**The Intentionality of Speech Acts: A Confrontation between Ordinary Language Philosophy, Phenomenology, and Deconstruction?**

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A critical Notice of Raoul Moati, *Derrida/Searle: Deconstruction and Ordinary Language*. Translated by Timothy Attanucci and Maureen Chun. Foreword by Jean-Michel Rabaté.

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Raoul Moati may have been correct when, in 2009 (when *Derrida/Searle* was originally published in French), he noted that the time has come to revisit the polemical encounter that took place between Derrida and Searle in the 1970s. Furthermore, it might be right to say that scholars can now do this, as Moati puts it, ‘with new interpretative parameters while protecting ourselves from the hasty and impassioned biases that have served too long as a stopgap for an in-depth study of the theoretical issues raised by the controversy itself’ (p. 3). Moati’s book is commendable for reconstructing the Derrida-Searle controversy in a manner that does away with many such ‘biases’. It is, however, questionable, for reasons which I will proceed to discuss, whether Moati’s short analysis of this, as he puts it, ‘confrontation over the performative between the pragmatism of the ordinary [*sic*] and continental thought’ (p. 122) can fully realise the ambitious task of overcoming all such ‘biases’.

The English translation of Moati’s book opens with a foreword written by Jean-Michel Rabaté.[[1]](#endnote-1) Rabaté comments on the place of Moati’s book in his own classification of recent Derrida scholarship, placing it in the category of dialogical works (works that relate Derrida’s work to that of other philosophical traditions). The main part of the book consists of Moati’s introduction, followed by two large chapters. Of these, the first zooms in on Derrida’s article ‘Signature, Event, Context’, while the second discusses Searle’s reply to the English translation of the article, with selections from Derrida’s response to that reply. The book closes with a brief concluding chapter.

Part of the introduction describes how the controversy developed in the wake of the publication of the translation of Derrida’s text in *Glyph*; the rest briefly reviews some of the more polemical aspects of Derrida’s disagreement with Searle, including the relation of this controversy to the analytic-continental divide. A factual error, one that was repeated from prior commentaries, is committed at the outset with regard to the order in which the texts involved in the controversy were published. Moati claims that Derrida’s text was translated in the first issue of *Glyph*, and that it was followed by Searle’s reply, which was published in the second issue of *Glyph*. Nonetheless, Moati is mistaken: Searle’s reply was published, alongside the translation of Derrida’s ‘Signature, Event, Context’, in the first, not the second, issue of *Glyph*.[[2]](#endnote-2) Moati cites Searle’s reply as having been published in ‘*Glyph Review* 2 (1977): 198-202’ (p. 125); these page numbers coincide with the first, not the second, issue of *Glyph*. The second issue of *Glyph* included Derrida’s ‘Limited Inc a b c ...’, which, as Moati points out, was ‘translated by Samuel Weber and published in the same journal’ (p. 5); Moati is unclear here about whether he means that Derrida’s reply was published in the same issue as Searle’s reply (and there is no citation which might serve to clarify this question). I suspect that the source of Moati’s error is to be found in the ‘Editor’s Foreword’ to *Limited Inc* (the book which republished the relevant articles by Derrida, and notoriously not by Searle who refused to grant his permission to republish), which mistakenly states that ‘in its second volume (1977), *Glyph* published a response to Derrida’s essay by John Searle’.[[3]](#endnote-3)

The first chapter opens by pointing out the distortion to Austin’s thought that occurs in both Derrida’s and Searle’s interpretations of Austin in light of a theory of communication, which, as Moati points out, Austin never proposed. Austin’s focus was, rather, on a theory of utterances, and not of communication. Searle’s interpretation of Austin as a theorist of communication, according to Moati, is influenced in this by Paul Grice’s pragmatics of communication. Grice is only quickly mentioned here at the outset, while his influence on Searle is briefly explicated in the second chapter. Moati goes on to summarise some of the basic elements of Austin’s thinking about performatives in order to diagnose a joint confusion in Derrida and Grice, both of whom are seen as unable to clearly distinguish between the illocutionary and perlocutionary aspects of speech acts.

