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The Conception of *stasis* and *pleonexia* in Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings: Platonic Influences and *Bricolages*

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Archéologie et histoire ancienne: Méditerranée

Abstract

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Pythagoreanism; pseudo-Pythagorean literature; stasis; bricolage; Ancient Greece; Hellenistic philosophy, Platonism, scientific controversy.

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Introduction

In the *Republic*, Socrates debates with Glaucon about the way Homer should have created poems which are *simulacra*, unable to represent the true reality of the things. In a series of comparisons, Plato's master tries to undermine the authority of the poet by showing his inefficiency compared to those who have been truly benevolent to their cities, such as Solon, Charondas, Thales, Anacharsis, and finally Pythagoras[1]. The latter appears as a wise and

[1] Plato, *Republic*, X, 599e-600b. Concerning Solon, see Rhodes, Peter John, "The Reforms and Laws of Solon: An Optimistic View," in *Solon of Athens: New Historical and Philological Approaches*, ed. Josine Blok, André Lardinois, (Leyden: Brill, 2006): 248-260; Owens, Ron, *Solon of Athens: Poet, Philosopher, Soldier, Statesman* (Brighton-Portland: Sussex Academic Press, 2010); Kalyvas, Andreas, "Solonian Citizenship: Democracy, Conflict, Participation," in *Athenian legacies: European debates on citizenship*, ed. Paschalis

beloved character who managed to educate his followers and who succeeded in establishing a peculiar way of life dubbed the *bios pythagorikos*.[2] Anyhow, this is the only clear mention of the philosopher from Croton found in Plato's writing, even if thoroughly analyzing the whole dialogues may reveal some references to the Italian community.[3] As far as we know, Plato sojourned three times in Italy and Sicily; his first voyage led him to Archytas of Tarentum, a Pythagorean philosopher who would later be the main *strategos* of his city and a wise leader deeply involved in mathematics and physics.[4] It is surely at this time that he observed the Pythagorean way of life and inquired about it by learning more about its founder, Pythagoras, who had died a little more than a century earlier. Later, Plato returned twice to Italy, and especially Sicily, in order to teach the tyrant of Syracuse, Dionysius II in 367/6 and 361. Both stays in the city took a wrong turn and, the second, time Plato almost got killed by the mercenaries of Dionysius after being jailed, managing to save his life only thanks to the interventions of his friend Dion (the brother-in-law of the tyrant) and of Archytas.[5] This episode clearly shows that Plato was in contact with the Pythagoreans and got some primary information from the leader philosopher of Tarentum.

Therefore, the relation between Plato and Pythagoreanism was already well known in Antiquity. This allowed some authors tell the story of Plato's visits with greater detail, somehow invented or created from what they know about the Italian community and its famous members (such as Philolaus or Timaeus for example, who finally became the alleged main sources of a few Plato's discourses, as well as the Athenian philosopher was sometimes accused of plagiarism[6]). The whole recreation of the character of Pythagoras by the Academy and the Lyceum only blurred the fundamental aspects of the presocratic philosophy, and with the emergence of neo-Pythagoreanism in the 1st century B.C., and later of Neo-Platonism, Platonism and Pythagoreanism finally merged in part.

This mixing can be clearly retraced by examining a special kind of philosophical literature which appeared between the second part of the 4th century B.C. and the last years of the Roman Republic. This corpus has been labeled pseudo-Pythagorean following the groundbreaking work of H. Thesleff, who edited the whole set of texts and fragments

Kitromilides (Florence: Léo Olschki, 2014): 19–36. For Charondas, see Max Mühl, "Die Gesetze des Zaleukos und Charondas," *Klio*, 22, 4 (1929): 432–463; Bruno Centrone, "Charondas de Catane," in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. II*, ed. Richard Goulet, (Paris : CNRS Éditions, 1994): 302-303; Antoine Chabod, "Des héros ordinaires. Les législateurs légendaires grecs en contexte archaïque," *Cahiers des études anciennes*, LVII, 1 (2020): 17-31. For Thalès, see Georg Wöhrle, Richard McKirahan, *The Milesians: Thales*, (Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter, 2014); Dmitri Panchenko, "Thalès de Milet," in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. VI*, ed. Richard Goulet, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2016): 771-793 (with bibliography). Finally, on Anacharsis, see Charlotte Schubert, *Anacharsis der Weise: Nomade, Skythe, Grieche*, (Tübingen: Gunter Narr Verlag, 2010); Jan Frederik Kindstrand, "Anacharsis," in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. I*, ed. Richard Goulet, (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2018): 176-179.

[2] *Republic*, X, 600b.

[3] See the recent work of Philipp Sidney Horky, *Plato and Pythagoreanism* (Oxford: OUP, 2013) and in general the seminal work of Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972).

[4] Bernard Mathieu, "Archytas de Tarente, pythagoricien et ami de Platon," *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé* 3 (1987): 239-255; Carl A. Huffmann, *Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher and Mathematician King*, (Cambridge: CUP, 2005).

[5] Plato, *Seventh Letter*.

[6] This phenomenon is linked to the emergence of skepticism in the Academy, see Gabriele Cornelli, *In search of Pythagoreanism: Pythagoreanism as an historiographical category*. (Berlin – Boston: De Gruyter, 2013): 156–157; Bruno Centrone, "Cosa significa essere pitagorico in età imperiale: per una riconsiderazione della categoria storiografica del neo pitagorismo," in La filosofia in età imperiale: le scuole e le tradizioni filosofiche, ed. Aldo Brancacci (Naples: Bibliopolis, 2000): 155. For additional information, see *infra* n. 46.

scattered in Greek literature.[7] Some apocryphal treaties of this corpus deal with the best way to administer a city and govern according to law and philosophy. They clearly display a Platonic influence, but Pythagoreanism is never totally absent. On the contrary, both philosophies are summoned to create a government which can at least tackle the potential conflict emerging from opposition between the inhabitants of the city. The reign of *stasis*, a state of civil war, occurs for various reasons, depending mainly on the habits of the citizens who may be influenced by their own greed, the *pleonexia*, the will to dominate at all costs. This raises the issue of why these authors decided to theorize *stasis* with both philosophies, and the question of locating the true Pythagorean fragments in their discourses.

Therefore, we should first proceed to a close examination of the treatises which deal with *stasis* in order to show their influences. Then we will focus on the Pythagorean images and the apocryphal name of the writers to show how this kind of literature was acknowledged. Finally, we will explore the hypothesis of a *bricolage* mingling Platonism and Pythagoreanism, which allow this *stasis* to be avoided by using concepts deriving from both philosophies.

