in the structure of value preference, of love and hate, is one of the fundamental causes of historical and cultural ethical relativity (p. 312). Errors in analysis inevitably occur if this variation is overlooked. Growth of a particular ethos occurs through the discovery, by affective perception motivated by love, of values superior to those already grasped (pp. 318-319). Preferential rules are modified in the light of this discovery. Preferential rules between the old values remain intact, but are now relative to the newly discovered superior value (p. 319).

Knowledge of levels of moral formation can be gained through study of differences in the differentiation of affective perception and the graduation of approval and disapproval based on it (p. 319). Needs are distinct from instincts, for the former are only the product of civilization and are based on affective perception of value in the "needed" goods. Needs are produced by habitual experience of non-primitive
goods. New production thus leads to the development of new needs (p. 365).

In order further to clarify the role of Wertfühlen in Scheler's value theory, let us assume a situation in which Wertfühlen is totally inoperative. In essence what we are doing is truncating the system in order to see what remains. Affective states, such as pleasure and pain, would still exist. Such affective states could still be mediately related to their objects by representation and perception. Affective perception of affective states and of atmospheric character would also still exist. Strivings could no longer be oriented by values and therefore would probably have affective states, such as pleasure, as their goals. Without any means of verification the question of whether a striving was oriented towards positive value would become simply tautological. Choices made by the will could not be made on the basis of immediate knowledge of superior and inferior value and thus would probably be oriented to a maximization of pleasure or self-interest.

We would need completely new criteria for what constituted a moral will and moral action. There would be no a priori axiology. A man's behavior would be our sole means of evaluating his morality, i.e. the degree to which he possessed a moral will. Duty would have lost its main critic. The new view of duty would depend on the notions of moral will and of moral action and the degree to which the potential clash between a social ethic and an individual ethic based on pleasure and self-interest had been resolved. Such is the situation with which one would be faced. It is one to which we should be quite accustomed as it contains the essential elements of recent ethical theories based on
interests. One must recognize, however, that it is far removed from the value theory envisioned by Scheler.
CHAPTER FOUR

EVALUATION OF SCHELER'S DOCTRINE OF WERTFÜHLEN

There are three fundamental problems which must be taken up in the evaluation of Scheler's doctrine of Wertfühlen: the nature of value, the existence of Wertfühlen, and error and illusion in Wertfühlen. As in any epistemological relationship the basic elements of the object, the method by which the object is known, and the validity of the resultant knowledge, are intertwined. For the purposes of discussion we will consider these problems in the order given above, referring back and forth as necessary.

Scheler's notion of value as objective, irreducible, eternal, and trans-human is controversial. There are numerous criticisms of, and alternatives to, this view of value which must be considered. Without an object, that is, without the existence of values, Wertfühlen would become superfluous. Insofar as Scheler's notion of value, or a close approximation thereof, is rejected, any discussion of Wertfühlen becomes sheerly academic. If Scheler's notion of value is accepted one must then consider whether or not Wertfühlen is indeed the means by which we have access to value. On the other hand, if his notion of value is rejected, the argument, though weak, that those who do not grasp objective value in his sense have an undeveloped form of Wertfühlen, must be considered. The problems of illusion and error are no less important.
here than for any other form of knowledge. The attempt to found an ethic on Wertzfühlen would be severely shaken by the lack of any criterion of validity. The questions here are two-fold. On the one hand we will be concerned with that of the validity of Wertzfühlen as such and on the other hand with the validity of the phenomenological analysis which Scheler uses to argue for the existence of Wertzfühlen and objective value.

1. The Nature of Value

Values, for Scheler, are independent of goods and ends, and irreducible to strivings or to affective states. They are a priori, objective, and can be grasped by Wertzfühlen, but not by reason or sensibility. Values are in no way dependent upon the psycho-physical structure of human beings.¹

What we now wish to clarify is the sense in which Scheler regarded values as objective. Scheler often referred to values (including those of good and evil) as qualities. "Therefore if one wishes to subsume all values under one category, then one must denote them as qualities, but not as relations."² This choice of terminology is surprising at first glance because it appears to run counter to Scheler's insistence on the independence, the self-subsistence, of values. Scheler says that values find their value content in phenomena only insofar as they

¹Scheler's notion of value is presented in greater detail in Chapter One, p. 7ff., to which the reader may wish to refer.

²"Wenn man also Werte überhaupt unter eine Kategorie subsumieren will, so muss man sie als Qualitäten bezeichnen, nicht aber als Beziehungen." Formalismus, p. 257.
have things or persons as supports, though they remain quite distinct from these supports and cannot in any sense be explained by, or reduced to, these supports. In this sense values may be called "qualities".

This choice of terminology by Scheler was unfortunate, however, and though he extends it in examples such as the one translated on page 7, where values are compared with colors, we can only assume that he did so for lack of some better metaphor. If the comparison is to be taken literally, as it has been by many critics, ultimately it renders the notion of value only more complex and obscures, rather than clarifies, Scheler's notion of value.

There remains the difficulty of the distinction between value as objective in itself, whether in its independent existence or as supported by an existing thing or person, and as objective as grasped by a subject in affective perception. Scheler is ever insistent that values are in no way determined by the knowing subject. In this way he rejects any position allied with subjectivism. Values continue to exist even when grasped by no men. It is this same notion which allows Scheler to speak of man discovering new values insofar as his affective perceptive capacity develops. Values are thus quite independent of man as knower, though man's affective life is relative to values.

Scheler asserts that we think we live in a common universe of values, one which is common because it is objective, and we distinguish from it both our subjective aptitude to grasp it and our degree of interest in its various elements (p. 190). Thus, Scheler adds, when we say "This man is good" we mean to refer to an objective reality,
not the expression of our strivings (p. 190). Thus Scheler by no means excludes from discussion questions of the significance of subjective elements in the relations of a human being to values and things of value, but at the same time he always insists on the objectivity of values and their hierarchy.

The temptation to find similarity between Scheler's notion of value and Plato's Forms must be set aside. Values, Scheler insists, belong no more to reason than they do to sensibility. Values are not ideal objects. Thus neither their mode of existence nor of being known should be compared to such an object as the number 3 or the concept of a triangle. Values in fact belong originally to all degrees of being, not by comparison to the "good" in the sense of the ens realissimum, nor by participation in the "good" in a Platonic sense. (See pp. 180-183).