It should be noted here that Moati’s presumptions regarding the reader’s prior knowledge tend to shift in this first chapter. Though he gives only a very brief outline of Austin’s view of performatives, he goes on to expound a detailed introductory account of some basic Derridean theses about writing, presence, and ‘logocentrism’. Yet, by contrast to the foray into introductory material about deconstruction, Moati’s view of the relationship between the Husserlian concept of intentionality and Derrida’s discussion of *intention* is not made precisely clear. Moati writes that ‘intentionality’ is to be ‘understood as the intention to signify something with the intermediary recourse to signs’ (pp. 34-35). The question which arises here is that of whether one can, without more ado, see such an account as being a straightforwardly Husserlian definition of intentionality. There is, it should be noted, no mention of the term ‘intentionality’, but only of ‘intention’, in ‘Signature, Event, Context’ (the text which Moati appears to be explicating here). It is only later, in Searle’s reply, that we pass from a discussion of ‘intention’ to one of ‘intentionality’. Derrida’s reply to Searle points out that this is ‘passing moreover too quickly from intention to intentionality’,[[4]](#endnote-4) a matter which Derrida seems to both consider ‘the most important’[[5]](#endnote-5) and one which he says he will skip.[[6]](#endnote-6) This quick passage from one concept to another seems to also take place in Moati’s text, which perhaps may be said to have inherited it from Searle rather than from Derrida. Moati’s focus on the concept of intentionality does give him an interesting angle on the interpretation of the positions involved in the controversy. Given, however, that a large part of Moati’s argument rests on the partial demarcation between Derrida’s Husserlian, as opposed to Searle’s Gricean, account of intentionality, a sustained, explicit account of the relation between Derrida’s critique of intentionalism and the phenomenological account of intentionality would have been helpful (both to the reader, and to Moati’s argument).

The first chapter goes on to elaborate on Derrida’s problematic of the relation between intended meaning and speech acts. Moati discusses the ways in which Derrida’s particular account of writing destabilises the relation between utterance and context, and thus between intention and act. Rather than being determined by a speaker’s intention, writing is characterised by citationality, i.e. by the impossibility of fixing its meaning by reference to some particular (set of) context(s).[[7]](#endnote-7) Moreover, Derrida’s account of writing (as Moati also clarifies in his subsequent discussion of the replies by Searle and Derrida) is not one which limits itself to one specific part of language (i.e. to the common sense notion of writing) but is a general condition for all communication.

Having set out an account of Derrida’s views on language, Moati goes on to criticise Derrida’s interpretation of Austin. Moati follows Searle and Cavell in claiming that Derrida does not take seriously into account Austin’s distinction between illocutionary (conventional) and perlocutionary (natural) force, subsuming both under a Nietzschean conception of ‘force’ irrelevant to Austin’s account. Ignoring this distinction allows Derrida to read a kind of intentionalism into Austin which Searle can avoid by reference to conventions.

This leads up to Moati’s discussion of Searle’s reply, and of Derrida’s reply to the reply, which are analysed together in chapter two. Here Moati tries to balance out his exposition of Searle’s critique with selections of Derrida’s replies, thus effectively producing the reply that Derrida had not produced. Moati is here at his best and clearest, by contrast with Derrida’s ‘Limited Inc, a b c ...’, whose polemical tone (notoriously epitomised by his rewriting of Searle’s name as ‘Sarl’) tends to overshadow the theoretical issues at stake. Moati explains some of the basic assumptions which disable both authors from understanding each other. The balancing act which Moati undertakes in this chapter constitutes the most valuable contribution of this book, showing, as Moati rightly puts it, that the Derrida-Searle exchange is not ‘a vain quarell’ (p. 122). Rather, what this balancing act amounts to is clearly spelled out in the conclusion, which calls for ‘posing the question of the performative for renewed reflection’ (p. 122). Moati’s view towards ‘a new inflection of the performative in its articulation at the limits of meaning’ (p. 122) seems, however, to put his balancing act aside, betraying a preference for Derrida’s account (already prefigured by Rabaté’s introduction which positions the book on the side of Derrida scholarship).

