

The Nature and Development of Quine's Naturalism

SANDER VERHAEGH

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WORKING FROM WITHIN

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It is understandable [...] that the philosopher should seek a transcendental vantage point, outside the world that imprisons [the] natural scientist and mathematician. He would make himself independent of the conceptual scheme which it is his task to study and revise. "Give me $\pi o \upsilon \sigma \tau \omega$ [a place to stand]", Archimedes said, "and I will move the world." However, there is no such cosmic exile. [...] The philosopher is in the position rather, as Neurath says, "of a mariner who must rebuild his ship on the open sea".

W. V. Quine (notes for Sign and Object, November 5, 1944)

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Preface

This book is the result of almost nine years of thinking and writing about Quine's naturalism. The project started with a term paper on the Carnap-Quine debate for Jeanne Peijnenburg's inspiring course on the history of analytic philosophy in 2008 and gradually evolved into a dissertation about the relation between holism and naturalism in Quine's philosophy, which I defended in Groningen in 2015. Encouraged by the warm support of my colleagues and a number of fellow Quine scholars, I spent the last two years revising and extending the manuscript. Having acquired a serious case of 'archive fever', a significant chunk of this period was spent at the W. V. Quine Papers at Houghton Library, Harvard University. Using his published corpus as well the thousands of letters, notes, draft manuscripts, lectures, grant proposals, teaching materials, and annotations collected at the archives, I have aimed to write a book that reconstructs both the nature and the development of Quine's naturalism. The notes, letters, and lectures that have most influenced my views about (the development of) Quine's naturalism are transcribed and collected in the appendix.

Parts of this book have been published elsewhere. I thank the respective journals for granting me permission to reprint these papers:

Quine's Argument from Despair (2014). British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 22(1), 150-173. (chapter 2)

Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal-External Distinction (2017). *Erkenntnis*, 82(4), 873-890. (chapter 3)

Boarding Neurath's Boat: The Early Development of Quine's Naturalism (2017). Journal for the History of Philosophy, 55(2), 317-342. (sections 4.1-4.2, 6.2, and 6.6)

Quine on the Nature of Naturalism (2017). *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 55(1), 96-115. (section 4.5)

Sign and Object: Quine's Forgotten Philosophical Book Project (forthcoming). *Synthese*. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-018-1693-z. (chapter 5)

Quine's 'Needlessly Strong' Holism (2017). *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, *Part A*, *61*(1), 11-20. (sections 6.8-6.11)

Setting Sail: The Development and Reception of Quine's Naturalism (forthcoming).

Philosophers' Imprint. (chapter 7)

Still, this book aims to be more than a collection of papers. Many sections have been revised, extended, and rewritten for the purposes of this book. Moreover, an introductory chapter, a conclusion, several new sections (i.e. 4.3-4.4; 4.6-4.8; 5.5; 6.3-6.5; 6.7), and seven appendices have been included to fill the gaps and to present a comprehensive account of Quine's naturalism.

Much of this research has been funded by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (grants 322-20-001 and 275-20-064). My research visits to Harvard University, Houghton Library, Bethel, CT, and the Harvard University Archives have been funded by a Kristeller-Popkin Travel Fellowship from the *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, a Rodney

G. Dennis Fellowship in the Study of Manuscripts from Houghton Library, and a Travel Bursary from the Evert Willem Beth Foundation. I am very grateful for this financial support.