A further problem arises in regard to whether Scheler intended to distinguish in any essential manner between the mode of existence of a value in itself as independent, without any content in phenomena, and value as supported by things or persons. Affective perception is evidently not at all limited to grasping value as supported by phenomena, for in Scheler's discussion of love and hate it is said that values can be perceived in their diversity, plenitude, and differentiation completely independently of things of value. Moreover, since love is spoken of as a guide for Wertfühlen rather than its result, as a movement leading to the discovery of heretofore unknown values, such perception of independent values is evidently not dependent on a previous knowledge of these values as supported by phenomena. It thus appears
that there is no fundamental distinction between independent values and values supported by phenomena, in respect to their modes of existence, which is apparent to the affectively perceiving subject. This being the case, it would seem that phenomenological analysis should not be expected to discover such a distinction.

Scheler used phenomenological evidence to support his claim that Wertfühlen is not subjective. "Exactly that is the phenomenological fact, that in the affective perception of a value the value itself is given as different from the affective perception of it — in each individual case of an affective-perceptive function — and therefore the disappearance of an affective perception does not abolish the being of the value." ¹ Scheler counters all attempts to reduce value to pleasure and displeasure by arguing that such affective states in fact presuppose experience of value. "The value givenness and the value distinction of the objects therefore in principle precedes the experience of the affective states, which these objects cause, and founds these states and their expiration." ²

Historical change in the preferential value structure, in the ethos of particular cultures, is also interpreted by Scheler as supporting his notion of value as independent and a priori. Variety in moral

¹"Eben das ist der phänomenologische Tatbestand, dass im Fühlen eines Wertes er selbst von seinem Fühlen als verschieden — und dies in jedem einzelnen Fall einer Felhensfunktion — gegeben ist und darum das Verschwinden des Fühlen sein Sein nicht aufhebt." Formalismus, p. 259.

²"Die Wertgegebenheit und die Wertunterscheidung der Gegenstände geht also der Erfahrung der Gefühlzustände, welche diese Gegenstände bewirken, prinzipiell voraus und fundiert diese Zustände und ihren Ablauf." Formalismus, p. 261.
systems indicates that an adequate view of the universe of value and its hierarchy is attainable only if one considers all these systems and their historical development. The totality of the realm of value can never be given to a single person, people, nation, or epoch. Not evidence for scepticism, but a reaffirmation of the notion of value as objective, independent, and a priori, is thus what Scheler finds in the phenomenon of diversity of ethos.

The notion that men create values is excluded from the Schelerian schema. Scheler does, however, recognize the existence of development of new supports for value and the development of the human capacity for affective perception. The values themselves, being independent from both their supports and from the knowledge which men may have of them, cannot be said to be either created or destroyed by men.

Values and the value hierarchy were evidently conceived of by Scheler as absolute. Had they not been absolute, they would have been relative to something, and this is an alternative for which Scheler neither provides in any clear way in the Formalismus, nor evidently intended to do. In the Foreword to the 3rd edition he notes that his ethical position remains the same, and in particular that it has not been affected by alterations in his religious and metaphysical positions since it was not at all founded on metaphysical principles. We do not intend to take up the issue here of whether this independence is strict, and, if it were not, what the implications for his value theory would be. Such questions may be considered seriously only by those who have studied in detail his later writings, some of which have yet to be published.
Scheler's notion of value as absolute can be further clarified. The term 'absolute' is not used here in any Platonic sense. Sensible and vital values are regarded as relative, though not in the sense of subjectivity, to beings which have sensibility and are alive. These values would not exist if there were no sensible living beings and are therefore not absolute values. Absolute values are those values which are not relative to sensibility and life, that is, moral, spiritual, and sacred values. The absoluteness of a value is given immediately, and acts of comparison, induction, and judgement do not serve as evidence for it (p. 119). Values are higher insofar as they are less relative to an absolute value. A second kind of relativity is that between values and goods and is known, not immediately, but through reason, while the third form of relativity is that between goods and things.

The precise nature of value in Scheler's sense remains problematic. From a phenomenological point of view it can be said, as Scheler did, that values are the intentional correlates of Wertfühlen. Thus, assuming that phenomenological analysis is accepted, and that Wertfühlen is thought to exist, certain observations can be made about the relationships of values to one another and to things of value and persons. Attempts to compare the mode of existence of values in themselves to modes of existence discussed in the traditional terms of rational philosophy can be set aside by declaring that values are unique in this respect. Where difficulty is encountered, however, is where Scheler seems to have ventured beyond the bounds of phenomenological analysis. That is, if
we are to regard values as open to us as human beings only as intentional correlates of Wertfühlen, how can we regard as anything more than speculation statements to the effect that values are immutable, and that some values are absolute in the sense that they are not dependent on the existence of sensible living beings for existence?

It is one matter to assert that values are objective and independent on the basis of the phenomenological fact that a value as grasped by affective perception is given as distinct from that act of affective perception (p. 259). It is quite a different matter to assert that values are immutable, for this could only be known by an eternal being who continually grasped all values in affective perception. This is therefore one instance in which Scheler seems to have gone beyond the bounds of phenomenological evidence.

Scheler distinguished, as we have noted, absolute and relative values as those which were not and were dependent, respectively, on the existence of sensible living beings for their own existence. It is reasonable to say, as Scheler does, that sensible and vital values would not exist if there were no sensible living beings. It is, however, difficult to comprehend, in the absence of the postulation of a God or even a spirit of the universe, how moral, spiritual, and sacred values are not dependent for existence on the existence of at least some human beings. Moreover, insofar as his claim that some values are absolute does depend on the postulation of a God it cannot be said to rest on phenomenological evidence. If phenomenology is to attempt to build a metaphysic surely it must limit the scope of that metaphysic to discussion
of phenomena which are in fact open to phenomenological experience.

The questions of the nature of phenomenological evidence and self
givenness, fundamental for a proper evaluation of Scheler's arguments
for the nature of value, will be taken up in the third section of this
chapter.