Following a cue from Rabaté’s foreword, one may point out that Moati takes on the exchange between Derrida and Searle in isolation from its antecedents or effects. He shows little interest in either ‘the genealogy of the confrontation’ (p. xv),[[8]](#endnote-8) or the numerous commentaries responding to this confrontation. It is notable that the latter have played a significant role in shaping the view that the controversy should be seen as a symptom of some purported divide between the ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophical traditions. Moati does not review this literature, with the very selective exception of his mention of Cavell’s questioning of Derrida’s alignment between Austin and Nietzsche (pp. 57-59). Perhaps the reasoning behind this limitation has something to do with Moati’s mission, already mentioned at the outset, of developing a new interpretation of the confrontation that avoids the kinds of ‘biases’ which immediate responses to the controversy may have, in his view, suffered from. Nonetheless, one might argue that a careful examination of the literature, an examination that would demonstrate the existence of, and attempt to explain, such ‘biases’, might have been conducive to their overcoming. Furthermore, as I have shown elsewhere,[[9]](#endnote-9) the kind of examination of the ‘genealogy’ of the exchange, which Moati purposefully eschews,[[10]](#endnote-10) can allow for a clearer insight into the causes of the controversy.

Such insights could have helped illuminate a question that takes up a significant part of Derrida’s debate with Searle: that of whether their exchange constitutes a

confrontation between two major representatives of contemporary philosophy belonging to divergent currents of thought [...] two currents as divergent and irrelevant to each other as continental and analytic philosophy [... e]ach [...] capable of expanding its own space of questions and debates without concern for the problems with which the rival tradition was confronted at the same moment (pp. 1-2).

Derrida and Searle, Moati argues, are ‘each so representative of his own separate philosophical tradition’ (p. 2). The existence and separability of these two (and only two) traditions is simply postulated at the outset, only to be partly destabilised as Moati’s analysis brings the reader to a recognition of common ground. In particular, Moati’s endeavour in the book appears to be one of bridging these two separate traditions by explicating both Derrida’s and Searle’s texts, showing there to be some common ground in the Gricean pragmatic and Husserlian phenomenological conceptions of the intentionality of communication at work behind either thinker’s text. This particular genealogy that Moati’s text sets up aims at showing that ‘[b]etween continental philosophy and analytic philosophy, a bridge emerges, attesting to a whole swath of questions common to both traditions at the same moment of their development, but dealt with using apparently incommensurable conceptual tools’ (pp. 14-15). Thus, Moati seems to be implying that we should not be reading the texts involved in the Derrida-Searle dispute as symptoms of the analytic-continental divide. Rather we need to go beyond such biases in examining the theoretical content that is developed in these texts. He concludes that ‘the richness of this controversy makes ostensible not the insurmountable divergence of the continental and analytic traditions, but rather the wealth and diversity of the discussions of intentionality in the twentieth century’ (p. 119). In other words, once read in a context other than that of the question of the incommensurability between two (and only two) twentieth century philosophical ‘currents’ which go under the banner of ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’, Derrida’s and Searle’s texts turn out to be interesting and informative philosophical disagreements on concepts such as intentionality, performativity, iterability, citationality, parasitism, etc.

This question of the relation of the debate to a divide in twentieth century philosophy might more fruitfully be addressed in a manner different than that in which Moati’s book approaches it. Moati does briefly acknowledge that the question of the impossibility, through their confrontation, of reaching ‘a point of contact between continental and analytic philosophy’ (p. 2) is raised in Derrida and Searle’s texts themselves. It is, indeed, ‘the only point on which the two protagonists of the controversy happen to agree’ (p. 2). The point, however, on which they agree, is not, as Moati puts it, ‘the insurmountable incompatibility of their respective philosophical approaches’ (which may indeed be another point to which they agree, but not quite as explicitly as Moati claims). Rather, to be more precise, Derrida and Searle agree, each for different reasons, that the controversy they are involved in is not, and cannot be, one between ‘two prominent philosophical traditions’ (quoted on p. 6).