Finally, it is my great pleasure to thank the many people without whom I could not have completed this book: Jeanne Peijnenburg, Allard Tamminga, Lieven Decock, Gary Ebbs, Hans-Johann Glock, Peter Hylton, Gary Kemp, Fred Muller, Martin Lenz, and two anonymous referees for Oxford University Press for their comments on earlier versions of this book; Harvard's Department of Philosophy, Nyasha Borde, Monique Duhaime, Juliet Floyd, Warren Goldfarb, Leslie Morris, Mark Richard, Thomas Ricketts, and the staff at Houghton Library and the Harvard University Archives for their warm welcome during my research visits; Douglas and Maryclaire Quine for welcoming me into their house to examine the remaining 57 boxes of unprocessed archive material; Jody Azzouni, Richard Creath, Fons Dewulf, Juliet Floyd, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Warren Goldfarb, James Levine, Thomas Ricketts, Eric Schliesser, Andrew Smith, Serdal Tumkaya, Thomas Uebel, Wim Vanrie, the members of the EPS seminar in Tilburg, the members of the PCCP and the WiP seminars in Groningen, and audiences in Amsterdam, Athens, Bloomington, Bologna, Calgary, Chicago, Denver, Edinburgh, Groningen, Konstanz, Manchester, Milan, Modena, Munich, Rotterdam, Tampa, Tilburg, and Zürich for their comments on various papers and chapters in various stages; Reto Gubelmann, Frederique Janssen-Lauret, Gary Kemp, and Sean Morris for their wonderful Quine workshops in Denver, Glasgow, Manchester, and Zürich; and Douglas B. Quine (W. V. Quine Literary Estate), and Catherine Z. Elgin (Literary executor for Nelson Goodman) for granting me permission to publish some of Quine's and Goodman's papers, notes, and letters as appendices to this book. Of course, the above individuals do not necessarily agree with my conclusions and they are not responsible for any residual errors or omissions.

A note on citation and transcription: Unless specified differently, the unpublished documents I refer to in this book are part of the W. V. Quine Papers, collection MS Am 2587, Houghton Library, Harvard University. In the main text and in the footnotes, I refer to these documents by citing dates (if known) and item numbers. A letter of Quine to the American Philosophical Association, for example, could be referred to as (January 1, 1950, item 31). For quick reference, the item numbers are listed in the List of Abbreviations (pp. xiii-xxii). The items' full titles and box numbers are provided in the bibliography. In transcribing Quine's autograph notes, drafts, and letters, I have aimed to minimize editorial interference and chosen not to correct ungrammatical shorthand. In referring to Quine's *published* work, I use abbreviations (listed in the List of Abbreviations) as well as the year in which the paper or book was first published. If the paper is incorporated in one of Quine's collections of papers, the page numbers will refer to this collection. The first page of "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", for example, will be referred to as (TDE, 1951a, 20). The details of Quine's published work cited in this book are provided in the bibliography.

In his autobiography, *The Time of My Life*, Quine argues that science and history of science appeal to very different tempers: "An advance in science resolves an obscurity, a tangle, a complexity, an inelegance, that the scientist then gratefully dismisses and forgets. The historian of science tries to recapture the very tangles, confusions, and obscurities from which the scientist is so eager to free himself" (TML, 1985a, 194). I hope this book accomplishes a bit of both; although I will show that Quine faced many tangles, confusions, and obscurities in developing his naturalism, I also hope to convey that the system he created is one of great clarity and elegance.

Sander Verhaegh
March 2018

List of Abbreviations

This section provides a list of abbreviations used in this book to refer to W. V. Quine's published and unpublished work. Detailed references can be found in the Bibliography. A complete list of Quine's publications up to approximately 1997 (including reprints and translations) can be found in Yeghiayan (2009). For an overview of papers, books, reprints, and translations after 1997, see Douglas B. Quine's website http://www.wvquine.org. Most of Quine's unpublished papers, letters, lectures, and notebooks can be accessed at Houghton Library, Harvard University. The documents' call numbers, box numbers, and item numbers are provided in the Bibliography. A finding aid for much of Quine's unpublished work can be found at http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/~hou01800. Archival sources from Quine's Unprocessed Papers, Quine's Library, and the Papers of Nelson Goodman are not listed here because they are not properly itemized. Details about these sources are listed in the Bibliography.