I. The Road to Conflict in Pseudo-Pythagorean Writings

H. Thesleff tried to classify the different writings he found in the literature, first, by identifying their authors in alphabetical order. Thus, he was able to gather all the extant fragments and *testimonia* related to those names, even if the evidence clearly shows that most of them are apocryphal. A discourse or a treatise about nature, mathematics, philosophy, or ethics is attributed to a famous Pythagorean, but none of them could have written those texts, which date back to the Hellenistic period (or in some cases, to the last decades of the 4th century B.C.).[8] Eventually, they are all posterior to Plato and, obviously, to the Pythagoreans who were supposed to have written such treaties. A selection in this corpus was intended to analyze only the texts dealing with politics or economy.

A. The Selected Essays

The apocryphal authors mentioning *stasis* and *pleonexia* include Hippodamus of Thourioi, a certain Kallikratidas of Sparta, Kleinias of Tarentum, Lysis of Tarentum, Metopus of Sybaris, and Theages. Hippodamus refers to the architect and urbanist born in Miletus before its destruction by the Persians in 499, who emigrated to Athens and mapped the plan of the Piraeus urban area, as well as the Panhellenic colony of Thourioi in South Italy. Kallikratidas is virtually unknown, though his name recalls the famous general from Lacedaemon who fought at the battle of Arginousae in 406 B. C. Kleinias of Tarentum clearly recalls the name of a famous Pythagorean from the 4th century B.C. who may have been acquainted with Plato and with Archytas. Lysis of Tarentum is probably the best known among them, since he was one of the survivors who escaped from the arson of the house where the community was gathering after a violent rebellion against the Pythagoreans.[9] Of Metopus of Sybaris (or Metapontum), there remains barely a name. The same goes for Theages, who should not be confused with the interlocutor of Socrates.[10]

[7] Holger Thesleff, *An Introduction to the Pythagorean Writings of the Hellenistic Period* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1961).; Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period collected and edited* (Åbo: Åbo Akademi, 1965).

[8] L. Zhmud, "What is Pythagorean in the Pseudo-Pythagorean Literature?" *Philologus* 163/1 (2018): 72–94.

[9] Aristoxenus, fr. 18 Wehrli (*apud* Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 249–250).

[10] Pseudo-Plato, *Theages*; Plato, *Republic*, VI, 496b-c.

Hippodamus is considered as the author of the treatise *On the State* (*Peri politeias*), which describes the best way to organize the city in order to achieve harmony between all its parts.[11] This text is the only one which deals with the threat of conflict on this scale, but the essay of Kallikratidas *On the Wealthy Oikos* (*Peri oikou eudaimonias*; *oikos* means "family unit") is very close to it, but focuses on the familial sphere instead of the State.[12] The other writings deal with virtue and the measure of an individual.[13] Therefore, in this corpus we encounter the different levels of interpretation of the world—from the macrocosm to the microcosm—which are already present in presocratic philosophy[14] and in Plato's trilogy (*Timaeus*, *Critias* and the never-written *Hermocrates*).

B. Conflicts in the City, Conflicts in the House, and Conflicts in the Mind

We should begin with Hippodamus, whose essays remain among the most studied thanks to the important work of A. Delatte.[15] This rather long treatise (compared to extant fragments of other pseudo-Pythagorean authors) may be summed up in five parts:

- The city is divided into three parts: the legislative and decisional (*bouleutikon*), the defensive (*epikouron*) and productive (*banauson*). All these classes are then respectively divided into three subgroups: those who gather in the assembly and create the law (*proedron*), the magistrates and former magistrates (*archontikon*) and the Council (*boula*); those who command the troops and officers (*archontikon*), the best soldiers (*promachatikon*) and the rest of the gregarious army (*stratiôtikon*); the peasants (*geoponon*), the craftsmen (*technatikon*) and the traders (*metabatikon kai emporikon*). The first two parts require a group of leaders to govern the other two subgroups, with one serving as the real active force while the second is rather passive, simply obeying orders. The productive part is submitted to the two previous parts and produces what is necessary to the city.
- All these groups should be organized in order to achieve union and harmony, like a well-tuned lyre (*panteleia lyras*). Discipline, laws, and customs are the three rules to be respected, which are (in order of importance) beautiful, just and useful. If the various parts of the society long for these virtues, harmony will ensue; otherwise, discord and fights will break out (*stasiazousa kai diamachomena*). This can be avoided if passions are disciplined through the education of youths, if possessions and wealth are restricted and limited to what agriculture produces, and if those who govern are virtuous, right, skilled, rich enough to show generosity, and receive honors corresponding to their tasks. Old and young men must share common meals (*syssitia kai syskanias*), be taught by each other, and respect the various associations of the city.
- Manners and customs are essential and must be preserved from corruption. Consequently, the citizens need discipline and education to prevent them from giving up labor in favor of pleasure. Except for trading, foreigners must also be kept away

[11] Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts*, 97–102. While incomplete, a translation of most of the writings is available in William Keith Chambers Guthrie, *The Pythagorean Sourcebook and Library: An Anthology of Ancient Writings Which Relate to Pythagoras and Pythagorean Philosophy* (Grand Rapids: Phanes Press, 1987).
[12] Holger Thesleff, *The Pythagorean Texts,* 102–107.
[13] Ibid., 108 (Kleinias), 116–121 (Metopus), 190–193 (Theages).
[14] This is the case, for instance, of the *Poem* of Parmenides: see Luc Brisson, *Parménide de Platon* (Paris: GF-Flammarion, 1994): 291; Sébastien Charles, "Du Parménide à Parménide," *Les Études philosophiques* 59-4 (2001): 535-552.
[15] Armand Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* (Liège-Paris: Bibliothèque de la faculté de Philosophie et de Lettres de l'Université de Liège, 1922): 125-160.

from the city as they might introduce some change in manners, which risks corrupting them. All three parts should then be concerned about preserving customs at their own level and avoid superfluities which would engender greed (*perissa masteuonti*). Corruption may also come from the inside; therefore, the government should censure the sophists when they profess something contrary to customs, as well as the impious.

- The best government mixes monarchy (but only the divine part of this political system) with far more aristocracy (in which the best men emulate each other) and a dash of democracy for the common citizen (but not too much to avoid the disorder generated by the crowd).
- Nevertheless, a government is submitted to the necessity of nature (*ananka physios*) and belongs to the domain of mortality, unlike the gods. Consequently, a city will go through a complete cycle leading from its development to its decay, since the immoderate greed of men (*hybris*) will finally cause the end of fruition and destruction. Hence, pleasure and accumulation of wealth must be limited.