To clarify this we need to take one step back from the point at which Moati’s analysis of Searle’s reply begins. As I have pointed out in previous work,[[11]](#endnote-11) there is something enigmatic about Searle’s opening his paper by remarking that

It would be a mistake, I think, to regard Derrida’s discussion of Austin as a confrontation between two prominent philosophical traditions. This is not so much because Derrida has failed to discuss the central theses in Austin’s theory of language, but rather because he has misunderstood and misstated Austin’s position at several crucial points, as I shall attempt to show, and thus the confrontation never quite takes place. (1977, p. 198)

It should be noted here that Searle does not give a name to any of these two traditions, and there is nothing in the context of his remarks that would serve to clarify exactly which two traditions he is referring to. It might, at this point, be jumping to conclusions to imagine (as Moati seems to) that Searle had in mind a confrontation between ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy here.[[12]](#endnote-12) Furthermore, Searle’s wording is kept in Derrida’s reply (though it should be noted, as we shall see, that Derrida also talks of California and Europe, Oxford and Paris, and Anglo-Saxon as opposed to French theories):[[13]](#endnote-13)

if there is only one sentence of the Reply to which I can subscribe, it is the first (“It would be a mistake, I think, to regard Derrida’s discussion of Austin as a confrontation between two prominent philosophical traditions”), although for reasons other than those of Sarl [*sic*].[[14]](#endnote-14)

Moati, like the majority of earlier commentators, overlooks the possibility that Searle’s remark might be read alongside Samuel Weber’s programmatic statement for *Glyph*, which set up the editorial framework for the published version of the Derrida-Searle dispute. According to Weber:

The particular problematization of the representational framework of Western Metaphysics, which we take as our starting point, has been articulated by certain European thinkers – the names of Nietzsche, Marx, Freud, Heidegger, Derrida can serve here as indexes – who, however, were addressing themselves to a “universe of discourse” quite distinct from that prevailing in the English-speaking world. This continental form of Metaphysics, predominantly speculative, rationalist, and idealist, contrasts sharply with an Anglo-American tradition characterized precisely by a critique of such continental tendencies, from standpoints that can be described as nominalist, empiricist, functionalist, and syncretistic [...] in which, for instance, the critique of referential discourse, of the value of truth and of certain forms of subjectivity – all decisive blind spots of continental Metaphysics – have long been integrated into and appropriated by representational thought. (p. xi)

Given that both texts were published simultaneously, it is not completely obvious, from the way either text is written, whether Searle had read and was responding to Weber’s programme for *Glyph*, or whether Weber was writing in response to Searle’s reply.[[15]](#endnote-15) Yet it would not be unreasonable to assume that Searle’s vague reference to ‘two prominent philosophical traditions’ may be made slightly more precise if we see that it is made in the context of a publication which opens with the above lines. Weber’s approach does not talk, in the way that Moati does, of ‘analytic’ or ‘continental’ philosophy, but of these two vague tendencies (which one could, potentially, count as being more than two). Derrida’s response, furthermore, continues in Searle’s vein, using the vague designator of ‘two prominent philosophical traditions’. To be precise, though, Derrida’s reply to Searle does mention ‘Continental metaphysics’,[[16]](#endnote-16) a tradition to which (contrary to Weber’s claims) Derrida stands opposed, rather than as part of.

