Kruks, Sonia. *Retrieving Experience: Subjectivity and Recognition in Feminist Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001.

Lugones, María. "The Coloniality of Gender." *Worlds and Knowledges Otherwise* 2, no. 2 (2008): 1–17.

Ortega, Mariana. *In-Between: Latina Feminist Phenomenology, Multiplicity, and the Self*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2016.

Pitts, Andrea J., Mariana Ortega, and José Medina, eds. *Theories of the Flesh: Latinx and Latin American Feminisms, Transformation, and Resistance*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Sánchez, Carlos Alberto. *Contingency and Commitment: Mexican Existentialism and the Place of Philosophy*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2016.

Sánchez, Carlos Alberto and Robert Eli Sanchez, Jr., eds. *Mexican Philosophy in the 20th Century: Essential Readings*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017.

Sanchez, Robert Eli, Jr. *Latin American and Latinx Philosophy: A Collaborative Introduction*. New York: Routledge, 2019.

When Time Warps: The Lived Experience of Gender, Race, and Sexual Violence

Megan Burke (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2019). 174 pp. ISBN 978-1-5179-0546-0.

Reviewed by Caleb Ward
STONY BROOK UNIVERSITY (SUNY)

Megan Burke locates *When Time Warps* at the juncture between two major developments in feminist phenomenology. First, Burke joins the recent movement in Simone de Beauvoir studies to read *The Second Sex* as a rigorous phenomenology of women's oppression, replacing previous cultural and sociological interpretations with specifically philosophical analysis.[1] Second, Burke identifies their work with the emerging constellation of *critical phenomenology*, which investigates lived realities of oppression by supplementing phenomenology's attention to first-person perceptual experience with "a reflexive inquiry into how power relations structure experience as well as our ability to analyze that experience."[2] For feminists, critical phenomenology marks a shift away from pure phenomenological descriptions of female-bodied experience and women's oppression under patriarchy, mobilizing instead an increasingly interdisciplinary attention to intersectionality and complex sociohistorical interrelations, especially colonialism. While Beauvoir's socially situated phenomenology has inspired many identifying their work as critical phenomenology, critical phenomenology's interdisciplinarity and its critique of the exclusions of the classical phenomenological method put it in tension with the contemporary reading of Beauvoir as a thoroughgoing existential phenomenologist.[3]

This tension plays out in Burke's ambitiously intersectional monograph, which states its aim as developing "a feminist phenomenology of the temporality of feminine subjectivity that discloses how racialized colonial sexual domination is temporally woven into the fabric of that subjectivity" (3). Burke locates the object of inquiry squarely within traditional Beauvoirian feminist phenomenology: *When Time Warps* is about the nature of "feminine existence," which Burke defines orthodoxly as a "constrained mode of gendered embodiment," in which one "lives freedom through men and thus lives a relative existence" (4). Burke's primary innovation is to foreground the *temporal* structure and effects of normative femininity, in contrast with feminist phenomenologists' usual focus on women's bodily comportment in space. Burke's first major claim, supported by an original reading of *The Second Sex*, is that to become woman is to adopt the particular "temporal style" dominated by *waiting*, what Burke calls the "passive present," in which a woman lives a temporality that is not her own (25). Burke argues that the passive present is "the overarching temporality of domination that structures the lives of those who are or are taken to be women in a heteropatriarchal society" (31). This claim seems controversial in light of the diverse forms of domination women experience—an issue raised by many who criticize Beauvoir for overlooking the effects of race, class, ability, and other positionalities on women's experience. Burke takes on board these critiques, however, and responds by locating feminine existence as a particularly white, bourgeois ideal of womanhood: what Burke calls feminine existence is posited as a normative gender, the governing norm of femininity in a society structured by white supremacy. Thus, Burke uses a specialized definition of "women" and "feminine existence" that is fully indexed not only to the oppressive social expectations of normative gender but to the norms of whiteness: feminine existence is the situation of sexualized oppression that plagues cis-, bourgeois, heterosexual white women and at the same time confers privilege on them in the form of "recognition in a heteromasculinist world" (4).