Here, maintaining an ideal government requires a kind of imaginary organization, which is defended by Hippodamus. Discipline, law, education, and control are essential to avoid disorder and conflicts between citizens who are prone to passions and who seek their personal pleasure and wealth instead of the common good. This state of mind may be compared to *pleonexia*, the will to domination which appears because of greediness and arrogance. Two other famous treatises written in the entourage of Archytas, *On Mathematics (Peri mathematon*) and *On Law and Justice* (*Peri nomou kai dikaosynas*), deal with *pleonexia* which leads to *stasis*. This can be counteracted through a *logismos*—a specific proportion which attributes rightful honors to everyone (depending on their wealth and skills), which has been identified as the geometric mean.[16] Hippodamus also encourages giving honor to the most talented and virtuous, who are best suited to govern the city. We shall return to these concordances later.

Kallikratidas follows the same pattern and applies its recommendations to the *oikos*. The extant fragments may be divided into four groups preceded by a short and meaningful introduction:

- The introduction compares each community to a choir (*choros*) or a ship (*naus*) as a system of cooperation (*systama poti en ti koinon epampherestai, tan sunôdian*).
- Then, the *oikos* is assimilated to a zither (*psalterion*) which needs to be well tuned. A family is composed of two parts, one human (*anthropos*) and the other possessions (*ktasis*), and are similar to the soul and the body for an animal, because the soul/human is primary and uses the body/possessions as a tool. Inside the *oikos* are relatives (*oikeioi*) and kinsmen (*syngenees*), as well as friends. The more a family has friends, the more it will thrive, because friendship (*philia*) is the most important value. Possessions are secondary, though they belong to necessity; but yearning for more and domination (*hyperballoisa*) only leads to the destruction of the *oikos*. The same goes for the city; therefore, the lawmaker (*nomothete*) should limit possessions.
- A family should be ruled according to the mathematical proportion (*analogia*), which refers to a geometric means allowing the wisest to govern. This system is still valid in the city, which itself follows the divine government of the world (in which the gods have the strongest authority according to the geometric means). In a family, the governor is the husband who issues commands to the governed (his wife) and his auxiliaries (the offspring). The divine order is the most excellent thing; the world is thus called *cosmos* and is incorruptible, as are its principles which obviously must be applied

[16] Archytas 47 B 3 Diels-Kranz = fr. 3 Huffmann (*apud* Stobaeus, IV 1, 139 Hense) and Archytas 47 B 2 Diels-Kranz (*apud* Porphyry, *Commentary on Ptolemy's Harmonics*, 10, 23ff.).

in the *oikos*. The husband may rule according to three powers (*archai*): despotic (*despotika*), protective (*kadetai*) and political (*epimeletes/poltika*). The first will destroy trust and engender hate in his *oikos* and is therefore excluded, as is the second, which is only oriented toward the other members of the family. Therefore, political power is the best suited for the pleasure of man and his *oikos*.

- Concerning marriage, a man must act like a professional musician who knows how to sing properly. Consequently, he must marry a woman of his condition, in order not to undermine his authority with a too wealthy wife and fight to regain it (*stasiazein*), or to be despised by an inferior woman. She will obey better if she marries young, because she would be more docile at this age.

All these recommendations suggest a close parallel between the government of a city and administration of the *oikos*. The similarities with the treaty of Hippodamus and with *On Law and Justice* by Pseudo-Archytas are obvious, especially the use of a mathematical proportion to decide on the ideal government[17].

Kleinias' fragment is much more concise. It deals with virtue, which is caused by reason (*logos*), choice (*proairesis*) and power (*dynamis*) and altered by the research of pleasure (*philadonia*), the will to domination (*pleonexia*) through possessions, and the love of fame (*philodoxia*) which drives toward dominating the others. Three essential things counteract these vices: fear (*phobos*) through the law (*nomoi*), shame (*aischyna*) through the gods (*theoi*) and desire (*epitymia*) through reason (*logos*). Hence, teaching piety and reason is fundamental. It stands in close relation to the treatise *On Virtue* by Metopus, who postulates the same tripartition of the cause of virtue. The soul is divided between rational and irrational, with the latter submitted to the former. Virtue depends on the three parts of the soul: thought (*phronesis*), criticism (*kritika*) and contemplation (*theoretika*). A wrong orientation of the soul will lead to vices and disorder because of the excess of pleasure and its corollary, the will to domination (*pleonexia*). Theages' essay is composed of a succession of syllogisms. We will limit our inquiry to its first part. Along with Metopus and Kleinias, Theages lists three virtues, but replaces reason with knowledge (*gnosis*), with all three commanded by the order of the soul composed of reasoning power or calculation (*logismos*), the meaningful *thymos* and desire (*epithymia*). Concord (*synoarmoge*) and virtue result from their common adaptation, but discord (*anarmostia*) appears in case of sedition (*stasiazein*) of one part.

Finally, Lysis's letter to Hipparchus is a famous apocryphal writing which recalls how the Pythagorean Hipparchus betrayed the secret doctrine of the master by teaching it to the multitude. Lysis reminds his peers that the doctrine of Pythagoras should not be received by those who are not prepared and requires an intense preparation. Pythagoreans are not like sophists who teach distraction and misbehavior. Without proper training, the words of the master would be misinterpreted, leading to incontinence and the will to domination (*pleonexia*), and eventually to sacrilege and violence. The soul is thus like a forest which must be purified by iron and fire before it can receive new seeds (*i.e.,* teachings). Lysis ends the letter by reminding Hipparchus that Pythagoras prohibited any teaching in public and that he is the first to disobey the master; if he perseveres, he will be considered dead to Lysis. We will set aside this letter as an element of comparison which seems more historical than philosophical.[18]

[17] Pseudo-Archytas, fr. 3 Thesleff (*apud* Stobaeus, IV, 1, 137 Hense). About the *logismos* and the *analogia* in Pseudo-Archytas' works, see especially Michel Humm, *Appius Claudius Caecus: La République accomplie* (Rome: Publications de l'École française de Rome, 2005): 572-584

[18] A careful study of the letter with a commentary including parallels and bibliography has been proposed by Alfons Städele, *Die Briefe des Pythagoras und der Pythagoreer* (Meisenheim am Glan: Hain, 1980): 154–159, 203–251. Though now outdated (but still offering very useful commentary), see Armand

This overview of the texts brings out some similarities between them, such as the link between the individual, his or her family, the city and the divine order of the world, which creates a kind of entanglement. The main source of conflict, the *stasis*, appears to be the citizens' lack of self-control and their inclination to pleasures instead of to the common good. Individuals long for something more to satisfy their desire for possession and hedonistic habits, which finally push them to the will to domination, the *pleonexia*. On the individual scale, it triggers a conflict between virtue and vice which has consequences in the family, since a man who is unable to temper his pleasure and his greed cannot rule his *oikos* properly and only brings destruction. On the level of the city, such men will never be able to reach a consensus in politics and will yearn for more in order to satisfy their own interests. This will surely lead to discord and conflicts between factions, the *stasis* and to annihilation. The higher level of the gods is sometimes perceived as incorruptible (which allows it to escape the cycle of destruction) or as a perfect example which shows the best way, which men should follow to achieve harmony.