As Moati rightly goes on to point out, Derrida refuses to concede that his own place is one of being a representative of a ‘prominent philosophical tradition’. Derrida insists both that his own position is close to Austin’s (which Moati perhaps too quickly interprets as ‘equivalent to defending a deconstructive interpretation of the British philosopher’s theory as fully legitimate’ (p. 9)), but also that Searle’s position is close to that of a ‘Continental metaphysics’ (e.g. ‘the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and the archaeology of Foucault’).[[17]](#endnote-17) Whatever one may make of his comments on this, Derrida insists that he is not a representative of this latter tradition, but rather emphasises that he stands in a critical position with regard to it, that he is somehow foreign to it.[[18]](#endnote-18)

With regard to Searle’s proximity to the continental phenomenological tradition, there is perhaps more to be said than what can be contained within the bounds of this critical notice. As Moati correctly points out, Derrida seems to attribute this proximity to Searle on the basis of the former’s purported misunderstanding of the latter’s account of intentionality. This divergence in their accounts of intentionality, which, according to Moati, forms the basis of the common problematic which may bridge the ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ traditions, relies on their having been influenced by Husserl in Derrida’s case, and by Grice in Searle’s case. The fact that Moati ignores the relevant literature on the divide does not help here, since the issue of the possible line of influence between early phenomenology and Oxford ordinary language philosophy has been raised in the context of the discussion of the Derrida-Searle dispute by Kevin Mulligan.[[19]](#endnote-19) According to Mulligan, ‘some of the best-known philosophical problems, solutions, and theses associated with Oxford philosophy are to be found in realist phenomenology and in other parts of the legacy of Brentano’,[[20]](#endnote-20) including ‘Grice’s influential analysis of meaning in terms of what a speaker means or intends by doing something on a particular occasion [which] extends a related analysis given by Brentano’s pupil Marty in 1908’.[[21]](#endnote-21) It is not clear whether Grice had actually known of Marty’s little known work, though it is possible that he may have heard of him through Ryle (who briefly mentions him in one of his many articles dealing critically with phenomenology, a review he wrote in 1946).[[22]](#endnote-22) Apart from the parallels between the work of Grice and Marty, Mulligan lists a number of common features between early phenomenology and Oxford philosophy,[[23]](#endnote-23) including the well known development of speech-act theory by Husserl’s student Reinach (half a century before Austin). Austin himself, as is oft repeated in the context of discussing the analytic-continental divide, thought that one could aptly describe his work as ‘linguistic phenomenology’ (with similar admissions made in different contexts by Ryle, Wittgenstein, and many other philosophers prominently associated with the ‘analytic’ tradition). Through such a historical lineage, Derrida’s claim that Searle is, knowingly or not, indebted to the phenomenological tradition could turn out to be correct.

What difference does this historical lineage, questionable as it is, make when it comes to Moati’s account? It might, first of all, allow us to question whether Searle’s indebtedness to Grice is completely separable from Derrida’s presumption of Searle’s indebtedness to phenomenology. The opposition between ordinary language philosophy and phenomenology may be less clear cut than Moati presumes. According to Moati, Searle inherits from Grice (and not from Austin, whose work is concerned with the study of utterances, and not of communication) a theory of language revolving around ‘the communication of intentions between speakers’ (p. 90). Through a critique of Grice’s view, Searle comes to develop the position that intentions are ‘expressed *by* the conditions themselves’ (p. 90), thus separating his account of intentionality from the notion of presence which Derrida (mistakenly, Moati claims, reading Searlean intentionality as if it were Husserlian) ties to it. Searle’s account of intentionality does not fall prey to Derrida’s psychoanalytic critique of phenomenology: intentions need not be present to the consciousness of the speaker, but need only abide by conventions which the speaker may or may not be conscious of. Moati rightly points out Derrida’s confusion about Searle’s account of intentionality, but in the process sets up an unnecessary and imprecise opposition between ordinary language and phenomenological views on intentionality.