We find it possible to agree with Scheler that subjective theories
which attempt to ground value solely in satisfaction or some other
psychological state are incorrect, for such psychological states presup-
pose values and grounds of values which are objective. Similarly interest
cannot be said to bestow value on its object, but only the condition
of being regarded as valuable which is quite a different matter. When
we say "x is good" we mean that it is worthy of approval, not simply
that we approve of it. A parallel is found in the case of facts which
are known about the physical world. My coming to know a fact does not
create the fact which existed previous to my knowledge of it.

If we take any given situation, then, we must say that it is made
up of a multitude of facts — physical facts and value facts. A descrip-
tion of this situation by any particular individual might well be some-
what different from that given by any other individual in regard to both
the physical facts and the value facts. A simple example of this in
regard to physical facts is found in descriptions of Gestalt diagrams.
Similarly, presented with other pictures or situations two individuals
often note different elements and emphasize different relationships
when asked to comment. Disparity in descriptions of value facts should
therefore not be taken as proof of the non-objectivity or subjectivity
of value facts, but rather as confirmation of the fact that different individuals have distinct perspectives, concerns, interests, and desires, which tend to make them aware of the value facts which correspond to these distinct perspectives, concerns, etc.

From what we have said it follows that we are willing to regard the value of a thing, person, or event, its being valuable, as a fact, quite independent from our knowledge of it. Thus we can agree with Scheler that value is objective. The question of the nature of the tie between the value and that of which it is a value is a distinct issue. The example which illustrates the problem best is that of the thing regarded as "good in itself" since this avoids consideration of long chains of means and ends. The term 'quality' was used by Scheler to denote this relationship of the value to the support of value. We have suggested that 'quality' was a poorly chosen term. The problem, however, is whether, in this ultimate instance of that which is "good in itself" we can accept Scheler's insistence that the value could in no way be reduced to, or equated with any physical attributes, since this confounds value with supports of value and necessarily leads to errors in analysis.

In connection with this contention Scheler made an apt remark when he said that many values are conceptually indefinable (p. 36). When one takes into account the difficulty which value theory has had in isolating in discursive formulas what it is that makes something "good in itself" one is inclined to accept Scheler's point. However, just as without sensation it would be impossible to experience sensible objects and to
speak of the physical configurations which serve as objects for sen-
sation, so without some means of experiencing values it should be
impossible to speak of values. Thus, ultimately, if we are to reject
the view that values are reducible to physical attributes of their sup-
ports and yet still continue to talk of values, some sort of cognitive
function must be capable of grasping values. If values are not reducible
to physical attributes this particular cognitive function cannot be
attributed to sensation, and while reason could provide evidence that
something must be good because it is the means to some desirable end,
reason can hardly be said to have originally the capacity for grasping
that end as desirable. This line of argument leads directly to the
notion that there must be some other means of grasping value, and of
course, for Scheler this other means was Wertfühlen.

2. The Existence of Wertfühlen

The whole notion of cognitive emotion has been rejected by some
authors. Rudolf Allers asserted that all modern psychologists regard
cognitive emotions as "reactive and subjective states".¹ Ernst von
Aster asserted that most men have no intuition of value and that those
who claim to have that capacity are in fact disguising from themselves
the influence of their prior attitudes towards, and experience of, the
objects whose value they claim to intuit.² European psychology, however,

¹Rudolf Allers, "The Cognitive Aspect of the Emotions", The Thomist,
IV (1942), 621.

²Ernst von Aster, "Zur Kritik der materialen Wertethik", Kantstudien,
XXXIII (1930), 175-176.
has been influenced by Scheler's theory of emotional levels which is based on the notions of emotional intentionality and objectivity.\(^1\) It is our thesis that it is necessary to admit at least the distinction between feelings which are subjective states and feelings which are intentional.

Sensations are widely held to have objective reference, while feelings are thought to be subjective. In the strict sense, however, objective reference can be attributed only to some sensations. Likewise not all feelings have a purely subjective origin. The assumption that sensation is a more reliable source of data about the objective world than is feeling may be a rash one. The question is rendered more complex when we attempt to differentiate the feeling and sensation aspects of a given experience.\(^2\) Inability to distinguish clearly between sensation and feeling should lead either to regarding sensations to be as unreliable as feelings for cognition of the objective world or to a re-evaluation of the supposed subjectivity of all feelings.

The notion of immediacy is of significance in evaluating the objective and subjective aspects of any experience. Objects and events as they are experienced as given to us as phenomena are the products of complex chains of physical and psychic events. Thus in one sense they are highly mediated, though they strike our consciousness as immediate


\(^2\)Examples of various positions which have been held on this question are given by Charles Wallruff in Philosophical Theory and Psychological Fact: An Attempt at Synthesis, Tucson: University of Arizona, 1961, p. 26.
and it is only through yet further analysis that we become aware of their component elements: brain events, pure sensations, prior assumptions, etc. If we assume that truly immediate experience cannot be in error, for error arises only through the processes of judgement, inference, and reason, then feeling must be regarded as a cognitive faculty which is as reliable as is sensation in those instances where feeling can be shown to be immediate. It is, however, difficult if not impossible to demonstrate conclusively that any of the sensations or feelings, with which we are concerned at the level of experience of the phenomenal object, are immediate. It is only in analysis of the experience of the phenomenal object that we can begin to identify points of unconscious mediation.

The lines of argument which are followed concerning the nature of the various cognitive faculties strongly mirror the view which is held of the world and vice-versa. Just as we suggested in the last section that the view that values were objective and independent of the physical attributes of their supporting objects implied that Wertfühlen or something analogous existed, so here if sensation is regarded as a faculty of grasping the objective world it must be assumed that objects or qualities of objects exist corresponding to sensible experience. Likewise, if feeling is to be regarded as a cognitive faculty of this same order, objects or qualities of objects which correspond to the experience grasped by feeling must exist.

The real issue arises then in the question of whether feeling does in the end have a claim to immediacy, whether feeling has a direct cognitive relation to the objective world. It could be argued that feeling has a
cognitive function which is purely within the subject. Thus, for example, one would not say that one could grasp the goodness of an object in that object itself as it is in the world but rather as one represented that object to oneself. The "immediacy" of feeling would thus not be between the subject and the object, but between the subject and the phenomenal object, and the object available to feeling would thus already have been mediated by the processes of sensation and perception. Feeling could provide new experience of the object only insofar as it interpreted the phenomenal object. A faculty of feeling of this sort would be in a position in relation to the external object similar to that of reason.