B. Plato's Influence and Pythagorean Resonance

Anyone reading or listening to these treatises in antiquity would have had Plato in mind. The Athenian philosopher pondered the question of the political problem of Athens which faced crisis and threats of *stasis* at different levels in the first half of the 4th century B.C.[19] To solve the problem, Plato would have considered various political systems (some of which he had observed when he was in southern Italy in particular), seeking in their constitution what was best suited for a new city. This choice was accompanied by deep reflection on the role of the citizens in the perfect city, *Kallipolis*, and the creation of the guardians in charge of the administration, who specialized in philosophy. This imaginary project was exposed in the *Republic* and later followed by the *Laws* at the end of Plato's life, presenting another kind of more viable city.

In the *Republic*, *stasis* comes about due to internal dissension between citizens and when factions are struggling against each other.[20] Hippodamus mentions the same kind of dissension when discipline, laws and customs are insulted and when the citizens of the three parts of the city (commanders, defenders and producers) are not able to agree. This finds an obvious echo in the *Republic* when Plato theorizes the tripartition of the soul between rational, irrational and irascible and explains how this conception also applies to the *polis*.[21] As they belong to a class, each individual has to play his or her role in order to make Justice (*Dike*) triumph. In Hippodamus' treaty, education and restriction of wealth are essential to tame the passions (which are the irrational part of the soul, in Plato's words) and avoid greediness. In the *Republic*, the complete state of discord and familial conflicts always comes about because of possessions, resulting from the various affairs of succession between the *oikoi*.[22] Plato's way would be to share goods in common through the institution of some peculiar familial links (*i.e.*, a collective education of all the children who do not know who their parents were). Hippodamus agrees to this point, but he does not go quite as far as Plato, and he restricts

Delatte, "La lettre de Lysis à Hipparque," *RPh* 35 (1911): 255–275. Further indications concerning the letter can be found in Bruno Centrone, Constantin Macris, "Lysis de Tarente," in *Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques, vol. I,* ed. Richard Goulet (Paris: CNRS Éditions, 2018²): 219-220.

[19] On *stasis* and Plato, see Nicole Loraux, *La Cité divisée: l'oubli dans la mémoire d'Athènes* (Paris: Payot, 1997).

[20] Plato, *Republic*, V, 470b-d. See J.-A. Mallet, "War and Peace in Plato's Political Thought," *PJCV* I, 1 (2017): 87–95.

[21] Plato, *Republic*, IV, in particular 441c–444b.

[22] Ibid., V, 464d-e.

possession to what agriculture produces. Trade is a necessity for the city's supply, but strangers must remain far away from the population in order to avoid the contamination of their customs (which in any case is insufficient to prevent the *polis* from being corrupted; it is only a precaution). The same phenomenon is explained by Plato, who reduces the confrontation to a poor-rich dichotomy.[23] As another extreme, poverty is not mentioned by the pseudo-Pythagorean author, whereas Plato tries to tackle this problem by framing the possession of lands between minimum and maximum territories in another dialogue, the *Laws*.[24] According to Hippodamus, conflicts may also be avoided by giving power to those who have the best skills and are wealthy enough. This condition is accompanied by the institution of common meals and interweaves families and classes of all ages. This surely recalls Plato's dialogue to find the fairest political regime, which is close to the aristocracy.[25] At least, the risk of *stasis* is reduced thanks to the conciliation of oligarchy, monarchy and democracy, with tyranny removed—a conviction which has almost become casual in 4th century theoretical literature. However, whereas the *Peri nomou kai dikaiosynas* of Archytas deals with mathematical proportion, Hippodamus does not invoke mathematics to solve the question of *stasis*; it seems quite sure that the pseudo-Pythagorean author is closely following the *Republic* in which the issue of mathematical proportion stands in the background and appears only concerning democracy.[26] Finally, the last section of the treaty shows how corruption will happen anyhow for each human creation and *polis* in particular. This is an obvious reformulation of the discourse of the Muses imagined by Socrates, but without any arithmetical speculation, which is quite strange for a supposedly Pythagorean writing.[27]

I will now turn to Kallikratidas' treatise. As it deals with economy, its sources may not be found directly in Plato but rather in Aristotle, despite differences between them.[28] Nonetheless, platonic conceptions are not totally absent; we will focus on these. The fifth book of the *Republic* stands in sharp opposition with the pseudo-Pythagorean treatise since Plato longs for abolishing casual familial links. Nevertheless, the repercussion of the will to domination may be encountered at each scale. This is also true in Plato whence the importance of the nomothete who will oversee the limitation of possession.[29] Kallikratidas continues by stating that familial conflicts occur when the man who has the power in the *oikos* uses it abusively, clumsily, or when his rank is not equivalent to his wife's rank. Consequently, a mathematical proportion (*analogia*) should regulate each level of the society, which recalls the treatise attributed to Archytas in which the best constitution is the one ordered according to the geometric mean. This is probably a reference to another dialogue of Plato, the *Timaeus*, in which the Demiurge models the world according to the *logismos* (science of numbers) and an *analogia* (a mathematical proportion).[30] The soul of the world follows the same pattern and the entanglement between the *cosmos* and the individual's soul is finally accomplished, thanks to mathematics.[31] Even if the link with the most pythagorizing treatise of Plato is probable, the extant fragments of Kallikratidas do not allow for further specification of the nature of this *analogia*.

[23] Ibid., VIII, 556e.
[24] Plato, *Laws*, V, 744d.
[25] Plato, *Republic*, VIII, 547d ; see *Laws*, VI, 757a.
[26] Ibid., VIII, 558c.
[27] Ibid., VIII, 546a-e.
[28] Armand Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne*, 161-165.
[29] Plato, *Republic*, IV, 441c – 444b; see *supra.*
[30] Plato, *Timaeus*, 31c–32a; see *Gorgias*, 508a.
[31] Plato, *Timaeus*, 36d–37a.