Chapters two and three turn to Burke's critical project, which is to demonstrate that normative gender is produced and perpetuated through histories and present practices of racial domination. Burke argues that white women's gendered existence is inextricable from the legacy of colonialism—including especially sexual violence against women of color: "normative genders are lived and undertaken in the service of racialized gendered state violence that is always sexualized" (44). Rather than trace a genealogy of "woman" in the manner of Denise Riley's classic *Am I That Name?*, Burke sets out from their earlier claim that feminine existence is constituted by temporality.[4] Burke suggests a connection between the linear time of heteronormativity critiqued by queer theorists and the linearity of colonial time identified by María Lugones and other decolonial theorists. Through a detailed and welcome reading of Lugones's colonial/modern gender system, Burke argues that a colonialist distinction between (white, human) woman and (nonwhite, nonhuman) female founds feminine existence and the dominant conception of woman that persists in the present. It follows that sexual oppression against white women imposes the temporality of feminine existence on them, whereas sexual oppression of women of color targets them as animal, as female rather than woman. These divergent "markings" impose divergent effects on the lived time of both those who are taken to be candidates for the ideal of woman and those who are excluded from that ideal.

Chapter three specifies one way in which legacies of racialization shape the temporality of feminine existence,

namely, through the myth of "stranger rape," which Burke claims is identical to the myth of the nonwhite rapist. Burke's fundamental aim here is to show a particular relationship between history and the present actualization of feminine existence in people's lives, namely, that colonial legacies remain central in women's temporality in the form of the "regulatory gender apparatus" of rape myths. The uncomfortable implication for white women—which Burke suggests but does not unpack in detail—is that fears of stranger sexual assault reflect a degree of complicity in the actual historical (and ongoing) violence suffered by colonized and otherwise racialized others. For Burke, it is not a point of counterevidence that women of color might share this fear; they may have internalized the racist imperatives of normative femininity, or they might be sensitized to the intersectional threat posed to them not as women, but as female racialized others.

Burke then shifts to the present, tracing how the violent historical legacy attributed to normative femininity evades detection in everyday life. Chapter four provides a compelling reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's analysis of habit as arising from sedimentation and the anonymity of the past, contending that the colonial history of gender is lived only as an absence: the forgotten history of a habit that hides itself (97). Burke proposes this as an alternative to Judith Butler's notion of gender as performative repetition, which Burke criticizes for underestimating the obstinacy of normative gender. Merleau-Ponty's anonymity describes "the accumulation of a past that allows a particular I to be realized without conscious reflection," which explains how the habit of "normative gender . . . is not lived as habit; it is lived as me" (98). This extends the view of habituation to account for the disappearance of its past: normative gender is a "forgotten habit," not merely a repeated social construct but a sedimentation of "past events, actions, interactions, ideologies, and histories" that enables it to be "deeply personal but yet almost impossible to perceive" (99). The past habituation that leads to present normative gender practices is not something that *has happened to* a subject, but something that has been actively pursued and then forgotten, making those practices especially difficult to resist.

Chapter five uses the metaphor of haunting to thematize how the fear of rape becomes a "constitutive temporal constraint" on women's subjectivity (13). Following Ann Cahill's conception of feminine embodiment as a "previctim" existence, Burke argues that "the fear of rape generates a negated body" (114) through "a continual deferral of [the] claim to freedom" (115).[5] This notion of the "present absence" of rape as the "temporality of normative threat" is compelling as a structuring force on subjectivity. However, it is not evident whether Burke improves on Cahill's account by using haunting, specters, and ghosts as framing metaphors, especially because Burke explicitly dismisses the generative excess that defines spectrality in the work of Jacques Derrida, Butler, and Avery Gordon. However, the temporally circulating character of haunting—the "continual return of the specter" (116)—reveals an interesting reorganizing of the temporality of the "forgotten habit" of femininity discussed in chapter four; it is the persistence of rape as present absence rather than its disappearance that constitutes "previctim" existence. Burke leaves this resonance unexplored, instead arguing (controversially, as I discuss below) that the fear of rape imposes a disruption of temporality akin to that imposed by actual, lived trauma in that it "freezes time" in a passive present (119).