There seem to us to be two possible ways in which feeling can be related to objective value. The first is that whereby feeling grasps objective value immediately as it is in the external world. The second way feeling may be related to objective value is that in which feeling does not grasp objective value immediately in the external world, but rather as supported by the object as it is represented to the self by sensation and perception, that is, as supported by the phenomenal object. If we want to maintain that there is objective value which can be grasped by feeling, then one of these two possible ways of stating the relationship between feeling and objective value should, upon examination, show itself to be theoretically superior.

The phenomenal object as given is structured by selection, attention, simplification, the frames of reference, etc., which we bring to our
experience. Our phenomenal experience is highly mediated. This does not, however, imply that phenomenal objects exclude representation of objects of the external world as containing or supporting value. Hence the second possibility is not rejected on this basis.

A more serious objection to the second possibility lies in the view that since value is an original primitive quality, i.e. not reducible to any physical attributes, value cannot exist in the phenomenal object unless the latter is based on value feeling as well as sensation. Sensation can grasp only physical attributes of objects, while value is neither a physical attribute nor does it consist in any relation of physical attributes. This difficulty can be dissolved if it is possible to maintain that value, an original primitive quality, is supported by the physical object as a whole and hence as long as the phenomenal object is truly representative of the essence of the object there is nothing to prevent this phenomenal object from serving the same role as a support of value.

Within the framework of the more detailed picture of the relation of feeling and objective value, which we have provided, a clearer view of value feeling should emerge. Value feeling within the frameworks of the first and second possible relations seems to be essentially the same save as to the place of its object, which is external in the first case and internal in the second. This difference is highly significant, however, for in the second case, where the object is internal, there is no need for "feeling-organs" to perform a function parallel to that performed by sense-organs. In the second, where feeling grasps value...
supported by the phenomenal object, the whole process of value feeling is internal to the subject. Value feeling, in this respect, is similar to reason, but it is still quite distinct from reason in other respects.

Reason deals with comparisons and differentiations of that which is already given. Reason can compare the values of x and y once these are given, but we still have not clarified how it is that values are given. Even though we have eliminated the first possible relation of feeling and value and with it the problem of "feeling-organs", we still must provide a means for value to be grasped if it is a primitive element, objective, etc., as we have maintained. It is necessary to admit the existence of a faculty of value feeling which has an original cognitive capacity. There is no other way to explain the processes of human valuation within this framework.

We note in passing that the theory whereby value is grasped in the phenomenal object allows an additional opportunity for error. Insofar as the phenomenal object is not a true representation of the external object, different values may be supported by the phenomenal and external objects. Thus error may enter here even though one maintains that value feeling grasps the value of the phenomenal object immediately, i.e. infallibly.

There is a strong affinity between the position we set forth above and the fundamental assumption of Brentano according to which "nothing can be judged, nor can anything be desired, nothing can be hoped for or feared, if it is not represented". Brentano maintained

1 "Nichts kann beurteilt, nichts kann aber such begehrt, nichts kann
the priority of representation among all mental acts, and this is essentially what we have reasserted above in opposition to Scheler. At the same time, however, the role which we have allowed reason and affectivity in influencing the content of representations, or phenomenal objects, is far greater than that given to them by Brentano.

What we must clarify first, is the degree to which our position diverges from that of Scheler, and second, what repercussions this divergence has for Scheler's value theory. It must be remembered that Wertfühlen, in Scheler's view, can grasp either value as supported by goods, that is, as it finds its content in phenomena, or value apart from phenomena. Our position does not exclude the latter as it is as yet concerned only with the former.

Scheler states that affective perception (Fühlen) has the same relation to its axiological correlate as "representation" has to its "object", i.e. an intentional relation (p. 272). In this statement there is nothing to preclude Wertfühlen from having as its object value as supported by the phenomenal object. Nor does Scheler's statement, that affective perception is not tied from without to the object either immediately or by representation, but views originally a particular kind of objects, i.e. values (p. 272), at all clash with our view that the object of value feeling, is not the supporting good or person, but rather the value which is supported by the phenomenal object.

_gehofft oder gefürchtet werden, wenn es nicht vorgestellt wird._ ZVES, p. 104.
In Scheler's assertion that Wertfühlen does not require the mediation of "acts of objectivations", belonging to judgment, representation, etc., to be tied to the objective scheme (p. 273), there is still no disagreement with our view as long as we keep in mind that the values supported by phenomenal objects are as "objective" as values supported by external objects. We must disagree with Scheler, however, when he asserts that intentional affective perception is clearly shown to constitute an "act of objectivations", which needs no representative mediation, by the "simple fact" of its often being produced without any imaged object (p. 273). How strongly we disagree depends on the interpretation we take of what he intends to say by this statement. If he means, as we think he did, that it is possible to grasp the value of something without having that thing as a phenomenal object, then we must disagree. If he was instead speaking of value grasped quite apart from consideration of any possible support for that value then we have no quarrel with him for the moment for this is not the issue with which we have been concerned.

There are problems, however, with the notion set forth by Scheler whereby Wertfühlen can grasp independent values, values unsupported by any phenomena. We cannot accept this view for it requires that Wertfühlen not be dependent in its operation on the presence of a phenomenal object within the consciousness of the individual. Any form of Wertfühlen which functioned in the affective perception of independent value in the manner envisioned by Scheler would necessarily be capable of performing the function of "feeling-organs". Not only are we sceptical about the ability of Wertfühlen to function in this way, but we also can find no
case in our own experience where we can say that we have grasped values independent of all phenomenal supports, of all images, and of all representations, authentic or illusory.

It is, of course, inadequate to argue that because one person does not experience some object, no one is capable of experiencing that object. Scheler probably would have suggested that the affective perceptive capacity of a person who did not grasp independent value was limited. The fact that people talk about goodness, beauty, love, hate, etc., seems to support Scheler's view that men can indeed grasp independent value. It is, however, far more likely that the object in these cases is not an independent, objective value, but rather a subjective abstraction based on the whole of the speaker's previous experience. As such it is not an abstraction limited to discursive rational categories, but may be based as well on affective and sensory experience. The tendency to assume that an independent objective value exists which corresponds to this subjective abstraction is understandable, though misguided. Not only has Scheler failed to demonstrate that independent objective value must exist, but he has also failed to explain satisfactorily how men would be capable of grasping values of this type.