On the individual level, the three writings by Kleinias, Metopus and Theages include a foundational tripartition of the cause of virtue. Discord between these parts leads to internal *stasis*. The mere fact that these treatises deal with virtue and how to teach it (especially in Kleinias) recalls the *Meno*, but the division of virtue between power, choice and reason is rather Aristotelian, with references to the *Nicomachean Ethics*.[32] Those qualities change with Theages (*gnosis*), though Peripatetic influences remain. Finally, concerning Metopus, his tripartition of the soul into contemplative, critical and thought parts is surely borrowed from Aristotle. Anyhow, Theages talks about a *logismos* ordering *thymos* and desire, which can be replaced by *logos* to recognize the Platonic tripartition of the soul. The correct proportion leads to concord, whereas imbalances increase discord and *stasis*.

Platonic borrowings are eventually numerous throughout the whole corpus, though their importance may be better perceived in Hippodamus and Kallikratidas (whereas Kleinias, Metopus and Theages are rather close to Aristotle). Generally, macrocosm and microcosm should be regulated by a proper constitution, sometimes by way of mathematics and a specific mean. One part of the State, the household, or the soul is meant to command the others and seek harmony; otherwise, conflict will emerge, then discord, and finally destruction. However, to be considered Pythagorean, those writings had to display a specific flavor which was not only Platonic.

II. What Makes Pseudo-Pythagorean Literature about Conflicts Sound Pythagorean?

Generally, fragments of pseudo-Pythagorean writings are mostly found in Stobaeus' *Anthology*, a compilation of various sources belonging to Greek literature between the archaic period and late Antiquity, which was written by a Byzantine erudite between the end of the 5th and 6th centuries AD. Each new fragment is introduced by a formula which names the author and provides some information about him (location, philosophy, etc.). Both the fragments and the name may evoke Pythagorean allegiance.

A. Pythagorean Topoi *of the Hellenistic Period*

At first glance, what really sounds Pythagorean is the importance given to music in comparison to the political order. Thus, Hippodamus introduces the harmonious city as a lyre (*lyra*) with technical terms which have been explained by A. Delatte in his study.[33] To sum up his arguments, we meet those words in other pseudo-Pythagorean treaties and some of them in genuine fragments of famous Pythagoreans such as Philolaus. Lately, Iamblichus in his *Life of Pythagoras* mentions those terms as Pythagorean inventions to mix melodies and create a kind of musicotherapy to tame the passions.[34] The mere fact that Kallikratidas uses the same

[32] "Can you tell me, Socrates, whether virtue can be taught?" is the question opening the *Meno* (70a). Socrates ultimately shows that virtue is not reason and cannot be taught (96c-d). Kleinias agrees with Plato that virtue is a good, but the conclusion about its nature is different, because he does not mention divine inspiration as its cause (99e-100a). The reference to "choice" (*prohairesis*) clearly recalls the *Nicomachean Ethics* (I, 1094a), as well as "knowledge/reason" (*gnosis*) (VI, 1139a1-20). Virtue is defined as "power/ability" (*dynamis*) in the *Rhetoric* (I, 9, 1366a38), while it is a "state" (*exis*) in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (II, 6, 1106b36-1107a2), but the different between those two is due to the difference of goals between the treatises. Therefore, *dynamis* is probably an interpretation of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Finally, *Aischyna* is either a Platonic reference (*Laws*, 919e), or belongs to the vocabulary of tragedy and rhetoric.

[33] Armand Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne*, 136-141.

[34] Aristoxenus fr. 26 Wehrli (*apud Anecd. Paris.* I, 172); see Christoph Riedweg, *Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching and Influence* (London and Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002): 30; A. Provenza, "Aristoxenus

comparison clearly shows that it was a Pythagorean *topos* after the 4th century B.C., but music actually belongs to the oldest substratum of Pythagoreanism. According to various sources, the lyre was preferred to the *aulos* for healing, and the master of Croton used to play this instrument in different cases to soothe the men.[35] By extending these effects to the city, it becomes possible to find the correct tuning for the political instrument, which will lead to concord and avoid *stasis*. This theory can be traced back at least to the 4th century thanks to the treatises attributed to Archytas, *On Mathematics* and *On Law and Justice*, where geometric musical means increase concord. Plato was aware of this comparison as he mentions it in the *Republic,* and we cannot exclude that this image was already a reference to Pythagoreanism.[36]

Secondly, Hippodamus insists on discourses of the sophists as a source of deregulation of the city which leads to greed, the will to domination (*pleonexia* in Kleinias and Metopus) and *stasis*. Its closest parallel appears in the apocryphal letter of Lysis to Hipparchus, where sophists are accused of dishonesty and of perverting their young disciples through impious discourses. Even if it may refer to the famous dialogues of Plato about sophistic teachings (such as the *Protagoras*), some elements point toward Pythagoreanism as a very pious philosophical system. Indeed, Aristoxenus explains that the rule of the gods is essential to guarantee justice on the earth and that the existence of the divine should not be denied, for it is impious and triggers an excess of passion.[37] Kallikratidas' and Hippodamus' views agree to this statement. Furthermore, in the same fragment, Aristoxenus underlines the role of the laws coming from the divine and the shame toward the god for the Pythagoreans, which echoes in Kleinias' treatise on virtue. Hence, the importance of the divine order was surely well known and associated with the community of Pythagoras.

Finally, I have already mentioned the role of *logismos* in these treatises and will now focus on its link to *harmonia*. The pseudo-Pythagorean authors often employ this kind of vocabulary: *harmoga*, *synarmoga* and *synarmozein* sometimes appear in relation to calculation and are intended to contrast with *anarmostia*, *pleonexia*/*hyperballoisa* and *stasiazein*.[38] *Synarmozein* is particularly known in Dorian and in pseudo-Pythagorean writings, as well as in Plato's very pythagorizing *Timaeus*.[39] It is no surprise that this notion of harmony was linked to the Pythagoreans, along with the very similar *homonoia*, the personification of Concord whose cult was well attested in

and music therapy: Fr. 26 Wehrli within the tradition on music and catharsis," in *Aristoxenus of Tarentum: Discussion*, ed. Carl A. Huffmann (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2012): 91–128.