Burke closes their discussion of specters with an engaging description of "feminist ghostbusting" enacted in Emma Sulkowicz's *Mattress Performance*, which exposed the present absence of her own rape and its threat at Columbia University by "making it a presence," and thereby "uncovering the affective, material, and historical conditions that constrain, police, and enforce normative gender" (122). The sixth, final chapter is about further avenues for resistance, setting out from the bold claim that "reconfiguration of temporality" is a necessary condition for ending sexual domination (128). Rather than follow many continental feminist philosophers by focusing on the open potentiality of the present to produce novel futures, Burke argues that feminist politics must renegotiate the affective grip of the past. In particular, the role the past plays in the present must be made "malleable" rather than "heavy" (140), enabling hidden pasts that remain "pregnant with meaning and potential" (104). Burke articulates three possible modes of resistance to achieve this aim, each posed as a "feminist politics of temporality" (128). These include (1) "untimely events"—both Elizabeth Grosz's "virtual leap" that pulls disavowed pasts back into the present and Alia Al-Saji's conception of a "hesitation" that slows down habit and brings the possibility of disruption—(2) Lisa Guenther's conception of "doing time" as a reclamation of temporality, and (3) a queer "habit of indeterminacy" that refuses the sedimentation of normative gender. Ultimately, for this reader, the most promising avenue is that adopted from Al-Saji; each of the others seems to suffer from the same problem of foreclosure—the stubbornness of a "forgotten habit"—that motivates Burke's dismissal of Butlerian performative resistance to repetition.

The discussion of resistance would have benefited from a reckoning with the role of the past in the first section of the book, namely, Burke's earlier claims about histories of colonial domination. If the historical past of slavery in the Americas, for example, is to be refigured by a feminist temporal politics, it will be highly significant *who* shapes the new meanings attributed to that past, particularly who wields power over which meanings of the past are forgotten and which are retrieved. Here a return to Lugones might have served Burke well, invoking perhaps how the decolonial feminist resists by "seeing the colonial difference, emphatically resisting her epistemological habit of erasing it. Seeing it, she sees the world anew, and then she requires herself to drop her enchantment with 'woman,' the universal, and begins to learn about other resisters."[6]

When Time Warps makes a convincing case that temporality is central to normative gender and sexualized oppression, with the upshot that feminist phenomenology should not limit itself to considering the spatial dimensions of gendered embodiment. Burke's treatment of gender norms as "forgotten habits" is especially welcome to

deepen discussions of ideology and habituation, not reducible to concepts of repetition or gender scripts. This is an importantly fine distinction for critical philosophy seeking to overcome the perceptual invisibility of norms of gender and race. Further, Burke should be recognized for performing a feminist phenomenology that puts questions of race and the legacy of racializing trauma at the heart of the analysis.

Unfortunately, many of Burke's insights are overshadowed by unnecessarily stark causal claims that ultimately give *When Time Warps* an aura of unfulfilled promise. For example, Burke is right to locate a shared genealogy between the myth of stranger rape and the myth of the black rapist, but the claim that "the two myths are actually the same myth" is unnecessarily reductive (71). More broadly, Burke demonstrates that "white supremacy and heterosexism shape and constrain the way woman is lived" (116), but this does not justify the claim that "the colonial use of rape . . . *underlies the existences* of those who inhabit normative gender formations" (57, my emphasis). What is it for a historical practice to underly one's existence? And what counts as inhabiting the norm of femininity? Colonialism produces complicated lines of causality, and the experiences of women of color testify to the effects of multiple modes of oppression. The work of Hortense Spillers, for example, would have added another layer of complexity to Burke's explanation of the historical ungendering of women of color.[7] Finally, the closing chapters of the book make much of the analogy between normative femininity and traumatization, including the aggressive claim that "to become a feminine existence is to become a traumatized subject" (119). This claim is certain to rile scholars who examine the uniquely devastating effects of trauma, which Burke somewhat anticipates by describing a survivor of rape as facing "at least a double haunting—that of the trauma of rape and that of the specter" (120). However, Burke appears to double down on this reduction in the final chapter, where feminine existence is likened to the temporal destruction of subjectivity in solitary confinement. For such an abstract claim to be justified, the method of critical phenomenology demands that it be held accountable to the actual experiences of women who have been in solitary confinement.