Archival sources

Item 31	Correspondence with the American Philosophical Association (1936-1986)
Item 40	Correspondence Ap- through As- (various dates)
Item 86	Correspondence with Lars Bergström (1988-1996)
Item 96	Correspondence with Evert Willem Beth (1947-1964)
Item 205	Correspondence with the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
	Sciences (1955-1979)

Item 224	Correspondence with Alonzo Church (1935-1994)
Item 231	Correspondence with Joseph T. Clark (1951-1953)
Item 234	Correspondence Co- (various dates)
Item 248	Correspondence with Columbia University (1949-1970)
Item 254	Correspondence with James Bryant Conant (1951-1979)
Item 260	Correspondence with John Cooley (1932-1962)
Item 270	Correspondence with Richard Creath (1977-1998)
Item 287	Correspondence with Donald Davidson (1957-1997)
Item 293	Correspondence with Grace De Laguna (1950-1954)
Item 306	Correspondence Di- through Do- (various dates)
Item 315	Correspondence with Burton Dreben (1948-1997)
Item 336	Correspondence Er- through Ez- (various dates)
Item 370	Correspondence with Philipp Frank (1951-1967)
Item 420	Correspondence with Nelson Goodman (1935-1994)
Item 471	Correspondence with Harvard University, Department of Philosophy (1930-
	1994)
Item 473	Correspondence with Harvard University, Faculty of Arts and Sciences (1931-
	1998)
Item 475	Correspondence with Harvard University, Grants (1931-1988)
Item 479	Correspondence with Harvard University, President's Office (1937-1998)
Item 499	Correspondence with Carl Gustav Hempel (1936-1997)
Item 529	Correspondence with Christopher Hookway (1988)
Item 530	Correspondence with Paul Horwich (1991-1992)
Item 545	Correspondence with the Institute for Advanced Study (1955-1965)
Item 553	Correspondence Ir- through Iz- (various dates)

Item 570	Correspondence with the Journal of Symbolic Logic (1936-1996)
Item 616	Correspondence with Imre Lakatos (1964-1974)
Item 637	Correspondence with Michelle Leonelli (1966-1998)
Item 643	Correspondence with Clarence Irving Lewis (1929-1996)
Item 675	Correspondence with Joseph Margolis (1967 and undated)
Item 724	Correspondence with Hugh Miller (1948-1952)
Item 741	Correspondence with Charles W. Morris (1936-1947)
Item 755	Correspondence with John Myhill (1943-1985)
Item 758	Correspondence with Ernest Nagel (1938-1964)
Item 921	Correspondence with the Rockefeller Foundation (1945-1980)
Item 958	Correspondence Sc- (various dates)
Item 972	Correspondence with Wilfred Sellars (1938-1980)
Item 1001	Correspondence with B. F. Skinner (1934-1998)
Item 1005	Correspondence with J. J. C. Smart (1949-1998)
Item 1014	Correspondence with Ernest Sosa (1970-1995)
Item 1200	Correspondence with Paul Weiss (1937-1972)
Item 1213	Correspondence with Morton White (1939-1998)
Item 1221	Correspondence with Donald Cary Williams (1940-1994)
Item 1237	Correspondence with Joseph Henry Woodger (1938-1982)
Item 1239	Correspondence with the World Congress of Philosophy (1952-1998)
Item 1244	Correspondence with Morton G. Wurtele (1938-1997)
Item 1263	Correspondence concerning requests to publish or for copies (1950-1959)
Item 1355	Editorial correspondence with D. Reidel Publishing Company (1960-1982 and
	undated)
Item 1391	Editorial correspondence concerning Mathematical Logic (1939-1940)