35 Antonius Diogenes (*apud* Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 33); Cicero, *Librorum Philosophirocrum Fragmenta*, fr. X 3; Quintilian, *Intitutio oratoria* 1, 10, 32; Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 112.

36 Plato, *Republic*, IV, 443d.

37 Aristoxenus, fr. 33 Wehrli (*apud* Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Way of Life,* 174–6).

38 *Harmoga*: Hippodamus, *On the State*, p. 99, 17 Thesleff (all the following references are from Thesleff's edition); Theages, *On Virtue*, p. 191, 1. *Synarmoga* appears for the first time in pseudo-Pythagorean literature: Aresas, *On Human Nature*, p. 49, 15, 18; Diotogenes, *On Kingship*, p. 73, 18; Damippus, *On Prudence and Good Fortune*, p. 68, 10, 19, 22, 24, 26, p. 69, 2, 12, 19; Euryphamus, *On Violence*, p. 86, 11, 17, 20, 21, 24; Hippodamus, *On the State*, p. 99, 19, 22; Metopus, *On Virtue*, p. 119, 12, 28; Kallikratidas, *On the Wealthy Oikos*, p. 104, 5; Ocellus, *On the Nature of the Universe*, p. 127, 18, 20, p. 128, 4, p. 137, 3, 5; Ps.-Archytas, *On Principles*, p. 20, 4; *On Law and Justice*, p. 33, 17, 26; Theages, *On virtue*, p. 190, 11, p. 191, 15, p. 193, 15; Timaeus, *On the World and the Soul*, p. 207, 22. *Synarmozein*: Diotogenes, *On Kingship*, p. 72, 14, p. 73, 19; Hippodamus, *On the State*, p. 99, 23, p. 100, 21; Kallikratidas, *On the Wealthy Oikos*, p. 105, 22, p. 106, 24; Metopus, *On Virtue*, p. 119, 11; Ocellus, *On the Nature of the Universe*, p. 128, 4, 21, p. 136, 18–19; Theages, *On Virtue*, p. 192, 8. *Anarmostia*: Theages, *On virtue*, p. 190, 14. (much more frequent in Plato's works). *Pleonexia*: Archytas, 47 B 3 D.-K. (*apud* Stobaeus, IV 1, 139); Kleinias, *On Piety*, p. 108, 12; Lysis, *Letter to Hipparchus*, p. 113, 9; Metopus, *On Virtue*, p. 118, 23. *Hyperballoisa* : Kallikratidas, *On the Wealthy Oikos*, p. 104, 27; Ps.-Archytas, *On Good and Happy Man*, p. 12, 11. *Stasiazein* : Hippodamus, *On the State*, p. 100, 7; Kallikratidas, *On the Wealthy Oikos*, p. 106, 17; Theages, *On Virtue*, p. 190, 12

39 Plato, *Timaeus*, 31b.

Southern Italy, especially in the 4th century B.C.[40] This term appears in pseudo-Archytas in relation to the *logismos*, but a synonym, *homologia*, is employed by Theages as the result of the harmony of the three principles of virtue. Hippodamus talks about *homologese* and *symphonos* (along with Theages), which can be considered close synonyms with an additional musical signification. It was a purposeful evocation of the famous principle of the harmony of Sirens (or Muses) which belongs to the earliest moments of Pythagoreanism.[41] This *akousma* makes even more sense if we consider the importance of the *cosmos* in the pseudo-Pythagorean treatises. Its harmony is to be reproduced in the city, in the *oikos* and in the soul. *Cosmos* was supposed to have been a word coined by Pythagoras himself.[42] Therefore, every writing with catchwords related to harmony or the *cosmos* could have been considered Pythagorean, especially after Plato's works.

B. Prestigious Names and Priority Disputes

All the authors of this corpus bear the name of a character who can be securely dated between the end of the 6th century and the first half of the 4th century. Thus, they predate or at least are contemporary with Plato. Obviously, it was intended to demonstrate an apparent anteriority to Pythagorean ideas and challenge the innovations of Plato. For instance, Hippodamus is named as a Pythagorean philosopher of Thourioi, where he was supposed to have settled at the end of the 440s. This information establishes him as an authority since it is true. Besides, Thourioi was set in Southern Italy where Pythagoreanism was officially born, even if the anti-Pythagorean revolt of this time had quite diminished its influence. Hippodamus had a central role in Greek urbanism of the 5th century and created the map of the Panhellenic colony. His works and theories are only partially known thanks to Aristotle, who comments on his theory of an organized city divided into parts which are not only spatial (modular urbanism), but also civic.[43] Indeed, Hippodamus did not plan the *asty* itself, but the entire *polis,* which means that his work was not devoid of political ideas (whether democratic or not).[44] Furthermore, Aristotle mentions a division into three classes—craftsmen, farmers and defenders—which was supposed to constitute the best *politeia*. It was sufficient to assimilate his theory to Plato and to postulate its anteriority. In the same way, Kallikratidas was a Spartan general and the constitution of his city inspired Plato, along with other Doric institutions.[45] Kleinias was Tarentine and may have been acquainted with Archytas and, consequently, with Plato.

Furthermore, biographical details about Plato focus on his work as a mere plagiarism. Indeed, while he was studying with the Pythagoreans of Southern Italy, Plato managed to

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[40] Gaétan Thiérault, *Le Culte d'Homonoia dans les cités grecques* (Lyon: Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée Jean Pouilloux, 1996) : 13-17; Michel Humm, *Appius Claudius Caecus : La République accomplie* (Rome: Publications de l'École française de Rome, 2005), 433-435.

[41] Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 82; see Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science*, 187; Irini-Fotini Viltanioti, *L'harmonie des Sirènes, du pythagorisme ancien à Platon* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2015).

[42] Favorinus fr. 99 Amato (*apud* Diogenes Laertius 8, 48); see Philipp Sidney Horky, "When did Kosmos become the Kosmos?" in *Cosmos in the Ancient World*, ed. Philipp Sidney Horky (Cambridge: CUP, 2019): 22-41.

[43] Aristotle, *Politics* II, 1267b-1269a.

[44] See Brice Gruet, "Retour sur Hippodamos de Milet. À propos d'un mythe moderne," *Histoire urbaine* 21, 1 (2008): 87-110.