This last concern points to a methodological tension—touched on in the introduction to this review—that holds back the political possibilities of Burke's analysis. Burke's overarching focus on the temporal structure of normative femininity is true to Beauvoir's project of existential ontology, but it remains overly invested in describing "existence" according to transcendental structures of temporality rather than experience as it appears in life. Burke correctly attributes to Beauvoir the methodological innovation of attending to "the way in which the particularity of the historical and social phenomenon of gender mediates the generality of lived time" (29–30), but Burke overstates the radicality of this innovation, claiming that "Beauvoir argues that a triadic temporal horizon is not a given feature of human existence but is instead conferred by the material conditions in which one lives" (30). However, according to Burke's own account, feminine existence discloses itself within a transcendental framework of immanence and freedom, and Burke's retelling of Beauvoir's feminine existence is located always with respect to *modifications* of the past, present, and future—precisely the transcendental triadic structure of existence that Burke claims to be displaced by Beauvoir's method. My concern is that, despite Burke's political commitments, the transcendental terms of existential ontology prevent Burke's investigation from doing justice to the complexity of the subjective experience in which every situation of gender (and race) is lived out.

To do critical phenomenology with Beauvoir requires examining how the oppressive situation imposed upon women is each time responded to and taken up, always differently and with different affordances for resistance. Claims about the existential structure of normative gender must be checked against lived experience, where gender takes on different guises, and normative femininity is always only one part of the story, domineering though it may be. Burke's wariness of discussing the experience of gender likely stems from concern about the epistemological limits of subject-centered accounts; by sticking to "feminine existence," Burke seeks to avoid an overinvestment in subjectivity as the seat of knowledge and action. This is a principled position, but it overlooks how critical phenomenology is built on feminist innovations that facilitate critique at the level of experience while avoiding dehistoricizing or atomizing subjectivity.[8]

Insofar as Burke demonstrates that Beauvoir's account of feminine existence can be informed by intersectional historical analysis, the Beauvoirian aspect of this project succeeds. However, many of the claims Burke extrapolates from Beauvoir's existential ontology are less plausible for critical phenomenology because they understate the complexity of lived experience and the unruliness of subjectivity, thereby both overlooking the diversity of experiences of oppression and missing how dominating structures retain power through continual adaptation. The promise of critical phenomenology is that it can trace dynamic effects of histories of domination in the register of particular human lives, in which differently situated women experience the world and from which solidarities must form to change it. The problem of resistance in the face of normative femininity becomes less intractable with the recognition that sexual oppression produces harms experienced across a multitude of social positions—as Lugones would agree—even if rape is invested with divergent meanings due to histories of racial domination. Navigating the multiple meanings of different experiences of oppression is where the "'world'-traveling" and "complex communication" Lugones calls for might begin: to "recognize that there is more than one reality and that women cross back and forth between them."[9]

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to thank Ann Cahill, Ellie Anderson, Jenny Strandberg, and Elena Granik for discussions that contributed to this review.

NOTES

1. One of the founding texts of this movement is Sara Heinämaa, "Simone de Beauvoir's Phenomenology of Sexual Difference," *Hypatia* 14, no. 4 (1999): 114–32.

2. Gail Weiss, Ann V. Murphy, and Gayle Salamon, eds., *50 Concepts for a Critical Phenomenology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2019), xiv. See also Gayle Salamon, "What's Critical about Critical Phenomenology?," *Puncta: Journal of Critical Phenomenology* 1, no. 1 (2018): 8–17; and Lisa Guenther, *Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its Afterlives* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013), xiii–xv.
3. See Beata Stawarska, "Subject and Structure in Feminist Phenomenology: Re-reading Beauvoir with Butler," in *Rethinking Feminist Phenomenology: Theoretical and Applied Perspectives*, ed. Sara Cohen Shabot and Christinia Landry (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), 13–32. For an analysis of Beauvoir's method as auto-contesting and hybridizing, contra Heinämaa, see Penelope Deutscher, *The Philosophy of Simone de Beauvoir: Ambiguity, Conversion, Resistance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
4. Denise Riley, *"Am I That Name?": Feminism and the Category of "Women" in History* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988).
5. See Ann J. Cahill, *Rethinking Rape* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).
6. María Lugones, "Toward a Decolonial Feminism," *Hypatia* 25, no. 4 (2010): 753. See discussion in Emma Velez, "Decolonial Feminism at the Intersection: A Critical Reflection on the Relationship Between Decolonial Feminism and Intersectionality," *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 33, no. 3 (2019): 390–406.
7. Hortense J. Spillers, "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe: An American Grammar Book," *Diacritics* 17, no. 2 (1987): 64–81.
8. See, e.g., Linda Martín Alcoff, "The Politics of Postmodern Feminism, Revisited," *Cultural Critique* 36 (1997): 5–27; and Johanna Oksala, *Feminist Experiences* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2016).
9. María Lugones, "On Complex Communication," *Hypatia* 21, no. 3 (2006): 78. See also Lugones, "Playfulness, 'World'-Travelling, and Loving Perception," *Hypatia* 2, no. 2 (1987): 3–19.