A reappraisal of the relation between phenomenology and ordinary language philosophy might constitute one way forward with regard to the project of visiting anew the concept of the performative. Moreover, it may also allow us to leave behind the stereotypical imagery associated with the idea of a divide between ‘two prominent philosophical traditions’ in twentieth century philosophy. Derrida himself, in a part of his reply to Searle which Moati omits from his commentary on the controversy, seems to have had an alternative image in mind, one which might serve to replace the old conception, as Ryle had put it, of ‘the wide gulf [...] between Anglo-Saxon and Continental philosophy’.[[24]](#endnote-24) In his reply to Searle, Derrida rethinks this idea of a divide by putting to use the Nietzschean Austin that he had conjured up in ‘Signature, Event, Context’, and in particular his conception of ‘force’. Having denied his suitability as a candidate for representing a ‘prominent philosophical tradition’, Derrida nonetheless analyses his dispute with Searle in terms of ‘forces’ and ‘fronts’:

What I like about this “confrontation” is that I don’t know if it is quite taking place, if it ever will be able, or will have been able, quite, to take place; or if it does, between whom or what. Evidently, John R. Searle and “myself” do not sign here, or speak for ourselves. [...] In this simulated confrontation, we are “fronts”. [...] But these fronts do not, as Sarl suggests, represent “two prominent philosophical traditions.” [...] What these “fronts” represent, what weighs upon them both, transcending this curious chiasmus, are forces of a non-philosophical nature.[[25]](#endnote-25)

Derrida clarifies that the particular problems that his own text and Searle’s reply addressed, namely ‘re-production, iterability, citation, translation, interpretation, multiplicity of codes and parasitisms’,[[26]](#endnote-26) are at the surface of a number of ‘forces of a non-philosophical nature’ which underlie the dispute. He insists that he is not able to give an analysis of such non-philosophical phenomena within the bounds of his reply to Searle, though he insinuates in passing that this is related to things like the politics of the University (a theme which he explores extensively in later works), the migration of scholars, ‘geographical bearings in an area which disrupts all cartography - mid-way between California and Europe, a bit like the Channel, mid-way between Oxford and Paris’.[[27]](#endnote-27) Derrida goes on to disrupt the ‘fronts’ involved in this confrontation, in a confrontational manner, by asking whether Searle is ‘ultimately more continental and Parisian than I am’.[[28]](#endnote-28) Moati, who (perhaps justifiably, given the type of project he is involved in) insists on cutting off any reference to extra-philosophical ‘biases’ from his discussion of performativity, has nothing to say about Derrida’s peculiar analysis of this undecidable, shifting confrontation (which is not one between ‘two prominent philosophical traditions’) in terms of ‘forces’ and ‘fronts’.

An exploration of the implications ofDerrida’s unclear use of this conception of ‘forces’ and ‘fronts’ might open up a direction of questioning in which the idea of the existence of two, and only two, ‘prominent philosophical traditions’ is no longer as certain and stable as might have been presumed by Moati. Following this line questioning, which Derrida’s text allows, one may even see that Derrida himself is here ambivalent: despite rightly questioning whether he could represent one of these prominent traditions, he also seems bound to a confrontational approach which leads him to talk of *two* fronts. This ambivalence by Derrida captures an elusive aspect of a divide that seems at once deniable and undeniable. What is perhaps most interesting in Derrida’s view of the divide is that it begins taking into consideration its relatively understudied non-philosophical aspects without, however, having yet undertaken their study. The latter remains, in Derrida’s text, an unfulfilled promise.

Moati’s reading of the Derrida-Searle controversy seeks to focus on the ‘serious’ part of the discussion, which he reads as being primarily about ‘intentionality’, leaving aside the remainder which is rejected at the outset as bias. One of the problems with this approach is that Moati’s transformative reduction of the confrontation into what Derrida considered its surface, does not close the chapter on the divide. Rather it appears simply to presume the existence of these two relatively stable points of reference which go under the name of ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ philosophy. Moati’s apparent attempt to destabilise these points of reference seems to amount to the conclusion that some philosophers who happened to be members of either camp somehow simultaneously happened to have become interested in intentionality. Though the overall discussion of the intentionality of speech acts has its merits and its flaws, it is questionable whether, in the absence of a more careful understanding of the ‘confrontation’ involved, it can give rise to the kind of bridge between ‘two prominent philosophical traditions’ which Moati envisages. On that ‘front’, a lot more remains to be said.