[45] Werner Jaeger. *Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture. Vol. III: The Conflict of Cultural Ideals in the Age of Plato* (Oxford, B. H. Blackwell, 1945): 213–262; Anton Powell, "Plato and Sparta: Modes of Rule and of non-rational Persuasion in the *Laws*," in *The Shadow of Sparta*, ed. Anton Powell and Stephen Hodkinson (London/New York: Routledge, 1994): 273–321.

acquire Philolaus' books for a good price and from this material built his own doctrine, especially the *Timaeus*.[46] The acrimonious debates regarding the influence of Pythagoreanism on Plato would stray too far from the scope of this analysis, but it is certain that Hellenistic writers such as Satyrus and Hermippus were eager to accuse Plato of plagiarism, as well as to portray Pythagoras as a charlatan.[47] Even Aristoxenus could have been the inventor of this accusation after he failed to succeed Aristotle.[48] Therefore, the context of the redaction of the pseudo-Pythagorean writings could have been the controversy about what Plato owes to his predecessors. We are in fact confronted with what looks like a scientific dispute. According to the landmark study of R. Merton, science is based on normative structures (universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organized skepticism)[49]; this interpretative paradigm of sociology has obviously been challenged in its structure, because members of a same scientific network sometimes favor a deviant attitude toward the common *ethos*. According to L. Coser, conflicts in general and scientific disputes in particular are fierce because the connections between opponents reinforce group cohesion and tensions end quickly if it happens in an institutional frame.[50] The link between Platonism and Pythagoreanism seems obvious: instead of Aristoxenus, who was apart from the Academy, preference had been given to Theophrastus as the head of the Lyceum (which had scarcely been founded). Therefore, all the necessary ingredients were present to create a controversy where Aristotle's master was implied. Since Pythagoreanism had disappeared as an institutionalized school at the end of the 4th century B.C., we may think that pseudo-Pythagorean writers with no strict allegiances were eager to interact in the controversy by coining apocryphal treaties supposed to predate Plato and Aristotle. It seems quite paradoxical, then, to write about *stasis* while being implied in a controversy. But this shows how Plato's thought about conflicts was significant in the Hellenistic period.

The individuation of Platonic and Pythagorean elements clearly demonstrates what could have been at stake in the pseudo-Pythagorean writings. However, negotiation between these parts had to be coherent and, since philosophy cannot afford a clear consensus to settle the controversy, had to appear older than Plato's writings.

III. The Pseudo-Pythagorean *Bricolage*

To find a coherent philosophical solution to *stasis* was surely not easy after the monumental works of Plato, and the context of the Hellenistic period was quite different from that of the 4th century B.C. A good knowledge of Plato's theories and of Pythagorean *topoi* or writings would have sufficed to create apocryphal writings which sounded authentic. This may be seen as an example of *bricolage*.

A. The Concept of Bricolage

The concept of *bricolage* appears in the major study of C. Lévi-Strauss, *La Pensée sauvage*. According to the French anthropologist, there is a fundamental difference between the engineer and the *bricoleur*, because the first one creates the material to conceive a project, while

[46] The first accusation is that of Timon of Phlius, fr. 54 *PPF* (*apud* Aulus Gellius 3, 17, 6); Hermippus FGrHist 1026 F 69; Satyrus (*apud* Diogenes Laertius 3, 19). See Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science,* 225–227; Luc Brisson, *Lectures de Platon* (Paris, Vrin, 2000): 25-41.
[47] See Hermippus *FGrHist* 1026 F 24; Satyrus (*apud* Diogenes Laertius 8, 40).
[48] Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science*, 226, n. 40.
[49] Robert Merton, "The Normative Structure of Science," in *The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*, ed. Robert Merton. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973): 267-278.
[50] Lewis Coser, *Les fonctions du conflit social* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1982).

the *bricoleur* must use what is immediately available for his creation. Transferred to lévi-straussian mythical thought, this concept helps to explain how myths can be built with what is directly present in the sensible world.[51] Therefore, the development of brand-new material is conditioned by a closed entity. This concept has been debated especially in the sphere of the anthropology of religion where it regularly crosses such concepts as cultural transfer, *métissage*, or hybridity[52]. In any case, most anthropologists agree on the varying origins of the material used by the *bricoleur*, which leads to the conclusion that every thought is the result of a previous construction of diverse elements; in modern religions for example, it means that *syncretism* is prior to any supposed "pure" religion and that its origin is not unique. This is why J.-L. Amselle prefers the term *branchement*.[53]

Without entering this complex debate, it seems rather appropriate to bring *bricolage* into the discussion concerning pseudo-Pythagorean writings. This approach has been proposed for other philosophical-religious movements and phenomena of antiquity, especially for the "Orphics" who did not constitute a unified sect which labeled itself Orphic, but rather a group of individuals sharing the same ideas and religious preoccupations, such as extreme purity. Therefore, all the texts and the attitudes which seemed Orphic in antiquity had something extraordinary or beyond the norm in common, what R.G. Edmonds has called (using Wittgenstein's concept) "family resemblance."[54] It seems reasonable that the same tools may be used to study pseudo-Pythagorean writings.

B. Pseudo-Pythagorean Bricoleurs' *Answer to* Stasis

Hellenistic writers were particularly influenced by Plato and the Academy, by Aristotle and later by Stoicism. According to A. Delatte, Plato's political theory had become quite common at the end of the 4th century and could therefore have been one of the sources of the pseudo-Pythagorean authors, especially concerning *stasis*.[55] We have already shown that the controversy about what Plato owes to Pythagoreanism was well attested in the Hellenistic period. Consequently, it was easier for a *bricoleur* to find what was relevant in Plato, to mix it with what was generally known about Pythagoreanism and to find a significant name for the

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[51] Claude Lévi-Strauss, *La Pensée sauvage* (Paris, Plon, 1962): 26-47.

[52] A cultural object is transmitted to a group or a population which appropriates it, interprets it to give it a new or additional meaning; this is a real metamorphosis. This process of re-semantization is called cultural transfer. See Michel Espagne, "La notion de transfert culturel," *Revue Sciences/Lettres* 1 (2013), online: http://journals.open edition.org/rsl/219, accessed 26/03/2020; Michel Espagne, Mathias Werner (ed.). *Transferts. Les relations interculturelles dans l'espace franco-allemand (XVIIIe-XIXe siècle)* (Paris: Erc/Adpf, 1988). Cultural *métissage* is an acculturation in the case of the definitive borrowing of allogenic elements from a given culture, or a process of fusion of two or more cultures which does not depend on the individuals who make it up. See Serge Gruzinski, *La pensée métisse* (Paris: Fayard, 1999); Jean-Loup Amselle*, Branchements. Anthropologie de l'universalité des cultures* (Paris: Flammarion, 2001). Hybridity is a term coined by Homi Bhabha, using the "third space" theory to describe "a dynamic within which the colonizer's culture and identity are transformed by an encounter that produces the necessity of communication between groups using different languages, cultures, and ideologies". See Carla Antonaccio, "Hybridity and the Cultures within Greek Culture," in *Cultures within Greek Culture: Contact, Conflict, Collaboration*, eds. Carole Dougherty and Leslie Kurke (Cambridge: CUP, 2003): 59. Or more generally, see Homi K. Bhabha, *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994); Antony Easthope, "Bhabha, hybridity and identity," *Textual Practice* 12, 2 (1998): 341–348.