As regards the case of the discovery of "new" values, new in the sense that they are new to us, unsupported by phenomenal objects, we would say in opposition to Scheler that we discover these values only through extrapolation from our previous experience of values. Thus, in the very process of coming to "grasp" them, we necessarily provide them with supporting images and representations. It is in such extrapolation
that men are closest to being creators of value. In this process men are not dependent on the actual existence of external objects which support these new values or on their own capacity to affectively perceive value as supported by a phenomenal representation of an external object. This process of extrapolation, however, can never create objective values. Somewhat ironically, our discovery of new values also can be based on erroneous representations of external objects. Discovery of such misrepresentations may lead us to realize that the external object in fact supports a different value than that which we had originally assumed, but it does not destroy the fact of our having experienced the new value supported by the phenomenal object.

The main indication that the position we have taken does in fact diverge from Scheler's, and that he would be critical of it, is found in his assertion that by attributing the affective domain only to psychology one is concerned only with what we find in ourselves by internal perception (i.e. by a representative attitude) when we perceive affectively, when we prefer, when we love and hate, when we enjoy a work of art, when we pray to God, and not with that which in affective perception, in preference, in love and hate, opens itself to us from the world and the axiological constituents of this world (p. 274). We have not, however, attributed the affective domain only to psychology. Rather our position lies between this one and the one Scheler supported whereby intentional affective perception often is produced without any imagined object.

Scheler's position and the one which we support do not have different implications for the function which Wertfühlen would serve in value theory
in respect to values which find their content in phenomena, i.e. values
supported by phenomena, save in respect to the ways in which error and
illusion arise. Our position does differ from Scheler's in regard to
the grasping of values unsupported by phenomena. In practice, however,
the implications of this difference would not be radically diverse,
for while Scheler claims that Wertfühlen can only grasp new values
which are relatively immediate in their superiority or inferiority
to values previously known, we have claimed that discovery of new
values occurs only through extrapolation from our previous experience
of values. The range and diversity of values which can become objects
for Wertfühlen, according to the two schemes, thus would not differ
significantly.

3. The Problems of Error and Illusion

Scheler maintained that the rigour of phenomenology is founded on
its return to the facts. An ethic based on this method is therefore
regarded as being founded, not on arbitrary constructions, but on
facts. The facts with which phenomenology is concerned are essences
and essential correlations rather than empirical and contingent facts.
These a priori facts can be neither observed nor defined. Since their
content is truly fundamental and irreducible it can only be revealed.
Scheler maintained that experience of essences corresponds more
closely to the idea of experience than does sensible experience.
The first is pure and immediate experience, whereas the second is
conditioned, and therefore mediated, by a natural organic structure.
In the essential constituents given in phenomenological experience the ontological and absolute constituents of the world are revealed and the difference between the thing in itself and the phenomenon dissolves.

Phenomenology, according to Scheler, gives a pure knowledge, without presuppositions. Moreover, since phenomenology gives the absolute facts themselves it coincides precisely with metaphysics. At the same time Scheler asserts that phenomenology represents empiricism and positivism in their most radical forms, because it admits nothing save experience.

Inductive knowledge is only probable, while phenomenological intuitions have an intrinsic evidence which defends them against all attacks. Though phenomenological intuitions are not reducible to inductive knowledge they still are experienced and therefore are a posteriori, though they may be concerned with that which is a priori. The a priori is given as the content of an intuition, it is not constructed by thought, it is not the result of a subjective elaboration and organization of experience. Scheler rejected the Kantian view whereby the a priori was an ordering structure imposed by reason on experience. The a priori, according to Scheler's schema, is in the things (Sachen) themselves. It is the real immanent structure.

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2Zur Ethik, p. 381.
It is within such a view of the nature and scope of phenomenology that the question of phenomenological evidence, and therefore the problems of error and illusion, arises. The being given of an object of phenomenological intuition is distinct from that of sensible and conceptual awareness. The sensible given is contingent and relative to the subject. In addition, the senses only represent the object. Conceptual thought has only an indirect relation with its object. But in phenomenological experience the essence is directly present to the consciousness without intervening symbols and signs. Phenomenology is a continual "de-symbolization" of the world.¹

In phenomenological experience nothing is intended which is not given, and nothing is given which is not intended. Any case where the given exceeds the intended, or the intended is not given "in person", is not a pure phenomenological experience. The phenomenon manifests itself exactly in this coincidence of the intended and the given. No phenomenon is without evidence which is found in the constitution of the phenomenon. For Scheler evidence consists of an objective state of a thing of value, in respect of its Sosein, being present to the subject "in person" by virtue of being the correlate of an intentional act, in such a way that a complete unity of coincidence is realized between the constituents of all the acts of thought and intuition which it is possible to have regarding the object.

¹Zur Ethik, p. 384.
Scheler is convinced that close familiarity with the facts must precede questions of criteria. Thus he asserts that the question of criteria is posed by the one who is eternally "other", who does not wish to find the true and the false or the good and the bad in lived experience, but who places himself outside all these like a judge.¹ Each domain has an intrinsic truth, which is not established by the application of principles originating elsewhere, but is constituted instead by the phenomena themselves. Those who are preoccupied by questions of criteria are reminded that criteria are never primary, that criteria always derive in the end from some contact with things. One wants to insist that if there is no criterion for self-givenness there can be no certainty based on phenomenological intuitions. But Scheler responds by insisting that the very idea of a criterion of self-givenness is absurd, since all questions relative to criteria make sense only when the thing (Sache) is not given "in person" and is only represented by a "symbol".²

Truth, in the case of a phenomenological intuition, indicates that the object is as it appears to be, as it is represented, while truth, in the case of a judgement, according to Scheler, indicates a coincidence of the judgement with the state of the thing as it is intentionally, not as it is in itself. Truth, or authenticity, in the case of the phenomenological intuition, is opposed, not to the false, the erroneous, but to the apparent, the illusory. Illusion

¹Zur Ethik, p. 382. ²Zur Ethik, p. 382.
always resides in the way in which the states of the thing attain the rank of the given.\textsuperscript{1} Illusions arise from the pre-logical sphere of consciousness, and it is therefore impossible to reduce illusions to errors of judgement and reason. It is impossible to escape illusion by overcoming error. To overcome illusion one must attain a new relationship with the things themselves. The truth of intuitive evidence is the foundation of all other forms of truth.\textsuperscript{2} Illusory objects, such as those found in hallucinations, can be made the subjects of true judgements. Precision of judgement would, however, appear pointless, when one attempted to dine upon an illusory banquet, even after correctly classifying the range of colors, odors, and shapes found in that banquet.