Item 1401	Editorial correspondence concerning Methods of Logic (1947-1950)
Item 1422	Editorial correspondence concerning Ontological Relativity (1968-1988)
Item 1423	Editorial correspondence concerning On Translation (1956-1959)
Item 1443	Editorial correspondence concerning On What There Is (1948-1975)
Item 1401	Editorial correspondence concerning <i>Theory of Deduction</i> (1946-1949)
Item 1488	Editorial correspondence concerning Word and Object (1952-1960)
Item 1489	Editorial correspondence concerning Word and Object (1959-1980 and
	undated)
Item 1490	Editorial correspondence concerning Words and Objections (1966-1974)
Item 2388a	Quine's Annotated Copy of Putnam's Meaning and the Moral Sciences
	(undated)
Item 2441	Epistemology Naturalized; or, the Case for Psychologism (1968)
Item 2498	In conversation: Professor W. V. Quine. Interviews by Rudolf Fara (1993)
Item 2733	Russell's Ontological Development (1966-1967)
Item 2756	Stimulus and Meaning (1965)
Item 2829	A Short Course on Logic (1946)
Item 2830	Theory of Deduction (1948)
Item 2836	Foreword to the Third Edition of From a Logical Point of View (1979)
Item 2884	Questions for Quine by Stephen Neale (1986)
Item 2902	For Rockefeller Lecture (1968)
Item 2903	For Symposium with Sellars (1968)
Item 2928	The Inception of "New Foundations" (1987)
Item 2948	Kinds (1967)
Item 2952	Levine Seminar Questions for Quine (1982)
Item 2954	Logic, Math, Science (1940)

Item 2958	Mathematical Entities (1950)
Item 2969	Nominalism (1937)
Item 2971	The Notre Dame Lectures (1970)
Item 2994	Ontological Relativity (1967)
Item 2995	Ontological Relativity (1968)
Item 3011	The Place of a Theory of Evidence (1952)
Item 3015	The Present State of Empiricism (1951)
Item 3102	Word and Object Seminar (1967)
Item 3158	Philosophy 148 (1953)
Item 3169	Early Jottings on Philosophy of Language (1937-1944)
Item 3170	Erledigte Notized (various dates)
Item 3181	Ontology, Metaphysics, etc (1944-1951)
Item 3182	Philosophical Notes (various dates)
Item 3184	Pragmatism, etc (1951-1953)
Item 3225	Miscellaneous Papers (1925-1931)
Item 3236	Papers in Philosophy (1930-1931)
Item 3254	General Report of my Work as a Sheldon Traveling Fellow 1932-1933 (1934)
Item 3266	Philosophy 148 (ca. 1947)
Item 3277	Oxford University Lectures (1953-1954)
Item 3283	Oxford University Lecture: Philosophy of Logic (1953-1954)

Published work

ANM Animadversion on the Notion of Meaning (1949)

AWVQ Autobiography of W.V. Quine (1986)

CA Carnap (1987)

CB Comment on Berger (1990)

CCE Confessions of a Confirmed Extensionalist and Other Essays (2008)

CD Contextual Definition (1995)

CGC A Comment on Grünbaum's Claim (1962)

CLT Carnap and Logical Truth (1954)

CPT Carnap's Positivistic Travail (1984)

CNT Comments on Neil Tennant's "Carnap and Quine" (1994)

CVO Carnap's Views on Ontology (1951)

DE Designation and Existence (1939)

EBDQ Exchange Between Donald Davidson and W. V. Quine Following Davidson's

Lecture (1994)

EESW On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World (1975)

EN Epistemology Naturalized (1969)

EQ Existence and Quantification (1968)

FHQP Four Hot Questions in Philosophy (1985)

FLPV From a Logical Point of View (1953/1961)

FM Facts of the Matter (1977)

FME Five Milestones of Empiricism (1975)

FSS From Stimulus to Science (1995)

GQW Nelson Goodman, W. V. Quine and Morton White: A Triangular

Correspondence (1947)

GT Grades of Theoreticity (1970)

IOH Identity, Ostension, Hypostasis (1946)

IQ The Ideas of Quine. Interview by B. Magee (1978)

ITA Indeterminacy of Translation Again (1987)

IV Immanence and Validity (1991)

IWVQ Interview with Willard Van Orman Quine. Interview by L. Bergström and D.