[53] Jean-Loup Amselle*, Branchements. Anthropologie de l'universalité des cultures* (Paris: Flammarion, 2001).

[54] Radcliffe G. Edmonds, *Redefining Ancient Orphism: A Study in Greek Religion* (Cambridge, CUP, 2013): 6–10, 73; Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (Oxford, Blackwell, 1958): 66–67.

[55] Armand Delatte, *Essai sur la politique pythagoricienne* (Liège-Paris: Bibliothèque de la faculté de Philosophie et de Lettres de l'Université de Liège, 1922): 154.

authorship of his writing. The task was made even simpler since Aristoxenus had written a biography of Pythagoras and Aristotle had written a whole book about Pythagorean philosophy.[56] Pythagoras himself had been the victim of an internal conflict in the community which lead to the Kylonian conspiracy, and according to some sources, his flight to Metapontum where he ended his life.[57] However, Pythagoreanism was still thriving at the beginning of the 5th century and many members of the *hetaireia* exercised a certain political influence in Southern Italy. Around 440 B.C. another revolt occurred in the cities of *Magna Grecia* which marked the beginning of a general *stasis* which ceased after a while. Most Pythagoreans had then fled to Tarentum, Lucania or to continental Greece. This was surely sufficient to explain Pythagorean interest in *stasis*.

Furthermore, the personality of Archytas should have played a significant role in this construction. We already mentioned the *Peri nomou kai dikaiosynas* which dealt with harmony and the mathematical mean to avoid *stasis*. Tarentum was considered even by Aristotle a well-administered *polis*.[58] It is therefore no surprise to find its name associated with an apocryphal treaty, or to emphasize the importance of his conception of *logismos* in the various pseudo-Pythagorean writings. All these philosophical theories constituted a closed entity rich enough to create something sounding Pythagorean, with a skillful *bricolage*, to counteract *stasis*. It mingled Plato's *Republic* with other dialogues and discourses, sometimes by affording Aristotle a significant place alongside Plato, and Pythagorean elements which were either invented, or true and documented.

We might see another point as supporting the simplicity of a *bricolage*. Pythagoreanism was not a united philosophy with a system defended by each Pythagoreans.[59] As far as we know, they were not working on the same topics; the conception that "all is number" was a common idea which they all shared is a creation of Aristotle that did not reflect the real interests of all the Pythagoreans.[60] However, this peripatetic explanation strongly influenced later works on Pythagoreanism and for some neo-Pythagoreans, such as Nicomachus of Gerasa or Numenius of Apamea, the original sect and its founder were already deeply engaged in mathematics and working on music and harmonics.[61] It is therefore no surprise to find traces of this unified mathematical Pythagoreanism modeled by Aristotle in pseudo-Pythagorean literature.

It was even easier to make these treatises sound original and coherent by using the Doric Greek dialect. H. Thesleff has noticed that the great majority of the extant pseudo-Pythagorean writings were written in Doric. The archaic structure of the dialect provided an illusion of antiquity and made believe that the content of the treatises predated Plato's works. Consequently, the *bricolage* reinforced the impression that Pythagoras had founded a coherent and unified philosophy, with a succession of philosophers who were themselves involved in mathematics and music. Archytas appeared as a kind of paradigm since he came from

[56] James A. Philip, "Aristotle's Monograph on the Pythagoreans," *Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association*, 94 (1963): 185–198.
[57] Aristoxenus fr. 18 Wehrli (*apud* Iamblichus, *Life of Pythagoras* 249–251; Aristotle fr. 21, 1 Gigon, (*apud* Diogenes Laertius, 8, 46; Dicearchus, fr. 41A Mirhady (*apud* Porphyry, *Life of Pythagoras* 56).
[58] Aristotle, *Politics* 6, 1320b9–11.
[59] Gabriele Cornelli, *In search of Pythagoreanism: Pythagoreanism as an historiographical category*. (Berlin–Boston: De Gruyter, 2013): 55–61.
[60] Harold Cherniss, *Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1935): 390; Leonid Zhmud, "'All Is Number?'," *Phronesis* 34 (1989): 270–292; Gabriele Cornelli, *In search of Pythagoreanism: Pythagoreanism as an historiographical category* (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2013): 138–171.
[61] John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists. A Study of Platonism 80 B.C. to AD. 220*. (London: Duckworth, 1996²): 341–383; Christoph Riedweg. *Pythagoras: His Life, Teaching and Influence*. (London-Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002): 124–127.

Tarentum where the common language was Doric, the dialect he used for his treatises, like some authors writings apocryphal texts with his name. Then, Plato had been in close contact with Archytas and had borrowed his ideas without naming him, just like he had supposedly borrowed Philolaus' theories. This opened the doors to all sorts of accusations of plagiarism against Plato and reinforced the prestige and the impression of authenticity of the pseudo-Pythagorean writings.

Conclusion

Pseudo-Pythagorean writings about *stasis* remain essential to understand the impact of earlier philosophical theories. They are not devoid of any interest, because they give some information about Pythagoreanism or, at least, about how this philosophy was perceived after the 4th century. The treatises display a patchwork of philosophical influences which are the result of a consistent *bricolage*. They may have been written to reinforce the weight of Pythagoreanism in the antic priority disputes on Plato's debt to Pythagoras and his followers, who nevertheless did not constitute a homogenous group. In general, *stasis* disappears thanks to harmony between the different parts of the city, of the *oikos* or of the soul. Some considerations are made concerning education, a cherished theme to Plato.

Peripatetic ideas are not absent and require to be studied further. A formal comprehension of pseudo-Pythagorean writings about conflict may finally be completed by examining in detail each philosophical conception in order to clarify not only this corpus, but the whole pseudo-Pythagorean literature. A. Delatte and H. Thesleff opened the way and recent attempts to understand it are increasing. Finally, these treatises form an essential part of Pythagoreanism, as a phenomenon which enjoyed a particular fame between the end of the 6th century and the Renaissance.

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