Illusions are characterized by something being taken as given which in fact is not there. The distinction of true and false belonging to the spheres of judgement and inference does not pertain to illusion at all. An illusion may seem to be as fully given as a pure intuition. If one sees a wax figure and mistakes it for a human being one may well have grasped all the characteristics of the wax figure. The mistake enters in taking these characteristics to be those of a human being rather than of a wax figure. This is a case of error in judgement, rather than an illusion.

Sense illusions and perceptual illusions are distinct. The phenomenon of the bent stick is a sense illusion, since the visual object is actually bent though the stick itself is not bent. It is when different

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Zur Ethik}, p. 409. \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Zur Ethik}, p. 409.
senses concur in presenting the impressions one would expect from the supposedly real illusory object that a real perceptual illusion has occurred.

Judgements about the content of illusions are false if taken as referring to reality, but may be true if taken as referring to the illusion. Error occurs only subsequent to the existence of certain actual matters of fact and beliefs about those actual matters of fact.

Scheler admits quite readily that there can be illusions of evidence: a subject can believe he has an intuition where there is none, he can think he has grasped a true essence when in fact it is merely a subjective phenomenon.¹ The only recourse for Scheler, who rejected the notion of a criterion of self-givenness as absurd, was to purify the evidence and ascertain that nothing exterior would intervene in the givenness of the object. The historical situation, preferences, heredity, etc., of the subject could be suspended. Two persons, however, still might not grasp the same evidence or not seem to grasp the same evidence. This is sometimes due to the difficulty of communicating an intuition. Phenomenological essences cannot be defined or conceptualized, but only seen. Descriptions and arguments often take a negative form whereby aspects are eliminated until nothing remains save the phenomenon itself.² Discord is not sufficient to make an intuition suspect since it can always be attributed to difficulties of communication.

There are objective essences which are accessible only to one person, one culture, or one historical era. There are truths which hold for only one individual just as there are goods whose value is manifest only to an individual consciousness.\(^1\) Each person must maintain his position, understanding at the same time that evidence which escapes him constitutes truths and values for others which are no less objective and absolute.\(^2\) Scheler did not believe that the principle of phenomenological evidence, as he understood it, was at all weakened by the existence of illusions of intuition or by the impossibility of many intuitions being universally recognized as such.

Though there are many ways in which errors can intervene in a value theory, in the case of Scheler's value theory we have not only the possibility of errors of judgement but also the possibility of illusory intuitions. Intuition is at the same time the most fundamental type of experience and source of knowledge within this scheme. For this reason we will be primarily concerned with the question of illusory intuitions, though this by no means implies that error is a problem of little significance.

Scheler's notion of self-givenness lies at the core of our problem. He rejected, as we noted above, any attempt to formulate criteria for self-givenness. At the same time he admitted the possibility of illusory intuitions. Self-givenness was regarded by Scheler as the absolute measure of cognition. That which was given with an exact co-incidence

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\(^1\) *Zur Ethik*, p. 393.  
\(^2\) *Zur Ethik*, p. 394.
of intention and experience, i.e. adequately, was in fact absolute being.\footnote{Zur Ethik, p. 398.} Essences were either intuited, and thus self-given, or not intuited and thus not given at all (p. 69). The lack of an adequation of intention and self-givenness automatically renders the phenomenological experience impure (p. 72) and lacking in absolute evidence (p. 89). An example of the function of self-givenness in respect to Scheler's value theory is found in the case where, due to the self-givenness of a value, Socrates' maxim, that the action of the will is determined by knowledge of the good, does indeed hold (p. 89).

Scheler's account of self-givenness and the sketchy suggestions he made for eliminating illusions in respect to evidence are not satisfactory. Though Scheler is in some sense correct in associating questions of criteria with knowledge which deals with symbols rather than with the given itself, there must be some more rigorous means of measuring the absolute degree of adequation than he has provided. Because Scheler regarded self-givenness as a sound and unproblematic notion and spent little time in suggesting measures to avoid illusions of evidence the only critical response can be that of providing, in some degree, such measures.

It would seem that illusion could be eliminated in many cases by subjecting it to intersubjective tests. Immediately, however, we are confronted with two problems — though the object is a real objective entity and therefore available in theory to all subjects, it is possible
that the intuitive capacity of some subjects may be inadequate to grasp this object and that problems of communicating phenomenological experiences may prevent two subjects who do in fact have the same intuition from ascertaining that this is the case. But these are both problems which Scheler himself raised and did not find insurmountable.

The first problem — that of inadequacy of intuition or, in the particular case where the objects are values, an undeveloped affective perceptive capacity — is used by Scheler to explain the phenomena of diversity and change of ethos. The problems of communicating phenomenological intuitions serves to underline the non-symbolic and therefore non-discursive quality of phenomenological experience as opposed to other forms of experience. It therefore seems that some other approach than that of intersubjectivity must in the end be taken to the problem of illusory intuitions. Indeed, in regard to the ultimate ethical questions where the individual must stand alone, supported only by the moral autonomy which is his due to his intuition of objective value, intersubjective tests can serve only a secondary role.