Føllesdal (1994)

LAOP A Logistical Approach to the Ontological Problem (1939)

LC Lectures on Carnap (1934)

LDHP Lectures on David Hume's Philosophy (1946)

LP Linguistics and Philosophy (1968)

ML1 *Methods of Logic*. First edition (1950)

ML4 *Methods of Logic*. Fourth edition (1982)

MSLT Mr. Strawson on Logical Theory (1953)

NEN Notes on Existence and Necessity (1943)

NK Natural Kinds (1969)

NLOM Naturalism; Or, Living within One's Means (1995)

NNK The Nature of Natural Knowledge (1975)

NO Nominalism (1946)

OI Ontology and Ideology (1951)

OME On Mental Entities (1953)

ONAS On the Notion of an Analytic Statement (1946)

OR Ontological Relativity (1968)

ORE Ontological Relativity and other essays (1969)

ORPC Ontological Remarks on the Propositional Calculus (1934)

ORWN Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers (1964)

OW Otherworldly (1978)

OWTI On What There Is (1948)

PL Philosophy of Logic (1970/1986)

PPE The Pragmatists' Place in Empiricism (1975)

PPLT Philosophical Progress in Language Theory (1970)

PR Posits and Reality (1955)

PT *Pursuit of Truth* (1990/1992)

PTF Progress on Two Fronts (1996)

QCC The Quine-Carnap Correspondence (1932-1970)

QD Quine in Dialogue (2008)

QSM Quine Speaks His Mind. An interview by E. Pivcevic (1988)

QU Quiddities (1987)

QWVO Quine/'kwain/, Willard Van Orman (b. 1908) (1996)

RA Responses to Articles by Abel Bergström, Davidson, Dreben, Gibson,

Hookway, and Prawitz (1994)

RC Reply to Chomsky (1968)

RCP Reply to Charles Parsons (1986)

RE Reactions (1995)

RES Responses to Szubka, Lehrer, Bergström, Gibson, Miscevic, and Orenstein

(1999)

RGE Response to Gary Ebbs (1995)

RGH Reply to Geoffrey Hellman (1986)

RGM Responding to Grover Maxwell (1968)

RHP Reply to Hilary Putnam (1986)

RJV Reply to Jules Vuillemin (1986)

RMW Reply to Morton White (1986)

ROD Russell's Ontological Development (1966)

RR The Roots of Reference (1973)

RRN Reply to Robert Nozick (1986)

RS1 Reply to Stroud (1968)

RS2 Reply to Stroud (1981)

RSM Reply to Smart (1968)

RST Reply to Stenius (1968)

RTD Reply to Davidson (1968)

RTE Responses to Essays by Smart, Orenstein, Lewis and Holdcroft, and Haack

(1997)

SCN Steps toward a Constructive Nominalism (1947)

SLP Selected Logic Papers (1966/1995)

SLS The Scope and Language of Science (1954)

SM Stimulus and Meaning (1965)

SN Structure and Nature (1992)

SSS The Sensory Support of Science (1986)

STL Set Theory and its Logic (1963/1969)

TC Truth by Convention (1936)

TDE Two Dogmas of Empiricism (1951)

TDR Two Dogmas in Retrospect (1991)

TI Three Indeterminacies (1990)

TML The Time of My Life (1985)

TR Truth (1994)

TT Theories and Things (1981)

TTPT Things and Their Place in Theories (1981)

VD Vagaries of Definition (1972)

VITD On the Very Idea of a Third Dogma (1981)

WDWD Where Do We Disagree (1999)

WB The Web of Belief (with J. S. Ullian 1970/1978)

WIB What I Believe (1984)

WO Word and Object (1960)

WP The Ways of Paradox and other essays (1966/1976)

WPB What Price Bivalence? (1981)

WRML Whitehead and the Rise of Modern Logic (1941)

WW The Way the World Is (1986)