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1. Note that I shall limit myself here to commenting on the translated version. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Samuel Weber, Henry Sussman (eds), *Glyph: Johns Hopkins Textual Studies* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977). [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Gerald Graff , ‘Editor’s Foreword’, in S. Weber (ed.), *Limited Inc* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. vii-viii, p. vii. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Jacques Derrida, ‘Limited Inc, a b c …’, trans. S. Weber, in S. Weber (ed.), *Limited Inc* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 29-110, p. 55. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. ‘But let’s skip that’ (Ibid). [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. Here, of course, one perpetually runs the risk, in attempting to explain Derrida, of thinking that a particular meaning of Derrida’s own writing can be fixed in the form of a thesis attributed to Derrida. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. With the exception, that is, of pointing out the divergence between Derrida’s Husserlian and Searle’s Gricean take on the concept of intentionality. [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. See Andreas Vrahimis, *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy* (Hampshire: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2013), esp. pp. 160-181. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Despite attempting to eschew such genealogies, Moati in fact employs, whether knowingly or not, some of the language used to characterise the so-called analytic-continental divide, when he says of the Derrida-Searle exchange that ‘[a]t first glance their controversy certainly appears to be a dialogue of the deaf’ (p. 2). The phrase ‘dialogue de sourds’ (Charles Taylor, ‘Review: Beck, L. (Ed.), (1962). *La Philosophie Analytique (Cahiers de Royaumont No. 4)*’, *The Philosophical Review*, 73(1) (1964), pp. 132-135, p. 132) was used in a review by Charles Taylor to describe the 1959 Royaumont colloquium, conceived at the time as an attempt at rapprochement between ordinary language philosophy and phenomenology.

    Austin’s presence at the conference might be seen as having been the spark that led to the fire that was the Derrida-Searle controversy; furthermore, Derrida would have a traumatic encounter with a number of the conference’s participants almost a decade later at Balliol College; see Vrahimis, *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, pp. 160-163. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Vrahimis, *Encounters between Analytic and Continental Philosophy*, pp. 175-176. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. For example, as Mulligan points out, Searle carefully avoids using the term ‘continental philosophy’. (Kevin Mulligan. ‘Searle, Derrida and the Ends of Phenomenology’, in B. Smith (ed.), *John Searle* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 261-286, p. 261). [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. Derrida, ‘Limited Inc, a b c ...’, pp. 38-39. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Ibid., pp. 37-38. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. Here the correction pointed to at the beginning with regard to the publication of Searle’s text in the first, not the second, issue of *Glyph*, comes to undermine any potential for certainty in imagining that Searle was responding to Weber’s text. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Ibid, p. 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. Ibid, p. 39. [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. ‘It is because in appearance at least ‘I’ am more of a historian that ‘I’ am a less passive, more attentive and more ‘deconstructive’ heir of that so-called tradition. And hence, perhaps again paradoxically, more foreign to that tradition.’ (Jacques Derrida, ‘Afterword: Toward an Ethic of Discussion’, , trans. S. Weber, in S. Weber (ed.), *Limited Inc* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1988), pp. 111-154, p. 131). [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Kevin Mulligan, ‘Searle, Derrida and the Ends of Phenomenology’, pp. 264-266. [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Ibid, p. 264. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Ibid, p. 264-265. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. Gilbert Ryle, “Review of Marvin Farber: The Foundations of Phenomenology”, in *Collected Papers: Critical Essays*, Vol. 1 (Oxon: Routledge, 2009), pp. 223-232, pp. 225-226. [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. Mulligan, ‘Searle, Derrida and the Ends of Phenomenology’, pp. 264-266. [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Gilbert Ryle, ‘Phenomenology vs. *The Concept of Mind*’, in *Collected Papers: Critical Essays*, Vol. 1 (Oxon: Routledge, 20092009), pp. 186-204, p. 189. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Derrida, ‘Limited Inc, a b c ...’, pp. 37-38. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid, p. 38. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)