In such instances the ultimate responsibility rests with the individual who can only do his best to eliminate confusion of his interests and prejudices with what he affectively perceives to be valuable. In this context attention should perhaps be given to the fact central to the Schelerian schema whereby the ultimate reference for the individual in making a value judgement is not duty or interest, ideally, whether for himself or for society, but objective value as grasped by him in affective perception. Such a view has been seen as giving moral sanction
to anarchic or fascist movements, particularly when it is coupled with
the views that a value may be given to only one person and that realization
of a superior value is a morally good action. That reading of Scheler
would, however, be inadequate, for he did not neglect questions of means
and ends as this might be taken to imply. Nor did he allow subjective
elements to influence Wertfühlen in the ideal case, though he admitted
that subjective elements, such as resentment, do in fact often influence
value judgements.

There are many valuable insights in Scheler's value theory. It is of
great importance to find a valid way in which to ground the ultimate respon-
sibility for value judgements in the individual, if the phenomenon of
avoiding responsibility by acting as if an agent of the state, or a pawn
of the necessity of a situation, is to be overcome. The need for a means
of grounding value judgements is also to be seen in Anglo-American ethical
discussion since Moore. Emotivism developed in reaction to the tendency
in intuitionist circles to use Moore's theory to give authority to their
own attitudes and feelings. Ayer, Stevenson, and even Hare, however,
in the end also make the individual his own final authority in value
questions without identifying any means whereby value judgements are
to be validly grounded in reality. It is in his concern with this most
difficult and central problem that the importance of Scheler's discussions
of value theory is found.

Scheler's response to ethical relativity is brilliant, and, taken
together with his analysis of the role of subjective elements in value
judgements, strongly tempers what would otherwise be an unrealistic
absolutist value theory. The notion of essential \textit{a priori} correlations of value theoretically provides the objective basis for a universally valid value system, while at the same time allowing for the distinction between ethics and morality.

Scheler was at times careless in developing his ideas and occasionally went beyond the bounds of phenomenological evidence. An example of the latter is found, as we have already noted, in his discussion of values as absolute and immutable. If Scheler's notions of \textit{Wertfühlten} and objective value, or some close approximations thereof, could be shown to be correct, they would be most valuable as a means of grounding value judgements. They can, however, serve such a function only if illusory intuitions are eliminated and if values are not only objective, but also have a hierarchic relationship which can be grasped in affective perception. It is necessary to make an advance upon Scheler's suggestions for the elimination of illusory intuitions and his account of self-givenness, but this cannot be done adequately within the scope of this thesis. It is clear, however, that this is a task which must be performed if Scheler's value theory is in the end to be regarded, with any degree of certainty, as a scheme of practical and theoretical value, rather than merely a collection of untrustworthy, though occasionally brilliant, insights.
CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

It should be noted that the arguments of the fourth chapter were circular in respect to the nature of value and the existence of Wertfühlen. The notion of values as objective and irreducible to the physical attributes of their supports led directly to the view that there must be some means of grasping value other than that of sensation or reason. Likewise, just as objects or qualities of objects corresponding to sense experience must be assumed to exist if sensation is to be regarded as a faculty of grasping the objective world, so objects or qualities of objects which correspond to the experience grasped by feeling must be assumed to exist if feeling is to be regarded as a cognitive faculty. In a strong sense this observation is damaging to the whole argument for objective value and Wertfühlen. It in itself cannot lead immediately to rejection of the whole scheme, however, due to the lack of viable alternative positions, the fact that men continue to speak of values, and the ultimate inevitability of such circles in any epistemological problem where one is concerned with the correspondance of the object and the means of knowing the object.

What I now wish to consider are the implications the position I have taken in opposition to Scheler's, in respect to the affective perception of value, whether independent or supported by phenomenal
objects, has for a value theory in which \textit{Wertfühlen} functions as a cognitive faculty. My position is that feeling does not grasp objective value immediately in the external world, but rather as supported by the object as it is represented to the self by sensation and perception, that is, as supported by the phenomenal object.

Our phenomenal experience is highly mediated. The phenomenal object as given is structured by selection, attention, simplification, the frames of reference, etc., we bring to our experience. Thus, though representation is prior to judgement and feeling (this is the case directly for judgement, where its data is provided by the content of the representation, and indirectly for feeling where the object of feeling is not the representation of the thing or person supporting the value, or a representation of the value itself, but rather the value supported by the representation, which may be a more or less authentic representation of the external object), a representation may be influenced by reason and feeling. Thus, in ascertaining the validity of any given value feeling, illusion must be avoided at two points. The first is in the constitution of the phenomenal object. The second is in the intuition of value as supported by that phenomenal object. In both instances the questions raised about the adequacy of Scheler's notion of self-givenness apply. It is possible for the constitution of the phenomenal object to be authentic while the intuition of value as supported by that phenomenal object is illusory and \textit{vice-versa}. The goal, of course, is the elimination of illusion at both junctures. In addition errors of judgement are possible in respect both to the value grasped and to the phenomenal object.
The position I have taken thus differs from that of Scheler in that it recognizes an additional opportunity for illusion in value intuitions, insofar as these are regarded as intuitions which are to be valid for value as supported by external objects. Consequently, rather than limiting the range of influence which Scheler found subjective elements (perspectives, concerns, interests, desires, etc.,) to have in the relations of a human being to values and to things and persons as supports of value, I have extended it. Subjective elements are thus seen to be important for value theory not only insofar as they influence the affective perception of value, but also insofar as they influence our representation of any thing or person which supports value. A phenomenology of perception is therefore of importance for value theory. One could argue, of course, that value theory, as such, need be concerned only with the authenticity of value intuitions. However, according to the position I have taken, value theory cannot claim to be validly grounded in reality unless it is accompanied by a sound perceptual theory.
APPENDIX

COMMENTS REGARDING MATERIALS AVAILABLE IN ENGLISH ON SCHELER'S ETHICS

Max Scheler is relatively unknown in English speaking countries, and few of his works have yet appeared in English translation. The following are the published English translations of Scheler's writings:

- Ressentiment
- The Nature of Sympathy
- On the Eternal in Man
- Man's Place in Nature
- Philosophical Perspectives

Ressentiment, first published in 1912, and later enlarged, is a short, non-technical introduction to Scheler's early point of view in historical sociology and social psychology. The English translation by William Holdheim is prefaced by a knowledgeable introduction by Lewis Coser. The student of ethics will find this work particularly valuable as a detailed analysis of one of the many factors which often lead to prejudiced value judgements.