Antagonizing White Feminism: Intersectionality's Critique of Women's Studies and the Academy

Noelle Chaddock and Beth Hinderliter (eds.). (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2019). 184 pp. ISBN 978-1498588348.

Reviewed by Shay Welch
SPELMAN COLLEGE

Chaddock's and Hinderliter's *Antagonizing White Feminism* is a timely book, indeed. The purpose of this book is to interrogate the ideology of White Feminism that has long served as the dominant narrative and rigid, exclusionary framework for Feminism, as it is broadly understood; these authors take to task the oppressive—and often suffocating—pervasive attitudes of White Feminists in Women's Studies spaces. In this book, they curate a series of chapters that define, oppose, resist, and circumnavigate these narratives, attitudes, and spaces. This book is not timely for its general project since the insidious narratives and projects of White Feminism have been operative and harangued since before the abolitionist movement. Its timeliness is in its focused response to the sweeping mass outcries of white feminists in the US (and Canada, the UK, etc.) towards the 2016 election of a racist and misogynist president of the United States of America. This book, while mundane and redundant for folks similarly situated to the included authors, is—and should be—electrifying for many of the readers who claim alliance with them. Regardless of how inclusive one thinks their feminism is, many chapters in this book shake the reader into discomfort, at least, and, more likely, a denial to avoid the brutal, but necessary, invitation to (an unwanted) deep existential reflection. If you are of the first sort—good, that's the point. If you are of the latter sort, I suggest you read this book twice.

The chapters in the book are largely narrative and richly contextualized; but I focus on the authors' motivations and goals given the present space limitations.

In "Introduction: Antagonizing White Feminism," Chaddock and Hinderliter demonstrate that a problem with Women's Studies is that this supposed safe space for women enacts "restrictive membership and authenticity management" of who gets to count as a woman (xiii)—and thus, of who deserves protection. As such, Women's Studies is "mono-dimensional" and can often be the most exclusionary, antagonist space where faculty fake-act on issues of race and actively thwart gender spectrum inclusivity. In resistance, they bring forth new tools to "dismantle" biological essentialism and reject exclusionary biases of womanhood in white cisgender feminism (xii). They engage in "Afrofuturistic world-building that dreams the world we need into being" and *conjures feminism* that draws on African American hoodoo and herbalist traditions (xiii). Their goal is to utilize these tools to mark difference as celebratory while extending kinship networks (ibid). They argue that "[f]eminism has been aligned with whiteness as a system of persecution since its inception, and these allegiances must be unlearned so that new forms of radical freedom can be established" (xvii).

In "White Feminism Is the Only Feminism," Chaddock avows that through a series of painful and exploitative interactions with white feminists and Women's Studies, they do not identify as a woman or feminist. They define mainstream feminism as a constructed space meant only for "white Western, heteronormative, cisgender, able-bodied, academy-related, upper-middle-class women" (1) who intentionally bat away questions about, and advocacy for, intersectionality; it is a transphobic and racist space that deploys white women's marginalization to authorize discriminatory spaces throughout the academy. As is the case for many, they exclaim—in a way that I think snatches the whole of the problem—that "I have been rewritten by the very people who claimed to be in sisterhood and solidarity with me and who claimed to be 'people like me'. *I cannot imagine a greater ideological betrayal*" (8, italics mine).

In "Unsettling Dominant Femininities: Promissory Notes Towards an Antiracist Feminist College," Piya Cahtterjee, a Brahmin-*savarna* woman, "unsettles" the role of dominant femininity and transnational caste supremacy in elite white feminism at women's colleges. She examines how caste privilege and the acceptance of white-adjacency can make one complicit in supremacist and feminized logics. Additionally, the empowerment of elite women's colleges frames excellence in cisgendered terms, but as the visibility of queer and transgender movements impress themselves