The Nature of Sympathy, first published in 1913, was the first of the English translations of Scheler's writings to be published. The translator, Peter Heath, included both a German-English glossary of technical terms and detailed footnotes commenting on problems of trans-

1Detailed information concerning publication of all works mentioned in this Appendix is to be found in the Bibliography of this thesis.
lation, in part due to the highly technical nature of the work and therefore of much of its terminology, and in part due to the fact that his translation could be expected to set precedents for future translations of Scheler's writings. The introductory essay by W. Stark attempts to deal primarily with psychological questions but also relates the work to Scheler's over-all philosophical position. *The Nature of Sympathy* is a phenomenological analysis of love, hate, sympathy, pity, etc., and contains a critique of metaphysical and naturalistic theories of the emotions. Feelings are regarded as our means of access to other minds. Knowledge of ourselves is gained only as we gradually differentiate ourselves from the totality of the objects of our immediate experience, which, according to Scheler, includes other minds.

Phenomenological analysis is also the approach used by Scheler in his work on religious philosophy, *On the Eternal in Man*. This work has been much discussed in Catholic circles. It represents a significant point in Scheler's philosophical development, for soon after its publication in 1921 Scheler repudiated it and was hereforth less involved with purely phenomenological analysis of the questions he chose to study.

*Man's Place in Nature*, first published in 1928, appeared in English with an excellent introduction by its translator, Hans Meyerhoff. It belongs to the same phase of Scheler's philosophical thought as *Philosophical Perspectives*, first published in 1929. These works are fragments of the work planned by Scheler to deal with the question "What is man?" Scheler envisioned a philosophical anthropology which would render self-conscious man's self-knowledge as it has developed in the
whole spectrum of human culture. This work was never completed.

These translations do not give an adequate view of Scheler's philosophy as a whole. The Gesammelte Werke, when complete, will consist of thirteen volumes. The contrast in sheer bulk is quite evident, while that in content is less evident though just as real. It should be noted that none of the strictly ethical works is available in English translation.

Phenomenology, ethics, theology, and sociology are the spheres of thought and research on which Scheler's works have had any significant influence in English speaking countries. Scheler's value theory has received attention for a variety of reasons. It has appealed to some people as a means of avoiding ethical relativism. It also exemplifies a realist position which is of particular interest to those who wish to pursue a phenomenological analysis and yet avoid idealism. Dissatisfaction with interest theories and willingness to consider affective perception as a cognitive faculty, subject to the same realist arguments as is sensation, seem to have been the other factors contributing to Scheler's popularity, limited as that has been. Scheler has not been neglected in England any more or less, generally speaking, than he has in the United States. The main explanation for the lack of acquaintance with his work in English speaking countries is the lack of representative translations and the ban on publication of his writings in Germany from 1933-1945. The latter produced a lull in research and in discussion of his theories both in Germany and abroad.
The reader who is interested in pursuing a study of Scheler's ethics is well advised to begin with Herbert Spiegelberg's *The Phenomenological Movement*. Spiegelberg presents a well balanced view of Scheler's ethics as well as of his philosophy as a whole, thus providing the student with a sense of the place of his ethics within his system. It is primarily expository though certain central problems are raised. "Max Scheler's Epistemology and Ethics" by Alfred Schuetz and "The Phenomenological Ethics of Max Scheler" by Quentin Lauer are also valuable introductory studies. Quentin Lauer's *Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect* provides a comparison of Scheler's point of view on key points with that of other phenomenologists, most notably Husserl.

All of the works by Marvin Farber and V. J. McGill listed in the Bibliography of this thesis may also be read by way of introduction to Scheler. They do not have, however, the virtue of broad scope found in the works mentioned above and in addition, on the basis of questionable arguments, accuse Scheler of having contributed to various unpopular political and anti-social tendencies. Jean Wahl's "A Letter to Marvin Farber" is an excellent response to the sort of arguments used by McGill and Farber, even though Wahl was not concerned with Scheler as such at the time.

John Staude's *Max Scheler 1874-1928: An Intellectual Portrait*, is a well documented historical study of Scheler, which is based not only on a study of the German political, social, and intellectual forces of the period, but also on a careful reading of Scheler's writings. William Frankena's "Ethics", and Robert S. Hartman's "General Theory of Value", 
clarify the position of Scheler's ethics within the spectrum of ethical thought.

The following articles: 1) "Max Scheler's Epistemology of the Emotions" by Hunter Guthrie, 2) "A Phenomenological System of Ethics" by Mary Evelyn Clark, 3) "Some Merits and Defects of Contemporary German Ethics (Materiale Wertethik in Scheler, Spranger, N. Hartmann)" by David Baumgardt, and 4) "A Critique of Ethical Realism" by Sidney Hook, are all journal articles from the 1930's. Those by Guthrie and Clark are expository and deal with Scheler's schematization of the emotions and his response to ethical relativity, respectively. Those by Baumgardt and Hook are critical studies, the first being concerned with specific inconsistencies, some of which were eliminated by N. Hartmann, and the second with the nature of the objects of phenomenological intuition.

"Material Value in Max Scheler's Ethics, An Exposition and Critique", by Robert Daniel Sweeney is primarily a work of superficial exposition, containing little criticism, and is therefore of limited value. Sweeney finds D. von Hildebrand to have advanced beyond Scheler's ethical position.

"Max Scheler's Theory of Moral Obligation", by Charles S. Wallruff contains the most thorough presentation there is in English of Scheler's critique of Kantian formalism.

Max Scheler: A Concise Introduction Into the World of a Great Thinker, by Manfred Frings is best when not read first due to the fact that it is indeed so concise. One section is devoted to Scheler's ethics.

In this thesis I have attempted to deal systematically with Scheler's notion of Wertwählen. To my knowledge this has never been done before,
though the central importance of Wertfühlen to Scheler's theory of non-formal value has long been recognized. The problems with which I have dealt, the existence and nature of objective value and Wertfühlen, error and illusion, and the debt of Scheler to Brentano and Husserl, are not new problems. Each of them has been discussed in some context in the past; however, to my knowledge they have never been systematically dealt with in their relation to one another either apart from, or in connection with, Scheler's notion of Wertfühlen. I have attempted to provide a demonstration of their importance, in themselves, for one another, and for value theory.
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